9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq

Prof. Theo FarrellDept of War StudiesKing’s College London

Content

9/11 and Al Qaeda 2001-2002 Afghanistan War The Bush Doctrine 2003 Iraq War The Logic of Prevention

The bad guys

Al Qaeda’s record

bombing of World Trade Center (1993)

attempt to destroy 11 Jumbo’s (1995)

bombing of US facilities in Riyadh (1995) & Dhahran (1996), killing 26 and injuring 540

embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 (1998)

attack on USS Cole (2000)

Impact of 9/11

Blair on 9/11 (March 2004)

September 11 was for me a revelation

If the 20th century scripted ourconventional way of thinking, the 21st

century is unconventional in almostevery respect. This is true also of oursecurity.

Terrorism and public fear

involuntary exposure- cars kill more than terrorists- terrorism is beyond our control

unfamiliarity- Malaria (kills 1m each year) v Ebola (killed 891 since 1976)– Sept01 anthrax attack on US closes down DC but only kills 5

The New Terrorists

Smarter

More agile

More lethal

Al Qaeda’s strategy

1. Bleeding wars

2. Building safe havens and franchises (AQI, AQIM, Hamas)

3. Raids on the West

Bruce Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda

GWOT: the opening campaign

“War on Terrorism”: Bush address to nation on 11 Sept.

Rumsfeld orders JCS to draw up military options on 12 Sept.

CENTCOM plan approved 2 Oct and Op Enduring Freedom begins 7 Oct

CENTCOM uses the CIA plan

JCS plans (13-15 Sept)(a) cruise missile attacks(b) longer bombing campaign(c) large-scale invasion

CIA plan: US airpower, SOF teams + local Afghan allies

Op Enduring Freedom

1. Coalition air offensive (7-19 Oct)

2. US/UK supported NA offensive in North (late Oct–Nov 2001)

3. US/UK-led land offensive in South (Dec 2001–July 2002)

Bush Doctrine

Terrorists + WMD = increase the risks of inaction

“To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense.”

Nat Security Strategy, 20 Sept 2002

Neocon agenda

Moral certitude

Military primacy

Middle East democracy

Iraq: the road to war

Post 9/11: worse-case analysis gained a new credibility

Bush orders war plans (21 Nov 2001)

Framing the threat: “Axis of Evil” (2002 State of the Union)

Selling the threat: Iraq, Al Qaeda and WMD

Iraq: countdown to war

Aug 2002: Bush authorises war plans

10 Oct 2002: Congress authorises war, 296-133 & 77-23

8 Nov 2002: UNSC passes res. 1441

20 March 2003: OIF begins

Twenty days later…

Rumsfeld Doctrine

CONOPS: “Shock and awe” replaces “overwhelming force”

“Army lite” invasion force: 170,000 (v. 540,000 in 1991 GW)

Victory for military transformation

Losing the peace

Lack of phase IV planning

ORHA & CPA: poorly resourced and staffed

US forces: too few and unprepared for COIN

American mistakes

American mistakes

1. De-baathification2. Disbanding the Iraqi Army3. Failure to maintain order4. Pushing too fast on political and

economic reform

The logic of prevention

Preventive war thinking in early Cold War America

Clinton administration and North Korea

Israeli raids on nuclear facilities in Iraq (1981) and Syria (Sept 2007)