A R T I C L E

A change of government and thefuture of EU–Georgia relations

Salome Samadashvili

Published online: 27 May 2014� Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies 2014

Abstract The decade of the Rose Revolution in Georgia has ended with thedefeat of the United National Movement (UNM) in the parliamentary and pres-idential elections of 2012 and 2013. With this, Georgia has gone through the firstpeaceful transfer of power as the result of democratic elections in its politicalhistory. As Georgia is about to sign Association and Free Trade Agreements withthe EU, further consolidation of its democracy will be a decisive factor in makingGeorgia’s European future irreversible. Following the change of government, thecountry has entered a new and important stage in the development of a moderndemocratic state. With this in mind, this article will review some of the chal-lenges facing Georgia’s democracy and identify the potential threats they poseto the future of EU–Georgia relations.

Keywords Georgia � Democracy � European integration � United NationalMovement � Georgian Dream Coalition � Transition � Association Agreement

Introduction

The efforts preceding the birth of a modern democratic nation can be a messysight for observers and extremely painful for those involved in the process—thepeople of the emerging democracy. Georgia has not been an exception. Sinceregaining its independence in 1991, the country has gone through an armedcoup d’etat and civil and territorial wars, followed by an economic collapse and

S. Samadashvili (&)Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Rue du Commerce 20,1000 Brussels, Belgiume-mail: ssamadashvili@hotmail.com

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years of mismanagement and corruption. After the state was virtually destroyedby vested corrupt and criminal interests, the peaceful and democratic RoseRevolution of 2003 brought to power a political team of young reformers, whohave succeeded in addressing the rampant corruption and rebuilding the state.Though often criticised for their failure to consolidate the democratic institu-tions, the most important legacy of the government of the Rose Revolutionarieswas securing the necessary conditions for the peaceful transfer of power after adecade of their rule.

The parliamentary elections of October 2012 have ushered in a new era inGeorgian history. The Georgian Dream Coalition (GDC), led by the billionaireBidzina Ivanishvili, defeated the United National Movement (UNM) and formed anew government, led by Ivanishvili as prime minister. The defeated party quicklyconceded victory and Georgia has gone through a monumental change—thefirst democratic and peaceful transfer of power in its history. The democratictransfer of power, a rare development in the post-Soviet world, has also been awelcome, if unexpected, development for the international community. Georgiaseems to have accomplished an important precondition for moving forward onthe road towards Euro–Atlantic integration, fulfilling the necessary democraticcriteria.

In November 2013, the GDC candidate, Giorgi Margvelashvili won thepresidential elections with a comfortable margin, defeating his main rival, theUNM candidate David Bakradze. Following the presidential elections, BidzinaIvanishvili resigned from his post and left behind a hand-picked successor, IrakliGaribashvili, to lead the government. Bearing in mind that the volatile domesticpolitical scene in Georgia does not mandate early elections, the currentgoverning coalition is set to lead the country until the parliamentary elections of2016. As an important new chapter in Georgia’s history begins and the GDC isset on a course to consolidate power, it is timely to assess what the future ofdemocracy, and hence the prospects for Georgia–EU relations, looks like.

Politics driven by personalities rather than political parties

The GDC, hastily created a year before the 2012 parliamentary elections, broughttogether political actors with little in common. It includes parties such as TheIndustrialist Party and the Georgian Forum, with their considerable record ofanti-Western rhetoric and strongly nationalistic, almost isolationist attitudes. Atthe same time, the GDC also has some committed pro-Western players, such asthe Republican Party and Our Georgia-Free Democrats. In essence, the GDC wasbased on anti-Saakashvili unity. It lacks both a clear programme of action and anideological platform.

Looking at the polling numbers for the individual parties of the Coalition justa year before the 2012 elections, it is clear that on their own, none of them waslikely to pass the minimum threshold of votes necessary to win a seat inparliament. This leads us to conclude that, while the opportunity for a protestvote played a significant role in garnering support for the GDC, it was not a

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decisive factor. If casting a vote against the UNM was the only motivation forGeorgian voters, they could have chosen to support one or another memberparty of the GDC on its own merits. As mentioned above, those parties offeredsomething to the voters of every political taste: those who believe that Georgia’sfuture should be in Europe, as well as those who think that the Free TradeAgreement with the EU will only destroy national industry and who prefer tolook to Russia for potential markets. Yet, each one of them, taken individually,enjoyed only marginal support.

Therefore, it would be both fair and justified to assert that the defining factorin securing the victory of the GDC was the personality of Bidzina Ivanishvili. Hewas probably aware of this as, instead of giving tacit financial or political backingto the coalition, which is often the preferred way for oligarchs to influencepolitics, he decided to run for election himself. However, the fact that in theseelections Georgian voters decided to place their trust in the personality ofBidzina Ivanishvili, rather than in a political party, makes it clear that politicalparties as such, an important attribute of a pluralistic democracy, are still veryweak in Georgia.

It remains to be seen if the UNM, founded by former President MikhailSaakashvili and now the strongest opposition party, can sustain itself withoutthe strong personal leadership of a charismatic politician. While Saakashvilicontinues to be chair of the party, he has been living abroad since leaving hispost and could possibly face prosecution if he chose to return to Georgia. Thegeneral secretary of the party, former Prime Minister Ivane Merabishvili, wassentenced to a lengthy prison term shortly after the presidential elections of2013. The UNM does not lack political talent, but lacks internal democraticstructures and has been run in a top-down management style. However, itseems to be going through an uneasy process of reinventing itself, not least byintroducing democratic elements into its own structure. For example, thepresidential candidate for the 2013 elections was chosen through primaryelections, and the governing bodies of the party have been expanded to includemore members of the party in order to create space for internal debate. Somesupporters of the UNM feel that these changes have in fact paralysed thedecision-making process in the party and will hinder its progress. Therefore it istoo early to say whether these changes will make the UNM stronger as a party or,in contrast, result in its demise and break up.

The lack of democratic processes also seems to be an issue within thecurrently governing GDC. The election candidates for the posts of both presidentand prime minister were selected unilaterally by Ivanishvili. There has been nodemocratic procedure, primaries or otherwise, to decide who would be headingthe government following Ivanishvili’s departure. The leader of Our Georgia–Free Democrats, Irakli Alasania, a well-respected politician in the West who cantake credit for giving the GDC legitimacy abroad, has, in fact, been ‘punished’ bydemotion from the post of vice–prime minister for discussing his potentialpresidential candidacy within his own party.

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European integration and political parties

There is an ongoing attempt among the political parties in Georgia to positionthemselves along the ideological lines of the main pan-European politicalparties. For several years the UNM has been an observer member of theEuropean People’s Party. The Republican Party of Georgia and Our Georgia–FreeDemocrats have developed a similar alliance with the European Liberals, whilethe GDC has nurtured a relationship with the European Socialists. Thiscooperation is a very welcome development and hopefully will help theGeorgian political parties to learn from the European experience. Specificallythey could benefit from learning how to develop democratic internal politicalstructures and how to bring more clarity to their ideological framework.Hopefully this cooperation will be an important vehicle for strengthening theparties as political organisations that can survive without ‘mega-personalities’such as Saakashvili or Ivanishvili. Stronger links between the Georgian politicalparties and their European counterparts is also important for strengthening EU–Georgia cooperation. It will help to develop important political relationships andstrengthen the capacity of the country to position its interests in Europe. Closerassociations between the political elites of Georgia and Europe, which suchcooperation fosters, might ultimately play a very important part in Georgia’sfuture in Europe.

Uninformed voters

The last elections have once again exposed the preference of Georgian voters foromnipotent leaders—Ivanishvili’s unimaginable wealth, as well as the legendsabout the scale of his philanthropic activities and his implicit promise to use hispersonal wealth for the benefit of all Georgians, has been a decisive factor in thechoices made by Georgian voters. In a predominantly poor society, the lack of amiddle class has made it possible to win the support of voters through ultra-populist pre-election promises, which have often verged on an attempt to buyvotes. A good example of this is the ‘wish-list’ questionnaires circulated at therallies organised by the GDC as part of its pre-election campaign, in which voterswere invited to write down their dreams. Many Georgian voters filled them withtheir dreams of washing machines, cars, refrigerators and apartments. It seemedthat a considerable number of voters were confusing the political leaders withfairies, exposing just how low the level of political and civic culture is amongstthe population.

While Bidzina Ivanishvili warned from the outset of his debut on the politicalscene that he would leave politics after just one or two years, it seems that theoverwhelming majority of Georgians assumed that this was not true. When hedid resign from his post, the majority of GDC supporters believed that he shouldhave stayed and now feel reassured by the assertion that he continues to makevital decisions concerning the future of the country from his informal position. Ina demonstration of their strong trust in Ivanishvili’s choices, Georgians elected

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his choice for the post of president, current President George Margvelashvili,who was largely unknown to the Georgian public prior to the elections.Ivanishvili’s selection for the post of prime minister was also surprising. Ratherthan trusting one of the relatively experienced politicians from the coalition,Ivanishvili placed his trust in a political novice and close business associate, IrakliGaribashvili. This was also accepted by the GDC supporters, who clearly believethat Ivanishvili knows best. His choice of a close associate for the post of primeminister only proved to them that Ivanishvili continues to run the show. The factthat the majority of Georgians accept that their country can be governed fromoutside the realm of accountability given by public office is very worrying. Thisclearly demonstrates the lack of understanding of the democratic institutionsamong voters and also the lack of political culture.

In the context of Georgia’s European future, it once again proves the need tomobilise substantial resources to increase the public’s awareness of theexpectations set for political leaders in a democracy. While even in developeddemocratic European countries voters are not averse to it, in developing andpoor states, like Georgia, it seems that popular opinion can be even more easilymanipulated by populist rhetoric which does not pretend to create even theslightest hint of a responsible party platform.

Constitutional model

Georgia has undergone another important change with the latest elections—achange in its constitutional model of governance from a presidential to aparliamentary republic. Weathering the challenges posed by these importantinstitutional changes will be an important stage in the consolidation of itsdemocracy. The governance of the UNM was widely criticised for the absence ofa strong parliamentary role—with the UNM having a comfortable constitutionalmajority, it rushed desired legislation through the Parliament at lightning speed.Often this was important for the speedy reinforcement of reforms, which werevital on many fronts following the Rose Revolution. However, it also createdample opportunity to tamper with the system of checks and balances neededfor an adequate legislative process and democratic government.

The new constitutional model, which was adopted under the UNM’s rule, andhas entered into force under its successor, presents an important opportunity toaddress this shortcoming, by increasing the powers of the Parliament vis-a-visthe executive branch. The fact that the GDC has not managed to garner aconstitutional majority in this parliament is a welcome development forGeorgian democracy. However there is confusion and a lack of coordination inthe governing coalition with respect to the legislative agenda. A closer look atthe ongoing political process clearly shows that the prime minister seems keento concentrate the power in his own hands and further curtail the already-limited functions of the president. It is also clear that there is an internal powerstruggle occurring within the coalition to claim the credit for the reforminitiatives. There are also proposals for further constitutional amendments. It is

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likely that the different players of the GDC will be pushing their own agendasthrough regarding the proposed changes. What kind of obstacles this will create,both for the consolidation of democracy, but also for the speedy enforcement ofthe reforms necessary for fulfilling the EU–Georgia agenda, is hard to say.

What one can assert with objectivity at this point is that clearly the newGeorgian government does not have the same well-oiled machinery for gettingreform initiatives through the legislative process as its predecessor. As Georgiamoves forward on its path towards European integration it will requiresubstantial support from the EU to address these problems. Considering thevolume of legislative work that the Georgian Parliament must implement inorder to secure harmonisation and approximation with the EU acquis, thelegislative process has to run smoothly. The government needs to have bettercoordination in this regard and could also use assistance from the EU with this,as well as with reforming the state institutions and agencies in order tostreamline their work with the new constitutional model.

Xenophobic and homophobic public attitudes, the role of the GeorgianChurch

One of the most unwelcome developments in the election campaign of the GDCwas its pronounced xenophobic and homophobic rhetoric. The UNM govern-ment worked hard to develop the modern notion of citizenship, inclusive ofethnic and religious minorities. Unfortunately this trend has been reversed underthe new government, and it has failed to prevent several instances ofinfringements of citizens’ religious rights in the regions of Georgia withsubstantial Muslim populations. Given the widespread homophobic attitudes inthe country, gay rights is an issue that has always been controversial. HowGeorgia will rise to the challenge of adopting a law on non-discrimination, whichwill also apply to gay rights, remains to be seen. While the head of Georgia’sOrthodox Church, Patriarch Ilia II has always been publicly very supportive ofGeorgia’s European future, many representatives of the Georgian Church usestrongly anti-Western rhetoric. It is safe to say that at least a considerable part ofthe Georgian Church subscribes to the conservative, Orthodox ideological base,which has been consciously cultivated by the current Russian leadership as anideological counterweight to liberal Western traditions. Considering the enor-mous authority the Orthodox Church wields in Georgia, its position on the futureof EU–Georgia relations will play a significant role in public opinion regardingGeorgia’s European future. It is important for the EU to work closely with theGeorgian authorities, as well as civil society and the media, to develop anoutreach programme that takes into consideration the enormous moralauthority and public trust enjoyed by the Church.

As Russia is deploying its ‘soft power’ tools in order to rebuild ties with theformer Soviet republics, it is important that the EU should find a way to reachout to the hearts and minds of Georgian citizens, retaining their support for afuture with Europe. Russia’s most recent aggression in Ukraine has derailed any

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progress it had made to rebuild its relationship with the neighbours. It has alsodestroyed the nonsensical foreign policy promise made by the currentgoverning coalition in Georgia that through successful diplomacy it would bepossible to convince Russia that Georgia’s Euro–Atlantic aspirations are notdirected against Russia. The West’s reaction to Russian aggression in Georgia, aswell as Ukraine, has also exposed its weaknesses vis-a-vis Russia. Russia is notlikely to give up its dominion in the South Caucasus easily and Georgia willcontinue to be its main target.

EU–Georgia relations

As far as EU integration is concerned, the inheritance of a new Georgiangovernment is excellent news. By the parliamentary elections of 2012, thenegotiations with the EU on the future framework of cooperation had almostclosed. The GDC has taken over where the UNM left off, has completed thenegotiations on the Association and Deep and Comprehensive Free TradeAgreements (DCFTA), and is preparing to sign them in the summer of 2014.

Looking forward, however, the new government needs to retain strong publicsupport for Georgia’s future in the EU. While Georgians overwhelmingly supportthe European choice, it is important to ensure that they see, sooner rather thanlater, the benefits of closer political and economic cooperation with the EU. Inthis respect there are three areas which need to be highlighted: economicbenefits, mobility and wide public outreach.

The economic benefits of the DCFTA for the Georgian population will not bedelivered immediately. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a clear and efficientplan for deploying the DCFTA as soon as possible. So far the governing coalitionhas failed to produce a vision that is relevant in this regard—it seems to beconsumed with both internal power struggles and a continuing campaignagainst the party it defeated in the elections, the UNM.

Conclusion

While the peaceful transfer of power has made it clear that Georgia hasgraduated to the next level of its democratic development, it has also exposedthe immaturity of the country’s democratic traditions and institutions. AsGeorgia signs the Association and Free Trade Agreements with the EU, it isimportant that the pro-Western political forces in Georgia, both in the newgovernment and in the UNM, continue to work together to address theseshortcomings. The EU needs to make support of further consolidation ofdemocracy in Georgia the key priority area of assistance and cooperation. Inorder to demonstrate how closer Georgia–EU cooperation would benefitcitizens, it is also important to ensure that an agreement on visa-free travelbetween Georgia and the EU is reached as soon as possible. If Georgian citizensfind it impossible to travel to EU member states due to cumbersome visa

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restrictions, it will be difficult to convince them that EU–Georgia relations areadvancing.

As the pressure from Russia is likely to increase in order to derail theadvancement of Georgia’s democratic and European future, the EU and pro-Western political players in Georgia must make sure that the fear of Russia anddisappointment due to Europe’s perceived weaknesses are not exploited todraw the support of Georgian citizens away from their Western future. This, inturn, requires all the shortcomings of the Georgian democracy, as described inthis article, to be addressed.

Ambassador Salome Samadashvili was the Head of Georgia’s Mission tothe European Union from 2006 to 2013. She was a member of the GeorgianParliament and Deputy Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee in 2004–5.Since November 2013 she has been a visiting fellow at the Wilfried MartensCentre for European Studies.

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