82198366-Rem-Digest-Crimpro-rule111-Rights-of-the-Accused.pdf

7/25/2019 82198366-Rem-Digest-Crimpro-rule111-Rights-of-the-Accused.pdf

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REMEDIALLAWREVIEWDIGESTS(CIVPRO)TranquilSalvadorIIIAlcisso,Antonio,Arriola,Bernardo,Cajucom,Claudio,Dialino,Dizon,Escueta,Imperial,Martin,Martinez,Mendoza,Raso,Rosales,Sia,Venzuela

1

PART II

B. CIVIL ASPECT OF A CRIMINAL CASE

(RULE 111)

1.BUNTIONGvBALBOA

Facts:

VicenteBalboafiled2casesagainstCarolineSiokChingTeng:

(1)acivilcaseforCollectionofSumofMoneyonFeb24,97based

onthepostdatedchecksissuedbyCarolinewithRTC.TheRTCruled

infavorofBalboaaffirmedbytheCA.

(2) criminalcases forviolationofB.P.22on July21, 97.TheMTC

acquittedTendbutheldhercivillyliable.TheRTConappealdeleted

theawardofcivildamages.

TheSpsChingTengnowcomestocourtchargingBalboawithforum

shopping.

Issue:W/Nitconstitutesforumshopping

Held:NO

Forum shopping is the institution of 2 or more actions or

proceedingsgroundedon the samecause,on the supposition that

one or the other courtwould render a favorable disposition. The

elementsare:(1) identityofparties;(2) identityofrightsandrelief

prayed for; (3) identity of 2 preceding particulars such that any

judgment

in

the

other

action

would

constitute

res

judicata

or

litis

pendentia.

IntheHyattcaseitwaspronouncedthatthereisidentityofparties

and causes of action between a civil case for recovery of sum of

moneyandcriminalcaseforBP22.InthesaidcasetheSCappliedSC

Circ.No. 5797 effective Sept 16, 1997,which provides that the

criminalactionforviolationofBP22shallbedeemedtonecessarily

includethecorrespondingcivilactionandnoreservationtofilesuch

action separately shall be allowed or recognized. This was later

adoptedinRule111(b)ofthe2000RevisedRulesofCrimProcedure

(b)ThecriminalactionforviolationofBP22shallbedeemedto

include the corresponding civil action.No reservation to file such

civilactionseparatelyshallbeallowed.xxx.

Theforegoinghoweverisnotapplicableasthecivilandthecriminal

actionswerefiledonFeb24andJuly211997,respectively,priorto

theadoptionoftheSCCircular.TheapplicablerulewasstillSec.1,

Rule111ofthe1985RulesofCourtSec.1.Institutionofcriminal

and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil

actionfortherecoveryofcivilliabilityisimpliedlyinstitutedwiththe

criminal action, unless the offended partywaives the civil action,

reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civi

actionpriortothecriminalaction.xxx

SinceBalboa institutedthecivilcaseprior tothecriminalcase, the

civilcasemayproceedindependentlyofthecriminalcaseandthere

is no forum shopping. Even under the amended rules, a separate

proceedingfor

recovery

of

civil

liability

in

cases

of

violation

of

BP

22

isallowedwhenthecivilcaseisfiledofthecriminalcase.Eventhen

theRulesencourageconsolidation.

2.JOSEvSUAREZ

FACTS:

Sps.Suarez (Respondents)hadavailedofpetitionerCarolina Joses

offer to lendmoneyatdaily interestof1% to2%which the latte

increasedto5%andrespondentswereforcedtoacceptduetothei

financial distress. They sought to nullify the 5% interest per day

fixingclaiming

that

the

same

were

contrary

to

morals

and

done

under vitiated consent. Thereafter, the petitioners filed cases o

violationofBP22againstrespondentswherethelatterfiledmotion

to suspend hearings based on the existence of a prejudicia

question. Respondents claimed that if the 5% interest rates are

nullifiedand loansarecomputedat1%permonth, itwouldmean

that thecheckswhichareobjectsofBP22casesarenotonly fully

paidbutinfactoverpaid.

ISSUE:

W/N a prejudicial questions exists such that the outcome of the

validityofthe interest isdeterminativeof theguiltor innocenceo

therespondents

in

the

criminal

case?

No

RULING:

No. Prejudicial questions have two elements: a) The civil action

involvesan issuesimilaror intimatelyrelatedto the issueraised in

the criminal action; b) The resolution of such issue determine

whether or not the criminal actionmay proceed. The validity o

invalidityoftheinterestrateisnotdeterminativeoftheguiltofthe

respondentsinthecriminalcase.Thecauseorreasonforissuanceo

a check is immaterial in determining criminal culpabilityunderBP

22.The lawpunishes the issuanceof thebouncingcheck,which is

malum

prohibitum,

and

not

the

purpose

it

was

issued

for.


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2

C. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

1.COMMUNITYRURALBANKvTALAVERA(borrowed)

FACTS:

CommunityRural

Bank

(Bank

for

short)

filed

acomplaint

with

the

prosecutors office of Cabanatuan charging several persons (the

accused)withEstafa.Afterpreliminaryinvestigation,6informations

forestafawere filed,2ofwhichwere raffled to thebranchwhere

respondent,JudgeTalavera,presided.

TheaccusedappealedthefindingoftheFiscaltotheDOJ,whichthe

latterdenied,so JudgeTalavera issuedawarrantofarrestwithno

bailagainsttheaccused.

Later, the accused filed with Judge Talavera a motion for

reinvestigation and to lift the warrant of arrest. Bank was not

notified of this motion. Judge granted the motion without any

hearingthereon.Whenthereinvestigationwasconducted,theBank

wasstillnotnotified.

The assistant provincial prosecutor who conducted the

reinvestigation reversed the earlier findings of the fiscal. On the

same day, a motion to dismiss was filed with Judge, which he

granted,andhealsoordered thereleaseof theaccused.TheBank

wasnevernotifiedofanyoftheseproceedings.

BankthenfiledanMRarguingitwasdeprivedofdueprocess.Italso

askedthatthecriminalinformationbereinstated.Judgedeniedthis.

Now, Bank filed the present case charging Judge Talavera with

seriousmisconduct

and

gross

inefficiency.

Issue:DidJudgecommitgrossignorance? Yes

Motion

for

Reinvestigation. Judge shouldnothaveentertained the

motion for reinvestigation, since DOJ Secretary Serafin Cuevas

alreadydeniedwith finality theappealof theaccused, finding that

therewas prima facie evidence against the accused. Under Dept

Order No. 223 (Rules Governing Appeals from Resolutions in

Preliminary Investigations or Reinvestigations), a motion for

reinvestigation may be filed on the ground of newly discovered

evidenceandthismustbefiledbeforetheDOJSecretaryrulesonan

appealfromtheresolution inapreliminary investigation.Here,the

motion for reinvestigation was filed 3 months after the DOJ

Secretary already denied their appeal with finality. Clearly,

therefore, JudgeTalaverawaswrong ingranting themotion.Also,

there was no newly discovered evidence. Moreover, considering

thataprimafaciecasewasfoundtoexistagainsttheaccusedduring

thepreliminary investigation,JudgeTalaverashouldhaveexercised

greatrestraint ingrantingareinvestigation.Thecourtstressedthat

a preliminary investigation is essentially prefatory and

inquisitorial. It isnotatrialofthecaseonthemeritsandhasno

purpose except to determine whether a crime has been

committed, andwhether there is probable cause to believe tha

theaccused is guiltyof that crime.Apreliminary investigation is

not theoccasion for a full andexhaustivedisplayof theparties

evidence,whichneeds tobepresentedonly toengenderawell

groundedbeliefthatanoffensehasbeencommitted,andthatthe

accusedisprobablyguiltythereof.

Motion

to

Dismiss. It was also error for the Judge to grant the

Motion to Dismiss by relying merely on the resolution of the

prosecutor who conducted the reinvestigation. In his Order, he

merelystatedthatthemotiontodismissismeritorious,andnothing

more.TheOrder failed todemonstratean independentevaluation

orassessmentoftheevidenceagainsttheaccused.TheJudgeacted

withunduehastewhenhegrantedtheMotiononlyadayafterthe

reinvestigationwasconcluded.Thisleadstotheconclusionthatthe

judgedidnotpersonallyevaluatethepartiesevidencebeforeacting

on theMotion. The discretion to grant aMotion toDismiss rest

solelywiththecourt.However,mereapprovalofthepositiontaken

bythe

prosecution

is

not

equivalent

to

the

discretion

required.

Once

acomplaintoran information isfiled incourt, thejudge not the

prosecutor assumesfullcontrolofthecontroversy.Agrantofthe

motion to dismiss is equivalent to a disposition of the case itself

whichisasubjectclearlywithinthecourtsexclusivejurisdictionand

competence.WhenJudgeissuedthewarrantsofarrestwithoutbai

against all the accused, it is presumed that he had studied the

Informationand theResolutionof theprosecutorandagreedwith

thelattersfindingsofprobablecause.Thus,thegrantoftheMotion

for Reinvestigation and of the Motion to Dismiss for alleged

insufficiencyofevidenceposedaseriouscontradictionoftheearlie

findingofprobablecause.

Finally,JudgegrantedbothoftheMotionsdespitetheobvious lack

of notice to the Bank and lack of hearing. This lapse effectively

depriveditofitsdayincourt.

2.SERAGvCA(borrowed)

Facts:

Atty. Jesus Sibya, Jr. amayoralty candidate in Iloilowa

shot. His driver Norberto Salamat was also wounded. Hence, a

criminal complaint for murder and attempted murder was filed

against Napao who was an incumbent mayor at that time and

Sebastian Serag. The prosecutor filed two informations: (1) fo

Murderwith

the

Use

of

Unlicensed

Firearms,

and

(2)

Attempted

Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearms against Serag and

Napaoand7others.

Thewounded driver Salamat andwife of the victimMa

Daisy Sibya filed before the provincial prosecutor a supplementa

complaint formurder, frustratedmurderandviolationofPD1866

(Illegalpossessionoffirearms)againstNapag,Seragand16others

Provincial Prosecutor issued an order finding probable cause fo

murderandattemptedmurderwiththeuseofunlicensedfirearms

Hence, an amended informationwas filed (to include the use o

unlicensed firearms).Napaoand theotheraccused filedapetition

forreviewtoappealthesaidresolutionbeforetheDOJ.


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3

The trial court found probable cause for murder and

attempted murder. Warrants of arrest were issued against the

accusedwhowerestillatlarge.

Pending the resolutionby theSecretaryof Justiceof the

saidpetitionforreview,theproceedingsweresuspended.However,

the accusedwere still set to be arraigned. A day before the said

arraignment,theSecretaryofJusticeaffirmedwithmodificationthe

resolutionand

downgraded

the

charges

from

murder

to

Homicide.

Provincialprosecutorwas likewiseorderedtoamendtheAmended

Informationsaccordingly.

Thewife of the victim,Daisy, filed anMR to appeal the

saidresolution.

In compliance with the order of the DOJ, provincial

prosecutorfiledbeforetheRTCamotion for leaveto fileasecond

amendedinformationforhomicideandattemptedhomicide.Private

prosecutorsopposedthemotionandmovedfordefermentbecause

they said that Daisy had earlier filed an MR questioning the

resolution downgrading the charges. They said that it would be

prematuretofileamotionfortheadmissionofthesecondamended

informationand for thecourt toadmit the same.But theRTC still

granted themotionof theprovincialprosecutor and admitted the

secondamended

information

for

homicide.

The

attempted

homicide

case however was dismissed on the ground that it had no

jurisdictionoverthesaidcase.RTCsaidtheyhadnotreceivedacopy

ofDaisysMR.Hence,thecourtarraignedtheaccusedforhomicide,

whopleadednotguilty.

Taking intoaccountthefindingoftheDOJ,thecourtheld

that the findingofprobable cause formurderagainst theaccused

didnotbar itfromadmittingtheSecondAmended Informationfor

Homicide.Likewise,thependencyofDaisysMRoftheResolutionof

theSecretaryofJusticewasnotavalidreasonforthedefermentof

thearraignmentoftheaccusedforhomicide.

The private complainant (Daisy) forthwith assailed the

ordersof the trial court and the arraignmentof theaccusedviaa

petition forcertiorariin theCA.She insisted that theadmissionby

theRTC

of

the

Second

Amended

Information

downgrading

the

crime

charged therein toHomicide and the arraignment of the accused

therein on June 6, 2002 were premature since the Secretary of

Justicehadnotyet resolvedhermotion for reconsiderationof the

May20,2002Resolution.

CA issuedaTROenjoining theRTC fromproceedingwith

thecase.

Inthemeantime,DOJissuedaresolutiongrantingtheMR

of private complainant Daisy and set aside the resolution

downgraded the offense to homicide. The Secretary of Justice

opined that the killing of thedeceasedwas, after all, qualifiedby

treachery.Secretaryalsosaidthathecannotbestoppedfromtaking

cognizance of the case and resolving the MR despite the

arraignmentoftheaccused.HedirectedtheProvincialProsecutorto

withdraw the Second Amended Information for Homicide andAttemptedHomicideand to file, instead separate Informations for

MurderandAttemptedMurder.

TheaccusedpetitionersfiledanMRofthesaidresolution.

Theyargued that,with theirarraignment in theRTCand theMTC,

the Secretary of Justice should have denied the private

complainantsmotionforreconsideration.DOJdeniedsaidmotion.

JuanNapaoand theotherpetitioners in theDepartment

of Justice filed a petition forcertiorariwith the CA assailing the

November 18, 2002 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, and

praying for the reinstatement of ResolutionNo. 258 (wherein the

chargesagainstthemweredowngraded).

The Provincial Prosecutor filed a Motion with the tria

court for thewithdrawal of the SecondAmended Information fo

homicideandforthereinstatementoftheAmendedInformationfo

murder.However,inviewofthetemporaryrestrainingorderissued

bytheCA,thetrialcourtsuspendedtheproceedings.

CAeventually

issued

an

order

nullifying

the

orde

downgrading the offense. It also issued an order nullifying the

arraignment. Of course, the accusedpetitioners questioned thi

sayingCAactedwithGADLEJwhenitissuedtheordernullifyingthei

arraignment. They insist that the CA should have dismissed the

petitionofDaisy forbeingmootandacademicbecause theywere

alreadyarraigned.

ISSUE:

W/NtheCAcommittedGADLEJ?No,petitionisdenied.

HELD:

TheappellatecourtsnullificationoftheJune6,2002and

July 26, 2002 Orders of the RTC and the arraignment of the

petitionerson

June

6,

2002

are

well

founded.

Section

13

of

DO

CircularNo.70reads:

SECTION 13.Motionfor reconsideration.The aggrieved

partymay fileamotion forreconsiderationwithinanon

extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of the

resolutiononappeal,furnishingtheadversepartyandthe

Prosecution Office concerned with copies thereof and

submitting proof of such service. No second or furthe

motionforreconsiderationshallbeentertained.

The private respondent (Daisy) received a copy o

Resolution No. 258 of the Secretary of Justice downgrading the

charges from murder and attempted murder to homicide and

attempted homicide. She had the right to file a motion fo

reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution on or before June 6

2002.it

behooved

the

RTC

to

suspend

the

proceedings

until

afte

the Secretary of Justice had resolved such motion with finality

including the consideration of the motion of the Provincia

Prosecutor for theadmissionof the SecondAmended Information

for homicide, the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 926, and the

arraignment of the petitioners for homicide. It was, in fact

premature for theProvincialProsecutor to filesuchmotion for the

admissionof theSecondAmended Information since theSecretary

ofJusticehadnotyetresolvedthesaidmotion;afterall,hemaystil

reconsiderResolutionNo.258,whichhedid,effectivelyreversinghis

previousrulingandthusrevertingtotheoriginalchargesofmurde

andattemptedmurder.

Accordingly,werulethatthetrialcourt inacriminalcase

which takes cognizance of an accusedsmotion for review of the

resolutionoftheinvestigatingprosecutororforreinvestigationand

defersthearraignmentuntilresolutionofthesaidmotionmustac

ontheresolutionreversingtheinvestigatingprosecutorsfindingo

on amotion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such

resolution isalreadyfinal inthatnoappealwastakentherefromto

theDepartmentofJustice.

In fine, the RTC acted with inordinate and precipitate

hastewhen it granted the Provincial Prosecutorsmotion for the

admission of the Second Amended Information for homicide

ordered the withdrawal of Criminal Case No. 926 for attempted


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4

homicide based on ResolutionNo. 258 of the DOJ Secretary, and

arraignedtheaccusedthereinforhomicide.QuotingtheCA:

Public respondent also erroneously found that the

pendencyofthemotionforreconsideration,andtheother

reasons given, not compelling for the court to defer its

action on the motion to admit. As earlier stated,

Department Circular No. 70 places the duty upon the

appellantand

the

trial

prosecutor

to

see

to

it

that,

pending

resolutionoftheappeal,theproceedingsincourtareheld

inabeyance.

Itshouldbeconsideredthatthemotiontodeferwaseven

withtheconformityofthepublicprosecutorandtheappearanceof

theprivateprosecutors ispursuant to Section16,Rule110of the

2000RulesonCriminalProcedure,towit:

Intervention

of

the

offended

party

in

criminal

action.

Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is

instituted inthecriminalactionpursuanttoRule111,the

offended party may intervene by counsel in the

prosecutionoftheoffense.

All these facts taken together, there appears to be an

unduehasteon thepartof thepublicrespondent inadmitting the

secondamended

informations

for

homicide

and

attempted

homicideandordering thearraignmentof theprivaterespondents

tothesaidinformations.AsaresultoftheassailedOrdersissuedby

public respondent, the private respondents were arraigned for

homicideandattemptedhomicide.

TheDOJcannotbestrippedofhisauthoritytoactonand

resolve the aforesaid motion of the private complainant on the

Prosecutors insistence that the accused be arraigned on June 6,

2002.Indeed,underSection7ofDOJCircularNo.70,theSecretary

of Justicemay resolve the saidmotiondespite thearraignmentof

thepetitioners:

SECTION 7.Action on the petition. The Secretary of

Justicemay dismiss the petition outright if he finds the

sametobepatentlywithoutmeritormanifestly intended

fordelay,

or

when

the

issues

raised

therein

are

too

unsubstantialtorequireconsideration.

Ifan informationhasbeen filed in courtpursuant to the

appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due

course if the accused had already been arraigned. Any

arraignmentmadeafterthefilingofthepetitionshallnot

bar the Secretaryof Justice fromexercisinghispowerof

review.

3.SORIANOvPEOPLE

Facts:Sometimein2000,theOfficeofSpecialInvestigation(OSI)of

theBangkoSentralngPilipinas(BSP),sentalettertotheChiefState

Prosecutorof

the

DOJ.

The

letter

attached

five

affidavits,

which

wouldserveasbasesforfilingchargesforEstafathruFalsificationof

Commercial Documents and violation of the DOSRI law against

HilarioSoriano.

Thesefiveaffidavitsstatedthatacertaincouple,thespousesCarlos,

appeared tohaveanoutstanding loanofP8millionwith theRural

BankofSanMiguel(Bulacan),Inc.(RBSM),buthadneverappliedfor

nor received such loan and that itwaspetitioner,whowas then

president

of

RBSM,

who

had

ordered,

facilitated,

and

received

the

proceeds

of

the

loan;and that theP8million loanhadneverbeen

authorizedbyRBSM'sBoardandno report thereofhadeverbeen

submitted to the BSP. The letter of the OSI, which was no

subscribed under oath, ended with a request that a preliminary

investigationbeconductedand thecorrespondingcriminalcharge

befiledagainstpetitionerathislastknownaddress.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash and argued that the lette

transmitted by the BSP constituted the complaint and hencewa

defectivefor

failure

to

comply

with

the

mandatory

requirements

o

Section3(a),Rule112oftheRulesofCourt,suchasthestatemento

address of petitioner and oath and subscription. Moreover

petitionerarguedthattheofficersofOSI,whowerethesignatorie

tothelettercomplaint,werenotauthorizedbytheBSPGovernor

muchlessbytheMonetaryBoard,tofilethecomplaint.

TheRTCdeniedit.TheyruledthattheassailedOSIletterwasnotthe

complaintaffidavit itself; thus, it need not comply with the

requirementsundertheRulesofCourt.Itwasbutacoverletter,and

merelycontainedasummaryoftheaffidavitswhichwereattached

to it. Itdidnotcontainanyavermentofpersonalknowledgeofthe

eventsandtransactionsthatconstitutetheelementsoftheoffenses

charged.TheRTCheld that theaffidavits,whichwereattached to

theOSI

letter,

comprised

the

complaint

affidavit

in

the

case.

Since

theseaffidavitsweredulysubscribedandsworntobeforeanotary

public,therewasadequatecompliancewiththeRules.Oncertiorar

the CA agreed. These complaintaffidavits complied with the

mandatoryrequirementssetout in theRulesofCourt theywere

subscribed and sworn to before a notarypublic and subsequently

certifiedbyStateProsecutorFonacier,whopersonallyexaminedthe

affiantsandwas convinced that theaffiants fullyunderstood thei

swornstatements.

Issue:Whichwas the complaint, the letter or the affidavits?Wa

therecompliancewithRule112,sec.3[a]oftheRulesofCourt?

Held: 1. The letter was not intended to be the complaint, a

envisionedunder

the

Rules.

They

did

not

contain

averments

o

personal knowledgeof theeventsand transactions constitutiveo

any offense. The letters merely transmitted for preliminary

investigation theaffidavitsofpeoplewhohadpersonalknowledge

oftheactsofpetitioner.Werulethattheseaffidavits,nottheletter

transmitting them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since

theseaffidavitswere subscribedunderoathby thewitnesseswho

executed thembefore anotarypublic, then therewas substantia

compliancewithSection3(a),Rule112oftheRulesofCourt.

TheCourt isnotunawareofthepracticeof incorporatingallallegations in

onedocumentdenominatedascomplaintaffidavit.Itdoesnotpronounce

strictadherencetoonlyoneapproach,however,fortherearecaseswhere

theextentofonespersonalknowledgemaynotcovertheentiregamuto

detailsmaterialtotheallegedoffense.Theprivateoffendedpartyorrelative

ofthedeceasedmaynotevenhavewitnessedthefatality,inwhichcasethe

peaceofficerorlawenforcerhastorelychieflyonaffidavitsofwitnesses.The

Rulesdonot in factpreclude the attachmentofa referralor transmitta

letter.

Therulehasbeenthat,unlesstheoffensesubjectthereofisonethatcanno

beprosecuteddeoficio,thesamemaybefiled,forpreliminaryinvestigation

purposes, by any competent person. The witnesses who executed the

affidavitsbasedontheirpersonalknowledgeoftheactscommittedbythe


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5

petitioner fallwithin the purview of any competent personwhomay

institutethecomplaintforapubliccrime.

A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an

affidavitofanycompetentperson,without the referraldocumenthaving

beensworntobythelawenforcerasthenominalcomplainant.Torequire

otherwiseisaneedlessexercise.Afterall,whatisrequiredistoreducethe

evidenceinto

affidavits,

for

while

reports

and

even

raw

information

may

justify the initiationofan investigation,thepreliminary investigationstage

canbeheldonlyaftersufficientevidencehasbeengatheredandevaluated

whichmaywarranttheeventualprosecutionofthecaseincourt.

2.Anent thecontention that therewasnoauthority from theBSP

Governoror theMonetaryBoard to fileacaseagainstSoriano,we

holdthattheNCBAdoesnotapplybecausetheBSPdidnotinstitute

the complaint butmerely sent the affidavits of the complainants

[theofficers]totheDOJ.

3.We further held that since the offenses forwhich Sorianowas

chargedwerepubliccrimes,authorityholdsthat itcanbe initiated

by any competent personwith personal knowledge of the acts

committedby

the

offender.

Thus,

the

witnesses

who

executed

the

affidavitsclearlyfellwithinthepurviewofanycompetentperson

whomayinstitutethecomplaintforapubliccrime.

Appealdenied,MotiontoQuashremainsdenied.

4.SAMUELLEEvKBCBANK

Facts

Midas Diversified Export Corporation (MDEC) obtained a

$1,400,000 loan from KBC Bank N.V. (KBC Bank). KBC Bank is a

Belgiancorporation licensed to do business in the Philippines. For

this loan, SamuelU. Lee (Lee), assistant treasurer and director of

MDEC,executedapromissorynoteinfavorofKBCBankandadeed

of assignment transferring all of MDECs rights over Confirmed

Purchase Order No. MTC548 to KBC Bank. Confirmed Purchase

Order No. MTC548 was allegedly issued by Otto Versand, a

companybased inGermany,andcovered shipmentsamounting to

$1,863,050.

MDECobtainedanotherloan,amountingto$65,000,fromKBC

Bank. For this second loan,Maybelle L. Lim (Lim), treasurer and

assistantsecretaryofMDEC,executedapromissorynoteinfavorof

KBCBankandadeedofassignmenttransferringallofMDECsrights

overConfirmed

Purchase

Order

No.

WC

128

to

KBC

Bank. Confirmed Purchase Order No. WC128 was also allegedly

issued by Otto Versand, and covered shipments amounting to

$841,500.

MDECdefaulted in thepaymentof these2 loans.KBCBanksenta

letter toOttoVersandverifying thevalidityofConfirmedPurchase

OrderNos.MTC548 andWC128. However,Otto Versand sent a

facsimilemessage toKBCBankstating that (1) itdidnot issue the

purchaseorders,(2)itdidnotorderorreceivetheitemscoveredby

thepurchaseorders,and(3)itwouldnotpayMDECanyamount.

Thus, KBC Bank filed a complaint for estafa against Lee and Lim

StateProsecutorSubia found theexistenceofprobable causeand

recommended that two counts of estafa be filed against Lee and

Lim.

Accordingly, two informations forestafaagainstLeeandLimwere

filed with the RTC. After finding probable cause, Judge issued

warrantsofarrestagainstLeeandLim.

Lee and Lim filed a petition.for review with the Department o

Justice(DOJ)challengingthestateprosecutorsresolution.

InhisResolution,DOJ SecretaryPerezdirected thewithdrawal o

theinformationsfiledagainstLeeandLimholdingthatthefacsimile

messageconstitutedhearsayevidencebecausecontentsofthesaid

messagewasnotofpersonalknowledgeofKBCBank,butofOtto

Versand,which

did

not

present

asworn

statement

during

the

trial.

Thereafter,CityProsecutorSibucao,filedamotiontowithdrawthe

informations against Lee and Lim,whichwas granted by the RTC

(throughanorder).However,onappeal,theCAsetasidethisorde

forthewithdrawalofinformations.Hence,thispetition.

Issues

1. Whetherornot the issueofadmissibilityof the facsimile

messagemaybeproperlyventilatedduringthefullblown

trialandnotduringthepreliminaryinvestigation.YES

2. WhetherornotJudgeDumayasoftheRTC,inorderingthe

withdrawalof

the

informations

against

Lee

and

Lim,

ailed

tomakehisownevaluationandmerelyreliedonSecretary

Perezsrecommendation.YES

Ruling

1.Yes.The issueofadmissibilityofthefacsimilemessageshouldbe

ventilatedduringthefullblowntrialandnotduringthepreliminary

investigation.

TheCourtsaid thatwhether the facsimilemessage isadmissible in

evidenceandwhethertheelementofdeceitinthecrimeofestafais

presentare

matters

best

ventilated

in

afull

blown

trial,

not

in

the

preliminary investigation. InAndresv.JusticeSecretaryCuevas,

the

Courtheldthat:

[Apreliminary investigation] isnot theoccasion

for the full and exhaustive display of [the

prosecutions] evidence. The presence or

absence of the elements of the crime is

evidentiaryinnatureandisamatterofdefense

thatmaybepasseduponafterafullblowntrial

onthemerits.


6/24


6

In fine, the validity andmerits of a partys defense or

accusation, as well asthe admissibility oftestimonies

andevidence,are better ventilated during trial proper

thanatthepreliminaryinvestigationlevel.

2.Yes,JudgeDumayasoftheRTC,inorderingthewithdrawalofthe

informationsagainstLeeandLim,failedtomakehisownevaluation

andmerelyreliedonSecretaryPerezsrecommendation.

JudgeDumayasorderreadsasfollows:

This Court, after an indepth scrutiny of the

argumentsraisedbytheprosecutionandprivate

complainant, finds the contentions of the

prosecutiontobesufficientandmeritorious.

Accordingly,theMotiontoWithdrawInformationfiledby

theProsecution

is

hereby

granted

and

the

two

(2)

informationsforthecrimeofEstafapenalizedunderpar.2

(a)oftheRevisedPenalCodeareherebywithdrawnfrom

thedocketofthiscourt.

TheCourtreiterated itsrulingsonseveralcases,suchasthatfound

inCovs.Lim:

Once a case is filed with the court, any

dispositionof itrestsonthesounddiscretionof

thecourt. Thetrialcourt isnotboundtoadopt

theresolutionoftheSecretaryofJustice,sinceit

ismandated

to

independently

evaluate

or

assess

the merits of the case. Reliance on the

resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone

would be an abdication of its duty and

jurisdictiontodetermineaprimafaciecase. The

trialcourtmaymakeanindependentassessment

ofthemeritsofthecasebasedontheaffidavits

and counteraffidavits, documents, or evidence

appendedtotheInformation;therecordsofthe

publicprosecutor,whichthecourtmayorderthe

latter to produce before the court; or any

evidence already adduced before the court by

theaccused

at

the

time

the

motion

is

filed

by

the

publicprosecutor.

XXXX

[T]HE TRIAL JUDGEDIDNOTPOSITIVELY STATE

THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AGAINST THE

RESPONDENTSWAS INSUFFICIENTFORAPRIMA

FACIECASE, NOR DID THE AFOREQUOTED

ORDER INCLUDEADISCUSSIONOFTHEMERITS

OF THE CASE BASED ON AN EVALUATION OR

ASSESSMENTOFTHEEVIDENCEONRECORD. IN

OTHER WORDS, THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE

WAS BASED UPON CONSIDERATIONS OTHER

THANTHEJUDGESOWNPERSONALINDIVIDUAL

CONVICTION THAT THERE WAS NO CASE

AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS. THUS, THE TRIAL

JUDGE

IMPROPERLY

RELINQUISHED

THE

DISCRETIONTHATHEWASBOUNDTOEXERCISE,

AND THE ORDERS DATED 11 FEBRUARY 2004

AND 29 JUNE 2004 ARE INVALID FOR HAVING

BEENISSUEDINGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETION.

In the present case, Judge Dumayas, in his order, did not (1

positively state that the evidence against Lee and Lim is

insufficient, (2) includeadiscussionof themeritsof thecase, (3

assess whether Secretary Perezs conclusion is supported by

evidence, (4) look at the basis of Secretary Perezs

recommendation,(5)embodyhisassessmentintheorder,and(6

state his reasons for granting the motion to withdraw the

informations.

JudgeDumayasfailuretomakehisownevaluationofthemeritso

the case violates KBC banks right to due process and constitute

graveabuseofdiscretion.Thus,JudgeDumayasordergrantingthe

motiontowithdrawtheinformationsisvoid.

5.OKABEvGUTIERREZ(borrowed)

FACTS:

Maruyama suedOkabe for estafa. Itwas alleged in the

complaint thatMaruyamaentrusted toOkabeasumofmoney fo

thelatter,whowasengagedinthebusinessofdoortodoordelivery

toremit

to

the

Philippines.

Okabe

failed

to

remit

such

amount.

The complaint forestafawas filedwith the2nd

assistan

cityprosecutorforpreliminary investigation.Duringthepreliminary

investigation,bothOkabeandMarumayaweregiventhechanceto

adduce evidences/affidavits on their behalf. The 2nd

assistant city

prosecutor found probable cause and issued a resolution and the

corresponding information.AppendedtheretowastheMaruyama

complaint affidavit. These documentswere forwarded to the city

prosecutorforapproval.

Then the informationwas filedwith theRTCofPasay.A

warrantofarrestwasissuedbutOkabewasabletopostbail inthe

amount of 40,000 thereby allowing her to freely leave the

PhilippinesforJapan.Upontheinstanceoftheprosecution,ahold

departureorderwasissuedbythecourt.

Okabefiled

amotion

for

judicial

determination

o

probable cause. She claims that the documents attached to the

resolution of the investigating prosecutor were insufficient to

warrantafindingofprobablecause.Shecontendsthatitbehooved

the investigating prosecutor to submit the following to the tria

courttoenableittodeterminethepresenceorabsenceofprobable

cause: (a) copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of the

complainant; (b) the counteraffidavit of Okabe and those of he

witnesses;(c)thetranscriptsofstenographicnotestakenduringthe

preliminary investigation; and, (d) other documents presented

duringthesaidinvestigation.


7/24


7

ISSUE:

Whetherornotthetrialcourtjudgeshouldhaverequired

the production of the affidavits of Maruyamas witnesses, their

documentary evidences, stenographic notes of the preliminary

investigation and Okabes counteraffidavit for the purposes of

determiningprobable

cause

for

the

issuance

of

the

warrant

of

arrest

YES

Whether or not posting of bail bars the accused from

questioning the legalityof thearrestor theconductofpreliminary

investigation NO

HELD:

ThecaseofWebbvDeLeonandHovPeoplesaythatfor

the purposes of determining the existence or nonexistence of

probable cause for thepurposeof issuing awarrantof arrest, the

judge should not rely solely on the said report. Thejudge should

considernotonlythereportoftheinvestigatingprosecutorbutalso

theaffidavit/affidavitsandthedocumentaryevidenceoftheparties,

thecounteraffidavitoftheaccusedandhiswitnesses,aswellasthe

transcriptof

stenographic

notes

taken

during

the

preliminary

investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating

prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. This rule is now

embodiedsection8(a)ofRule112(butwhichissection7(a)inour

codal)whichmandates that an information filed in court shall be

supported by affidavits and counteraffidavits of the parties and

theirwitnesses,other supportingdocumentsand the resolutionof

thecase.Thereasonforthisruleisbecausethelawaimsnotonlyto

acquit the innocent but to like insulate the clearly innocent from

falsechargesandfromthestrongarmofthelaw.

Section26oftheRule114saysthatanapplicationforor

admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the

validityofhisarrestorthelegalityofthewarrantissuedtherefor,or

from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a

preliminaryinvestigation

of

the

charge

against

him,

provided

that

he

raisesthembeforeenteringhisplea.This isacurativerulebecause

modifiedthepreviousrulingsoftheSCsayingthatpostingofbailisa

bar to challenging the validity of the arrest. Being curative and

procedural innature, it applies retroactively. Itmust favorOkabe.

Besides,everywaiverofarighttoquestionthevalidityofanarrest

mustbeunequivocallyestablishedbytheconductoftheaccused.In

this case, the seriesofactsbyOkabepoint to the conclusion that

shewas insistent about the fact that the arrestwas orderedwith

insufficientfindingofprobablecause.Infact,sheimmediatelyfileda

motionforjudicialdeterminationofprobablecause.


8/24


8

D. ARREST

1.PEOPLEvDELEON

FACTS

RodanteDe

Leon

was

convicted

for

violation

of

Secs.

5(sale)

&

11

(possession), Art. 2 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Acts

(CDDA)of2002.Aconfidential informantwent to theofficeof the

AntiIllegal Drug Special Operation Task Force of the Novaliches

Police inQC reporting the illegal activitiesofDe Leon.Abuybust

teamwas then createdwith PO2Magcalayo as poseurbuyer and

PO2Collado,etal.toassisthim.Lateratnight,theteamwenttoSta.

Monica,Novalicheswhere the informant introducedMagcalayo to

DeLeonasbuyerofshabu.ThepolicemanaskedwhetherDeLeon

hadshabu,towhichhesaidyesandaskedhowmuchhewouldbuy.

Magcalayo gave the money and, in return, De Leon gave him 1

plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Magcalayo

thenscratched

his

head,

which

was

the

signal

for

the

others

that

the

transaction has already been consummated. Thereafter, De Leon

was arrested. The buybust money was recovered. De Leon was

handcuffed.Uponfrisking,Colladofoundanotherplasticsatchet.De

Leon was then brought to the police station for investigation.

Collado placed his initials on the sachet found. The evidencewas

then turnedover toanotherpolice,PO1Estrelles,whoprepareda

requestforlaboratoryexamination.Collado,Magcalayo,and2other

police then brought the sachets to the PNP Crime Laboratory in

Mandaluyong.

De Leon questioned the legality of the buybust operation

conducted.Healsoclaimedthattheprosecutionfailedtoprovethe

chainofcustodyoftheconfiscateditems.

ISSUEs

(1)Whetherthebuybustoperationwasvalid.

(2)Whetherthechainofcustodywasviolated.

RULING

(1)YES.Abuybustoperationisaformofentrapmentwherebyways

andmeansareresortedtoforthepurposeoftrappingandcapturing

the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this

jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an

effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due

regardtoconstitutionalandlegalsafeguardsisundertaken.

Here, the evidence clearly shows that the buybust operation

conductedbythepoliceofficers,whomadeuseofentrapmentto

captureappellantintheactofsellingadangerousdrug,wasvalid

andlegal.Thedefensehasfailedtoshowanyevidenceofillmotive

on thepartof thepoliceofficers. Even appellanthimselfdeclared

thatitwasthefirsttimehemetthepoliceofficersduringhiscross

examination.Therewas,therefore,nomotiveforthepoliceofficers

toframeupappellant.The identityofappellantasthepersonwho

sold the dangerous drugs to PO2 Magcalayo and the one in

possessionoftheshabucannotbedoubtedanymore.Suchpositive

identificationprevailsoverappellant'sdefensesofdenialandalibi

These defenses have been invariably viewed by the Court with

disfavor,for

they

can

easily

be

concocted

but

difficult

to

prove,

and

theyarecommonandstandarddefenseploys inmostprosecution

arisingfromviolationsoftheCDDAof2002.

Absent any proof ofmotive to falsely accuse appellant of such a

graveoffense,thepresumptionofregularity in theperformanceo

officialdutyand the findingsof the trial courtwith respect to the

credibilityofwitnessesshallprevailoverappellant'sbareallegation.

(2)NO.TheIRRoftheCDDAof2002provide:

SECTION21.CustodyandDispositionofConfiscated,Seizedand/o

SurrenderedDangerousDrugs, Plant Sources ofDangerousDrugs

Controlled

Precursors

and

Essential

Chemicals

Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The

PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs

plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and

essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/o

laboratoryequipmentsoconfiscated,seizedand/orsurrendered,fo

properdispositioninthefollowingmanner:

(a) Theapprehendingofficer/teamhaving initialcustodyand

controlof thedrugsshall, immediatelyafter seizureand

confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the

sameinthepresenceoftheaccusedortheperson/sfrom

whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, o

his/her representativeor counsel,a representative from

themediaandtheDepartmentof Justice (DOJ),andany

elected public officialwho shall be required to sign the

copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof

Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph

shallbeconductedattheplacewherethesearchwarran

isserved;oratthenearestpolicestationorattheneares

office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is

practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided

further, that noncompliance with these requirement

underjustifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and

evidentiary value of the seized items are properly

preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall no

render void and invalid such seizures of and custody

oversaiditems...

A close examination of the law reveals that it admits of certain

exceptions.Thus,contrarytotheassertionsofappellant,Sec.21o

the foregoing lawneednotbe followedas anexact science.Non

compliancewithSec.21doesnotrenderanaccused'sarrest illega

or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is

essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary

value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the


9/24


9

determinationoftheguiltorinnocenceoftheaccused."

Here, there was substantial compliance with the law and the

integrity of the drugs seized from appellantwas preserved. The

chainofcustodyofthedrugssubjectmatterofthecasewasshown

nottohavebeenbroken.Thefactualmilieuofthecaserevealsthat

afterPO2

Magcalayo

seized

and

confiscated

the

dangerous

drugs,

as

wellasthemarkedmoney,appellantwasimmediatelyarrestedand

broughtto thepolicestationfor investigation,wherethesachetof

suspected shabuwasmarkedwith "NM." Immediately thereafter,

theconfiscatedsubstance,witha letterofrequestforexamination,

was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination to

determine the presence of any dangerous drug. Per Chemistry

Report No. D12402003 dated November 9, 2003, the specimen

submitted contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a

dangerous drug. The examination was conducted by one Engr.

Jabonillo,aForensicChemicalOfficerofthePNPCrimeLaboratory,

whosestipulatedtestimonyclearlyestablishedthechainofcustody

ofthe

specimens

he

received.

Thus,

it

is

without

adoubt

that

there

wasanunbrokenchainofcustodyoftheillicitdrugpurchasedfrom

appellant.

2.PEOPLEvLAGUIO

Facts:

LawrenceWangwaschargedonthreeseparate informationsfor1)

violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 2) Illegal Possession of

Firearmsand3)ViolationoftheComelecGunBan.Policeoperatives

of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the

Department

of

Interior

and

Local

Government

arrested

SPO2

Vergel

de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful

possession ofmethamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug

popularly known as shabu.RedentorTeck,aliasFrank,and Joseph

Junio were identified as the source of the drug. . In a separate

operation that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Juniowere

arrestedwhiletheywereabouttohandoveranotherbagofshabu

to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned, Redentor Teck and

JosephJunioinformedthepoliceoperativesthattheywereworking

astalentmanagerandgymnast instructor,respectively,ofGlamour

Modeling Agency owned by LawrenceWang. Redentor Teck and

JosephJuniodidnotdisclosetheirsourceofshabubutadmittedthat

theywereworkingforWang.Theyalsodisclosedthattheyknewofa

scheduleddeliveryof shabuand that theiremployer (Wang) could

be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The

police operatives decided to look forWang to shed light on the

illegaldrugactivitiesofRedentorTeckandJosephJunio.

Wang,whowasdescribedtotheoperativesbyTeck,cameoutofan

apartment andwalked towards aparkedBMW car.Policeofficers

approachedWang, introducedthemselvestohimaspoliceofficers,

asked his name and, upon hearing that he was LawrenceWang,

immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back

compartmentoftheBMWcar.Whenfrisked,therewasfoundinside

the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an

unlicensedAMTCal.3809mmautomaticBackupPistolloadedwith

ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the

operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the

following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing white

crystallinesubstance

with

atotal

weight

of

29.2941

kilograms,

which

substance was later analyzed as positive for methamphetamine

hydrochloride,aregulateddrug locallyknownasshabu;(b)cash in

theamountofP650,000.00; (c)oneelectronicandonemechanica

scales; and (d) an unlicensedDaewoo 9mm Pistolwithmagazine

Thenandthere,Wangresistedthewarrantlessarrestandsearch.

Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for hi

acquittalandthedismissalofthethree(3)casesagainsthimforlack

ofavalidarrestand searchwarrantsand the inadmissibilityof the

prosecutions evidence against him. Due to the demurrer, Judge

Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the assailed Resolution granting

WangsDemurrer

to

Evidence

and

acquitting

him

of

all

charges

fo

lackofevidence.

Issue:

WhetherornotWangswarrantlessarrestwasvalid?

Ruling:

No. ThepertinentprovisionsofRule 113 of theRuleson Crimina

Procedureonwarrantlessarrestprovide:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace

officeroraprivatepersonmay,withoutawarrant,arresta

person:

a)When, inhis presence, the person to be arrestedha

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to

commitanoffense;

b)Whenanoffensehasjustbeencommitted,andheha

probablecausetobelievebasedonpersonalknowledgeo

factsorcircumstancesthat theperson tobearrestedha

committedit;and

c)When theperson tobearrested isaprisonerwhohas

escaped fromapenalestablishmentorplacewherehe i

servingfinal

judgment

or

is

temporarily

confined

while

his

case is pending, or has escapedwhile being transferred

fromoneconfinementtoanother.

Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantles

arrestmaybe lawfullyeffected: (a)arrestofasuspect in flagrante

delicto;(b)arrestofasuspectwhere,basedonpersonalknowledge

ofthearrestingofficer,thereisprobablecausethatsaidsuspectwa

theauthorofacrimewhichhadjustbeencommitted;(c)arrestofa


10/24


10

prisonerwhohas escaped from custody serving finaljudgment or

temporarilyconfinedwhilehiscaseispending.

For awarrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto

under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisitesmust

concur: (1) the person to be arrestedmust execute an overt act

indicatingthat

he

has

just

committed,

is

actually

committing,

or

is

attemptingtocommitacrime;and(2)suchovertactisdoneinthe

presenceorwithintheviewofthearrestingofficer.

The facts and circumstances surrounding thepresent casedidnot

manifestanysuspiciousbehavioronthepartofprivaterespondent

LawrenceWang thatwould reasonably invite the attentionof the

police.HewasmerelywalkingfromtheMariaOrosaApartmentand

wasabouttoentertheparkedBMWcarwhenthepoliceoperatives

arrestedhim,friskedandsearchedhispersonandcommandedhim

toopenthecompartmentofthecar,whichwaslateronfoundtobe

ownedbyhis friend,DavidLee.Hewasnotcommittinganyvisible

offensethen.Therefore,therecanbenovalidwarrantlessarrestin

flagrantedelictounderparagraph(a)ofSection5. It issettled that

"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a

felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the

arrestingofficers, isnotsufficienttoconstituteprobablecausethat

wouldjustifyaninflagrantedelictoarrest.

Neithermaythewarrantlessarrestbejustifiedunderparagraph(b)

ofSection5.Whatisclearlyestablishedfromthetestimoniesofthe

arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the

informationthathewastheemployerofRedentorTeckandJoseph

Juniowhowerepreviouslyarrestedandchargedforillegaltransport

ofshabu.TeckandJuniodidnotevencategoricallyidentifyWangto

betheir

source

of

the

shabu

they

were

caught

with

in

flagrante

delicto.Upon theduosdeclaration that therewillbeadeliveryof

shabuon theearlymorningof the followingday,May17,which is

onlyafewhoursthereafter,andthatWangmaybefound inMaria

Orosa Apartment alongMariaOrosa Street, the arresting officers

conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said apartment,

hoping to find a personwhichwillmatch the description of one

Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These

circumstancesdonotsufficientlyestablishtheexistenceofprobable

causebasedonpersonalknowledgeasrequiredinparagraph(b)of

Section5.

3.VALDEZ

vPEOPLE

(borrowed)

FACTS: In 2003, Valdez had in his possession and custody dried

marijuana leaves wrapped in cellophane and newspaper page,

withoutfirstsecuringthenecessarypermitorprescriptionfromthe

propergovtagency.HewasthenchargedwithviolationofSec.11

ofRA9165.Onarraignment,Valdezpleadednotguilty.Duringtrial,

theprosecutionpresentedthetestimonyof the3barangaytanods

(Bautista,AratasandOrdoo)whoarrestedValdez.Whilethethree

wereconductingtheroutinepatrolduringthenightoftheincident,

theynoticedValdez,luggingabag,alightfromaminibus.Theythen

observedthatValdez,whoappearedsuspicioustothem,seemedto

be looking for something. Thus, they approached Valdez but he

purportedly attempted to run away. The tanods chased Valdez

arrested and brought him to the house of Brgy. Capt.Mercado

Bautista testified that itwasMercadowho instructedhim toopen

Valdezbag,where themariajuana leaveswere found.Aratas and

OrdoocorroboratedBautistastestimonyonmostmaterialpoints

Oncross

examination,

however,

Aratas

admitted

that

he

himsel

broughtoutthecontentsofValdezbagbeforethelatterwastaken

to Mercados house. Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercado

house, itwasValdezhimselfwhobroughtout the contentsofhis

baguponordersfromMercado.Forhispart,Ordootestifiedthati

washewhowasorderedbyMercadotoopenValdezbagandthati

wasthenthattheysaw itscontents.Valdezdeniedthecharges.He

basicallyalleged thatwhilehewaswalkingafteralightingfromthe

bus,witnessOrdooallegedlyapproachedhimandaskedwherehe

wasgoing.Ordoothenpurportedlyrequestedtoseethecontent

ofhisbagandValdezacceded.ItwasatthispointthatBautistaand

Aratas joined them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag

Valdeztestifiedthathewasrestrainedbythetanodandtakentothe

house ofMercado. It was Aratas who carried the bag until they

reachedtheir

destination.

At

Mercados

house,

his

bag

was

opened

bythetanodandMercadohimself.Theytookoutanitemwrapped

innewspaper,whichlaterturnedouttobemarijuanaleaves.Valdez

denied ownership of themarijuana. The RTC found Valdez guilty

TheCAaffirmedtheRTCdecision.

ISSUE:W/Nthedrugswereseizedpursuanttoalawfulwarrantless

arrestthatwouldmakethedrugsadmissibleasevidence?(NOTE

Valdezneverraisedtheirregularityofhisarrestbeforearraignment

buttodeterminetheadmissibilityoftheseizeddrugsinevidence,i

is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which

yieldedtheallegedcontrabandwaslawful.)

HELD/RATIO: NO. Thus, the seizedmarijuana is inadmissible as

evidence.

Section5,Rule113oftheRulesonCriminalProcedureprovidesthe

only occasions on which a person may be arrested without a

warrant.1Itisobviousthatbasedonthetestimoniesofthearresting

barangaytanod,notoneofthesecircumstanceswaspresentatthe

timeValdezwasarrested.By theirownadmission,Valdezwasno

committinganoffenseatthetimehealightedfromthebus,nordid

he appear to be then committing an offense. The tanods did no

haveprobablecauseeithertojustifyValdezwarrantlessarrest. Fo

theexception in Section 5(a),Rule 113 to operate, this SC ruled

that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be

arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has jus

committed, is actually committing,or is attempting to commit a

crime;and(2)suchovertactisdoneinthepresenceorwithinthe

view of the arresting officer.Here, Valdez act of looking around

aftergettingoffthebuswasbutnaturalashewasfindinghiswayto

1Section5.Arrestwithoutwarrant;whenlawful.Apeaceofficeroraprivatepersonmay,without

warrant,arrestaperson:

(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or i

attemptingtocommitanoffense;

(b)Whenanoffensehasjustbeencommittedandhehasprobablecausetobelievebasedonpersona

knowledgeoffactsorcircumstancesthatthepersontobearrestedhascommittedit;and

(c)Whenthepersontobearrestedisaprisonerwhohasescapedfromapenalestablishmentorplac

wherehe isservingfinaljudgmentortemporarilyconfinedwhilehiscase ispending,orhasescape

whilebeingtransferredfromoneconfinementtoanother.


11/24


11

hisdestination.Theallegationthatheattemptedtorunawayasthe

tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be

construedasadequatetochargethetanodwithpersonalknowledge

that Valdez hadjust engaged in,was actually engaging in orwas

attemptingtoengage incriminalactivity.More importantly,Valdez

testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the

barangaytanodwhentheyapproachedhim.

Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth, the

conclusionwillnotbeanydifferent.Itisnotunreasonabletoexpect

thatValdez,walkingthestreetatnight,afterbeingcloselyobserved

andthen later tailedbythreeunknownpersons,wouldattempt to

fleeattheirapproach.Flightperseisnotsynonymouswithguiltand

mustnotalwaysbeattributedtoonesconsciousnessofguilt.Alone,

andunder thecircumstancesof thiscase,Valdez flight lends itself

just aseasily to an innocentexplanation as itdoes to anefarious

one. The supposed acts of Valdez, even assuming that they

appeareddubious,cannotbeviewedassufficienttoincitesuspicion

ofcriminalactivityenoughtovalidatehiswarrantlessarrest.Ifatall,

the searchmost permissible for the tanod to conduct under the

prevailing backdrop of the casewas a stopandfrisk to allay any

suspicionthey

have

been

harboring

based

on

Valdez

behavior.

However, a stopandfrisk situation, following Terry v.Ohio,must

precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer

clothing,andshouldbegroundeduponagenuinereason,inlightof

the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to

warrantthebeliefthatthepersondetainedhasweaponsconcealed

abouthim.

Accordingly, Valdez waiver of his right to question his arrest

notwithstanding, themarijuana leaves allegedly taken during the

search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as theywere

seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. As in

Peoplevs.Baclaan,theSCruledAwaiverofanillegalwarrantless

arrestdoesnotalsomeanawaiveroftheinadmissibilityofevidence

seizedduring

an

illegal

warrantless

arrest.

The

following

searches

andseizuresaredeemedpermissiblebyjurisprudence: (1)search

ofmovingvehicles(2)seizureinplainview(3)customssearches(4)

waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry

Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last

includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an

equally validwarrantless arrest, for,while as a rule, an arrest is

consideredlegitimateifeffectedwithavalidwarrantofarrest,the

RulesofCourtrecognizepermissiblewarrantlessarrests,towit:(1)

arrestsinflagrantedelicto,(2)arrestseffectedinhotpursuit,and,

(3)arrestsofescapedprisoners.Thus,whenValdezwasarrested

without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto

committingacrimenorwasthearresteffectedinhotpursuit.Verily,

it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless

searchconductedonValdezwas incidentaltoa lawfularrest.Evengranting that Valdez admitted to opening his bag when Ordoo

asked to see its contents,his impliedacquiescence, ifat all, could

not have been more than mere passive conformity given under

coerciveor intimidatingcircumstancesandhence, isconsideredno

consent at all within the contemplation of the constitutional

guarantee.Asaresult,Valdez lackofobjectiontothesearchand

seizureisnottantamounttoawaiverofhisconstitutionalrightor

avoluntarysubmissiontothewarrantlesssearchandseizure.

4.ROLITOGOvCA(borrowed)

FACTS:On July 2,1991, EldonMaguan andRolitoGohad anear

collision incident in San Juan.After that,Goalighted fromhis car

walkedoverandshotMaguan insidehiscar.Gothenleftthescene

but a security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to get his

licenseplate.

On July8,1991,Go ,with2 lawyers,presentedhimselfbeforeSan

JuanPoliceStation toverynewsreports thathewasbeinghunted

bythepolice.Hewasdetained.Aneyewitnesstotheshootingwa

able to positively identify him as the gunman. That same day, a

complaint for frustratedhomicidewas filedwith theOfficeof the

ProvincialProsecutorofRizal.Hewas informed, in thepresenceo

his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary

investigationbutthathemustfirstsignawaiveroftheprovisionso

Article125oftheRPC.Gorefusedtosignthewaiver.

Initially,

he

was

released

on

bail

but

CA

issued

an

Order

wherein

thebail grant was recalled so Go had to surrender himself. He wa

detainedagain.

CA said thatGo'swarrantlessarrestwasvalidbecause theoffense

for which he was arrested and charged had been "freshly

committed."Whenheshowedupatthepolicestation,wasalready

an existing manhunt for him; he was positively identified by an

eyewitness.

Solicitor General argues Go was validly arrestedwithoutwarran

because his identity as the gunman had been sufficiently

established,was validlyarrested six (6)days later at the San Juan

Police

Station.

The

Solicitor

General

relies

In

the

Matter

of

thePetition

for

Habeas

Corpus

of

Roberto

Umil,

etc., v.Ramos, e

al. wheretheSCupheldawarrantlessarrestasvalidalthoughmade

14daysafterthekilling.

Go argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warran

because hewent to the police station 6 days after the shooting

Thus thecrimehadnotbeen"justcommitted"at the time thathe

was arrested. Since there had been no lawfulwarrantless arrest

Section7,Rule112oftheRulesofCourtwhichestablishestheonly

exceptiontotherighttopreliminaryinvestigation,isnotapplicable.

ISSUE:WONtherewasalawfulwarrantlessarrestNO

First, the reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor Genera

uponUmilv.Ramosis, inthecircumstancesofthiscase,misplaced

InUmil v.Ramos therewas a validwarrantless arrestbecause the

offense (subversion) constituted "continuing crimes." Here, the

offensewasmurder,notacontinuingcrime.

Secondly,thewarrantless"arrest"doesnotfallwithinthetermso

Section5ofRule113ofthe1985RulesonCriminalProcedure.Go'

"arrest"tookplace6daysaftertheshooting.The"arresting"officers

obviously were not present at the time petitioner allegedly sho

Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected 6 days after be


12/24


12

reasonablyregardedaseffected"whentheshootinghadinfactjust

been committed". Plus, none of the "arresting" officers had any

"personalknowledge"of facts indicating thatGowas thegunman.

Thepolicemerelyreliedonthestatementsofanallegedeyewitness.

**OnPreliminary Investagion:WONGohadeffectivelywaivedhis

righttopreliminaryinvestigation. NO

FromtheverystartGodemandedthatapreliminaryinvestigationbe

conducted. Itwasntwaivedwhenhe incorrectly filedanomnibus

motionforreleaseandpreliminaryinvestigationwiththeProsecutor

(shouldbefiledwiththeRTC).Plus,theProsecutorhimselffiledthe

samewiththeRTCdaysafterfilingtheinformationformurder.


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13

E. BAIL

1.MABUTASvPERELLO

FACTS

Subjectmatters

of

the

present

administrative

cases

are

two

complaintsagainstrespondentJudgePerello.

Admin.MatterNo.RTJ031817(1stadministrativecase)

MabutasofPDEAcomplainedofcertainirregularitiescommittedby

respondentJudge inthegrantofbailtoaccusedOmadan.Omadan

was charged with Violation of RA 9165, or the Comprehensive

Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for the possession, custody and

controlof57.78gramsofMethamphetamineHydrochloride(shabu),

with no bail recommended. Respondentjudge explained that the

bailwasgrantedbecause theprosecutionsevidenceofOmadans

guiltwasnotstrong.

Admin.MatterNo.RTJ041820(2nd

administrativecase)

Prosecutor Togononon charged respondent Judge of partiality,

serious misconduct in office and gross ignorance of the law,

concerning the latters grant of bail in four criminal cases for

ViolationsofR.A.No.9165pendingbeforeher.Respondentjudge

issuedanordergrantingmotionforbailwithouthearing.Asst.City

ProsecutorFranciscofiledMR,arguingthatsincethecrimecharged

isa capitaloffense,bail isnot allowedasamatterof right,anda

hearingisindispensable.RespondentJudgedeniedthemotion.

RespondentJudgeexplainsthatshedidnotconductanyhearingson

themotions/petitions forbailbecause the crimes chargedarenot

capital offenses as the quantity of shabu involved therein was

minimal. They all involve selling of less than 5 grams of shabu.

RespondentJudgebelievesthatunderR.A.No.9165,shabuisnotadangerous drug but merely a controlled precursor, in which the

sellingoflessthan5gramsispunishableonlywithimprisonmentof

12 years to 20 years. Such being the case, respondent Judge

maintainsthatbailisamatterofrightandahearingisnotrequired.

ISSUE:w/nrespondentJudgemaybeadministrativelyheldliablefor

thegrantofbail.

HELD:

1.

Admin.MatterNo.RTJ031817(1stcase)NO,judgenotliable.

Under RA 9165, possession of 50 grams or more of

methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is punishable by life

imprisonment to death; hence, a capital offense. As such, bail

becomesamatterofdiscretion. In thisregard,Rule114,Sec.7of

theRulesofCourtstates:

No person chargedwith the capital offense, or

an offense punishable by reclusionperpetua or

life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail

when theevidenceofguilt is strong, regardless

ofthestageofthecriminalprosecution.

Thematterofdeterminingwhetherornottheevidenceisstrongisa

matterofjudicialdiscretionthatremainswiththejudge.Underthe

present rules, a hearing on an application for bail ismandatory

Whether bail is amatter of right or of discretion, the prosecuto

should be given reasonable notice of hearing, or at least his

recommendation on the matter must be sought. In case an

application for bail is filed, thejudge is entrusted to observe the

followingduties:

1. In all cases,whether bail is amatter of right or discretion

notify theprosecutor of thehearingof the application forbailo

requirehimtosubmithisrecommendation;

2. Wherebail isamatterofdiscretion,conductahearingofthe

application for bail regardless ofwhether ornot the prosecution

refusestopresentevidencetoshowthattheguiltoftheaccusedis

strong for thepurposeofenabling the court toexercise its sound

discretion;

3. Decidewhethertheguiltoftheaccusedisstrongbasedonthe

summaryofevidenceoftheprosecution;and

4. Iftheguiltoftheaccusedisnotstrong,dischargetheaccused

upon the approvalof the bail bond.Otherwise thebail shouldbe

denied.

Based on the abovecited procedure and requirements, after the

hearing, the courtsorder grantingor refusingbailmust containa

summary of the evidence for the prosecution. Based on the

summaryofevidence, thejudge formulateshisownconclusionon

whethersuchevidence isstrongenoughto indicatetheguiltofthe

accused.

Inthiscase,respondentJudgecompliedwiththeforegoingduties. A

hearingwas held on the petition; the prosecutionwas given the

opportunity to present its evidence; respondent Judge based he

findings on the prosecutions evidence; respondent JudgesOrde

grantingtheaccusedspetitionforbailcontainedasummaryofthe

prosecutionsevidence;

and

since

it

was

her

conclusion

that

the

evidenceof accusedOmadans guilt isnot strong, thepetition fo

bailwasgranted.

2.Admin.MatterNo.RTJ041820(2nd

case)YES,judgeliable.

Tojustifyhergrantingbail in the threecriminal cases, responden

Judge insists that she did so because of her belief tha

methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is merely a precurso

andthereforethesalethereofisnotacapitaloffense. Thisopinion

isblatantlyerroneous.

Respondent Judgeneednot exhaustively studyR.A.No.9165 to

determinethenatureofmethamphetaminehydrochloride. Aplain

readingofthelawwouldimmediatelyshowthatmethamphetamine

hydrochlorideisadangerousdrugandnotacontrolledprecursor.

Methamphetamine hydrochloride is listed in the 1971 UN Single

Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which are considered

dangerousdrugs. This is further stronglymanifest inSection11o

R.A.No.9165,whereinitisspecificallyprovidedthatthepossession

of dangerous drugs, such asmethamphetamine hydrochloride o

shabu, is punishable with life imprisonment to death and a fine

ranging from P500,000.00 to P10M, if the quantity thereof is 50

grams ormore. Furthermore, had respondentjudge kept hersel

abreastofjurisprudenceanddecisionsoftheCourt,shewouldhave


14/24


14

been apprised that in all the hundreds and hundreds of cases

decided by the Court,methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu

hadalwaysbeenconsideredasadangerousdrug.

Given thatmethamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug,

regardlessofquantity,thesale,trade,administration,dispensation,

delivery,distribution and transportationof shabu ispunishableby

lifeimprisonment

to

death.

Being

acapital

offense,

it

is

incumbent

uponrespondentJudgetoholdahearingonthepetitions/motions

forbailfiledbytheaccusedthereintodeterminewhetherevidence

ofguiltisstrong. Tograntanapplicationforbailandfixtheamount

thereofwithoutahearingdulycalledforthepurposeofdetermining

whether theevidenceofguilt is strongconstitutesgross ignorance

or incompetencewhosegrossnesscannotbeexcusedbyaclaimof

goodfaithorexcusablenegligence.

2.LEVISTEvCA

FACTS:

Levistewas

convicted

by

the

Regional

Trial

Court

of

Makati

City

for

the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an

indeterminatepenaltyofsixyearsandonedayofprisionmayoras

minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as

maximum.HethenappealedtotheCA.Pendingappeal,hefiledan

urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his

advancedageandhealthcondition,andclaimingtheabsenceofany

riskorpossibilityofflightonhispart.

TheCAdeniedhisapplication forbail. It said that in thematterof

bailpendingappeal,thediscretiontoextendbailduringthecourse

ofappealshouldbeexercisedwithgravecautionandonlyforstrong

reasons. It ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged

detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison

facility.According

to

it,

Leviste

failed

to

show

that

he

suffers

from

ailmentofsuchgravity thathiscontinuedconfinementduring trial

willpermanentlyimpairhishealthorputhislifeindanger.

TheCAalsoconsideredthefactofpetitionersconviction.Itmadea

preliminaryevaluationofpetitionerscaseandmadeaprima facie

determination that there was no reason substantial enough to

overturntheevidenceofpetitionersguilt.

Petitioner then filed aMR and now questions as grave abuse of

discretion(Rule65)thedenialofhisapplicationforbail,considering

thatnoneof theconditionsjustifyingdenialofbailunder thethird

paragraphofSection5,Rule114oftheRulesofCourtwaspresent.

Basically, Leviste claims that in the absence of any of the

circumstancesmentioned

in

the

third

paragraph

of

Section

5,

Rule

114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an appellant

sentencedbytheRegionalTrialCourttoapenaltyofmorethansix

yearsimprisonmentshouldautomaticallybegranted.

ISSUE:

Inabailapplicationpendingappealofaconvictionwithasentence

ofmorethansixyears,doesthediscretionarynatureofthegrantof

bailpendingappealmeanthatbailshouldautomaticallybegranted

absentanyof thecircumstancesmentioned in the thirdparagraph

ofSection5,Rule114oftheRulesofCourt?

HELD:

No. Thus, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the

assailed resolution without or in excess of itsjurisdiction. Bail i

eitheramatterofrightorofdiscretion.It isamatterofrightwhen

theoffensecharged isnotpunishablebydeath,reclusionperpetua

or life imprisonment.On the other hand, upon conviction by the

Regional TrialCourtof anoffensenotpunishabledeath, reclusion

perpetuaorlifeimprisonment,bailbecomesamatterofdiscretion

Similarly,ifthecourtimposedapenaltyofimprisonmentexceeding

six (6)years thenbail isamatterofdiscretion,except [that]when

anyoftheenumeratedcircumstancesunderparagraph3ofSection

5,Rule114ispresentthenbailshallbedenied.

Inthefirstsituation,bailisamatterofsoundjudicialdiscretion.This

means that, if none of the circumstancesmentioned in the third

paragraphofSection5,Rule114 ispresent,theappellatecourthas

thediscretiontograntordenybail.Anapplicationforbailpending

appealmaybedeniedevenifthebailnegatingcircumstancesinthe

thirdparagraphofSection5,Rule114areabsent.

Inotherwords, theappellatecourtsdenialofbailpendingappea

where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and o

itself, constitute abuse of discretion. On the other hand, in the

second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringen

discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the

enumeratedcircumstances in factexists. If it sodetermines, itha

no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal

Conversely, iftheappellatecourtgrantsbailpendingappeal,grave

abuseofdiscretionwilltherebybecommitted.

Giventhesetwodistinctscenarios,therefore,anyapplicationforbai

pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two

stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the

appellatecourtmustdeterminewhetheranyofthecircumstancesin

the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this wil

establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound

discretionorstringentdiscretioninresolvingtheapplicationforbai

pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where

assumingtheappellantscasefallswithinthefirstscenarioallowing

theexerciseofsounddiscretion,theappellatecourtmayconsideral

relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third

paragraphofSection5,Rule114, including thedemandsofequity

andjustice;onthebasisthereof,itmayeitherallowordisallowbail.

Thus,afindingthatnoneofthecircumstancesinSection5,Rule114

is presentwill not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such

findingwill

simply

authorize

the

court

to

use

the

less

stringen

sounddiscretionapproach.Moreover,historically,thedevelopmen

overtimeoftheRulesOnCriminalProcedurerevealsanorientation

towards a more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. I

indicatesa faithfuladherence to thebedrockprinciple, that is,bai

pendingappealshouldbeallowednotwith leniencybutwithgrave

caution and only for strong reasons. After conviction by the tria

court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly

theconstitutionalrighttobailends.46

Fromthenon,thegrantofbai

issubjecttojudicialdiscretion.Attheriskofbeingrepetitious,such

discretionmustbeexercisedwithgravecautionandonlyforstrong

reasons.Considering that theaccusedwas in factconvictedby the


15/24


15

trialcourt,allowanceofbailpendingappealshouldbeguidedbya

stringentstandards approach. Thisjudicial disposition finds strong

support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the

languageofSection5,Rule114oftheRulesofCourt.

3.DOMINGOvPAGAYATAN(borrowed)

FACTS:

TheBureauof Immigration(BOI)BoardofCommissioners

(BOC) issuedSummaryDeportationOrder(SDO)No.ADD2001057

againstErnestoM.Peaflorida,aU.S. citizen,after finding thathe

was an overstaying and undocumented alien, in violation of the

Philippine ImmigrationActof1940.Peafloridawasalsoa fugitive

fromjusticesincehestood indicted intheUnitedStatesforhealth

carefraudwhichresulted inmorethan$1,376,000.00 lossestothe

U.S.FederalGovernment.NoappealwasfiledwiththeOfficeofthe

President.TheSDObecamefinalandexecutor.

Respondent Judge Pagayatan issued a Notice of

Arraignment requiring the production of Peaflorida. On the

scheduledhearing,

Judge

Pagayatan

denied

the

P40,000

bail

recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor for the provisional

releaseoftheaccusedonthegroundthatthecrimePeafloridawas

charged with involved large scale estafa, a nonbailable offense.

Judge Pagayatan ordered the commitment of Peaflorida to the

Provincial Jail inMagbay, San Jose,OccidentalMindoro.However,

later on that same day, the BOI received information that

respondent judge had allowed the release from detention of

Peaflorida without the interdepartmental courtesy of affording

priornoticeto theBOIofsuchaction.CommissionerDomingowas

appalled not only by the respondents employment of legal

subterfuges inordering the releaseofPeafloridawhoseSummary

DeportationOrderhadalreadybecomefinalandexecutory,butalso

by the respondentsbad faith indeceiving them into surrendering

thecustody

of

an

undesirable

alien

federal

fugitive

to

the

Provincial

JailatMagbay,SanJose,OccidentalMindoro.

Asaresult,CommissionerDomingofiledalettercomplaint

withtheOfficeoftheCourtAdministrator(OCA)chargingPagayatan

withgrossignoranceofthelaw.

In his Comment, Judge Pagayatan explained that the

prosecutionandthedefensejointlymanifestedthatitwouldbefair

andjust if the court would fix the bail bond for the provisional

release of the accused Peaflorida at P250,000.00 and that he

granted themotion to fixbail;and that at the timehe issued the

order fixing the bail bond, he was not aware that a deportation

orderhasalreadybeenissuedbytheBOI.

Inits

Evaluation

Report,

the

OCA

recommends

to

the

Court that respondentbe finedP5,000 forGross Ignoranceof the

Law.

ISSUE:Whether Judge Pagayatanwas guilty of gross ignorance of

the law in granting the bail of the accusedwithout conducting a

hearingYES

HELD:

Undertherulesonbail,ahearingismandatoryingranting

bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. A hearing is

indispensableforthecourttoasksearchingquestionsfromwhichit

may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it

against the accused, in caseswhere the offense is punishable by

death,reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment. After hearing, the

courtsorder grantingor refusingbailmust contain a summaryo

the evidence for the prosecution and based thereon, the judge

should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the

evidence sopresented is strongenough as to indicate theguilto

theaccused.

Otherwise,

the

order

granting

or

denying

the

application for bail may be invalidated because the summary o

evidence fortheprosecutionwhichcontainsthejudgesevaluation

of theevidencemaybeconsideredasanaspectofproceduraldue

processforboththeprosecutionandthedefense.

The herein respondent granted bail to the accused

Peaflorida without conducting a hearing despite his earlie

pronouncement in the Order denying bail as he considered the

crimetheaccusedPeafloridawaschargedwithtobeanonbailable

offense.Themanifestationoftheprosecutorthatheisnotreadyto

presentanywitnesstoprovethattheprosecutionsevidenceagains

theaccused isstrong, isneverabasisfortheoutrightgrantofbai

withoutapreliminaryhearingon thematter.Ahearing isrequired

evenwhen

the

prosecution

refuses

to

adduce

evidence

or

fails

to

interposeanobjectiontothemotionforbail.

The joint manifestation of the prosecution and the

defensethat itwouldbefairandjust ifthecourtwouldfixthebai

bondfortheprovisionalreleaseoftheaccusedatP250,000doesno

justify the grantingof bailwithout ahearing in a case involving a

nonbailable offense. A hearing is necessary for the court to take

into consideration the guidelines in fixing the amount of bail se

forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Crimina

Procedure.

Respondent judge should have ascertained personally

whether the evidence of guilt is strong and endeavored to

determinetheproprietyoftheamountofbailrecommended.Todo

awaywith

the

requisite

bail

hearing

is

to

dispense

with

this

time

testedsafeguardagainstarbitrariness.

Although the Domingo failed to prove that Judge

Pagayatanhadpriorknowledgeoftheexistenceofthedeportation

orderorwas informedby theBOIofsuchorder,respondentjudge

cannot escape administrative liability by invoking unawareness o

thedeportationorder.Absentevidenceofmalice,respondentslack

of knowledge of the deportation order will only free him from

administrative liability for gross misconduct but not for gros

ignoranceofthelawfordisregardingtherulesonbail.

4.LACHICAvTORMIS

FACTS

Defendant Domugho was apprehended and was brought to the

policestationforbookingandcustody.AfewdayslaterComplainan

wasflabbergastedtolearnthatshewasreleasedfromconfinement

Complainant inquiredfromthepolicestation ifanOrderofRelease

was issued by the court. Complainant learned that accused wa

releasedbecausetherespondentjudgecalledthepolicestationand

toldthedeskofficerthat theaccusedhadpostedacashbailbond

andmayalreadybereleased.


16/24


16

Upon investigation by complainant, the police blotter showed no

entry thatanorderof releasewas receivedby thepolice. Onlya

notationthattheaccusedhadputupacashbailbondwasentered

therein.

Complainantalsoassertedthatitwas improperfortherespondent

judgeto

receive

the

cash

bail

bond

as

the

function

belongs

exclusively to theOffice of the Clerk of Court. She claimed that

respondentjudgecommittedanactof improprietywhenshecalled

thepolicestationtoverballyorderthereleaseoftheaccused. Itis

vexing further thatnocopyof the releaseorderwas foundon the

dayofrelease.

Respondent judge denied the charges of complainant. She

maintained that she issued theOrderofReleaseafter theaccused

postedacashbond. Sheclaimedthattheaccusedwasreleasedby

virtueof theOrderofReleaseandnoton thebasisofheralleged

telephonecalltothepolicestation..

TheOffice

of

the

Court

administrator

fined

and

suspended

the

judge

after finding several inconsistencies inheralibi.Even thearresting

officerdeniedreceivingacourtorderforrelease

ISSUE:W/nthejudgeisadministrativelyliable.

HELD:Yes.

Respondentjudge personally received the cash bail bond for the

accused. For thisactalone,responden