A Cost Benefit Analysis

61LEGAL IDENTITY FOR INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT

Public demand for legal identitydepends on a rational calcula-tion that compares the per-ceived benefits of obtaining

identity documents to the perceived costsinvolved in the registration process. Indeciding whether or not to register,people ask themselves the followingquestions:

What do I get out of registering? (Orwhat are the repercussions of notregistering?)What does registration cost?Is there an alternative that is cheaperor involves less hassle?

In answering these questions, individu-als generally rely on a subjective analysis,based on the cumulative impact of theirperceptions, impressions, and experiences.If the costs outweigh the benefits, indi-viduals will naturally be disinclined toregister. If the benefits outweigh the costs,registration documents will be desirable.However, if less expensive, more acces-sible, and equally effective substitutes areavailable, many will opt for alternatives.

The first two of the questions listedabove are explored in the precedingchapters, which provide a detailed analysisof the benefits and costs of registering.This chapter focuses on the third question,

ALTERNATIVE MARKETS FOR

LEGAL IDENTITY:

by examining available alternatives. Thesealternatives, which vary in terms oflegality, include legitimate substitutes aswell as documents obtained throughalternative or “black” markets.

Legitimate Substitutes

A wide range of substitutes for legalidentity documents may be accepted inpractice, depending on the intendedpurpose. Legitimate alternatives to identitydocuments vary in their degree of formal-ity. For example, in the rural areas ofBangladesh and Cambodia, governmentofficials, who are personally acquaintedwith members of the local community,are frequently lenient in interpretingidentity requirements, and their ownfamiliarity with a particular family be-comes a highly informal legitimate substi-tute for birth certificates or other identitydocuments. In Bangladesh, local govern-ment officials report that they oftenestimate an applicant’s age if no formalproof is available. In many cases, in theabsence of a birth certificate, a sworndeclaration provided by the individual inquestion or a relative or neighbor may besufficient for many purposes, such asenrolling in school or obtaining socialwelfare benefits.

A Cost Benefit Analysis

62 ALTERNATIVE MARKETS FOR LEGAL IDENTITY

In addition to the highly informalsubstitutes, various formal and quasi-formal alternatives may also be accepted.Among the three countries, Cambodiastands out for its flexible approach toestablishing proof of identity. Cambodia’svarious identity documents are generallyinterchangeable for most purposes. If abirth certificate is not available, often afamily book, lodging book, or NIC willdo.

In Bangladesh, in addition to officialcitizenship certificates, which are governedby the Citizenship Act of 1951, a secondtype of semiformal citizenship attestationis regularly issued by various levels ofgovernment authorities, from city corpo-rations and mayors down to the lowestlevel rural officials. Despite serious effort,this research could not identify any legalauthority governing the provision of thesedocuments, which may explain theinconsistency in the procedures forobtaining them. They are also referred toin different ways: Aside from being calleda “citizenship certificate,” this document

may also be referred to as a “letter ofcertification” or a “certificate of national-ity and character.”

Despite the lack of consistency, thissemi-formal form of legal identity iscommonly used, and is often essentialwhen seeking employment. No support-ing documentation is required, though alocal ward member must vouch for theapplicant. These semi-formal documentsgenerally feature the same minimal per-sonal information, including the applicant’sname, parents’ names, village of residence,and post office, while birth dates are notincluded. More importantly, however,these certificates testify that the bearer isof good character, has not been involvedin any anti-state activities, and that he orshe is a permanent citizen of Bangladesh(though one city corporation attests onlyto permanent residency). These certificatesare usually provided free of charge,although bribes are common.

In Nepal, citizenship certificates arestrictly required to access many of themost important benefits and opportuni-


ties. However, a variety of other quasi-official alternative documents are some-times accepted for limited purposes. Onealternative that is widely used, particularlyin areas that have been hit hard by theinsurgency, is a letter of recommendationfrom a VDC or municipality. These lettersare sometimes, though not consistently,accepted in place of migration certificatesor for school admissions. Other alternativedocuments sometimes accepted in practiceinclude hospital cards, affidavits, andfamily records. Traditional Hindu religiousdocuments, which are prepared by a localpriest, may also serve to establish age sincethese documents note the astrologicalindicators of birth.

Alternative Markets

The existence of alternative markets isperhaps the truest gauge of both publicdemand for legal identity and the barriersto obtaining it. The market price signifiesthe value of the document, in terms ofthe benefits and opportunities it confers,as well as the degree to which the officialsystem fails to deliver efficient services.Thus, the emergence of a thriving alterna-tive market reflects the costs and benefitsof identity documents.

REASONS FOR ENTERING ALTERNA-

TIVE MARKETS

The most common reasons applicantsenter the alternative market are: (1) theapplicant is eligible in principle, butexcluded from the official system; (2) thealternative market provides more efficientservice; (3) the applicant is ineligible toreceive an official document; or (4) theapplicant needs a false document tofacilitate illicit activities. The third andfourth categories capture a graduated scaleof culpability and deceit in terms of theintended use of falsified documents—from illegal migration, to working beyond

mandatory retirement ages, and to serious,violent crimes such as human trafficking.

Some applicants face difficulties inobtaining identity documents due toexclusionary laws and practices, such asdiscriminatory treatment or overly bur-densome requirements for supportingdocumentation. These applicants mayresort to alternative markets because theycannot access the official system to obtainidentity documents, even if they are legallyentitled to do so.

While the alternative market providesrelief to applicants that cannot obtainidentity documentsfrom the officialsystem for onereason or other, thehigh fees it chargesmay render alterna-tive markets out ofreach for vulnerablepopulations.

Despite priceshigher than thosefor an officialdocument, docu-ments procuredthrough alternativemarkets are in highdemand, evenamong those who can obtain bona fidedocumentation. The processes associatedwith obtaining official legal identitydocuments can be discriminatory, inconsis-tent, lengthy, unpleasant, confusing, andinaccessible. In contrast, alternative mar-kets offer relative efficiency and accessibil-ity. Those seeking documents throughalternative markets can count on receivingthem in less time, with less hassle.

In other cases, the alternative marketprovides services to prospective applicantswho are ineligible to receive the documentin question. The ultimate goal of suchapplicants is often to obtain documentsthat are necessary to earn a living. InNepal, for example, the bulk of alterna-tive market activity occurs in the terai

A focus group participant in Nepal re-

ported that she had a child as the result

of incestuous rape. After the child was

born, she decided to leave the country

to avoid the ensuing stigmatization. The

local registrar refused to register the

child’s birth, however, because the ap-

plication did not attach a copy of the

father’s citizenship certificate. The case

went up to the ministry level, but the

authorities refused to issue the child a

passport without a birth certificate. As a

result, the mother was compelled to turn

to the alternative market, where she

managed to get a birth certificate for

NRs 6,000.1


districts bordering India. Indian citizensoften turn to the alternative market toobtain Nepalese identity documents sothat they can conduct business and pur-chase property in Nepal. It is unclear towhat extent the insurgency has curtailedthis interest.

Tibetan refugees also access Nepal’salternative market for citizenship docu-ments and passports and use these docu-ments to obtain work overseas. Interest-ingly, it is perceived that officials aregenerally more inclined to provide fraudu-

lent or question-able legal identitydocuments toTibetans than toIndians. SinceTibetans tend toleave the country,whereas Indiansremain andcompete forlimited businessopportunities,providing falsifieddocuments to

Tibetans is viewed as having a less harmfulsocioeconomic impact on local Nepalicommunities.3

Other applicants enter the market forfalse documents with more deviousintentions, ranging from manipulating thesystem of public benefits to engaging incriminal activities. In some instances,applicants seek falsified identity documentsto take advantage of various benefits thatare otherwise mutually exclusive. Forexample, multiple identity documentsnoting differing ages may allow anindividual to collect retirement or old ageallowances, while at the same time con-tinue to work beyond the mandatoryretirement age. False identity documentsmay also facilitate international travel.

Researchers in all three countries alsonoted the potential connections betweenfalse documents and serious, violentcrimes against the person. In Bangladesh,

for example, fraudulent and counterfeitdocuments are used to facilitate crimes,such as fleeing the country to escapeprosecution and human trafficking.Similarly, in Cambodia and Nepal, traffick-ers often use false marriage certificates as apretense to entice and transport victims.

MODES OF OPERATION

The modes of operation of alternativemarkets reflect the creativity and entrepre-neurial spirit of those involved. Throughcollaborative working relationships, soundincentive structures, and well-organizedprocedures, the alternative markets areable to deliver fast and efficient services.Key players in the alternative markets aremiddle persons or “fixers,” who worktogether with corrupt bureaucrats and/orcriminal rings of counterfeiters to produceillicit identity documentation for a largeand diverse clientele. The falsification ofdocuments that are difficult to replicate(e.g. passports and driving licenses) ismore likely to involve public officials. Theresearch gained some insights into howthese alternative markets operate withinthe three countries by examining reportedcases and interviewing a range of partici-pants, including middle persons, govern-ment officials, and clients.

Alternative markets provide a rangeof services, depending on the client’sparticular situation and needs. The mostbasic service offered simply involvespaying a bribe, commonly known as

An official interviewed at the Commis-

sion for the Investigation of Abuse of

Authority, Nepal’s anticorruption watch-

dog agency, shared that it took him 3

days to register the transfer of a piece

of land simply because everyone in the

land revenue office was aware of his

position and did not dare suggest that

he go through the alternative market.

Had he done so, his documentation

would have been processed within a

single day.2

One researcher in Bangladesh recounts

the story of a man applying for a visa to

visit a country notoriously strict about

issuing visas. The gentleman became

so exasperated by the embassy’s de-

mands to submit various documents,

including a birth certificate, that he pro-

duced both his birth and his own death

certificate to demonstrate the futility of

relying on such documents.4


“grease” or “speed” money, to bypassofficial procedures and get faster docu-ment delivery. Applicants may pay govern-ment bureaucrats directly. However, inmany cases, officials prefer to worktogether with mediators or “fixers.” Eventhough they take a percentage of thebribe, mediators screen applicants andprovide a useful buffer that can serve toreduce risk.

In Bangladesh, those seeking to havefalse identity documents commonly availof the services of middle persons, ordalal. According to a dalal who wasinterviewed, an efficient system hasdeveloped where applicants pay anadditional fee to avoid the hassle of goingthrough the official procedures, particu-larly for procuring passports. The dalalpays the relevant issuing officer, who inturn pays the special branch of the policefor the required verification. Such verifica-tion is generally issued regardless ofwhether the information provided iscorrect or not. While the dalal spokedisparagingly about fraudulent passportsand lamented the country’s widespreadcorruption, it seemed he considered hisown enterprise to be perfectly legitimate.

In Nepal, mediators, who can befound in the vicinity of relevant govern-ment offices, regularly approach prospec-tive applicants to offer assistance inobtaining their desired documents. Thedistrict administrative office (DAO), landrevenues offices, transport managementoffices, and Law Books ManagementBoard (LBMB) are among the morenotorious examples of agencies wheregetting things done through a commissionagent or broker has become standardpractice. A Committee for the Investiga-tion of Abuse of Authority (CIAA)official interviewed explained that evenwhen the middle persons have to resort toofficial formalities, these channels provideefficient service and the client is notrequired to do anything except pay theprice and wait for the result.5

For those seeking fraudulent docu-ments, the alternative market consists ofseveral major modes of supply: (1)producing genuine documents based onfalse information or supporting documen-tation, (2) obtaining and manipulatingpreexisting documents, and (3) outrightcounterfeiting.

A common mode of falsificationinvolves obtaining bona fide identitydocuments on the basis of false informa-tion. Mediators can facilitate this processby ensuring that officials required to signoff turn a blind eye and have sufficientincentive to do so. Providing false infor-mation in anapplication form isfairly straightfor-ward, but produc-ing supportingdocumentation maybe required tominimize the risk ofdetection.

In Nepal,falsified supporting documentation issometimes generated by manipulatingjudicial or translation service procedures.An applicant may file a claim in court,which identifies a third party as possessinga certain status or relationship. The officialcourt documents are then used as proofof the false status or relationship.6 Oppor-tunities to obtain falsified supportingdocumentation also exist in the translationprocesses of Nepal’s LBMB. This schemeinvolves submitting false papers to theLBMB for translation, and then obtaininga certified translation to use as an originaldocument. The LBMB is not equipped tocheck this abuse because it lacks any meansor procedures to ascertain the veracity ofdocuments submitted.

Another common practice in Nepalthat facilitates the issuance of false docu-ments, while reducing the risk of detec-tion, involves removing the complete fileor record of an identity document thatwas issued based on false information or

The most basic service

offered simply involves paying

a bribe, commonly known as

“grease” or “speed” money, to

bypass official procedures and

get faster document delivery.


fake supporting documents.6 This tactic,which requires the involvement of publicofficials, is facilitated by poor record-keeping practices. In a case investigated bythe CIAA, the production of the officialrecord behind the issuance of a citizenshipcertificate was ordered. The concernedDAO responded that the official recordpertaining to the questionable citizenshipcertificate could not be found, although asearch was under way. The CIAA’s onlyrecourse was to direct the Ministry ofHome Affairs to be more vigilant inmaintaining records in a secure manner.7

A second method of falsification is toalter or manipulate preexisting officialdocuments. According to the dalal inter-viewed in Bangladesh, criminal syndicatesprovide what is known as gola kata (orcut-neck) passports. These forgeries relyon replacing the original passport holder’sphotograph with the purchaser’s. Suchpassports often contain unexpired visas,and are bought and sold in the blackmarket.

Similar tactics are also used in Nepal.In the case of HMG v. Som Bahadur Junjali

and others, the CIAA found that apassport with a visa to the United King-dom, which had been used by the originalholder, was purchased and manipulated sothat the purchaser could also enter the

country using the same passport and visa.After arriving in the United Kingdom, thegenuine passport holder sent the passportback to Nepal, where the photograph waschanged and the immigration seal wasdistorted.

Outright counterfeiting of documentsis another frequent method of falsifica-tion. Inadequate security features, like thelack of serial numbers on Nepal’s citizen-ship certificate holograms, make counter-feiting fairly easy. In Bangladesh, however,the introduction of modern technology,such as machine-readable passports, ismaking it increasingly difficult to producecounterfeits of the more heavily regulateddocuments.

COST STRUCTURES FOR COMMONLY

FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS

The alternative market for identity docu-ments is a reflection of supply anddemand. Both the pervasiveness and theprice of fraudulent identity documentsvary, depending on the document in-volved. The research suggests that coun-tries with robust alternative markets arethose where: (1) obtaining identity docu-ments takes a long time; (2) offices incharge of providing identity documentsimpose burdensome evidentiary require-ments as preconditions to releasing thesedocuments; and (3) identity documents arewidely recognized to facilitate access tomore opportunities and benefits. Com-mon examples of documents that meetthese criteria are passports, academiccertificates, and driving licenses. The costof false documents generally depends onthe urgency and means of the serviceseeker, the nature of the document, andthe risks associated with the specific typeof document falsification. Rates tend tobe higher if the document yields signifi-cant benefits or if obtaining it entailsconsiderable risks.9 Due to the illicit natureof the business, prices charged even forthe same document tend to be neither

In 2004, the Cambodian authorities

busted a major criminal ring that pro-

duced counterfeit and forged civil regis-

tration documents. Among the evidence

confiscated were computer equipment,

scanners, and thousands of fake docu-

ments. In over 2 years of operation, this

group provided at least 30 foreigners

with illegal Cambodian passports and

citizenship documents. The group also

issued several land titles and business

licenses, which were fabricated with

such precision that court officials re-

ported that the forgeries were indistin-

guishable from the actual documents

through an eye examination alone.8


uniform nor transparent. However, theresearch discovered anecdotal evidence ofprice information based on interviewingknowledgeable informants and reviewingreported cases and relevant news items.

Based on the analysis of the benefitsand costs of legal identity, it is not surpris-ing that among the three countries in thisstudy, Nepal has the most robust alterna-tive market for identity documents.Identity documents, particularly citizenshipcertificates, are strictly required in Nepal toaccess a wide range of advantages—fromland ownership to employment opportu-nities. At the same time, they are difficultto obtain. Together, these incentives andobstacles to procuring official legal identitydocuments combine to create a thrivingalternative market. Nepal’s alternativemarkets for falsified identity documentsare estimated to generate millions ofrupees.

In Nepal, the cost of false birthregistration reportedly ranges from in-kindgifts, such as alcohol and goats, to cashpayments of up to NRs10,000.10 Pass-ports and letters of recommendation forcitizenship are both significantly moreexpensive and more likely to be falsified,though their prices vary greatly. On thehigh end, the accused in one case investi-gated by the CIAA claimed that he paidover $6,000 for a falsified passport with avisa to the United Kingdom. In a casefiled at the Supreme Court, a foreignermarried and residing in Nepal paid only$200 for a falsified passport.11 AnotherSupreme Court case, which involved staffof the Nepalese Embassy in New Delhi,reported that fees of $900 were chargedfor the processing of falsified passports.12

Reported cases on fake citizenshipdocuments also reveal a wide disparity inprices charged; service recipients paid feesranging from NRs4,000–60,000. In onecase, for example, the accused paidNRs6,000 for a local authority’s recom-mendation for citizenship.13 Cases re-ported by the CIAA indicate that multiple

identity documents are often involved.14 InHMG v. Binod Kumar Sharma, a seniorpublic officer and others were chargedwith corruption for seeking bribes ofNRs22,000 from each of 15 people inexchange for fake citizenship, passports,and migration certificates.15

Compared to Nepal, Cambodia fallson the opposite end of the spectrum interms of public demand for identitydocuments. Since by and large thecountry’s various identity documents areinterchangeable, citizens can generallyaccess the few available benefits andopportunities, provided they have at leastone form of identity. The Government’sflexible approach of permitting the use ofidentity documents interchangeablydiminishes the incentive to obtain identitydocuments, which in turn reduces thedemand needed to fuel a thriving alterna-tive market. Among the FGD participants,only one reported any direct experiencewith alternative markets for identitydocuments. FGD participants could notprovide information on the cost of thesefalsified documents.

The majority of Cambodia’s alterna-tive market activity is concentrated inpassports. This is not surprising since this isthe one document for which substitutesare not acceptable. While FGD partici-pants outside of Phnom Penh were barelyaware of the concept of a passport, those


in Phnom Penh were well informed ofthe alternative market for faster deliveryof official passports. This service, whichunofficial agents with connections topassport staff facilitate, appears to have astandardized, transparent scale of gradu-ated prices, depending on the purchaser’sdesired time frame. Passports are deliv-ered in 1 month for a fee of $120, in 3weeks for $150, in 2 weeks for $170, in 1week for $200, and in 3 days for $250.

In Bangladesh, there does not seem tobe an active market for fraudulent birthcertificates since alternatives are so readilyaccepted. It can be expected, however,that this will change as soon as birthregistration becomes a mandatory precon-dition for accessing benefits and opportu-nities under the 2004 Registration Act.

Increasing technological sophisticationand anti-fraud measures make passportcounterfeiting quite difficult, and has led toan apparent decrease in this activity.However, false passports appear toremain available through illegal manpoweragents, offering package deals whichinclude passports, visas, and employmentabroad. Packages to Saudi Arabia, forexample, are offered for prices ranging

from Tk80,000–125,000. Additionally, likeCambodia, Bangladesh has a well-devel-oped market for the delivery of officialpassports through unofficial mediators oragents. For example, the official fee for anurgent new passport is Tk5,000. However,an applicant can avoid the hassle of theofficial procedures by paying a dalalTk6,500, of which Tk700 or Tk800 isreportedly paid to the officer, who thenallegedly pays a share to the police official.

Challenges in Preventing Alter-native Market Activities: NepalCase Study

The research in Nepal included a thoroughreview of ongoing and reported casesinvolving false identity documents. Itprovides a picture of the challenges facedin government efforts to curb alternativemarket activities.

Nepal has a range of legal provisionsthat criminalize the creation, provision,sale, and use of fraudulent identity docu-ments. Various authorities are responsiblefor initiating legal action against fraudulentactivities involving identity documents.Most cases of fraud involving privateindividuals are subject to prosecutionthrough normal legal channels under theState Cases Act of 1992. Other laws, suchas the Citizenship Act, the Passport Act,and the Country Code, criminalize thecreation, provision, and use of falsedocuments under their purview. TheRegistration Act of 1977, for instance,gives DAOs the power to bring chargesagainst fraudulent acts in vital registrations.The DAO is subject to the procedures ofthe Special Court Act of 2002 and itsdecisions may be appealed at the con-cerned appellate court.16

Also relevant is the Prevention ofCorruption Act, which established theCIAA. The CIAA has jurisdiction overcases of fraudulent identity documentsinvolving corruption among public

A market for Cambodian passports also

appears to have emerged since the Min-

istry of Interior started issuing standard

Kingdom of Cambodia passports in Au-

gust 1995. It appears that the clients of

this market are primarily foreigners. Ac-

cording to media reports, a Cambodian

passport, which officially costs $100,

can go for as much as $2,000. This is

easy money for Cambodians, who can

replace a passport without great diffi-

culty by reporting the old one lost or sto-

len. Westerns appear to be doing the

same thing, but with a much greater re-

ward, as the going rate for an American

passport is $25,000. Other anecdotal

evidence from news reports indicates

that forgery rings charge foreigners up

to $40,000 for Cambodian citizenship

and passports.


officials. In response to sus-pected offenses, the CIAA maytake two types of action: Itmay file charges in specialcourts where the fraud iswillful, or it may refer thematter to the relevant ministrywhere it is negligent.

Despite adequate laws,however, the likelihood ofdetection, prosecution, andconviction for participating inNepal’s alternative markets islow. This is especially so for thefalsification of civil registrationdocuments. The number ofcases filed under the Birth,Death, and Other PersonalEvents (Registration) Act isstrikingly low. Not a single case of fraudu-lent birth registration could be found withthe DAOs in four of the five districts wherethis research was conducted.17 Among thethree reported cases on vital registration filedwith the DAO of Kathmandu, two in-volved birth registration and one marriageregistration. Moreover, only a single case onvital registration could be found in all ofSupreme Court jurisprudence.18

A significantly higher number offraudulent identity cases related to citizen-ship certificates and passports could befound. These cases generally involve theillegal acquisition of documents by meansof providing inaccurate information in theapplication form; submitting false recom-mendations, falsified supporting docu-mentation, or fraudulent signatures; usingfalse names; or producing counterfeit seals.The CIAA has recently investigated andprosecuted a number of cases, thoughtheir overall success ratio remains low.

Despite the fact that the CIAA hasestablished a special investigation unit oncitizenship, passport, and vehicle registra-tion, the trade in fraudulent identitydocuments remains a high-profit, low-riskbusiness. According to key informantsinterviewed, major factors that perpetuate

the production, sale, and use of forgeddocuments are the ease of falsification andforgery, the low rate of convictions, andlight penalties imposed. Some of thechallenges in trying to stem the tide offalse document registration include a lackof systematic record keeping; unsophisti-cated investigation techniques; a dearth ofhuman resources; and the mutuallybeneficial web of relationships amongpoliticians, bureaucrats, and black marketdocument brokers. The low convictionrate is not only a matter of incapacity, butalso one of political will. On severaloccasions, the CIAA has directed thegovernment to take administrative actionagainst violators of registration regulationsto no avail. Informers do not often stepforward in forgery/false document cases.In any event, the punishments imposed aregenerally quite low.

LOW REPORTING

Procuring false modes of legal identitythrough the alternative markets is amutually beneficial transaction between thebuyer and seller that produces seeminglyfew negative externalities. It is, therefore,generally considered to be a victimless


crime. As a result, few cases are reported.Interestingly, those cases that are reportedare frequently due to internal familydisputes over property. Since citizenship isrequired to own property in Nepal,invalidating the grounds for an individual’scitizenship is an effective strategy toprevent one from receiving a share offamily property. Out of the 21 SupremeCourt citizenship cases reviewed, 12involved people who reported theirneighbors or relatives for allegedly provid-ing false information regarding linealdescent in their citizenship applications,thus effectively depriving them of theirright to own or inherit property.

LOW PENALTIES AND IMPUNITY

Further undermining deterrence are thelight punishments imposed for participat-ing in the production and sale of fakeidentity documents. For example, thepenalty for altering a document issued bya government agency is imprisonmentfrom 3 months to 2 years, a fine of up toNRs50,000, or both.19 Similarly, thedestruction of a government document ispunishable by imprisonment from 6months to 1 year, a fine of NRs10,000–50,000, or both. This provision, however,is only applicable in corruption casesinvolving public officials. The forgery ofgovernment documents, not involvingcorrupt public officials, is subject to 1 yearimprisonment. Additional penalties,including fines and increased prison time,may be imposed, depending on thespecific characteristics of the offense. Thepunishment for acquiring or trying toacquire a passport by providing falseinformation is imprisonment of up to 1year, a fine up to NRs500, or both.

Even when harsh sentences arepermissible, they are rarely imposed. Inone case, the CIAA raided the residenceof a local registrar, where they recoveredcounterfeit government seals, registers, andbirth registration forms. Investigators

discovered that the local registrar wasworking in conjunction with other govern-ment officials, including a section officerof the home ministry, to produce and sellfake birth certificates to Tibetan refugees.The CIAA only ordered departmentalaction against those found guilty.20 Inanother case, the CIAA discovered thatthe accused had purchased and manipu-lated a passport with a visa to the UnitedKingdom. The penalty imposed in thiscase was cancellation of the passport anda warning to the immigration officials fortheir negligence.21

Often cases involving false documentsare treated with outright impunity. Forexample, in 1999 the CIAA ordered theGovernment to take action against a localofficial of Siraha district for illegallyproviding citizenship and passports. But asof 2004, nothing had been done. Similarly,in 1997 the CIAA decided to take actionagainst a government official in Chitwan,but this has not been done to date.

BURDENSOME PROCEDURES AND

HIGH STANDARDS OF PROOF TO

ESTABLISH CORRUPTION

Filing charges in fake document casesinvolves lengthy and burdensome proce-dures, including verification of the docu-ments and an inquiry with the concernedagency. These cases are also frequentlydelayed due to the nonavailability ofrecords. Officials involved often destroythe original registration records to obstructinvestigations. Further undermining therisk of punishment is the high standard ofproof needed to establish corruption.What constitutes sufficient evidence ofcorruption is not clear, but the followinganecdotes illustrate that the bar is high.

INVOLVEMENT OF ORGANIZED CRIME

SYNDICATES

This CIAA has found that the market forfraudulent identity documents is highly


organized, based on well-established,mutually beneficial relationships amongvarying levels of government officials and

The Bhaktapur DAO issued 78 pass-

ports without duly verifying the authen-

ticity of the supporting documents. The

CIAA later found that this was not a case

of negligence; the registrars involved

willfully failed in their duty to conduct

due diligence. Yet the CIAA could not

prove that an exchange of money oc-

curred, resulting in an acquittal.22

An assistant level employee, who was

the custodian of 28 passports “lost” in

the process of distribution, admitted to

selling the passports for NRs70,000.

Despite this confession, the court found

that the prosecution lacked sufficient

evidence of guilt, and dismissed the

case.23

ENDNOTES

1 The affected person recounted her story duringa focused group discussion (FGD) held inKathmandu, September 2005.

2 Interview with a key informant working withthe Committee for the Investigation of Abuseof Authority (CIAA), September 2005.

3 Interview with a key informant working withthe CIAA and DAO, Kathmandu, September2005.

4 Shahnaz Huda, researcher in Bangladesh.5 Interview with the chief of the Special Team

on Fake Certificates and False Citizenship andPassports in the CIAA, 22 November 2005.

6 Raj Kumar Shaha vs. HMG Nepal, NKP, vol.7, at 403–406, (1998).

7 CIAA Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2002–20-03.8 2004. The Cambodia Daily. 9, September.9 Note 5.10 FGDs and interviews with key informants.11 Supreme Court (Nepal), writ No. 71, decision

No. 6212.12 Supreme Court (Nepal), writ No. 57, decision

No. 4463, (1991).

external brokers. In a recent case, theCIAA discovered that an organizednetwork, which included brokers, media-tors, and a range of public officials, issuedfalsified passports based on fake citizen-ship and migration certificates. It wasestablished that 15 fraudulent passportswere sold to residents of Darjeeling,India. The CIAA initiated an investigationand prosecuted the case at the SpecialCourt, but failed to convict the defendantsdue to inadequate evidence of bribery.The case illustrates how the alternativemarkets operate through organized crimesyndicates, which makes it difficult topinpoint the actual persons responsibleand the exact modes of operation.Moreover, since those involved includeinsiders, they are able to use sophisticatedmeans to obstruct law enforcementefforts and protect one another.

13 HMG v. Shila Shah Teli et al. (Ongoing case atSupreme Court of Nepal).

14 Interview with CIAA key informant andreview of CIAA case file and Annual Report(2001–2004).

15 HMG v. Binod Kumar Sharma, 2003(CIAA14th Annual Report, 2060, pp. 13–15).

16 Birth, Death and others Personal Events(Registration) Act (Nepal), sec. 15(1), (1977).

17 No cases on birth registration were found inNawal Parashi, Dang, Dadeldhura, and Dolka.

18 This case is related to death registration.19 Prevention of Corruption Act (Nepal), sec. 11,

(2003).20 CIAA Annual Report for FY 2003/04, pp.

63–64.21 HMG v. Som Bahadur Junjali.22 Interview with the concerned investigation

officer of the CIAA, 20 November 2005.23 Note 22.

Documents

A Cost Benefit Analysis