81. Santos v. Comelec

7/21/2019 81. Santos v. Comelec

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/81-santos-v-comelec 1/13

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 155618. March 26, 2003.]

EDGAR Y. SANTOS , petitioner , vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(FIRST DIVISION) and PEDRO Q. PANULAYA, respondents .

Alexander M. Versoza for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

Rex Raynaldo C. Sandoval for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for Mayor of theMunicipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14, 2001 elections. TheMunicipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Panulaya as the duly

elected Mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest before the trial court whichdeclared and proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected Mayor. Petitionerthereafter filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Meanwhile, before thetrial court could act on petitioner's motion, respondent filed with the COMELEC apetition for certiorari assailing the decision of the trial court, which wasdismissed. Respondent filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition for certiorari . Thereafter, he filed a supplementalpetition. While his motion for reconsideration and supplemental petition werepending, respondent filed another petition for certiorari with the COMELECcontaining the same prayer as that in the supplemental petition.

The Supreme Court ruled that respondent was guilty of forum-shopping. Inthe case at bar, respondent obtained an adverse decision when his petition forcertiorari was dismissed by the COMELEC. He thereafter filed a motion forreconsideration and a supplemental petition praying for the nullification of thetrial court's order for the execution of the decision pending appeal. Two daysafter filing the supplemental petition, and while the same was very muchpending before the COMELEC, he filed a wholly separate petition for certiorari wherein he pleaded the same reliefs prayed for in the supplemental petition. Indoing so, respondent, before allowing the COMELEC to fully resolve the incidents

in the first petition for certiorari , both of which were at his own instance, soughtto increase his chances of securing a favorable decision in another petition. Hefiled the second petition on the supposition that the COMELEC might look withfavor upon his reliefs. Considering that respondent was guilty of forum-shoppingwhen he filed the second petition for certiorari , his petition should have beendismissed outright by the COMELEC. Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is aground for summary dismissal of the case, and constitutes direct contempt of court.

The Court further ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was committed bythe trial court in granting the execution pending appeal. In the case at bar, the



three-year term of the Office of the Mayor continued to run. The will of theelectorate, as determined by the trial court in the election protest, had to berespected and given meaning. The municipality needed the services of a mayoreven while the election protest was pending, and it had to be the candidate

judicially determined to have been chosen by the people. IHaSED

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FORUM-SHOPPING; REQUISITES. — Forum-shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has beenrendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion inanother forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari . It may alsobe the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the samecause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorabledisposition. For it to exist, there should be (a) identity of parties, or at least suchparties as would represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rightsasserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)

identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in theother action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata inthe action under consideration.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, respondentobtained an adverse decision when his petition in SPR No. 20-2002 was dismissedby the COMELEC. He thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration and asupplemental petition, praying for the nullification of the trial court's order for theexecution of its decision pending appeal. Two days after filing the supplementalpetition, and while the same was very much pending before the COMELEC, he filed

a wholly separate petition for certiorari , docketed as SPR No. 37-2002, wherein hepleaded the same reliefs prayed for in the supplemental petition. . . . In doing sorespondent, before allowing the COMELEC to fully resolve the incidents in SPR No20-2002, both of which were at his own instance, sought to increase his chances ofsecuring a favorable decision in another petition. He filed the second petition on thesupposition that the COMELEC might look with favor upon his reliefs.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; A GROUD FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF THE CASE ANDCONSTITUTES DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT. — Forum-shopping is considered apernicious evil; it adversely affects the efficient administration of justice since it

clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial processes. The most important factor indetermining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused the courts andparties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or relatedcauses or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs. Considering thatrespondent was indubitably guilty of forum-shopping when he filed SPR No. 37-2002, his petition should have been dismissed outright by the COMELEC. Willful anddeliberate forum-shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, andconstitutes direct contempt of court.



4. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; TO OBTAIN ANNULMENT IN AN EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IN A PETITION FORCERTIORARI, IT MUST BE PROVED THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITSDISCRETION. — The petition for certiorari in SPR No. 37-2002 assailed the triacourt's orders for the execution of its decision pending appeal. The grant ofexecution pending appeal was well within the discretionary powers of the triacourt. In order to obtain the annulment of said orders in a petition for certiorari , itmust first be proved that the trial court gravely abused its discretion. He shouldshow not merely a reversible error committed by the trial court, but a grave abuseof discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. "Grave abuse of discretion"implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lackof jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner byreason of passion or personal hostility which must be so patent and gross as toamount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the dutyenjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is notenough.

5. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENTS; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL; IN

ELECTION CASES, A VALID EXERCISE OF DISCRETION TO ALLOW EXECUTIONPENDING APPEAL REQUIRES THAT IT SHOULD BE BASED UPON GOOD REASONS TOBE STATED IN A SPECIAL ORDER. — While it was indeed held that shortness of theremaining term of office and posting a bond are not good reasons, we clearly statedin Fermo v. COMELEC that: "A valid exercise of the discretion to allow executionpending appeal requires that it should be based "upon good reasons to be stated in aspecial order." The following constitute "good reasons" and a combination of two ormore of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interestinvolved or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness of the remaining portion of theterm of the contested office; and (3.) the length of time that the election contesthas been pending."

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The decision of the trial court in ElectionProtest No. 1-M (2001) was rendered on April 2, 2002, or after almost one year oftrial and revision of the questioned ballots. It found petitioner as the candidate withthe plurality of votes. Respondent appealed the said decision to the COMELEC. Inthe meantime, the three-year term of the Office of the Mayor continued to run. Thewill of the electorate, as determined by the trial court in the election protest, had tobe respected and given meaning. The Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Orientalneeded the services of a mayor even while the election protest was pending, and it

had to be the candidate judicially determined to have been chosen by the people.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BETWEEN THE DETERMINATION BY TRIAL COURT OFWHO OF THE CANDIDATES WON THE ELECTIONS AND THE FINDING OF THEBOARD OF CANVASSERS AS TO WHOM TO PROCLAIM, IT IS THE COURT'S DECISION

THAT SHOULD PREVAIL; CASE AT BAR. — Between the determination by the trialcourt of who of the candidates won the elections and the finding of the Board ofCanvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the court's decision that should prevail

This was sufficiently explained in the case of Ramas v. COMELEC in this wise: "Althat was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending



appeal was that the immediate execution should be based "upon good reasons to bestated in a special order." The rationale why such execution is allowed in electioncases is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique , "to give as much recognition to the worth ofa trial judge's decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to theproclamation by the board of canvassers." cCSDaI

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

Petitioner Edgar Y. Santos and respondent Pedro Q. Panulaya were both candidatesfor Mayor of the Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14, 2001elections. On May 16, 2001, after the votes were counted and canvassed, theMunicipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Panulaya as the duly electedMayor.

Petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of MisamisOriental, Branch 26, which was docketed as SPL Election Protest No. 1-M(2001)After trial and revision of the ballots, the trial court found that petitioner garnered2,181 votes while respondent received only 2,105. Hence, on April 2, 2002, itrendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring and proclaimingprotestant/petitioner Edgar Y. Santos as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, in the mayoralty elections held on May 14, 2001

with the plurality of Seventy Six (76) votes over and above his protagonist-protestee Pedro Q. Panulaya setting aside as null and void the proclamationof protestee made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on May 16, 2001,ordering to pay protestant/petitioner the costs and expenses that the latterincurred in this protest in accordance with Section 259 of the OmnibusElection Code of the Philippines (B.P. 881) and Section 7 of the COMELECResolution 1566, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx.

The Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby directed to furnish copy of the

DECISION to the following: Office of the Commission on Elections(COMELEC); Office of the Commission on Audit; Office of the Department of Interior and Local Government; Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Oriental, in accordance with Section 15 of the COMELEC Resolution1566.

SO ORDERED. 1

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Meanwhile, beforethe trial court could act on petitioner's motion, respondent filed on April 22, 2002



with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition for certiorari, docketed asSPR No. 20-2002, assailing the decision of the trial court. 2 Likewise on April 222002, respondent appealed the trial court's decision to the COMELEC, where it wasdocketed as EAC No. A-12-2002.

The COMELEC, in SPR No. 20-2002, issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, whicheffectively enjoined the trial court from acting on petitioner's motion for executionpending appeal. Subsequently, on August 19, 2002, the COMELEC dismissed SPR

No. 20-2002 after finding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse ofdiscretion in rendering the assailed judgment. Moreover, the COMELEC held thatthe remedy from the decision of the court a quo was to file a notice of appeal, whichrespondent precisely did in EAC No. A-12-2002. Hence, it directed the trial court todispose of all pending incidents in SPL Election Protest No. 1-M(2001) with dispatchto wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division)RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.

ACCORDINGLY, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on 16 May 2002, aswell as the Order issued on 27 April 2002 by the Commission (First Division),are hereby set aside and lifted, respectively. The Court a quo is herebydirected to dispose with immediate dispatch all pending incidents in SPL Election Case No. 1-M (2001) entitled "Edgar Y. Santos, Petitioner/Protestantversus Pedro Q. Panulaya, Respondent/Protestee."

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED. (emphasis ours) 3

Thus, on August 20, 2002, the trial court issued an Order as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby upholds andapproves the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Further, finding goodreasons therefor, the Court hereby directs and orders the immediateexecution of the Decision promulgated on April 18, 2002, and as prayed forinstall protestant/petitioner EDGAR Y. SANTOS as the duly elected Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, to take his oath of office and assume thefunctions and duties of Mayor after he shall have filed a bond of OneHundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

SO ORDERED. 4

After petitioner posted the required bond, the trial court issued the Writ ofExecution, 5 thereby installing petitioner as Municipal Mayor of Balingoan, MisamisOriental. Accordingly, petitioner took his oath of office and thereafter assumed theduties and functions of his office. ISADET

On August 21, 2002, respondent filed with the COMELEC a motion forreconsideration of the dismissal of his petition in SPR No. 20-2002. 6 After five days



or on August 26, 2002, he filed a supplemental petition in SPR No. 20-2002, 7

wherein he prayed:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, petitioner [herein respondent]respectfully prays unto this Honorable Commission that the following Ordersof the public respondent:

1. Resolution dated 20 August 2002;

2. Order dated 20 August 2002;

3. Writ of execution dated 21 August 2002;

Be nullified and set aside.

It is further prayed that in the event that the public respondent has carriedout its Order of ousting petitioner [herein respondent] from his position asMayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, that the same be nullified andconsidered of no legal effect. It is likewise prayed that a STATUS QUO ANTE

ORDER be issued by the Honorable Commission in order to reinstate thepetitioner to his rightful position as Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental.

Other reliefs, just and equitable are likewise prayed for. 8

Barely two days later, on August 28, 2002, and while his motion for reconsiderationand supplemental petition in SPR No. 20-2002 were pending, respondent filedanother petition with the COMELEC, docketed as SPR No. 37-2002. 9 The petitioncontained the same prayer as that in the supplemental petition filed in SPR 20-2002, viz :

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, petitioner [herein respondent] respectfully prays unto this Honorable Commission that immediately upon the filing of the herein petition, the following Orders of the public respondent:

1. Resolution dated 20 August 2002;

2. Order dated 20 August 2002,

3. Writ of execution dated 21 August 2002;

Be nullified and set aside.

Pending trial and final judgment, and soon after the issuance, but during theeffectivity of the Temporary Restraining Order, a Writ of PreliminaryInjunction be issued prohibiting, restraining and/or enjoining the publicrespondent from further implementing the highly unjust, irregular andoppressive Orders above-quoted;

It is further prayed that in the event that the public respondent has carried out its Order of ousting petitioner [herein respondent] from his position as Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, that the same be nullified and



considered of no legal effect. It is likewise prayed that a STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER be issued by the Honorable Commission in order to reinstate the petitioner to his rightful position as Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental.

Upon due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of thepetitioner [herein respondent] and against the respondent [herein petitioner]as follows:

1. Making the Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction permanent;

2. Declaring Resolution dated 20 August 2002, Order dated 20 August2002, and Writ of Execution dated 21 August 2002; as null and voidfor being highly unjust, irregular and oppressively prepared in utterviolation of the Constitutional provisions on equal protection of thelaws and due process, and for having been rendered with grave abuseof discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

3. A writ of Prohibition be issued specifically commanding publicrespondent to cease and desist from further implementing the highly

unjust, irregular and oppressive Orders above-mentioned areconcerned (sic) ; and

4. Ordering the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

Such other reliefs and remedies, as are just and equitable in the premises,are likewise prayed for. 10

On September 3, 2002, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order directing the partiesto maintain the status quo ante and enjoining petitioner from assuming thefunctions of Mayor. Pertinent portion of the Order reads:

In the interest of justice and so as not to render moot and academic theissues raised in the petition, the Commission (First Division) hereby directsthe parties to maintain the status quo ante , which is the condition prevailingbefore the issuance and implementation of the questioned Order of thecourt a quo dated August 20, 2002 and the Writ of Execution issuedpursuant thereto dated August 21, 2002, in SPL. ELECTION CASE NO. 1-M(2001) entitled "EDGAR Y. SANTOS versus PEDRO Q. PANULAYA."Accordingly, effective immediately, private respondent EDGAR Y. SANTOS ishereby ordered to cease and desist from assuming the duties and functionsof the office of Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental until further ordersfrom this Commission. 11

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Order. However, theCOMELEC First Division did not refer the said motion to the COMELEC En BancHence, petitioner, citing our ruling in Kho v. COMELEC, 12 brought the instantspecial civil action for certiorari with this Court.

Meanwhile, on September 9, 2002, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) ToDissolve The Status Quo Order As It Was Based On An Unverified And DismissedPetition With Pending Motion For Reconsideration; And (2) To Refer This Motion To



The Commission En Banc Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules ofProcedure." 13 On October 14, 2002, the COMELEC issued a Resolution in SPR No.37-2002, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED.Accordingly, the August 20, 2002 Resolution of the respondent judgegranting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal as well as his Order alsodated August 20, 2002 directing the issuance of the Writ of Execution and

his Writ of Execution dated August 21, 2002 are hereby set aside. PrivateRespondent Edgar Y. Santos is enjoined from assuming the function of mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental until the final determination of theelection appeal case.

This resolution shall be immediately executory.

The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) is herebyrequested to assist in the peaceful and orderly implementation of this

Resolution.

SO ORDERED. 14

The petition is impressed with merit. IaDTES

It is at once apparent from the records, as shown above, that respondent was guiltyof forum-shopping when he instituted SPR No. 37-2002 with the COMELEC. Forum-shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has beenrendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion inanother forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may alsobe the institution of two or more action or proceedings grounded on the same causeon the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable dispositionFor it to exist, there should be (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties aswould represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights assertedand relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity ofthe two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other actionwill, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the actionunder consideration. 15

In the case at bar, respondent obtained an adverse decision when his petition in SPR

No. 20-2002 was dismissed by the COMELEC. He thereafter filed a motion forreconsideration and a supplemental petition, praying for the nullification of the triacourt's order for the execution of its decision pending appeal. Two days after filingthe supplemental petition, and while the same was very much pending before theCOMELEC, he filed a wholly separate petition for certiorari, docketed as SPR No. 37-2002, wherein he pleaded the same reliefs prayed for in the supplemental petition

This is plainly evident from the respective prayers in the supplemental petition andthe petition for certiorari as reproduced hereinabove. In doing so, respondent, beforeallowing the COMELEC to fully resolve the incidents in SPR No. 20-2002, both ofwhich were at his own instance, sought to increase his chances of securing a



favorable decision in another petition. He filed the second petition on thesupposition that the COMELEC might look with favor upon his reliefs.

Forum-shopping is considered a pernicious evil; it adversely affects the efficientadministration of justice since it clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens thefinancial and human resources of the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judiciaprocesses. 16 The most important factor in determining the existence of forumshopping is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks

different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same osubstantially the same reliefs. 17

Considering that respondent was indubitably guilty of forum-shopping when he filedSPR No. 37-2002, his petition should have been dismissed outright by theCOMELEC. 18 Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for summarydismissal of the case, and constitutes direct contempt of court. 19

The petition for certiorari in SPR No. 37-2002 assailed the trial court's orders for theexecution of its decision pending appeal. The grant of execution pending appeal was

well within the discretionary powers of the trial court. In order to obtain theannulment of said orders in a petition for certiorari, it must first be proved that thetrial court gravely abused its discretion. He should show not merely a reversibleerror committed by the trial court, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lackor excess of jurisdiction. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious andwhimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where thepower is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion orpersonal hostility which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion ofpositive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all incontemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. 20

We find that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court. In itsorder granting execution pending appeal, it held:

It is of judicial notice that for the public official elected last May 14, 2001elections only a short period is left. Relative to this Court's jurisdiction overthe instant case, the settled rule that the mere filing of the notice of appealdoes not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and to resolvepending incidents, i.e., motion for execution pending appeal (Asmala vs.COMELEC, 289 SCRA 745) need not be overemphasized. 21

However, the COMELEC set aside the aforesaid order, saying that shortness of termalone is not a good reason for execution of a judgment pending appeal. We disagree.

While it was indeed held that shortness of the remaining term of office and postinga bond are not good reasons, we clearly stated in Fermo v. COMELEC 22 that:

A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requiresthat it should be based "upon good reasons to be stated in a special order."

The following constitute "good reasons" and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interestinvolved or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness of the remaining portion



of the term of the contested office; and (3.) the length of time that theelection contest has been pending (italics supplied). 23

The decision of the trial court in Election Protest No. 1-M(2001) was rendered onApril 2, 2002, or after almost one year of trial and revision of the questioned ballotsIt found petitioner as the candidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent appealedthe said decision to the COMELEC. In the meantime, the three-year term of theOffice of the Mayor continued to run. The will of the electorate, as determined by

the trial court in the election protest, had to be respected and given meaning. TheMunicipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, needed the services of a mayor evenwhile the election protest was pending, and it had to be the candidate judiciallydetermined to have been chosen by the people.

Between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates won theelections and the finding of the Board of Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it isthe court's decision that should prevail. This was sufficiently explained in the case oRamas v. COMELEC 24 in this wise:

All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow executionpending appeal was that the immediate execution should be based "upongood reasons to be stated in a special order." The rationale why suchexecution is allowed in election cases is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique , 25 "togive as much recognition to the worth of a trial judge's decision as thatwhich is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers." Thus:

Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice asbasis of the right to assume office, subject to future contingenciesattendant to a protest, and not the decision of a court of justice?

Indeed, when it is considered that the board of canvassers iscomposed of persons who are less technically prepared to make anaccurate appreciation of the ballots, apart from their being more aptto yield to extraneous considerations, and that the board must actsummarily, practically racing against time, while, on the other hand,the judge has benefit of all the evidence the parties can offer and of admittedly better technical preparation and background, apart fromhis being allowed ample time for conscientious study and maturedeliberation before rendering judgment, one cannot but perceive thewisdom of allowing the immediate execution of decisions in election

cases adverse to the protestees, notwithstanding the perfection andpendency of appeals therefrom, as long as there are, in the sounddiscretion of the court, good reasons therefor.

To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appealwould, in the words of Tobon Uy v. COMELEC, 26

bring back the ghost of the "grab-the-proclamation-prolong theprotest" techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in thepast in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. Thiswould, as a consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate. 27



Thus, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due courseinstead of dismissing outright, the petition in SPR No. 37-2002 despite the clearshowing that respondent was guilty of forum-shopping; and in setting aside the triacourt's order granting execution pending appeal.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orderdated September 3, 2002 and the Resolution dated October 14, 2002 of theCommission on Elections in SPR No. 37-2002 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the

said case is ordered DISMISSED on the ground of forum-shopping. The Order datedAugust 20, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 26,granting the execution pending appeal of its decision in Election Protest No. 1-M(2001), and the Writ of Execution dated August 21, 2002, are REINSTATED. Thefull enforcement of the said Writ must forthwith be made. The court of origin shaltransmit immediately to the Commission on Elections the records of SPL ElectionCase No. 1-M(2001), and the Commission on Elections shall dispose of the appeal inEAC No. A-12-2002 with deliberate dispatch.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Srand Azcuna, J J., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo , pp. 106–107; penned by Presiding Judge Joaquin M. Murillo.

2. Rollo , pp. 42–84.

3. Rollo , pp. 126–132, at 131; First Division composed of Presiding CommissionerRufino SB. Javier, Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco and CommissionerResurreccion Z. Borra; Commissioner Tancangco, ponente .

4. Rollo , pp. 102–104, at 104.

5. Rollo , pp. 106–108.

6. Rollo , pp. 85–91.

7. Rollo , pp. 92–101.

8. Id., at 98–99.

9. Rollo , pp. 31–41.



10. Id., at 37–38.

11. Rollo , p. 28; First Division composed of Presiding Commissioner Rufino SB. Javierand Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Resurreccion Z. Borra.

12. 344 Phil. 878 [1997]. "In a situation such as this where the Commission indivision committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action pending before it

and the controversy did not fall under any of the instances mentioned in Section 2Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party isnot to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not permissibleunder its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorarunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court" (at 888).

13. Rollo , pp. 109–115.

14. Rollo , pp. 116–125, at 124–125; First Division composed of CommissionersRufino SB. Javier, Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Resurreccion Z. Borra;Commissioner Tancangco, ponente .

15. GSIS v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 141454, 31 January 2002.

16. Canuto, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. , 412 Phil. 467, 474[2001].

17. Roxas v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 139337, 15 August 2001, 363 SCRA 207, at218.

18. Candido, et al. v. Camacho, et al., G.R. No. 136751, 15 January 2002.

19. Republic of the Philippines v. Carmel Development, Inc. , G.R. No. 142572, 20February 2002.

20. The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. NationaLabor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 113541, 22 November 2001.

21. Rollo , p. 122.

22. 384 Phil. 584 [2000].

23. Id., at 592.

24. 349 Phil. 857 [1998].

25. G.R. No. L-40415, 27 June 1975, 64 SCRA 494.

26. G.R. Nos. 88158 & 97108-09, 4 March 1992, 206 SCRA 779.

27. Supra , note 23, at 869–870.



Documents

81. Santos v. Comelec