9 Conceptions of Critique in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy

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DOI: 10.1177/0725513614521484 2014 120: 119Thesis Eleven

Thomas KlikauerConceptions of critique in modern and contemporary philosophy

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Review essay

Karin de Boer and Ruth Sonderegger (eds),Conceptions of critique in modern and contemporary philosophy(Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012)

Reviewed by: Thomas Klikauer, University of Western Sydney, AustraliaEmail: [email protected]

Despite a rather unattractive cover page, Karin de Boer and Ruth Sondereggers

Conceptions of Critique in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy provides an insightful

illumination of the current debate on critique in philosophy. The edition contains an

introduction and 14 chapters written by 14 contributors, an index, but no conclusion.

Perhaps the key question why this edition exists is to answer the initial claim raised in the

introduction, namely critique has run out of steam (Bruno Latour). To a large degree

most authors discuss two forms of critique external and immanent critique. However,

the editors argue that we would suggest that during the 20th century, critique has

developed along three different paths: a radicalisation of 19th century self criticisms

of critical philosophy [with] philosophers such as Benjamin, Adorno, Foucault, and

Derrida; Habermas critique of society [that] gained force by drawing on criteria that

allow the critic to tell right from wrong, true from false or alienation from self-rea-

lisation; and a third path that critique has taken to lead beyond the confines of philo-

sophy . . .Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Jaques Rancie`re and Judith Butler.Judith Butler distinguishes the domain of the speakable and thinkable from what

Adorno has called the ineffable (see Freyenhagen, Adornos Ethics without the

Ineffable, Telos, no. 155), arguing that critique is . . . protecting the public againstharmful doctrines. To some degree, Butlers article fights a bygone battle against state

intrusion into the domain of academic freedom while the real danger today inside and

outside of universities is managerialism (see Klikauer, Managerialism, Palgrave,

2013). Nevertheless, she hits the nail on the head when arguing that Kant writes that the

philosophy faculty can never lay aside its arms in the face of the danger that threatens the

truth entrusted to its protection, because the higher faculties will never give up their

desire to rule. Kantian philosophy occupies a largely unchallenged position when it

comes to critical philosophy. This is discussed in the introduction by Butler but perhaps

even more so in Tosels Spinoza or the Other Critique. Tosel agrees with Kants

position inside critical philosophy by arguing that any form of critique after Kant has

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often been seen as the other critique and as a reflection of Kants seminal trilogy of

critiques (1781, 1788, 1790). Tosel maintains that philosophy, as critique, thus poten-

tially subverts the encyclopaedia of knowledge and, without taking recourse to a utopian

realm of ends, reforms the idea of the good life governed by reason.

One of the collections most delightful chapters is Quadrios Rousseau, Kant and

Philosophical Auto-Criticism: The Practical Ends of Critical Thinking in which he traces

the importance of Rousseaus critical philosophy by asserting the continental tradition of

philosophy is [to be] a civil servant to humanity [with] the task of the philosopher to consist

in serving, to the best of their ability, the end of human emancipation. Quoting Rousseau,

Quadrio highlights what are we to think of commerce, in which the interest of every indi-

vidual dictates to him maxims diametrically opposite to those which the interests of the

community recommend to the body of society. He continues with: we no longer ask if

a man has integrity but rather if he has talent; we do not ask if a book is useful but if it

is well written. Rewards are showered on clever minds, but virtue receives no honours.

Quadrio concludes with what can be said about many: the thing that thinkers fear most

is that they are not the centre of the intellectual world hailed for their theoretical genius.

This is Rousseaus auto-criticism driven to the most exquisite level.

McQuillians Beyond the Limits of Reason: Kant, Critique and Enlightenment

continues this line of argument by focusing on Foucault describing the post-Kantian era

as the genuine age of criticism [perhaps partly because] so long as human beings find

the courage to sue their own understanding without direction from another, Kant consid-

ers them to be enlightened. Hence, Kant insists that everything must submit to the strict

criticism of Enlightenment. Kants immediate German successor Hegel continues

this as outlined in de Boers Hegels Conception of Immanent Critique: Its Sources,

Extent and Limit. She emphasizes that Hegel has argued that a genuine philosophical

critique must assume the very idea of philosophy as its criterion. Boer continues by writ-

ing: Hegel considers so-called philosophies that merely consist of single, unconnected

thoughts to have lost all credit (see Klikauer, Hegels Philosophy, Philosophy and

Social Criticism, 38/6).

But what critique, practical critique, and above all philosophical critique is all about has

been outlined to perfection in Robin Celikates Karl Marx: Critique as Emancipatory

Practice. Written in theMarcuse tradition of critical theory, Celikates emphasizes that his

[Marxs] version of immanent critique focuses on the internal contradictions of the social

order (modern capitalist society) and its social imaginary. Crucially, based on his critique

of idealism, Marxs materialism claims that the consciousness of individuals is

determined, or conditioned, by their social existence and that the superstructure of

society (law, politics, religion, morality, etc.) is determined, or conditioned, by its

economic structure. Hence, the critique of ideology is of fundamental importance to

Marxs project: freeing oneself from ideological illusions is a precondition for enga-

ging in emancipatory action.

Celikates continues by arguing that Marx notes that a focus on redistribution only

leads to cosmetic corrections of the status quo as long as the relations of production (and

the question of just distribution of the means of production) are not tackled. Perhaps this

is not to be seen totally unconnected from the debate on recognition-vs.-redistribution

raging inside critical theory (see Fraser and Honneth,Redistribution or Recognition,Verso,

120 Thesis Eleven 120(1)


2003). Conceivably, Frasers emphasis on redistribution is, at least according toMarx, no

more than placing a bit of cosmetics on capitalisms ugly face, while Honneths suggestion

that critical theory should focus on recognition places even more Botox on capitalisms

repulsive visage. Celikates an associate member of the Institut fur Sozialforschung does

not go into details of this debate but focuses on the subject at hand: critique.

He highlights Marxs contribution to critical philosophy via the analogy of Marxs

critique of religion, emphasizing that human emancipation . . . requires a transformationof individuals, their social relations and their self-understanding. Similar to Seyla

Benhabib, Celikates notes that the critique of capitalism as inhumane, unjust and

irrational . . . has to be accompanied by a critique of the bourgeois forms of knowledgewhich presents a historically specific and politically changeable mode of production as

natural and thus as apolitical and unchangeable. Finally, Celikates continues the

aforementioned concept of immanent critique by outlining immanent critique has to be

based on an analysis of social reality and finds its criteria in social practice, struggles,

experiences and self-understanding.

A quite different approach to critique is presented in Porters contribution of

Nietzsches Genealogy as Performative Critique, highlighting key elements of

Nietzsches thinking such as the slave revolt begins when resentment itself becomes

creative and gives birth to values. Porter concludes that Nietzschean genealogy is a

critical practice whose principle object is the human mind and its endless capacities for

(self-)delusion. Drilling even deeper into the human mind is Rottenbergs part on

Psychoanalytic Critique and Beyond, focusing on Kant and Freud. Rottenberg high-

lights that psychoanalysis must purify through criticism the minds natural but illegi-

timate demands for consolatory illusion. She also observes that Freud has, in a sense,

returned us to a notion of critique in which destruction takes centre stage . . . raising thespectre of Freud the all-destroyer, of a Freud interested first and foremost in

destroying illusions.

Destroying illusions and myths is also a task set by Walter Benjamin as Lijsters

enjoyable chapter on The Interruption of Myth: Walter Benjamins Concept of Critique

shows. Lijster simply states Benjaminian critique is immanent . . . it is a critique ofmyth. Hence every critical review should be at the same time a philosophy of criti-

cism. Crucial to understand Benjamins take on critique is his Critique of Violence

(1921). Lijster notes: in Greek mythology, the gods use violence against man not to

punish him for breaking the laws, but to manifest their existence [and] for the

exercise over life and death, more than in any other legal acts, the law reaffirms itself

(Benjamin). In other words, hundreds of death row inmates had to die so that American

penal law could reaffirm itself. But not only law is mythical, capitalist culture in all its

facets contains mythical elements . . . capitalism reproduces this temporary hell, forinstance, in the form of factory labour. The worker on the assembly line, like a modern

Sisyphus, has to repeat the same action over and over again.

In a 1939 essay Benjamin describes

the shift from Erfahrung to Erlebnis, whereas the first term denotes meaningful, embedded

experiences, the second refers to reified, isolated experiences. Traditionally, the individu-

als experience of time went hand in hand with collective experience. His life is embedded

Review essay 121


within tradition, and is measured by the religious calendar, which lifts certain moments out

of the historical continuum. In modernity, tradition is no longer self-evident. Life is mea-

sured by the clock, of which its succeeding seconds represent merely the ever-the-same.

Within this empty, homogeneous time, experience in its traditional sense is no longer

possible.

In line with that, Benjamin argues that Marx says that revolutions are the locomotives of

world history. But perhaps it is quite otherwise. Perhaps revolutions are an attempt by the

passengers on this train namely, the human race to activate the emergency brake.

Yet another highlight of the collection is Freyenhagens Adornos Critique of Late

Capitalism: Negative, Explanatory and Practical. However, focusing unilaterally on

Adorno might cut the highly fruitful and collaborative Adorno-Horkheimer relation-

ship out of which fundamental aspects of critical theory developed a bit short. Crit-

ical theory not only significantly enhanced Kants project of Enlightenment and

critique itself (Kant) but also developed critique into a proper theory, namely critical

theory. Simultaneously, critical theory remains closely linked to critical philosophy. In

his part, Freyenhagen argues that Adornos theory is a form of radical social critique

in that it aims at changing not merely specific aspects of contemporary society, but its

whole social structure. While not neglecting the Adorno-Horkheimer collaboration,

Freyenhagen writes:

Adorno wholeheartedly endorsed Horkheimers programmatic statement, according to

which critical theorys objective is not simply to eliminate one or other abuses, for it regards

such abuses as necessarily connected with the entire setup of the social structure. Although

it itself emerges from the social structure, its purpose is not, either in its conscious intention

or in its objective significance, the better function of any element in the structure. On the

contrary, it is suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and

valuable, as these are understood in the present order, and refuses to take them as non-

scientific presuppositions about which it can do nothing.

This rather lengthy quote reminds us once again what the task of critical theory is.

Crucially, Freyenhagen emphasizes that Adorno, in fact, doubts that the strict division

between immanent and external critique can be maintained. Not least because late

capitalism has become so delusional and has affected our faculties so much that we

cannot even imagine what a really different society would be like (e.g. Brinks

Damaged Life in Brink and Owen, Recognition and Power, Cambridge University

Press, 2010). Feyenhagen closes with Lukacs famous objection that often theory

amounts to the lament of a few intellectuals lodging in the Grand Hotel Abyss and

contemplating the end of civilisation.

Perhaps more than contemplating civilization is shown in Habermas Social Theory:

The Critical Power of Communicative Rationality, as Cooke explains by arguing the

linguistically focused critical approach on society [has been exposed to] the accusation

that this critical perspective is insufficiently robust too thin and too weak to do justice

to the forms of suffering and subordination characteristic of contemporary modern

societies. Axel Honneth is representative of this line of criticism. Having outlined

several major critiques of Habermas version of critical theory, Cooke concludes that

122 Thesis Eleven 120(1)


these objections to the concept of communicative rationality offer no compelling

reason to Habermas to abandon his critical project. Habermas critical project is

somewhat different from Foucaults project but it also contains a few meeting points

(see Habermas, Foucaults Lecture on Kant, Thesis Eleven, 1986).

A Foucauldian version of critique is presented in Hendricks Prophecy and Parresia:Foucauldian Critique and the Political Role of Intellectuals. To some degree it

represents a continuation of Lukacs intellectuals lodging in the Grand Hotel Abyss.

Hendricks argues that according to Foucault, intellectuals can contribute to political

change by employing critique to undermine what appears in the present to be stable,

certain or necessary. Important is Foucaults concept of genealogical critique on which

Hendricks writes: according to Foucault, genealogical critique is at one and the same

time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with

the possibility of going beyond them. It also involves Parresia. In contrast to Kant,Hegel, Marx and critical theory, Parresia does not involve demonstrating the truth but isinstead a form of critics, including those who are more powerful that the speaker.

Hendricks Parresia therefore involves risks and requires courage. Her conclusion Parresia is courageous truth-telling as critique in the face of risk is somewhat contra-dictory to her Parresia which does not involve demonstrating the truth.

Foucault has often been associated with what has been called post-modernism and so

has Derrida, who is the subject of Custers Derrida: Echoes of the Forthcoming in

which Custer quotes Derrida when writing he [Derrida] insists that deconstruction is not

a critique in a general sense or in a Kantian sense. Nevertheless, Derrida gives us all the

goals to see in these foundations of critique also the foundations of imperialism and

colonialism the dark side of Enlightenment, that which we must not settle for. Custer

concludes by re-emphasizing that deconstruction is not critique. That is, deconstruction

is all about not being critique.

Sondereggers Negative versus Affirmative Critique: On Pierre Bourdieu and

Jacques Rancie`re argues that according to Bourdieu, structures of domination remain in

place, and oftentimes even go unrecognised by those who suffer from them. Key to

Bourdieus idea is, however, that people living in poor conditions . . . are prepared toaccept much more than we would have believed . . .They put up with a great deal, andthis is what I mean by doxa that there are many things people accept without knowing.

Sonderegger highlights that Rancie`re saw Bourdieus ideas as anti-emancipatory

sociology, arguing that Bourdieus theory of practice is yet another variant of author-

itarian ideology critique. Rancie`re later on developed a theory of emancipatory dis-

agreement (mesentente). Sonderegger notes: Rancie`re holds that the critical theorist

should almost disappear so as to give voice to actual practitioners of critical disagree-

ment as outlined in his The Ignorant Schoolmaster (e.g. wikipedia.org/wiki/Marx_

Reloaded). The Boer/Sonderegger collection ends without a conclusion on the con-

ceptions of critique in modern and contemporary philosophy. Despite this, their semi-

nal edition is one of the most meaningful contributions to the discussion of critical

philosophy.

Review essay 123


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