8017-Taggants in Explosives

Taggants in Explosives

April 1980

NTIS order #PB80-192719

.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 80-600070

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OfficeWashington, D.C. 20402 Stock No. 052-003-00747-9

Foreword

This assessment was made in response to a request from the Senate Committeeon Governmental Affairs that OTA examine the issues surrounding a proposal to re-quire that commercial explosives and gunpowders be manufactured with “tag-gants” as an aid to law enforcement. Two types of taggants are contemplated:

● “identification taggants” would be designed to survive an explosion, and wouldcarry a code which would enable those who recovered such taggants from thedebris of a criminal bombing to assemble a list of the last legal purchasers ofthe batch of explosives used to make the bomb;

● “detection taggants” would be designed to emit a vapor which would escapefrom a suitcase, package, etc., so that a taggant-sensing machine at an airportor public building could detect the presence of concealed explosives.

The proposal to require taggants is generally viewed as helpful by the law en-forcement community, and opposed by the manufacturers of explosives (and someothers) on the grounds that taggants would be ineffective, unsafe, and too costly.

The report addresses four major questions. First, it reviews the program to de-velop such taggants, and addresses the question of whether taggants would in factwork. Second, it assesses the question of whether adding such taggants to explosivesand gunpowders might create a safety hazard. Third, the cost of a taggant program(on the assumption taggants work and are safe) is calculated, and the major parame-ters which would affect its costs are identified. Finally, the study assesses the likelyvalue of such a program (assuming that taggants work, are safe, and are available ata reasonable cost) to law enforcement.

The project was directed by Dr. Peter Sharfman, Program Manager for International Security and Commerce within OTA’S Energy, Materials, and InternationalSecurity Division, headed by Assistant Director Lionel S. Johns. The principal investigator was David Garfinkle of Science Applications, Inc.

OTA is grateful for the assistance of its Taggants in Explosives Advisory Panel,as well as for the assistance provided by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire-arms of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Institute of Makers of Explosives,the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute, the 3M Company, andthe Federal Aviation Administration.

JOHN H. GIBBONSDirector

. . .Ill

Taggants in Explosives Project Advisory Panel

Sanford Kadish, ChairmanDean, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley

Tom Ashwood Robert E. Hodgdon

Air Line Pilots Association president, Hodgdon powder Co., Inc., andPyrodex Corp.

Jerome S. Browerpresident, /. S. Brower & Associates, Inc. Neal Knox

H. J. Burchellpresident, At/a

Charles E. Cal feeSpecial Agent

Executive Director, Institute forLegislative Action

Powder Co. National Rifle Association

Lynn LimmerDirector, Department of Public Safety

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Robert R. Dimock, Jr.Utah Copper DivisionKennecott Copper

Ernest H. EvansBrookings Institution

Henry EyringDepartment of ChemistryUniversity of Utah

Eugene H. EysterLos Alarnos Scientific Lab.

Rona M. FieldsConsultant in Psychology

Gary L. HendricksonDane Count y Sheriff’s DepartmentMadison, Wise.

Dallas-Fort Worth Airport

Alexander v. d. LuftDirector, Internationa/ Operations

Explosives products DivisionE. 1. du Pent de Nemours & Co.

Hugh M. McGowanNew York City Police Department

William T. PoeLouisiana State Police

Theodore J. SullivanNaval Surface Weapons Center

Robert W. Van DolahPittsburgh, Pa.

Charles O. WilliamsOlin Corp.

NOTE: The advisory panel provided advice and critique throughout the assessment, but does not necessarilyapprove, disapprove, or endorse the report, for which OTA assumes fulI responsibility.

Taggants in Explosives Project Staff

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTAEnergy, Materials, and International Security Division

Peter Sharf man, Program ManagerInternational Security and Commerce Program

David R. Garfinkle, Principal /investigator(under contract with Science Applications, Inc.)

Administrative Staff

Dorothy Richroath Jacqueline Robinson

GIoria Proctor Helena Hassell

Contractors

Edward James, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

Steve Kornish

Roland R. Franzen, Physics Internationa/ Co.

James A. Henderson, Jr.

OTA Publishing Staff

John C

Kathie S. Boss

Marvin Liebstone, Science Applications, Inc.

Rowland B. Shriver, J r., Science Applications, Inc.

Susan Katznelson

Mark Starinsky

Holmes, Publishing Officer

Debra M. Datcher Joanne Heming

v

Contents

Chapter1.

I l .

I l l .

Iv.v.

V1.

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . .

Detailed Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Taggant Research Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . .

Taggant Safety and Compatibility Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Taggant Cost Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Taggant Utility Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendixes

A. Letterof Request. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B. Detection and identification Taggants and Criminal Bombings–

Summary and Questionnaire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .C. OTA Recovery Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .D. Products Liability implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusionof

Taggants in Explosives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .E. Suitability of ANFO as aFiller for Criminal Bombs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .F. Derivation of Bombing StatistG. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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202227233262

Chapter I

SUMMARY

. .

Chapter L-SUMMARY

Page

Introduction ***. *.. **. **. **** **. **** *.. .*. **e**************** 3ResearchApproach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Some Project Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

SummaryofFindings .**.*..* . . . . . . . . . .***..*.. .**.**.*. ● * * . . * . . 9Taggant Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9TaggantCost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......11Technical Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......12Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......12

ContinuingControversies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...0..0. ..0..0.. 13Significance of Compatibility Testing to Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......13Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......14Blasting Agents(ANFO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......14Survivability and Recovery of Taggants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......15Development Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....16

Congressional Options . . . . . . . . ● . .* . .*. . . . . .***** ● . .0.. . . . ● * * O . * 16

TABLES

Page

l. MajorSourcesof information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52. Current Status of Taggant Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73. Summary of Current Status of Taggants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94, Minimum Bombing Incidents Statistics Summary . . . . . . . . . . .......105. Praportions of Bombings Attributed to Groups of Perpetrators. .. ....10

Chapter I

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

At the request of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the Office ofTechnology Assessment has undertaken an analysis of the proposal to mandate theuse of taggants in explosive materials manufactured for commercial use. A “tag-gant” is a material that might be added to explosives and gunpowders* at the timeof manufacture, as an eventual aid to law enforcement. This study assesses the ex-isting taggant technology in order to assist Congress in its decision whether to adoptlegislation which would require taggants in explosives and gunpowders.

Two different kinds of taggants are being developed for possible incorporationin chemical explosives, and it has been proposed that both be required. Identificationtaggants are designed to survive the detonation of an explosive, and to be retrievedfrom the debris. They would contain a code identifying the batch of explosives orgunpowder used in a particular bombing. The intent of those advocating the devel-opment of such taggants is that law enforcement officers investigating a criminalbombing would retrieve identification taggants and decode them, could then begintheir investigation knowing what kind of explosive material had been used, andwould be able to obtain a list of the last legal purchasers of these explosives andgunpowders. At the present time the leading contender for an identification taggantis a color-coded microscopic plastic chip which has been developed by the 3M Co.

Detection taggants are designed to be sensed by a suitable detection machineeven when contained in a package. The intent of those developing detection tag-gants is that detection machines at airports, public building entrances, and other ap-propriate sites would signal any effort to introduce explosive materials into thearea. In facilities not normally protected by such devices, portable detection sen-sors could be used to search the facility in response to a threat. The leading con-tender for a detection taggant is a microcapsule which would emit small quantitiesof a vapor whose molecules are so distinctive that a suitable sensing instrument(which is under parallel development) could detect a parts-per-trillion concentra-tion.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire-arms (BATF) of the Department of the Treas-ury, which is the executive agency that hasjurisdiction over most crimes involving high ex-plosives, has sponsored a program to developtaggants, Most of the effort has been carriedout or supervised by the Aerospace Corp., un-der contract to BATF. Neither identificationtaggants nor detection taggants have been ful-

● The term gunpowder includes black and smokeless powdersand pyrodex (a registered trademark of thePyrodex Corp) ablack powder subst i tu te

Iy developed and tested; the detection tagganteffort is less advanced than the identificationtaggant effort.

Legislation proposed in the U.S. Senatewould make it unlawfuI (in the words of S. 333)// for any person or persons to manufacture. . .any explosive material which does not con-tain . .“ both detection taggants and iden-tification taggants, a n d w o u l d r e q u i r e t h a tmanufacturers and distributors keep recordsshowing the distribution chain for each batchof explosive material that carried a separate

3

4 ● Taggants in Explosives

identification taggant code. (Similar legisla-tion has been proposed in the House of Repre-sentatives. ) The Secretary of the TreasurywouId issue regulations implementing this re-quirement, and such regulations would bephased in as testing was completed and tag-gants became avaiIable in sufficient quantity.

At hearings on this proposal, representativesof the explosives and gunpowder industriesand others expressed opposition to this pro-posal on the grounds that:

●

●

●

●

it is premature to consider explosives tag-ging legislation while development and test-ing of taggants have not been completed;taggants may be unsafe, since they wouldrequire adding a foreign substance to the ex-plosive materials;a taggant program would be extremely cost-ly; anda taggant program would not, in fact, havemuch utility for law enforcement.

Proponents of a taggant program have coun-tered that:

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●

●

taggants are inert materials, no more unsafethan current additives to explosives and gun-powder;a taggant program need not be unduly cost-ly; andbombings are extremely difficult crimes toprevent or solve using existing methods, andtaggants would provide an extremely usefultool to law enforcement agenices.

The Senate Committee on Governmental Af-fairs has requested that OTA review the avail-able data on explosive taggant technology,and conduct an assessment which would ad-dress;

1.

2.

3.

4.

the safety of adding taggants to explo-sives;the postdetonation survivability and re-coverability of identification taggants;the cost impact of a taggant program onthe explosives industry and users;the utility of a taggant program to law en-forcement;

5.

6

7

The

the effects on cost and utility of excludingcertain explosive materials from the tag-gant program;the removal of taggants from tagged ex-plosives; andalternatives to a taggant program.

text of the request letter is included as ap-pendix A.

The proposal to require that taggants beadded to commercial explosives at the time ofmanufacture has aroused intense controversy.While OTA believes that this report will serveto narrow many of the areas of controversy,there are a number of issues on which theavailable data do not permit a scientificallyconclusive finding. OTA has therefore made anumber of judgments based on the availableevidence where conclusive proof was lack ing.In some cases these judgments, and the reason-ing underlying them, have proved unpersua-sive to one side or another in the controversy.Therefore, the final section of this chaptercalls attention to the major areas in which oneor more affected parties may disagree with theOTA findings.

Research Approach

In order to assess the impacts of a taggantprogram, a two-stage approach has been nec-essary. As the first stage, an analysis has beenmade of the safety and technical efficacy ofthe taggants at the current state of develop-ment, since cost and utility are moot points ifthe taggants are not safe and do not work. Asthe second stage, an assumption has beenmade that the taggants work and are safe anda parametric analysis of costs and utility madeas a function of the specific implementationplan.

Due to severe time constraints, OTA did lit-tle original research; instead, an intensive re-view of existing research was supplemented bydiscussions with manufacturers, distributors,and users of explosives and gunpowders, andwith law enforcement personnel and experts

Ch. l—Summary ● 5

on terrorism. Table 1 summarizes the majorsources consuIted.

I n addition, OTA sent a questionnaire to ap-proximately 950 members of the InternationalAssociation of Chiefs of Police (IACP) askingthem to assess the utility of taggants. (TheIACP membership list was chosen because itconstituted a broad cross section of the law en-forcement community. ) The questionnaire wassent to a random sample of the IACP members,and the low response rate (about 15 percent)probably created a bias towards those with in-terest in, and knowledge of, the subject. (Apossible misconception may have been intro-duced by the explanatory material introducingthe questionnaire, which inadvertently indi-cated that identification taggants could iden-tify the last legal purchaser of explosives usedin a bombing, rather than identifying a list oflast legal purchasers. ) The results of the ques-tionnaire, interpreted with considerable cau-

tion, are integrated into theVI, and reported in detail in

analysis in chapterappendix B.

OTA also directed a series of tests on the re-coverability of the 3M identification taggant.The Aerospace Corp. had conducted a largenumber of laboratory tests on the survivabilityof the 3M identification taggants, but the onlyinformation on the recovery of taggants underf ie ld condit ions came from poor ly docu-mented demonstrations and training tests, con-ducted by BATF, the Federal Bureau of investi-gation, and other organizations. These tests,and others conducted by the Institute of Mak-ers of Explosives, had produced conflictingand contradictory results. OTA planned andsupervised a limited series of tests of the post-detonation recovery process of taggants fromautomobiIes. The resuIts of these tests are inte-grated into the findings, and described in de-tail in appendix C.

Table.–Major Sources of Information

ManufacturersExplosives manufacturers (Du Pent, Atlas, Independent, Goex, Hercules)Gunpowder manufacturers (Hercules, Goex, Olin, Pyrodex )Manufacturer of identification taggants (3M Co. )

Trade organizationsInstitute of Makers of Explosives(I ME)Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute (SAAMI)

Consumer organizationsNational Rifle Association (NRA)National Muzzle Loaders Association (NM LA)

Organizations developing a taggant programBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms of the U S. Treasury

Department (BATF)Aerospace Corp. (BATF contractor)

Organizations involved in taggant researchManagement Sciences AssociatesInstitute for Defense AnalysesLawrence Livermore Laboratories

Explosives and gunpowder distributorsB, F HodgdonTri-State Explosives

Gunpowder retailerThe Bullet Hole

Explosives usersCopper mines (Bingham Canyon open pit mine. Crow Fork

underground mine)

Explosives users–continuedCoal Mine (Webster Coal Co. )(Quarries (Tri-State, Rockville Crushed Stone)Construction firm (Guy Atkinson)Blasting contractor (Tri-State Explosives)

Law enforcement personnelNew York, N.Y,San Mateo County, Calif,Dallas-Fort Worth Airport, Tex,Summit County, OhioWashington, DC.

Experts on terrorists and terrorismExperts from foreign and domestic law enforcement agenciesWriters on the subject (Dr. Ernest Evans, Dr. Rona Fields,

Dr. Robert Kupperman)

Foreign law enforcement sourcesWest GermanyEnglandIrelandInterpol

U.S. Federal agenciesFederal Bureau of InvestigationFederal Avation AdministrationBureau of MinesDepartment of TransportationU.s. Army (Corps of Engineers, Criminal Investigation Division,

Development and Research Command)

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment


Photo credit Kennecott Copper Co.

[explosives are util ized extensively at the Bingham Canyon open pit copper mine

S o m e P r o j e c t L i m i t a t i o n s

There are three general limitations to thecompleteness of this analysis of the proposalto legislate the use of taggants in explosive ma-terials. The primary limitation is caused by thepreliminary nature of the taggant research–much data are simply not available. Additionalinformation is req Jired on all aspects of theanalysis—technical efficacy, safety, cost, andutility. Table 2 summarizes the research con-ducted to date.

Preliminary safety testing has been con-ducted on only a portion of the materials towhich identification taggants would be added,and compatibility testing has barely begun

with detection taggants. Evidence has beenfound of reactivity (using high taggant concen-trations at elevated temperatures) between the3M identification taggants and one type ofsmokeless powder, as well as one booster ma-terial. This reactivity creates a presumption ofincompatibil ity. Until this presumed incom-patibility is resolved, taggants cannot be safelyadded to these explosive materials. Resolutionof the problem may result in s igni f icantchanges in the taggants, requiring a new set ofcompatibility tests and perhaps changing thebasis of the cost analysis. If the problem is re-solved, more data still need to be generated.The lack of data on long-term effects, in termsof safety, stability, and performance, especial-ly on products such as gels and slurries, is par-


Photo credit U S Department of fhe Treasury

Photograph of automobiles utilized in the OTA taggant recovery test

Table 2.–Current State of Taggant Researcha

ID taggants Detection taggants

Compatibility Survival recovery Compatibility

C a p s e n s i t i v e . Preliminary finished Preliminary finished Preliminary underwayB o o s t e r s Preliminary underway–compatibility problem identified Preliminary underway Testing initiatedDetonators . ., Prelimmary underway Preliminary underway Testing initiatedB l a s t l n g a g e n t s . , . , . , None None NoneDetonating cord ., . . None Testing initiated Testing initiatedBlack powder ., . . . . Preliminary finished Preliminary underway Preliminary underwaySmokeless powder ... . . Preliminary underway–compatibility problem identified Preliminary underway Testing initiatedMilitary explosives ., ., None None None

aAs of mid-January 1980


8 . Taggants in Explosives

ticularly important. As a result of this uncer-tainty, not even preliminary indications ofsafety are possible at this time, much less thedemonstrations recessary before a taggantproposal could safely be implemented.

While preliminary research has been con-ducted on the survivability and recoverabilityof the 3M identification taggants, only a por-tion of the explosive materials which might betagged was tested, and that research is poorlydocumented. Hundreds of possible detectiontaggants have been screened to yield five can-didate materials, but detailed testing of theproperties of those materials is barely under-way. Similarly, three candidate detection sen-sors have been identified, and Iimited Labora-tory testing of preliminary or “breadboard”models completed. Methods of air samplingare also at a preliminary stage. Thus, estimatesof technical efficacy can only be made on thebasis of preliminary data.

As a result of the pilot test program, reason-able data are available for the analysis of thecost impact of adding taggants during themanufacture of cap-sensitive high explosives,at least for those companies which partici-pated in the program. The data, however, onthe cost impact of adding taggants during themanufacture of the other types of explosivematerials (for exalmple, gunpowder) are lessadequate. While firm estimates of the cost ofunencapsulated identification taggants areavailable from 3M under a variety of imple-mentation conditions, little data are availablefor the cost of encapsulated identification tag-gants (a more likely baseline case) or for thecost of detection taggants. Only the grossestestimates have been made of recordkeepingcosts, and the estimates by both the propo-nents and opponents are open to some ques-tions of objectivity. Rule-of-thumb engineeringestimates have been made for the candidatesensor systems costs, but the accuracy of thoseestimates cannot be very precise as neitherproduction rate, tc)tal production, nor specifi-cations have been established.

So far, identification tagging of explosiveshas played a part in only one criminal case that

has reached a courtroom. (Those investigatingand prosecuting the case considered evidencefrom taggants very helpful.) Quantification ofthe utility of taggants (identification as well asdetection) is therefore simply not possible, par-ticularly given the inadequacy of bombing sta-tistics. Experience with the date-shift code(which facilitates tracing of undetonated ex-plosives) provides useful data, as does the ex-perience of foreign countries, but the availableinformation on the utility of taggants is pre-ponderantly qualitative in nature.

A second general limitation to the complete-ness of the analysis, imposed by Iimits on avail-able time and resources, is that only a limitedsample of the population concerned with thestudy could be contacted. As a result, cost dataderived from a detailed analysis of one or twocompanies have been assumed to be represent-ative of an entire segment of an industry, suchas underground coal mining or retail sale ofgunpowders. Similarly, processes for addingtaggants, reworking of waste material, qualitycontrol, compatibil ity testing, and storage,which are applicable to a segment of the man-ufacturers of explosive materials, have beenassumed to be universal for the purpose ofgenerating cost estimates. A more serious man-ifestation of the limited sample size is that in-depth discussions of the utility of identifica-tion and detection taggants to law enforce-ment and security personnel could only beheld with a small number of organizations. Asthe bomber threat varies considerably fromone part of the country to another, it is diffi-cult to generalize the results of those discus-sions.

The third limitation on the analysis is caused bythe language of the draft legislation, S. 333. Thebill calls for tagging of all “explosive materi-als, ” which does not appear practicable if thephrase is strictly interpreted to include the tag-ging of blasting agents that are mixed the sameday they are detonated, and otherwise offersno guidance for the implementation regula-tions which the Secretary of the Treasurywould promulgate.


SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This assessment distinguishes between anevaluation of the present state of developmentof taggants and a projection of the cost andutility of a taggant program if and when thenecessary development and testing are suc-cessfully completed. A detailed evaluation ofthe development status of the identificationand detection taggants is contained in chapterI I 1. A crucial factor in the development statusevaluation concerns the safety of adding tag-gants to explosives; the safety and generalcompatibility analysis is contained in chapterIV. OTA then separately evaluated the costand utility of a program to add taggants tocommercial explosive materials. For this anal-ysis, it was assumed that the baseline identifi-

cation and detection taggants had successful Iycompleted the development process, includinga resolution of the safety issues. These anal-yses are contained, respectively, in chapters Vand VI. Details of these and other findings aregiven in chapter 11. The principal findings areshown in table 3 and briefly summarized be-low.

Taggant U t i l i t y

Assuming, for purposes of analysis, that stabil-ity questions are successfully resolved and thattechnical development is successfully completed,both identification taggants and detection tag-

Table 3.–Stimmary of Current Status of Taggants

Idenhf!cation taggants Detection taggants

safetyDynamites, gels. slurries, No change in sensitivity, stability No reported data; testing initiatedBlack powder . No change in sens i t iv i ty , s tabddy No reported data; testing initiatedS m o k e l e s s p o w d e r Reactivity with Herco’ powder observed, No reported data, testing initiated

incompatibility presumedB o o s t e r m a t e r i a l s Reactivity with Composition B observed, No reported data; testing initaited

incompatibility presumedBlasting agents ., No data No data

Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . Limited testing No data

SurvivabilityFavorable conditions. Yes N/AFire ., ., Probable N/AConfinement : Insufficient data N/A

RecoverabilityF i e l d r e c o v e r y . , Probable if survive N/AF i e l d r e a d i n g Unlikely N/ALaboratory reading Almost a l l condi t ions NIA

Sensor development. . . . . . . N/A Early stages

utilityLow-value targets Little Virtually noneHigh-value targets, no

countermeasures High HighHigh-value, Including

c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s High, due to Increased risks High for all but most sophisticatedbombers

Cost, $ millions/year Identification Detecioon Both

Low-level program (ID tag code for each product changede a c h y e a r . A N F O e x c l u d e d )a . $15 $22 $30

Baseline program (ID tag code for each product changedfor each date/shift, ANFO excluded) . 25 25 45

High-level program (ID tag changed for each 10,000-lbbatch, ANFO Included) . . 215 65 268

N/A not applicableaThese programs are defined in detail in ch v

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment


gants would be useful law enforcement toolsagainst most terrorist and other criminal bomb-ers. Their utility against certain types of bomberswould probably be quite high; their utility againstthe most sophisticated of terrorists and profes-sional criminals is open to question.

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Data on the number and kinds of bombingscommitted are dispersed and inconsistent.Table 4 gives an idea of the magnitude ofthe problem; its significance is discussed inchapter II and the derivation of the figuresin appendix F. OTA diligently sought to findor reliably derive data from which one couldcalculate the number of bombings that ataggant program would solve or deter, andfound this an impossible task.

Criminal bombings are committed by a widerange of perpetrators, including both “individu-als and groups. It is helpful to group criminalbombers into four categories, which differ

Table 4,–Minimum Bombing Incidents Statistics Summary a

BATF FBI

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Item 1977 1978 1977 1978Explosive bombings, number. ., ... l,037b 896b 867 768Undetonated explosive bombs, number. 319 287 118 105Incendiary bombings, number . . , 339 446 248 349Unignited incendiary bombs, number ., 81 71 85 79Criminal accidents, number ., ., ., ., 21 67 – –Property damage from bombings,

millions of dollars c d . ., . . . . . . $ 10 $ 17 $ 9 $ 9Injuries c ., ., . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 185 162 135People killed by bombingsc ., , ., , 38 23 22 18a BATF reported 3.177 total Incidents in 1977 and 3,256 in 1978 Total incidents include ac-

cidents, threats deized and recovered explosives, and hoaxes as well as axtual explosives and in-cendiary bombings The OTA stud/ was concerned only with explosive bombings

b of these 953 in 1977 and 787 m 1978 were against substantial targetsc lncludes both explosive and incendiary bombings OTA was unable to obtain Separate figures forthe number of criminal accidents, injuries, deaths, and property damage caused by Incendiarybombs Incendiary bombs and bombings would not be affected by taggant program

d Actual value probably considerably higher due 10 lack Of data file updates

SOURCE SOURCE: BATF 1978 Explosives Incidents Report. FBI Uniform Crome Report. Bomb Report.1978 See app F for a dicussion of the derivation of these figures

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greatly in their motivation, skill, training, re-sources, and ability to respond to a changingenforcement environment. They are definedand their proportions estimated in table 5.Note that despite the tendency for somegroups to claim “credit” for a bombing, amotive was established for only 23 percentof the bombings reported to BATF in 1977and only 38 percent in 1978; table 5 is basedon the assumption that the distribution ofmotives was the same for the numerous inci-dents in which law enforcement officialswere unable to assign a motive.

Identification taggants would facilitate the in-vestigation of almost all significant criminalbombings in which commercial explosiveswere used. Due to the need for laboratory in-volvement in the taggant recovery process,the taggants would probably not enter intoinvestigations of bombings that produce nocasualties and I ittle property damage.

Detection taggants would be very effective inprotecting those high-value targets where pro-tection by detection taggant sensors is feasible.The improvement in protection of such po-tential targets would be quite substantial.However, most current bombings take placeagainst targets that are unlikely to be pro-tected by detection taggant sensors.

Adding taggants to blasting agents would havesome utility, but the incremental utility wouldbe small compared to the utility of tagging cap-sensitive high explosives, gunpowders, anddetonators (and the incremental cost would behigh). A taggant program that did not in-clude gunpowders would be of relativelylimited utility as pipe bombs filled with gun-powder are used in a substantial number of

Table 5.–Proportions of Bombings Attributed to Groups of Perpetrators (average for years 1974-78)

Percentage Estimated numberBomber type Characteristics of bombings in 1978a

Terrorists. . . ., ., ., ... Highly motivated, varied skill levels, act in groups, continuing involvement 12 107Criminals . . . ., . . . . . . Varied motivations, varied skill levels, act alone or in small groups, 11 98

repeated activities, specific targetsMentally disturbed ., ., ., . . . . Highly motivated, poorly trained, act alone, seldom repeat crimes 38 340V a n d a l s a n d e x p e r i m e n t e r s , Limited motivation, poor training, limited resources, do little damage 39 348

asee app F for dervations of these estimates

SOURCE FBI data

Ch. l—Summary ● 1 1

bombings; i t only high explos ives weretagged, criminals could shift to pipe bombsrather easily.

● The utility of both identification and detectiontaggants would be decreased because somebombers would take countermeasures. Explo-sives experts have suggested a number ofpossible countermeasures to the proposedtaggant technology which would be avail-able to those bombers with the requisiteknowledge and resources. Most availablecountermeasures would increase the risk tothe bomber of personal injury or arrest, ordecrease the reliability of the bomb. Law en-forcement officials and experts on terrorismagree that most bombers would not utilizethe available countermeasures. A taggantprogram would retain substant ial ut i l i tyeven though some criminal bombers wouldattempt countermeasures, and these coun-termeasures would be effective wheneverthey were carried out with sufficient knowl-edge and skil1.

● The utility of taggants to law enforcement per-sonnel is not adequately quantifiable, due tothe paucity of data on taggants or similarcontrol mechanisms, the difficulty of ana-lyzing the currently collected statistics onbombings, and the fact that it is difficult toquantify how much any single clue adds toan investigation or prosecution. Generallyspeaking, law enforcement techniques areseldom subjected to cost-benefit analysis,and the data which exist do not lend them-selves to such effort. Similarly, OTA was un-able to quantify the deterrent effect tag-gants may have, although the apparent ef-fectiveness of airport screening proceduresin reducing the number of hijacking at-tempts suggests that detection taggants mayhave a considerable deterrent value.

Taggant Cos t

The cost of a taggant program would varyenormously depending on the nature of the pro=gram. Costs are likely to be reasonable if andonly if any taggant legislation requires regula-tions to be written in a way that weighs costs

against considerations of law enforcementut i I it y.

A low-level taggant program, in which aunique taggant species would be used toidentify each year’s production of a specificproduct, and 800 detection sensors would bedeployed, would cost $3o million per year.

A “baseline” program identified by OTA (de-scribed in detail in ch. V) would cost approxi-mately $45 million per year,adding approxi-mately 12 percent to the cost of cap-sensi-tive explosives and slightly under 8 percentto the cost of gunpowder, Cap-sensitivehigh explosives, boosters, detonators, deto-nating cord, and gunpowder would betagged. A unique taggant species would beused for a shift’s production of each productand size. Fifteen hundred detection sensorswould be deployed. The bulk of this costwould eventually falI on users of explosivesand on users of products produced with theaid of explosives; the costs of detection tag-gant sensors would presumably be borne bythe owners or users of protected facilities. Itis not expected that costs of this magnitudewould lead to any major shifts in the pat-terns of production and use of explosives.

Separate baseline identification and detectiontaggant programs would cost approximately$25 million per year each, including publicoverhead costs.

A high-level program, in which a unique tag-gant would be used for each 10,000-lb batchof explosives or 2,000-lb batch of gunpow-der, in which blasting agents would betagged, and in which 5,000 detection sensorswould be deployed, would have an estimatedcost of $268 million per year.

The cost estimates assume that the taggantmaterial costs do not differ appreciably fromcurrent estimates for mass-produced taggants.Chapter V discusses the causes and the ex-tent of the uncertainties surrounding thesecost estimates.


Techn ica l Deve lopment

The development of taggants is not yet com-plete. Further developmental effort, particu-larly resolution of the questions regarding thestability of smokeless powder and cast boost-ers to which taggants have been added, andsuccessful completion of a variety of tests,would be required before it would be appropri-ate to begin adding taggants to commercial ex-plosives.

●

●

The identification taggants developed by 3Mappear to survive the detonation of commer-cial explosives under ideal conditions. Con-finement and fire may adversely affect sur-vival, although test data is very limited. Re-covery of the taggants appears to be a func-tion of the specific incident conditions(weather, type of target, firefighting activ-ities) as well as the training and care of thefield and laboratory investigators. A trainedteam can probably recover debris fromwhich a laboratory can separate taggantsunder most incident conditions.

There is little basis for judging whether the de-tection taggant system, based on machinesensing of microencapsuiated vapors, whichappears to show promise under laboratoryconditions, would function reliably under con-ditions of mass production and field use, orhow soon sucn a system would be available.

S a f e t y

The tests so far conducted create a presump-tion that there are no incompatibilities betweenthe 3M identification taggant and dynamites, slur-ries, gels, emulsions, or black powder. Neverthe-less, a full-scale qualification program is neces-sary before taggants can be added to all such ma-terials.●

●

●

The addition of 3M identification taggants toone brand of smokeless powder (Herco” *)and one variety of booster material (Composi-tion B) produces a chemical reaction at ele-vated temperatures and high taggant concen-trations. The taggants must be considered in-compatible with such explosives unless oruntil: 1 ) the composition of the taggant ischanged in a way that eliminates this chemi-cal reaction, or 2) a determination is madethat the reaction takes place only under cir-cumstances that can be prevented from aris-ing in commercial production, distribution,and use. If the incompatibility remains, thenCongress could, if it chose, require thatthese particular explosives either be them-selves modified, withdrawn from the mar-ket, or granted an exemption from tagging.(OTA believes that exemption of smokelesspowders could significantly diminish theutility of a tagging program; exemption ofcast boosters would diminish this utility to asomewhat lesser extent. ) If compatibility isestablished, completion of a qualificationprogram would still be necessary.

There is little evidence regarding the safety ofdetection taggants, or of the combination ofidentification and detection taggants, as testinghas only recently been initiated and no resultshave yet been reported.Analysis, and the limited testing so far con-ducted, indicate that the performance of ex-plosive material would not be degraded by theaddition of taggants. However, preliminarytests suggest that abnormally high concen-trations of taggants might decrease the bal-l istic performance of smokeless powder.Testing, including long-term effects, wouldbe necessary, however, before the questioncould be fully resolved.

*A registered trademark ot Hercules, Inc


CONTINUING CONTROVERSIES

Some of OTA’S findings have been chal-lenged by one or more of the participants inthe controversy that surrounds the proposal torequire that commercial explosives be tagged,The nature of these challenges is outlined here

S ign i f icance o f Compat ib i l i t y

Test ing to Date

A large number of tests have been carriedout to determine whether the 3M identifica-tion taggant is compatible with commercial ex-plosives. More tests are required, and the Aero-space Corp. (under contract to BATF) is spon-soring a continuing testing program. The testscompleted to date are described in chapter IV.

OTA found that the testing done to date cre-ates a reasonable presumption that the 3M iden-tification taggant is compatible with dynamites,gels, slurries, emulsions, and black powder. Onthe other hand, there is evidence of increased re-activity, and thus a presumption of incompatibil-ity, with at least one form of smokeless powder,and at least one cast booster composition. It isnot yet possible to arrive at presumptionsabout the compatibility of the 3M taggant withblasting caps or detonating cord, or about thecompatibility of detection taggants with anycommercial explosive. OTA further found that,even for products such as dynamites where noevidence of incompatibility exists, further test-ing is required before it can be definitely con-cluded that taggants are compatible with, andcan safely be added to, al I such explosives.

The Aerospace Corp. takes the view that thecompatibility tests with dynamites, gels, slurries,emulsions, and black powder generally are suffi-cient to permit implementation of a program totag these substances. Aerospace recognizesthat there is a need for Mine Safety and HealthAdministration approval of tagged permissibledynamites, that final qualification of produc-tion-line 3M taggants must be made to ensurethat they match those used in the pilot test,and that the black powder ballistics testing

should be reviewed and possibly augmented.However, Aerospace points out that while notevery test has been conducted with everybrand of every explosive, the program suc-cessfully carried out was designed by industryand was considered sufficiently thorough sothat several major firms were willing to distrib-ute pi lot quant i t ies of tagged explosivesthrough their normal commercial distributionchannels. With regard to smokeless powdersand cast boosters, Aerospace takes the viewthat no safety hazard has been demonstrated,but that the failure of the tagged explosive topass certain extreme tests means that compati-bility has yet to be demonstrated, and the pos-sibility that some changes will be required toensure safety cannot be ruled out.

Representatives of the explosives industry takethe view that taggants cannot be consideredcompatible with explosives until all the testingthat ought to be carried out has been successfullycompleted. They maintain that untiI safety hasbeen conclusively demonstrated, it would bepremature to consider whether to legislate arequirement that commercial explosives betagged. Explosives industry representativesalso make a distinction between the pilot pro-gram so far carried out and normal commer-cial production. They maintain that the taggedexplosives manufactured under the pilot pro-gram received unusual care and attention dur-ing the manufacturing process, and weredistributed to a limited number of selecteddistributors. The manufacturers also believethat the terms of the pilot program relievedthem of liability for accidental explosions dueto taggants, a point which the Aerospace Corp.contests. Some explosives industry represent-atives take the view that the failure of the mix-ture of taggants with one brand of smokelesspowder and one cast booster composition topass one safety test means that the 3M taggantshould be viewed as unsafe unless or until it isredesigned, and point out that any such rede-sign would require repeating all other testspreviously carried out.


C o u n t e r m e a s u r e s

It is clear that it would be possible for terroristsor other criminals to take measures to defeat theimpact of a tagging program, by making or ac-quiring untagged explosives. OTA found thatsuch countermeasures would require a consid-erable degree of technical knowledge andskil1, and that in most cases countermeasureswould either require the commission of an ad-ditional crime (with some added risk of ap-prehension), or else manufacturing or modify-ing explosives in a way that would risk either apremature explosion or a misfire of the bomb.The law enforcement experts whom OTA con-sulted predict that many terrorists and othercriminals would probably not avail themselves ofcountermeasures that were theoretically avail-able to them.

Representatives of the explosives industry takethe view that one should assume that an avail-able countermeasure will in fact be employed.They point out that the most sophisticatedbombers, who are most likely to be willing andable to employ countermeasures, are thosewhich may pose the greatest threat. They fearthat a taggant program would fail to be effec-tive because of widespread use of counter-measures, and that law enforcement officialswould then wish to counter the countermeas-ures by extending the range (and hence thecost) of the taggant program.

OTA has noted a consistent pattern of dis-agreement on this point. Experts in the explo-sives industry and Government explosives ex-perts almost unanimously believe that coun-termeasures exist which would enable bomb-ers to evade the effects of a taggant program,whether the countermeasures take the form ofremoval of taggants from tagged explosives,use of untagged blasting agents, theft of explo-sives, fabrication of “homemade” explosives,or use of incendiary devices. Law enforcementexperts, and experts on terrorists and terrorism,almost unanimously believe that most bomb-ers, including terrorists, would fail to take thesteps necessary to evade a taggant program,even though the necessary equipment andknowledge is not too difficult to obtain. A pos-sible analogy is the effectiveness of the pro-

gram to counter aircraft hijacking; since thatprogram began, thousands of weapons havebeen detected each year, while there havebeen no cases of aircraft hijacked with wea-pons smuggled onboard, despite the fact thatmechanisms can be postulated for smugglingweapons past the screening apparatus. OTAbelieves that while countermeasures to a tag-gant program would be available and would beeffective if correctly used, most bomberswould not make effective use of such counter-measures. OTA believes that taggants, if success-fully developed, could have significant law en-forcement utility even if some terrorists or othercriminals successfully employed countermeas-ures.

B las t ing Agent s (ANFO)

Blasting agents are the most widely usedtype of commercial explosive; the most com-mon type of blasting agent consists of mixturesof prilled ammonium nitrate and fuel oil; theseexplosives are collectively known as ANFO.ANFO can be mixed in a factory, or mixed di-rectly at the site where blasting is to takeplace. Ammonium nitrate ferti l izer can bemixed with ordinary fuel oil to create a ratherinsensitive ANFO.

Because of the very large volume of ANFOthat is used commercially, a tagging programwhich included ANFO would be substantiallymore costly than one from which ANFO wasexcluded. Chapters I I and V present detailedinformation on this point. One of the reasonsfor the wide gap between BATF and the explo-sives industry cost estimates for a tagging pro-gram is that the industry read the draft legisla-tion (S. 333) as requiring that ANFO and otherblasting agents be tagged, while BATF wasplanning for a taggant program that would notinclude ANFO.

Representatives of the explosives industryhave taken the position that exclusion ofANFO would greatly diminish the law enforce-ment utility of a taggant program, becausebombers could and would use untagged ANFOin place of tagged, cap-sensitive explosives ortagged gunpowders. OTA believes that it is in-


deed the case that an effective bomb, suitablefor almost all criminal or terrorist purposes,can be manufactured from ANFO if the crimi-nal has adequate time, skill, knowledge, andmotivation. The critical area about which judg-ments differ is the extent to which terrorists andother criminals would in fact make use of ANFObombs if other commercially available explosivematerials were tagged.

OTA does not consider it appropriate to de-scribe here how one would go about manufac-turing an AN FO-filled bomb. The process in-volves more steps, a greater number of materi-als and components, and more opportunitiesfor error than a bomb made from a cap-sensi-tive explosive; however, it would be easier andsafer than fabrication of a bomb from “rawchemical s.” The ANFO commercially avail-able in the United States would not be reliablydetonated by an ordinary detonator (#8), evenin a pipe bomb. ANFO can be readily deto-nated by using a smalI high-explosive booster,but such boosters would be tagged, and a largebooster or several small ones would make anefficient bomb without the use of ANFO.ANFO can also be detonated using materialsthat wouId not be tagged (if the bomber knowshow to wire them), but an ANFO pipe bomb issubstantialIy harder to detonate than a smoke-less-powder pipe bomb or a stick of dynamite.

Photo credit U.S Department of the Treasury

A typical pipe bomb. Such bombs are normally filled withblack and smokeless powder, but a bomber with sufficient

knowledge and skill could use ANFO

At the present time, ANFO is seldom used inpipe bombs despite the fact that it is cheaperand, if properly detonated, considerably moreenergetic than smokeless powder. Whether thetagging of cap-sensitive high explosives andpowders would in fact lead many criminals toswitch to the use of ANFO is a question thatcannot be answered with certainty. However,as in the case of other countermeasures, OTAhas found that explosives experts tend to expectthat criminals would switch to ANFO, while lawenforcement experts and experts on terrorismtend to doubt that this would happen in manycases.

Surv ivabi l i ty and Recovery of Taggants

The testing done to date on the conditionsunder which identification taggants would infact survive an explosion, and surviving tag-gants could in fact be recovered, is not ade-quate to sustain firm conclusions. Much of theavailable data is anecdotal rather than system-atic. Part of the problem is that it is difficultto arrange for testing under realistic but con-trolled conditions. Faced with inadequate andsomewhat contradictory data, particularlywith respect to the recovery question, OTA ar-ranged for a very Iimited test program to sup-plement the previous tests; appendix C reportson this effort.

OTA feels that prior testing supports thepresumption that taggants would probably sur-vive most bomb detonations under most condi-tions. However, survivability decreases withthe size of the explosive charge and its power.The survivabi l i ty of indiv idual taggants inlarge explosive charges or in extremely power-ful explosives (such as booster material andmilitary explosives) has not been demon-strated. Pressed pellets, fabricated from the in-dividual taggants, do survive the detonation,but recovery has not been adequately demon-strated, and compatibiIity tests on pellets re-main to be accomplished. OTA found that thetaggants surviving most bombs could probablybe recovered under most conditions. However,field investigators might well find it impossible toseparate the taggants from the debris, identify in-


dividual taggants, and read the codes in the field;instead the field team would have to gather de-bris likely to contain taggants, and a laboratorycould thereafter separate and read the taggants.Such a laboratory need not be elaborate, andcould be installed in a truck if onsite taggantreading was considered desirable.

BATF maintains that, on the contrary, the 3Midentification taggant can be recovered and readin the field by investigators who have received areasonable amount of training.

Some industry representatives maintain thatthere is considerable doubt as to whether tag-gants would actually survive and be recoveredfrom a bomb. Such doubts should, they hold,be cleared up before attempting to reach any

judgment about the utility of an explosivestagging program.

Deve lopment T ime

OTA believes that the further developmentand testing that would be required before anidentification taggant program couId be imple-mented are likely to take until 1983. If an iden-tif ication taggant program were legislatedearly in 1980, it would be at least late 1984 be-fore all commercial explosives could be manu-factured with taggants. Even if the sensor de-velopment and detection taggant programs aresuccessful, OTA feels it would be at least 1985before full implementation could occur. BATFmaintains that these times are too pessimistic.

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

Given the present state of development oftaggants, OTA’S data and analysis appear to beconsistent with any of three possible courses ●

of action. (No significance is intended in orderof listing. )

● Pass legislation requiring taggants, and set upa procedure to determine if and when thetechnical development and testing have pro- ●

gressed to a point where implementationcan begin. Given the active involvement ofBATF in the development of taggants, it maybe inappropriate for the implementation de-

cision process to reside in the Treasury De-partment.

Defer legislative action on taggants, but en-courage BATF to continue taggant develop-ment, with a view to consideration of legisla-tion when development and testing are com-plete.

Take no legislative action on taggants, and en-courage the executive branch to search forother ways of improving the effectiveness oflaw enforcement against terrorist and othercriminal bombers.

Chapter II

DETAILED FINDINGS

Chapter II- DETAILED FINDINGS

Page

Overview of the Problem . * . * . . * * . * . . . * * * . . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 19The Bombing Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......19Manufacturer to User Chain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......21

Explosives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......21Gunpowders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......22

TechnicalEfficacy ● *****.* ● *****9** ● ***.**** ● *******O .******** ● 24Compatibility ofTaggant wtih Explosive Materials. . . . . . . . . .. . . .......28Cost of aTaggant Program ● * * * * * * * * ● * * * * * * * * ● * * * * . . . * . * * 32Utility of Taggants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . * * * . * * * * ● * * * * * * * * ● * * . * * . * * ● 36

Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......36Common Criminals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......37Mentally Disturbed.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......37Vandals and Experimenters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....38program implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....46

TABLES

Page

6. Minimum Bombing Incidents Statistics Summary . . . . . . . . . .......207. Identified Explosive Fillers Used in Bombs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......208. BombingCasualtiesand Damage in 1978 byTypeof Bomb . . .......219, BATF Recovery Demonstrations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......25

10. Recovery Tests Participated in by Summit County Sheriff’s Office ...2511. OTA Recovery Test Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..2612. Elements of a Suggested Compatibility Qualification Program ......2913. Cost of a Taggant Program as a Function of implementation Plan. ...3214. Attributes of Criminal Bomber Croups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......3715. Taggant Utility Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....38

FIGURES

Page

I. Explosive Distribution Chain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....222. Gunpowder Distribution Chain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .233. Photo micrographs of Recovered Taggants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......264. Size Comparison of the 3M Identification Taggantand

Some Smokeless Powders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....41S. Marginal Cost-Utility Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....47

Chapter II

DETAILED FINDINGS

This chapter presents the findings of the study in some detail, along with asketch of the data and analytical methods used to arrive at them. The full analyseson which these findings are based are found in the subsequent chapters and the ap-pendixes.

The analysis proceeded in two stages, which were conducted simultaneously.The first stage assessed the technical efficacy of the taggants, and their compatibili-ty with explosive materials. Definitive judgments on these points must await the re-sults of further technical development and testing. The second stage estimated thecost and law enforcement utility of taggants, assuming that taggants can be madewhich work and are safe. It should be clearly understood that a taggant program isonly appropriate if all the conditions are met: it must be technically sound, it mustbe safe, it must have value for law enforcement, and the costs must be reasonable inthe light of this law enforcement value.

The analysis and discussion of technical efficacy and safety were conducted asif it had been established that taggants are useful in relation to their cost. The analy-sis and discussion of cost and utility were conducted as if it had been establishedthat taggants work and are safe.

Because a variety of implementation plans are possible, costs and utility are eval-uated parametrically in order to show how the choices made in writing regulationswould lead to variations in cost and law enforcement value.

OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

In order to appreciate the potential benefitsand shortfalls of a tagging program it is neces-sary to understand the magnitude of the cur-rent and projected future bombing threat, aswell as the processes involved in the manufac-ture, distribution, and sale of the various ex-plosive materials.

The Bombing Threat

Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, andFirearms (BATF) maintain national bombingdata information centers which collect statis-tics on bombings and other explosive inci-dents. The data are not consistent between thetwo centers, however, and many bombings arenot reported to either center. The formatting

of the data, and the lack of updating proce-dures, make accurate analysis difficult. Appen-dix F explains in some detail which datasources were used, and why. While BATF andFBI data differ in the absolute values (e. g.,number of bombings in a year), both sets ofdata support the OTA findings. Most tables inthis report make use of BATF data because itsformat appeared more amenable to analysis.

The BATF 1978 Explosives Incidents Reportincludes over 3,000 incidents for both 1977 and1978. The incidents include accidents, threats,seized and recovered explosives, and hoaxes,as well as actual explosive and incendiarybombings. Of these incidents, 1,377 repre-sented actual explosive detonations, acciden-tal detonations by criminals, or recoveredbombs that failed to detonate in 1977, with

19


1,250 the corresponding number for 1978. Atleast 953 of these in 1977 and 787 in 1978 rep-resent actual detonation of explosive bombsagainst substantial targets (mailbox and open-area bombings are not included).

During 1977, BATF estimates that 38 peoplewere killed and 180 wounded by explosive andincendiary bombs, while the numbers in 1978were 23 and 185, respectively. Due to the wayinitial estimates of property damage are made,and the lack of updating, only the crudestproperty damage estimates can be made.There was at least $10 million in direct proper-ty damage due to explosive and incendiarybombs in 1977, and at least$17 million in 1978.In 1977, 35 of the 38 reported deaths and 20of 23 reported in 1978 were from bombingsagainst vehicles, residences, and commercialestablishments. Similarly, about 80 percent ofthe injuries from bombing of known targets in1977 and about 70 percent in 1978 were causedby bombings of those three types of targets.The 1977 and 1978 statistics are summarized intable 6, and discussed in more detail in appen-dix F.

The available data do not sustain any con-clusions about trends in the bombing threat;both the number of incidents and the extent ofdeaths, injuries, and property damage varyfrom year to year, and from data base to data

Table 6.–Minimum Bombing Incidents Statistics Summary a

BATF FBI

Hem 1977 1978 1977 1978

Explosive bombings, number. . . . . . . . . 1,037b 896b 867 768Undetonated explosive bombs, number. 319 287 118 105Incendiary bombings, number . . 339 446 248 349Unignited incendiary bombs, number 81 71 85 79Criminal accidents, numberc . . . . . 21 67 – –Property damage from bombings, millions

of dollarsc d . . . . . . . . . . . ... $ 10 $ 17 $ 9 $ 9Injuries c ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 185 162 135People killed by bombingsc . . . . . 38 23 22 18

aBATF reported 3,177 total incidents in 1977 and 3,256 in 1978 Total incidents include ac-cidents threats, seized and recovered explosives and hoaxes as well as actual explosive and in-cendiary bombings The OTA study was concerned only with explosive bombings

b of these 953 in 1977 and 787 m 1978 were against substantial targetsincludes both explosive and incendiary bombings OTA was unable obtain separate figures for

number of criminal accidents, injuries deaths, and property damage caused by explosive and in-cendiary bombings Incendiary bombs and bombings would not be affected by a taggant pro-

gram value probaly Considerably higher due to lack Of data file updates

SOURCE : BATF 1978 Explosive Incidents Report, FBI Uniform Crime Report: Bomb Report1978 See app F for a discussion of the derivation of these figures

base. Management Sciences Associates (MSA)conducted a detailed study of the data in the 5years from 1972 through 1976 without discov-ering any significant trends. Many experts onterrorism believe that the United States mayexperience an increase in bombings, particu-lar ly catast rophic bombings, in the yearsahead. However, this belief is based on an as-sessment of U.S. vulnerability to bombings andthe observation that the United States hasrecently had less of a terrorist problem thanother developed countries; there is no evi-dence that this increased threat has material-ized. In looking at bombing statistics, oneshould bear in mind that a single incident in-volving an aircraft exploding in flight couldproduce more deaths than have occurred inany year to date.

Data on the types of fillers used in bombsare also not consistent between the FBI andthe BATF data banks. It is instructive to look attwo BATF data sources, however, as shown intable 7. The second column represents 1978data for the fillers identified in the field for allexplosive bombs that were detonated, bombsrecovered undetonated, and criminal acci-dents. The first column represents 1978 datafor only those fillers that were identified in thelaboratory from postdetonation analysis. Thethird column averages the first two. In bothcases, black and smokeless powders and cap-sensitive high explosives all occur with highfrequency. Table 8 shows a breakout of theminimum number of significant bombing inci-dents, deaths, and injuries occurring during1978 by explosive material fillers. The averagecolumn in table 7 was multiplied by data on

Table 7.–ldentified Explosive Fillers Used in Bombs

Lab identified All Identifiedfillers 1978 fillers 1978 Average

B l a c k p o w d e r . , . 13% 21% 17!40Smokeless powder . 16 19 17.5Military ., ., ., ... 2 7 4.5Cap sensitive ., ., 32 30 31Blasting agents, – 1 .5Chemicals . . – 1 .5Others, ... ., 36 21 2 8 5

See app F for derivation of these numbers

SOURCE BATF data

Ch. n-Deta i led F indings ● 2 1

Table 8.–Bombing Casualties and Damage in 1978 by Typo of Bomb

Number ofbombings against Property damage

Filler material substantial targets Deaths Injuries $ millions’

All fillers. ., 1,298 23 185 $17.2I n c e n d i a r y . . . . , 428 3 13 3.7B l a c k p o w d e r 148 4 19 .2Smokeless powder : : : : : : : 152 3 23 .2M i l i t a r y e x p l o s i v e s . 39 0 7 —

Cap sensitive. . . . . . . . . . . . 270 7 26 3.3Other . . . . . 3 40 2.4Unknown ., ., 3 57 7.4

Total for those fillers whichwould be directly taggedb. 570 14 68 3,7

aValue probably higher due to lack 01 data updateb cap-sensitive explosives black powder and smokeless Powder would be tagged

SOURCE BATF data See app F for a derivation of these figures

total bombing to generate the table 8 esti-mates. See appendix F for details.

Manufacturer to User Chain

E x p l o s i v e s

Approximately 4 billion lb of explosives aremanufacturered and used annually in theUnited States. Of this amount, approximately600 million lb are standard explosives and 3.4billion lb are blasting agents, primarily am-monium nitrate-fuel oil mixtures. Of the 600million lb of standard explosives, about halfare cap-sensitive (will reliably be detonated bya #8 detonator) dynamites, emulsions, gels,and slurries, and about half are non-cap-sensi-tive gels, slurries, and emulsions. Most of thestandard explosives are manufactured in aplant, packaged in cartridges, and shipped,either directly to a large user such as a coalmine or to a distributor, although some areprocessed essentially onsite. Some of the blast-ing agent products are prepared by a manufac-turer and sold in packages, some are preparedby a manufacturer and sold in bulk [tankertruck), while some are mixed onsite and usedthe same day they are prepared.

Standard explosives are made by mixing to-gether the fuel and oxidizer ingredient andfeeding the mixed product into the final car-tridges by a batch, semicontinuous, or continu-ous process. I n a batch process, the ingredientsfor a particular batch are first mixed and then

packaged before another batch is started onthat production line. In a semicontinuous proc-ess, the mixed batch is fed into an intermediatehopper from which packaging takes place,while another batch is mixed in parallel to thepackaging of the first batch. In a continuousprocess, the material is continuously added tothe mixer, processed, and packed in a con-tinuous flow.

If taggants were added to standard explo-sives, they would be added at the mixing stage.Taggants could also be added to packaged orbulk form manufactured blasting agents at themixing stage. If the ammonium nitrate used tomake onsite-fabricated blasting agents were tobe tagged, identification taggants could beadded during the “prilling” process, while de-tection taggants, which are not batch specific,could be added with the fuel oil.

Boosters are generally fabricated by pouringa molten, high-energy, cap-sensitive explosive,such as TNT, into containers. Taggants couldbe added during the cooling process of the ex-plosive.

Detonators and detonating cord are manu-factured products in which the product is builtup around an explosive core in an assembly-Iine process. In both cases, the taggants wouldbe added during the assembly process, ratherthan directly to the explosives.

All of the products have a similar flow frommanufacturer to ultimate user, as shown in fig-

.


ure 1. Some of the products are sold directlyby the manufacturers to large users, such as a

Figure 1.— Explosive Distribution Chain

I ManufacturerI

I 1I Distributor I1 I

1.

Retailerb

- User User m4

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment

mine or large construction company. Suchsales may represent an entire day’s production.The rest is sold to distributors, who may buyportions of several production batches, entirebatches, or even several batches. The distribu-tors in turn sell to retail stores, supply explo-sives directly to some users (such as a quarry orconstruction site), and may also do explosivecontracting themselves. A particular uniquelytagged batch of explosives may, therefore, godirectly to one user, may go to one distributor,or may be sold to a number of users and dis-tributors. From the distributor it may again goto one of several users, sometimes with a fur-ther distribution level (retailer) involved. A listof the ultimate purchasers of one specificbatch of explosives could, therefore, containone name, or up to a hundred names for aworst case example, although generally thenumber would be at the low end of that range.

Gun powders

The manufacture and distribution processesfor gun powders are significantly different from

those of explosives. Approximately 2 1/2 millionlb of black powder and 20 million lb of smoke-less powder are produced for commercial useeach year. Most of the smokeless powder isused in fixed ammunition for rifles, pistols, andshotguns, would not be sold to users as an endproduct, and would not be tagged under S.333. Approximately 5 million lb per year wouldbe sold to the end user, primarily for handload-ing of ammunition. Of the black powder pro-duction, approximately 2 million lb are used asan intermediate product in the manufacture offuzes and other finished products and wouldnot be tagged; approximately 400,000 lb peryear are sold for use in muzzle-loading gunsand would be tagged if a taggant programwere legislated.

The basic process for the manufacture ofgunpowders involves the following steps:

mixture of ingredients, which may includethe raw ingredients as well as surplus andreworked powders;granulation, where the “dough” is ex-truded, chopped, or otherwise granulatedto form the various grains;screening of grains into designated sizes;andblending of various batches to get the de-sired ballistic characteristics.

In the smokeless powder manufacturingprocess, nitroglycerine, nitrocellulose, andother additives are combined to make variousgrades before the blending process. Smokelesspowder grades therefore differ due to size dif-ferences and composition differences (variousamounts of nitroglycerine), while black pow-der and black powder substitutes such as Pyro-dex@ * vary only by grain size. In a given gradeof powder, variations in density and other fluc-tuations during the manufacturing process cancause considerable variations in the ballisticproperties of the final powder. As the hand-Ioader generally has no means of controllinghis ballistics other than the weight or volumeof powder added, the ballistic properties of aparticular grade of powder must be carefullycontrolled by blending. A given brand name

*A registered trademark of Pyrodex Co

Ch. n-Deta i led Findings “ 23

product may therefore contain parts of severalbatches, blended like brandy to give the de-sired ballistic properties. Several sequentialblending operations may be necessary beforethe product meets the required specifications.If the ballistic properties of a particular batchor blended lot are too far off, the materialmust be reprocessed or used for somethingother than hand loading.

If taggants are added to gunpowders, theymay have to be added at different stages in themanufacturing process for different manufac-turers, due to the differences in blending andreworking processes. As an example, at onesmokeless powder factory that makes powderfor both handloading and fixed ammunition,taggants could be added during the blendingstage; blended batches that were sti l l notsatisfactory could be used for fixed ammuni-tion. At another factory, due to their largerework factor, an additional taggant-mixing

stage might be necessary. For some products, itmay be possible to add taggants to the dough,although this may affect the granulation proc-ess and present blending problems.

The distribution network from gunpowdermanufacturers to users differs markedly fromthat of explosives, since there is a very largenumber of ultimate users, each of whom con-sumes a smalI amount of powder. The networkis shown schematicalIy in figure 2. The manu-facturer has several master distributors, eachof whom supplies a number of distributors.Each distributor supplies a number of retailers,who sell the product, often in lots as small as 1lb. A 2,000-lb uniquely tagged batch of prod-uct “A” may therefore ultimately be sold toover a thousand customers. Not only does thisproduce a much larger list of last legal pur-chasers, but considerably more record keepingwould be involved at the retail level.

Figure 2.—Gunpowder Distribution Chain

Manufac-turer

uMasterdistributor uMaster

distributor



TECHNICAL EFFICACY

The issues to be addressed here include thesurvivability of the identification taggants andthe status of the detection taggant materialsand sensors. A detailed discussion of the re-search program related to technical efficacy isin chapter I I 1; chapter IV discusses in detail theresearch related to safety.

The identification taggants developed by 3Mappear to survive the detonation of commercialexplosives under ideal conditions. Confinementand fire may adversely affect survival, althoughthe test data are very limited. Recovery of thetaggants appears to be a function of the specificconditions in which the explosion and taggant re-covery take place, as well as the training of thefield and laboratory investigators.

A large number of laboratory survival testshave been conducted to establish the postdet-onation survivability of the 3M identificationtaggants. In many of these tests, the chamberused to recover the taggants was not ideal, re-sulting in low recovery ra tes . For example,when relatively small steel-walled chamberswere used, the impacting taggants either brokeup upon impact, or flowed plastically due tothe impact pressure pulse. When the explosivecharges were detonated in large chambers, oron a large open pad, however, several hundredtags were recovered from a single, one-half-lbstick of the cap-sensitive explosives, includingAtlas Power Primer, the most energetic of thestandard commercial explosives. Similarly, thetaggants should survive the detonation ofblack and smokeless powders, which havemuch lower energy than the more energetic ex-plosives, under idea I conditions. The indi-vidual taggants are not expected to survive thedetonation of high-energy explosives, such asthe TNT used in boosters or military explo-s ives; Aerospace Corp. calculations haveshown that the taggant material would beraised above the taggant decomposition tem-perature in these explosives. Survival in theseenergetic explosives has been demonstratedwhen the taggants are pressed into large pel-lets (one-fourth inch), but no definitive re-covery testing has been conducted.

When conditions are less than ideal, survivaldecreases. The number of surviving taggantsdecreases sharply as the size of the charge in-creases, although sufficient taggants havebeen recovered even from a 25-Ib PowerPrimer charge to establish a definite identifica-tion. The number of taggants also decreases ifthe explosive is confined, for example, in apipe bomb. Hundreds of taggants survive ablack powder pipe bomb; tens of taggantshave been recovered, under nonideal recoveryconditions, f rom smoke les s powder p ipebombs. Only one test seems to have been con-ducted with cap-sensitive high explosive in apipe bomb; scores of taggants were recoveredfrom a pipe bomb filled with 60-percent Extra,a low-energy explosive.

The recoverability of the taggants underreal-world conditions is less well-established.The vast majority of the tests of recovery havebeen demonstrations and training exercises,with IittIe attempt at scientific controls, pro-cedures, or documentation. Table 9 shows theresults of 10 demonstrations using explosivestagged during the manufacturing process withencapsulated taggants at a 0.05 percent byweight tagging level. The number of taggantsrecovered is shown in each case; in some casesheroic recovery efforts were required. Statisti-cal analysis by the Aerospace Corp. indicatesthat it is highly desirable to recover 20 tag-gants; that many were not recovered in eachcase. In some tests, particularly the last one,recovery was halted after the reported numberwas found. Table 10 shows the results of 14similar tests, conducted without the assistanceof the Aerospace Corp. and the BATF labora-tory team. These tests were significantly lesssuccessful.

Due to the apparent inconsistency of thetest results and the lack of documentation,OTA had a limited series of five recovery testsconducted. The purpose was twofold: to get afeel for the recovery process and its difficul-ties, and to generate a limited number of datapoints for which the testing, recovery, andanaIysis were wel l control led and docu-

Ch. n-Deta i led Findings 25

Table 9.–BATF Recovery Demonstrations

Place Time Target Explosive Test conditions Taggant recovery

Birmingaham, Ala. February 1977 CarHouseHouse

Donaldson, Pa March 1977 Borehole incoal mine

Seneca, Md. June 1977 HouseCar

Fort McArthur, Calif, November 1977 HouseLos Angeles, Calif. August 1978 OpenOtis AFB, Mass. October 1978 OpenFort Belvoir, Va March 1979 Car

1 1/2 -lb Power Primer Against engine, fire, firefighting11/2 -lb Coalite-8S Table, near front hallj/4-lb, 60% Extra in pipe Outside house, near wall101/2 -lb Coalite-8S 7 each, 1 I/2-lb packages in

separate boreholes2-lb Coalite-8S Exterior room2-lb Coalite-8S Passenger compartment1/2 -lb Powerdyne —

1-lb Powerdyne In suitcase1-lb. Tovex 220a Three shots, 1 lb each2-lb. Coalite Z Trunk

35 from soil sample in laboratoryHundreds, at sceneScores, at scene20 from coal in laboratory

Dozens at sceneFew at sceneMany at scene20 at sceneLess than 103 in field

a Undetonted stick had only 10 percent of expected taggants Data Indicates that this explosive was from end of a batch


Table 10.–Recovery Tests Participated in by Summit County (Ohio) Sheriff’s Office

Date Explosives Target Conditions Recovery results

May 2, 1978 Total of 41/z-lb permissibles

May 11, 1978 2-lb permissiblesMay 17, 1978 3-lb permissibles, 1 black

powder pipe bomb(untagged)

Oct 12, 1978 2-lb permissiblesMay 16, 1979 1/2 permission

May 17, 1979 2-lb permissiblesAug 14, 1979 2-lb water gel

1 3/4-lb gelatine dynamite2-lb permissible


Two cars, —ground

Car —3 cars, pipe 1 car fire

bomb in open

Car —Car —

Car —

Car Under driver seatCar Under driver seatCar Under driver seat

2-hour field search (night), 10 men, 4 taggants in one car,no tags from other targets.

2-hour field search (night) by 2 men. No taggants1-hour field search (daylight with blankets). No taggants.

2-hour field search (night). by 2 men. No taggants.1 I/2 -hour field search (daylight with blankets), 20 men.

No taggants2-hour field search (night) by 2 men. No taggants3-hour field search (dark), 6 men Found 3 taggants from water

gel. Laboratory analysis of 60-lb debris from each car Found5 more taggants from water gel.

mented. The results of the tests are summar-ized in table 11 and described in detail in ap-pendix C. Sample photomicrographs of recov-ered taggants are shown in figure 3. Althoughthese tests were extremely limited in scope,and covered only one type of target (automo-bile), they provided a great deal of insight intothe recovery process and suggest a reconcilia-tion of the prior test results. However, a full-scale test program must be completed before adefinitive assessment of taggant recovery ispossible. With that caveat, the foIlowing tenta-tive observations may be made:

1. The recovery process does not appear tobe a field-readable process under thetested conditions. No taggants were spot-ted, and identified as such, in any of thefive tests, under daylight or night condi-tions, without the use of a laboratory sep-aration procedure. However, the recovery

conditions were not ideal. Field recoveryand identification of the taggants may bemore Iikely on paved surfaces.

2. Under ideal conditions (no fire, subse-quent firefighting activities, or adverseweather), sufficient debris can be gath-ered in a short time (less than 1 hour) byan untrained team to produce a positivetaggant identification (more than 20 tag-gants) in the laboratory. Only a moderate(1 to 2 hour) laboratory effort is necessaryby a highly trained laboratory team to iso-late and identify the taggants. This prob-ably holds for all classes of unconfinedcommercial explosives (excluding veryhigh-energy explosives such as boosters ormilitary explosives). The laboratory neednot be elaborate and could well be trans-portable to the bombing site.

3. Under conditions of confinement (bombplaced between the engine block and the


Table 11 .–OTA Recovery Test Resutts

Target Placement Dynamite Test condition Taggant recoveryAuto Under driver seat 2-lb Collier C 5-gal gas in tank; no fire 28 taggants in 1 M-hour lab timeAuto Under driver seat 2-lb Unigel 5-gal gas in tank; no fire 23 taggants, 1 contaminant in %-hour lab timeAuto Under driver seat 2-lb Power Primer 5-gal gas in tank; no fire 21 taggants in 1 1/2-hour lab time:

12 of type Ao f t y p e ~ d u a l t a g g e d

Auto Under driver seat 2-lb Collier C 1-gal gas adjacent to bomb, 23 taggants in3-hour lab timefire, firefighting

Pickup Between engine 2-lb Power Primer Dry tank, no fire 26 taggants, plus one contaminant in 4 hours lab time, 5-hourand firewall induction time preceded the search time due to confusion caused

by equipment contamination,


Figure 3.—Photomicrographs of Recovered Taggants

\

\.

\ \.

a) Scale— 1 division = 1 mm b) Collier C under driver, 8 taggantson slide

e) Collier C under driver, 17 taggantson slide

Photo credits’ U.S Department of the Treasury

firewall), sufficient taggants can still be 4. Taggants can be recovered from an auto-recovered for a confirmed identification, mobile bombing with a low-power explo-although somewhat more effort is prob- sive, even after a gasoline fire and subse-ably necessary, both in the field and in the quent firefighting efforts. Tests would belaboratory. This tentat ive conclus ion necessary to determine if taggants wouldwould hold for all cap-sensitive commer- survive a postdetonation fire in conjunc-cial explosives (excluding boosters and tion with a more energetic explosive. ItmiIitary explosives). should be noted that no fire occurred in


5.

6.

the three tests in which gasoline wasplaced in the gas tank. Fire had to be spe-cifically induced (a gallon of gasoline wasplaced adjacent to the bomb) for the burntest.The results of the automobile tests maywell be generalizable to other test condi-tions (buildings, open areas), but testingwould be required before that claim couldbe made.No substantive recovery data are avail a-ble for large charges, explosives in pipebombs, tagged boosters, detonators ordetonating cord, or charges consisting ofan untagged blasting agent with a taggedbooster and detonator. Taggants were re-ported recovered from a large bomb con-sisting of an untagged blasting agent anda tagged booster, conducted in December1979, but the test specifics have not yetbeen examined by OTA.

The technology for detection sensors has beendemonstrated in the laboratory, but at leastseveral years of development would be neces-sary before field models would be available.Three types of sensors are being considered foruse with the microencapsulated vapor detec-tion taggants. Each type is capable of sensing,under properly controlled conditions, in theparts-per-trillion regime envisioned for the sys-tem. The mass spectrometer sensor is a simpli-fied version of a standard laboratory instru-ment. The spectrometer, however, must be cal-ibrated regularly, requires ski lied scientists tooperate and maintain it, is large, and is quiteexpensive. The ion mobility spectrometer hasbeen commercially available for approximate-ly 5 years, with approximately 50 machines be-ing used in laboratory analyses. It shares thelaboratory instrument characteristics of themass spectrometer. The continuous electroncapture detector has been produced as a labo-ratory instrument, but in limited numbers. Lab-oratory and controlled-environment testingwith the three types of instruments has shownpromising results. For example, a less sensitivemass spectrometer is currently operating in anonline process mode at Libby-Owens-Ford,maintained by regular maintenance personnel.Testing of the ion mobility spectrometer in an

airport environment has indicated that thespectrometer can differentiate molecules ofmass similar to the vapor taggants from theambient environment. S imi lar ly, laboratorytesting of the continuous electron capture de-tector has indicated its ability to discriminatetaggant-like molecules.

These limited tests, however, are a long wayfrom demonstrating that the sensors can distin-guish the specified vapor taggant species fromother molecules, particularly those in the samemass range. The ion mobiIity spectrometer andmass spectrometer have an active separationmechanism to preclude interference with mol-ecules that differ significantly in mass; thecontinuous electron capture spectrometermust rely on a far less reliable passive breakupmechanism.

No estimates have been made of the time re-quired to produce fielded units, once a feasi-bility demonstration has been made (none ofthe three candidates has yet progressed thatfar). The only time estimate so far made is anestimate by the Aerospace Corp. that it wouldtake 14 months from demonstration of feasibil-ity to the completion of the prototype stagefor the ion mobility spectrometer. This esti-mate is quite optimistic for an instrument thatwould be produced in large numbers by asmall company. OTA feels it would be at least3 years, and probably more like 5, before a tag-gant sensor could be fielded. The estimate isbased on generalizing from other commercialand military instrument development exper-ience.

The candidate detection taggant vapors ap-pear promising, but more research is necessary.Several hundred candidate chemicals havebeen screened in a search for a vapor that ex-hibits the desired properties of scarcity innature, long-term stability, chemical inertness,vapor pressure, penetration, and nonadhesionto surfaces likely to be present in containersused to conceal bombs. The five candidateperfluorinated cycloalphones appear promis-ing on the basis of early tests. (No long-termstability data are available, however, nor arethere data on the long-term stability of the dif-fusion rate through the encapsulating materi-


al). Additional problems, such as ease of manu-facture, specificity with respect to the de-tector, and compatibility, have not yet beenaddressed. Ease of manufacture is a double-edged problem — if manufacture is too diffi-cult, then costs will be high; if it is too easy,then illegally manufactured material can beused as a countermeasure to the detection sen-sors. The most promising candidates are dif -

ficult to manufacture, require highly special-ized equipment, and wou ld be hard fo rbombers to make or acquire for use as counter-measures. Once the equipment is operational,unit costs should not be unreasonable. A prob-lem which probably applies to all varieties ofvapor taggants is that seals can be made thatare taggant proof — although apparently com-mon seals are insufficient.

COMPATIBILITY OF TAGGANTS WITH EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS

The compatibil ity of explosive materialswith the specific identification and detectiontaggant materials is addressed here. Compati-bility has two connotations: the first concernsthe safety during manufacture, transportation,storage, and use of explosive material due tothe addition of taggants; the second concernschanges in the performance of the explosivematerials to which taggants have been added.Such compatibility must be demonstrated byspecific tests. Generalization of the results toother hypothetical taggants is hazardous atbest.

Safety tests conducted to date with the encap-sulated 3M identification taggants have shown noincompatibilities with dynamites, gels, slurries,emulsions, or black powder, allowing a presump-tion that comprehensive testing would show thatthese taggants are compatible with these explo-sives. High concentrations of taggants do reactwith one kind of smokeless powder and one typeof cast booster material at elevated tempera-tures, and consequently incompatibility must bepresumed pending further research. A largenumber of paired safety tests have been con-ducted comparing the sensitivity and stabilityof commercial explosives and gunpowderswith and without ident i f icat ion taggantsadded. Safety tests included mechanical im-pact, thermal stability, thermal impact, fric-tion, electrical properties, and chemical reac-tivity, although no single explosive has beensubjected to al I of the above tests. I n no casedid the addition of encapsulated taggants sig-nificantly increase the sensitivity of the explo-sive materials to the test conditions. No evi-

dence of any decreased stability, or other sig-nificant changes, was found in any of the testswith dynamites, gels, slurries, or black powder.

The tests with tagged cast booster materialsshowed some indications of instability at ele-vated temperatures. A mixture of RDX andTNT (Composition B) showed evidence of reac-tion and probable decomposition at tempera-tures of 120° C when taggants were added tothe booster mix; significantly less reaction oc-curred without taggants. Tests with Octolshowed little reaction whether taggants werepresent or not. Pentolite showed little evi-dence of reaction with taggants in one test at1 20

0 C; the gas evolution from untagged pen-tolite was too high for comparative testing ona second series.

Similarly, the stability of one type of Hercu-les smokeless powder has been shown to besignificantly decreased by the addition of the3M identification taggants at elevated temper-atures and taggant concentrations. (AlthoughHercules tested only Herco * powder, Her-cules believes that their other brands of pow-der designed for the reloading market are sosimilar to Herco@ that similar test results couldbe expected.) Tests were conducted at temper-atures ranging from 80° to 120° C and at tag-gant concentrations of 50 percent. Tests at theLawrence Livermore Laboratories appear to in-dicate that the incompatibil ity is betweensome element of the powder and the basicmelamine/alkyd material of the taggants,rather than with the encapsulant or a pigment.

*A registered trademark of Hercules Inc.


Both the smokeless powder and booster ma-terial tests took place at high temperatures,and, in most of the tests, at high taggant con-centrations. The temperature used for thesmokeless powder test was higher than wouldbe expected in actual manufacture, storage, oruse; the temperature used for the cast boosteris sometimes reached in manufacturing proc-esses. In each test, a taggant concentration of50 percent was used rather than the 0.05-per-cent tagging concentration suggested for rou-tine use. The tests, nonetheless, indicate thatthe stability of the materials has decreased,due to the addition of taggants, and that a re-action is taking place between elements of thetaggant and elements of the explosive mate-rial. Standard qualification test procedures re-quire that such evidence be considered a signof an existing incompatibility between the ma-terials. Carefully controlled testing and exten-sive analysis must be completed before it canbe determined if the observed evidence of in-compatibility does, in fact, indicate a potentialsafety problem during the manufacture, stor-age, transportation, and use of the tested ma-terials. Unless demonstrated otherwise, it mustbe assumed that it is unsafe to add the tag-gants to that smokeless powder or to thebooster material. Until the elements of the in-compatibility have been identified, a questionremains as to the safety of adding the taggantsto similar smokeless powders and booster ma-terials, although tests with other smokelesspowders and boosters have shown no evidenceof incompatibility.

The tests so far conducted are only a smallfraction of the total number of tests that mustbe performed before it can conclusively be de-termined whether taggants are compatiblewith commercial explosives and gun powders.

Even if the current question of the stabilityof smokeless powder and boosters is resolved,it is not possible to generalize from the results ofthe limited test program so far completed andconclude that the testing has demonstrated thattaggants can be safely added to explosives.Thousands of people come into contact withexplosives every day during the manufacture,storage, transportation, and use of explosives.

Accidents involving explosives can have ex-tremely severe consequences to these thou-sands of people; therefore, safety must bedemonstrated. A carefully administered quali-fication program of analysis, safety testing,manufacturing procedures control, and experi-ence is necessary before a new explosive, or anexplosive with a significant change in compo-sition, can be considered safe. I n addition,each type of explosive product requires indi-vidual evaluation and testing, The type ofqualification program considered necessarybefore safety can be demonstrated is shown intable 12 and discussed in detail in chapter IV.A particularly important aspect of that qualifi-cation testing is the effect of long-term stor-age.

While the qualification program outlined intable 12 must be performed before taggants

Table 12.–Elemertts of a Suggested Compatibility(qualification Program

● unique with each manufacturer● analysis to define the new explosive or Ingredient● laboratory testimg

—impact, friction, thermal, chemical composition–electrical, aging, chemical interactions, performance

● pilot production committee and management review● early production and review special tests● experience


can be safely added to explosive materials, theapparent incompatibility with the Herco”smoke-Iess powder must be resolved before it makessense for the taggant compatibility qualificationprogram to proceed. Resolution of this problemis pertinent for the entire identification tag-gant program, not simply for smokeless pow-ders or for Herco@ . As discussed in detail inchapter Vl, smokeless powders are used in asignificant number of criminal bombing inci-dents and account for a significant fraction ofbombing casualties. If smokeless powders arenot controlled, then more bombers may wellswitch to their use, resulting in an even greatersmokeless powder born bing problem. The reso-lution could take any of several forms, includ-i ng:

—.

30 ● T a g g a n t s in E x p l o s i v e s

Reformulation of the 3M taggant — thiscould require starting essentially fromscratch in the taggant testing program, asthe reformulated taggant would undoubt-edly exhibit different compatibil ity, aswell as survivability, properties.

. Reformulation of the particular reactantsmokeless powder— this may or may notbe easily accomplished, once the elementor elements that react with the taggantare isolated. This option would be viableonly if no other smokeless powders werefound to show incompatibilities.

● Exe/us ion of the reacting smokeless pow-waler from the taggant program– the eco-nomic effects on competition could needto be carefully considered, as would alter-nate control mechanisms.

● Exclusion of smokeless powders from theidentification taggant program — such anexclusion would rely on the fact thatsmokeless powders would be less effec-tive than cap-sensitive high explosives andthat the detonators would be tagged. OTAbelieves that this last approach may notbe viable–too many people are currentlykilled or injured by bombs using smoke-less powders and the numbers would al-most certainly increase if this approachwere adopted. Alternate control mecha-nisms for smokeless powders could alsobe adopted.

● Development of a different type of tag-gant for use with Herco@ , or with allsmokeless powders, while retaining the ex-isting taggant for high explosives. Thiswould somewhat complicate field investi-gation of bombings.

● Demonstration that the observed stabilityproblem does not constitute a safety haz-ard. The observed decreased stability oc-curs at elevated temperatures and taggantconcentrations 1,000 times greater than“normal. ” As the decomposition rate isboth temperature and concentration sen-sitive, it may be that no safety hazard ex-ists under realistic conditions. If it couldbe positively demonstrated that the de-

composition rate was within the normallyaccepted range for temperature regimesand concentrations which reflect worstcase actual use conditions, then it may bepossible to add taggants to the smokelesspowder, particularly if no further incom-patibi l i t ies surface. Demonstrat ion ofsafety would have to be quite convincing,however, to overcome the currently per-ceived incompatibility.

Similarly, the apparent incompatibility withone cast booster material should be resolved be-fore the taggant compatibility qualification pro-gram should proceed. Booster material is rarelyused as a bomb filler, but it is used to initiateblasting agents. The current BATF plan wouldbe to not directly tag blasting agents, but totag the booster and detonators used to initiatethe blasting agent. Exclusion of boosters fromthe taggant program may well require an alter-nate control mechanism for blasting agents.Given the extremely large quantity of blastingagents produced (3.4 billion lb annually), anyother control mechanism may have seriouscost consequences.

The limited number of tests conducted, theconditions under which some of the tests wereconducted, and the preliminary manner inwhich the tests have been reported, make itdifficult to definitely assess the extent of thepotential compatibility problem. If definitivetest results do show an increased decomposi-tion rate, at least for RDX/TNT explosive mate-rials, the incompatibility will have to be re-solved before those booster materials can betagged. Most of the mechanisms for resolutionof the smokeless powder incompatibility areapplicable to booster materials, with the sameconsequences and caveats.

While the testing program conducted todate gives an indication that the identificationtaggants may well be compatible with mostcommercial explosives and gunpowders, littledata are available as to the potential compatibili-ty of detection taggants with explosive materials.Compatibil ity testing with gunpowders andcap-sensitive high explosives has recently beeninitiated under contract to the AerospaceCorp.; however, no compatibility testing has as

Ch. n-Deta i led Findings . 31

yet been reported. As indicated above, eachchange to an explosive composition must beevaluated separately. Successful completionof the preliminary detection compatibiIity pro-gram would indicate the need for a full qualifi-cation program. As some compounding of sen-sitivity may occur with both types of taggantspresent, the full qualification testing programshould address that issue.

Compatibility testing includes performancetesting, as well as the safety testing discussedabove. In most cases, the performance of ex-plosive materials is unlikely to be significantly af-fected by the addition of small amounts of tag-gant materials. Performance proof-testing mustbe completed, however, before a definitive state-ment could be made. The energy density andrate of energy release are the two most impor-tant performance attributes of commercial ex-plosives. Energy density is a fundamentalchemical property of the explosive formula-tion. The rate of energy release is a function ofthe materials involved and the physical prox-imity of the fuel and oxidizer components. Thepresence of taggants, in the few hundreths-of-a-percent by weight basis being considered, isunlikely to directly affect either of those per-formance characteristics. Similarly, the pres-ence of taggants in the suggested concentra-tion is unlikely to affect the ballistic propertiesof gunpowders. The few tests conducted s ofar, including tests of the basic properties ofexplosive materials, such as detonation veloci-ty, cap sensitivity, chamber pressure, and pro-jectiIe velocity, support that conclusion.

Physical segregation of the taggants is onemechanism which could affect performance. Ifthe gunpowder grains segregate from the tag-gant, then it is statistically possible that aclump of taggants could cause uneven burn-ing, prevent ignition, or result in a hazardoushangfire condition. Similarly, in some specialtyexplosive products, such as shaped chargesused for oiI welI perforators, migration of thetaggants to the explosive-metal interface couldcause poor jet formation. Testing with gun-powder has shown that migration apparentlydoes occur, at least u,nder vibration conditionsconsistent with truck transportation. I n tests

with gunpowders that differ in both size anddensity from the taggants, the taggants andpowder fines tend to separate from the largerpowder grains. Tests with smokeless powdermatched in size with the taggants, but differ-ent in density, were inconclusive. Testing is re-quired to determine both the extent of segrega-tion which could be expected if tagged gun-powders went through extreme but plausibleconditions of transportation and storage, andalso the statistical probability that segregationto this degree would adversely affect ballisticperformance or in-gun safety.

The Winchester Western Div i s ion of theOlin Corp. recently conducted a series of teststo evaluate the effects of segregation and hightaggant concentration on the ignition proper-ties of smokeless powder. Significantly re-duced ballistic performance was noted on oneround, fired at – 30

0 C with four times the sug-gested taggant concentrat ion. The otherrounds fired in this test series showed accept-able performance (velocity, chamber pressure,and ignition time).

Olin-Winchester conducted additional testsusing 100-percent segregation of taggants frompowder grains, a condition so extreme that noconclusions can be drawn (see ch. IV).

OTA believes that although testing is indeedrequired to establish the ballistic effects, ifany, of adding taggants to smokeless powder,it is necessary first to establish (by testing andby statistical analysis) the extent to whichvariation in taggant concentrations and segre-gation of taggants in normal conditions oftransportation and use could be expected.

Taggant clumping (10 to 15 taggants) some-times occurs when the taggants are added toexplosive materials. I t i s unl ike ly that theclumping would affect performance or safety,but that type of anomalous behavior should beinvestigated, particularly as the physical chem-istry of some of the explosive products, partic-ularly the gels and slurries, is so poorly under-stood.

As for the possible performance degrada-tions in shaped charges due to taggants, OTA


estimates, based on tests conducted by the could cause some degradation to occur, but itU.S. Army Ballistics Research Laboratory, in- is difficult to envision a mechanism whichdicate that a clump as large as 0.02 inch would would allow that large a clump to accumulate,not affect performance, even for precision- as that would represent all of the taggants inshaped charges, unless the clump contained a approximately one-half lb of explosives.large hollow center. Clumps as large as 0.1 inch

COST OF A TAGGANT PROGRAM

Estimates can be made of the total cost of ataggant program, the cost impact on manufac-turers and users of explosives, the effects of alegislated monopoly, and the possibil ity ofadded liability of manufacturers due to the in-clusion of taggants in explosives. In the abovesafety and efficacy discussion, the status ofthe current identification and detection tag-gant systems was evaluated. In the followingcost section, an assumption is made that thetaggants work and are safe, and cost estimatesare generated parametrically as a function ofthe implementation plan. It is specifically as-sumed that the resolution of the smokelesspowder and booster material incompatibilityquest ions, and any subsequent questionswhich may arise, do not have significant costimpacts. I n the case of the smokeless powderand booster materials, this assumption is prob-ably justified, as the cost of the taggant materi-als represents only a small fraction of the totalcost added by a taggant program.

The primary finding of the cost analysis isthat the cost of a taggant program can vary byalmost an order of magnitude, depending on theimplementation plan. A baseline program is iden-tified that would increase the cost of explosivesand gunpowders to the ultimate user by approxi-mately 10 percent. The primary variables af-fecting the total program costs are the class ofexplosive materials to be tagged, the uniquelytagged batch size, and the number of locationsat which the detection sensors would be de-ployed. Cost estimates for total program cost,added cost per pound of explosive or gunpow-der, and public overhead costs are shown intable 13 for three implementation levels. Thecost estimates include the costs for both iden-tification and detection taggant programs. The

Table 13.–Cost of a Taggant Program as a Functionof lmplemmtation Plan

Program level

Cost parameter Low Baseline High

Added cost per pound to cap-sensitive explosives 3.5$ 6.0$ 9.6cAdded cost per pound to gunpowders . . 3,5c 65.8c $1.04Public overhead cost, millions of dollars per year $5,3 $8.5 $24.5Total program costs, millions of dollars per year $30.5 $45 $268


total program cost for separate implementa-tion of identification and detection taggantprograms is included in the discussion of eachcase. The low, baseline, and high cost esti-mates do not correspond to different estimatesof the same program; rather they refer to dif-ferent tagging levels, different explosives tag-ged, and different numbers of sensors. ChapterV contains a detailed discussion of the costestimates and a discussion of the sensitivity ofthe costs to the accuracy of the cost elementestimates. To compare the program costs for aconstant number of detection taggant sensorlocations, it is only necessary to adjust thehigh- and low-program cost figure by $4,370 foreach sensor deployed.

1. The low-level program would use a uniqueidentification taggant for each manufac-turer, type of product, and year of manu-facture. A total of 800 detection sensorswould be deployed, one for passengersand one for baggage at each airport loca-tion currently deploying magnetometersand hand baggage X-ray units. Cap-sensi-tive high explosives, detonators, boosters,detonating cord, and smokeless and blackpowders would be tagged with both iden-tification and detection taggants. Blastingagents would not be directly tagged. The

C h . n - D e t a i l e d F i n d i n g s 3 3

cost of separate low-level identificationand detection taggant programs would beapproximately $15 mill ion and $22 mil-lion, respectively.

2. The baseline program would tag the samematerials as the low-level program, butwould use a unique identification taggantfor each shift of each product –analo-gous to the current date-shift code mark-ing on the exterior of explosives. Tracea-bility to the list of last legal purchaserswould be maintained, as the taggantswould contain all the information neededfor a BATF trace (date, shift, product, andsize). Approximately 2,500 detection tag-gant sensors would be deployed at air-ports and major controlled-access facili-ties such as powerplants, refineries, andGovernment bu i ld ings . Ma jo r po l icebomb squads would operate portableunits,

This baseline program differs from theprogram proposed by the BATF/Aero-space Corp. team in only two respects.The most important is that a full shift ofthe same product (a different cartridgesize would be treated as a different prod-uct) would be tagged with the same tag-gant, rather than an arbitrary 10,000 to20,000 lb. The practical util ity result isthat a potentially longer list of last pur-chasers would be produced by a trace, atleast for those lines that make more than10,000 to 20,000 lb of a product in a singleshift. The second difference concerns re-work. It has been assumed that a specialtaggant will be added to material withmore than 10-percent cross-containina-tion; such a taggant would indicate thatthe material used was a composite andthat taggant codes other than the specificcomposite code should be ignored.

The cost of separate baseline identifica-tion and detection taggant programswould be approximately $25 million foreach.

3. The high-level program would uniquelytag each 10,000-lb batch of explosive andeach 2,000- I b batch of gunpowder. AlI ex-

plosive materials, including blast ingagents, would be directly tagged. Am-monium nitrate fabricated for use in blast-ing agents would be tagged, but not ferti-l izer-grade ammonium nitrate. Approxi-mately 5,000 detection taggant sensorswould be deployed at every major trans-portation facility, controlled-access utili-ty, Government facility, and other poten-tial high-value targets such as campuscomputer locations. Portable units wouldbe routinely available to police bombsquads. The taggant level and types of ex-plosives to be tagged in the high-level pro-gram correspond to a strict interpretationof S. 333, as propounded by the Instituteof Makers of Explosives (IME). The cost ofseparate high-level identification and de-tection taggant programs would be ap-proximately $214 million and $65 million,respectively.

The identification taggant cost figures usedin alI three levels of the analysis are based onprice estimates furnished by 3M, for specificimplementation guidelines. 3M furnished man-agement-approved cost estimates for unencap-sulated taggants for three different quantitiesof explosives to be tagged, assureing a firmorder for 2 years (costs would remain the samefor a 5-year contract). These cost estimates rep-resent the firmest figures possible short of anactual contract. Assuming linear interpolationbetween data points furnished, the unencapsu-Iated taggants would cost between $93 and$114/lb for the amount of taggants necessaryfor the baseline level case (41 9 million lb of ex-plosive equivalent). The first figure representsa cost goal and the second a worst case esti-mate. 3M technical people also furnished anestimate of encapsulating cost, but were un-able to estimate the cost of the opaque encap-sulation assumed by OTA as the baseline prod-uct. Based on the above data, OTA estimatedthat it would cost approximately $55/lb foropaque encapsulated taggants; as the baselinetagging level is 0.05 percent by weight of en-capsulated taggants, and the encapsulatingmaterial weighs the same as the unencapsu-Iated taggants, this corresponds to 2.75 cents/-lb of cap-sensitive explosives for the identifica-


tion tagging material ($93 for 1 lb of unencap-sulated taggants plus $17 for 1 lb of encapsu-lating material plus the process equals $110 for2 lb of encapsulated taggants, or $55/l b.) OTAestimated the same cost for taggants at theother two implementation levels. Chapter V in-cludes an analysis of how changes in the costand/or concentration of the taggants them-selves wouId affect the cost of the program.

All other cost figures are estimates based onspecific inputs submitted to OTA by manufac-turers, distributors, and end users. Detailedtreatment of the cost elements is contained inchapter V.

The cost impact to end users of explosivescan be considerable. Implementation plansthat do not take into account the impact onmanufacturers and users of explosives coulddrive a number of manufacturers and users outof the market; could make some classes offinished products, like copper, uncompetitivein the world market; and could force entiresegments of industries to radically changeoperating procedures, such as shifting under-ground coal mining from explosive mining tomining machines. Detailed discussions andanalysis, however, indicate that it is quite un-likely that a taggant program similar to the“baseline” would eliminate any current uses ofexplosive materials, although marginal com-panies and product lines might be eliminated. Asindicated above, the baseline program differsfrom the BATF-proposed implementation onlyin that batch size takes into account the nor-mal production processes and quantities of theexplosives and gunpowder manufacturers. Thisfinding is based on detailed discussions with alimited number of users and manufacturersabout current costs and the possible impact ofcost increases.

Some examples are illustrative. Increasingthe cost of cap-sensitive high explosives the 12percent projected would increase the cost ofextracting coal in a particular modern under-ground mine by only 0.1 percent. Such a smallincrease would not be significant to this inten-s ive user of cap-sens i t ive explos ives, andwould be quite unlikely to cause a shift tomechanical mining machines or render a par-

ticular mining operation uneconomic. Similar-ly, that type of increase in the cost of cap-sensitive explosives, boosters, detonators, anddetonating cord in a large, open pit coppermine would increase the cost of producingcopper only 0.03 percent. As blasting agentsare currently used whenever possible in thatmine (cap-sensitive explosives are used onlyfor secondary breakup), no shift in explosiveproducts used would take place. The cost of arecent explosive-intensive dam constructionproject would increase 1 percent under thebaseline program, a larger percentage, but notenough to be significant or force alternateuses. A price differential of approximatelyfive-to-one currently exists in favor of blastingagents over cap-sensitive high explosives,which has caused most users of explosive ma-terials to consider blasting agents, and shiftwhere feasible; an increase in that differentialto six-to-one is unlikely to significantly changethe current status.

As a final example, consider the cost impacton handloaders. Handloaders load their ownammunition for two reasons —economy andthe hobby aspect. A less-than-l O-percent costincrease in expendable material is unlikely toaffect a hobby for which hundreds of dollars incosts have already been incurred (hand loadingequipment and guns). As powder is only one ofseveral materials on which a handloader savescosts (cartridge cases, projectiles, wadding),and additional cost-savings are realized fromlabor and by eliminating the excise tax on pur-chased ammunition, an 8-percent increase inpowder cost would translate into an evensmaller increase in total reloading costs. It ispossible, however, that manufacturers wouldshrink the range of available product lines inorder to minimize the startup costs of tagging.A smaller choice of products would bean addi-tional “cost” to the handloader.

The identification taggants currently pro-posed to be used are manufactured only by 3Mand are a proprietary product manufacturedby a proprietary process. In addition, a signifi-cant public overhead cost would have been in-curred before the compatibility of explosivematerials with the taggants could have been


demonstrated. Mandating the addition of iden-t i f icat ion taggants to explos ive mater ia lswould, therefore, ensure a monopoly of theGovernment-mandated market for 3M, at leastfor a period of several years. Under such cir-cumstances, development of a mechanism toregulate the virtual monopoly of the identifica-tion taggant market which 3M would enjoy ishighly desirable.

A number of mechanisms are available toregulate the price of taggants, including:

1. a price level set by Congress in the en-abling legislation,

2. regulation as a public utility,3. licensing by 3M of competitors,4. a multiyear, fixed-price contract, and5. a free-market price, regulated only by the

possibility of competition or sanctions ifprices get too high.

The free-market mechanism may be unac-ceptable to manufacturers of explosives andgunpowders, given the long time needed toeither develop and qualify an alternative tag-gant or enact sanction legislation. Legislationof a price or use of a regulation mechanismsimilar to that used for public utilities wouldbe an awkward, time-consuming process for aproduct whose total annual value would be onthe order of $10 milIion.

Licensing is not only disagreeable to 3M, butit is probably not cost-effective. The cost ofthe taggant material includes a component foramortization of the taggant production facili-ty, as a new facility must be built and theprimary market for identif ication taggantswould Iikely be the mandated explosives mar-ket. The process which 3M plans to implementis capital intensive. Licensing of other manu-facturers would therefore require the construc-tion of facilities for the licensee, in addition toa new 3M facility, resulting in a substantiallyhigher total cost.

A long-term contract is a potentially attrac-tive mechanism, In fact, the 3M cost estimatesare conditional on firm orders for a 2-yearperiod, although 3M is willing to consider con-tracting periods of up to 5 years. The details ofthe regulating mechanism have not been ad-

dressed by this study; if a multiyear contract isan acceptable mechanism, there may be someadvantage to a single contracting agency (pre-sumably within the Government), rather thanseparate contracts with each manufacturer ofexplosives and gunpowders. I n addition to sav-ing the cost of multiple contracting, the singlecontract concept would Iimit the amount of in-formation on numbers of product lines andproduction quantities of explosives availableto 3M, a matter of some sensitivity to the ex-plosive manufacturers.

A final cost-related issue merits attention.The legislation of a taggant program mightchange the extent to which manufacturers areheld liable for accidental explosions. In the eventthat an accidental explosion takes place, thoseinjured may attempt to hold the manufacturerof the explosives, the seller of the explosives,or the manufacturer of the taggants liable. Theaddit ion of taggants to explos ives couldchange the existing situation in several possi-ble ways:

●

●

●

●

The use of taggants would make it easierto identify undetonated explosives fromthe same batch as those involved in theaccident, thus facilitating proof or dis-proof of allegations that the explosive, thetaggant, or both were incorrectly manu-factured.

Evidence that incorrectly manufacturedtaggants had been involved in an accidentwould probably subject the taggant manu-facturer to l iabil ity, regardless of anydisclaimers made at the time of sale.

Evidence that taggants had been incor-rectly added to explosives (e. g., an ex-cessive concentration) might expose theexplosives manufacturer to Iiability, ifevidence could be presented that such ahigh concentration posed a danger.

There should be no cases in which theevidence shows that taggants were unsafeif made and used correctly, due to the ex-tensive qualification program required todemonstrate taggant safety. In any event,the fact that Federal law required the useof taggants would be a defense.


● If, however, taggants actualIy create ahazard but there is no evidence that theydo so, the manufacturers of explosivesmight be exposed to liability based on an(incorrect) assumption that the manufac-turing process was somehow at fault.

Furthermore, Congress could include in thelegislation mandating a taggant program provi-sions directing who should bear the costs of ac-cidents. For example, Congress could shift thecost to the Government by allowing suitsagainst the Government for accident losses al-

UTILITY OF

Before the utility of identification and de-tection taggants to law enforcement, security,and other regulatory agencies can be assessed,it is first necessary to examine the bomberthreat in some detail. The utility against eachsegment of the bomber population can then beassessed, together with the possible responsesof the criminal bombers, and be compared tothe utility of other control methods. identifica-tion taggants may also have utility for pur-poses other than tracing of criminal bombers.

The bomber population of the United States isextremely heterogeneous, with varying motives,resources, skills, and ability to adapt to a chang-ing control environment. For ease of discussion,bombers are divided into four categorieswhich differ from each other in most charac-teristics. These categories include terrorists,common criminals, the mentally disturbed,and vandals and experimenters. The character-istics of the various types of bombers are sum-marized in table 14 and briefly describedbelow.

Terrorists

The terrorist groups active in the UnitedStates vary widely in ability, resources, train-ing, and adaptability. They share the commoncharacteristics, however, of high motivation,action as a part of a group, and a continuing

Iegedly due to taggants. Alternatively, by legis-lating a presumption that taggants are safe orsimply by granting immunity to manufactur-ers, Congress could shift the cost of any tag-gant-caused accidents to explosives users. Athird possibility would be to legislate in a waythat would make taggant and/or explosivesmanufacturers liable for accidents caused bytaggants despite legislative coercion to usethem. A final option would be to divide thecosts of accidents by legislative limits on thedollar amount of claims arising from accidentsallegedly caused by taggants. The issue ofliability is treated in detail in appendix D.

TAGGANTS

involvement in catastrophic, illegalagainst society. These characteristics

activitiesmake the

terrorist particularly dangerous to society anda particularly appropriate target for anti bomb-ing controls. Terrorists can be roughly dividedinto pol i t ical , react ionary, and separat istgroups. Political groups are primarily inter-ested in attracting attention to, and sympathywith, their cause. For that reason they engagein spectacular events, such as bombings, butgenerally attempt to avoid or limit injury anddeath resulting from their bombings. Politicalterrorists often have considerable resourcesavailable to them, due to the significant num-ber of people who support their aim, if not nec-essarily their means. The leadership of most ofthese groups are of above-average inteliigence,and have either had specialized training orhave studied extensively in terrorist activities.They are thus able to adapt to a changing envi-ronment, although the range of responsesavailable to them may be Iimited by their polit-ical aims. Such political groups have been rela-tively inactive in the United States in recentyears.

Separatist groups, such as FALN (a PuertoRican terrorist group), generally hope to gaintheir aims by generating a reaction to their ac-tivities, rather than a sympathy to their aims.They are therefore generally less concernedwith public revulsion to bombings that cause


Table 14.–Attributes of Criminal Bomber Groups

Experience IndividualPerpetrator and training Resources Motivation or group Reaction capability Frequency

CriminalU n s o p h i s t i c a t e dS o p h i s t i c a t e d .

LH

MH

MH

Mu It!Multi

LM

II

TerroristPolitical .,S e p a r a t i s tR e a c t i o n a r y

M-HM-H

L

M-HML

M-HHH

GGG

M-HH

L-M

MultlMultiMulti

Mentally disturbedD i s e n c h a n t e dV e n g e f u lP a t h o l o g i c a l . ,

LL

L-M

LLL

L-MM-H

H

III

LL-ML-M

SingleSingleVaries

OtherV a n d a l sE x p e r i m e t t o r

LM

L-ML-M

SingleSingle

LL

II

LL-M

L Low M-Moderate H-High I Individual G. GroupSOURCE Oftice of Technology Assessment

substant ia l in jury and deaths. Separatistgroups have been credited with more than 25percent of catastrophic bombings—those re-sulting in major property damage, injuries, anddeaths. The resources of domestic separatistsvary from group to group, but are generallyless than for comparable groups of politicalterrorists.

Reactionary groups, such as the Ku KluxKlan and the American Nazi Party, share someof the characteristics of the political terrorists,but generally do not possess the same levels oftraining, motivation, and resources, and arenot as capable of reacting effectively to achanging control environment. They also differin that their bombings are usualIy directly tar-geted at the individual or group they intend toinfluence, rather than simply at a spectaculartarget.

Terrorists have been responsible for approxi-mately 12 percent of those bombing incidentsin the past 5 years to which law enforcementagencies assigned a motive.

readiIy adapt to a changing enforcement envi-ronment. The only major characteristic heshares with the professional bomber is that histargets are generally individuals or small com-mercial establishments, unlikely to be pro-tected by a detection taggant sensor. The pro-fessional bomber is highly trained and moti-vated and generalIy has considerable re-sources available to him, either directly orthrough his “employer.” Criminals share withterrorists the characteristics of engaging in re-peated bombings, but differ in that the profes-sional criminal bomber usualIy works alone,rather than as part of a group. Criminals as agroup are responsible for approximately 6 per-cent of bombing incidents. Most incidents arelimited to specific targets and do not generallycause substantial injury or death to innocentbystanders.

Mentally Disturbed

The mentally disturbed bomber differs fromterrorists and criminals in that he generallydoes not engage in multiple bombings, al-though exceptions such as the Los Angeles “Al-phabet Bomber” certainly exist. He generallyis poorly trained, has Iimited resources, andacts alone. He is often highly motivated, butperhaps only for short periods of time, in directresponse to some stimulus. He is extremelylimited in his ability to respond to changing

Common Criminals

Criminals range from the petty operator whoutilizes a bomb for extortion to the profes-sional bombers of organized crime. The pettyoperator is generally poorly trained, is not verymotivated, has limited resources, and cannot


control situations, either through lack of careof consequences or belief in his invincibility.As his motives are hard to identify, it is dif -ficult to predict his targets.

Vandals and Experimenters

vandals and experimenters share the charac-teristics of poor training, limited motivation,and limited resources. They generally workalone or in small groups, and do not generallyintend to harm people or cause extensive dam-age. Their targets are often of little value, likemailboxes or outhouses, but some acts of van-dalism can cause extensive damage to build-ings such as schools. While accounting forover 40 percent of the reported bombing in-cidents, they are responsible for little damageand few casualties.

Given the diversity of the criminal bomberpopulation, the range of targets involved inbombings, and the choice of explosives avail-able to the bombers, it is difficult to assess theutility of taggants to law enforcement agen-cies. The assessment is made particularly dif-ficult by the lack of experience with taggants,although the McFillan case (recently tried inBaltimore) provides one example where identi-fication taggants were an extremely importantpiece of evidence linking a suspected perpetra-tor to the crime. Inferences can also be madefrom experience with the date-shift code andwith the X-ray machines and magnetometersused at airports to prevent hijackings. A usefulconstruct for viewing the findings is shown intable 15, the discussion of which follows.

Both identification and detection taggantswould have limited utility in combating bombingsof low-value targets. Due to limitations on lawenforcement time and resources, minor bomb-ings, such as a vandalism bombing of a mail-box, do not warrant as thorough an investiga-tion as bombings involving casualties or signif-icant property damage. In New York, for exam-ple, such cases are generally handled at the in-dividual precinct level, without the use of thetrained bomb squad, bombing investigators,and forensic laboratories. As evidenced by theresults of the recovery demonstrations, a vis-

Table 15.–Taggant Utility Summary

Specific bombingconditions Identification taggants Detection taggants

Low-value targets Limited utility Limited utilityHigh-value targets,

no bomber High utility Extremely high utilitycountermeasures

High-value targets, Countermeasures Countermeasuresbomber costly due to require technicalcountermeasures increased risk knowledge,

planning


ual search of the area by untrained law en-forcement personnel is unlikely to turn upidentification taggants. Similarly, detectiontaggant sensors are unlikely to be present be-fore the detonation. The lack of utility in thesecases, however, does not greatly diminish theoverall utility of a taggant program, as the in-tent of the program is not to prevent this typeof bombing, but to help prevent significantbombings and to help in the arrest and convic-tion of the perpetrators of such bombings.

Identification and detection taggants wouldprovide a quantum increase in utility in combat-ing bombings of high-value targets, assuming theabsence of effective bomber responses.

The current procedure for the apprehensionand control of criminal bombers consists ofthree phases:

1.

2.

3.

the postdetonation search of the area forphysical evidence;the investigation, based on the results ofthe analysis of the physical evidence; andintell igence gathering on, and surveil-lance of, suspected perpetrators or ex-pected targets.

The search for evidence phase includes a de-tailed analysis to try and determine the type ofexplosive used (successful approximately 5 0percent of the time) and examination of what-ever parts of the bomb, such as elements of thetiming device, may have survived the detona-tion. This evidence, together with any evidenceof the presence of the perpetrator (such as hairor footprints) serves as the starting point forthe investigative phase.

Ch. I/—Detailed Findings ● 3 9

The investigative phase consists primarily oftrying to generate some type of lead to the per-petrators from the physical evidence gathered,as well as tracking leads provided by inform-ants or witnesses and attempts to correlate thecharacteristics of the bombing with similar in-stances. A great dealpended, for instance,sources of a common cmechanism.

The addition of ident

of effort may be ex-in investigating the

ock used as the timing

fication taggants to ex-plosives would aid the investigatory efforts oflaw enforcement personnel in a number ofways, provided that tagged explosives areused, the taggants survive the detonation, andthe taggants are recovered from the explosivedebris. The taggants provide a good startingpoint for an investigation as they directly in-dicate the type of explosive used, manufac-turer, time of manufacture, and provide a listof the last legal purchasers. This informationmay lead directly to a bomber who purchasedthe explosives legally. In some cases, thebomber would not otherwise be identified withthe bombing; in others, as was the case withthe McFillan incident in Baltimore, the tag-gants add a strong link in a chain of evidence,which may help to obtain a conviction. Tag-gants may provide intelligence information,such as linking a series of bombings, or linkinga suspect to a theft of explosives by establish-ing that one of the legal purchasers reported atheft at the time the suspect was in the city inwhich the theft occurred. Finally, bombersmay be deterred from committing bombingsby the knowledge that the chances of their be-ing apprehended are increased by a taggantprogram.

In order for the taggant information to beuseful, however, the bombing must be of suffi-cient importance (in terms of property dam-age, notoriety generated, or casualties pro-duced) to warrant a thorough investigation. Insuch cases, identification taggants will providemuch more information, and more reliable in-formation, than present methods, and this in-formation will require much less effort by theinvestigating team.

The value of the list of last legal purchaserswill depend somewhat on the length of the Iist.A trace which indicates that the full taggantbatch of explosives was sold directly to a mineby the explosives manufacturer obviously pro-vides a more useful lead than a trace whichshows a large number of purchasers of a lot ofsmokeless powder. Even for the smokelesspowder case, the list of names would probablynot be excessively long. The types of bombingslikely to warrant a detailed investigation areunlikely to be caused by 1 or 2 lb of gunpow-der, eliminating most purchasers from the listor providing multiple traces of the multiple 1-Ib lots used to make up the filler.

The utility of detection taggants in protect-ing high-value targets is obvious. The currentprocedures for protection of potential high-value targets vary with the type of the facilityand the time since the last perceived threat.Airports are protected by requiring all carry-onluggage to go through inspection (usually X-ray) and all passengers to walk through a mag-netometer. Search of checked baggage is notroutinely required, although spot checks,sometimes with trained dogs, do occur, par-ticularly when the perceived threat is high.Many Government buildings and other con-trolled-access facilities require a package orbriefcase check as well as personnel identifica-tion to gain entry. The airport instruments areoperated and inspection checks conducted pri-marily by personnel who are poorly trained,poorly paid, and subject to the problems ofmaintaining alertness over long periods whileperforming a dull job. The magnetometers areuseful solely to detect metal, and informationfrom the X-ray machines must be interpretedby the attendant. The use of a self-calibratingsensor, which would reliably give an alarm atthe presence of explosives in hand baggage,checked baggage, or on a person would offeran enormous increase in utility over currentmethods.

Many of the criminal bombers who would belikely to attack a high-value target would bedeterred by the knowledge that the target wasprotected by a sensor that would detect the ex-plosives in their bombs (assuming no effective


countermeasures by the bomber). The deter-rence might work to redirect the bomb againstanother target, to cause a less vulnerable partof a target to be attacked, or (perhaps infre-quently) to deter the attack altogether. Thosewho were not deterred would have their bombsintercepted, protecting that target and pro-viding security personnel with additional cluesto the perpetrator.

Detection taggants would only provide util-ity to those targets that were protected by adetection taggant sensor. Portable detectiontaggants sensors would also be quite valuablein locating a bomb whose approximate loca-tion was known and in determining if a sus-pected package contained explosives.

In summary, identification taggants wouldprovide a quantum increase in utility for thosebombings significant enough to warrant a thor-ough investigation, while detection taggantswould provide that increased utility in protect-ing those potential targets sufficiently impor-tant to warrant a detection taggant sensor.

The above discussion assumes that the crim-inal bombers do not respond to the introduc-tion of a taggant program. However, counter-measures exist which would enable bombers toevade the effects of a tagging program. The avail-able countermeasures require varying degrees ofspecialized knowledge, and some of them in-volve significant risks. Because most bomberswould probably not avail themselves of the possi-ble countermeasures, a taggant program wouldprobably retain substantial law enforcement util-ity.

Bombers seeking to respond to a taggantprogram by using countermeasures can useany

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

ot several approaches:

removal of the taggants,fabrication of homemade explosives,use of incendiary bombs,theft of explosives,black-market purchase of explosives,use of explosives manufactured beforethe taggant program commenced,use of blasting agents,sealing of detection taggants,

● “spookng” of taggant sensors, or● resorting to another unlawful activity,

such as assassination or kidnapping.

The baseline 3M identification taggants con-tain both a magnetic layer and a fluorescentlayer to aid in recovery after a detonation. Thetaggants could therefore be removed frompowdery explosives by using a magnet; theprocess would be both easy and safe, andwould require less than an hour for a typicalbomb. In order to hinder this countermeasure,taggants have been manufactured without amagnetic layer. If a powdery explosive weretagged with a mixture of magnetic and non-magnetic taggants, then the use of a magnetwould enable a criminal to remove only a por-tion of the taggants; the remainder would bepresent after an explosion, although theywould be somewhat more difficult to recoverthan the baseline taggant. If the criminal weredeterred from attempting magnetic removalby the knowledge that about half the taggantswere nonmagnetic, then postdetonation recov-ery would be only marginally more difficultthan the baseline case.

Another possible technique for removingtaggants from an explosive is to use a blacklight to identify the taggants by their fluores-cence, and then remove them with a tweezer.This process is safe, but more difficult thanmagnetic separation, and would probably re-quire many hours of painstaking effort for atypical bomb. Unlike magnetic separation, itcould be used to remove taggants from explo-sives that are tacky rather than powdery. It hasbeen proposed that the encapsulation of thetaggants be made opaque, and matched to thecolor of the explosive, in order to render suchremoval impossible. Since the encapsulantwould be melted by the heat of a detonation,postdetonation recovery would not be af-fected. Although it should not be difficult todevelop an opaque encapsulant, this has notyet been done. Opaque encapsulation wouldmake quality control, both of manufacturingtaggants and mixing them with explosives,more difficult, and its cost impact has notbeen evaluated.

Ch. /l—Detailed Findings . 41

In order to remove a nonmagnetic taggantwith an opaque encapsulant from an explo-sive, the explosives could be acetone dis-solved, the taggants and other SoIid materialremoved by filtering, and the explosives recon-stituted. This complex operation wouId requirespecialized knowledge, be roughly equivalentin danger and difficulty to fabrication of ex-plosives from raw materials, and would resultin less reliable (less likely to detonate) explo-sives.

Taggant removal from some gunpowderscould be significantly easier than from explo-sives, as some gunpowder grains are consider-ably larger than the identification taggants, asshown in figure 4. Separation from these pow-ders may therefore be accomplished simply byscreening, even if the taggants are nonmag-netic. Tests with several Du Pont IMR powdershave shown that it would be difficult to sepa-rate the taggants from the chips and fines con-tained in the gunpowder package, but all smallparticles could easily be separated from the in-tact grains by screening. It has been proposedto alleviate this problem by agglomerating thetaggants into clumps whose s ize roughlymatches the specific powder grain size. Thecost impact of such a solution was not ad-dressed during this study.

Removal of the detection taggants wouldnot be feasible.

Fabrication of explosives may be accom-plished by a variety of means, but a consider-able degree of expertise is required to avoidthe risk of premature detonations, and to en-sure high reliability. It should be noted thatfabrication of detonators is significantly moredifficult than fabrication of the explosivecharge.

A substantial number of bombing incidentsinvolve the use of incendiary bombs; it is quiteimpractical to tag the wide range of materialsfrom which incendiary bombs could be fabri-cated. It may be more difficult, however, tofabricate a reliable delay fuze for an incendi-ary bomb. In addition, while incendiary bombsmay be effective in destroying structures andjeopardizing groups of people, explosive bomb

Figure 4.—Size Comparison of the 3M IdentificationTaggant and Some Smokeless Powders

3M identificationtaggants

Hercules Bullseye

Du Pont IMR 4350

W-W 452AA

Hercules Red Dot

F 1-4 1’) “1 - - 93 - L


fillers offer a better chance of killing, injuring,or intimidating a particular individual.

A significant fraction of the explosive cur-rently used for fabricating bombs is stolen. Ataggant program may well increase the theft ofexplosives; however, additional explosive secu-rity could reduce the incidence of theft. Tag-gants from stolen explosives would not providea direct clue to the purchaser, but would helplaw enforcement officials to establish patternsand I inks between crimes, improving thechances of apprehending the criminals. Thebomber who steals explosives further increasesthe risk of apprehension by committing an ad-ditional crime. Finally, taggants could pinpointlocations from which explosives were stolen,providing a guide to tightening security inthose places most vulnerable to theft.

Explosives could be purchased on the blackmarket or illegally imported from abroad. Bothcourses of action subject the bomber to in-creased risk of capture, from informants or un-dercover agents in the former case and as a re-sult of smuggling, in the latter. Both courses ofaction would require substantial resources andthe ability to plan in advance.

Explosives manufactured before the imple-mentation of a taggant program could be usedto fabricate bombs. There is some evidencethat a considerable stockpile of explosives cur-rently exists in the hands of criminal bombers,and this stockpile could be expanded in thetime between legislation and implementationof a taggant program. Acquisition and storageof the explosives for a period of time requireconsiderable advance planning and resources,however, and increase the risk to the bomberof discovery of the explosives. While the use ofexplosives manufactured prior to a taggantprogram may be an effective countermeasureinitial I y, most explos ive mater ials have alimited shelf-life. Gels, slurries, and emulsionsare generally reliable for less than 1 year; thesensitivity of dynamites tends to increase withage; gunpowders and booster materials have along shelf-life.

Blasting agents, such as ANFO, are notamong the explosive materials BATF plans todirectly tag. (OTA finds that tagging blasting

agents, if it were judged desirable, wouldgreatly increase the cost of a taggant program.)Effect ive bombs can be fabr icated f romANFO; to do so requires a certain level of skillto ensure reliable detonation and the assemblyof a number of components, some of whichmay not be readily available. The risk of pre-mature detonation is small for a bomber withadequate knowledge and patience, but may besignificant for bombers without those charac-teristics. Blasting agents are infrequently usedat present in criminal bombings.

The effectiveness of detection taggants canbe severely limited by creating a seal betweenthe explosives and the detection taggant sen-sor as the vapor could not escape the packageto trigger the sensor. Such a seal can be con-structed with the appropriate industrial materi-als and equipment, but a reliable seal wouldbe very cliff i cult to fabricate with the resourcesnormally available to individuals. Hence spe-cialized knowledge, advance planning, and theresources to buy the required material, wouldbe needed to defeat the detection taggants.

Detection taggant sensors could be purpose-ly triggered or “spooked” by placing detectiontaggants, or other materials so similar chemi-cally to the detection taggant that the sensorcould not make the distinction, in nonexplo-sive materials. If several suitcases or packageswithin a short period of time triggered the de-tection taggant sensor for no apparent reason,those operating the sensor might well con-clude that it was malfunctioning, and discon-nect it. It would then be possible to introducetagged explosives into the protected area. Thiscountermeasure wou ld requ i re t h a t t h ebomber obtain a supply of the detection tag-gant material; access to detection taggantscould and should be made difficult.

Finally, bombers can turn to other crimes,such as murder, assassination, or kidnapping.These crimes, however, are often not as spec-tacular as bombings and all involve greatlyhigher risk to the perpetrators than do bomb-ings. I n addition, a direct action against a visi-ble target requires more motivation and a dif-ferent temperament than does an indirectcrime such as a bombing.


Dynamite bomb with nails

Pipe bomb

. ..

. .-Molotov cocktail, dynamite, and grenade

Photo credits US. Department of the Treasury

Various types of explosives used by terrorists

OTA consulted numerous explos ives ex-perts, all of whom agreed that countermeas-ures such as these are possible. However, theexperts on law enforcement and terrorismwhich OTA consulted agreed that criminalbombers would fail to make use of countermeas-ures, even when the necessary knowledge andequipment could be obtained without enormousefforts. However, some terrorists and profes-sional criminals would make use of countermeas-ures. This judgment appears to be based on anassessment of the type of personality that isgenerally involved in this kind of criminal ac-tivity. Bombings are currently a low-risk, rel-atively simple type of criminal activity. Eachadded element of risk, or additional stagenecessary to fabricate a bomb, will decreasethe likelihood of the prospective bomber ac-tually committing the bombing. An instructiveanalogy is aircraft hijacking. It is possible tosmuggle a weapon on to an airplane by a num-ber of means, but, in fact, since the antihijack-ing program started there have been thousandsof weapons found annually by the screeningprocess, hundreds of weapons found aban-doned near the controlled boarding gates, andfew or no cases of aircraft hijacked with theuse of smuggled weapons.

Consequently, OTA believes that counter-measures are not likely to greatly diminish thelaw enforcement utility of a taggant program,despite their potential to do so.

The above discussion has been essentiallyqualitative, as little quantitative data is availa-ble. However, an attempt was made to draw in-ferences from similar programs. The data avail-able from the date-shift program suggests thatidentification taggants may prove effective in in-creasing the arrests and convictions of criminalbombers. However, the data base is too small tobe more than suggestive. Similarly, data on thereduction of hijackings after the introduction ofan antihijacking program suggests that detectiontaggants would prove an effective deterrent. Theprogram most directly analogous to the pro-posed identification taggant program is the re-quirement that the date and shift of cap-sensi-tive high explosives be clearly printed on eachstick. For undetonated bombs the date-shift


code provides the same information as identi-fication taggants would provide for the post-detonation case. No total review of the casesinvolving explosives recovered from malfunc-tioning bombs has been conducted. A limitedset of 55 cases was examined, however, byBATF. In that sample, six cases were forwardedfor prosecution (10.9 percent). That is twice thepercent forwarded in cases that did not in-clude date-shift code data. Similar results wereobtained by MSA during a review of the BATFdata. Of the 10 bombing attempts MSA re-viewed, the date-shift code proved useful in 40percent of the cases, was not useful in 50 per-cent of the cases, and was of questionable util-ity in 10 percent. While the results were posi-tive in both cases, the extremely small samplesize makes it impossible to draw significantconclusions. I ME reported to OTA that manu-facturers are seldom requested to appear incourt to testify regarding a date-shift trace; inrecent years less than 1 percent of the tracesrequested led to a court appearance.

The most direct analog of the detection tag-gant program is the antihijacking program ini-tiated in 1971. There was an average of 27 hi-jackings from domestic origins in the 4 yearspreceding full implementation of the program.In the next year (1973), hijackings decreased toa single incident, and have averaged only fourper year since. It should be noted that a num-ber of countermeasures are possible thatwould evade the currently used magnetom-eters and X-ray machines. However, essentiallyno incidence of the use of these countermeas-ures have occurred since the inception of theanti hijacking program.

Numerical est imates of the numbers ofbombers who would be arrested and the num-ber who would be deterred by a taggant pro-gram were made by MSA in order to generateinput to their cost-effectiveness analysis of thetaggant program. The numbers they used in theanalysis were a 50-percent increase in the ar-rest rate (from 8 to 12 percent) and a 5-percentdetergency rate. These numbers are simplyguesses and OTA has no data that would allowit to make guesses or assess the accuracy ofthe MSA guesses.

The above discussion dealt with the utilityof taggants for the control of criminal bomb-ers. There exist other approaches to the problemof control of criminal bombers which could beused in conjunction with, or instead of, a taggingprogram. Some of the methods, however, maybe unpalatable or not cost-effective. Other ap-proaches, some of which have been imple-mented in areas facing a more severe bomberthreat, particularly from separatist terroristgroups, include:

● alternate detection approaches,● control of explosive materials,● better security,. more coordinated police response, and● harsher judicial response.

The Aerospace Corp., the Federal AviationAdministration, and the military are currentlyinvestigating, or have investigated, a largenumber of techniques for detection of untag-ged explosives. Methods investigated have in-cluded X-ray fluorescence, gamma ray excita-tion, nuclear magnetic resonance, both fastand thermal neutron activation, dual energytomography, detection of the characteristicvapors of explosives, and deactivation of blast-ing caps. Some of the approaches are prom is-ing, although all but the last two would belimited to checked baggage. However, none ofthe approaches, with the exception of non-tagged vapor detection, has progressed as faras the detection taggant research and most ap-pear to be significantly more expensive, bothfor the instrument and for personnel to manthe instrument. Commercial vapor detectorsare currently marketed for explosive detection,but their sensitivities and flexibil ity fall farshort of the goals of the taggant vapor detec-tion devices. Research on the promising ap-proaches should continue; it may be most ef-fective to deploy a detection taggant system inconjunction with one of the other systems.

Control of explosive materials could rangefrom uniform procedures for the purchase ofexplosives to the total control by the militaryor police of all explosives, from manufactureto the legal detonation. In some States, explo-sives are tightly controlled. For instance, inLouisiana all users or transporters of explosives

Ch. /l—Detailed Findings ● 4 5

must be licensed by the State police. I n someother States, however, explosives may be pur-chased over-the-counter simply by providingidentification and presenting a Federal permitor fi l l ing out a form. Uniform tight controlwould make it more difficult to purchase ex-plosives for illegal use and would be particu-larly effective in combating the less sophisti-cated bombers. Complete control of explo-sives, to the point of requiring police or mili-tary personnel to physically be at the site of alegal use of explosives and be responsible foreach detonator, as is the case in Ireland, wouldessentially eliminate the use of domesticallyproduced commercial explosives in bombings.Sophisticated bombers would be forced to fab-r icate their own explos ives (or purchase“homemade” explosives on a black market),while the unsophisticated bomber would beeliminated. Such a program would entail ex-tremely high costs however, both in monetaryterms and in terms of the disruption to indus-tries that currently use explosives.

Better security is possible, both to protectpotential targets and to protect explosive ma-terials from theft. It would be possible, as anexample, to hand-search all checked luggagebeing loaded on an airplane; in fact, EL AL (na-tional airl ine of Israel) does conduct suchsearches. Similarly, it would be possible, al-though extremely time-consuming, to searchevery person entering the Rose Bowl for theRose Bowl game. However, detection taggantsappear a more reasonable alternative.

Protection of explosives from theft could beimproved, however, and may well have to beto prevent a wholesale shift to theft as asource of explosive material if a taggant pro-gram is instituted. All of these controls havecost impacts which have not been calculatedin this study; a match must be made betweentheir cost and their marginal utility in the faceof the current bomber threat. As an example, ifthe use of mi l i tary explos ives in cr iminalbombings increases markedly it may becomenecessary to counter that threat. Tagging ofmilitary explosives would be extremely costly,due both to the large amount produced and tothe requalification cost of all current munition

systems which would be necessary. A reason-able alternative may be to increase the securi-ty of military explosives.

A more coordinated law enforcement re-sponse to the bomber threat would be effec-tive, whether a taggant program were insti-tuted or not. At present, “major” bombingsmust be reported to either the FBI or BATF.However, no uniform definition of “major” ex-ists. Other agencies, including some Stateagencies, also collect bombing statistics. Ex-amination of the statistics shows a significantlack of uniformity in what is reported to each,the information available on each incident re-ported, the retrievability of information fromthe data bank, and the methods for updatingthe files. One responsible center, to which allbombing information would be required to bereported in a uniform, easily updated, easilyaccessed format, would be an obvious aid tolaw enforcement efforts against cr iminalbombers.

Better coordination and communicationsbetween the forensic laboratories and the fieldinvestigators would also be helpful. Agents inthe field are sometimes not sensitive to whatinformation or what physical evidence wouldbe useful to the laboratory. This coordinationwill be particularly important if an identifica-tion taggant program is introduced, as the re-covery of the taggants appears to be a labora-tory-intensive procedure.

Finally, control of the physical site of thebombing by a single responsible individualwould be extremely useful. A major incidentmay involve several levels of law enforcementagencies, several levels of elected representa-tives, and other activities such as first aid andfire control. Uncoordinated activity by allthese people could well destroy valuable phys-ical evidence. Excessive use of water by fire-fighters is a potentially serious problem if iden-tification taggants are used, as they might bewashed totalIy away from the bombsite.

The utility of a harsher judicial response tocriminal bombers is a particularly sensitive is-sue, with little technological insight available,and is mentioned only for completeness.


Program Implementation

Given the current development state of theidentification and detection taggants, a num-ber of options are available regarding themethod of implementation of a taggant pro-gram. Among the issues are what, if any, tag-gant program should be legislated; if a taggantprogram is legislated, what materials should betagged, what level of tagging should apply,and what is the procedure for making deci-sions not specifically resolved by the legisla-tion.

One of the first issues needing resolution iswhat explosives should be tagged. The analysisconducted showed that criminal bombers tendto use the most readily available source of explo-sives. Therefore the tagging program with thehighest utility would include provisions for tag-ging of commercial explosives and gunpowders.

Table 7 showed the frequency-of-use distri-bution of explosives for bombings, includingexplosives identified both in the field and inthe BATF laboratory. While the completenessof these statistics may be open to interpreta-tion, it is clear that a wide variety of materialsare used as bomb fillers. Discussion with bothdomestic and foreign law enforcement offi-cials has stressed the fact that all types ofbombers will use the most readily availablesource of explosives, although sophisticatedbombers would be more likely to limit theiruse to materials that are efficient for the in-tended purpose. As an example, a relativelysmall amount of a powerful explosive was ap-propriate for the La Guardia Airport bombing,as it would cause extensive damage and beconcealable in a relatively small package. Theamount of gunpowder needed to do as muchdamage would occupy a much larger volume,and might be noticed; it would therefore notbe an appropriate choice for a sophisticatedbomber.

If one type of explosive material is not ashighly controlled, then bombers will tend toshift toward that material. For that reason, itmay be desirable to tag or otherwise controlmilitary explosives. Although current statisticsshow a relatively infrequent use of military ex-

plosives in criminal bombings, tagging of com-mercial explosives may shift the expected fu-ture frequency. Similarly, tagging of black andsmokeless powders is of critical importance toan overall taggant program.

Some mechanisms to tag blasting agentsmay also be desirable. However, the cost ofdirectly tagging the agents would be extremelyhigh. The BATF plan to tag the detonators,boosters, and detonating cord normally usedwith blasting agents may be a reasonable com-promise, particularly as blasting agents arenow rarely used in criminal bombings and ap-proximately half of the blasting agents aremixed and used onsite in the same day.

As indicated above, various levels of im-plementation of a taggant program are possi-ble, each with an associated cost of implemen-tation. The most reasonable way to determinethe optimum program to implement may be toconsider the marginal additional cost of each ad-ditional element of utility. This approach is il-lustrated in figure 5, where the identificationtaggant utility function is varied. Qualitativeestimates of marginal utility are shown to ap-proximate scale, along with quantitative esti-mates of the cost of implementing a programthat would yield that level of utility.

The lowest implementation option wouldtag cap-sensitive explosives, boosters, detona-tors, detonating cord, and gunpowders, but notblasting agents. A unique identification tag-gant would be used for each manufacturer,type of product, and year of manufacture. Thisprogram corresponds to the low-level programpreviously discussed. That level of implemen-tation would directly provide most of the phys-ical evidence information that current meth-ods attempt to provide. However, it would notdirectly provide a list of last legal purchasers.The relatively modest cost for that programwould be approximately $15 million per year, *probably less than is currentlyattempt to provide the samecurrent means, although theshifted to manufacturers andsives.

*The cost estimate In this sectton IS forgant program only

expended in aninformation bycost would beusers of explo-

an Identification tag-


Figure 5.— Marginal Cost-Utility Function

Marginal utility Marginal cost


The next option would be to provide aunique taggant code for each shift of eachproduct manufactured and to keep a record ofthe movement of explosives from the manu-facturer to the last purchasers, in a manneranalogous to the date-shift code currentlymarked on the casings of explosives. This op-tion corresponds to the OTA-identified base-line program, and would provide a list of lastlegal purchasers and additional intelligence in-formation, at a program cost increase of ap-proximately $10 million per year.

A further implementation option would beto uniquely tag each 10,000-lb batch of explo-sives and each 2,000-Ib batch of gunpowder.This would lead to a somewhat smaller Iist oflast legal purchasers, which would mean fewerplaces that must be investigated, as well as a

somewhat finer grain of intelligence informa-tion. However, the cost increase of $20 millionper year would be fairly substantial.

Additional marginal utility could be gainedby tagging blasting agents. This would be ofvalue in two cases —the case in which the iden-tification taggants from the detonator andbooster used to ignite the blasting agent didnot survive (or were not recoverable) from thedebris of an explosion, or the case in which abomb was fabricated that used some other (un-tagged) means of detonating the blastingagent. There is no body of test data to indicatethe l ikely frequency of the first condition;while the second condition is certainly possi-ble, almost all bombers capable of detonatinga blasting agent without commercial detona-tors and boosters would also be capable of ob-taining or fabricating untagged explosives inthe first place. At present blasting agents areinfrequently used for bombings — averagingtwo BATF sources suggests that blasting agentsare used in about 0.5 percent of bombings, andaccount for a small percentage of the propertydamage and casualties. Since the cost of tag-ging blasting agents would be approximately$170 million per year, several times that of allthe other elements of a tagging program com-bined, the marginal utility of doing so appearsrelatively low.

In short, the implementation of a taggantprogram would require unambiguous decisionsabout which materials required taggants, andwhat the applicable regulations would be. Itwould be desirable if any legislation on thesubject either made these determinations orunambiguously delegated authority to do so.

Given the present state of development of tag-gants, OTA’S data and analyses appear to be con-sistent with any of three possible courses of con-gressional action:

1

2.

Pass legislation requiring taggants, and setup a procedure to determine if and whenthe technical development and testinghave progressed to the point where imple-mentation can begin.

Defer legislative action on taggants, butencourage (inter alia by appropriating


adequate funds) BATF to continue tag-gant development, with a view to consid-eration of legislation when developmentand testing are complete.

3. Take no legislative action on taggants,and encourage the executive branch tosearch for other ways of improving the ef-fectiveness of law enforcement againstterrorists and other criminal bombers.

If Congress chooses the first of these op-tions, it should recognize that even though thelegislation can define precisely what materialswould require taggants and provide guidanceon the stringency of regulations, there will re-main some determinations which it is not yetpossible to make:

● When and if an adequate number of suc-cessful compatibility tests have been con-ducted. Particularly pertinent in this re-gard would be a determination of whatconstitutes a resolution of the current in-compatibility between the 3M identifica-tion taggants and one type of smokelesspowder or the RDX-based booster mate-rial. The 3M identification taggants can-not safely be added to these materials un-

●

●

●

til such a resolution is accomplished, andneither smokeless powders nor boostersshould be excluded from a tagging pro-gram.

When and if a sufficient probability ofsurvival and postdetonation recovery of agiven identif ication taggant has beendemonstrated to justify adding that tag-gant to a given type of explosive.

When and if a detection sensor has dem-onstrated adequate sensitivity, low false-alarm rate, ease of operation, ease ofmaintenance, and acceptable unit costunder field conditions to be consideredsufficiently “available” to justify requir-ing the addition of detection taggants toexplosives.

When and if a detection taggant has dem-onstrated adequate shelf-life, nontoxicity,and penetrativity to be considered “avail-able. ”

In view of the fact that BATF has become themajor proponent of the use of taggants in ex-plosives, there is much to be said for entrustingsuch determinations to an official or proce-dure outside the Treasury Department.

—. —

Chapter Ill

TAGGANT RESEARCH REVIEW

Chapter 111.–TAGGANT

—. . — —

RESEARCH REVIEW

* * * * * * * * * . * 0 * * * * 9 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 0 * 0 * * * * * * * * 0 * * * * * 9 51Taggant Development History● **** **** **** 900* **4* *a **a********** 51

Identification Taggants.Predetonation Only. .Radiological Tracers.Chemical Assay. . . . .Physical Taggants . . .Summary. . . . . . . . . .

Detection Taggants. . . .Vapor Taggants. . . . .Summary. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58Detection Taggant Sensor Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......59

untagged Detectoin ● **** a*** **** **** e.** a*** **** *e* be********* 62Vapor Detection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..62

Differential Contrast Radiography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .....63Excitation lnduced Emissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......64Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......65

Current BAFT/Aerospace Tagget ● * * * * 65Program Status ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65Projected Schedule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ 68Implementation Philosophy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . .......69

Identification Taggant Surviaval Teasting● **0* **** **m* **09 *b** **em **0** 70Boosters, Military Explosives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . .......71Black and Smokeless Powders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......72Detonators and Detonating Cord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......72Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......72

Chapter Ill

TAGGANT RESEARCH REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

TAGGANT DEVELOPMENT HISTORY

The idea of adding material to explosives toenhance the predetonation detection and thepostdetonation identification of explosives hasbeen considered by various military and civil-ian agencies for at least 15 years. Some of thesuggested material, such as radioactive iso-topes, would perform both functions, somecould only perform one. A number of the con-cepts which have been proposed during thattime are briefly described in the following sub-sect ions.

Identification Taggants

Ideas for tagging materials to be used foridentification of the source of explosives usedin criminal bombings and bombing attemptscan be generally grouped into the followingfour classes:

1. addition of materials that would not sur-vive the detonation, but which would pro-vide information if a bomb were recov-ered undetonated;

51


2. addition of materials that would physical-ly survive the detonation and be recov-ered intact;

3. addition of materials to the explosivesthat would be detected in an assay of thedebris; and

4. addition of radioactive isotopes.

Predetonation Only

Since 1970, the date, shift, manufacturer,and product have been printed on the car-tridge of cap-sensitive high explosives. Themanufacturer keeps records, by that date-shiftcode, and can tell to whom each batch of ma-terial was sold; distributors also are required tokeep records of sale. It is possible, from thedate-shift code, to compile a list of last legalpurchasers of explosives from a lot with thesame date-shift code. I n fact, BATF maintainsa National Explosives Tracing Center, whosefunction is to coordinate that activity. A typi-cal trace would start with the recovery of anundetonated bomb by a BATF special agent.He would call into the tracing center with theinformation, and the data would be forwardedto the manufacturer who would provide thelist of consumers or distributors; if explosivesfrom that lot were sold to a distributor or dis-tributors, they would be contacted for a list ofretail purchasers.

The date-shift code information has provenuseful in investigations of criminal bombings,although its utility is Iimited to instanceswhere the explosive is recovered before deto-nation, or in some cases, where a low-orderdetonation does not destroy the cartridge. Inaddition, the information is only on cap-sensi-tive high explosives, and on the packages ofdetonators, black powder, and detonatingcord. No trace data is available for other ex-plosive material, such as smokeless powder, in-dividual detonators, or even cap-sensitive highexplosives that have been removed from thecartridge.

Smaller amounts of information are given byother systems that do not survive the detona-tion. For instance, all dynamite legally cominginto New York must be red. I f dynamite is re-covered that is not red, it indicates a purchase

not legally usable in New York. This data is nothelpful to police in tracking bombers but doesassist in control of legal uses of dynamitewithin New York.

The English apparently use a method some-what better than the date-shift code in that theidentifying code consists of colored threadswithin the explosives. The threads do not sur-vive the detonation, but the information con-tent is not lost by discarding the cartridge, as isthe case with the date-shift code; it may not bepossible, however, to encode sufficient infor-mation for U.S. needs by that method.

Radiological Tracers

Addition of small amounts of radioactiveisotopes to explosives during the manufactur-ing process is particularly attractive as it pro-vides a mechanism for both identification ofthe explosive materials from the postdetona-tion debris and a simple detection mechanism.There are a large number of radioisotopes, soan identification scheme could certainly be de-veloped that would provide sufficient uniquecode species.

The two primary objections to this often-proposed solution are public reaction andsafety. Given the present widespread antipathyto anything involving radioactivity, it is doubt-ful if the public would accept such a solution,even if there were no safety hazards.

Two potential safety hazards exist, one hav-ing to do with sensitization of the explosivematerials, and the other with the effects oflow-level radiation. Addition of foreign materi-als to explosives poses a potential sensitivityhazard. However, the amount of radioisotopesrequired would be far smalIer than the mate-rial necessary for other tagging mechanisms,so explosive sensitization would probably beno more of a problem than with other types oftaggants.

The hazards of low-level exposure to radia-tion are not well-defined; the current trend istoward severe limitation of exposure. Thou-sands of people come into direct contact withexplosives every day at the manufacturers, dis-tributors, and users level, so a large number of

Ch. 111—Taggant Research Review . 53

people would have some exposure. Primaryconcern would be at the manufacturing level,where workers would have more continuousexposure than, for instance, a user. Aside fromthe adverse psychological effect the use oftracers might have on such workers, and thepossible long-term effects of low-level expo-sure, there would be a large cost impact due tothe need for specially trained personnel, aswelI as storage, handling, and decontaminat-ing equipment. If it were necessary for theNuclear Regulatory Commission to control theshipment of the explosives and to license andotherwise supervise all explosive users, addi-tional major costs and inconvenience wouldoccur.

A final drawback is that reading of the in-formation encoded in the postdetonation de-bris would be a fairly complicated laboratoryprocedure involving sample preparation, radia-tion counting, and radioisotope identification.Only a limited number of laboratories in thecountry have the trained personnel and facili-t ies; pol ice forensic laborator ies are notamong them.

Chemical Assay

A number of approaches have been pro-posed that have in common the addition ofchemicals to the explosives that would be re-covered from the postdetonation debris and beidentified by a laboratory assay of the debris.While the number of chemical materials is al-most limitless, a successful chemical taggantmust have the following properties:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

inertness,nonsensitization of the explosives,not present in background material,able to survive the detonation,long-term stability,not a health hazard, andsufficient variation must be possible toform a large number of unique codes.

The chemical taggant with which the great-est amount of research has been conductedwas developed by the Ames Laboratories in theearly 1970’s, I n this method, rare earths wereadded to explosives as oxides or as nitrates in

ethanol solutions. By using several rare earthsand by varying concentrations, a sufficientnumber of unique codes could be constructed.The taggants were recovered from the debriswith ethanol-dampened cotton swabs. Theswabs were then assayed in the laboratory byion-exchange methods; analysis was accom-plished by X-ray excited optical luminescencetechniques.

Drawbacks to the Ames taggants includedsensitization of the explosives by the ethanolcarrier, a high background level, particularlyfor detonations taking place near or on theground, and a rather specialized laboratoryprocedure necessary for the taggant assay andidentification.

Physical Taggants

This class of taggants is designed to survivethe detonation in its original physical form, tobe separated from the debris, and to be de-coded, either in the field or in the laboratory.Several types of materials have been sug-gested. Physical taggants must meet the samerequirements as the chemical taggants, how-ever, in addition to physical survival, so thenumber of serious candidates is somewhat lim-ited. Three taggants remain promising candi-dates.

3M COLOR-CODED TAGGANT

More research has been conducted with the3M identification taggant than with any other.It is the baseline taggant proposed by BATF forimplementation if a taggant program is legis-lated, and is the taggant used for the OTA cost,safety, and utility analyses.

The taggant consists of an irregular chip ofthermosetting melamine alkyd, approximately0.12 mm thick and about 0.40 mm in its great-est dimension. Figure 6 shows the eight-layerconstruction; variation of the sequence colorsprovides the necessary library of codes. A totalof approximately 6 mill ion unique codes isavailable, when al Iowances are made for cer-tain forbidden adjacencies (colors too difficultto distinguish) and other restrictions. One faceof the taggant visably fluoresces when illumi-


Figure 6.—3M Color-Coded Identification Taggants

I . . .4 ---

. “ : . 3 - . I m

r - . ., -. - - 4

Ch. 111—Taggant Research Review ● 5 5

nated with black Iight (366 nanometers) as anaid in recovery, either in the field or labora-tory. The other face contains iron powder, al-lowing the taggant to be picked up by amagnet, another recovery aid.

I n theory, the taggant can be recovered fromthe debris by use of a magnet and a black light,read in the field by a low-power microscope,and traced through the BATF tracing center. I nfact, laboratory separation may be needed inmost bombings; the recovery and laboratoryprocedures are quite simple, however, and canbe performed in the field with little equipmentand train i ng.

Several variations of the basic concept havebeen tried, some including a polyethylene en-capsulant and some including SIightly differentchemical and physical properties of the indi-vidual layers. The safety, survivability, utility,and cost aspects are discussed in great detailelsewhere in this report.

WESTINGHOUSE CERAMIC TAGGANT

The Westinghouse taggant consists of a mix-ture of rare-earth compounds, bound togetherinto a ceramic-1ike particle, whose appearanceis similar to a grain of sand, and whose largestdimension is approximately 0.2 mm. Each ofthe rare-earth compounds fluoresces at a char-acteristic wavelength when illuminated by ul-traviolet radiation (325 nanometers). A scan-ning monochronometer is used to read thewavelength of the various rare-earth com-pounds, and thus to identify the taggant code.The 10 rare earths that have been evaluated,and their characteristic emission wavelengths,are:

NanometersS t r o n t i u m c h l o r o p h o s p h a t e . e u r o p i u m 447Yttrium vanadate thulium. 476Y t t r i u m p h o s p h a t e c e r i u m , t e r b i u m 546Yttrium vanadate erblum 555Y t t r i u m v a n a d a t e : d y s p r o s i u m 575Y t t r i u m v a n a d a t e : s a m a r i u m 608-648Yttrium vanadate: europlum 618Y t t r i u m o x y s u l f i d e e u r o p l u m 6 2 6S t r o n t i u m f l u o r o b o r a t e . e u r o p l u m ,

samarium 687S t r o n t i u m f l u o r o b o r a t e e u r o p l u m 375

As in the 3M taggant, the Westinghouse tag-gant incorporates a spotting phosphor which

fluoresces in the visible range when il lumi-nated by shortwave ultraviolet radiation (254nanometers) and magnetic particles, both ofwhich assist in the recovery process.

Due to the l imited number of rare-earthcompounds available, and the fact that the in-dividual components are not ordered like the3M taggant layers, the Iibrary of possible codesis only approximately 3,000, even with threedistinct spotting phosphors. Use of differentconcentrations or pairing of two different tag-gants to form a unique species can significant-ly increase the l ibrary, with approximately600,000 codes available for the paired taggantvariation.

A significant number of compatibility testshave been conducted with the taggant, as havea small number of survivability-recoverabilitytests. Due to the ceramic nature of the taggant,it is extremely survivable and does not ther-mally degrade in high-energy explosives (suchas boosters), as does the 3M taggant. In addi-tion, since the rare-earth doping is homoge-neous throughout the material, the full codecan be read from even a small recovered tag-gant chip. The Westinghouse taggant is ex-tremely gritty, and has been shown to sensitizeexplosives if not encapsulated in a polyethyl-ene coating.

No additional effort is currently underwaywith the Westinghouse taggant, due to a West-inghouse concern over liability should sometaggant not be fully encapsulated and thuscause sensitization of an explosive material.From the limited data available, it would ap-pear that the Westinghouse taggant shows in-teresting potential, particularly due to its highsurvival rate, although solut ions must besought to ensure 100-percent encapsulation. I naddition, some further limitations are imposedby the relatively small code library availableand by the rather complex laboratory identifi-cation procedure required.

CURIE POINT TAGGANT

The Curie point taggant consists of a collec-tion of five distinct ferrites, packaged with anultraviolet sensitive spotting phosphor in abinder of potassium silicate. Ferrites exhibit


the property that their ferromagnetism disap-pears when the temperature of the ferrite israised above a specific temperature, desig-nated the Curie point temperature. identifica-tion of a particular taggant is thus accom-plished by placing the recovered taggant in atemperature-controlled chamber and record-ing the magnetism as a function of tempera-ture.

Approximately 50 ferrites have been identi-fied whose Curie point falls in a laboratorypractical temperature range. The 50 ferrites,used in combinations of s at a time, yield a li-brary of approximately 2 million unique spe-cies.

As the taggants are ceramics, their surviva-bility in high-energy explosives, such as boost-ers, should be good. Very preliminary testshave demonstrated the survivability of the tag-gant in boosters and high-power commercialexplosives such as Power Primer.

The Curie point taggants share the potentialsensitization problem of the Westinghousetaggants, and must therefore be encapsulatedwith 100-percent certainty. The Curie pointtaggants have another serious drawback: mag-netic separation from powdery materials suchas gunpowders and powdery dynamite wouldbe an obvious simple countermeasure.

Summary

The 3M taggant, which has been the mostthoroughly researched identification taggant,appears to be the most viable candidate, al-though the Westinghouse taggant exhibits agood deal of promise at this early stage of de-velopment. The other candidates exhibit tech-nical, cost, countermeasure, or public accept-ance problems, or require elaborate laboratoryseparation and analysis to yield the identifica-tion code. However, as other sections of thisreport make clear, the 3M taggant is not yetfully developed or tested, and could not begenerally used unless and until several remain-ing problems are resolved.

Detect ion Taggants

Four general types of detection tagging ap-proaches are described in the literature, in -CI uding:

1. radioisotopes,2. vapors,3. electromagnetic (E/M) taggants, and4. activation of nonradioactive isotopes

Radioisotopes for use as detection taggantspossess the same drawbacks as they do for useas identification taggants; the above discus-sion need not be repeated here.

Electromagnetic taggants incorporated intoa detonator, such as the passive harmonic ra-dar taggant investigated by the AerospaceCorp., offer the possibility of detection at adistance with a relatively low rate of falsealarms. All of the concepts so far proposed,however, can be easily defeated by wrappingexplosives in metal foi1. I n addition, inclusionof such devices would probably have a signifi-cant effect on the procedures used to manu-facture detonators, on detonator cost, and sig-nificant false alarms could be caused by com-mon diodes from radios, calculators, and otherelectronic instruments.

A variation of the idea of electromagnetictaggants has been proposed, called detonatordeactivation. In this concept, a reed switch isconnected in series with a detonator bridgewire. illumination of the detonator by a switch-able electromagnetic source would cause thereed to open. A number of methods are possi-ble to ensure that the reed could not be subse-quently closed. The advantages of the conceptare twofold:

●

●

the necessary illuminator could probablybe made quite inexpensively, allowing itto be used to protect far more targets thanwould be possible with other detectorconcepts; andthe deactivator process is passive — no op-erator is necessary.

Disadvantages include the fact that deacti-vation rather than detection of bombs wouldoffer no help in finding the would-be criminal


bombers; significant (and possibly costly) im-pacts on current processes of manufacturingdetonators; and the risk of accidentally deacti-vating detonators, resulting in their failure fornormal use. No research beyond initial concep-tualization has been conducted for this con-cept.

An interesting taggant concept has been sug-gested by the Franklin Institute, based on theidea of using Moss bauer active isotopes as tag-gants. The technique involves the addition ofnonradioactive trace taggants to explosives,followed by the gamma ray excitation of theMossbauer isotopes and the measurement ofthe characteristic absorption spectrum ofthose taggant isotopes. The Mossbauer effecthas been measured in numerous common ele-ments, including iron, tin, and nickel. In aMossbauer isotope, gamma rays, whose energycorresponds to the transition energy betweennuclear levels, may be resonantly absorbedupon excitation, producing a sharp absorptionspectrum characteristic not simply of theMossbauer element, but of the chemical com-pound of the element. This effect is due to thesmall perturbations of the nuclear levels by thesurrounding electrons. For use as a taggant, achemical compound not found in nature orused in industry would be manufactured. Dueto the low excitation level required, l ittleshielding of the source wouId be necessary.

Mossbauer taggants are simply a concept atthis stage, however, so little judgment can bemade of its practicality, cost, or safety in ex-plosives An Aerospace Corp, analysis ques-tions the practicality of the technique. A sig-nificant I imitation to the use of the Moss bauerand other activation techniques is that theycannot be used to search people, due to the ac-tivation radiation

A number of other activation taggant tech-niques have been suggested, including the dop-ing of explosives with material that would en-hance the effectiveness of X-ray or similar de-vices These concepts al I lack specificity, how-ever, and could cause the X-ray to be triggeredby many common items, resulting in an unac-ceptable faIse a I arm rate

Vapor Taggants

vapor taggants have received the bulk ofthe research on detection taggants. vapor tag-gants share the common taggant requirementsof stabiIity, inertness, compatibility with ex-plosives, and absence from normal materials.In addition, they must have a vapor pressuresufficient to produce enough molecules to besensed, but not so high that a large initial masswould be required to ensure continued opera-tion when placed in explosives that have ashelf-life of several years. They must have arelatively steady molecuIe emission rate over a5- to 10-year shelf-life, must not produce an en-vironmental hazard, and must not readily ad-here to surfaces with which they are likely tocome into contact.

Several hundred different vapor sourceshave been considered, with almost 200 havingbeen investigated in the laboratory. Avenuesof approach have included the use of dispro-portionating salts, the direct adsorption ofvapor taggants into the elastomeric plug mate-rial of detonators, and the microencapsulationof taggant materials.

DISPROPORTIONATING SALTS

A number of the salts of weak acids andbases, such as boron trifluoride adduct com-pounds, disproportionate or separate into twoor more constituent parts, some of which sub-limate at room temperatures, theoreticallyproviding a possible stable vapor emissionsource. Tests conducted by the AerospaceCorp. indicated that no compounds investi-gated had the proper balance of vapor pres-sure, emission rate, desired Iifetime, and pro-jected detection limit by a sensor to allow theuse of a sufficiently small amount of taggantmaterial. It is possible to control the emissionrate of a high vapor pressure salt by the use ofa microencapsulation membrane; use of sucha membrane allows the considerationlarge number of more easily handledtaggants, however, as described below.

ELASTOMERIC ADSORPTION OFVAPOR TAGGANTS

The adsorption of the vapor detectionrial directly into the elastomer used to

of aliquid

mat e-fabri-

61-401 0 - 80 - 5


cate the end plug of detonators offers a num-ber of advantages, including removal of thenecessity for additional steps or changes in thedetonator fabrication process. Research hastherefore been conducted to evaluate the ef-fectiveness of various elastomer/taggant pairs.Taggants evaluated include sulfur hexafluo-ride, and hologenated alkanes, amines, aero-batics, esters, and ketones. A number of com-binations appear feasible, although useful life-times may be shorter than the 5-year minimumdesirable. A more severe limitation, however,is that the elastomerically adsorbed taggantswould be useful only on detonators, and pos-sibly with detonating cord. None of these tag-gants appears to be as successful as other can-didates when microencapsulated for use withother explosive materials. Use of separate tag-gants for detonators for other explos iveswould lead to the development of two sensorsor to the requirement for dual-mode sensing ina single sensor, an unnecessary sensor develop-ment constraint.

MICROENCAPSULATED VAPOR TAGGANTS

Approximately 180 vapor materials havebeen screened in the laboratory as candidatemicroencapsulated vapor taggants. In addi-tion, several hundred other materials were re-jected after a thorough analytical review. Fivecandidate perfluorinated cycloalkane com-pounds have been extensively tested, and havesuccessfulIy completed barrier penetration,mutagen, toxicity, and atmospheric impacttesting. The five candidate vapor taggants andtheir chemical properties are shown in table16.

A parallel research effort has been under-way to find an appropriate microcapsuIe mate-rial. The optimum material would be inexpen-

sive, easy to use with the candidate taggantmaterials, compatible with the explosive mate-rials, and form membranes that account foronly 10 to 20 percent of the microencapsu-Iated taggant weight. Figure 7 shows a photo-graph of a canadidate microencapsulated vapordetection taggant, with a needle to indicaterelative size.

Emission rate studies are currently under-way with a number of membrane materials.Early tests were very encouraging; a number ofmore recent test results show variations inemission rate from lot to lot and as a functionof ambient relative humidity and temperature.Tests have not yet started on long-term emis-sion behavior, especially in the presence of ex-plosives. Tests have only recently started onthe compatibility of explosive materials witheither the taggant vapors or the membrane ma-terials.

Summary

Although a wide range of detection taggantmaterials have been proposed, the need forlong life, stability, specificity, and absence ofeasy countermeasures has caused the bulk ofthese to be rejected, at least given the currentstate-of-the-art. The most promising concept isthe microencapsulation of perfluorinated cy-cloalkane compounds, although the direct ad-sorption of taggants into the detonator plugelastomer appears promising for that applica-tion. A number of preliminary tests have beenconducted with five candidate taggants; com-patibility testing has just been initiated. Deto-nator deactivation is a possible alternate ap-proach, although little research has been ac-compl i shed.

Table 16.–Candidate Vapor Taggant Properties

Empirical Molecular Boiling point Melting point Specific Vapor pressureChemical name Abbreviation formula weight “ c “ c gravity (300° K = 27° C)Perf luoro-1 1-2-d lmethy l -cyc lobutane PDCB C, F,, 300 45 - 3 2 1.67 390Perfluoromethylcy clohexane ., PMCH C, F,, 350 76 - 3 7 1.79 106Perf luoro-1,3 3-d imethy lcyc lohexane PDCH C, F,, 400 101-2 - 7 0 185 35P e r f l u o r o d e c a l l n PFD C 0F ,8 462 141-2 0 193 6.6Per f luorohexy lsu l f su l fur -pentaf luonde L-4412 CSFI,SF, 446 118 - 3 1 1.89 195

SOURCE The Aerospace Corp

Detect ion Taggant Sensor Systems

The development of a system to detect theemitted vapors is proceeding in parallel withthe development of vapor-emitting detectiontaggants. A schematic block diagram for theoperation of such a system is shown in figure 8.Air, from the vicinity of the item being in-spected, is collected and delivered to a sensor,after first being conditioned. The sample col-lector can simply consist of a gust of air for in-spection of boarding passengers, or can in-clude a small pressure pulse to a piece ofchecked baggage to introduce more of the airfrom the interior of the baggage into the airsample stream. For some of the concepts thefree oxygen and water vapor must be removed

P h o t o credtt Aerospace Corp

prior to insertion of the air into the sensor. Ifthe vapor taggant is present, an alarm indica-tion is registered; if none is present, then theitem passes through with no delay. A detailedprocedure has not been developed to deal withalarms, but the procedure would probably in-clude a recycle through the sensor to eliminatethe chance of an equipment transient being re-sponsible, followed by a suspected bomb dis-posal procedure if the alarm persists.

Work is progressing on three candidate de-tection sensors. Very little effort has been ex-pended by the Aerospace Corp. on the otherelements of the system, although some prelimi-nary design identif ication work has takenplace on the air sampling process and on meth-ods of enhancing the original sample. A U.S.


Figure 8.— Detection Taggant Sensor SystemBlock Diagram

Samplecollector

Airsampler

Samplerconditioner

sensor

Alarm

Calibrator Inspection

No Alarm

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

Customs Service device has been tested, for in-stance, which exerts a gentle force on baggage,causing an exhalation of the baggage interiorair into the sampling network.

The three candidate detection sensors are, inorder of increasing complexity and cost, thecontinuous electron capture detector (CECD),the ion mobility spectrometer (lMS), and themass spectrometer (MS). Figure 9 shows a sche-matic diagram of the operation of IMS. Gas isintroduced from the sampling device into theconditioner. After the free oxygen and watervapor are removed, the sampled gas moleculesare drawn into the ionization region wheremany molecular species, including the taggantmolecules if present, form negatively chargedions. The negative ions are then gathered andinjected into a drift tube where an electricfield causes them to flow against a counter-flowing drift gas stream. By virtue of the ionmolecule reactions between the negative ionsand the neutral drift gas molecules, the ionsare separated into spatial clumps of like spe-cies. Each species, depending on the strengthof the ion-molecule interaction, traverses thelength of the drift tube in a different length of

time so that one can turn-on, or gate, the de-tector to respond only to a specific molecularspecies or group of species such as the taggantvapors.

The taggant molecules being considered allhave long drift times and are easily separatedfrom common gasses in the IMS. Additionalspecificity is gained by the toughness of thetaggants; most other large molecules fragmentin processing through the detector.

IMS devices have been commercially avail-able for approximatelys years, with about sOcurrently in use for various applications. Testshave been run with a commercial IMS unit atairports to examine ambient air for the pres-ence of molecules in the critical drift time re-gion; no molecules which would have triggereda false alarm were detected.

While the laboratory tests are promising, it isnot possible to extrapolate to estimates of IMSperformance in the field, in a real-life envi-ronment, when maintained by normal airportmaintenance people, and when using an inter-nal calibration source.

CECD can be conceptually viewed as an IMSdevice without a drift tube. It simply consistsof the conditioner and reaction chamber; thedecrease in current in the reaction chamber isa sign that the taggant molecules are presentand have been ionized. As described, CECDwould have less specificity than IMS, andwould probably be triggered by a wider rangeof interference sources. The key to the deviceis in the conditioning chamber; the chamber isa catalytic reactor that contains hydrogen gasand palladium metal plated onto a number 5Amolecular sieve and operating at 1400 C. Thereactor removes oxygen and water vapor, frac-tures some other potent ia l inter ferencesources, while sti l l others are removed byreduction or combustion. The number of mole-cules that will survive the conditioning cham-ber is limited, but the taggants may well not bethe only survivors of the passive screeningprocess.

CECD devices have been used as a labora-tory instrument by the Brookhaven NationalLaboratory for the past several years. A bread-


Figure 9.— Cutaway View of the Phemto”Chem 100 Sensor Cell in the Ion Mobility Spectrometer

ALL GAS

SAMPLE AND GAS FLOWS DRIFT GAS 80% ●CARRIER 200/0SAMPLE ●

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IMS HOUSING AND HEATER

DRIFT GAS100-3000 ml/min

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SOURCE David Williams BATF

board device was recently shown to be quitesuccessful in detecting vapor-tagged dummyblasting caps in baggage on a conveyer belt.

The MS is a standard laboratory instrument,easily capable of resolving the taggant mole-cuIes from other species. Current MSS, how-ever, are usualIy expensive, relatively sensitivelaboratory instruments. The challenge is to de-sign and develop a low-cost, field-usable in-strument that will detect taggant molecules ina parts-per-tril I ion concentration level.

The limited laboratory testing of detectionsensors that has taken place has demonstratedthat the technology exists for sensors whichcould detect the taggant vapors. These testshave not yet demonstrated, however, the abili-ty of the instruments to distinguish betweenthe taggant materials and similar materialswhich may exist in the environment or may bedeliberately introduced into the environmentas a countermeasure. It has also not been dem-onstrated that any of the instruments can suc-cessfully detect the taggants in the requiredparts-per-tri I I ion concentration level underfield-use conditions.

The time required to develop instruments ofthis type is a pertinent subject for discussion,even assuming that the technical problems canbe solved. The milestones in a developmentprocess include:

● demonstration of technical feasibility,● generation of specifications for a proto-

type,● prototype development,● generation of specifications for the instru-

ment,● pilot production of the instrument, and● ful l-scale production.

None of the detection sensor concepts hasyet passed the technical feasibility demonstra-tion milestone. The only time estimate whichhas been made is an extremely optimistic es-timate of 14 months from demonstration oftechnical feasibility to completion of a proto-type. The estimate assumed no technical, con-tractual, or other problems, and may well beoff by a factor of two. Given the fact that theseinstruments would be produced in quantity (upto several thousand), must be self-calibrating,maintained by routine maintenance people,


and detect at the state-of-the-art parts-per-tri l l ion level, it is unlikely that productioncould be underway in less than 5 years.

If the instruments can be developed to per-form as desired, however, they should be quite

effective; the operating costs and false alarmrates would be negligible while the detectionrate would ensure essentially no successfulpenetration of the sensor system.

UNTAGGED DETECTION

Three general methods have been exploredfor detecting explosives that do not have de-tection taggants added. These include vapordetection of the characteristic vapors presentin the explosives, the use of differential con-trast radiography, and the use of excitation in-duced emissions. Some of the specific tech-niques investigated are br ief ly discussedbelow.

Vapor Detection

A great deal of research effort has been ex-pended in the field of detection of the charac-teristic vapors emitted by explosives. Table 17shows the physical properties of the vaporphase of a number of explosive materials,while table 18 shows some of the methodsused to detect the explosive vapors. ’ Much ofthe effort has been concerned with character-izing the vapors that are present in explosives,looking for vapors common to a number of ex-plosive materials, and quantifying the prob-lems of vapor detection. While the equilibriumconcentrations of the vapors shown in table 17are within the detection capabilities of muchof the instrumentation depicted in table 18,several problems limit the utility of vapor de-tection.

One of the primary problems is the lack of acommon vapor in the various explosive mate-rials. Either nitroglycerine or EGDN is oftenpresent in dynamites, and in smokeless pow-ders, but neither are present in the other ex-plosive materials used in criminal bombings,such as gels, slurries, black powder, detonat-

‘From “Explosive Vapor Detection Instrumentation, ” by j RHobbs, prtnted In the Proceedings of the 1979 Electro Profes-sional Program, New York, April 1979

ors, and boosters. A detection device wouldthus have to be able to detect a significant va-riety of vapors (and thus either be quite slow orexpensive) or it would be subject to a high rateof false alarms if it could be triggered by thespectrum of materials that would be spannedby the vapors from the common explosive ma-terials.

A second significant problem is the amountof vapor actually available for detection.While the equilibrium concentrations of thevapors are high enough to ensure detection,the actual amount of vapor present will be sig-nificantly degraded by the container that con-tains the explosive, particularly if an effort ismade to create a vapor barrier. The explosivevapors do not have the properties of penetra-tion and nonadsorption of the vapor taggantmaterials discussed in the previous section.Concentration of the vapors could help alle-viate this problem, but that might cause suffi-cient concentration of ambient interferencemolecules to generate a high false alarm rate.

These defects must be balanced against themajor advantage that detection of the charac-teristic vapors of explosives has over the detec-tion of taggant vapors —only those explosivesthat have been tagged can be detected if thesensors are designed to look for the vapor tag-gant.

As shown in table 18, a large number ofphysical principles have been used to detectthe vapors. The most successful, however, arethe ionization mechanisms exploited for detec-tion of taggant vapors. Continued research isprimarily devoted to these sensors.

Animal detection deserves a specific com-ment. Although less sensitive than the other


Table 17.–Vapor Pressures of Selected Explosives

Vapor pressure CompositionCompound Molecular weight Temperature 0 C mm Hg gm/cm 3

E G D N – e t h y l e n e g l y c o l d m l t r a t e 152 25 2,8 X 10-2 23 x 1 0 7

N G – n i t r o g l y c e r i n e . 227 25 2,4 X 1O-s 29 x 10-10

P E T N – p e n t a e r y t h r l t o l t e t r a n l t r a i e ’ . , . . 316 25 54 x 10”6 9.2 X 10 IIAN–ammonium nitrate 80 25 5.0 x 10”6 2.2 x 1011

DNT–dinitrotluene 182 25 1 4 x 10”4 1,4 x 109, .TNT–2, 4, 6,-trinitrotoluene. ~ 227 25 30 x 10”6 37 x 10”11R D X 222 25 1.4 x 109 1.7 x 1014

Mole fraction(V. P./76O)

37 ppm32 ppb7 ppb7 ppb

184 ppb4 ppb2 ppt

SOURCE J R Hobbs Explosive Vapor Dection Instrumentations`

Table 18.–Explosive Vapor Detection Techniques

Optical Ionization Animals Other

Infrared Electron capture Bioluminescence PlezoelectncUltraviolet Gas chromatography Dogs ThermoionicMicrowave Mass spectrometry Gerbils Condensation nucleiFluorescence Gas chromatography/ EnzymesLaser- raman mass spectrometryTwo-photon absorption Plasma chromatographyChemiluminescenceLaser optoacoustical

SOURCE J R Hobbs Explosive Vapor Detection Instrumentations

sensors (by orders of magnitude), animals havesome potential advantages. If small animalssuch as rats and gerbils can successfulIy detectexplosive vapors, then the cost of an animalbackup system would be quite small. Dogs aremore expensive to train and work with, buthave the advantage of being used for other lawenforcement work such as patrols.

Differential Contrast Radiography

Differential contrast radiography takes ad-vantage of the fact that different materials at-tenuate the strength of a source to a differentdegree, depending primarily on density andatomic number. Common clinical X-rays andthe imaging X-ray detectors used to screenhand baggage at airports work on this princi-ple. Similar devices have been fabricated usinggamma radiation and neutrons as the beamsource. This method is quite effective for de-tecting materials whose density is significantlygreater than other materials in the environ-ment, such as a steel gun (specific gravity of7.8) in a briefcase containing books or clothes(specific gravity less than 1,0), but is much lesseffective in detecting smaller differences in

density. Most dynamites have a specific gravi-ty of approximately 1.6; booster materials andmilitary explosives are SIightly higher (up to1,8); gunpowders have a bulk density of lessthan 1.0.

The current imaging systems at airports areoperator-monitored and therefore dependenton the ability of the poorly trained operator todiscriminate small density differences. Mostrecent research has been concerned with auto-mating the radiographic scannin g systems.Due to the wide span in density of explosivematerials, and the large density overlap be-tween explosives and other materials, it isnecessary to include other means of discrim-ination in the detection algorithm. Shape is theother discriminant currently used. The patternrecognition algorithm in a computer reactswhen the proper density and shape pattern aredetected. Such a system is sensitive to orienta-tion, arrangement, and shape of the high explo-sive as well as to the mass of the high explo-sive. The breadboard laboratory models so fardeveloped can incorporate only a l imitednumber of shape-density combinations and areable to detect only certain shapes of C-4 explo-

64 “ Taggants in Explosives

sive and certain shapes of dynamite bombs.While they could detect a 2-lb C-4 chargeshaped like a package of butter, they wouldnot detect the same charge shaped as a sphere,cylinder, pancake, or sausage, or even anotherexplosive of slightly different density shapedin the butter package shape. As the devicesscan from only one axis, a 2-inch-thick slabwith a specific gravity of 0.5 looks much Iike al-inch-thick slab of density 1.0. Such a lack ofspecif ic i ty not only generates h igh falsealarms, but explosives arranged in an unusualshape would not be detected.

Two avenues of approach are being pursuedto try and alleviate the discrimination specific-ity problem. The first is to use more than oneenergy level for the radiation source. Eachtype of material has a different opacity to dif-ferent radiation energies. If more than one en-ergy source is used to illuminate the object,then additional information about the materialis gained. Some recent work indicates substan-tial gains in information are possible using twocarefully chosen energy levels.

The second approach is to illuminate thepackage along more than one scanning direc-tion. The information gained can help generatea better idea of both the package shape and itsdensity. In a technique called tomography, theimages formed by scanning from several direc-tions are computer processed and used to gen-erate a three-dimensional image of the pack-age in the computer. Any two-dimensional pro-jection can then be generated as well as an ac-curate density value. This image can be com-pared to all possible conformations of com-mon explosive materials by the computer,yielding a much higher probability of detec-tion as well as a lower false alarm rate. Aero-space Corp. is currently sponsoring research ondual-energy tomography, which would com-bine the additional information available fromboth multiple directional scans and multipleenergy scans.

Excitation-Induced Emissions

Many materials absorb radiation of a specif-ic wavelength and subsequently emit an in-

duced radiation whose energy may be a func-tion of the element itself or of the specificcompound, due to the interaction of the orbit-al electrons with the nuclear material. TheMossbauer isotope taggants described in theprevious section were an example. Severalmethods of utilizing induced emissions havebeen investigated for detection of explosives,including the use of thermal neutrons, X-rayfIuorescence, and nuclear magnetic reso-nance.

The thermal neutron detection concept uti-lizes the capture of thermal neutrons by nitro-gen with the subsequent prompt emission of a10.8 MeV gamma ray. Explosives are rich in ni-trogen and should be easily detected in an un-shielded suitcase, but so are a large number ofother materials, such as wool, orlon, nylon,and leather. Coupling the system to a patternrecognition computer might be sufficient todiscriminate between a solid block of explo-sives and a couple of orlon sweaters (althoughtest results were marginal), but discriminationbetween these sweaters and a bomb in whichsingle dynamite sticks are connected by deto-nating cord, for instance, would be extremelydifficult. Processing times for this concept arealso rather long for efficient transport of bag-gage.

Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) is atechnique with considerably greater specifici-ty. In NMR detection, an applied radio fre-quency magnetic field, with the correct fre-quency, induces energy level transitions in hy-drogen, with the subseq~ent prompt reradia-tion of energy in a manner specific to thechemical compound containing the hydrogen.A sensor, tuned to receive the signals thatwould be emitted by the hydrogen in variousexplosive materials, could theoretically detectany type of explosive, even when present insmall quantities. A major problem with theut i l i zat ion of th is technique for explos ivedetection would be the fact that metal inter-feres with the NMR performance, thus shield-ing the explosive. The unit would also have tobe quite large (and thus expensive); the magnetfor an NMR unit large enough to scan a suit-

Ch, 111—Taggant Research Review . 65

case would weigh several tons. Another prob-lem is the rather slow response cycle time.

Summary

A number of techniques have been de-scribed for the detection of untagged explo-sives. Preliminary testing has been accom-plished on most of the techniques discussed;few concepts have progressed as far as thestudies on detecting vapor taggants, with theexception of the use of animals to detect thecharacteristic vapors of explosive materials.Some explosive detection devices are currentlyon the market, although their performance isnot satisfactory. Other techniques have been

suggested, and extremely Iimited testing hasbeen conducted on some of them. All of theuntagged detector concepts contain signif-icant problems in terms of adaptation to fielduse. Instrumentation for many of the conceptswould be large and expensive; many are easilycountermeasure and none, with the except ionof the vapor detection devices, could be usedto screen passengers.

Granting the many problems in nontaggeddetection, there may still be a significant po-tential payoff. If an explosive detection instru-ment or technique could be fielded, it coulddetect all explosives, not just those to whichtaggants had been added.

CURRENT BATF/AEROSPACE TAGGANT PROGRAM

I n 1976, the Aerospace Corp. was designatedby BATF as the system technical manager ofthe taggant program. Prior milestones leadingto the current taggant program developmenteffort were:

1973.–Joint establishment by BATF andFAA of an ad hoc committee on explo-sives seeding.1973.–Formation of the Advisory Commit-tee on Explosives Tagging chaired byBATF for coordination of Federal agen-cies involved with tagging and the controlof the illegal use of explosives.1973.–Lawrence Livermore Laboratorystudy to determine feasibility of identifi-cation tagging with Aerospace Corp. act-ing as the program technical manager andLEAA as sponsor.1976.–National Implementation Modeland Pilot Test Plan for Identification Tag-ging developed by the Aerospace Corp.u rider contract to the Bureau of Mines,1977.–Aerospace Corp. designated thesystem technical manager for the taggingprogram by BATF.

Since 1977, Aerospace has been engaged inan ongoing program of analysis and testing todevelop identification and detection taggants

and to demonstrate their use in explosive ma-terials. Details of the taggant and sensor devel-opment programs were given above; the statusof the compatibiIity testing program is de-tailed in chapter IV; the status of survivabilityand recovery testing is reviewed in the follow-ing section and in appendix C; some details ofthe analysis and pilot testing status are re-viewed in chapter V. This information is brieflysummarized below, as is a description of theBATF implementation philosophy.

Program Status

The status of the taggant development ef-fort is summarized in table 19 for identifica-tion taggants and in table 20 for detection tag-gants. In the tables, “Technical feasibil ity”refers to a demonstration or analysis which in-dicates the concept is feasible, “Technicalread i ness ” refers to a demonstration or anal-ysis that the concept will work in the mannersuggested, and “Practical readiness” indicatesthat the full spectrum of analyses and tests hasbeen completed which shows that the conceptis ready for full-scale implementation.

The ability of the 3M Co, to produce thecolor-coded taggants has been demonstrated,


Table 19.–ldentification Taggant Program Status

Accomplished I Planned or required

Technical feasibility Technical readiness Practical readiness 1 Technical feasibility Technical readiness Practical readiness

Color-coded taggant development● Initial survivability ● Pilot production ● Leadyime study

compatibility compatibilitytesting

● Environmental impact assessment

● Health impactassessment

Cap-sensitive packaged explosives (dynamite, water gels, slurries,

I

I

I

I

1 0

● Tooling-up period/testing

Optimize hues

and emulsions)● Initial compatibihty

testing● Initial survivability

testing● Manufacturing

process reviewedand practicalityassessed

Black powders● Initial compatibility

testing● Hand-mix survwa-

bility testing● Manufacturing

process reviewedand practicalityassessed

Cast boosters● Initial compatibility

testing● Initial survivability

testing● Manufacturing

process reviewedand practicahtyassessed

Online taggingdemonstratedTagging methodsselected/evaluated

● Pilot test produc-tion-level tagging

● Record/tracingmethods demon-strated

● Some ballisticstesting

Comprehensivecompatibility testing

Comprehensive sur-vivability testing

● Analysis/optimiza-tion of approach

Long-term compati-bility

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

�

●

●

●

●

Online taggingAdditional compati-bility (electrosta-tic) testingTransport/vibrationsegregation testing

Comprehensive com-patibility testing

Comprehenswe sur-vivability testing

● Ballistics testing● Online tagged sur-

vivability testing Long-term segre-

gation● Long-term compati-

bility

Online taggingTagging methodsselected/evaluated

Solution of problemposed by reactivity(and presumed in-compatibility) withComposition BComprehensive com-patibility testingRecovery testing

Comprehensive sur-vivability testing

● Pilot testing, produc-tion-level tagging

● Long-term compatt-

●

●

bilityComprehensive sur-vivability testingRecord/tracingmethodsdemonstratedAnalysis/optimiza-tion of approach

Comprehensive sur-vivability/compati -bility testingPilot testing

●

Detonating cord● Taggants added by

hand, initialsurwvability demon-strated

● Manufacturingprocess studied andtagging practicabil-ity assessed

Smokeless powders● Hand-mix surviva-

bility testing

Recovery testing Tagging stationdevelopment

● Online tagging●

Solution of problem ● Evaluation testingof sequential lots

● Production hazardand acceptancetesting

● Comprehensive sur-vivability testing

● Online tagging

Ballistics testingPilot testingI posed by reactivity

(and presumed incompatibil ity) with

I Herco” powder● Compatibility and

hazards analysis . Compatibility and

acceptance testingDetonators— I

I Full range 01 tests and process evaluation required



Table 20.–Detection Taggant Program Status

Accomplished I Planned or requiredTechnical Practical I

Technical feasibility readiness readiness 1 Technical feasibility Technical readiness Practical readinessMicrocapsule development Production and eval-

uation of test batches● Health and atmospheric

Impact assessment

Dynamite, slurries, and water gels● Compatibil ity testing —

initiatedBlack powder● Compatibility testing —

initatedCast Boosters● Compatlblllty testing —

I1010I1 0

I

I—

Intial compatibility studies ● Pilot production of capsules ●

Complete health and atmos-pheric Impact assessment ●

Taggant selection●

Competitive award /leadtimestudiesDevelopment and testingof productionFull-scale production capability

initiated The full range of analyses and tests detailed for identification taggants must be accomplishedSmokeless powder for the detection taggants, with the exception of postdetonation surivability● Compatibil ity testing— — and recovery testing

initiatedDetonating cord— —Detonators● Compatibility testing

InitiatedContinuous electron capture detector● S u c c e s s f u l b r e a d - —

board demonstration● Instrument charac-

terization (initiated)● Callbration system

(initiated)

II

— IIII

I—

I10

IMS detector I● Initial feasibility

studiesI

/IIII10I

IIII

I

MS detector● High-cost laboratory

system testing● Development and

breadboard demon-stration—in process

Instrument character-ization (in process)Calibration (in process)

Demonstration(Imminent)

Development and bread-board demonstrationto be completed

● Design prototype● Fab and lab test

evaluation● Aerospace lab test

● Design prototype● Fab and lab test

prototype● Aerospace lab test Prototype field test

Prototype design,fabrication, and test

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Prototype field testPrototype design changesFinal production drawingsProduction pilot releaseProduction pilot completeField support function setupTraining and field test

Prototype design changesProduction drawingsManufacture and checkoutengineeringProduction pilot releaseProduction pilot completeSupport functions setupTraining and field test

Prototype design changesProduction drawingsManufacture and checkoutengineeringProduction pilot releaseProduction pilot completeSupport functions setupTraining and field test


although some hue and color code optimiza- in detail, this initial testing has revealed ap-tion remains, as well as construction of a facili- parent incompatibilities between the 3M tag-ty to produce the taggants. Initial compatibili- gant and one type of smokeless powder andty and survival testing has been completed for also between the 3M taggant and one castthe cap-sensitive high explosives, as has pilot booster material. If and when these presump-production of tagged explosives and activation tions of incompatibility are removed, compre-of the tracing network. As chapter IV describes hensive compatibility and survivability testing


must then be completed and decisions madeon implementation levels before readiness isdemonstrated. A similar level of testing andanalysis has been accomplished for black pow-der, while significantly less has been accom-plished for smokeless powder and cast boost-ers. One of the key remaining booster issues isthe recoverabi l i ty of the taggants whenpressed into large pellets (survivability hasbeen demonstrated). Methods of approachhave been explored for tagging detonators anddetonating cord, but l ittle testing has oc-curred.

The significant accomplishments in identifi-cation taggant compatibil ity testing whichhave so far occurred have been made possibleby cooperation between the Aerospace Corp.and the explosives and gunpowder industries.Unfortunately, this working arrangement hasbroken down in the past few months, and theindustry has, for a number of reasons, with-drawn i ts cooperat ion. The resul t of th ischange in the prior working relationship hasbeen a significant delay in the program, par-ticularly with regard to compatibility testing ofthe detection taggants. The results of these de-lays, together with an originally planned lag ofapproximately 1‘A years between the identifi-cation and detection taggant development ef-forts, are evident in the current status of thedetection taggant development program,shown in table 20.

Development of candidate detection tag-gants is continuing. Taggants have only recent-ly been added to explosive materials for com-patibility testing and process evaluation. Asdescribed previously, development of threecandidate sensors is also continuing, with lab-oratory-type tests showing prom i sing resuIts.

Projected Schedule

As a result of withdrawal of industry coop-eration, technical problems which have oc-curred, and the uncertainty of funding for out-year efforts, a firm schedule for the remainingdevelopment effort is not available. An esti-mate was made by Aerospace of the revisedschedule for the remaining development ef -

fort; the estimate is shown in table 21. Th i sschedule does not take into account, however,the need for additional compatibility and sur-vivability recovery tests, particularly the res-olution of the current smokeless powder andbooster material reactivity issues, and the needfor the evaluation of long-term effects of tag-gants on explosive material safety and per-formance. These efforts would probably addat least 1 year, and possibly more, to the devel-opment time. It is unlikely that the effort todemonstrate the use of identification taggantsin cap-sensitive high explosives, the type of ex-plosives with which the research effort has pro-gressed farthest, could be completed prior toearly 1981. The research on identification tag-gants in detonators, including pilot-plant tool-up and testing, would not likely be finishedbefore late 1983; the research on other explo-sive materials would probably fall betweenthese dates. These estimates assume a success-ful completion of each development stage.Technical problems may occur that add sub-stantially to the estimate delays; continuedlack of industry participation could make pilottesting impossible; even resolution of contrac-tual problems could add months of delay.

Table 21 ,–Revised Schedule Estimates for theIdentification Tagging Program

Aerospace preliminaryProgram element estimated completion date a

Identification taggantsC o l o r - c o d e d t a g g a n t Early 1983Cap-sensitive packaged explosives ., Early 1980Black powders. ., .,Cast boosters ., ., ., Mid-1981Detonating cord ... ., ., ., ., Mid-1980S m o k e l e s s p o w d e r s . , Mid-1983Detonator ., . ., ., ., Late 1983

Detection taggantsM l c r o c a p s u l e d e v e l o p m e n t . , Mid-1981Cap-sensitive packaged explosives. ., Mid-1981B l a c k p o w d e r Not criticalCast boosters ., . 7Smokeless powder, ... Late 1981Detonating cord ., ., Not criticalB l a s t l n g c a p s - m i c o c a p s u l e s . . , ?CECD ., ., Mid-1982IMS detector. ., ., Late 1981MS detector ., ., . ., Mid-1982

a Estimated by Aerospace October 1979



3M has indicated that it would need a lead-time of at Ieast 22 months after receipt of afirm order before substantial quantities of tag-gants could be delivered. It is unlikely that afirm order would be given before resolution ofall technical problems, including uncertaintiesregarding long-term effects. If a mid-1 983 dateis assumed for resolution of al I identificationtaggant efficacy and compatibility questions,then explosives tagged with the 3M identifica-tion taggant could be in full-scale productionby late 1985.

A decision could be made to implement tag-ging as soon as all technical uncertainties areresolved for some portion of the explosive ma-terials, such as cap-sensitive explosives. Underthose circumstances, 3M could receive firmorders by early 1981 and tagged explosivescould therefore be in full-scale production asearly as 1983,

The detection taggant development haslagged that of identification taggants; thedevelopment cycle may be shorter, however,due both to the learning experience of theidentification taggant tests and to the fact thatno survivability demonstration is necessary.The Aerospace Corp. estimates are probablyquite optimistic, however, for developmentand test times of both the detection taggantand the detection sensors, Few compatibilitytests have yet been conducted. These tests,particularly the effects of long-term storage,will take at least 2 years. No specific taggant orencapsulation method has been chosen. Pilot-plant production of the taggant is likely totake a considerable time, as the manufacturingprocesses are complex and the reagents usedquite reactive. It is unlikely that solving thetechnical problems and constructing proper fa-ciIities for the large-scale production of detec-tion taggants can be accomplished in a signifi-cantly shorter period than that required for theidentification taggants. Assuming completionof the compatibility tests, pilot-plant testing ofdetection taggants in the explosive materialscould be accomplished by early 1983, andassuming 22 months from that time to theavailability of production quantities of detec-tion taggants, full-scale production of explo-

sives containing detection taggants couldprobably not be underway until mid-1 982, withsometime in 1984 a more reasonable estimate.

As indicated previously, the estimated de-velopment schedule for the detection taggantsensors is extremely optimistic; a more realisticestimate would be that production of the sen-sors couId be underway by late 1984.

In summary, by early 1985 it is possible thatall explosives manufactured could be taggedwith both identification and detection tag-gants, and that detection taggant sensorscould be in fulI production. This schedule isrealizable only if no major development prob-lems occur and a taggant program is mandatedby legislation,

Implementation Philosophy

BATF has publicly stated’ that it feels tag-gants should be included only in those explo-sive materials that constitute a present or ex-pected threat of use by criminal bombers.They feel that explosive materials that do notconstitute a threat could be excluded. Amongthe materials which BATF considers appropri-ate for exclusion are:

1.

2.

3,

4.

explosives manufactured for U.S. Govern-ment agencies other than the mil itary(e.g., National Aeronautics and Space Ad-ministrate ion); military explosives are spe-cificalIy excluded in S.333;special fireworks such as used for 4th ofJuly displays;industrial tools such as explosive bolts,switches, and air bag in flaters;blasting agents. It is the BATF intention totag the boosters and detonators normallyused to initiate the blasting agents. Theexplosives industry maintains that if cap-sensitive explosives are tagged but blast-ing agents are not, the use of ANFO bybombers will increase, and BATF will then

Proposed Guidelines for Exemptions to the Requirements for

Tagging Explosive Materials Bureau o f AIcohol , Tobacco, andFirearms, June 7, 1978

70 ● Taggants in E x p l o s i v e s

5.

In

wish to tag ANFO. See chapters 1, 11, andVI for a discussion of this issue; andexplosives which are raw materials used ina fabrication process, such as the blackpowder used infuzes.

addition to the categories eligible for ex-emption, certain types of explosive materialsare currently exempted from regulation, andare viewed by BATF as inappropriate for tag-ging, including:

1. explosives used in medicine;2. fireworks soId to the public;3. propellant-activated industrial devices,

such as nail guns; and4. fixed small arms ammunition.

Given that philosophy, the BAT F/Aerospace

team has concentrated on taggant research forcap-sensitive high explosives (dynamites, gels,emulsions, slurries), boosters, detonating cord,black and smokeless powders directly con-sumed by the public (primarily for handload-ing), and detonators. Blasting agents would notbe directly tagged; rather the detonators andboosters normally used to initiate the blastingagents would be tagged.

A strict interpretation of S. 333, at least inthe opinion of the Institute of Makers of Ex-plosives, would not allow the Secretary of theTreasury to exempt explosives simply becausethey do not constitute a significant threat.Resolution of this issue may be facilitated bymore specific wording in the final proposedlegislation.

IDENTIFICATION TAGGANT SURVIVAL TESTING

The 3M identification taggant would have tosurvive the detonation of the explosive and berecoverable from the postdetonation debris tobe useful in identifying the source of the ex-plosive. It is useful to separate the survival andrecovery discussions. Recovery of taggants un-der real-life conditions is discussed in detail inchapter I I and in appendix C. Survival of thetaggant is briefly reviewed here.

To assess the survivability of taggants in ex-plosives, the tests should be carried out so thatrecovery is maximized. ideally, tests wouldtake place on a large concrete pad or in a verylarge bunker with steel or concrete walls andfloor. Unfortunately, few of the survivabilitytests carried out by the Aerospace Corp. weredone under conditions that enhanced recov-ery. A majority of the tests were carried out ina 4-ft-diameter steel-walled chamber. For allbut the lowest power explosives, the taggantseither shattered upon impact or flowed plasti-cally due to the large impact pressure pulse(estimated by Aerospace to be between 10 and40 kilobars (kb)). Many of the other tests werecarried out in a chamber with a cracked rockfloor, or in the open on a dirt and cinder floor.I n several cases rain made the open area quite

muddy or covered the taggants with a layer ofwater, severely decreasing the efficiency of themagnetic pickup.

The survival test results for cap-sensitivehigh explosives, under the varying conditions,are gathered in table 22. That table includes allthe survival tests conducted by Aerospace withuniformly tagged explosives. Earlier tests, inwhich the explosive stick was split down thecenter and salted, are not realistic and are notdiscussed here. Some of the tests used unen-capsulated taggants (so indicated on thetable); as no difference was observed, they arelumped together in the discussion.

Aging time was another variable tested, withthe material being aged up to 6 months beforetesting; again, no effect was observed and allthe tests are lumped together.

Given the diversity of test sites and condi-tions, it is difficult to assess each test. How-ever, several trends appear clear:

1, Under opt imum recovery condit ions,using small explosive charges, many hun-dreds of taggants survive, even for PowerPrimer, the most powerful cap-sensitive


Table 22.–3M Identification Taggant Survival Testing

Detonationpressure Number of Tags recovered

Explosive K bars Explosive weight, lb Test site tests (averaqe)

Independent K - 1 0 - 4 0C o a l i t e 8 S 30-40

G e l c o a l - 2 5 - 4 0

Gel power A-2 - 4 0

600/o Extra 50

Tovex 800 70

400/o giant gelatin 75

Specially sensitizedemulsion 100

Power Primer 135

1/2

1/2

10 (part of composite 25-lb charge)3/4

101

10

‘/2

5 (Part of composite 25-lb charge)‘/2

‘/2

‘/2

‘/2

1/2

1/2

1

1

10 (part of composite 25-lb charge)2525


commercial explosive (excluding boost-ers).

2. As the size of the charge increases, thepercent of surviving taggants decreasessharply, particuIarly for the most power-ful explosives, Under optimum condi-tions, however, dozens of taggants stillsurvive; even under rainy conditions 26taggants were recovered from the 25-lbPower Primer tests.

3. Confinement sharply decreases survival,even under optimum recovery conditions.Only one test has been conducted with ex-plosives confined in a pipe bomb (seechapter I I discussion); in that test scoresof taggants were recovered from 60 Per-cent Extra Dynamite. When that result iscompared to the chamber survival tests(in which over 1,000 taggants were recov-ered from 60 Percent Extra) it appears Iike-Iy that considerably fewer taggants wouldsurvive in pipe born b detonations usingone of the more powerful explosives.

4-ft diameter steel chamber4-ft diameter steel chamberOpen air, dirt, cinder floor4-ft diameter steel chamber10-ft cube concrete chamber, rock floor4-ft diameter steel chamber10-ft cube concrete chamber, rock floor12x 20x 8 ft concrete bunker

4-ft diameter steel chamberOpen air, dirt, cinder floor12x 20x 8 ft concrete bunker

4-ft diameter steel chamber

12x 20x 8 ft concrete bunker

4-ft diameter steel chamber4-ft diameter steel chamber12x 20x 8 ft concrete bunker

4-ft diameter steel chamber500 x 100 ft concrete padOpen air, dirt, cinder floorOpen air, muddy, cinder floor500 x 100 ft concrete pad, rainy day

210

171813

916

5

6

121113

66111

1,0001,000

18075

4115

101,450

(unencapsulated)1,160

581,390

(unencapsulated)16

(some tests withencapsulated, some

unencapsulated)545

62016

510(unencapsulated)

3530

40

26

Boosters, Military Exp osives

Commercial boosters are normally madefrom cast TNT or TNT-based explosives. Theseexplosives have higher detonation pressuresthan even the most powerful cap-sensitivecommercial explosives (180-200 kb v. 135 kb).Calculations by the Aerospace Corp. show thattaggants will be raised above 4000 C, their de-composition temperature, by booster explo-sives. Testing showed fewer than two taggantsrecovered per pound of booster, even for testsconducted under ideal conditions on a largeconcrete pad. The Aerospace solution to theproblem is to press the individual taggants andpolyethylene into a large pellet (one-fourthinch). Tests show that approximately 65 tag-gants survive in a pound booster when pelle-tized into a one quarter-inch-diameter pellet.Initial recovery tests indicate that the taggantsfrom boosters can be recovered, but far toofew tests have been completed to allow a de-finitive judgment.


Military explosives are generally at least asenergetic as boosters, presenting even more se-vere survival problems for the taggants. Due tothe survival issuemilitary explosuse in criminalto include militaryprogram.

, the excessive cost of taggingives and their low frequency ofbombings, BATF does not pIantary explosives in the taggant

Black and Smokeless Powders

Black and smokeless powders are much lessenergetic than the least energetic dynamite.Gunpowders are normally used as fillers forpipe bombs, however, so the effect of confine-ment is expected to be considerable, Tests withboth black and smokeless powders were con-ducted in a 20-ft semicircular chamber havingsteel walls but a sand floor. Due to the poorrecovery conditions, only 2 to 3 dozen tag-gants were recovered for the black powderbombs, and from O to 3 for the smokeless pow-der. When black powder bombs were deto-nated under near ideal recovery conditions,using the 8 ‘ x 12 ‘ x 20 ‘ bunker, an averageof 1,100 taggants survived 1 lb of the FFFgpowder. No ideal recovery tests have beenconducted with smokeless powders, but theone pipe bomb test with explosives gives an in-dication that scores to hundreds of taggantsshould survive.

Detonators and Detonating Cord

Only the most rudimentary tests have beenconducted of the survival of identification tag-gants when placed on a detonator and noneconducted with detonating cord. As the tag-gants are placed outside of the explosive inboth cases, sufficient taggants should surviveto enable a positive trace to be made. Howlikely the taggants are to be recovered in real-world s ituat ions, however, cannot be ascer-tained without testing.

Summary

In summary, the 3M identification taggantssurvive the detonation of cap-sensitive high ex-plosives in large numbers for small chargeswhich are unconfined. Survival decreases asthe charge size increases, but sufficient tag-gants should survive even a large charge of themost energetic commercial explosive. The ef-fect of confinement significantly reduces tag-gant survival, but taggants can probably sur-vive pipe bombs filled with low-energy explo-sives and gunpowder; their survival in pipebombs filled with higher energy explosives isuncertain. Individual taggants do not survivebooster detonation but pellets made from thetaggants do. Taggants wou Id probably survivethe explosion of detonators and detonatingcord, but there is little or no test data.

. .

Chapter IV

TAGGANT SAFETY ANDCOMPAT BILITY REVIEW

* .

9 * . * * . *

Chapter IV

TAGGANT SAFETY AND COMPATIBILITY REVIEW

The addition of identification and detection taggants to explosive materialswould constitute a significant change to the material qualification program istherefore necessary to investigate the compatibility of the explosive materials withthe taggants. This chapter briefly discusses the involved in compatibili-ty, describes qualification procedures in industry and for defense applica-tions, suggests the form. that a qulification program should take to demonstrate thecompatibility of taggants with explosives and gunpowders , and describes the com-patibilitytesting that has been reported to date.

EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS COMPATIBILITY PARAMETERS

Explosive materials are chemical systemsthat I iberate a large amount of energy in an ex-tremely short time. The detailed physical andchemical behavior of these reactants is notwell-understood, due to the complexity ofsome of the reactants and the very short reac-tion time scale. However, the principal meas-urable parameters of the materials and theirreactions are well-known. To demonstrate

compatibility of the explosive materials withthe taggants, it is necessary to show that thereis no significant change in these parameters asa result of the addition of taggants. The prin-cipal parameters include:

● energy density and rate of release,● sens i t iv i ty,● chemical stability,

75


● electrical properties,● generalized mechanical properties, and● tox ic i ty .

Energy Density and Rate of Release

The energy density and rate of energy re-lease are the two most important performanceattributes of commercial explosives and gun-powder. Energy density is a fundamentalchemical property of the explosive materialformulation. The available energy of a givenexplosive material is well-understood, and itcan be measured with a high degree of accu-racy and reliability. It can also be calculatedquite accurately from the basic chemicalknowledge of a particular formulation. Thepresence of the small amounts of taggants thatare currently recommended should have onlya minute effect. Limited testing has borne outthis conclusion. 1 2

Generally speaking, the higher energy densi-ty explosives tend to be easier to initiate andtend to progress to a fast energy release ordetonation more quickly. Primary explosivesused in caps are an exception. They are easy toinitiate, and build to detonation very rapidly,but do not always have a high energy density.

The rate of energy release is a function ofthe materials involved and the physical prox-imity of the fuel and oxidizer components.When the fuel and oxidizer are in the samemolecule, as in nitroglycerine, the explosivecan release its energy on a millionth of a sec-ond time scale. Ammonium nitrate/fuel oilmixtures, on the other hand, contain ratherlarge, separated fuel and oxidizer componentsand thus release their energy on a much slowertime scale. The physical proximity of the com-ponents also tends to affect sensitivity; the in-timately connected materials are generallymore sensitive than the gross mixtures. Thebalance of fuel to oxidizer directly affects the

1 1 etter, R E Lunn (Du Pent ) to C [30yars ( A e r o s p a c e ) , “Tag-

ging — Du Pent Pilot Te~t S~tety and stabil Ity T e s t s , ” M a r 6 ,

1978, pp 5-17, 5-41, 5-42

‘C Hovar$, CornpatIbI/Ity of /derrf/f/cat/on Taggant\ W ItfI Ex-

p/o~Ive\, A e r o s p a c e repor t No AT E!-78( 1860-02}1 ND, August

1978

energy density and sensitivity of the explosivematerial. The balance that yields idealizedcombust ion products general ly y ields thehighest energy and most sensitive explosives.

The rate of energy release cannot be pre-dicted quantitatively from basic physical andchemical considerations but it can be esti-mated in a qualitative way. Energy release ratecan be measured accurately but the test meth-ods can be quite expensive and difficult. Afew hundredths of a percent by weight of tag-gants should not affect the energy release rate.

Sensitivity

Sensitivity is an ill-defined term which hasmeaning in a safety sense, but is not definablewith simple direct physical constants. One rel-ative sensitivity scale can be developed fromimpact and friction tests, another scale fromelectrochemical reactions, and still anotherfrom thermal considerations. All aspects ofreactions to external stimuli must be consid-ered and judged with respect to practical ex-perience. Then with a variety of “sensitivity “numbers and functions a systems safety esti-mate is made — not always totally scientificalIybut with an additional input from experienceand common sense.

Sensitivity tests are referenced and dis-cussed in other sections of this report, but theindividual numbers are not in themselves thefinal criteria. It is their sum total plus experi-ence which determines sensitivity.

Chemical Stability

Chemical stability is a critical safety param-eter, of paramount importance in the handling,transportation, and storage of the raw materi-als that go into making explosives and gunpow-der and in the manufacture, handling, trans-portation, storage, and use of the final explo-sive product. The stabil ity of the explosiveproducts cannot be adequately predicted ana-

‘.Sa/ety and Per fo rmance Tests for Qual/t/cat/on oi Exp/o\/ves,

I Kablk, (NSWC, W O ) , R Strefau (Stre$du Ldboratorles, I nc ),K R Hamil ton (NWC), J Jones, (NWC), N~vord 0[1 44811, VOI 1,

January 197.2

Ch. /V— Taggant Safety and Compatibility Review 77

Iytically, but must be confirmed by tests thatdemonstrate the stability behavior of the prod-ucts, such as long-term rates of decomposition,interact ions between the explosive compo-nents, and reaction with materials into whichthey are likely to come into contact duringmanufacture, packaging, and end use. As anexample, picric acid and ammonium picrate,rather powerful high explosives, which are in-sensitive and generally quite safe, were onceused extensively. When these explosives comeinto contact with copper or copper salts, how-ever, they become quite sensitive; their use is,therefore, now quite limited.

Electric Properties

The sensitivity of initiation of explosives bystatic electricity and/or induced currents hasalways been a major concern. There are sever-al modes of initiation due to electrical energy.One, inductive coupling, is serious enough topreclude the use of electric blasting caps insome operations. Direct initiation by staticspark discharges is another mode, The energyof an electric field can be coupled to an explo-sive device in other ways, for example, by ther-mal heating of a wire or capacitance effects,The primaries, lead styphnate and lead azide,are extremely sensitive to electric effects. Drynitrocellulose and black powder are also verysensitive. Most cap-sensitive high explosivesand generalIy used blasting agents are not par-ticularly sensitive to electric forces. Additionof taggants to the explosive materials couldcause a change in their electrical properties;buildup of a static charge during the additionof the taggant to the mix could be one mode.As analytical methods are not adequate tohandle the problem, tests are normally con-ducted.

Generalized Mechanical Properties

The relationship of mechanical properties toexplosive safety has only recently been under-stood to be of paramount importance, Experi-ence and intuition led the industry into ex-plosive formulations that were not ideal chem-ically, but have proven safe and economical.

Most, but not all, commercial explosives arerather soft granuIes, rubbery or gelatinous sub-stances, or sometimes Iiquid-like.

When soft substances are subjected to im-pact the mechanical forces are not concen-trated in a smalI volume and they dissipate aslow-level thermal waves. Stiff, brittle materialsexperience strong fast compression or shockwaves under impact conditions that locallyproduce high-energy concentrations. Localhigh-energy concentrations create hot spots.This means that a hot spot can be a center ofintense chemical reaction and therefore, in anexplosive composition, a region of fast energyrelease. Thus, an initiation center is createdwhen the rate of energy release exceeds itsdissipation. Grit or hard substances can createlocal hot spots under handling conditions pres-ent in the mixing and packaging processes, andespecially in operations such as explosivetamping in the bore hole. As an example, asmall number of hard particles has been dem-onstrated to critically sensitize certain militaryexplosives in United Kingdom la boratories.4

The danger of hot-spot creation may be evengreater for more, brittle explosives, such asthose used in cast boosters.

The effects of adding taggants to explosivescould be simulated using complex hydro-elas-tic-plastic computer codes, but the calcula-tions would be quite expensive. In addit ion,lack of sufficient data on the detailed physicalproperties of the various materials would tendto limit the reliability of such calculations. Ex-perimental testing must therefore be under-taken.

Toxici ty

The decomposition products of explosive re-actions are generalIy toxic; standard precau-tionary measures must be taken to avoid ex-cessive exposure. The materials used in thetaggants are generally not mutagenic or car-cinogenic. Tests must be conducted to eval-uate the toxicity of any taggant materials


whose properties are not well-known, and todetermine if the end-product gases show addi-

QUALIFICATION

A new explosive compound or formulationmust be subjected to an extensive series oft e s t s b e f o r e i t c a n b e q u a l i f i e d f o r u s e a n dmanufacture. The number and nature of thetests differ between various manufacturers ofcommercial explosives and between commer-cial manufacturers and Government develop-ers such as the Department of Defense (DOD)and the Department of Energy (DOE). Tests arespecifically designed for the explosive prod-uct, the environment it will be subjected to,and its end use. It follows that an extensivebattery of tests are required for each explosive.Interpretation of the tests, including the validi-ty of some prescribed ones, is not straightfor-ward and a single number derived from a testor tests cannot alone define its safety. Theclosest that one can come to a measure of ex-plosive safety is the long-term accident record.[t is important to realize that experience playsa role equal to good scientific understandingand execution of prudent, conservative prac-t ices. The decis ionmaking process as towhether or not the new explosive and processof manufacture are safe is therefore unique toeach organization.

In general, the qualification procedures de-scribed in this section are those followed byagencies or companies that routinely developnew explosives or significant modifications ofexisting explosives, including Governmentagencies such as DOD and DOE and somemanufacturers of commercial explos ives.Companies that rarely develop new productsdo not generally need a comprehensive qual-ification program. Within those organizationsthat do have a comprehensive program, thecomplexity, qualification time, and cost varyconsiderably, due to differing manufacturingprocedures and end uses. As an example, com-plete qualification of a new military explosivecan take several years with a total cost ofmany m i I I ions of dolIars.

tional toxicity as a result of the addition of tag-gants to explosive products.

OF EXPLOSIVES

NAVORD Report OD 44811 specifies safetyand performance tests for qualification of ex-plosives for the Navy. There is also a JointService Safety and Performance Manual usedby all three services. The DOE procedures aresimilar to the DOD ones but are not docu-mented in a single manual. Each plant and lab-oratory has its own rules and specifications ap-proved by the director. There are certain pro-cedures and test methods that are common toall, however, which are briefly discussed in thissect ion.

The initial testing is done on small quantitieson a laboratory scale, usually less than a gram.Drop weight impact tests are always done, fol-lowed by friction and thermal test such asDTA, DSC, Taliani, or others. The results of astatistically significant number of tests arethen compared with known standard explo-sives. If the tests give satisfactory results, thena laboratory or plant level management deci-sion, usually backed up by a safety committeereview, will give a go ahead to make limitedquantities sufficient to do the preliminary per-formance tests such as detonation velocity,detonation pressure, and shock sensitivity.These tests usually require several pounds ofthe new explosive to complete. At this stagemore elaborate chemical compatibility andthermal stability tests are also run along withsome accelerated aging tests. The small-scalelaboratory tests are repeated at this stage andcompared with the original results. Unless alltest results are satisfactory, further work onthe new explosive will be stopped.

If results are satisfactory and if the per-formance is as desired then a management de-cision beyond the laboratory level will gener-ally be made to proceed with Iimited pilot pro-duction. As much as several hundred poundsmay be involved. It is at this stage that manu-facturing hazards are assessed. Special testswill usually evolve at this stage that will relate

Ch. IV—Taggant Safety and Compatibility Review ● 7 9

to the actual manufacturing equipment suchas pipe diameter in which a liquid explosive orslurry will or wilI not propogate a detonation.Exact details of equipment and controls arethen reviewed. In the case of addition of tag-gants there is the possibility of buildup of thematerial in some part of the mixing or car-tridge-loading machinery. Consideration isgiven to fail-safe controls in the event of powerfailures or other equipment failures. Transpor-tation of raw materials and finished productwithin the plant is planned. Barricades and re-mote control are planned where required. Forexample, the pressing of booster pellets ofTetryl or PETN is a hazardous operation andmust be done by remote control and the pressitself barricaded so that no personnel are ex-posed in case of an accidental explosion. Stor-age in magazines must also be planned.

If the new product has passed its perform-ance and safety requirements in the pilotstudy, a parallel effort of evaluating the newexplosive in its use environment is made. HereDOD and DOE differ significantly from indus-try. Military weapons are subjected to manyextreme environments and the finished weap-on with the new or modified explosive mustundergo special safety testing to qualify it.Commercial explosives generally are used insomewhat more benign environments and theend-use safety testing is more limited and lessexpensive. End-use testing is required for per-missible explosives (i. e., explosives that havebeen approved by the Bureau of Mines for usein underground coal mining operations). Theircap sensitivity, toxic fume production, andfailure diameter must be established. For ex-ample, the minimum size bore hole requiredfor a particular permissible explosive to func-tion properly must be determined, as well asthe safety of use in the underground coal envi-ronment (incendivity testing).

Samples from pilot production must, at thisstage, be submitted to the Department ofTransportation (DOT) for determination ofshipping category. DOT has stated that addi-tion of taggants does not change the shipping

category of the explosives used in the pro-gram. 5

The aspects of quality control are addressedduring the pilot phase of development. Chem-ical and physical test specifications are estab-lished to control all component raw materials.Incoming taggants must be examined for for-eign material and their code verified. If thetaggants are gritty, such as the Westinghouseceramic particles, there must be assurancethat each taggant is properly coated with thedesensitizing polyethylene or wax. Similarly,sampling and test schemes for product qualityassurance are set up at this stage.

In some cases a company’s managementmay decide that the change involved in thenew explosive is smalI and complete requal-if ication is not required. The extensive experi-ence the management has developed in thehistory of its plant and products makes this, inmany cases, an acceptable procedure. Al-though taggants would be added in only asmal I amount by weight, their use in explosivesis sufficiently different from other constituentsthat it is the general consensus of manufac-turers and other parties that addition of tag-gants will require complete requalification ofal I tagged explosives.

Description of Qualification TestsNormally Performed

Testing of explosives involves a wide varietyof tests which must ascertain chemical compo-sition, performance, sensitivity, and stability.Chemical composition analysis is a dominatingfactor since it is obvious that the manufacturerand user must know what he is using and whathe has made. Chemical analysis methods arenot the direct concern here, as taggantschange the composition little, but it is to beemphasized that knowledge of the chemicalcomposition must be a part of qualificationassessment.

‘Letter, P J Student (As$oc of Amer Railroads) to R B Moler(Aerospace), June 27,1977


There is a large number of tests that are spe-cific to evaluation of an explosive product.The details of these tests are given in severalsources. 6 10 The most commonly used tests arebriefly described below.

Performance

Performance is determined by measuringdetonation velocity, detonation pressure, pres-sure rise rate, shock sensitivity, and failure di-ameter in explosives and ballistic propertiessuch as burn rate, muzzle velocity, and cham-ber pressure in gunpowder. The addition ofsmalI amounts of inert material to an explosiveprobably will not effect its performance sig-n if i cant I y; however, performance must bedemonstrated. Detonation velocity measure-ments consist of placing electric probes inprecisely measured positions, detonating theexplosive, and measuring the time that it takesthe detonation front to pass between theprobes with high-speed electronic equip-ment. 11 12 Initiation or shock sensitivity testsare done by separating a donor explosive fromthe test acceptor explosive by a measured gap.The gap is varied until a 50-percent probabilityof explosion of the acceptor explosive is estabIished.

Detonation pressure and pressure rise rateare measured by inserting transducers into theexplosive material and recording the resultantpressures on fast response rate electronicequipment. Critical diameter testing, to estab-lish the failure diameter of an explosive mate-rial, is accomplished by attempting to deto-nate varying diameters of the explosive. The

6“Safety and Performance Te\t\, op c it

‘)o/nt Service .Sa/et y anci Performance Manual tor Qua//i/cat/on

of ~ xp/o JILw\ for M///tar y U\P (Ch ln,~ Lake, Ca I If Nava I Wea pensCenter, September 1971 )

‘G R Walker, CARDE, Canada, E G Whltbread, ERDE, UnitedK Ingdom, D C Horning, NSWC/WO, U S A , The Technica/ Co-operation Program Manual of Sensitiveness Tests, TTCP Pane l0-2, February 1966

“K R tlecker, C M Ma\on, ~nd R W Wat\on, B u r e a u o f

M)nef /n~trurnentec/ /mpact Tester (Bureau ot M ines ) RI 7 6 7 0 ,1972

‘“R W Wdtson, (arci(;ap a n d Pro/ecti/e /mpact Senslflvity

Measurements, a compilation, 1 C 8605, 1971‘ ‘Safety and Performance Tes(~, op clt

‘‘~ M Mason and t G Alken, Methods for [ valuatlng Explo

~lve$ and Ha/ardou\ Mater/a/$ (Pltt\burg Mlnlng and Safety Re-search Center, Bureau of Mine\), report No 1 (“ 8541, 1971

diameter at which 50 percent of the tests prop-agate to a high-order detonation is the criticalor failure diameter.

The chamber pressure of gunpowder i smeasured by the use of spherical copper crushgauges or by transducers placed in the cham-ber. Burn rate is measured by a variety ofmethods, often by placing the powder in aV-groove, igniting one end, and measurin g t h evelocity by high-speed camera, thermocouple,or pressure transducers. The muzzle velocityof the propelled projectiles can be measuredby a variety of methods, including photogra-phy and make or break switches.

Impact

Impact tests, although variable in natureand sometimes difficult to interpret, are criti-cally important; their relationship to safety isobvious. They quickly provide informationthat categorizes the level of hazard of an ex-plosive composition. They normally are usedto tell if significant differences exist betweenexplosive samples. Impact tests are not infalli-ble and the results must be considered in rela-tion to other type testing.

Impact tests range from laboratory-scaletests involving less than 35 mg to large-scaledrop tests amounting to as much as 50 kg. Asindicated previously, the initial tests would belaboratory-scale tests.

All laboratory impact machines are similarin principle. The energy source is a free-fallingweight which impacts the explosive samplethrough a mechanical linkage. Criteria are es-tablished for distinguishing between positiveand negative responses. The criteria differ forvarious laboratories so comparisons are onlyvalid when made in a single laboratory. Thetests consist of dropping the weight from vary-ing heights onto samples of test explosivesplaced between them — sample weights areusualIy about 50 to 100 mg. The results are re-corded as a go or no-go. A statistical analysisof the data determines the relative stimuluslevel corresponding to a chosen level of prob-abiIity that the explosive will react to give apositive result according to the arbitrary cri-

Ch. /V—Taggant Safety and Compafibility Review . 81

teria, 13 14 15 Some manufacturers report a 50-percent probability height, but most report athreshold height.

Bullet tests are done by firing buIlets or pro-jectiles, usually .22, .30, or 50 caliber, into thetest explosive. Powder loads are varied to ob-tain a range of projectile velocities. The testexplosive may either be essentialIy unconfinedin an ice cream carton, or highly confined in aheavy steel pipe, The minimum velocity re-quired to obtain a reaction is reported, 6

Friction

I n the manufacture, handling, and use of ex-plosives there are many situations where fric-tional forces either are or could be present.Several test methods have been devised overthe years and two of them have been used ex-tensively in evaluating the taggants. In theBureau of Mines tester a sample is placed onan anviI and subjected to the glancing, rubbingmotion of a weighted shoe attached to the endof a pendulum that swings freely over the an-vil. The shoe is either mild steel or a specifiedphenolic resin-bonded composite. The othertest, developed by commercial industries, uti-lizes a 2-kg torpedo which is released to slidedown a V track and obliquely impact the testsample. Both the height and angle of impactare independent variables, 17

A new precision instrument developed inWest Germany and known as the BAM (afterthe Bundesanstalt fur Material prufung whichdeveloped it) seems to demonstrate improveddiscrimination. Some of the permissible willbe tested on this new machine at the Bureau ofMines. 18 The friction surfaces in this device areceramic. The load on the moving friction sur-face is varied until a response level is estab-lished.

Stability

Stability testing may be divided into twogeneral categories. One is simply long-termstorage in which samples are removed period-icalIy and retested to see if a significantchange has occurred. The second category in-volves accelerated aging, which generallymeans subjecting the test sample to extremetemperature environments and then measuringthe effects of the environment. Stability testsnormalIy conducted include the above-de-scribed friction and performance tests, plustests which are basically thermal in nature.These thermal tests provide a measure of somephysical chemistry parameters of the explosiveas well as being measurements of stabiIity.

Among the stability tests widely used are:

Differential thermal analysis [DTA) in whichidentical containers, one containing the sam-ple and the other a standard reference materi-al, are set up in identical thermal geometrieswith temperature sensors arranged so as togive both the temperature in each containerand the difference in temperature between thecontainers. The data are displayed as a DTAthermogram in which this temperature differ-ence is plotted against the temperature of thesample. Such a plot is almost a straight line ifthe sample has no rapidly changing thermalbehavior. Excursions below or above the base-line are due to endothermic, that is heat ab-sorbing, or exothermic, that is heat releasing,reactions. The DTA analysis permits the inter-pretation of phase changes, decomposition,and melting points; from these, some kineticinformation on thermal stability can be ob-tained. Sample sizes are in the order of 20 mg.Since the temperature of the thermal event isdependent, to some extent, on the heatingrate, various heating rates are normally used.The standard rates are 100 C/rein and 20 C/rein.

Differential/ scanning calorimetry is verysimilar to DTA except the energy difference(calories) between the standard reference ma-terial and the explosive is recorded during thetime-temperature program.

Vacuum stability is measured by placing a 5-mg sample in a gas burette and then evacuat-


ing the burette. The flask containing the sam-ple holder is then heated to an appropriatetemperature for 20 to 48 hours . The gasevolved is measured by the manometer con-nected to the sample flask and then normal-ized to standard temperature and pressure.Test temperatures specified for mil itary ex-plosives are 1000 C and 1200 C. Dynamites andslurries are less temperature-resistant and usu-ally contain volatile compounds; therefore,the test is really only useful for candidatebooster materials, gunpowders, and explosivecomponents of detonating cord.

The Taliani test is almost exactly the same asthe vacuum stability test except that the test isusually run in a nitrogen atmosphere at 750 Cat some laboratories and 93.30 C at others; tag-gant tests in one laboratory were run at 1200 C.At the end of 1 or 2 hours, the apparatus isvented to 1 atmosphere to eliminate the effectof the vapor pressure of water and the expan-sion of the original gas. The pressure changebetween 2 and 5 hours is measured.

In the chemical reactivity test (CRT) a sampleof the explosive, approximately 0.25 g, is usual-ly heated under a helium blanket at 1200 C for22 hours. Tests have been conducted at othertemperatures and times; tests with the West-inghouse taggants in dynamites were run at1000 C for 4 hours. A cryogenic gas chromatog-raphy unit is then used to measure the individ-ual volumes of the product gases, includingsuch species as nitrogen oxide, carbon monox-ide and dioxide, water, and other gases as maybe determined necessary. This test is used prin-cipally to determine the reactivity of explo-sives with other materials, i.e., a compatibilitytest.

In the hot bar test a bar is heated to 2500 Cand test samples of explosive are dropped onit. In the hot tip test, a 7\8-inch square by 1\8inch-thick piece of steel is heated to white heatby means of a Presto-Lite torch and droppedon a test sample.

The stability bath test measures an exotherma n d , t h e r e f o r e , d e c o m p o s i t i o n a t e l e v a t e dtemperatures. It is similar to the DTA, but useslarger samples. The sample is generally heatedto a predetermined temperature and retained

there for a number of hours. Visual evidence ofdecomposition is sought as well as the meas-urement of endothermic and exothermic reac-tions.

T h e a b e l h e a t t e s t c o n s i s t s o f h e a t i n gsamples in contact with methyl violet paper,usually at 71 0 C. The elapsed time before thepaper changes color is recorded. The test is ap-plicable only to explosives containing nitrateester. A similar test, the German test is done at1200 C and a minimum time of 40 minutesallowed before a color change.

When the stability of an explosive is beingcompared to the stability of that explosiveafter an additive (such as the taggant) has beenincorporated, the tests are normally conductedwith significantly increased concentration of-that additive. Thus, while only 0.05 percent byweight of taggants is proposed to be added toexplosives, stability tests are conducted withtaggant concentration as high as so percent.

Incendivity Testing (The Gallery Test)

Incendivity testing is done to certify ex-plosives and blasting assessories for use inunderground mines. Permissible explosives arethose that pass the proscribed incendivity test.An explosive charge, which is loaded into asteel cannon (mortar), is fired directly into thegallery chamber containing a flammable mix-ture of natural gas and air or natural gas, air,and coal dust. There are two large gallery testsfor explosives. on one test the incendivity ismeasured in mixtures of coal dust and naturalgas in which the gas concentration (4 percent)is below the explosive limit of the mixture. Inthe other, the incendivity of explosives is meas-ured in the presence of an 8-percent naturalgas-air mixture.

The gallery represents a coal mine face, andis a 6-ft, 4-inch diameter steel tube, 80 ft long.The first 20 ft are charged with the flammableair/gas mixture and isolated by a thin mem-brane from the remaining 60 ft of tube which isfilled with air and acts as an expansion vol-ume. I n the 4-percent concentration test, 1‘A -lb charges of the explosive are fired in the can-non under specified conditions. Ten trials are


made; if any explosion occurs the explosivehas failed the test. In the 8-percent concentra-tion version, the amount of explosive that isbeing treated is varied from shot to shot to es-tablish the weight required to cause a 50-per-cent probability of ignition. 19

Cap Sensitivity

This test provides a simple means for differ-entiating an explosive from a blasting agent. ANo. 8 detonator is inserted into a sample ofgiven size and fired. If the sample is initiatedto detonation, the material is classified as anexplosive. A material that is not initiated todetonation is classed as a blasting agent. Thetest is used by the Bureau of Explosives toestablish its shipping classification. The sam-ple is put into a container at its approximatepackaged density and a No. 8 detonator is in-serted through the cover. The assembly isplaced on soft ground in an isolated, safe-guarded area, and the detonator is fired. If acrater is formed, the sample is considered tobe cap-sensitive. The sample container is a 1-qt, spiralwound, paperboard cylinder withcover, of the type used commercially for foodpackaging. Any commercial No. 8 blasting capmay be used as the detonator.

Spark Sensitivity

The method of determinin g sensitivity tospark initiation is to subject the material tosingle discharges from a capacitor charged toa high voltage. The maximum energy of thespark discharge to which the material can besubjected without being ignited is a criterionof its sensitivity. Results are expressed as themaximum energy, in jouIes at 5,000 v, at whichthe probability of an ignition is zero. 20

Charge Generation

Taggants are electrically nonconductive. Acharge can be generated on them by pouringthe taggant into the mixer; a charge generationtest was therefore devised by one manufac-turer. The test apparatus consists of an angled

l k e r , et dl 0 1 ) c It

‘“K w Wdtw)ll, ()[) ( It

chute (grounded stainless steel, 2 ft long), andan ungrounded stainless steel catch containerwith a known capacitance connected to anelectrostatic volt meter. The taggants werepoured from a polyethylene container, downthe chute into the catch container. The chargedeveloped is calculated from the voltage. Therelaxation time is determined by the time re-quired for the charge to dissipate. The chargegenerated, and relaxation time, can then becompared to materials commonly added to ex-plosive materials, such as aluminum powder.

Elements of a Taggant CompatibilityQualification Program

Taggants are a sufficient departure from thematerials normally used in explosives and gun-powder to require full qualification of thenew taggant-explosive material composition.While the taggants are fabricated from quiteinert materials and are to be added i n amountsof only a few hundredths of a percent byweight, the conservative safety philosophy ofthe explosives industry makes requalificationnecessary. As the detailed physical chemistryof the explosive reactions is not completelyunderstood, it is not possible to safely conducta few spot tests and generalize to alI explosivematerials from these tests. Table 23 outlinesthe elements of the type of qualification testprogram considered adequate by the OTAstudy team.

In principle, the manufacture of explosivematerials consists simply of adding togetherthe fuel, oxidizer, sensitizers, and stabilizers,mixing the components and packaging them in

Table 23.–Elements of a Suggested CompatibilityQualification Program

● Unique with each manufacturer.● Analysis to define the new explosive or ingredient● Laboratory testing+impact, friction, thermal, chemical composition,

electrical aging, chemical Interaction, performance● Pilot production● Commitee and management review● Early production and review Special tests.● Experience



a casing (most explosives) or granulating themixture (gunpowder). I n practice, however,each explosive mixture of ingredient is com-bined and processed in ways that differ sig-nificantly for each manufacturer. The numberof ingredients used can vary from 2 (for ANFO)to 10 or more for some explosives and smoke-less powders. The mixing process used can varyfrom the simple mixing of ammonium nitrateand fuel oil to form ANFO to a complex proc-ess involving preparation of the basic ingredi-ents (one manufacturer grinds all ingredientsto a 300 mesh powder for instance) and severalmixing and processing stages. The equipmentused also varies widely, from the wooden mix-ing equipment used by one manufacturer ofnitroglycerine-based dynamites to the complexcontinuous process equipment used by onemanufacturer of emulsions. End uses also vary;soft dynamites are often dropped or otherwisesubjected to impact forces which would be un-safe if used with more brittle explosives suchas TNT boosters. For these reasons, the qualifi-cation program must be unique to each manu-facturer, and must reflect the exposure ex-pected during the manufacture, storage, trans-portation, handling, and use of that particularproduct.

While it is true that the state of the art andlaboratory instrumentation of physical chem-istry are not sufficiently advanced to provide adetailed understanding of the process involvedin all explosive reactions, it is certainly truethat a careful and thorough analysis of theprobable effect of adding taggants to explo-sive materials can provide a great deal of in-formation. This information can be used as apreliminary screen to eliminate obviously dan-gerous explosive-taggant combinations, suchas taggants placed directly in primary explo-sives or the use of gritty taggants. In additionthe analysis can suggest critical tests and pro-vide insight into the expected result and theirinterpretation. Proper analysis must thereforebe considered the first element of any com-patibiIity qualification program.

Laboratory testing must obviously play thecentral role in a qualification program. The ex-act tests to be performed are a function of the

manufacturing process and end use, the resultsof the analysis, and the standard procedure ofthe manufacturers. At a minimum, tests mustbe conducted to demonstrate that the additionof taggants to explosive materials does not in-crease their impact and friction sensitivity;does not detrimentally alter the thermal,chemical, electrical, or storage properties ofthe materials; does not decrease stability; doesnot alter the chemical interactions involved(by eliminating interactions originally presentor by introducing new interactions); and doesnot adversely affect the performance of the ex-plosive material,

After the small-quantity laboratory tests andthe analysis are successfully completed, pilot-plant scale production should be initiated toinvestigate potential problems involved in themanufacturing, packaging, and storage of thetagged explosives and gunpowder. This test-ing should simulate, as nearly as possible, theactual manufacturing processes to be used iftagged explosives were to be produced.

Reviews, both technical and managerial, arean integral part of the qualification process.Substantive special reviews would probably beheld at the end of the small-scale laboratorytesting phase and at the end of the pilot pro-duction.

Through their qualification process the man-ufacturer would gain a great deal of experi-ence in handling and working with the taggedexplosives. This experience, and the general ex-perience gained by working with the untaggedexplosives, and with other explosives, repre-sent an important, although qualitative, partof the qualification evaluation process. Forthis reason, it is desirable for the manufac-turers to conduct at least a large part of thequalification process. Some manufacturers donot have the requisite facilities and personnelto conduct the initial analyses and laboratorytesting. This testing can be accomplished byoutside agencies. It is obviously necessary forthe manufacturer to participate in the pilot-scale testing phase.

In the taggant compatibility testing whichhas taken place (presented below), the manu-


facturers were asked to suggest critical tests minimum program, such as described above,that were required before the pilot test manu- must be conducted; additional tests, suggestedfacturing and distribution program could take by the manufacturer, may be made a part ofplace. That process is not sufficient for a for- the program.mal compatibil ity qualification program. A

TAGGANT COMPATIBILITY TESTING ACCOMPLISHED TO DATE

Several hundred individual tests have beenconducted in an effort to define the compati-bility of identification taggants with explosivematerials. These tests have generally beenpaired tests in which the reaction of a specificexplosive material to a specific test is com-pared to the reaction of that material whenidentification taggant have been added. Mate-rials tested include dynamite and other cap-sensitive high explosives, cast boosters, blackpowder, and smokeless powder.

Several varieties of identification taggantshave been tested, including the current 3Mbaseline taggant in both encapsulated (type C)and unencapsulated (type A) form; a harder,more highly cross-1 inked variety of the taggant(type B); a higher melting point variety (typeD); the Westinghouse ceramic taggant; and theCurie-point taggant.

No tests have shown increased explosivesensitivity due to the addition of the baseline3M taggant (either encapsulated or unencapsu-Iated). Similarly, no changes in electrical,general mechanical, or toxicity characteristicshave been noted, Decreased chemical stabilitywas noted, however, for one type of smokelesspowder (Herco@ );21 22 decreased stability wasalso noted in one type of booster material(Composition B). The tests conducted to dateclearly show that some chemical reactiontakes place when Herco@ powder or Composi-tion B is mixed with a high concentration of3M taggants and then heated to a high tem-perature; further research is required to deter-

mine the nature and cause of the reaction, theextent of the safety hazard created, and whatremedial steps may be feasible. Extremely Iim-ited testing has indicated no significant changein balIistic velocity or chamber pressure whenthe 3M taggants are added to smokeless pow-ders, even at extremely high taggant concen-trations.

The hard 3M taggants (types B and D) didcause significantly increased sensitivity in cap-sensitive explosives, as did the Curie-point tag-gant and the unencapsulated Westinghousetaggant.

Compatibility testing for the detection tag-gant materials has been recently initiated withblack powder and cap-sensitive high explo-sives. No data has been formally reported; tox-icity and mutogenacity tests of the materialsthemselves have been negative.

The following paragraphs briefly summarizethe tests so far conducted. The extent of test-ing described in the tables includes thosewhose results had been formally reported byMarch 1, 1980. However, OTA has reviewed alltesting about which information was received,whether or not formal reports have beenissued. Tests are continuing.

Dynamites

The paired compatibility tests conductedwith dynamite and with EDCN are summarizedin table 24, In this table and those which fol-low in this section, an asterisk by the tagganttype indicates a sensitization or other indica-tion of noncompatibil ity The other symbolsare defined in the legend. As can be seen fromthe table, no significant differences in re-sponse to the various tests evaluated were ob-


Table 24,–Summary of Compatibility Tests Conducted With Dynamite and Dynamite Ingredients

T e s t t y p e

E l e c t r o -D r o p S l i d i n g 5 - k g s t a t i c C h e m i c a l

T y p e o f d y n a m i t e w e i g h t F r i c t i o n r o d i m p a c t d i s c h a r g e H e a t ( a b o l )D T A reactivity pH

V i b r o g e lR e d H AT a m p t i t e g e l a t i n e x t r a 6 0 % .U n i g e lG e l o b e l A AEGDN

N i t r o g l y c e r i n .9 0 / 1 0 E G D N / N G : :6 0 % a m m o n i a g e l a t i n6 0 % s e m i g e l a t i n4 0 % s p e c i a l8 5 % h y d r i v e .850/o gelatinG e l a t i n o u s p e r m i s s i b l e60/40 NG/EGDNP o w e r P r i m e r

A , CA , CA , CA , CA , B *

C,W, X*

c

ww

ww

A , CA , CA , CA , C

x *A, B*, C,W, X,D, E

c A ’C , Y , Z *

w ww w

cA , CA , CA , C

A , B * , W *C , W *

xc

D *wwwwww

w wA’ ,C’ Y*, E,A*, C A*, C,D*

Y*, Z*

cccc

A’

C, W, X,D, E

A ’cw

W.x ”A ’

w ww

w

A’

A– unencapsulaled 3M laggant X–unencapsulaled Westinghouse ceramic taggantB–unencapsulated hard cross.linked 3M taggant Y–encapsulated Curie-point IaggantC–encapsulated 3M Iaggant Z–unencapsulah?d Cunepolnt faggantD–encapsulated higher meltlng point 3M taggant ‘ indicating Irradiated taggantE –unencapsulated higher melting point 3M taggant “–md[caled noncompatibilityW–encapsulated Westinghouse ceramic taggant


served for any of the dynamites into whicheither the encapsulated or unencapsulatedbaseline 3M taggants were added. Unencapsu-Iated hard or gritty taggants of various sortscaused sensitization under impact testing.

In addition to those tests shown in the table,a small number of drop weight tests were con-ducted in which the 3M taggants (both base-line and the cross-linked varieties) were encap-sulated in several high melting point resins.Sensitization of both Power Primer and 90/10EGDN/NG were noted for most combinationstested.

A final series of tests examined the stabilityof tagged Power Primer, Coalite-8S, and EC DNunder both accelerated aging (higher tempera-ture) and ambient aging conditions. The PowerPrimer showed a significant decrease in stabili-ty as measured in the Abel test after 2 monthsaging at 400 C. Unfortunately, no control testwas conducted with untagged Power Primer,so no compatibility judgment can be made. No

other signs of decreased stability appeared inthe other tests.

Gels and Slurries

A smaller number of tests was conducted tocompare the response of tagged and untaggedgels, slurries, and emulsions. These tests aresummarized in table 25. I n no case tested wasthere an indication of changes in sensitivity orstability due to the presence of taggants. Testswere also conducted to determine if the addi-tion of taggants to the gels and slurries wouldaffect performance as the explosive materialsaged. Tests included initiation sensitivity anddetonation velocity as well as visual observa-tion of gel quality. Both ambient and acceler-ated aging tests were conducted. No changesin these properties were observed. Cap-sensi-tivity tests at low temperature were also con-ducted with special sensitized emulsions con-taining a combination of the baseline 3M andthe Westinghouse taggants. The performance

Ch. IV—Tagganf Safety and Compatibility Review ● 8 7

Table 25.–Summary of Compatibility Tests Conducted With Gels and Slurries

Test type

Weight Electro-Drop Sliding Projectile Chemical Thermal loss under Hot Hot static

Type gel or slurry weight rod impact Friction stability stability Taliani heat tip bar disch

G e l - p o w e r A - 2 A,C A,C c● H20, MMAN, SN, AN A cMixture of tovex 700, tovex 800, tovex 320 C c c c cG e l - c o a l c cGel-powder

c c cc c c c c

Permissible (unspecified) W W w

A–unencapsulaled 3M taggant Y–encapsulated curie-poml taggantB–unencapsulated hard cross linked 3M taggant Z–unencapsulated curie point taggantC–encapsulated 3M taggant ‘ indicating iradiated tagganD–encapsulated higher melting point 3M taggant “MMAN –monomethylamme nitrateE–unencapsulated higher melting point 3M taggant SN –sodium nitrateW–encapsulated West ing ceramic taggant AN–ammonium nitrateX –unencapsulated Westinghouse ceramic taggant


of the tagged explosives was superior to theuntagged control samples. It should be notedthat the reason for any change in performanceshould be carefully investigated.

Cast Boosters

The tests comparing the sensitivity and sta-bility of tagged and untagged cast boosters aresummarized in table 26. The 3M taggant didnot affect the sensitivity of any of the castboosters explosives in any of the paired test-ing. Evidence of decreased stability was ob-served in tests conducted of molten boostermaterial to which 3M taggant had been added.I n a series of tests, Goex heated booster explo-sives to temperatures between 1200 and 1650C for a period of 16 hours. ” Evidence of de-composition of the explosives occurred, in-cluding bubbling, dislocation, and the appear-ance of voids. Pentolite (50/50 PET N/TNT), Oc-tol (25/75 TNT/HMX), and an explosive mixturesimilar to Composition B were tested. The onlypaired test was with the Composition B-likematerial. Composition B normally containsjust under 30 percent TNT and just under 60percent RDX, with the rest being wax. TheGoex mixture used A-3 instead of pure RDX. AsA-3 contains approximately 9 percent wax, thecomposition of the Goex Composition B dif-fers from standard Composition B. Ignoring

I I L~tt~r j w H~rOn (GO~X, I n c ) t o S []erda (Aemspdc ~),“StdtlJs ot Tdgg, !ng Program, ” Aerospace purchase order W-025,l a b rept DTL) 10479

this nomenclature difference, the tagged com-position B showed significantly more severedegradation at the 120° C test temperaturethan did the untagged composition B at a 1300C test temperature. As no control tests wereconducted with an untagged batch of explo-sives for the Octol and Pentolite tests, it is im-possible to ascertain if the taggants were re-sponsible for the observed reactions. Whiletesting is often conducted at temperaturesabove those encountered in normal use, it isextremely dangerous to heat common boostermaterials to temperatures above 1200 C. Thetest serves as an indication of a potential com-patibility problem. More carefully controlledtests are currently underway at the Naval Sur-face Weapons Center, White Oak, Md. Prelimi-nary indications are that a 50-50 mixture of un-encapsulated taggants and TNT undergoes achemical reaction at 1200 C; research is con-tinuing to determine the nature, cause, andsafety significance of this apparent incompat-ibi I it y.

On July 15, 1979, an explosion and fire oc-curred at the Goex factory in Camden, Ark.,causing damage which Goex has estimated at$2 million. The explosion took place in a melt-pour operation in which scrap high explosiveswere being melted. Goex, Inc., asserts that thescrap materials avaiIable for melting down in-cluded some materials containing 3M identi-fication taggants. Goex further asserts that theexplosion began in a way that resembled the


Table 26.–Summary of Compatibility Tests Conducted With Cast Boosters

Test type

Vacuum BAM Pendulum ThermalType of booster Drop weight stability friction friction Sliding rod stability

PETN , A, B. C,X*,W A,B, X w C,WP e n t o l i t e A, B,X* A, C,Y,Z A.B, X w50/50 pentolite w w wC o m p o s i t i o n B . w w w c*T N T w w wR D X w w w

A–unencapsulated 3M taggant X– unencapsulaled Westinghouse ceramic taggantB–unencapsulaled hard cross linked 3M taggant Y–encapsulated Cune-point IaggantC –encapsulated 3M taggant Z–unencapsulated Curie-poml taggantD–encapsulated higher melting point 3M Liggant ‘ –idicating Irradiated taggantE - unencapsulaled higher melting point 3M taggant ‘ –Indicated noncompatibilityw–encapsulated Westinghouse ceramic taggant


reaction of tagged booster material in theabove tests. Goex claims that the explosionmust have been caused by the taggants. TheAerospace Corp. asserts that no tagged boostermaterial was located at the Camden factory atthis time, and that furthermore the low con-centrations which Goex asserts were presentcould not have initiated an explosion; the teststo which Goex refers involved extremely hightaggant concentrations, OTA is not familiarwith the facts regarding the possible presenceof taggants, and is not aware as the report goesto press of any experimental data on the possi-ble destabilizing effects of low concentrationsof taggants mixed with TN T/RDX mixtures.

As would be expected, the more gritty tag-

gants clearly showed evidence of sensitizin g

the booster explosives. In the case of the Curie-point taggant, sensit ization occurred even forencapsuIated taggants; these are the onIy testsshowing sensitization with encapsuIated tag-gants.

Black Powder

The black powder compatibility test resultsare summarized in table 27. Neither the blackpowder nor the black powder tailings are sen-sitive to either the friction or impact tests con-ducted, even for the gritty taggants, However,no stabiIity tests were conducted.

. .

Table 27.–Summary of Compatibility TestsConducted With Black Powder

Test type

Drop BAMType of powder weight frlctlonFFFg A,B, X A,B, XTailngs A.B, X A,B, X

A - unencapsulated 3M tagantB–unencapsulated hard cross-linked 3M taggantX –unencapsulated Westinghouse ceramic taggant

SOURCE Off Ice 01 Technology Assessmem

Smokeless Powders

The compatibi l i ty tests conducted withsmokeless powders are summarized in table28. Only the encapsulated 3M taggant (type C)was tested. Tests were originally conducted byHercules, Olin, and Du Pent on their ownsmokeless powders.24 25 No evidence of sensiti-zation or change in electrostatic propertieswas observed. I n the case of the Herco@ pow-der, however, the Taliani and German heattests both indicated a significant decrease instability due to the addition of the taggants (ina 50-percent concentration) to the smokelesspowder. (Although Hercules tested onlyHerco@ powder, Hercules believes that their

Ch. IV—Taggant Safety and Compatibility Review “ 89

Table 28.–Summary of Compatibility Tests Conducted With Smokeless Powders— — - . — ————

Test type

Electro- Crltlcalstatic Impmge- height to German Balllstlc Balllstlc

Type of powder Impact Frlctlon discharge ment explosion DSC Tallanl heat veloclty pressure— — —Hercules HPC cHercules bullseye cHercules Herco’m ’ C c c c c c c* c,

Du Pent H1-skor c c c c c cDu Pent PB c c c c c cDu Pent IMR 3031 c c c c c cDu Pent IMR 4064 c c c cO l l n 2 3 1 cOlln 296 cO l l n 4 5 2 cOlln 540 cOlln 473 cOlin 571 cOlln 680 cOlln 748 cO l l n 7 6 0 . cOlln 785 cO l l n W C 5 7 1 c c

— —C–encapsulated 3M taggant“–lndlcaled noncom pall bllrly

SOURCE Off/cc of Technology Assessment

other brands of powder designed for the re-loading market are so similar to Herco” thatsimilar test results could be expected. OTAbelieves that this is highly likely for the fourother Hercules brands that are chemicallyidentical to Herco”; it may not be the case forthe three Hercules brands with different com-positions.) As no changes were noted for theDu Pent or Olin Abel tests, the Herco@ t e s t swere repeated at the Naval Ordnance Station,Indian Head, Md. The decreased stability wasconfirmed. A more carefully controlled seriesof tests was then conducted by the LawrenceLivermore Laboratory (LLL) for the AerospaceCorp. in an attempt to isolate the element orelements of the taggant materials which areresponsible for the incompatibility. zb Briefly,the tests indicated that there exists an in-compatibil ity between something in theHerco” and the melamine/alkyd which formsthe basic matrix of the 3M taggants. It may bea basic reaction with the melamine/alkyd orwith the catalyst used to speed up the curetime. There may also be reactions occuring be-tween the taggant pigments and the Herco@

powder. The LLL tests are continuing in an at-tempt to resolve the issue.

‘“[l 5f’,]ton A I’,]vne Iettt’r, OIJ c It

At the present time, there appears to be anincompatibility between the 3M taggants andthe Herco” smokeless powder. Hercules hasindicated that it does not consider the com-bination safe and has stopped all work on it.OTA feels that, on the basis of the tests justdescribed, the conclusion must be drawn thatthe 3M taggants cannot be safely added to theHerco@ powder unless the present incompati-bility is resolved. Some justification exists forquestioning the validity of tests using severelyincreased concentrations of the taggant mate-rials (5o percent in the tests v. 0.05 percent ofencapsulated material in the proposed taggantprogram), but it has not been demonstratedthat there is a threshold concentration belowwhich the problem disappears, and that such athreshold would never be exceeded in prac-tice.

Preliminary ballistic tests have been con-ducted on tagged WC 571 shotgun powdermanufactured by Ol in. Bal l i s t ic velocity,chamber pressure, and time to initiate burningwere measured. Tests were conducted at threetemperatures ( –30° C, 20° C, and 50° C) andfour taggant concentrations (2, 4, 10, and 20times the recommended concentrations), bothwith the taggants mixed in the powder and

61-401 9 - 80 - 7


with the taggants separated and placed direct-ly over the primer flash hole.

The Olin rationale for such extreme testscondition (up to 20 times the nominal concen-trations, 100-percent segregation) was an at-tempt to evaluate the worst-worst case condi-tions that might appear due to segregation ofthe taggants from the powder during manufac-ture, transportation, and storage.

No deviation from acceptable ballistic per-formance was noted for the ambient- and high-temperature tests. A steady decrease in veloci-ty and pressure was noted with increasing tag-gant concentration. The practical signifance ofthis depends on the extent to which taggant

concentration would vary in actual use byhandloaders, which can and should be estab-lished by careful testing and statistical analy-sis. At the low-temperature condition twoanomalous test results occurred. Evidence ofimproper ignition occurred in 1 of the 20 fir-ings at the 20 times normal concentration, 100-percent segregation condition. Improper igni-tion would constitute a safety hazard as theround might not clear the barrel, Significantlyreduced bal I istic performance occurred on 1of the 20 tests at 4 times nominal taggant con-cent rat ion, with the taggants and powdermixed. No other performance degradation wasnoted, even under conditions of higher taggantconcentrate ion.

DISCUSSION OF COMPATIBILITY TEST RESULTS

Several hundred tests have been conductedto investigate the compatibility of explosivematerials with identification taggants. Most ofthe tests have been conducted with the base-line 3M taggants and variations of these tag-gants; a large number of tests, however, havealso been conducted with several other candi-date taggant materials. Compatibility testshave included those designed to indicate in-creased sens i t iv i ty, decreased stab i I it y,changed electrical properties, and changedperformance, Explosive materials have in-cluded dynamites, gels, emulsions and slurries,cast boosters, bldck powder, and smokelesspowders. A full set of qualification tests hasnot been completed on any single explosiveproduct and only a small fraction of the hun-dreds of products has had any testing. Giventhese limitations, it is sti l l possible to drawsome tentative conclusions on the compat ibi I i-ty of taggants with explosive materials (whichmay change as more data becomes available)and to discuss the implications of these resultsfor the taggant program,

First, it is important to realize the purpose of~ cornpatibiIity qua I if i cat ion testing program.In brief, a set of tests is established on thebasis of analysis, the projected manufacturing,storage, transportation, and end-use process-ing of the material, and the normal procedures

and experience of the organization conducting

the tests. If the candidate explosive productfails to pass any of the critical tests in theseries, it is judged to have failed the qual ifica-tion test program. If a flaw can be corrected,then the tests can continue, but the materialmust pass al I of the critical tests, not just a ma-jority or a certain fraction.

There is no indication that the 3M taggantsare incompatible with dynamites, gels and SIur-ries, or black powder.

C o m p o s i t i o n B b o o s t e r m a t e r i a l a n dHerco” smokeless powder do show significant-ly reduced stability in the presence of the 3Midentification taggants. Furthermore, carefultesting appears to indicate that the incompati-bility is with the basic melamine/alkyd materi-al of the taggants, rather than with a particularpigment or the polyethylene encapsulate.Tests, similar to those conducted with Herco”,were conducted with other smokeless pow-ders; no loss in stability was noted for otherHercules powders, or for the Olin or Du Pentsmokeless powders. The reaction, therefore,probably is between the melamine/alkyd andone of the sensitizers or stabil izers of theHerco@ . As the formulations of both Herco@

and the 3M identification taggants currentlystand, the two are not compatible. Further in-

Ch. IV— Taggant Safety and Compatibility Review ● 9 1

vestigation may isolate the element of incom-patibility, and it may be possible to replaceelements in either the Herco@ or the taggantsto remove the incompatibility. It is not yetpossible to tell whether the booster materialincompatibility is with the basic melamine/al-kyd or with one of the components of the tag-gants.

Both the smokeless powder and booster ma-terial tests took place at high temperatures,and, in most of the tests, at high-taggant con-centrations. The temperature used for thesmokeless powder test was higher than wouldbe expected in actual manufacture, storage, oruse; the temperature used for the cast boosteris sometimes reached in manufacturing proc-esses. In each test, a taggant concentration ofso percent was used rather than the 0.05-per-cent tagging concentration suggested for rou-tine use. The tests, nonetheless, indicate thatthe stability of the materials has decreased,due to the addition of taggants, and that a re-action is taking place between elements of thetaggants and elements of the explosive mate-rial. Standard qualification test procedure re-quires that such evidence be considered a signof an existing incompatibility between thematerials. Careful Iy controlled testing, and ex-tensive analysis must be completed before itcan be determined if the observed evidence ofincompatibiIity does, in fact, indicate a poten-tial safety problem during the manufacture,storage, transportation, and use of the testedmaterials. Unless demonstrated otherwise, itmust be assumed that it is unsafe to add thetaggants to that smokeless powder or thebooster material. Until the elements of the in-compatible Iity have been identified, a questionremains as to the safety of adding the taggantsto similar smokeless powders and booster ma-terials, although tests with other smokelesspowders and boosters have shown no evidenceof incompatibility.

The significance of the 01 in ballistic proper-ty tests cannot be fully assessed at this time.The Olin tests indicated that increasing tag-gant concentrations lead to a reduction in ve-locity and pressure, and this could create aproblem if and only if it proves impossible to

mix taggants with smokeless powder in such away as to avoid extreme variations in taggantconcentration from one round to the next.Testing is required to establish how great avariation in concentration could be expectedusing reasonable manufacturing methods, andnormal transportation, storage, and loadingprocedures. The Olin tests did show one caseof poor performance (at four times the sug-gested taggant concentration), but perform-ance anomalies sometimes occur without tag-gants, and a single anomaly is not enough tojustify a prediction as to whether taggantswould increase the frequency of such occur-rences. The segregation tests were conductedwith 100-percent segregation, which appearsquite unreal istic. Testing is needed to establishthe extent of segregation which might occurbefore a realistic worst case can be defined.Unlike the Herco@ and Composition B cases,the Olin ballistic property tests do not appearto OTA to constitute sufficient evidence to re-quire presumption of an incompatibility. It re-mains true, however, that no presumption ofcompatibility can be made until adequate bal-listics tests have been conducted.

This raises the question of the value of a tag-gant program from which smokeless powdersand cast boosters were excluded. As noted inchapter Vl, smokeless powders are used in asignificant percentage of criminal bombings(approximately 20 percent) and cause 10 to 20percent of deaths and injuries. As also noted inchapter Vl, criminal bombers are Iikely to re-act to a taggant program, If smokeless pow-ders are not tagged, then a logical reactionwould be for a large number of bombers toswitch to the use of smokeless powders. Al-though bombs using smokeless powder areconsiderably less efficient (lower specificenergy) than those using cap-sensitive high ex-plosives, smokeless powder bombs are respon-sible for a considerable number of injuries anddeaths. Effective controls over smokeless pow-der by means other than taggants may be pos-sible but appear unlikely. Booster material israrely used as a bomb filIer. It is used, how-ever, to initiate blasting agents. The currentBATF plan would be to not directly tag blast-


ing agents, but to tag the booster and detona-tors used to initiate the blasting agent. Exclu-sion of boosters from the taggant program maywell require an alternate control mechanismfor blasting agents. Given the extremely largequantity of blasting agent produced (3.4 billionlb annually), any other control mechanism mayhave serious cost consequences.

The above discussion concerned the resultsof the tests to investigate the compatibility ofthe baseline 3M taggants with explosive mate-rials. Tests were also conducted using hard orgritty taggants, In all cases, the unencapsu-Iated hard taggants caused increased sensitivi-ty to the drop weights, and, in most cases, tothe sliding rod tests. The ceramic Curie-pointtaggants caused increased sensitivity in somecases even when encapsulated, although no in-compatibility was noted for the Westinghouseor hard-core 3M taggants when encapsulatedwith polyethylene. When a hard resin was usedas an encapsulant, the 3M taggants showed aclear sensitization of PETN. The implicationsof these tests are obvious. l-lard or gritty tag-gants must be encapsulated. The encapsulatedmaterial should not only be soft but it shouldalso be a heat sink. The use of a soft additive isa common desensitizer in military explosives.Composition B and other RDX-based explo-sives include approximately 1 percent waxwith a softening point in the 800 F range.

The tests show that encapsulated gritty tag-gants, such as the Westinghouse ceramic tag-gant, may be alternatives to the baseline 3Mtaggant. As even a small amount of the unen-capsulated material (0.01 percent) causes in-creased sensitivity, however, great care mustbe exercised to ensure essentially 100-percent”encapsulation; this may seem to create an im-possible quality control problem. However,the problem may not be as difficult as it firstappears. If 99 percent of the taggants are en-capsulated, then unencapsulated taggantswould const i tute only .00025 percent byweight of the explosive, almost two orders ofmagnitude less than the amount demonstratedto cause increased sensitivity. Tests of thoseextremely low levels might welI show no in-creased sensitivity.

As noted above, much compatibility testingremains to be accomplished. Identificationtaggants have undergone comprehensive test-ing with a representative sample of dynamites,gels, slurries, cast booster materials/smokelesspowders, and black powder; even after the res-olution of the compatibility questions whichtesting so far has revealed, it would eventuallybe necessary to test taggants with all such ma-terials before instituting a comprehensive tag-g ing p rogram. In the case of detonators andd e t o n a t i n g c o r d , c o m p a t i b i l i t y t e s t i n g h a s n o tbeen completed even with a representativesample. Compatibility testing of detection tag-gants started only recently, and with the excep-tion of testing with detonators it is less far ad-vanced than compatibility testing of identifi-cation taggants.

It is necessary to resolve the incompatibilityobserved between the 3M identification tag-gants and the Composition B booster materialas well as the Herco@ powder however, beforeit makes any sense to finish the rest of the testswith other materials. The resolution of thesmokeless powder incompatibility could takeany of several forms, including:

●

●

●

●

Reformulation of the 3M taggant– thiscould require starting essentially fromscratch in the taggant-testing program, asthe reformulated taggant would un-doubtedly exhibit different compatibility,as well as survivability properties.It might be possible to develop a differenttaggant that proved compatible withsmokeless powders, and to use the exist-ing 3M taggant for explosive materialswith which it is compatible.Reformulation of the Herco” powder—this may or may not be easily accom-plished, once the element or elementsthat react with the taggant are isolated.This option would only be viable if noother smokeless powder were found to beincompatible.Exclusion of Herco” from the taggantprogram —the economic effects on com-petition would need to be carefully con-sidered, as would alternate control mech-an isms.

Ch. IV—Taggant Safety and Compatibility Review . 93

● Exclusion of smokeless powders from theidentification taggant program — such anexclusion wouId rely on the fact thatsmokeless powders would be less effec-tive than cap-sensitive high explosives andthat the detonators would be tagged. OTAbelieves that this last approach may notbe viable– too many people are currentlykilled or injured using smokeless powdersand the numbers wouId almost certainlyincrease if that approach were adopted.Alternate control mechanisms for smoke-less powders would be required,

● Demonstrate ion that the observed stabiIityproblem does not constitute a safety haz-ard. The observed decreased stabiIity oc-curs at elevated tern peratures and at morethan two orders of magnitude higher tag-gant concentration, As the decomposition

rate is both temperatu r-e and concentra-tion sensitive, it may be that no sa fe tyhazard exists under realistic conditions Ifit could be positively demonstrated thatthe decomposition rate was within thenormal I I y accepted range for temperatureregimes and concentrations which reflectworst case actuaI use conditions, then itmay be possible to add taggants to thesmokeless powder, particuIarly if no fur-ther incompatibiIities surface. However,demonstrate ion of safety wouId have to bequite convincing to overcome the current-ly perceived incompatibility.

A resolution of the booster incom patproblem could be accomplished by a sset of methods, once the elements of tcompatibiIity have been identitied.

bil itymilarl e i n -

Chapter V

TAGGANT COST REVIEW

PageOverview ● * . * . * . . , . * , . * . * * * * . . * , . . . , . * * , 97T-t Material Costs........., . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Identification Taggants, . ................101Detection Taggant Materials Costs . .......102Cost and Supply Guarantees , . ...........103

Sensor-Related Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104Numbers of Sensors Needed . . . . . . . .. ....105Sensor System Related Costs . ............105Mix of Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..106False Alarm Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107

ExpMvesandGunpowder Manufacturing Costs . 1(I7

Page

Recordkeeping Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111Markup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........112Summary of Manufacturing Costs Added .. .112

Distributor Costs . . . . . . . . . ................113Recordkeeping at 13istribution Levels .. ....113Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115Summary Cost IncludingMarkup. . ........116

UserCost Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117Increased Material Costs . ...............117Commercial IJsesof Explosives and

Cunpowcfers-Genera\ . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118Revised Processes, Tooling, and Facility Underground Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

c o s t s . . . . . . . . ’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 8 Quarries . . . . . . . . . ..................118Cap-Sensitive PackagedExpkMVes .. ....108 O p e n P i t M i n e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 9Cast Boosters, Smokeless Powcfersg and Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119

Black Powder., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....108 Hand load ing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120D e t o n a t i n g C o r d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 9 o t h e r c o s t l m p a c t s . . . . .o . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121BlastingCaps ..+. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .:.109 Government investigation Costsand Program

Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ...’. .109 A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 1Cap-Sensitive Packaged Explosives .. ....109 Inves t iga t iveCosts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121Cast Boosters.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ,..?09 EffectsofCompetition-Substitution . . . . ...I22B l a c k P o w d e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 1 0 9 Effects on Fixe&PriceCommodities. . ......122Smoke less Powder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 110 Possibie RemovaiofSome Gunpowders FromD e t o n a t i n g C o r d a n d B l a s t i n g . . 1 1 0 t h e M a r k e t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3

Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 0 - b w * $ - . . . . . . . ● . . . . . . 123Cap-SensitivePackagedExplosiv~ .. ....110 “ Identification Taggant MaterialOther Exp los ive Ca tegor ies . . . . . . . . . . . .111 Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........123

I n v e n t o r y C o s t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 Detection TaggantProgram Material Costs. .123Qua l i tyCont ro l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Manufacturing Level Program Costs . . . . . . 124Safety . . . . . . . . . . . ....................111 Distribution Network Program Costs. ., ....124

Public Overhead Program Cost . ..........124Taggant Program Baseline Cost Estimate. .. .125Program Cost Versus Implementation Level .125Program Cost of Separate Identification and

Detection Taggant Programs . ........126Comparison of OTA Cost Estimates With I ME

and Aerospace Corp. Estimates . . . . . .. 127Who Bears the Cost of a Taggant Program? .. 128

Cost Analysis Precision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129Cost Sensitivity Analysis . ...............129

Taggant Mater ia ls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129Adequacy of Current Data. . ................133Suggested Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

29

30313233

3435

TABLES

Page

Qualification of the Estimating Basis forTaggants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98List of Taggant Program Cost Elements .. ..100Baseline Taggant Program Configuration. .. 100Annual Taggant Requirements. . .........101Qualification of Estimating Basis forSensors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......105Vapor Taggant Detector System Cost .. ...106Current Manufacturing Cost/PriceData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............108

36. Summary of Explosives and GunpowderManufacturing Costs Included. . .........112

37. Cost Summary of Cap-Sensitive PackagedHigh Explosives Manufacturing CostVariations With Assumptions. . ..........113

38. Estimated Cost for Powders atD is t r ibu t ion Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

39. Distribution System –Summary of CostAdded and Markup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

40. Current High Explosives Cost Impact forVarious User Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121

41. Identif ication Taggant Material AnnualC o s t s , B a s e l i n e P r o g r a m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 4

42. Detection Taggant Material AnnualCosts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........124

4 3 . M a n u f a c t u r i n g C o s t A d d e d . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 544 . D is t r ibut ion System Cost Added . . . . . . . . . 12545. Taggant Program Summary Annual Cost-

Baseline Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12546. Taggant Program Summary Annual Cost

V e r s u s I m p l e m e n t a t i o n L e v e l . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 5

47. Identification Taggant and DetectionTaggant Program Cost Comparisons -Basline Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .126

48. Summary Program Costs Versus Level ofImplementation ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

49. Comparison of the Estimates for IDTags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........127

50. Comparison of OTA and Aerospace ProgramEstimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......128

51. Taggant Program Cost Impact by WhoWill Bear the Cost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

52. Elements of Cost Uncertainty. . ..........13053. Annual Cost per Sensor for Various

Mixes ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............132

FIGURES

Page10. Schematic Illustration of General Cost

11.

12.

13.

14,

15.

16.

17.

16.

19.

20$

21.

Element Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99BM Identification Taggant CostEstimates: 5Ib Tag Lots, Unencapsulated,2-Year Minimum Required . . . . . . . . .. ....102General Functional Network for VaporTaggant Detector, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..106Estimated Annual Vapor TaggantDetector Cost v. Quantity Deployed .. ...,106Estimated Cost of False Alarms v. False-Alarm Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... , .107Schematic of Cap-Sensitive High ExplosiveDis t r ibu t ion Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114Schematic Distribution Network ofGunpowder. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... , 114Recordkeeping Activity v. TaggingLevel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........115Summary of Added Costs to Explosive UsersCost Per Unit of Explosives in Dollars .. ...117Bingham Canyon open Pit CopperMine. . . . . . ., ., . . . . . . . . .............120Baseline Program Cost Sensitivity ImpactWith Changes in Identification Taggant,Material Cost, and Concentration Level, .. .131Baseline Program Cost Sensitivity ImpactWith Changes in Detection Taggant,Material Cost, and Concentration Level. .. .131

Chapter IV

TAGGANT COST REVIEW

OVERVIEW

A detailed review of the potential cost and economic impacts of the proposedtaggant program was conducted in parallel with the safety and utility segments ofthe study. In this analysis, the assumption was made that the taggants work and aresafe to put in explosive materials. it was furthermore assumed that the current in-compatibilities observed between the 3M identification taggant and one type ofsmokeless powder, as well as one type of cast booster material, would be resolved ina way which has no additional cost impact. The various cost elements were esti-mated by: ‘

● drawing on existing studies and testimony; and● interviewing the identification taggant manufacturer, explosive and gunpow-

der manufacturers and distributors, users of explosive materials, law enforcement personnel, and sensor instrumentation engineers.

Other important economic issues were ad-dressed in parallel with the development of theprogram cost. The addition of taggants to ex-plosives has a potential cost impact to an in-dustry in which explosive-type decisions arefrequently made on an economic, rather thanperformance or brand loyalty, basis. An addi-tional taggant material cost issue is that raisedby the probable monopoly of supply by onecompany, particularly by 3M for the identifica-tion taggants. The question of assuring priceand taggant availability also required atten-tion. Introduction of taggants into the explo-sive fabrication process will cause changes inthe manufacturing process, due both to possi-ble tooling costs and to the labor costs associ-ated with purchasing, controlling, and usingthe taggants. Other, one-time costs are associ-ated with product requalif ication tests forsafety, potent ia l costs for waste disposalequipment, and added plant capacity to makeup for lost productivity.

Identification taggants require additionalrecordkeeping by the manufacturer, by whole-salers and distributors, and by the retail sellers.There are law enforcement costs associatedwith the recovery and tracing of identificationtaggants from explosions and with the subse-

quent followup process. These costs must,however, be compared with the cost of currentlaw enforcement practices.

Detection taggants require a sensor and asystem to sample and convey the air from thesample item to the sensor. The sensor and sam-pling system requires operation and mainte-nance, although it is possible that currentsecurity personnel could operate the addition-al equipment at an airport, for instance. Thereis an additional potential cost associated withpossible delays raised by false alarms in the de-tection system. Significant false alarms couldcause enough ill-will (in addition to high costs)to lead to the abandonment or curtailed usageof detectors in situations such as airports.

A final cost aspect which must be consid-ered is the economic effect of a taggant pro-gram in which only selected explosives are re-quired to be tagged. In the cost-consciouscommercial explosive industry, that couldeliminate certain products or companies fromthe marketplace, perhaps resulting in signifi-cant local unemployment.

Due to the fact that the identification tag-gants have progressed further down the devel-opment path, the relative precision of the cost

97


estimates associated with their introductioninto explosives is expected to be greater thanthe estimates of detection taggant and relatedsensor costs. The precision of each estimate isindicated during the course of the cost analysisdiscussion.

This cost analysis by OTA has been an inten-sive, short-duration study. Of necessity, thestudy was accomplished by drawing on exist-ing studies from a wide variety of sources andby a limited number of onsite interviews withindustry and Government. Discussion with in-dustry included various explosives manufac-turers and BM, the taggant manufacturer. Vari-ous user types such as mining companies (un-derground and surface), construction firms,and quarry operators were also visited. Exten-sive discussions were also held with the Aero-space Corp. (the taggant program developmentcontractor), with the Institute for DefenseAnalysis, with Management Science Associ-ates, and with consumer groups such as theNational Rifle Association and the NationalMuzz le Loaders Associat ion. Government

agencies with whom detailed discussions wereheld include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,and Firearms (BAT F), the Federal Aviation Ad-ministration (FAA), the Department of Com-merce (DOC), the Bureau of Mines (BOM), andvarious Department of Defense agencies.

Various degrees of uncertainty exist in cost-ing out the taggant program, as little test dataexists and some potential manufacturing proc-ess applications are undefined. Table 29 illus-trates the qualifications of the estimating basisfor the taggant program, indicating the statusof pilot testing and the OTA understanding ofthe manufacturing processes required to im-plement taggants. On the right side of table 29is set forth, in general terms, the method forestimating utilized, such as direct estimating,Aerospace Corp. analysis and assumptions, theInstitute of Makers of Explosives (IME) mem-ber estimated inputs, Sporting Arms and Am-munition Manufacturers’ Institute (SAAMI )estimated inputs, etc. The particular methodsand data sources utilized are documentedthroughout this study where appropriate.

Table 29.–(lualification of the Estimating Basis for Taggants

Etimating, basis

Taggant mfgrType explosive Pilot tested process Process labor

understood

Cap-sensitive Yes Yes Direct/ estimatepackaged explosives Proprietary detail estimate

available.I ME member inputs.

C a s t b o o s t e r s Yes Yes Aerospace analysis/assumptions

Smokeless powder Underway Yes Aerospace analysisSAAMI estimate.

B l a c k p o w d e r Yes Yes Goex Study stor ing● security● administrative & records● mfgr, process cleanup

D e t o n a t i n g c o r d Planned No Aerospace assumptions,

B l a s t i n g c a p s Planned No Aerospace assumptions

Process tooling

Direct estimate

Equipment required:storage bins, hoppers,equipment for weighing,packaging, transferringtag samples,

Tooling. ●

Design required (no effectiveequipment currently available

Significant cost ● expected–

Other capital expenses

Direct estimateNonrecurringRequalification of products.

Waste disposal ifadditional waste due to‘‘unacceptable contaminatedtag batches

Investment offset lossesin productivity.

Cost of taggant InventoryIncluding the cost of money

new machine must be designed.

‘Aerospace estimates utilized and OTA survey inputs—


Ch.--Yaggant Cost Review . 99

The primary methodology uti l ized in thiscost analysis was to translate all programcosts, both nonrecurring one-time costs and re-curring costs, to annualized values. Capital in-vestment costs were annualized over a 10-yearperiod at an interest rate of 10 percent. Thismethod was utilized for all initial expenditures(requalification, waste facilities, etc.) with theexception of tooling costs estimated for deto-nators and blasting caps, which were writtenoff in a 5-year period at 10-percent interest.

The taggant program costs vary substantial-ly as a function of the level of implementationof the program. In this study, an OTA ident i -fied baseline program was assumed for base-line cost estimates, and the parametric varia-tion of the costs examined as a function ofhigher and lower level implementation plans.

Cost estimates were also generated for the im-plementation program proposed by BATF.

All cost data and program estimates in thisreport are stated in fiscal year 1979 dollars toassure consistent treatment. A list of taggantprogram cost elements was developed to per-mit a comprehensive framework for treatingall potential costs and resources impacted bythe taggants program. Figure 10 illustrates thegeneral sources of costs potentialIy involved inthe program, while a detailed list of potentialcost elements is shown in table 30.

For purposes of exposition throughout thiscost impact assessment, a baseline set of con-ditions or assumptions is utilized in the deter-mination of a total program estimate. Theseare shown in table 31. This baseline program

Figure IO.— Schematic Illustration of General CostElement Sources

Direct Costs Direct costsadded by added by

mabyfactyrer distributor

Taggant Direct costs

materials Incurred by

I d e n t i f i c a t i o n T a g g a n t suser

Program Cost

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment.


Table 30.–List of Taggant Program Cost Elements

Taggant materialsIdenhflcahon taggantsDetection taggants

Detection sensor-related costsSensorsSensor sampling and transport instrumentationOperations and maintenanceCost of false alarms

Explosive and gunpowder manufacturing costsNonrecurring cost

● Tooling● Storage● Product requalification- safety testing● Waste disposal facilities● New Investment to offset production losses

Recurring costs● Manufacturing process labor● Record keeping● Quality control● Production losses● Waste product line● Inventory costs● Administration expense

Markup

Distributor costsRecord keepingStorageMarkup

User costs

Other costsGovernment administrationTaggant program developmentInvestigative costs


Table 31 .–Baseline Taggant Program Configuration

. Encapsulated identification taggants● Explosive weight or units to be tagged and tagging concentration

Category Units/yr Concentration

Cap-sensitive packagedexplosives 325,000,000 lb .05%

B o o s t e r s 6,000,000 lb .1 %B l a c k p o w d e r 400,000 lb .05%S m o k e l e s s p o w d e r 5,000,000 lb .05%D e t o n a t i n g c o r d 500,000,000 ft 5 tags/in.Blasting cap 84,000,000 units 50 mg

. Identification and detection taggants

. 1,500 sensors to be deployed● Sensor mix. M S 10°/0, I MS 90°/0. 10% taggant contamination permitted● “Composite tag” permits rework of previously tagged material● Days production of each type/size explosive (date-shift basis)● New taggant code for each


includes several provisions which, OTA be-lieves, would do much to hold down costswithout a significant reduction in the utility ofthe program: blasting agents are not tagged;the identification taggant code is changedonly when the date, shift, or product changes(resulting in some code numbers correspond-ing to a large batch size and others to a smallbatch size); and a special “composite code” isused for taggants added to already tagged ma-terial (permitting rework without removal ofprevious tags). The special composite codetaggant would be added to material with morethan 10-percent cross-contain ination; such ataggant would indicate that the material usedwas a composite and that taggant codes otherthan the specific composite code should be ig-nored.

Although confidence levels are relativelyhigh for certain elements of costs, particularlyfor the identification taggant program, otherprogram elements are subject to considerableuncertainty (particularly the number and typesof sensors to be employed in the detection tag-gant program). Attention is called to the base-line assumptions associated with each cost ele-ment throughout the discussion of cost.

In the following section the costs for the tag-gant materials are developed. This is followedby detection taggant sensor-related programcost estimates. The potential cost increases oc-curring during the explosive manufacturingprocess and at the distribution level are thenaddressed. The potential cost impact(s) to theusers of explosives are subsequently discussed.Other cost impacts, including the cost contri-bution by Government for administration, in-vestigation, and taggant program develop-ment, are set forth in the next section. A gener-1 synthesis and summary of the taggant pro-gram cost estimates follows, with the relativeprecision or accuracy of the estimates dis-cussed after that, including aspects of cost un-certainty and program cost sensitivity. Theadequacy of the current cost data and sug-gested further research are briefly discussed inthe last two sections, respectively,

Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review ● 1 0 1

TAGGANT MATERIAL COSTS

The cost of both the identification and de-tection taggant material is heavily influencedby the amount of explosive material to betagged, the form of the tagging material, andthe concentration levels. Material cost esti-mates are developed for the baseline programdescribed above.

Identification Taggants

The annual quantity of explosives producedin the United States, shown in table 32, wasestimated based on data obtained from IME,BATF, Aerospace Corp., BOM, and DOC. Anunresolved problem exists with respect to theproduction of cap-sensitive packaged high ex-plosives. The basic difficulty stems from themethod of reporting data in the surveys col-lected by both BOM and DOC, Some “un-known” quantity (both permissible and otherhigh explosives) of cap-sensitive explosives isreported as included in unprocessed ammonianitrate and “al I other purpose” categories inorder to avoid disclosing individual companydata. Since the data are masked to protect themarketing positions of explosive manufactur-ers, the uncertainty in annual quantity will per-sist, For purposes of this study, the quantity of325 million lb/year (as adopted by Aerospace)wil I be used as the baseline condition.

A second variation concerns the level ofblack powder produced. Approximately 2.5m i I I ion lb of black powder are produced peryear in the United States, but the majority isused as a raw material in other fabricationprocesses, such as fuzes . Approximate y400,000 lb are sold directly to the consumer;this amount is included in the explosive materi-als to be tagged. Table 32 shows the produc-tion quantity, the concentration of unencapsu-Iated taggant material suggested by the BATF/Aerospace team, and the resultant quantity ofunencapsulated taggants required annualIy,

Price estimates, obtained from 3M as a func-tion of annual taggant production, are shownin figure 11 The estimates quoted are for un-

Table 32.–Annual Taggant Requirements— .

Annual taggantConcentrat ion requirement

Quantity to be level pounds

Explosive category lagged ( u n e n c a p s u l a t e d ) ( u n e n c a p s u l a t e d )

Cap-sensitive pack-aged high explosives 325.000.000 lb 0.025% 81,250

Cast boosters 6.000,000 lb 0 0 5 % 3,000Smokeless powder 5,000.000 lb O 025% 1,250B l a c k p o w d e r 400,000 lb 0.025% 100Detonating cord 500,000,000 ft 5 tags/in, 160Blasting caps 84,000.000 caps 50 mg each 4,620

90,380

SOURCE Of ficeof Technology Assessment

e n c a p s u l a t e d t a g g a n t s p r o d u c e d i n 5 - l b l o t sand assume a firm order for a minimum of 2years. The 150,000-lb level is a result of a de-tailed Ieadtime study conducted under con-tract to the Aerospace Corp. The target priceand worst case estimates for the 75,000- and100,000-lb levels were provided by 3M in re-sponse to an OTA request. The range of pricesreflects the fact that less time was availablefor the 3M estimates than the original 150,000-Ib level, resulting in some uncertainties. Thesetarget prices have all been through a rigorousprice review within the 3M corporate structureand represent the firmest commitment possi-ble short of a production contract.

Assuming linear extrapolation between thedata points, the price for unencapsulated iden-tification taggant material was estimated byOTA (from figure 11) to be approximately $93/lb for the estimated 90,000 lb of taggants to ber e q u i r e d a n n u a l I y . T h i s c o s t f i g u r e a s s u m e sp r o d u c t i o n in 10,000-lb lots. In cases wheremost lots are substantialIy smaller, taggantcosts per pound of explosives might rise.

This figure is for unencapsuiated taggants,while the baseline OTA program assumes thetaggants are encapsulate? in an opaque poly-ethylene wax. The 3M technical people fur-n i shed an estimate of the cost of encapsuIatingthe taggants in polyethylene wax, but were un-able to estimate the cost impact of using anopaque polyethylene wax. Based on the abovedata, OTA estimated that it would cost $55/lb

102~Tggants in Explosives

Figure 11 .—3M Identification TaggantCost Estimates

● 5-lb tag lots ● Unencapsulated● 2-year minimum required

Cost per poundof taggant

in 1979 dollars

140

130

120

110

100

90

80

70

75,000 100,000 150,000

Annual identification taggant production in pounds

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

for opaque encapsulated taggants, as the base-l i ne tagg ing leve l i s 0 .05 percent by we igh t o fencapsulated taggants, and the encapsulatingmaterial weighs the same as the unencapsu-Iated taggants. ($93 for 1 lb of encapsulatedtaggants, plus $17 for 1 lb of encapsulating ma-terial, plus the process, equal $110 for 2 lb ofencapsulated taggants, or $55/l b.) This corre-sponds to 2.75 cents/lb of cap-sensitive explo-sives for the identification tagging material.

IME and a number of other individuals andorganizations have based their cost estimateson a price of $200/lb of encapsulated taggants

and an additional library maintenance fee of$100/year per unique taggant species. Thisidentification taggant cost has been clearlyidentified by 3M as the cost of taggants pro-duced in their current pilot plant, which islabor intensive, if there is no program legis-lated to tag commercial explosives. It does notrepresent a potential cost figure if a taggantprogram is legislated, Details of the cost oftaggants, as a funct ion of total quant i tyneeded, were given above. No additional feewould be required for Iibrary maintenance.

Detection Taggants Materials Costs

The Aerospace Corp., as part of its taggantcontract effort for BATF, has put considerableeffort into the development of molecules fordetection taggant purposes. As a result of in-vestigation of the properties of several hun-dred potential molecules, five chemicals arecurrently considered excellent candidates forthe program. These perfluorinated cycloal-phones are:

● PDCB — perfluorodimethyl cyclobutane,● PMCH — perfluoromethyl cyclohexane,● PDCH — perfluorodimethyl cyclohexane,● PFD — perfluorodecal in, and● PS P — perfIuorohexyl-suIfur-pentafIuo-

ride.

The final selection of a particular detectortaggant will depend on the results of compati-bility testing, efficacy in conjunction with thedetection taggant sensor, price, and availabil-ity.

The microencapsulated detection taggantwould be directly incorporated as a free-flow-ing powder in commercial explosives and gun-powder. Since part of the chemical selectioncriteria includes a low or negligible utilizationof these materials in standard manufacturing(to minimize false alarms due to ambient airbackground), standard cost/price data current-ly available was supplemented by requests bythe Aerospace Corp. to a number of companiesfor budgetary pricing-type estimates at quanti-ty levels of 200,000 lb/year. A range of esti-mates was received for both the cost of the de-


tection taggants and for the encapsulationprocess. Taking these values into account, aswell as adjustments for process yield, the fol-lowing range of estimates was made by OTA.

Lower end of range $22 20/lbM e d i u m 4 0 . 0 0 \ I b

Higher end of range 58.15/ lb

For purposes of the baseline study OTA hasutilized the medium cost of $40/lb of encapsu-lated detection taggant. The Aerospace Corp.,in their inflationary impact study, estimatedconservatively a value of $65/lb, based onearly data. With the more recent quotes it isreasonable to estimate a lower value for detec-tion taggant material. Uncertainty as to thevalue chosen remains due to the following fac-tors:

final taggant selection,● final contract price,● cost of encapsuIation,● the weight effect of the encapsu I at ion

process, and the final yield ratio of the encapsulant ion

process,

Since the detection taggant program re-mains in the early stages of development, un-certainty will persist in this value. Variationsfrom this value will be examined in the costsensitivity analysis. The relative significance ofthe variations of the detection taggants cost isnot expected to greatly perturb the overalI tag-gant program cost estimates.

Cost and Supply Guarantees

The identification taggants currently pro-posed to be used are manufactured only by 3Mand are a proprietary product manufacturedby a proprietary process. In addition, a signifi-cant public overhead cost would have been in-curred before the compatibility of explosivematerials with the taggants could have beendemonstrated, Mandating the addition of iden-t i f icat ion taggants to explos ive mater ia lswould, therefore, ensure a monopoly of theGovernment-mandated market for 3M, at leastfor a period of several years. Under such cir-cumstances, development of a mechanism to

regulate the virtual monopoly of the identifi-cat ion taggant market that 3M would enjoy ishighly desirable. While several suppliers a r ecapable of supplying the vapor detection tag-gant, production in the necessary quantity wilIprobably require significant capital invest-ment, much of which wouId be amortized bythe taggant program. It is therefore desirableto have a mechanism that will ensure the priceof the vapor taggant material as welI

A number of mechanisms are available toreguIate the price of taggants, incIuding:

. a price level set by Congress in the ena-bling legislation,

● regulation as a public utility,

● licensing by 3M of competitors,● a multi year, fixed-price contract, and● a free-market price, regulated only by the

possibility of competition or sanctions ifprices get too high.

The free-market mechanism is probably un-acceptable, given the long time needed toeither develop and qualify an alternative tag-gant or enact sanction legislation, Legislationof a price or use of a regulation mechanismsimilar to that used for public utilities wouldbe an awkward, time-consuming process for aproduct whose total annual value would be onthe order of $11 million.

Licensing is not only disagreeable to 3M, butit is probably not cost-effective. The cost ofthe taggant material includes a component foramortization of the taggant production facili-ty, as a new facility must be built and theprimary market for identif ication taggantswould Iikely be the mandated explosives mar-ket, The process that 3M plans to implement iscapital-intensive. Licensing of other manufac-turers would therefore require the construc-tion of facilities for the licensee, in addition toa new 3M facility, resulting in a substantiallyhigher total cost.

A long-term contract may be the most effec-tive mechanism. I n tact, the 3M cost estimatesare conditional on firm orders for a 2-year peri-od, although 3M is willing to consider contract-ing periods of up to 5 years, The details of the


contracting mechanism have not been ad-dressed by this study, although there may besome advantage to a single contracting agency(presumably within the Government), ratherthan separate contracts with each manufac-turer of explosives and gunpowder. In addi-tion to saving the cost of multiple contracting,the single-contract concept would limit theamount of information available to 3M onnumbers of product l ines and productionquantities of explosives, a matter of some sen-sitivity to the explosives manufacturers.

Assurance of availability of a taggant supplyis a related issue. A number of approaches arepossible, including:

1. manufacture and maintain a large inven-tory of taggant materials, either by themanufacturers directIy or by the Govern-ment acting as purchasing agent; a 6-month supply should certainly be ade-quate;

2. develop redundancy by constructing abackup manufacturing site for taggants;and

3. utilize the discretionary power of BATF toprovide relief from the legislation in casesof emergency induced interruption of sup-ply.

A detailed tradeoff would be necessary todecide the relative merits of options 1 and 2.Option 2 shares the cost impact of additionalcapital-intensive construction identified forthe licensing option considered above. The ac-ceptability of option 1 to the explosives andgunpowder manufacturers may be heavilyweighted by who bears the cost burden ofmaintaining the 6-month inventory. Option 3carries with it a possibility of weakening theutil ity of the taggant program, and wouldprobably be implemented only if necessary;for instance, if a manufacturer ran out of tag-gants and would otherwise be forced to stopproduct ion.

In the OTA baseline costing estimate, the 6-month inventory option was assumed, andmanufacturing cost estimates include the costof the taggant inventory, as well as the cost ofmoney to carry the inventory.

SENSOR-RELATED

The detect ion taggant sensor program is inthe very early stages of development. To date,most of the effort in the detection area hasbeen devoted to the vapor taggant selectionprocess. Because detection taggants are still inan early development phase, a relatively highdegree of uncertainty exists in several of theprincipal cost-driving factors. The sensor(s) de-velopment and product ion unit cost estimatesare one area, and the quantity of sensors to bedeployed is another. Table 33 sets forth themajor qua I if i cat ions which underlie cost esti-mates of the sensor program. Three systemsare current I y undergoing development by theAerospace Corp.: the continuous electron cap-ture device (CECD), the ion mobiIity spectrom-eter (IMS), and the mass spectrometer (MS).Performance specifications are severe for eachof these canal i date opt ions incIuding sensitiv-

ity at

COSTS

the parts-per-tril ion level and low (0.01percent) false alarm rates. Parts lists for eachof these systems have been identified andpriced by Aerospace Corp. instrumental ionengineers and scientists, Commercial engineer-ing “rules-of-thumb” have been utilized in esti-mating production price levels. Developmentcost budgets and outyear forecasts totaling onthe order of $2.5 million have been estimatedfor advanced engineering development. Theestimates, by the very nature of a developmentprogram, assume that development proceedssmoothly and without major redirect ion of de-sign activity. In addition to the total number ofsensors Iikely to be deplovecl, uncertainty ex-ists in:

the development cost,● the production unit cost,


Table 33.–Qualification of Estimating Basis for Sensors

Continuos electron capture device Ion mobility spectrometer Mass spectrometer

General availabilty of technology Currently utilized in lab situation– Commercially available 5 years– High-cost laboratory model in use–noBrookhaven Breadboard 50 currently in use commercially available that meets

cost and performance requirementsTaggant program status Design of field Instrument in progress Off-the-shelf PC-1OO Instrument IS Preliminary design underway for

being characterized for candidate low-cost field unittaggants

Parts (materials) identified andestimated by Aerospace Yes Yes Yes

Taggant sensor production costestimated with engineering rule-of-thumb factor applied to materialcosts Yes Yes Yes

Quantities to be Implemented in anational program Quantities depend on scenario selection–also decision to purchase Instruments rests with a large

and varied user community–airports, courthouses, nuclear reactors, nuclear weapon centers,military communication centers, national shrines, Government office buildings, etc –quantities areuncertain and open-ended


the system or systems actually employed,andthe relative mix of systems to be deployedif severaI successfuI canal i dates emerge.

Numbers of Sensors Needed

Estimates of the total quantity of sensorsIikely to be deployed in the f ield are furthersubject to a wide range of uncertainty, as thedecisions must be made individualIy by a largenumber of organizations, aIthough reguIatorya u t horities s u c h as FAA and the NucIear Reg-uIatory Commission couId potentiaIIy repre-sent customers for Iarge numbers of sensors,The target to be protected must be high-valuedand subject to control ted-access. With the ex-ception of checked baggage, it is unlikely thatany Iocation that does not now have a guardwouId employ a detection taggant sensor.Likely targets for bombers, and Iikely Iocationsfor sensors, include airports, nuclear reactors,nuclear weapons centers, military communica-tions centers, Government buiId i rigs, and com-puter centers. There are approximately 620 airports in the United States, using approx imate ly400 X-ray machines to scan carry-on luggageThere are 70 nuclear power station~, and thou-sands of Government buildings of one type oranother. PO Iice bomb squads may also useportable sensors for investigation of bomb for all threats.

In the baseline program identified by OTA, atotal of 1,500 sensors was assumed deployed.That number would include one sensor eachfor passenger screening, carry-on baggage, andchecked Iuggage for each current X-ray ma-chine stat ion, as welI as 300 for protection ofother high-value targets. l-he low-level pro-gram assumed 800 sensors, 2 each for each cur-rent X-ray station. The high-level program as-sumed 5,000 sensors, enough for aII centrolled-access transportation faciIIties nucIear power-plants, important Government buildings, andportable police use

Sensor System Related Costs

The annual unit system cost for the sensors,including installation, maintenance, and falsealarms, is shown in table 34. Since each pointof controlled access where detection sensorsare contemplated is already manned by per-sonnel (who check entering personnel orsearch baggage), direct operator costs are notincluded for the baseline case. Excess falsealarm rates would possibly be a cause for add-ing personnel, Training would be accom-plished by the detector instrumentation com-pany and occur either at the company as partof an operator training seminar or at the timeof equipment instaIIation. Maintenance costsfor al I of the canidate systems are estimatedat 10 percent of the hardware investment cost.

61-401 - 80 - 8


Table 34.–Vapor Taggant Dotoctor System Cost (annual cost per unit)

Continuouselectron capture Ion mobility

Hardware investment device spectrometer Mass spectrometer

Cost per unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $12,355Installation and checkout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500Hardware subtotal a ., ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,855

Annual cost of investment per unitb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,082

Annual maintenance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,236

Cost of false alarm@ .01% rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0

$15,160500

15,660

2,537

1,516

0Total annual cost per detector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 3 , 3 1 8 $4,053

$35,270500

35,770

5,795

3,433

0$9,228

a lncludes cost of training operating Personnelb Estimated 10-year life and 10 percent interest rate

SOURCE Office of Technology Asessment

Figure 12.– General Functional Network forVapor Taggant Detector

V a p o r SampleSampler

D

gas source

Total Cost A + B + C + D


Mix of Sensors

D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e C E C D , I M S , a n d M Ssensors is expected to continue in a parallelfash ion . A sys tem type wou ld be e l im ina ted i fdemonstrated to be infeasible. A mix of poss i -ble sensors in the field is likely (given feasibil-ity demonstration) since each instrument typewould be found to offer advantages in givenscenarios for performance (specificity, thresh-old, etc. ) and costs (acquisition and operationand maintenance). The baseline program as-

Figure 13.—Estimatecl Annual Vapor TaggantDetector Cost v. Quantity Deployed

● Hardware cost only

● Annual cost = P - S

[ i 1+ i + SIAnnual cost (1 + i)n - 1

where: P = first costin millions of S = salvage value (assumed O)

FY 79$ n = equipment life (estimated 10 years)i = interest rate (estimated 10 percent)

30

25

20

15

10

5

05001,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000

Quantity of detectors deployed

sumes a total of 1,500 sensors is deployed, 90-percent IMS and 10-percent MS.

The annual cost per sensor for this mix is ap-proximately $4,580. In the cost synthesis sec-tion program costs have been estimated forvarious levels of implementation of sensor sys-tem to fit various utility levels examined in thisstudy.


False Alarm Costs

False alarm response costs have been exam-ined by FAA as a function of the false alarmrate for various technical approaches includ-ing explosive vapor detector schemes. The FAAstudy examined two airline operations at Lo-gan Airport, Boston, as a basis for the opera-tional scenario. As false alarm rates increase,so do the number of hand-searchers requiredand, therefore, the cost of operation. The re-sults of that analysis, adjusted for the taggantvapor sensor, are shown in figure 14, whereestimated annual cost impact for each of theairlines is shown as a function of the vapordetector false alarm rate. Incremental costsare incurred in a stepwise fashion at alarm

Figure 14. —Estimated Cost of False Alarmsv. False”Alarm Rate

Annualsystemcosts

($00,000)4

3

2

1

Based on analysis of selectedairline activity @ Logan Airportprocessing 6.5 bags/rein inexplosives vapor-detection scheme

Detection taggant sensor●

.2 .4 .6

Probability of false alarm


rates greater than 0.05 percent (1 in 2,000).Since the performance design specification forthe taggant sensor false alarm rate has been es-tablished at 0.01 percent (1 in 10,000), no falsealarm costs are expected if this performancegoal is realized. Cost level impacts reflect theparticular operational activity characteristicsof Logan Airport and would not necessarilyreflect nationwide characteristics. Discussionswith FAA personnel indicate that nationwidecost effects due to false alarms would be lessthan that reflected for the Logan scenario;costs of false alarms, on a national average,would probably not be significant at rates ashigh as a few percent, the current false alarmrate for airport magnetometers.

The cost of false alarms can also be calcu-lated as a funct ion of the cost per bagchecked. At a rate between 0.05 and 0.175, theestimated cost of increased inspections due tofalse alarms is approximately 2.8 cents/bag atLogan Airport. At an annual level of 300 mil-l ion checked bags per year in the UnitedStates, the estimated cost of false alarms dueto checked baggage alone would be approxi-mately $8.4 million. As noted, the cost esti-mate for Logan is considered high for purposesof estimating national levels; nonetheless, thepotential cost due to false alarms would be asignificant cost impact when considered in ab-solute terms. Since the cost of security checksat airports are ultimately passed on to theairline customer, the direct per capita costswould be minimal. At an average of 1.5 bagschecked per passenger the per capita annualcost for the above conditions would be on theorder of 5 cents. A high false alarm rate couldlead to delays in the departure of aircraft, withs igni f icant losses to both air l ines and thedelayed passengers.

EXPLOSIVES AND GUNPOWDER MANUFACTURING COSTS

The value-added costs of the taggant pro- understood for cap-sensitive packaged high ex-gram that occur at the explosive manufactur- plosives where pilot-plant tests have been ac-ing level are addressed here. As has been al- compl ished. The tagging implications for deto-Iuded to earlier, the manufacturing process im- nating cord and detonators, conversely, areplacations for tagging implementation are best only addressable in a general way. As no feasi-

—


ble designs have been set forth for the requiredtooling, and engineering design and analysishave not been accomplished, the implicationsfor blasting cap design remain uncertain. Be-cause the OTA study effort was time-con-strained, the major survey emphasis wasplaced in the area of cap-sensitive packagedhigh explosives. The estimates for cap-sensitivemanufacturing costs are based on discussionswith the major manufacturers. Some of theseestimates are applied to other explosive typeswhere appropriate. Preliminary estimates andanalysis by the Aerospace Corp. are also uti-lized as a cost basis for certain explosive typesand associated cost elements where deemedappropriate. These cases will be cited andcommented on as to their reasonableness anddepth of treatment.

The following subsections address each ofthe manufacturing cost elements considered inthis study. The last subsection summarizes theestimates of the various elements of manufac-turing cost.

Estimates of the current cost for each of theexplosive product categories considered areshown in table .35, along with the raw materialcosts. The difference between price and rawmaterial costs is made up primarily of labor,overhead, and markup (profit). Specific datafor these important elements of cost were notavailable to this study, since this kind of datais considered extremely proprietary. The un-certainty in the specific division of the othercosts and markups makes it difficult to assessthe degree to which the explosives manufac-turer will either absorb, or pass on through

Table 35.–Current Manufacturing Cost/Price Data

Current cost ofexplosive raw Average current

Explosive product category materials a price per unnit

Cap-sens i t ive exp los ives. 15c/lb 50@/lbC a s t b o o s t e r s 60cflb $1.5011bB l a c k p o w d e r . . 11 c/lb $6- $9/lbdSmokeless powder. NAc $6 - $9/lbdD e t o n a t i n g c o r d 2c/ft 5 / f tB l a s t i n g c a p s 20c - 30c/cap 50c/cap

—‘Source I MEbAerospace Corpc The ME reference did not contain thiss data It IS known that the military Pays on the order of

88 cents/lbd A leading manufacturer has recently quoted$9 of powder

SOURCE Officeof Technology Assessment

higher markups, the added cost of taggants inthe manufacturing process. This issue will beamplified later.

Revised Processes, Tooling, andFacility Costs

Cap-Sensitive Packaged Explosives

Requirements for additional tooling andequipment to accommodate the tagging proc-ess in dynamites, emulsions, slurries, and gelsconsist of equipment for weighing, hoppers,means of transferring taggant samples, andstorage bins for secured storage areas. Thecost for equipment to add the taggants into theexplosive mixing process is small, as mostmanufacturers use a handmixing operation.Based on data provided by one explosivesmanufacturer, OTA estimated the added costfor these investments as a function of theunique batch size and other considerations re-garding waste and productivity. OTA assumeda 10-year Iife, 10-percent interest rate in orderto annualize this initial investment. Detailedrequirements for other manufacturers of cap-sensitive packaged explosives were not madeavailable for this study. OTA believes thatthese marginal cost requirements are represen-tative of the cap-sensitive explosives industry.

The Aerospace Corp. indicated that somemanufacturers might wish to install automatictaggant-dispensin g equipment, and concludedthat this cost should be similar to the cost ofthe labor it replaces and hence would be cov-ered under the Iabor cost element. OTA’Sstudy survey and site visits did not uncover anyparticular requirement for automatic dispens-ing equipment at either gel or dynamite manu-facturing facilities.

Cast Boosters, Smokeless Powder, andBlack Powder

Specific tooling and equipment require-ments for these product categories were notavailable. For estimating purposes the assump-tion was made that the estimate for cap-sensi-tive explosives should be a representative val-ue until detailed requirements are established.


Detonating Cord

Tooling designs must be developed in orderto provide tagging capability at each detonat-ing cord production line. Aerospace Corp. indi-cates that several pieces of hardware havebeen tested but no effective equipment is cur-rently available. They further feel that a sta-tion configuration would apply both the identi-fication and detection taggants together withan adhesive before the final assembly polyeth-ylene sheath is applied, and that a reasonablecost for a station having a 5-year Iife is $50,000.Five such stations would be required by the in-dustry for an annual production of 500 mill ionft. The estimated cost for detonating cord tool-ing is $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . A m o r t i z i n g t h i s c o s t o v e r 5y e a r s a t 1 0 - p e r c e n t i n t e r e s t y i e l d s a n a n n u a lcos t o f $66 ,000 or $0 .00013 / f t .

Blasting Caps

The process by which taggants would beadded to blasting caps has not yet been deter-mined; it may well vary from one manufac-turer to another . Alternate poss ible ap-proaches are to place the taggants betweentwo end plugs, embed the taggants within asingle end plug, or add taggants to an existinginterior polyethylene strip. Cost will vary con-siderably depending on the process chosenand the current cap assembly process. For pur-poses of the study, a conservative value of $2milIion per manufacturer was assumed. Amor-tizing the $8 million cost (four manufacturers)over 5 years yields an annual cost of$2,112,000 or $0.025/cap. This figure would behigh if one of the simpler methods of taggingdetonators were adopted. However, the effecton the total cost of a tagging program is small.

Labor


Manpower estimates by the manufacturersindicated a range of requirements varyingfrom two to six additional men at a site, Thevariation results from differences among par-ticular site layouts, processes, and proceduresin use, For instance, in one company effort

would be required in various locations such asthe dope house, works control, laboratory (in-cluding works laboratory), and in the magazinearea. Additional activities involved includeordering, stocking, weighing, and supplyingtaggants to operators; collecting data, taggantsamples, keeping records of codes; handIing in-creased record keeping in magazine areas; andexamining the codes before use in the manu-facturing process. One contractor also indi-cated increased manpower costs due to codeconfusions and returned shipments. It shouldbe noted that incremental labor costs for theactual mixing operation of taggants and re-lated packaging are essentially zero. All addi-tional estimated labor costs are associatedwith peripheral activities in coordinating, han-dling, and recordkeeping activities.

The estimate for labor, as indicated by themanufacturers, is SIightly greater than 1 cent/lbof explosives, which reflects approximatelyfive to six additional men at the plantsite.

Cast Boosters

For the purposes of developing a baseline es-timate, the Aerospace Corp. analysis is utilizedhere. Assuming that this will be a manual proc-ess, two additional personnel were estimatedper assembly line, Given the four manufactur-ers (eight Iines) the estimated annual cost is$400,000 or $0.067/lb of explosives.

Black Powder

Labor costs associated with tagging blackpowder were studied by the Goex Co. and ref-erenced in the Aerospace Corp. Inflationary yCost Impact Study. The estimated cost perpound of black powder for manufacturing la-bor of 1.5 cents is based on replacing the pres-ent date-shift code with a tagging material sys-tem. EIements include:

storing tagging materiaIs,security for storage and handling of tag-ging materials,administrative and recordkeeping, andimpact on the manufacturing process (as-suming a cleanup would be required in


the glaze and packhouse operation eachshift).

This cost is exclusive of taggant material costs.Based on the study by Goex, OTA estimatedthe cost of labor for black powder to be 1.5cents/lb.

Smokeless Powder

The Aerospace Corp. estimated labor effortadded costs per pound of smokeless powder tobe on the order of 6.6 cents (including thedistribution system costs) and assumed thatmuch of this cost could be absorbed within thecurrent manufacturing and distribution organi-zation. The estimate is based on the followingassumptions:

● 2,000 Ib/lot, 2,500 different tag lots produced, and● 100,000 cases/year (50-lb cases).

Manufacturing costs were estimated to be0.4 cents (of the total 6.6 cents). Since ade-quate data are unavailable to validate the esti-mate, OTA estimated the cost of manufactur-ing labor for smokeless powders at the samelevel as black powder, using the Goex estimateof 1.5 cents/lb.

Detonating Cord and Blasting Caps

The Aerospace Corp. estimate for detonat-ing cord assumes that each assembly I inewould require one additional person to main-tain a tagging station and to operate it duringproduction. At $25,000 per man, the five sta-tions would add an annual cost of $125,000 or$0.00025/f t of cord,

Similarly, the Aerospace Corp. estimates areused for blasting caps. Several additionalworkers may be necessary to operate andmaintain the new equipment required. A rea-sonable estimate is four per manufacturer(there are four manufacturers) for an annual in-crease of $400,000. The resulting cost per blast-ing cap is $0.0048/cap.

Productivity y


Potential productivity losses have been esti-mated by the industry to be as high as 15 per-cent. The primary cause of such losses wouldbe halting production to change taggant codesand avoid contamination. Consequently, theextent of such losses depends on the degree oftaggant cross-contamination that would bepermissible and the taggant batch size. Vari-ous kinds of cost can impact the situation.They are:

● loss associated with scraping of hoppers,● new investment to offset product ion

losses,● loss of the market for mixed scrap, cur-

rently sold as an inexpensive explosive,and

● new investment for expanding waste dis-posal facilities.

As currently perceived by one major manu-facturer of cap-sensitive packaged high explo-sives, productivity losses wilI have a direct costimpact in each of the areas noted above. Pro-ductivity losses are estimated at 15 percent inthe condition where cross-contamination is notpermitted and on the order of 8 percent wherebatch cross-contamination of 10 percent ispermitted. Waste losses associated with scrap-ing of hoppers every fourth mix were also esti-mated. A significant amount of the mixedscrap material is currently marketed as a low-quality explosive. If this material could nolonger be marketed due to extensive taggantcross-contamination, there would be a furtherloss in profits. Current environmental regula-tions require that waste be disposed of bymeans other than burning in the open, in effectrequiring additional waste disposal facilities.In order to maintain the current productionand sales base, and thus maintain an adequateprofit level for the company, additional pro-duction facility augmentation would be re-quired to offset the expected losses in produc-tivity.


The total cost due to losses in productivitycould thus add up to several cents per poundof explosives for the worst case condition. If a10-percent taggant cross-contamination levelwere permitted (BATF assumes this level) thecost impact would drop dramatically. If a spe-cial “composite code” were created, then tagscontaining this code could be added to scrapmaterial and any other material containingcross-contamination in excess of 10 percent;investigators finding tags with the compositecode would know that any other tags shouldbe ignored, This would essentially eliminatecosts for decreased productivity, The OTAbaseline program assumes that such a compos-ite code taggant is used, so that productivitylosses are negligible.

Other Explosive Categories

Since pilot testing of adding taggant mate-rial to boosters, gunpowder, detonating cord,and caps has not taken place, the effects onproductivity are not apparent. For purposes ofcosting the baseline system, OTA assumedthere would be no productivity losses.

Inventory Costs

Inventory costs, including the associatedcost of money, are a function of supply held ininventory. There is no reason to assume thetagged finished product would be held longerthan is currently the case. It may be necessary,however, to stockpile a significant inventory ofthe taggant material to ensure an uninter-rupted supply, particularly for identificationtaggants, where there is likely to be only onesupplier. For the baseline case, the quite con-servative assumtion was made that a 6-monthinventory of both types of taggant materialswould be stockpiled. The added costs for thevarious types of explosives wouId be:

(’alp Cap sensitive $0 0021‘1 bBoosters $0 0066/lbSmokeless powder $0 0021/1 bBlack powder $0. 0021 lb

Space and added labor have been included inthe facility and labor costs detailed above. Forthe baseline case, no additional storage or la-

bor would be required for cap-sensitive explo-sives, as the batch size would be the same asthe current date-shift batch size. For the high-Ievel program, with 10,000-lb maximum batchsize, each batch would need to be separatedby an access aisle from other batches, requir-ing additional space and labor. Access aisleswould need to be maintained for inventorycontrol and inspection.

Quality Control

Quality control cost estimates are includedin the labor costs element. Some level of effortis required to ensure the taggant code and tag-gant quality prior to mixing. This effort wouldtake place in the plant lab or “works” lab, toexamine each code before use in the product.This appears to be a reasonable precautionsince the integrity of all substances enteringthe “mix” must be assured to maintain priorsafety levels. In addition, occasional speci-mens would be examined to assure that thetaggant-mixing specification (uniformity, shelf-Iife, etc. ) was being achieved.

Safety

Requalifying all product lines with taggantmaterials would be a necessary safety testingrequirement for the various explosives manu-facturers This one-time capital cost would in-volve analysis and testing of each type of prod-uct. To an extent uncertain at this time, thepilot testing programs have and will contributeto this requalification effort. Due to the uncer-tainty involved, OTA included the cost of safe-ty requalif ication in the cost element esti-mates. It should be pointed out that the abso-lute cost levels of nonrecurring costs are notinsignificant. However, after amortizing thesecosts over the significant production weightsof explosive produced annuaIIy, the relativecontribution of incremental costs to a poundof explosives is quite smalI.

Record keeping Costs

I n order to maintain the integrity of the iden-tification taggant tracing network, a certain


amount of additional or new recordkeepingmust take place within the explosives distribu-tion network. Current Federal requirements arethat each explosive package and shipping casebe marked with an identification code citingthe:

● plant of manufacture,● the date and shift manufactured, and● the type and grade of explosives.

explosives covered under this regulation arethe:

●

●

●

●

●

cap-sensitive packaged explosives (dyna-mites, slurries, water gels, and emu Is ions),cast boosters,blasting caps,black powder, anddetonating cord.

Records of the identification code must bemaintained at the manufacturer level as wellas each subsequent distributor. Smokelesspowders are currently exempt from this re-quirement, although powders used to hand-Ioad pistol ammunition must be recorded atthe retail sales level.

The cost of recordkeeping has been in-cIuded as part of the labor manufacturing costelements.

Markup

To the extent that incremental taggant costsare passed on to distributors and users, markupcosts must be included as part of the finalproduct price. No specific data were availableto treat markup for most of the explosive prod-uct categories. For purposes of establishing abaseline cost estimate, OTA assumed a IO-per-cent markup at the manufacturing level. Thisvalue may seem low, but all handling costshave been specifically covered in other costelements, including an overhead allowance.Markup in that sense is essentially profit on theadditional costs. Normal markups must coveral I of the handling costs.

In addition to manufacturing level markups,

OTA considered the pyramid of markups thatoccurs throughout the various echelons of dis-tributor and retailer levels. This is addressed inthe next sect ion.

Summary of ManufacturingCosts Added

Manufacturing costs elements and total costadded as a result of the inclusion of identifica-tion and detection taggant materials in explo-sives are summarized in table 36. The added

Table 36.–Summary of Explosives and Gunpowder Manufacturing Costs included— . — — . — .

Costs included

Baseline case Black Smokeless DetonatingCost element cap sensitive Boosters powder powder cord Blasting caps

Nonrecurring costsT o o l i n g Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesS t o r a g e No No No No No NoP r o d u c t r e q u a l i f i c a t i o n Yes Yes Yes Yes NAa NAa

Waste disposal facilities No No No No No NoN e w i n v e s t m e n t t o o f f s e t p r o d u c t l o s s e s No No No No No No

Recurring costsManufacturing process labor. . . . . . . . . .Recordkeeping . . . . . .

}Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Quality control. . . . . . . . . . . . .Product losses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No No No No No NoWaste product line , . No No No No No NoI n v e n t o r y c o s t s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesA d m i n i s t r a t i v e e x p e n s eb .

B o t t o m l i n e c o s t p e r u n i t o f e x p l o s i v e s 1 . 0 3 / l b 7 7c/lb 2c./lb 7,2. / lb .04c/lb 3. lc /cap— .

aData unavailableblncluded in labor


Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review 113

costs include the estimated costs to the manu-facturer and associated markup as well as themarkup placed on the cost of the taggant rawmaterials.

Manufacturing costs for cap-sensitive pack-aged high explosives are based on detailed in-puts received from a major manufacturer. Theraw data are proprietary informat ion and are

not shown here. The detailed cost data wereanaIyzed and alternative ground rules wereestablished to gain insight into cost effectswhere taggant batch size was varied; relatedeffects were taken into account regarding theproductivity and waste issues. The cost ele-ments incIuded in various assumptions, alongwith the bottom Iine cost perpound of explo-sives, are shown in table 37.

Table 37.–Cost Summary of Cap-Sensitive Packaged High Explosives Manufacturing Cost Variations With Assumptions

Costs Included

Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5—

1 0 0 0 0 - 1 2 0 0 0 l b t a gCost elements batch size

—

S i t e m a n p o w e r YesProduction losses YesW a s t e YesRequalification YesWaste disposal facilities YesE q u i p m e n t a n d s t o r a g e YesInvestment to offset production losses YesTaggant Inventory costs YesA d m i n i s t r a t i v e YesBottom line cost per pound of

explosives excluding markup 4.Oc/lb

20,000-lb tag batch sizeplus allow cross- Tag batch size equals

20,000-lb tag batch size contamination day s product ion

Yes (less than case 1 ) Yes (less than case 1 ) ‘- NoYes Yes No

Yes (less than case 1 ) No NoYes Yes Yes

Yes (less than case 1 ) No NoYes (less than case 1 ) Yes (less than case 1 ) Yes (less than case 3) YesYes (less than case 1 ) Yes (less than case 2) No

Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes

2 3c/lb 1 4c/lb O 6c/lb

Plan! /year

No

No

No

Yes

No

less than case 3)NoYesNo

O 3c/lb


DISTRIBUTOR COSTS

A general schematic i l lustration of the dis-tr ibution network for explosives is shown infigure 15 while the network for gunpowder isshown i n figure 16 Detailed quantitative net-works are not available; however, these illusstrations serve to depict the manner in whicht ransact ions take p lace wi th in the indust ry .Wi th in the networks, potent ia l cost impactsoccur in the areas of recordkeeping, process-ing and handling, storage, and further poten-t ia l pyramid ing o f markup costs throughoutthe distribution network.

Recordkeeping at Distribution Levels

Record keeping and control of packagedhigh explosives are required by the presentdate-shift code regulation. AdditionaI part I-

tioning of explosive products may be requiredbeyond that required by the date-shift codereguIations, which may or may not have an in-cremental cost effect at the distribution level.NO detailed studies of additional recordkeep-ing elements which wouId be required, or thetime necessary, have been conducted to date.I IME assessment of new activity requirementsby the distributor includes.

● comparing the taggant lot numbers with

the bilI of lading with greater- frequency,● classifying each explosiveproduct by typeby produ ct by t ype

and taggant lot number to faciIitate locat-ing records,

● expanding storage space for the increaseci

numberof books and records, and● increasing the time to Iocate the proper

product and taggdnt lot number at sale


Figure 16.—Schematic Distribution Networkof Gun powders

Largecustomer

Primarydistribution

points

Customer

User

(due to the greater number of records thatmust be searched).

The Aerospace Corp. further considered:

● segregating material on trucks and inmagazines to a smaller quantity; and

recording additional information in or-ders, invoices, and inventory lists.

An analysis by the Aerospace Corp. of avail-able BATF tracing records revealed that rec-ordkeeping entries on bills of lading would in-volve:

1.26 codes per order (20,000-lb tagging lev-el) (based on 282 BATF traces of sevenmanufacturers in 1976 and 1979),

■

Distrib-utor

m

Retailer

User


● 1.46 codes per order (12,000-lb tagging lev-el) (based on Du Pont data), and

. 1.66 codes per order (7,900-Ib tagging Iev-el) (based on dynamite traces).

In effect these data indicate that the addition-al recordkeeping, processing, and handling ef-forts for the finished explosives may be in-creased by up to 66 percent, depending on thetagging level. A plot of activity increases ver-sus tagging level is plotted in figure 17. Thisplot underscores the dramatic inverse relation-ship of recordkeeping activity with the uniquetagging batch level.

T h e A e r o s p a c e C o r p . f u r t h e r r e v i e w e d t h ea d d i t i o n a l d a t a e n t r y r e q u i r e m e n t s w h i c h

Ch. V—Tagganf Cost Review ● 1 7 5

Figure 17.— Recordkeeping Activity v.Tagging Level

● Cap.sensitive packaged explosives● Impact on distributor/retailer● Based on Aerospace analysis of

BATF tracing record

Distributor/retailerpercent increasein recordkeeping,processing andhandling effort

70

60

50

40

30

20

5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000

Tagging level in pounds


would be required on bills of sale. Tagged ex-plosive materials would require approximately25 percent more entries than the untagged ex-plosives for transactions at the distributorlevel. This analysis was specifically for taggingat the 20,000-lb level. At the retailer/explosiveuser level an 8.7-percent increase in data en-tries were computed using Federal form 4710and the biI I of sale or delivery t icket.

Aerospace did not quantify the absolutecost impact as a result of this tracing analysis,but did conclude, however, that the costswould be insignificant for cap-sensitive pack-aged high explosives. The OTA analysis as-sumed that negligible added costs exist at thedistributor retailer level for:

● cap-sensitive explosives,● boosters,● detonating cord, and● blasting caps.

This conclusion is particularly appropriate forthe baseline case, incorresponds to thebatch size.

The impact on thesmokeless powders

which the taggant batchcurrent date-shift code

distributors of black andis somewhat different.

Black powder and pistol-grade smokeless pow-der currently have significant recordkeepingrequirements, while the other smokeless pow-der grades have no current recordkeeping re-quirements. (Pyrodex”, a black powder substi-tute, would be marketed and regulated likesmokeless powder, so incremental recordkeep-ing costs would approximate those of smoke-less powder.) An estimate was therefore madeof the add i t iona l cos t o f en te r ing the cur ren t lyunregistered smokeless powder in, and detail-ing it out of, the records at each distributorlevel by taggant code. It was assumed that arecord for an “item” would take 2 minutes.The further conservat ive assumption wasmade that the average size of an “item” at themaster distributor level was 25 lb (primarilycase lots handled), was 10 lb at the distributorlevel, and was 2 lb at the retail level. Since con-siderable recordkeeping requirements current-ly exist for pistol-grade smokeless powder, thecosts were assumed to be half those of theother powders. A small additional cost for rec-ordkeeping was assumed at the retail level forblack powder. The cents per pound added bythose costs are shown in table 38.

Storage

E x p l o s i v e s a r e n o w g e n e r a l l y s e p a r a t e d b yd a t e - s h i f t c o d e b a t c h e s f o r m a g a z i n e s t o r a g eat all levels in the distribution chain, as recordsmust be kept, and physical control maintainedby date-shift batch. For the baseline taggantcase, no changes would be necessary. If thetaggant batch were smaller, then additionalstorage space would be required for access. Anestimate was made of the cost of magazinespace, based on two data points. The added


Table 38.–Estimated Cost Impact for Powdersat Distribution Network (cents per pound)a

Smokeless powder

Pistol loading Rifle andDistribution level Black powder grade shotgun grade

Master distributorsRecordkeeping . . . ., 0 1 .2b 2.4CStorage . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.2Distributor/wholesale levelRecordkeeping . 0 3d 6C

Storage . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.2Retail levelRecordkeeping. . . . . 1 I5e 30CStorage ., . ., . . 0 0 0

1,4 19,6 38.8Total cost through the distribution chain

Black, . ., . . ., . . ., ., ... .. 1,4$Pistol . . . . . ... . . . . ., .19,6$Other. . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . .. 38.8$

If pistol powder is assumed to be 25 percent of total smokeless powder,the average cost impact for smokeless powder is 33c/lb.

aEstimate by Integrated master distributor wholesaler, retailerbBased on I minute Average lot size 25 lbcAssume 2 minutes/lot‘Assumed lot size IS 10 lb‘Assumed lot size IS 2 lb


cost per pound of explosives was less than 0.1cents, even for the case in which 10,000-lbmaximum lots were tagged. For black andsmokeless powders, the assumption was madethat separation by taggant lot would require

additional storage space at both the masterdistributor and distributor levels, but probablynot at the retailer level. Using the same database as above, the cost was estimated to be ap-proximately 0.2 cent/lb at each level, as shownin table 38.

Summary Cost Including Markup

Distribution level costs are summarized intable 39. Markup on total costs incurredthrough the distribution system for explosiveswas assessed at 25 percent; for black andsmokeless powders a total markup of 80 per-cent was assumed. This estimate is based onanalysis of costs and price at each level, sup-plied by an integrated powder distributor.Table 39 sets forth the net cost added by thedistribution network and further summarizesthe net cost to explosive users from bothmanufacture and distribution for the variousexplosive categories. To illustrate the effectthat the method of program implementationcan have (taggant batch size and treatment ofwaste), costs for the five cases previouslydefined for the cap-sensitive high explosivesare shown. Case 4 is, as noted, the OTA base-line case.

Table 39.–Distribution System-Summary of Cost Added and Markup (cents per pound)

Total cost Ieaving Distribution Distribution Total cost added by Total added priceExplosive category manufacturing facility system cost added system markup distribution system to user

Cap-sensitive packaged high explosivesvCase . ., 8.5 0.2 2.2 2,4 10,9Case 2 . 66 0 1 1.7 1.8 8.4Case 3 ., ... ., 5.6 0.1 1.4 1.5 7.1Case 4 (baseline). . . . . . . ., . . ., 4.8 — 1,2 1,2 6.0Case 5 ..., . . . ., . . 29 — 0.7 0.7 3.6

Boosters . . . . . . ., ., . . . 20.9 0.2 5.3 5.5 26,4B l a c k p o w d e r , 6 3 1,4 6.20 7.6 13.9S m o k e l e s s p o w d e r 6.3 33.0 31.4 64.4 70,7Detonating cord ., ., 0.6 — 0.2 0,2 0.8Blasting caps ., 5 0 — 1.2 1,2 6 2


Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review ● 117

USER COST IMPACTS

T h e c o s t i n c r e a s e s e s t i m a t e d t o o c c u r a s aresult of the baseline taggant program are sum-marized and their impact on users analyzed.

Increased Material Costs

The net cost increase due to tagging e x p l o -sives is summarized here. Summary cost im-pacts include:

● the cost of identification taggant materi-als,

● the cost of detection taggant materials,● manufacturing costs added including

markup, and

$/lb

.56

.55

.54

.53

.52

.51

.50

● distribution network cost added incmarkup.

The following increases are noted for theline case:

Explosive category Percent cost increaseCap-sensitive packaged high explosives. ., .. ..11.9B o o s t e r s Black powder. 2.3Smokeless powder . . .. 11.8Detonating cord .23.5Blasting caps . . . . 15

The individual contributing cost elements tothe overall cost impact are illustrated in figure18 for the respective explosive categories.

$/lb1.80

1.70

1.60

1.50

uding

base-

Figure 18.—Summary of Added Costs to Explosive Users CostPer Unit of Explosives in Dollars

$/cap

$/lb9.15

9.10

9.05

9.

.58

$/lb

9.70

r9.60

9.50

9.40

9.301

$/ft

. 0 6 2 ~

.57

.56

.55

.54

.52

.52

.51

.5(

.

.

.

.

Dist.costadded

Mfgr.costadded

Detec.tagmatl.

ID tagmatl.

-Current

‘ r i c eCap-sensitive Boosters

packagedexplosives

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

Black Smokeless Detonating Blastingpowder powder cord caps

118 ● Taggants in E x p l o s i v e s

For the baseline case, the overall average in-crease in costs due to tagging is on the order of12.8 percent, the weighted average for each ofthe above percentage contributions. The esti-mate of absolute annual cost increase in explo-sives is approximately $37 million.

Commercial Uses of Explosives andGunpowders—General

Who uses commercial explosives and gun-powders? Over 55 percent of the total weightof explosives and blasting agents is utilized inthe mining of coal, both in underground andsurface mining operations. Quarrying and non-metal mining are next in rank (1 5.4 percent) fol-lowed closely by metal mining (14.6 percent).Construction work at 10.6 percent and “otheruses” at 4.2 percent complete the spectrum ofuser classes as adopted by BOM’S annual“Mineral Industrial Survey s.” Onsite investiga-tions were conducted for each of the majoruser classes in order to determine the order ofmagnitude cost and economic impact to theusers of tagged high explosives. The selectionof users investigated included both under-ground mining and surface mining as eachtype differs in the relative utilization of highexplosives. Onsite investigations were con-ducted with the following users during thecourse of the study:

Underground miningMetal mining (copper) –Anaconda, The

Crow Fork Mine, UtahCoal mine– Webster Coal Co., Kentucky.

QuarryTri State, MarylandRockville Crushed Stone, Maryland

Surface mining (open pit]Metal mining (copper)– Kennecott

“Bingham Canyon Mine, ” UtahConstruction work

Guy F. Atkinson, California

The following sections describe the findingsof the limited number of intensive investiga-tions of the above explosive users,

Underground Mines

The Crow Fork (Anaconda) Mine near Toole,Utah, is a large, deep underground operationin hard-rock, mining for essentially high-gradeore. The mine will primarily produce copper,although significant amounts of silver, gold,and molybdenum are expected as byproducts.This mine is still under development and hashad no production of ore as yet. Mine reservesare estimated at 20 years with an estimatedproduction output capacity of 10,000 tons ofore per day. The total use of explosives is pro-jected to be approximately 0.6 percent of totaloperating costs. Approximately 80 percent ofthe explosives used are non-cap-sensitive gelsand blasting agents such as ANFO. The remain-ing 20 percent of explosives, including dyna-mites, slurries, boosters, detonators, and deto-nating cord would be subject to a tagging re-quirement if taggant legislation were enacted,A 12.8-percent boost in the cost of tagged ex-plosives would translate into a 0.02-percent in-crease in the cost of mining, certainly an in-significant cost increase. The use of ANFO iscurrently related to clearing and abovegroundexcavation. Steady-state underground miningin the future can be expected to change the ex-plosive mix and potentially increase the costincrease noted above. If all explosives used inthe future were the cap-sensitive types, a tag-gant program would increase mining costs lessthan 0.1 percent.

The cost impact on underground coal min-ing is somewhat higher. At present, the cost ofthe cap-sensitive slurry and detonators (the ex-plosives used to mine the coal) represents ap-proximately 1.4 percent of the total cost ofbringing the coal out of the ground. The in-crease in the cost of the explosives, due to tag-ging, would increase operating costs less than0.2 percent. Other economic factors far out-weigh increases of this sort.

Quarries

Discussion with the Rockville Crushed StoneQuarry revealed that explosives contribute to

Ch. V—Tagganf Cost Review ● 119

slightly over 8 percent of the gross total costsof operation. Between 1.5 million and 1.75 mil-lion lb of cap-sensitive (80 percent) and non-cap-sensitive (20 percent) explosives are uti-lized annually at their location. Since the envi-ronment is wet, no ANFO is currently utilized.The blasting activity is all contracted with alocal blasting jobber, who provides the drilling,explosives, and blasting operation. The costimpact of an increase due to a tagging pro-gram is thus significantly higher in this ex-plosive-intensive operation, However, the in-crease would still be less than 1 percent of op-erating costs. If the costs of explosives, causedby legislation of a tagging program, are muchhigher than estimated for the baseline pro-gram, then the quarry might investigate thecost potential of using inexpensive blastingagents, coupled with a water pumping opera-t ion.

A quite dissimilar situation is provided bythe quarry operated by Tri State Explosives.The Tri State Quarry produces “facing stone”in various grades. The use of explosives in theoperation is relatively insignificant, averagingfrom 10 to 15 blastings per year. Between 15 to105 lb of explosives are used in each blasting,characterized as a “very precise operation. ”The incremental cost of tagged explosives istherefore trivial.

Open Pit Mines

The OTA study team visited the Kennecott“Bingham Canyon Mine” near Salt Lake City,Utah. This open pit mine has many distinc-tions, including:

●

●

●

●

the world’s largest manmade excavation,the first open pit mine in the copper indus-try (started in 1904),the largest single mining operation everundertaken, andthe holder of the largest copper produc-tion record of any individual mine in his-tory.

Figure 19 shows a photograph of the Bing-ham pit. Each vertical terrace is approximately50 ft high. The mine is an extremely large userof explosives, with approximately 105,000 lb of

explosives used per day or over 36 mill ionlb/year. For every pound of explosives used, 4.2tons of material are mined. Cap-insensitive ex-plosives predominate the utilization, consist-ing of almost 80-percent ANFO and almost 20-percent cap-insensitive slurry. Explosive costsrun from 3 to 5 percent of total operatingcosts. High explosives, although a smalI per-centage of the total weight of explosives used,account for 7 to 10 percent of costs for all ex-plosives used in the mine. Large amounts ofprimacord are used, together with boosters,detonators, and some dynamite for secondaryblasting (e. g., breaking up boulders). High ex-plosives therefore contribute on the order of0.3 percent of the total cost of operation. Thecost increase for a baseline taggant programwould be on the order of 0.03 percent of oper-ating costs.

Construction

The study team discussed the impact oftagged explosives with the Guy F. Atkinson Co.in South San Francisco, Cal if., a large con-tracting firm that utilizes large quantities ofexplosives in both underground (tunnels, etc. )and aboveground construction operations. Inrecent years this firm has utilized on the orderof 20 million lb of explosives annually. In un-derground applications, operating costs areconsidered to be very sensitive to the cost ofpowder. Values placed on underground opera-tions were:

P o u n d s O f

powder toremove yd 3 Cost per yd’

G e n e r a l 1/4 to- 1 3\4 lb 13 - 8 8C o a l ‘/~ I b 17~Hard-rock 1 lb 50~

In a recent tunnel application, Guy F. Atkin-son used approximately 900,000 caps in theconstruction of a 22-mile tunnel. At an esti-mated 50 cents/cap, the value of caps aloneamounted to approximate y $500,000.

In aboveground work, Guy F. Atkinson re-cently utilized over 40 milIion lb of explosivesin the construction of the Maloney Dam in Cal-ifornia. This fixed-price contract was very


Figure 19.— Bingham Canyon Open Pit Copper Mine

“powder intensive. ” The value put on exp lo -sives was approximately 9 percent of operatingcosts, consisting of 70-percent cap-sensitive ex-plosives and 30-percent ANFO.

A baseline taggant program would increaseoperating costs approximately 1 percent, a sig-nificant cost, but probably not sufficient tocause a shift to alternative excavation meth-ods. One additional potential impact shouldbe noted. Such construction projects are nor-mally long-term, fixed-price contracts. A sharpjump in the cost of explosives during thecourse of the contract could significantly af-fect profits.

A summary of the findings on current explo-sive cost contributions to the various user

Photo credit: Kennecott Copper Co

classes is shown in table 40. Explosives per-centage contributions to operating costs vary(dependent on user type) from less than 1 per-cent (underground metal mining) to as high as9 percent (dam construction example). As a re-sult, the cost impact of an increase in the priceof cap-sensitive high explosives also varies,particularly as these explosives represent vary-ing portions of the total explosive mix used.

Hand loading

The above cost impact calculations were forindustries that are generally able to pass on in-creases in the cost of operations to their cus-tomers. Handloaders, however, are the ulti-mate users of the product, and must absorb

Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review ● 121

Table 40.–Current High Explosives Cost Impactfor Various User Classes’

Percent Increase inoperating costs

Percent of due to baselineoperating costs taggant program

U n d e r g r o u n d m e t a l m i n i n g 0.2b 0.02Underground coal mining 1 .4C 02Open pit metal mining 0.2 to 0.5d 003Q u a r r i e s 8 0e

1 0Construction

Aboveground dam construction 9.0e

1 0Excavation–general 2 to 3Tunneling 5 —

dTheSe are single poml samplesbTo[al Operating COSIS mcludlng ref[mng were nol available For dlrecl mlnmg cost OPeratlOnS e~

ploslves accounted Ior less than 1 percent of costsCNOTE This data point reflects a htghly efflclent operalton‘Excludes blasllng agents‘Includes blastlng agents

SOURCE Otflce of Technology Assessment

any increased cost due to a taggant program.Handloaders load their own ammunition fortwo reasons —economy and the hobby aspect.A less than 10-percent cost increase in expend-able material is unlikely to affect a hobby forwhich hundreds of dollars in costs have al-ready been incurred (hand loading equipmentand guns). As powder is only one of severalmaterials on which a hand loader saves costs(cartridge cases, projectiles, wadding) and ad-ditional cost-savings are realized from laborand avoiding paying the excise tax on pur-chasedpowderpercent

—ammunition, an 8-percent increase incost would translate into a very fewincrease in total reloading costs.

OTHER COST IMPACTS

Government Investigation Costsand Program Administration

BATF has estimated* a requirement of 11man-years of effort annually to enforce theprovis ions of S.333, pr imari ly to establ ishstandards and monitor implementation of thetaggants program. Estimated program costs infiscal year 1979 dollars for this level of effortare approximately $500,000. This would in-clude several explosive specialists, chemists,inspectors, and clerical help. Estimated costsfor actually investigating taggant-tracing serv-ices are expected to be marginal beyond cur-rent BATF personnel levels and are containedin the above estimate. Their current tracingservice personnel would require one additionalslot at a cost of approximately $30,000. The to-tal annual costs estimated for BATF are, there-fore, just over $500,000.

Completing the spectrum of Governmentlevel costs are those expenditures that arebudgeted and projected to complete the tech-nical development of the taggants program bythe Aerospace Corp. Total program costs (in-cluding sunk costs of $5.4 million prior to fis-cal year 1980) are $10.0 million budgeted; pro-

jected outyear costs are estimated at $4.6 mil-lion.

Investigative Costs

Investigators of bombing incidents currentlydevote considerable time to examining explo-sive debris for clues regarding the type andsource of the explosive material. Further effortis devoted to forensic analysis at the labora-tory level. If an identification taggant programis implemented, collection of debris for a lab-oratory search for taggants wiI I become part ofthe standard bombing-scene investigatory pro-cedures. There should be little or no impact onthe time required for a bombing-scene investi-gation. Taggant recovery from the debris willbe an additional laboratory exercise but itcould we I I replace the more time-consumingprocedures now carried out to obtain less in-formation than would be furnished by tag-gants. Similarly, it will take time to follow upon the leads furnished to investigators by hav-ing a list of last legal purchasers of the bombfiller material,than would berect leads. Forsumption was

but that time is probably lessexpended following up less di-purposes of this study, the as-made that a taggant program

61-401 0 - 80 - 9

122 . Taggants in E x p l o s i v e s

would have no ne t cos t e f fec t on inves t iga t iont i m e .

Effects of Competition-Substitution

Depending on the ultimate rise in the priceof explosives to the user community due to theaddition of taggants, a variety of economic im-pacts could occur. As has been pointed outearlier, the choices of the type of explosivepurchased by users are frequently made on abasis of the lowest price rather than brand loy-alty. Since this is so, various kinds of potentialsubstitution threaten the explosives industry ifthe user perceives more economical choicesavailable to him. For instance, in the under-ground mining of coal, the cost of explosivescan play a predominant role in the overall costof operations, particularly so in marginal typesof mining operations. Substitution of mechani-cal coal mining equipment could essentiallyeliminate the use of explosives in those mines.The cost impact of the baseline taggant pro-gram is unlikely to significantly affect thattype of choice, particularly given the capitalinvestment in machinery that is currently usedto support explosive mining. A full economiccost tradeoff analysis between mechanicaltools and the increased cost of explosiveswould need to take place for a meaningfulsample size of users to determine the net ef-fect on the explosives industry.

Discussions with a dynamite and packagedslurry manufacturer revealed that in one casea recent 5.4-percent increase in the price of aslurry product resulted in several buyers shift-ing to other products —a loss in sales of 6 mil-lion lb of product for that manufacturer. Otherestimated potential losses by substitution weresuggested by the manufacturer. For instance,given a price increase of $1 0/1 00-weight intheir nitroglycerine-based products, that man-ufacturer estimated that as much as 25 percentof their business would shift to other boost-er/slurry combinations. The manufacturer fur-ther estimated that if a 10-cent increase in theprice of packaged slurries occurred, they couldl o s e 5 0 p e r c e n t o f t h e i r s l u r r y b u s i n e s s t oANFO, as mining operations would subs t i tu te

borehole dewatering (by pumping the hole outand utilizing a borehole liner) coupled withANFO. This kind of substitution, for cap-sensi-tive packaged high explosives to ANFO, wasalso noted by an explosives jobber (operatingin a quarry environment) as a highly likelyprospect should the cost of tagged explosivesincrease inordinately. l-he accuracy and objec-tivity of this type of unsubstantiated estimateare open to question, particularly as otheroperators expressed opposite views. Safety, re-liability, and ease of handling were cited asreasons why a cost increase, such as would oc-cur for the baseline tagging program, wouldnot cause a product substitution. The exam-ples do, however, highlight a very real poten-tial problem, particularly if the taggant pro-gram were to substantially increase the cost ofcap-sensitive explosives, or if a program wereadopted that included tagging some portion ofa cost-competitive segment of the industry(such as tagging dynamite, but not gels andslurries).

It is noted that the current annual utilizationof ANFO in this country is on the order of 3.4billion lb. It is estimated that the trend towardutilization of ANFO has gone about as far as itcan go, given the excel lent economies forANFO in a wide variety of circumstances. in-creasing inordinately the cost of explosivesdue to tagging could, however, further shiftcurrent uti l ization from cap-sensitive pack-aged explosives to ANFO.

Effects on Fixed-Price Commodities

There is a potentially important economicspillover on the marketplace for fixed-pricecommodities, due to taggants. Copper pricesare established in a competitive worldwidemarket setting. The Kennicott copper mine, forinstance, competes in this environment, and asa result is limited in its. ability to pass on addi-tional costs of operations. Tagged explosivescould affect this situation, depending on thedegree of tagging implemented and the cost oftagging. The OTA analysis revealed that onlyinsignificant influences on cost of operationwould take place due to cost increases from a

Ch. V— Tagganf Cosf Review ● 123

mandated taggant program. If ANFO and un-packaged slurries were also tagged, however,the impact could be quite different. T h e p r i c eof ANFO could approximately double, raisingthe cost of operations as much as percent.Such an increase may well require a highergrade cutoff point for ore, resulting in a signifi-cant decrease in the effective reserves of eco-nomically recoverable copper at that site.

Possible Removal of SomeGun powders From the Market

The initiation of a tagging program involvesstartup costs to the manufacturer, which this

ana lys is has assumed wou ld be amor t i zed over10 years and passed a long to the consumer inthe form of somewhat higher prices. I t is possi-b l e , h o w e v e r , t h a t s o m e m a n u f a c t u r e r s o fb l a c k o r s m o k e l e s s p o w d e r m i g h t p r e f e r t otake some product l ines o f f the marke t , so asto incur these s ta r tup cos ts fo r on ly a por t ionof their existing product l ine. I t is also possible,though perhaps less Iikely, that a manufacturermight choose to halt all production for theh a n d l o a d e r m a r k e t r a t h e r t h a n b e i n v o l v e d i ntagging such powders. If this should occur,handloaders would find their existing choiceamong powders reduced; this reduction inchoice would be a “cost” to handloaders,though not one which can be expressed in dol-lars.

TAGGANT PROGRAM COST SYNTHESIS

In this section of the report, cost estimatesare established for implementing a baselinetaggant program. This development of cost isan accumulation of total program cost ele-ments developed in prior sections of the re-port. The program cost elements include:

. identification taggant material costs;● detection taggant material costs; manufacturing level costs;● distribution system costs; and● public overhead costs:

— sensor-related production,— sensor development,— other taggant program development

costs, and— BATF annual administration and trac-

ing activity,

Subsequent to the buildup of the total base-line taggant program costs, a series of alter-native implementation levels are examined fortheir cost impact. Costs are estimated for atotal taggant program and for separate identi-fication and detection taggant programs. Fol-

lowing that are set forth the various aspects ofcost uncertainty in the study and a cost-sensi-tivity analysis of key uncertainty cost driversor parameters intrinsic to the taggant program.

Identification Taggant ProgramMaterial Costs

Table 41 shows the buildup of identificationtaggant material costs. The calculations, whichare self-explanatory, are based on the programunits (weight, feet, caps) set forth in the earliersection on “Taggant Material Costs, ” A pricefor polyethylene encapsulated tags of $55/lb isutilized with the concentration noted. The to-tal annual cost for this baseline condition is$11,200,000.

Detection Taggant ProgramMaterial Costs

Table 42 sets forth the buildup of detectiontaggant program material costs. The calcu la-


Table 41 .–Identification Taggant Material Annual Costs, Baseline Program

Annual costfor taggant

Estimated Explosive Encapsulated/ Taggant Increased cost materialsannual average Taggant unencapsulated cost per per unit of Increase in (dollars in

production unit cost concentration (total pounds) pound explosives explosive cost thousands)Cap-sensitive packaged

high explosives.

Cast boosters, .,

Smokeless powders

B l a c k p o w d e r ,

Detonating cord .,

B l a s t i n g c a p s

Total program

325 million lb $0.5011b o 05%

, . 6 million lb $1 50/lb 0.1%

5 million lb $6 00/lb 0,05%

400,000 lb $9.00/ lb 0.05%

500 million ft 5$/ft 5 taggantsper inch

. 84 million units 50c each 50 mg

Encapsulated(162,500)

Encapsulatedpellets (6,000)Encapsulated

(2,500)Encapsulated

(200)Encapsulated

(160)Encapsulated

(9,240)

$ 5 5 2.75u 5.5% $8,900

122 12.2C 8.1 % 732

55 2.75$ 0 46% 137

55 2.75c o 30% 11

25/batch 0.05$ 1 %0 250

120 1.32$ ea. 2 64% 1,100( +46) a

. . . , . ., .,, . ., . . .,, ,,, ,, . . . ,., $11,200

‘Allowance for cap materials


Table 42.–Detection Taggant Material Annual Costs

Taggant cost per unit ExpectedEstimated annual Detection taggant level Detection taggant explosives total annual costs

Explosive category production concentration required, pounds (@$40 /lb taggant) (dollars in thousands)

Cap-sensitive packaged highe x p l o s i v e s 325 million lb 0.025% by weight 87,500 1$ $3,250

C a s t b o o s t e r s 6 million lb 0.025% by weight 1,500 lc 60S m o k e l e s s p o w d e r s . 5 million lb 0.025% by weight 1,250 I 50B l a c k p o w d e r 400,000 lb 0.025% by weight 100 1$ 4D e t o n a t i n g c o r d 500 million ft 100 mg/ft 110,000 0.9C 4,500B l a s t l n g c a p s 84 million units 200 mg per cap 36,960 1.76c 1,478

worst case setTotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $9,340


tions, which are self-explanatory, are estab-lished at the noted concentration levels andweights, feet, and unit quantities common tothe identification taggant program. At the esti-mated cost of $40/lb of detection taggant ma-terial, the total annual program estimate is$9,340,000.

Manufacturing Level Program Costs

Explosive manufacturing level programcosts are delineated in table 43. The annualcost estimate for the baseline program is$7,068,500. The costs are based on explosivequantities and manufacturing incrementalcosts developed in previous sections.

Distribution Network Program Costs

The annual program cost attributable to thedistribution network is $9,231,000. The calcula-tion, shown in table 44, is based on the quanti-ties of explosives and distribution system in-cremental costs established in previous sec-t ions.

Public Overhead Program Cost

Public overhead program costs are definedto include the folIowing cost elements:

● sensor-related deployment costs,● taggant program development, and


Table 43.–Manufacturing Cost Added

Total programmanufacturing

cost addedEstimated annual Manufacturing (dollars m

Explosive category producilon cost added/unit thousands)

Cap-senstive packagedhigh explosives ., 325 mill ion lb 1 . 0 3 a $3,347

Boosters . . 6 million lb 7.72 463B l a c k p o w d e r 400,000 lb 2.57c 10Smokeless powder 5 million lb 2.57c 128Detonat ing cord . , 500 mi l l ion f t 0.094C 470Blasting caps .84 million units 3.15C 2,650

Total ., ., ., $7,068

aBaseline condition


Table 44.–Distribution System Cost Added

Total programdistribution

systemDistribution cost added

Estimated annual system cost (dollars inExplosive category production added/unit thousands)

Cap-sensitive packagedhigh explosives ., 325 mill ion lb 1. 19$a $3,869

Boosters . ., 6 milllon lb 5 . 4 8 328Black powder ., 400,000 lb 7.55$ 30S m o k e l e s s p o w d e r 5 milllon lb 6443$ 3,222Detonat ing cord . , 500 mil l ion f t 015$ 750Blasting caps .84 million units 1.23c 1.033

Total ., ., ., $9,232aBaseline conditions


● BATF administrative costs, including trac-ing activity.

The annual sensor program cost is $6.83 mil-lion for the baseline case in which 1,500 unitsare deployed in an assumed mix of 90-percentIMS and 10-percent MS sensor types. As in-dicated earlier, the annual BATF administra-tion cost is approximately $0.53 million, whilethe taggant program development annual costis estimated at $1.15 million, for a total of$8.51 million.

Taggant Program BaselineCost Estimate

The total estimated cost for the baseline tag-gant program is $45.37 million per year. Thecalculation of this estimate is shown in table45. It includes the estimated cost impact of

Table 45.–Taggant Program Summary AnnualCost-Baseline Program (millions of FY 1979 dollars)

Annual costT a g g a n t m a t e r i a l s $2056

Identification taggants(11 22)Detector taggants (9,34)

S e n s o r - r e l a t e d c o s t s a 6 8 3Explosives manufacturers’ added costs 7.07Dis t r ibutors ’ costs 9 2 3Government costs. ., 1,68

Administration and tracingTaggant program development

Increased Investigative costs . 0

T o t a l b a s e l i n e p r o g r a m a n n u a l c o s t $4537

a Assumed 500 units 90.percent IMS and 10 percent MS


taggant materials (identification and detec-tion), manufacturer-added cost, distributor-added costs, and public overhead (sensors, tag-gant development, and BATF administration).

Program Cost VersusImplementation Level

Table 46 shows the major cost elements ofthe taggant program as a function of imple-mentation level. The low-level program woulduse a unique identification taggant for eachmanufacturer, type of product, and year of

Table 46. --Taggant Program Summary Annual Cost VersusImplementation Level (millions of FY 1979 dollars per year)

Low case Baseline High caseSummary cost elements program program program

Taggant materialsI d e n t i f i c a t i o n t a g g a n t s $ 5.61a $11.22 $1122D e t e c t i o n t a g g a n t s 9 3 4 9 3 4 9 3 4

Explosive manufacturers’ added cost 5.26 b 7. 07C 19.41dDistribution system added cost 5.02 e 9.23 16.55 f

P u b l i c o v e r h e a d 5329 8. 51h 24.5 ‘

Total program annual cost $3055 $4537 $810(less ANFO)

ANFO $187.0 $268.0

aOTA estimate of slmpllf!ed code based on halwng the baseline es~lmafebPlant/year tagging levelcDate-shlff Iagglng leveldlo 00010 f 2 Or30.lb lagglng level for cap-sens(tlve 2000 lb for powders

‘Inc’ludes markup costs onlyflncludes Increase for adlustecj markups 75 mllllon lb of powders powder record keeping @$Illb

gBased on 800 sensors‘Based on 1 500 sensorsIBased on 5 000 sensorsIBased on 34 bllllon lb of ANFO lagged annually ID lag @I 2C/lb of ANFO detection lag C @O 5c/lb of ANFO manufacturing @ 2c/lb of ANFO and recordkeepmg @I lc/lb of ANFO



m a n u f a c t u r e . A t o t a l o f 8 0 0 d e t e c t i o n s e n s o r swould be deployed, one fo r pas senger s andone for baggage at each airport location cur-rently deploying magnetometers and handbaggage X-ray units. Cap-sensitive high explo-sives, detonators, boosters, detonating cord,and smokeless and black powders would betagged with both identification and detectiontaggants. Blasting agents would not be directlytagged.

The baseline program would tag the samematerials as the low-level program, but woulduse a unique identification taggant for eachshift of each product — analogous to the cur-rent date-shift code marking on the exterior ofexplosives. Traceability to the lists of last legalpurchasers would be maintained, as the tag-gant would contain all the information neededfor a BATF trace (date, shift, product, andsize). Approximately 1,500 detection taggantsensors would be deployed at airports and ma-jor controlled-access facilities such as power-plants, refineries, and Government buildings.Major police bomb squads would operate port-able units.

This baseline program differs from the pro-gram proposed by the BATF/Aerospace Corp.team in two respects. The most important isthat a full shift of the same product (a differ-ent size would be treated as a different prod-uct) would be tagged with the same taggant,rather than an arbitrary 10,000 to 20,000 lb.The practical utility result of that change isthat a longer I ist of last legal purchasers wouldbe produced by a trace, at least for those linesthat make more than 10,000 to 20,000 lb of aproduct in a single shift. The second differenceconcerns rework. It has been assumed that aspecial taggant containing a “compositecode” will be added to material containingmore than 10-percent cross-contain inat ion;such a taggant would indicate that other codesin the explosive were contaminants and couldbe ignored.

The high-level program would uniquely tageach 1(),()0()-lb batch of explosive and each2,000-Ib batch of gunpowder. All explosivematerials, including blasting agents, would bedirectly tagged. Ammonium nitrate fabricated

for use in ANFO would be tagged, but not fer-tilizer-grade ammonium nitrate. Approximate-ly 5,000 detection taggant sensors would bedeployed at every major transportation facil-ity, controlled-access utility, Government fa-cility, and other potential high-value targetssuch as campus computer locations. Portableunits would be routinely available to policebomb squads. The taggant level and types ofexplosives to be tagged in the high-level pro-gram correspond to a strict interpretation ofS.333, as propounded by IME.

Program Cost of Separate Identificationand Detection Taggant Programs

The above discussion has been for a pro-gram that includes both identification and de-tection taggants. Interest has been expressedin the cost of each program separately; thetotal cost and breakouts by cost elements arediscussed for each of the three implementa-tion levels. For the baseline set of conditions,the cost breakout is set forth in table 47. Thesecosts are, in summary:

I dentification taggant program $248 mllllonDetection taggant program $254 milllonTotal combined program $4537 mllllon

Table 47.–identification Taggant and Detection TaggantProgram Cost Comparisons–Baseline Case

(millions of dollars per year)

Identification Detection Baselinetaggant taggant combined

Program cost elements program program program

Taggant mater ia ls . , ,$1122 $ 9 . 3 4 $20.56Sensor-related costs – 6.83’ 6.83’Manufacturers’ cost ., 6.0b 94 7 0 7

Markup4.82

Labor andtooling

Dis t r ibu t ion sys tem cost , 6 .66b 2.57 9.23Markup

-o-Labor and

toolingGovernment cost

Administration and tracing 53 13C 53Taggant program development ,34 81 1.15

Total ., ., ., ., .$24.76 $25.44 $4537aFor 1,500 sensorsb LesS markup on delecllon IaggafllCASSUMed 25 percent of combined Program


Ch. V— Taggant Cost Review ● 127

As one can note, the sum of individual pro-grams is greater than the total combined pro-gram. This follows from the fact that each ofthe programs share certain labor and capitalresources in the combined program and eachopt ion bears the tota I cost for these resourcesif only one of the programs would be imple-mented. Shared resources in the combinedbaseline program are approximately $5 mil-lion/year, The detection taggant program isdirectly sensitive to the number of deployedsensors; variation in this would affect the costdifferentials significantly.

Similar cost breakdowns were calculated forthe separate identification and detector tag-gant programs at the low and high implemen-tation levels; these separate costs for the threeimplementation levels are summarized in table48.

Table 48.–Summary Program Costs VersusLevel of Implementation

Total combinedIdentification Detection program a

L o w $ 1493 $2192 $ 3 0 5 5Baseline 2476 2544 4537H i g h 21454 6526 2688

ac~~tJ(”~d ~rOgram CoSIS are less—than the sum of the Indlwdual Programs because of sharedl a b o r tooling admlnlsfrallon etc

SOURCE Otftceof Technology Assessment

Comparison of OTA Cost EstimatesWith I ME and Aerospace Corp.

Estimates

In testimony before the Senate Governmen-tal Affairs Committee, IME has estimated thatthe cost of the identification taggant programwould be on the order of $700 miIIion/year.That estimates includes the cost for the tag-gant materials, library maintenance fees, andrecord keeping costs. The estimate did not in-clude public overhead cost, manufacturingadded costs, costs through the distributechain, and markup. In addition, the I ME esti-mates for the quantity of cap-sensitive explo-sives produced is lower than the OTA estimateby 50 million lb, IME does not include the ef-fects of tagging 5 million lb of smokeless pow-der and assumes that the total production of

2.5 mil l ion lb of black powder would betagged. All but 400,000 lb of the black powderis used as a raw material input to other manu-factured items, such as fuzes, however, and sowould not be tagged.

For a taggant program with the scope as-sumed by IME, OTA estimates the cost wouldbe $214 million, not $700 million. The majorreasons for this difference are: I ME assumedmaterial cost for the identification taggants of$200/lb (versus the OTA estimate of $55/lb), theinclusion of a Iibrary maintenance fee of $100/-year per unique taggant (this fee would not becharged), and a concentration level of 0.05 per-cent for unencapsulated taggants versus theBAT F/Aerospace suggested level of 0.025 per-cent (equivalent to a 0.05-percent concentra-tion level for encapsulated taggants). As in-dicated previously, the IME figures for thematerial and library maintenance costs reflecta 3M quoted cost for taggants produced in apilot program.

Table 49 depicts the various cost elementsfor an identification taggant program that in-cludes blasting agents. The three columnsshow, respectively, the element cost estimatesmade by I ME, the corresponding costs underthe same assumptions made by OTA, and theactual cost elements, as estimated by OTA. Itmust be clearly understood that these cost esti-

Table 49.–Comparison of the Estimates for ID Tags(millions of dollars per year)

OTA estimates OTA estimatesI ME cost using I ME using OTA

Cost elements estimate assumpt ions a assumt ionsID tag materials–non-ANFO $ 525ID tag materials–ANFO 3400Manufacturers’ costs–

n o n - A N F O —Manufacturing cost–ANFO

and recordkeeping –Distribution system cost –Public overhead –Record keeping costs 195

Code reservation 291 1

T o t a l $703,1

$ 103868.0

172

10208 0

87in mfgr &

distribution—

$206.45

$ 112680

18.47

102,013,98

87in mfgr &

distribution—

$21454

dAssumpllons 275 mllllon lb of cap senslhve p a c k a g e d e x p l o s i v e s 2 5 mllllon lb of black

powder smokeless powder not Included

SOURCE Ott[ceol Technology Assessment


m a t e s a r e f o r t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t a g g i n g p r o -gram for the high implementation level.

The Aerospace Corp. cost estimate of ap-proximately $48 million/year was for a differ-ent program —one in which ANFO and otherblasting agents are not directly tagged. Asnoted above, the program for which the Aero-space Corp. cost estimate was given is quitesimilar to the OTA identified baseline pro-gram, differing only in the size of the uniquetaggant batch and in some assumptions on re-work material.

A summary of major differences betweenthe Aerospace Corp. assumptions and the OTAbaseline case assumptions is as follows:

Aerospaceassumptions

Detona t ing cord . . . . 12 ,000 ,000Number of sensors

deployed ., 5,000Increased investigatingcosts. .$5.4 million

M a r k u p . , NoID tag material cost,

e n c a p s u l a t e d . $ 5 0 / l b t a gDetection tag materialcost . . . . . . $65/lb tag

OTAassumptions

500,000,000 f t

1 , 5 0 0

NoneYes

$55/lb tag

$40/lb tag

Table 50 depicts the various cost elementsfor an identification and detection taggantprogram that does not include blasting agents.The columns represent, respectively, the costestimates made by the Aerospace Corp. andthe cost elements as estimated by OTA.

Table 50.–Comparison of OTA andAerospace Program (Option 2) Estimate

AerospaceCost elements estimates OTA estimate

ID tag materials ., ., .,D e t e c t i o n t a g m a t e r i a l sL a b o rRetooling. ., ., ., .,T o t a l i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n c o s tIncreased investigative costs . . . . Exp los ives manufactur ing cost . ,D i s t r i b u t i o n s y s t e m c o s t . , . ,Government costs, .,

Total ., ... . . . .,

$ 8 . 5 87.862.051.65

22.505.40(c)(c)—

$48.04

$11.229.34

— b

— b

6.83-o-7.079.231.68

$4537

aFr~m Explosives Tag9m9 Inflaflon Impact Analysls Aerospace Corp April 1979blncluded In exploswes manulaclunng costClncluded In labor cost


In s u m m a r y , t h e q u e s t i o n a s t o w h i c h c o s te s t i m a t e i s “ c o r r e c t , ” t h a t b y A e r o s p a c e o rtha t by I M E , c a n n o t b e s i m p l y a n s w e r e d , a sthey are giving estimates for different levels ofimplemental ion. Both estimates contain val-ues for cost elements that are not currentlyrelevant, and these are clearly indicated intables 49 and 50.

Who Bears the Cost ofa Taggant Program?

For the baseline program set of conditions,an analysis was made to determine which ofthe various segments affected would bear thecosts of the taggant program. Table 51 showsthe cost breakout. Sensor-related costs wouldreflect the perceived utilization of sensors atairports for screening of personnel, hand-car-ried baggage, and checked baggage. For thebaseline case of 1,500 sensors, 1,200 or 80 per-cent are assumed to be employed at airports,with 300 or 20 percent in Government build-ings, courthouses, transportation centers, andpolice bomb squads.

The users of explosives absorb the primaryimpact of the program, assuming that all costsassociated with the taggants (material, manu-facturing, and distribution), are passed on tothe various classes of users examined. The ex-tent to which these costs will ultimately im-pact consumers of goods produced by the ex-plosive users is uncertain.

Public overhead costs of administration andtaggant program development are borne di-rectly by the taxpayer who would also bearsome portion of the detection taggant sensordeployment in the baseline case.

Table 51 .–Taggant Program Cost Impact by Who Will Bear theCost (millions of dollars by impact segments)

Users of AirlineBaseline program costs explosives Taxpayers users TotalTaggant mater ia ls . . $20.56 $20.56Sensor-related costs ., – $1–3 $5-53 6.83Explosive manufacturers’

c o s t s 7,07 – – 7.07Ditribution system costs. 9.23 – – 9.23Public overhead – 1,68 – 1.68—

Total ., $36.86 $2.98 $5.53 $45.37Percent, . 81 ,2% 6,6% 12 2%40



COST ANALYSIS PRECISION

I n the preceding narrative description of thetaggant program cost analysis, OTA has setforth the basis for estimating the various fac-tors in the total program cost equation. Therelative certainty (or precision) of the esti-mates has been addressed to varying degrees.In this section, OTA specifically summarizesconcerns regarding the precision of the esti-mates and the related implications for: 1 ) thereasonableness of the estimates and 2) theprospects for cost-estimate growth or stability.

A precise evaluation of the costs of a tag-gant program is not possible due to the currentstate of development of the taggants and sen-sors and the uncertainties in how a taggantprogram would be implemented. Pilot testinghas been conducted between the identifica-tion taggants and several of the types of ex-plosive materials proposed to be tagged (cap-sensitive packaged explosives, boosters, andblack powder), testing is underway on smoke-less powder, and no pilot tests have been con-ducted for detonating cord or blasting caps.Three candidate sensors are being evaluated,but no system has progressed past the labora-tory stage. Various implementation levels arepossible, each of which directly affects costs.Examples of critical implementation decisionsinclude: which explosives will be tagged, whatwould constitute a unique “batch” with aunique identification species, and how manyof which type of detection sensors would bedeployed.

Several forms of cost uncertainty analysisare possible. Given a baseline case, one can ex-amine the cost effects of changes in individualcost factors and note the perturbation on totalprogram cost in a deterministic manner. Thismethod is employed in the following section inorder to highlight the primary cost drivers inthe taggant program. Another method treatscosts in a probabilistic manner. Additionaldata would be required to implement this pro-cedure.

Cost Sensitivity Analysis

The method used here essentially sets forththe cost impact changes that occur due to vari-ations in cost-driving variables of interest. Thecost-impact variations from an established orhypothesized baseline case is the traditionalmethod taken. Cost element changes in abso-lute or percentage terms are set forth and theimpact on total program cost is noted. Sincethe taggant program is in the early stages ofdevelopment, the factors in the total costequation need to be examined to determinethe potential ranges of variance from an estab-lished baseline. Table 52 includes a relativelycomprehensive Iist of elements that have an in-fluence on the program cost estimate. Theseinclude the various factors (both cost and re-lated requirements) for:

taggant materials;the manufacturing and distribution sys-tem;public overhead (sensors, administration,taggant program development); andprogrammatic considerations.

Taggant Materials

IDENTIFICATION TAGGANTS

Var ious factors can fur ther in f luence thecost o f ident i f icat ion taggant mater ia l . Thebest estimate from 3M is based on their recentIeadtime study, $75/lb of unencapsulated tag-gants in 2.5- to 5-lb lots. This value is based ontagging 600 million lb of explosives per year,requiring a guarantee of manufacturing of150,000 lb of taggants per year for a minimumof 2 years. Values utilized in the OTA study arebased on lower quantities of encapsulated tag-gants. 3M has made their best estimate of thiseffect on cost; however, more detailed studywould be required by them to provide anequivalent confidence to the current $75/lbquotation. Encapsulated taggants estimatesprovided for this study are targeted at $55/lb ofpolyethylene-coated taggants for 90,000 lb oftaggants per year. Additional study of opaque-


Table 52.–Elements of Cost Uncertainty

/dentiiication taggant material● Taggant cost dollars per pound

–Encapsulation cost-opaque capsule–Yield from encapsulation process–Cost IS an estimate, not a contracted value–Monopoly issue

● Taggant concentration level● Quantity of explosives to be tagged

–Cap-sensitive packaged explosive–ANFO and other blasting agents

● Taggant waste

Detection taggant material● Molecule prices● Encapsulation cost● Concentration levels● Quantity of explosives to be tagged

Sensor cost● Quantity of sensors to be deployed● What type sensors WiII be successfully developed?● What will be the mix of deployed sensors?● Development cost uncertainty● False alarm rate● Production price uncertainty

Explosive manufacturers added cost● Record keeping costs (particularly smokeless powders)● Tooling and labor, etc . for explosive categories not pilot tested

(powders, detonating cord, blasting caps)● Batch size

–Productivity–Waste

● Taggant inventory costs● Markup and degree to which costs are passed on

Distribution costs Recordkeeping● Storage● Markup levels

Cost of investigation● Cost penalty v. cost savings

Government regulation and administration

Implementation and programatic● Level of Implementation● Stand alone program costs

–Identification taggant program–Detection taggant program


t y p e e n c a p s u l a t i o n i s r e q u red in order to re-f ine the $55 / lb es t imate . 3M assessment o f thewors t case i s $70 / lb , to account fo r the uncer -tainty i n :

● encapsulation and encapsulant ion processyield (further research is required to de-finitize these parameters), and

● ultimate contractual conditions specified(the only basis for “precise” quotations).

3M believes that the worst case estimate ishighly unlikely and was provided to the study

g r o u p t o p e r m i t t h e c o s t u n c e r t a i n t y a n a l y s i sof the taggant program. The ultimate effect ofthe worst case condition would be to increaseidentification taggant direct costs of materialsby 27 percent.

If one were to implement unencapsulatedtaggants, as was studied in some detail in theIeadtime study, the ultimate effect would be areduction in the baseline program estimatefrom $11.2 million to $9.6 million, a reductionof approximately 14 percent.

Other areas of cost uncertainty are:

●

●

●

●

●

Monopoly issue–this is discussed in thesecond section of this chapter.

Taggant concentration levels –the surviv-abil ity and recovery tests so far con-ducted have been at one concentrationlevel, as have the safety tests. The testshave identified areas where the taggantssurvive and areas where individual tag-gants do not survive (with a substantialgrey area). Nonsurvival seems to be pri-marily a function of the thermal or phys-ical decomposition of the taggant materi-als, which would be essentially unaffectedby concentration level. I f concentrationleve ls were changed , the cos t o f mate r ia lwould increase almost l inear ly (seebelow).

Quantity of explosives to be tagged–greater quantities (over 325 million lb ofcap-sensitive) of tagged explosive woulddecrease cost per pound of taggant mate-rial; however, total program increaseswould not increase I i nearly.

ANFO tagging—see the section on “Tag-gant Program Cost Synthesis” for esti-mated effects. It is probable that if ANFOwere to be tagged, a taggant with addi-tional layers would require development,to permit the larger number of codes re-quired by the large quantities of ANFOand other blasting agents.

Taggant waste— the degree of taggantwaste (if any) in a production environmentis unknown; this factor, which is not con-sidered significant, would tend to increasetaggant material cost estimates.

Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review . 131

S u m m a r y b a s e l i n e p r o g r a m c o s t s e n s i t i v i t yto var ia t ions in ident i f i ca t ion taggant mater ia lc o s t s o r c o n c e n t r a t i o n l e v e l s i s d e p i c t e d i nf igure 20 . Cos t - impac t changes inc lude the e f -fec t o f markup a t the manufac tur ing leve l andth roughout the d is t r ibu t ion ne twork .

Figure 20.—Baseline Program Cost SensitivityImpact With Changes in Identification Taggant,

Material Cost, and Concentration Level

Total programcost in millions of dollars

55 “

50 -

program Percentchange in

1 45 1 ID taggant

2 500\o 100 ”/0 materialcost or

concentration

Increase ● D e c r e a s e


DETECTION TAGGANT MATERIALS

Detection taggant materials are still in theexploratory stage of development, with fivecandidate molecules currently under consid-eration. As shown in our discussion in the sec-ond section, estimates based on recent budget-ary and pricing quotations vary depending onthe molecule and the spread in the submittedcost estimates. The average value utilized inthis study is $40/lb. The range of estimates isfrom $22 to $58/Ib. The uncertainty in programdollar terms is as follows:

Baseline program $9.34 millionOptimistic estimate ., $5.14 millionWorst case estimate . . . $13.54 million

Concentration levels are another issue. Currentexpectations are that 0.025-percent concentra-tions are adequate. Further development test-ing is required in order to definitive this param-eter. Baseline program cost sensitivity due to arange of variation in detection taggant materi-al costs or concentration levels is set forth infigure 21. Cost variations include the succes-sion of markups that are estimated at the man-ufacturing level and throughout the distribu-tion network. It should be noted that the con-centration levels for identification and detec-tion tagging of detonating cord are inconsist-ent, with a very small concentration of identifi-cation taggants assumed and a very high con-centration of detection taggants.

THE MANUFACTURING ANDDISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

Taggant program cost estimates at the man-ufacturing and distribution levels vary in theirdegree of precision and are highly influencedby various assumptions that are required dueto the lack of substantive empirical data. Con-fidence is relatively higher in the estimates

Figure 21 .—Baseline Program Cost SensitivityImpact With Changes in Detection Taggant,

Material Cost, and Concentration LevelTotal program

cost in millions of dollars

60

55

50;

45

Percentchange in

_ detection50% 1000% taggant

materialcost or

concentration

❑ increase ■ Decrease



where pilot testing has been accomplished(e.g., cap-sensitive packaged explosives). Thedegree to which costs will be passed on, withassociated markups through the distributionnetwork, to the user of explosives is anotherarea of uncertainty.

As a result of the pilot test program, reason-able data is available for the analysis of thecost impact of adding taggants to the manu-facture of cap-sensitive high explosives, atleast for those companies that participated inthe program. No similar data is available,however, on the manufacturing impact of theother types of explosive materials that mightbe tagged. Only gross estimates have beenmade for recordkeeping and storage costs.

Federal requirements for date-shift code rec-ordkeeping currently pertain to cap-sensitivepackaged explosives, boosters, black powder,detonating cord, and blasting caps. Smokelesspowders, currently exempt from the require-ment, represent the largest uncertainty in rec-ordkeeping costs. OTA has treated this costelement parametricalIy with the level of imple-mentation analysis. For the three cases stud-ied, the following cost estimates were utilized:

Low program no cost increaseB a s e l i n e 60.4/lb powderHigh estimate ., ., 100$/lb powder

These estimates are based on preliminary as-sessments; further refinements in the smoke-less powder recordkeeping estimate require adata base reflecting pilot-testing experienceand a detailed description of the distributionnetwork.

An analysis of manufacturing cost impactfor cap-sensitive packaged explosives revealedthe following cost sensitivity to program im-plementation levels:

Manufacturers’ cost perTag batch size pound of explosives

10,000 to 12,000 lb ., ., ., 4.O20,000 lb . ., 2.3Shift production .. 0.6$Plant year . 0.3

U n c e r t a i n t y i n o t h e r p a r t i c u l a r e x p l o s i v e t y p ecos t elements w i l l pers is t un t i l a par t icu la r p ro -gram level is recommended for implementa-tion.

Taggant inventory costs, which were as-sessed as part of the manufacturers’ costs,were estimated at 10-percent interest for a tag-gant inventory supply of one-half year. Varia-tions from this assumption would have rela-tively minor influence over total program costeffects. Markup costs were estimated at 10percent at the manufacturing level and 25 per-cent for the distribution network for explo-sives, while 80-percent markup was utiIized forthe black and smokeless powders for the distri-bution network, based on estimated inputsfrom a manufacturer. Uncertainty exists in thedegree to which taggant program costs will bepassed on to explosive users, since ultimatelythese markups would be determined in themarketplace.

PUBLIC OVERHEAD

Sensor-related costs.— Considerable uncer-tainty exists in estimates of the sensor programcost. These relate to:

●

●

●

●

●

●

what type of sensors will be successfullydeveloped?what will be the mix of deployed sensors?how many will be deployed?development cost uncertainty,production price uncertainty, andfalse-alarm rates.

Table 53 delineates a set of cost possibilitieswhere sensor mix and quantity are varied. Onecan note the wide spread of resulting estimatesgiven these variations in assumptions. OTA es-timated the sensor development costs of twicethe level of the Aerospace estimates to ac-

Table 53.–Annual Cost per Sensor for Various Mixes

Total annual cost(millions of dollars)

Annual costper sensor 1,500 sensors 5,000 sensors

FY79 dollars

A l l C E C D $3,318 $5.0 $16.6All IMS . 4,053 6.1 20.3A l l M S 9,228 13.8 46.1CECD 90% MS l0%. 3,909 5 8 6 19.5CECD 75%; MS 25%. 4,796 7 2 24.0IMS 90%, MS 10%

( b a s e l i n e ) . 4,570 6.8 22.8IMS 75%; MS 25%. 5,347 8 0 26.74



count for development program contingen-cies. Production cost estimates confidence hasbeen stated by Aerospace as about * 25 per-cent. This production effect on the baselinecase estimate would be as follows:

BaselIne (1, 500 sensors). $683 millionL o w e s t i m a t e $512 millionW o r s t c a s e $854 mill ion

The effects of quantity and sensor mix aremore profound. Sensor costs could vary from$5 million to $13.8 million (see table 53) for thebaseline quantity of 1,500 sensors dependingon the ultimate mix of system deployed. Quan-t i ty variations would also proportionately im-pact program costs . High false-alarm rates(greater than 0.05 percent) in fielded sensorswould have tangible cost impacts in the cost ofoperations and in creating ill will.

Programmatic considerations.— The overrid-ing uncertainty in the cost of the taggants pro-gram stems from the nature of the present ear-ly phase of program development. Programcost uncertainty is a profound problem during

ADEQUACY

The taggant program cost estimates

the development phase of most major hard-ware system programs. This is so even for pro-grams where precedent-type data are available(e.g., aircraft, missile, electronics). The taggantprogram has no direct precedent as such andanalogous situations are limited. Historicaldata are therefore severely limited and slowlyevolved as pilot testing progresses. Traditional-ly, as a program proceeds during development,new elements of costs are recognized thatwere poorly perceived at the onset of develop-ment” in addition, program directions changeas ergineering and scientific problems are un-covered, resulting in scope changes and poten-tial for cost growth. Questions of scope, for in-stance, include program implementation levelswhich have been addressed in the cost synthe-sis section. As noted, costs estimates can varyby significant degrees depending on the pro-gram specification. Related to the scope issueare the individual identification and detectiontaggant programs as separate entities. Pursuingeither one of these objectives rather than pro-ceeding jointly would have a significant im-pact on cost.

OF CURRENT DATA

are scope changes; cost-esbased on a limited empirical data base and utes to a lesser degree.various analyses and assumptions. This situa-

i mating error contrib-

ution is caused by the relatively early stage of Further pilot testing and sensor deveiop-the development program, the limited numberof pilot tests conducted to date, and the lim-ited sample of organizations surveyed (manu-facturers, distributors, and users of explosives).The limitations in the data base and resultantassumptions have been underscored within thecost analysis section. Where assumptions weremade, OTA has taken a conservative positionin order to provide a reasonable cost estimatefor the program options. This is important be-cause cost growth normally ensues in typicaldevelopmental efforts. Cost growth is predom-inately affected by redesign and program

ment efforts are requi~ed in order to providerefined designs and requirements data for bothmanufacturing processes (e. g., detonating cordand blasting caps) and sensors, which are nec-essary for redefining the cost estimates. Untilthis progress is made, further refinements incost-estimate precision are not possible.

Additional survey samples of manufactur-ers, distributors, and explosive users wouldprovide higher confidence in certain of thecost-element estimates and other cost impactareas.


SUGGESTED FURTHER RESEARCH

A d d i t i o n a l c o s t a n a l y s i s r e s e a r c h w o u l d i m -prove the ability to determine more accurate lyand at a finer level of resolution the cost im-pact of the taggant program. This research ef-fort could take a number of avenues including:

● development of a cost model,● development of an economic model,● application of design-to-cost principles

for the sensor development, and● special studies and analysis.

The OTA study effort on the costs of the tag-g a n t p r o g r a m w a s l i m i t e d i n t i m e a n d r e -sources. Various insights gained during this re-search indicate that further research in theabove areas would contribute significantly toa better understanding of the multitude of costand economic tradeoffs and effects whichcould guide the development of a taggant sys-tem. The model developments (cost and eco-nomic) would further this goal. AppIications offormal design-to-cost principles to the devel-opment of sensors will further permit the pro-duction and implementation of cost-effectivesystems.

Other special studprovide further valuetaggant program cosare:

es and analyses wouldto the understanding of

impact. Among these

Q cost/uncertainty probabiIity analysis;!!i

● price elasticity for black powder, smoke- [iless powders, and cap-sens i t ive high ex- ,

plosives, etc.;● assessment of manufacturers’ “front end”

costs and the related burden; and● amplified cost and economic impact sur-

veys of manufacturers, distributors, andusers of explosives.

It must be clearly understood, however, thatresolution of the basic program issues, such aslevel of implementation, as well as resolutionof technical efficacy, safety, and utility is nec-essary before it makes sense to attempt a moredetailed cost analysis. The work reported inthis chapter clearly indicates the order of mag-nitude of the cost impact that decisions con-cerning taggant legislation would have on themanufacturers, distributors, and users of ex-plosives and gun powders.

Chapter VI

TAGGANT UTILITY REVIEW

Chapter VL-TAGGANT UTILITY REVIEW

Pageintroduction . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . , . . . , . . . . . , . . 137Problem Characterization . .................138

The Bombing Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139Explosives Used in Bombs . ..............141Types of Targets Bombed. . ..............142Characteristics of Criminal Bombers . ......142

Terrorists ... , ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , .143Common Cr imina ls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145Menta l ly D is turbed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145Vandals and Experimenters . ...........145

Sources of Explosives. . .................146Current Security Measures. . .............148

Sources of Explosives. . ...............148Potent ia l Targe ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 149

Current Antibomber Procedures . .........154Discussion of TaggantlJtiiity. .. ..............155

Deter rence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155Bomb Detection–Target Protection . . . . . . .157Bomber Apprehension . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . .159Intelligence Concerning Criminal Bomber

Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....161Prosecution of Criminal Bombers . ........162Taggant Utility by Typeof Perpetrator .., ..163Utility of Taggants to Update the Taggant

Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., ,, , .163Nonbomber Control Utility of Taggants, ...,164

PossIble BomberCountermeasures in Responseto a TaggantProgram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . .164Fabrication of Homemade Explosives. .. ...167Use of lncendiary Bombs. . ..............167Use of Blasting Agents. . ................168Theft of Explosives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .168I l l e g a l S o u r c e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 1 6 9Use of Explosives Manufactured Before a

Taggant Requirement. . . . . . . . . . , . . . .169Detection Taggant Seal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .169“Spooking’’of DetectionTaggant Sensors. ..l7OShift to Other Unlawful Activity . .........170S u m m a r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 0

Foreign Experience Controlof80mbers .. ....171

TABLES

Page

54. Minimum Bombing Incidents StatisticsS u m m a r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 9

Page

55. Explosive Bombing Incident Trends,1972-78. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...140

56. identified Explosive Fillers Used in

57

58

59

60.61.

62.

63.

64.65.

66.

67

6869

70.

22.23.24

25

26

Bombs . . . .; . . . . . . . . . . . .............141Bombing Casualties and Damage in 1978by Type o f Bomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . , . 142Bombings by Specific Targets for1977-78 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...143Percent of Bomber Targets That WouldBeProtected by a Dectection Sensor . .......143Attributes of Criminal Bomber Groups. ....144Estimated Number of SignificantBombings by Group of Perpetrators. .., ...146Stolen and Recovered ExplosiveSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., .,147Explosives Thefts by Method of Entry–Number of lncident sand Percentagesfor 1977-78 . . . . . . . ...................148Explosions Aboard U.S. Aircraft . .........150Location of Explosions Aboard Aircraft,1949-76. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...150Explosions and Devices Found at U.S.A i r p o r t s , 1 9 7 2 - 7 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 1 5 1Results of Civil Aviation Security ProgramPassenger Screening. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Premature Detonation Statistics . . . . . . .Commercial Airliner Hijacking Statisticsby Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Possible Perpetrator ResponseCountermeasures to Taggant Program. . .

FIGURES

Annual Bombing Statistics, 1972-77 . . . . .Schematic Airport Security System . . . . .Passenger/Hand-Baggage ScreeningStation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Schematic lllustration of IdentificationTaggant Utility in Criminal Investigation.Size Comparison of the 3M IdentificationTaggant and Some Smokeless Powders. ,

. . 153

. . 155

. . 157

. . 165

Page. . 141. . 152

. . 153

. . 160

. . 166

Chapter VI

TAGGANT UTILITY REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Bombings are a particularly heinous crime as they are normally indiscriminatein their choice of victims, often involve innocent people, and have the potential forproducing large numbers of casualties and high property damage. Bombings are at-tractive to the perpetrator as bombs can be placed at the bomber’s convenience andset to detonate at a time when the bomber is elsewhere. Bombings are a quite spec-tacular crime, easily drawing public attention when that is the perpetrator’s pur-pose.

Bombings are particularly difficult crimes for law enforcement agencies tohandIe as the bomber is not usually near the scene of the crime, the physical evi-dence is destroyed or damaged by the detonation, and the materials necessary tofabricate even a quite catastrophic bomb are easily obtainable.

It is the purpose of this chapter to review the utility of both identification anddetection taggants to law enforcement and security personnel. In order to assess theutility of taggants, it is first necessary to understand the magnitude of the bomberproblem, including the types of bombers, the types of targets, the sources of explo-sives, and current measures to control and combat bombers. This information is re-viewed in the next section. The utility of taggants is then discussed, together withpossible responses by criminal bombers to a taggant program. The chapter con-cludes with a short discussion of the experience of selected foreign countries in thecontrol of bombers.

In the analysis it is assumed that the t a g -gants have been demonstrated as safe to addto explosive materials; that the identificationtaggants survive the detonation of tagged ex-plosives and can be recovered at the scene ofthe crime, either directly or by laboratoryseparation of collected debris; and that sen-sors exist which detect the detection taggantvapor at a parts-per-tril I ion concentration inair, with extremely few false alarms and withno requirement for special maintenance orskil led operators. These assumptions wouldhave to be verified before a taggant programcould be implemented.

The analysis is primarily qualitative. Dataexist on the numbers and types of criminalbombings which take place, but it is difficultto analyze the data as it is not consistent fromone data bank to another and information re-trieval in any other than summary form is diffi-cult. Characterization of types of perpetrator,or of motives, is available in only a limitednumber of bombings; even identification ofthe explosive fiIler is not available for a sign if i-cant fraction of bombings.

No data exist that would allow a quantita-tive assessment of the numbers of bombers

137

61-401 0 - 80 - 10


who would be deterred, arrested, or convictedas a result of a taggant program, or of theamount of property damage or casualtieswhich would be averted by such a program. Ananalogy can be drawn between the utility ofthe current date-shift information containedon explosive cartridge cases and the utility ofidentification taggants in apprehending andconvicting bombers, but the date-shift infor-mation utility data base is quite small. Simi-larly, an analogy can be made between thedrop in hijackings that occurred after the intro-duction of antihijacking procedures and thepotential reduction to be expected in thebombings of high-valued, controlled-accessbuildings protected by detection sensors. Suchanalogies are discussed in the text. The pri-mary source of data on the current bombingsthreat, current means of combating thatthreat, and the utility of taggants to law en-forcement personnel, however, comes fromthe opinion of law enforcement personnel inthe field.

In-depth discussions were held with a broadcross section of law enforcement and securitypersonnel, including personnel from the fol-lowing agencies:

●

●

●

domestic law enforcement and securitypersonnel. (New York City; San MateoCounty, Calif.; Dallas-Fort Worth Airport;Summit County, Ohio; Washington, D.C.);

foreign law enforcement personnel (WestGermany, England, Republic of Ireland,INTER PC) L);

Federal agencies (Federal Bureau of inves-tigation (FBI), Federal Aviation A d m i n -istration (FAA), Bureau of Mines, Depart-ment of Transportation, Corps of Engi-neers, U.S, Army Criminal Investigat ion

●

Division, U.S. Army Development and Re-search Command); and

contractors (Management Sciences Asso-ciates (MSA) and Institute for D e f e n s eAna lys is ) .

A number o f d iscuss ions were a lso h e l d , o nvarious subjects, with the Bureau of Alcohol,Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), the agencycharged with explosives control.

Unfortunately, it was not possible, given thetime and money constraints of the OTA analy-sis, to meet with as many law enforcement per-sonnel as would be desirable, particularlygiven the large variations in types of bombers,types of targets, and local laws and proceduresin the various parts of the country. To obtain alarger sample of expert opinion, a question-naire was sent to approximately 950 membersof the International Association of Chiefs ofpolice (l AC P), chosen at random from theirdirectory. The IACP was chosen because of theOTA desire to obtain input from a broad crosssection of the law enforcement community—geographically, functionally, and by size ofcommunity. The results of the in-depth inter-views and questionnaire responses are inte-grated in the discussion in this chapter. Adetailed discussion of the questionnaire isgiven as appendix B. Due to the small responserate (approximately 15 percent) the samplemay be biased. However, the bias is probablytoward those with knowledge of, and interestin, the subject. An additional possible bias wasintroduced by an error in the explanatorymaterial accompanying the survey, which in-dicated that the identification taggant tracewould identify the last legal purchaser of theexplosives, rather than indicating that thetrace would produce a Iist of last legal pur-chasers.

PROBLEM CHARACTERIZATION

Approximately 3,000 incidents are reported we I I as actual explosive and incendiary bomb-annua l l y in the BATF Exp los i ves I n c i d e n t s ings. The BATF report contains a breakout byReport. The incidents include accidents, target type and explosive filler used, but Iittlethreats, recovered explosives, and hoaxes, as information on the various types of perpetra-

Ch. V1—Taggant Utility Review ● 139

tors. The FBI compiles similar bombing statis-tics at its National Bomb Data Center, whichare published quarterly and summarized annu-ally. The bombings are committed by a widerange of perpetrators, who differ in their skills,resources, motivations, and types of targets at-tacked. Current security measures at most ex-plosive manufacturers, distr ibutors, and u s e r sare sufficient to dissuade casual outside theft,but cannot readily protect against thefts thatare committed by or assisted by employees, oragainst a determined outside attempt to stealexplosives. Protection of some high-value po-tential targets against bomber threats is cur-rently adequate but some targets are essential-ly unprotected against a serious bombing at-tempt. Finally, current law enforcement effortsto control criminal bombings are not very ef-fective. These topics are discussed brieflybelow.

The Bombing Threat

Both the FBI and BATF maintain nationalbombing data information centers which col-lect statistics on bombings and other explosiveincidents. The data are not consistent betweenthe two centers, however, and many bombingsare not reported to either center. The format-ting of the data, and the lack of updating pro-cedures, make accurate analyses difficult.

The BATF 1978 Explosives Incidents ReportincIudes over 3,000 incidents for both 1977 and1978. The incidents include accidents, threats,seized and recovered explosives, and hoaxes aswelI as actual explosive and incendiary bomb-i rigs. Of these incidents, 1,377 represented ex-plosive detonations, accidental detonations bycriminals, or recovered bombs which failed todetonate in 1977, with 1,250 the correspondingnumber for 1978. At least 953 of these in 1977and 787 in 1978 represent actual detonationsof explosive bornbs against substantiaI targets(mailbox and open-area bombings are not in-clided).

During 1977, at least 38 people were killedand 180 wounded by explosive and incendiarybombs, while the numbers in 1978 were 23 and185, respectively Due to the way initial esti-

mates of property damage are made in theBATF data and the lack of updating, only thecrudest property damage estimates can bemade. There was at least $10 million in directproperty damage due to explosive and incendi-ary bombs in 1977, and at least $17 million in1978. Thirty-five of the thirty-eight reporteddeaths in 1977 and twenty of the twenty-threereported in 1978 were from bombings againstvehicles, residences, and commercial estab-lishments. Similarly, about 80 percent of theinjuries from bombing of known targets in1977 and 70 percent in 1978 were caused bybombings of those three types of targets.

The FBI data, as indicated above, are some-what different, both in number of incidents re-ported and in the breakout of categories. In1977, for instance, FBI data show 867 actualexplosive bombings and 118 attempted bomb-ings. Similarly, the number of people reportedkilled that year from both explosive and incen-diary bombings was 22, while 162 were re-ported injured. In 1978 there were 768 explo-sive bombings and 105 attempted explosivebombings. The pertinent 1977 and 1978 BATFand FBI statistics are summarized in table 54.

Table 54.–Minimum Bombing lncidents Statistics Summary’

BATF FBI

Item 1977 1978 1977 1978

E x p l o s i v e b o m b i n g s , n u m b e r 1 , 0 3 7 b 8 9 6b 8 6 7 768Undetonated explosive bombs, number 319 287 118 105I n c e n d i a r y b o m b i n g s , n u m b e r 339 446 248 349Unignited incendiary bombs, number 81 71 85 79Cr imina l acc idents , number c 21 67 – –Property damage from bombings.

m i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r sc d $ 10 $ 17 $ 9 $ 9I n j u r i e s c . . . 180 185 162 135People killed by bombings c 38 23 22 18

.dEATF repel’fed 3 177 total Incidents [n 1977 and 3 256 In 1978 Total Incidents include ac

cldents threats seized and recovered explosives and hoaxes as well as actual explosive and (ncendlary bombings The OTA study was concerned only wllh explosive bombings

bof these 953 In 1977 and 787 In 1978 were agalnsl subslarm !drgekclncludes both exp[oslve and Incendiary Domblngs OTA was unable to oblam separate f19ures tor

number of cnm!nal accidents lnjurles deaths and property damage caused by exploswe and Incendlary bombs Incendiary bombs and bombings would not be affected by Ihe proposed laggant

d~~l~~~~alue probably considerably higher due 10 lac~ of data file uPdates

S O U R C E EM TF 1978 Exp/os/ves /nc{derrfs Report Ft3/ Um/rmrJ Cnrne Repor/ B o m b /7epor/1978 See app F for a discussion ot me derivation 01 these hgures

An effort was made to resolve the differ-ences in statistics compiled by FBI and BATF;according to the Explosives Enforcement Divi-sion of BATF:


●

●

●

s

●

—

There is no Federal statute or law on thebooks requiring local police officials to re-port bombing incidents to either BATF or theFB I .Cooperation at the local level has led to aninformal procedure on the part of local po-lice to report a bombing incident to eitherBATF or FBI, who in turn will normally noti-fy each other. (There are obviously somebreakdowns in this procedure).There is a statute giving BATF the “right ofinspect ion” at the site of any explosion;therefore, whether BATF receives word of abombing from the local police, or whether alocal special agent reads of it in the localpaper, BATF can by law check it out.BATF requi res each agent to report a l lbombing incidents to its explosives data cen-ter in Washington, irrespective of the theo-retical importance, damage, casualties, orjurisdiction since, among other uses, thesedata are used by the Secret Service in ar-ranging security for the President when he istravel ing.There is a question of jurisdiction with refer-ence to investigations. A memo of under-standing exists between BATF and the FBI.Generally the FBI covers terrorist acts, at-tacks on airlines, attacks involving unions,college campus buildings, and Federal build-ings other than Treasury and Postal build-ings. BATF has pr imary jur i sdict ion overcriminal bombings related to interstate com-merce, firearms violations, and Treasurybuildings. Either the FBI or BATF may re-spond to requests for aid from other jurisdic-tions. Conflicts are settled by mutual agree-ment.

● The normally higher number of incidents an-nually in BATF reports is a direct result ofthe above.

I t i s of cons iderable interest to knowwhether the statistics for 1977 and 1978 arecharacteristic of the recent past, or if trends incriminal bombings are apparent. Table 55shows the bombing trend since 1972, from theFBI data. While the BATF numbers differ, therough trends are similar. Figure 22 shows thetrends graphically, with the total number of in-cidents depicted in figure 22a, property dam-age in 22b, injuries in 22c, and deaths in 22d.T h e t o t a l i n c i d e n t n u m b e r s i n f i g u r e 2 2 a i n -c lude bo th success fu l bombings and a t tempts ;the p roper ty damage and casua l ty f igures mayinc lude incend ia ry bombings as we l l as exp lo -s i v e b o m b i n g s . N o l o n g - t e r m t r e n d i s d e t e c -t a b l e f r o m t h e d a t a , a l t h o u g h a n u n u s u a l l yh i g h n u m b e r o f i n c i d e n t s a n d c a s u a l t i e s o c -cur red in 1975 . Th is increase was pr imar i ly dueto th ree inc iden ts .

1 . On January 24 a bombing a t the F raunces

2

3

Tavern in New York .City killed 4 people,injured 53 others, and did extensive prop-erty damage. Responsibility for the bomb-ing has been claimed by FALN, the PuertoRican separatist terrorists.A bomb detonated in the baggage claimarea at La Guardia Airport, on December29, killing 11 people with 70 additionalserious injuries. No positive identificationof the exact type of explosives used hasbeen made for this incident and no at-tribution has been made.A bomb detonated at a sponge factory inShelton, Corm., in March 1975, k i l l ing

Table 55.–Explosiv e 8 Bombing Incident Trends, 1972-78

Total actual and Total actual andattempted ex- attempted incen- Property damage Personal

Year plosive bombings Actual Attempted diary bombings Actual Attempted (dollar value) injury Death

1972 ., 951 714 237 1,011 793 218 $ 7,992,000 176 251973 . . . . . . . 995 742 253 960 787 173 7,262,0001974. , . . . . .

187 221,129 893 236 915 758 157 9,887,000 207 24

1975, . . . 1,326 1,088 238 748 613 135 27,004,000a 326’ 69a1976 ..., . . . 1,040 852 188 530 405 125 11,265,000 212 501 9 7 7 , . . . , 985 867 118 333 248 85 8,943,000 162 221978. , . . . . 873 768 105 428 349 79 9,161,000 135 18

alncludes three rnalor born~lrlg mcldents resulting In unusually high personal mjunes and dealhs and substanhal damage to ProPedY

SOURCE FBI UrJ//orrrJ Crmre Repwk t?wnb .%rnmary /978

Ch. V1—Taggant Utility Review . 141

Figure 22.—Annual Bombing Statistics, 1972-77

t 1 1 I I I I I3,000 ~

Including incendiary2 , 0 0 0 -

z 1 , 0 0 0 (1,301)873)

I 1 1 I Explosive only~ I. r

11972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

a. Number of incidents (includes attempts)

3 0 L I I I I I I -1

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

b. Property damage (includes incendiary bombings)

350f I I I d 1 I I)) 300

2 5 0 -.-Z 200

150 -(135)

100 “I 1 1 I 1 I

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

c. Persona/ injury (includes incendiary bombings)

‘ “ ~ ’ ‘1978

d. Deaths (includes incendiary bombings)

SOURCE: Drawn by OTA from FBI data

t h r e e p e o p l e a n d i n j u r i n g s e v e r a l o t h e r s .No attribution has been made for this inci-dent.

Using FBI and BATF data, the trend of bothtotal bombing incidents and catastrophic inci-

dents was analyzed by MSA for the 5-year peri-od from 1972 through 1976. The data show nos ign i f i can t change in inc iden ts over tha t per i -o d , a l t h o u g h 1 9 7 5 a n d 1 9 7 6 h a d s i g n i f i c a n t l yh igher in ju r ies and dea ths . In con t ras t to i n -ferences based on past statistics, many expertsbelieve a significant increase in bombings, par-

t i c u l a r l y c a t a s t r o p h i c b o m b i n g s , c a n b e e x -p e c t e d o v e r t h e n e x t f e w y e a r s . I t s h o u l d b en o t e d t h a t a s i n g l e i n c i d e n t i n v o l v i n g a n a i r -craft exploding in f l ight cou ld p roduce m o r edeaths than have occurred in the United Statesfrom bombings during this decade. Such inci-dents have occurred in foreign countries and anear miss occurred recently in New York. OnMarch 25, 1979, a TWA plane bound from NewYork to Los Angeles was delayed. A bombplanted in the checked baggage explodedwhile being transported to the aircraft on theluggage truck. If the aircraft had taken off ontime the bomb might have caused the deathsof most or all of the 166 people aboard.

Explosives Used in Bombs

Data on the types of fillers used in bombsare also not consistent between FBI and BATFdata banks. It is instructive to look at twoBATF data sources, however, as shown in table56. The second column represents 1978 datafor the fillers identified in the field for all ex-plosive bombs that were detonated, bombs re-covered undetonated, and criminal accidents.The first column represents 1978 data for onlythose fillers that were identified in the labo-ratory from postdetonation analysis. In bothcases, black and smokeless powders and cap-sensitive high explosives all occur with highfrequency. Table 57 shows a breakout of theestimated number of significant bombing in-cidents, deaths, injuries, and property damageoccurring during 1978 by explosive material fil-Ier. The average of the two frequencies col-umns shown in table 56 was used for the table57 estimates. (See app. F for the derivation of

Table 56.–ldentified Explosive Fillers Used in Bombs

Lab identified All identifiedfillers 1978 fillers 1978 Average

Black powder . . . . . . 13% 21% 17Y0Smokeless powder ., ., 16 19 17.5Military ., ., . . . . . . . . 2 7 4.5Cap sensitive . . . . ., 32 30 31Blasting agents. ., . . . . . – 1 .5Chemicals . . . . . . –Others, ., . . . . ., 36 2: 28:;

See app F for derivation of these numbersSOURCE BATF data


Table 57.–Bombing Casulties and Damage in 1978 by Type of Bomb


Filler material substantial targets Deaths Injuries $ millionsa

All fillers. ... . . . . . .Incendiary . . . . . .,Black powder ., ., . . . .S m o k e l e s s p o w d e r , . ,Military explosives. . . . . . . . . . .Cap sensitive. . . . . . .Other . . . . . . . . . .Unknown . .

1,298 23428 3148 4152 339 0

270 733

185131923

7264057

$17.23.7

.2

.2—3.32.47,4

Total for those fillers whichwould be directly tagged b, 570 14 68 3 7

avalue probably higher due to lack Of data uPdalebcap-sensltlve explosives black Powder, and smokeless powder would be ta99ed

SOURCE BATF data See app F for a dertvatlon of these rlgures

these numbers. ) The table shows that a largepercentage of the total bombings deaths andcasualties is caused by black powder, bysmokeless powder, and by cap-sensitive highexplosives.

Types of Targets Bombed

The types of targets that attract criminalbombers range from attacks on mailboxes andouthouses by vandals and pranksters to at-tacks on aircraft by terrorists. The targets mostfrequently attacked on a year-in, year-out basisare private residences, commercial facilities(usually small operations), and vehicles. Table58 is taken from the BATF 1978 Explosives inci-dents Report. It shows the total number of ac-tual bombings (both explosives and incendiary)fo r the year s 1 9 7 7 a n d 1 9 7 8 , t h e b o m b i n gbreakout by ta rge t type , the number k i l l ed andi n j u r e d , a n d t h e e s t i m a t e d p r o p e r t y d a m a g e ,all by target type. The FBI data are somewhatdifferent, but show the same trends in that themajority of bombings, property damage, andcasualties occurs at residences, at commercialfacilities, and in vehicles. In table 59, thesedata are rearranged to explicitly show thatmost of the bombings and casualties would oc-cur at targets that are not likely to be pro-tected by detection sensors. It is extremely un-likely that such sensors would be placed in pri-vate residences or in vehicles; most commer-cial establishments would also not have sen-sors. If the assumption is made that all of the

incidents that happened at commercial facili-ties occurred at facilities unlikely to be pro-tected by sensors, then 79 percent of the inci-dents, 89 percent of the injuries, and 94 per-cent of the deaths from actual explosive andincendiary bombings which happened in 1977and 1978 occurred at places unlikely to be pro-tected by detection taggant sensors.

Data are not available that would allow sep-aration of the explosive and incendiary bomb-ings statistics. It is Iikely that a larger percent-age of the targets of explosive bombings wouldbe of the type protected by a detection sensor,but probably not a large percentage.

Characteristics of Criminal Bombers

Criminal bombings are committed by a widerange of perpetrators, including both individu-als and groups. While it is always difficult toplace a heterogeneous population into well-de-fined categories with well-defined characteris-tics, it is helpful to group criminal bombersinto four categories: terrorists, common crim-inals, mentally disturbed, and vandals and ex-perimenters. These groups vary greatly in moti-vation, skill, training, resources, and ability torespond to a changing enforcement environ-ment. It is also difficult to determine whichgroup is responsible for a bombing, although“credit” is sometimes claimed, particularly bycertain terrorist groups. Of the bombings re-ported in the BATF 7978 Explosives Incidents

Ch. V1Taggant Utility Review ● 143

Table 58. –Bombings by Specific Targets for 1977-78 (actual detonations or ignitions)

Total incidents No. killed No. injured Property damagea

Type target 1977 1978 1977 1978 1977 1978 1977 1978

Residential . . 352 294 17 7 66 57 $ 1,022.3 $2,982.2C o m m e r c i a l 367 375 7 6 48 46 6,640.1 8,777.7A i r p o r t s / a i r c r a f t : . 7 l – 1 — ,2Police facllltles/vehicle . . . . . 14 2 : — — — — 5 : ; 70.4Educational ., . . . . 106 97 — — 13 5 43.1 532.3G o v e r n m e n t ( l o c a l ) 24 9 — 1 1 4 145.6 70.1G o v e r n m e n t ( F e d e r a l ) 26 22 — — 4 1 2.4 6.6M i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s 4 3 — — — 1 — 0.0U t d i l i t i e s . . 51 57 l – 1 2 628.0 1,727.7Banks . 22 18 — — — — 225.2 49.3V e h i c l e s 216 252 11 7 24 25 363.3 2,119.4O p e n a r e a s 36 40 1 2 8 13 .5 4.2Mailboxes . 48 69 — — 1 2 25.8 2,1O t h e r 90 137 — — 8 27 1,206.8 869.9U n k n o w nb 34 2 — — 5 2 22.6 0.0

Total ., ., 1,397 1,409 38 23 180 185 $10,331.7 $17,212.1

ap(opefiy danlage figures are In thousands and are esmated~Thls category includes those Incldenls where the type [argel was either unknown or not repofled

S O U R C E BATF T978 Exphswes Inc(derm Reporf

Table 59.–Percent of Bomber Targets That Would Be Protected by a Detection Sensor

Total bombings a Injuries Deaths

A v e r a g e n u m b e r o f b o m b i n g s o f k n o w n , s u b s t a n t i a l t a r g e t s b . . . 1,175 150 29Bombings of residences, vehicles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557 (47%) 86 (58%) 21 (72%)Bombings of commercial establishments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 (32%) 47 (31%) (22%)Total unlikely to have sensors . . . . . . 928 (79%) 133 (89%) 2 (940/0)

alncludes both Incendiary and exploswe bombings for 1977 and 1978bopen f(elds and mailboxes are excluded from these data

SOURCE BATF data

Repor t , a m o t i v e w a s e s t a b l i s h e d for only 2 3percent of the bombings in 1977 and only 38percent in 1978. Keeping in mind the above ca-veats, it is nonetheless useful to examine thecharacteristics of the various groups, whichare summarized in table 60 and briefly de-scribed below.

Terrorists

The terrorist groups active in the UnitedStates vary widely in ability, resources, train-ing, and adaptability. They share the commoncharacteristics, however, of high motivation,action as a part of a group, and a continuinginvolvement in catastrophic, illegal activitiesagainst society. These characteristics make theterrorist particularly dangerous to society anda particularly appropriate target for anti bomb-ing controls. Terrorists can be roughly divided

into pol i t ical , react ionary, and separat istgroups. Political groups, such as the WeatherUnderground, are primarily interested in at-tracting attention to and sympathy with theircause. For that reason they engage in spectacu-lar events, such as bombings, but generally at-tempt to avoid or Iimit injury and death result-ing from their bombings. Political terroristsoften have considerable resources available tothem, due to a significant number of peoplewho support their aim, if not necessarily theirmeans. The leadership of most of these groupsare of above-average intelligence, and haveeither had specialized training or have studiedextensively in terrorist activities. They are thusable to adapt to a changing environment, al-though the range of responses available tothem may be limited by their political aims.They may lack mechanical skilIs, however, andbe more likely to be involved in accidental ex-


Table 60.–Attributes of Criminal Bomber Groups

ExperiencePerpetrator and training Resources Motivation Individual or group Reaction capability Frequency

CriminalUnsophisticated . . . . . . . .Sophisticated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TerroristPolitical ., ., ., . . . . . . .Separatist . . . ., ... . . . . .Reactionary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

MH

MH

MultiMulti

LH

LM

II

M-HML

M-HHH

GGG

M-HH

L-M

MultiMultiMulti

M-HM-H

L

Mentally disturbedDisenchanted ... . . . .Vengeful ., . . . . . . . . . . .Pathological . . . . . . . . . . .

LL

L-M

LLL

L-MM-H

H

III

LL-ML-M

SingleSingleVaries

OtherVandals ., ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Experimenter . . . . . . . . . . . .

L-ML-M

LL-M

SingleSingle

LM

LL

II

L-Low, M-Moderate, H-High, I-lndwldual, G. GroupSOURCE Ofllce ol Technology Assessment

plosions, either while fabricating bombs orwhile placing them. Political terrorists have be-come less visible in the United States in recentyears.

Separatist groups, such as FALN, generallyhope to gain their aim by generating a reactionto their activities, rather than sympathy fortheir aims. They are therefore generally lessconcerned with public revulsion to bombingsthat cause substantial injury and deaths. Sep-aratist groups have been credited with morethan 25 percent of catastrophic bombings—those resulting in major property damage, in-juries, and deaths. The resources of domesticseparatists vary from group to group, but aregenerally less than for comparable groups ofpolitical terrorists, as only a fraction of thepopulation represents even potential support-ers. As an example, few people outside of theYugoslavian exile community care whether ornot the Croatians achieve separation from theYugoslavian federation; on the other hand, agroup like the Weather Underground, thatseeks to exploit discontent with the U.S. Gov-ernment, could seek support from a larger pop-ulation. Separatist groups are often criticallydependent on a small cadre of leaders; loss orincapacitation of those leaders may shatter thegroup or considerably reduce their effec-tiveness. As an example, FALN in New Yorklost their bombmaker over a year ago and have

not committed any bombings in New Yorksince that time. Their ability to react to achanging control environment is less than thepolitical terrorist groups, due to more limitedresources. If the goal of the separatist group isviewed with sympathy by a large part of thepopulation, as is the case in Northern Ireland,then the group can attract resources, attractrecruits, and perfect skills. If, on the otherhand, the population is either not in sympathywith the separatists or is not directly affectedby the cause of the separatists (as is the case ofthe Croatians in the United States or the SouthMoluccans in the Netherlands), then the groupwill not be able to attract resources or other-wise grow.

Reactionary groups, such as the Ku KluxKlan and the American Nazi Party, would ap-pear to share some of the characteristics of thepolitical terrorists, but generally do not pos-sess the same levels of training, motivation,and resources, and are not as capable of react-ing effectively to a changing control environ-ment. They also differ in that their bombingsare usually directly targeted at the individualor group they intend to influence, rather thansimply at a spectacular target. Generally, theirpurpose is intimidation; thus, fairly small, con-tained bombs are used. Even when murder orinjury is desired, the results are usually con-fined to the directly targeted individual. While

Ch. V/— Taggant Utility Review ● 145

the political terrorists are generally youngerand well-educated, the reactionary terroriststend to be less well-educated and somewhatolder.

Terrorists, as a group, have been responsiblefor approximately 12 percent of those bomb-ing incidents in the past 5 years for which theFBI attributed a motive,

Common Criminals

Criminals range from the petty operator whoutilizes a bomb for extortion to the profession-al bombers of organized crime, The petty oper-ator is generalIy poorly trained, not very moti-vated, has limited resources, and cannot readi-ly adapt to a changing enforcement environ-ment. The only major characteristics he shareswith the professional bomber are that his tar-gets are generalIy individuals or smalI commer-cial establishments, unlikely to be protectedby a detection taggant sensor, and that hegenerally works alone or as part of a smallgroup. The petty operator normally engages inrepeated bombings over a number of years.

The professional bomber is highly trainedand motivated and generally has considerableresources available to him, either directly orthrough his “employer.” While the profession-al generally works alone, he may be affiliatedwith a larger criminal structure, such as the or-ganized crime network in the United States.His target may range from bombs planted as aresult of labor problems to murder-for-hire“hits.” The professional bomber and the moresophisticated terrorists share many character-istics and are the most difficult to control orcontain.

Criminals as a group are responsible for ap-proximately 11 percent of bombing incidents.Most incidents are limited to specific targetsand do not generally cause substantial injuryor death to innocent bystanders.

Mentally Disturbed

The category of mentally disturbed includespsychopaths, those seeking revenge for a realor imagined wrong, and those who may be tem-porarily disenchanted with a particular situa-

tion. Many of the individuals who become ter-rorists or criminals could fall into this broadcategory; the term is Iimited here to the dis-turbed persons who act alone and do not actfor profit.

The mentally disturbed bomber also differsfrom terrorists and criminals in that he general-ly does not engage in multiple bombings, al-though exceptions such as the Los Angeles “al-phabet bomber” certainly exist. He generally ispoorly trained, has limited resources, and actsalone. He is often highly motivated, but per-haps only for short periods of time, in direct re-sponse to some stimulus. He is extremely Iim-ited in his ability to respond to changing con-trol situations, either through lack of care ofconsequences or belief in his invincibility. Ashis motives are hard to identify, it is difficult topredict his target.

The mentally disturbed account for approxi-mately 38 percent of al I bombing incidentsthat can be attributed to a specific type of per-petrator.

Vandals and Experimenters

Vandals and experimenters share the charac-teristics of poor training, limited motivation,and limited resources. They generally workalone or in small groups, and do not generallyintend to harm people or cause extensive dam-age. Their targets are often of little value, suchas mailboxes or outhouses, but some acts ofvandalism can cause extensive damage tobuildings such as schools. While accountingfor 39 percent of the reported bombing inci-dents, they are responsible for little damageand few casualties.

The primary danger from this group is that aharmless prank may accidently turn into a ma-jor bombing with subsequent significant prop-erty loss and casualties. There is also the dan-ger that experimenters will learn their craft and“graduate” to a more dangerous category ofcriminal bomber.

In summary, table 61 shows the approximatenumber of signif icant explosive bombings (ex-c l u d i n g m a i l b o x e s a n d d e t o n a t i o n s i n t h eopen) that would be attributable to each type

146 Taggants in Explosives

Table 61 .–Estimated Number of Significant Bombings byGroup of Porpotrators (average of years 1974-78)

Estimated numberPerpetrator group of bombings

Terrorists, ., ., ., ., 107Criminals . . . . . . . 98Mentally disturbed ., ., . . . . ., ., ., 340Vandals and experimenters. ., . . . . 348

SOURCE FBI data See app F for a deribation of these figures

of perpetrator, if the same relative distributionby perpetrator held for unattributed bombingsas for attributed ones. To obtain these esti-mates, OTA averaged F B I data from the 5years 1974-78 (no 1979 data is yet available).Year-to-year numbers vary due to changes inthe FBI categories and method for allocatingbombings by motive. (See app, F for more de-tail. )

No detailed data is available concerning thenumber of deaths and injuries caused by thevarious bomber groups. However, almost 40percent of catastrophic bombings (those withcasualties or serious property damage) are at-tributed to separatist terrorists and the moreprofessional criminals.

Sources of Explosives

The explosives used in criminal bombingscan come from a variety of sources, including:

●

●

●

●

●

●

legal purchase,illegal purchase,theft,importation from abroad,homemade, andtheft of some components, fabrication ofothers.

At present, a determination of the source of ex-plosives can rarely be made except in the caseof bombs that have been recovered undeto-nated. The date-shift code information on thecartridge label allows the source of the recov-ered explosives to be traced. Such traces can,theoretically, locate the source of essentiallyall cap-sensitive high explosives recovered intheir original cartridges; however, investigativeeffort is necessary to determine which of thelast legal purchasers on the list is the source of

the explosives. Such an effort would be ex-pended if the recovered bomb had the poten-tial to cause catastrophic damage, if the targetwas an important one, or if the pattern of theattempted bombing indicates that useful intel-ligence information would be gathered by thetrace. Devices recovered undetonated, whichwere small in size or which were to be usedagainst relatively unimportant targets, maywelI never be reported to the BATF network,

While it is impossible to determine preciselythe source of explosives used in most criminalbombings, analysis of the existing data does in-dicate some trends. Examining table 56, it ap-pears that homemade explosives are used veryinfrequently in cr iminal bombings in theUnited States, although they account for up to85 to 90 percent of the explosives used in coun-tries such as West Germany and England,where commercial explosives are rigorouslycontrolled. There also appears to be little useof explosives imported from abroad, a judg-ment supported by discussion with various lawenforcement agencies. Both of these sourcescould become more important, however, if ataggant program were legislated.

I I legal purchases are primarily of stolen ex-plosives, discussed below. That leaves legalpurchases and theft as the primary currentsources of explosives.

Explosive materials can be purchased legallyin each State; the requirements vary from Stateto State, and they vary for different explosivematerials. In every State, gunpowder can bepurchased legally; identif ication may or maynot be required for smokeless powders and isrequired for black powder. In some States,cap-sensitive high explosives can be purchasedsimply by showing identification and fillingout a form. In others, the explosives can onlybe legally sold to people with State or FederalIicenses.

A general rule-of-thumb expressed by mostlaw enforcement personnel was that criminalbombers will use the most easily availablesource. If explosives can be purchased legally,the bombers will do so; the Weather Under-ground apparently purchased much of their ex-

Ch. V/— Taggant Utility Review ● 147

plosives legally in New Hampshire. If explo-sives are easy to steal, then stolen explosiveswill be used. Explos ives are more prevalentand eas ier to s teal in the western S tates ; alarge thef t f rom Colorado, fo r ins tance, fu r-n i shed the explos ives fo r a la rge number o fbombings in the Eastern States.

BATF keeps t rack of s to len explos ives , aswell as explosives seized, recovered, or found.The data for 1977 and 1978 are summarized intable 62. While no firm conclusions as to out-standing amounts of explosives can be madeon the basis of the data, several trends are ap-parent.

Little gunpowder is stolen. As gunpowderare easily purchased, there is little needfor theftLarge amounts of blasting agents arestolen, and recovered, each year. Accord-ing to table 56, however, little of it is usedin criminal bombings.More military explosives seem to be re-covered than stolen. This may be due tothe inclusion of “souvenirs” as recoveredexplosives, or to the reluctance of the mil-itary to report thefts. At any rate, theamounts stolen are small. Much of themiIitary explosives used by cr iminalbombers is material acquired some yearsago. For instance, the Cuban exile terroristgroups, such as omega 7, still primarilyuse C-4 given to them by the Central In-telligence Agency at the time of the Bayof Pigs invasion.

●

●

The amount of cap-sensitive explosivesstolen and recovered appears in roughbalance. Some of the recovered explo-sives, however, include abandoned explo-sives found in old mines and other places.A significant net amount is probably avail-able, and used, for criminal bombings.

A large net number of blasting caps ap-pears to be stolen each year, and to beavailable for use in criminal bombings.This is not surprising as caps are generallynot as well secured as main charge explo-sives. If a taggant program is initiated, se-curity of detonators will require upgrad-ing, as detonators are generally needed toinitiate explosives and the fabrication ofdetonators is a much more diff icult andd a n g e r o u s j o b t h a n f a b r i c a t i o n o f t h emain explosive charge.

An additional analysis can be made of thefrequency with which explosives are stolen ona State-by-State basis and compared to the fre-quency of criminal bombings. A high correla-tion appears between the number of thefts andnumber of bombings. An even higher correla-tion appears when the thefts from nearbyStates are included in the analysis. As an exam-ple, both California and New York have morestringent regulations controlling the use andstorage of explosives than nearby States suchas New Jersey and Washington. Law enforce-ment officials feel that many of the incidentsin New york and California use explosivesstolen in New Jersey and Washington.

Table 62.–Stolen and Recovered Explosive Summary

Amount stolen Amount recovered

Tvpe 1977 1978 1977 1978

Blasting agents, pounds . . 20,834 42,172 21,260 23,623Black powder, pounds. . . . . 145 379 277 723Smokeless powder, pounds . . . 0 163 16 1,361Boosters, pounds . 2,177 9,528 2,804 362M i l i t a r y e x p l o s i v e s , p o u n d s . , 49 140 640 701C a p - s e n s i t i v e h i g h e x p l o s i v e , p o u n d s 36,498 44,316 43,738 41,097Primer, units ., ., ., : : . 1,300 4,333 2,733 344B l a s t i n g c a p s , u n i t s 61,531 66,614 40,719 44,456D e t . c o r d / s a f e t y f u s e / l g n l t o r c o r d f e e t . 183,224 113,510 84,554 101,117

T o t a l , e x p l o s i v e s , p o u n d s 61,003 101,217 71,470 74,966B l a s t i n g c a p s , u n i t s 61,531 66,614 40,719 44,456Det cord/safety fuse/igniter cord, feet . . 183,224 113,510 84,554 101.117

SOURCE BATF 1978 Explosivea incidents Report


Current Security Measures

Sources of Explosives

Current methods of securing explosives varysomewhat from State to State; different typeso f e x p l o s i v e s a r e a l s o s e c u r e d i n d i f f e r e n tways. In general , a l l cap-sens i t ive h igh ex-plos ives , inc luding boosters and detonat ingcord, must be stored in BAT F-approved maga-zines. The magazines require hardened locksand lock-covers to protect the lock from directaccess by hacksaws or from attempts to shootoff the lock. Detonators must be stored sepa-rately, in magazines that are not as well pro-tected from theft as the high-explosive maga-zines. Blasting agents are not as well-regu-Iated; bulk ANFO is often stored in large hop-pers for direct loading into trucks. Gunpow-der are stored in BATF-approved magazines,at least at the manufacturer and distributorlevels. At the retail sales level however, gun-powders are just stacked on the shelves.

The above provisions are for permanentstorage; some States allow overnight storageof explosives in temporary magazines; at leastone manufacturer keeps less than full-lotamounts of detonators in the detonator as-sembly area overnight.

The purpose of BATF and other regulationson the storage of explosives is primarily to pro-tect against surreptitious or casual theft byoutsiders, in much the same way that lockingyour car door protects the car from theft. Themagazines, however, are fairly flimsy, oftensimply a correlated frame building with addi-tional plywood or plank walls. Entry can stillbe gained by cutting or prying off the locks,forcing entry through the door, a window, theroof, or a vent, or by help from an employee.Table 63, from the BATF 1978 Explosives Inci-dents Report, tabulates the methods used togain entry to explosives. An average of 48 per-cent of known entries were by removing thelock, another 16 percent were by forcing entrythrough the door, wall or vent, while almost 9percent involved the use of a key or other in-side help.

Some magazines are well-protected by theirplacement in a facility or by guards. At the

Table 63.–Explosivos Thefts by Method of Entry–Number of Incidents and Percentages for 1977-78

Number Percentage

Entry method 1977 1978 1977 1978

Locks cut. . . . . . . . . . . .Locks pried ... . . .,Door pried . . . . . . . . . . .Key. ... . . . . . . . . . . .Window entry. . . . . . . .Inside help. ., . . . . . . . .Wall entry ... . . . . . . .Burning. . . . . . . . . . .Roof entry . . . . . . . . . .Door blown. . . . . . . . . . .Floor entry . . . . . . . . . .Vent entry . . . . . . . . . . .Other b. . . . . . . . . . . . . .Unknown. . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59361014

73

1027101

40137

327

71 31.1 26.950 18.9 19.010 5.3 3.923 7.4 8.8

3 3.7 1.10 1.6 –

16 5.3 6.11 1.0 .43 3.7 1.12 .5 .8

.43 .5 1.1

80 21.0 30.499 – –

362 100 100

a These percentages do not Include 137 unknown method incidents for 1977 and the 99 Incidentfor 1978

b This figure reflects those incidents where the entry method could not be Placed in the above

categories

SOURCE BATF 1978 Explosives incidents Report

Bingham Copper Mine, for instance, the maga-zine is placed within the interior of the proper-ty of the large open pit mine. The mine has alimited number of access points, controlled byguards. As the mine is operated three shifts aday, 7 days a week, it would be difficult foranyone to gain illegal access to the magazinearea. A similar situation prevails for at leastone manufacturer. The entire property isfenced with cyclone fencing, topped bybarbed wire. Inside the perimeter, and placedstrategically throughout the complex, is amicrowave break-circuit alarm system. Thesefacilities are in sharp contrast to others, inwhich the magazines are located in areas re-mote from other operations, and accessible bynearby roads.

Security of explosives on military reserva-tions is stricter, with magazines within afenced area. Security lighting is provided, themagazines are either directly guarded or pro-tected by an alarm which would bring a re-sponse within 15 minutes, security patrol in-spections are held at frequent intervals, andaccess is only through secured access roads.

At present neither commercial nor militaryinstallations can guard against theft by in-siders. While the theft of case lots would be

Ch. V—Taggant Utility Review ● 149

quickly discovered by inventory procedures, itwould be difficult to detect the theft of smallamounts of explosives, whether by militarytroops or by a miner daily placing a couple ofsticks of dynamite in his lunch pail.

Transportation of explosives is another po-tential point of theft. The primary purpose ofregulations concerning the transportation ofexplosives is to protect those people who Iivealong the route being traversed. For that rea-son trucks are clearly marked when they carryexplosives. Commercial explosives are oftentransported by a single driver; military ex-plosives normally have two drivers. In neithercase is the driver normalIy armed.

Potential Targets

A previous section discussed the wide varie-ty of targets attacked by criminal bombers.The security measures vary widely for eachtype, in response to the perceived probabilityof attack and the perceived consequence ofsuch a bombing. Table 59 indicates that almosthalf of the bombing incidents (and 60 percentof bombing casualties) result from attacks onprivate residences and vehicles. Security atthese targets is almost nonexistent, unless theindividual believes he is likely to be attacked;except in certain cases, such as Governmentofficials or witnesses, it is unlikely that law en-forcement officials play much of a securityrole with regard to those targets.

Another 32 percent of the incidents, and 30percent of the casualties, occur in commercialestablishments. Most of these establishmentshave no security means at present and it isunlikely that the development of detectiontaggants and sensors would significantlychange that situation. Some large office build-ings, with control led access, have provisionsfor checking people as they enter and leavethe building and, in fact, institute checks inoff work hours. G iven a sufficiently severebombing threat, it would be possible to protectthe larger facilities by a detection sensor, butthe difficulties involved, the large number offacilities, and the cost of operators and equip-ment probably preclude such deployment.

Government buildings, banks, police sta-tions, and military establishments account forless than 10 percent of bombing incidents andjust over 3 percent of casualties. Most of thesetargets have controlled access and maintainsome sort of guards. In times of increasedbombing threats, as happened in the late1960’s and early 1970’s, many of these facili-ties instituted checks of incoming people andpackages. A similar situation exists with re-spect to high-value manufacturing facilities,utilities, and high-value complexes within edu-cational facilities, such as computer centers.Many of these facilities now require inspectionof any parcels (including briefcases and purses)brought into the facility, as well as identifica-tion of people entering. Detection sensorscould be easily installed in each of these facili-ties, given sufficient threat.

Airports and aircraft represent another ma-jor class of potential targets. While attacks onairports and aircraft represent well under 1percent of incidents, the catastrophic conse-quences of an aircraft bombing make it an at-tractive potential target for criminal bombersand the subject of much current security ef-fort.

Current large aircraft cost in the neighbor-hood of $2o million to $50 million each, andcarry several hundred passengers. A single air-craft bombing could, therefore, cause moreproperty damage and more deaths than thesum of all domestic bombings this decade.Table 64 lists the explosions that have oc-curred aboard U.S. aircraft from 1949 through1976. Table 65 lists the location of the explo-sive devices for the 19 U.S. aircraft listed intable 64 and compares the location with the 63aircraft bombings worldwide in that time peri-od. Table 66 Iists the 26 incidents between1972 and 1976 in which explosive or incendiarydevices were found at U.S. airports. All of thetables are from FAA report FAA-R D-77-28. Thetables show that no bomb has caused casual-ties on a domestic flight since 1962; in fact,since 1962, all but one of the casualties, and alldeaths at U.S. airports or on U.S. domesticflights, were caused by bombs placed inlockers.


Table 64.–Explosions Aboard U.S. Aircraft

Date Carrier Aircraft Aircraft location Bomb location Outcome Device

1 1/1/557/25/57

1/6/60

5/22/62

11/12/67

11/ 19/68

8/29/69

9 / 7 / 7 0

9/12/70

12/29/71

3 / 8 / 7 29/21 /7312/17/73

8/26/74

9 / 8 / 7 4

2/3/75

12/19/75

7 / 2 / 7 6

7/5/76

. . . . -- -- . . . ,. --BaggageLavatory

Airplane disintegrated–44 killedPassenger thrown out of lavatory–

hole in aircraft side; plane landedsuccessfully

34 killed, airplane disintegrated

Tail blown off–45 killed

3 bags destroyed; aircraft saved

Fire and explosion in lavatory;extinguished by crew; plane landedsafely

No casualties from explosion

Demolished after evacuation


Aircraft destroyed, hangar damaged;no casualties

No casualties (plane empty)Not knownFire damage; 30 killed,many injured

Fire, confined to local area;no casualties

High-order explosion; 88 killed,aircraft lost

Extinguished by crew; minimumdamage

$10,000 damage to aircraft

Explosion and fire destroyed mainfuselage

Extensive damage

DynamiteDynamite

Dynamite, dry cells

Dynamite

Black powder (?)

—

Grenades &canister explosive

—

—

—

c-4—White phosphorous

grenadesc-4

—

Petrol and butane

Blasting caps

Dynamite (8-10sticks)

Dynamite

UALWA

NA

co

AA

co

TW

PA

TW

—

TW—PA

TW

TW

PA

—

EA

—

UL-6BCY-240

DC-6B

707

727

707

707

747

707

Turbo Cmdr

707Navion

707

707

707

747

AlouetteHelicopter

Electra

Helicopter

11 minutes after 1047 minutes after TO

184 minutes after TO

39,000 ft

102 minutes after TO

24,000 ft

Ground after hijack(Damascus, Syria)

Ground after hijack(Cairo, Egypt)

Ground after hijack(Dawson Field, Jordan)

In hangar

Parked on groundParked on groundOn ground, Rome

On ground, Rome

Over Ionian Sea

In air, Burma

On ground

Parked next to fence

On ground

Under seat passengercompartment

Towel container in rearlavatory

Rear baggagecompartment

Lavatory

Explosives thrown incockpit after evacuation

—

—

Seat in cabin

CockpitEngine manifoldAttack while loading

Aft baggage compartment


Lavatory (suicidalpassenger set fire)

Near fuel tank

External, near rightlanding gear

External, under tail

SOURCE FAA Civil Avaton Security Service

Table 65.–Location of Explosions Aboard Aircraft, 1949-76

Worldwide U.S. aircraft

f rom FAA repor t FAA-RD-77-28, shows a de-tailed schematic of the flow of people and ma-terial into the airport area.

I t i s poss ib le that bombs could be in t ro-duced through the mai l , f re ight , a i r cour ierserv ices , o r f o o d serv ices , as wel l as f romchecked baggage; or could be carried on byaircraft flight or service personnel or by pas-sengers. Current security procedures assumethat personnel screening procedures will besufficient to eliminate a serious threat fromairport or a ircraft personnel and that a irfreight and mail service would not allow acriminal bomber to be sure his bomb would beaboard a particular aircraft. Current aircraftsecurity procedures, therefore, concentrate onpassengers, carry-on baggage, and checkedbaggage. Air courier services, in which a small

Location of explosion Number Percent Number Percent

Stowed . . ... , ., . .Baggage. . . . . . . .Cargo or freight ., ...

Ground at tack. . . . ,External attachment. . .Passenger or crew

compartment. . . . .Lavatory. ... . . . . .Passenger compartmentCockpit. . . . . .

Unknown, . . . . . . . . .

13(8)(5)57

21—

43

21—

811

2116

(19)(4)5

63

52———

8

(2)

19

42—

oTotal . . . . . . . . 100 100

SOURCE Data supplied by FAA Civil Avation Security Service

Current airport security is based on an at-tempt to separate the areas of public accessfrom the secure air operations areas. Figure 23,


Table 66.–Explosions and Device Found at U.S. Airports, 1972-75

Date Airport Location Effects Comment Device,

3 / 7 / 23/8/72

11 /19/72

3/24/72

12/1 /72

12/31 /723/20/73

3/29/738 / 9 / 7 3

11/30/73

3/1 /747/21 /74

8/1 /74

8 / 6 / 7 48 / 9 / 7 4

8/26/749/ 16/74

3/15/753/22/753/27/757/22/75

KenneaySeattle

Denver

San Carlos, Calif

Grand RapIds,Mich.Austin

Los Angeles

MilwaukeeLos Angeles

Nashville

KennedyNew Orleans

Kennedy

Los AngelesJohnstown-Camoria, Pa.

O’HareBoston

San FranciscoHonolulu

Kingsford, MichTampa

10/17/75 Miami10/20/75 Miami

11/6/75 Buffalo

11 /27/75 Miami

12/29/75 La Guardia

Cockpit of TWA B-707Baggage compartment (UALflight)

Attache case carried byIndividual

Hanging from belly ofhelicopter

Paper towel container interminalConcession areaOn runway during approachof Continental Airlines plane

LockerLocker

Locker

Locker(unknown)

Cargo building

LockerHangar

Men’s roomAirline baggage room

Near ticket counterLost & found baggage areaStorage areaBaggage cartLockerDominican Airlines Office

Baggage claim area (2 bags)

Bahamasair aircraft. Behindwall panel in lavatory

Locker

No explosionNo explosion

No explosion

Hole in ground at remotelocation

No exploslion

Moderate damageNone

1 Injury–moderate damageDid not detonate

Did not detonate

3 injured–moderate damageNo explosion

No explosion

3 killed, 34 injuredHangar and aircraft destroyed

Commode damagedSubstantial damage

Minor damageDid not detonateNo explosion1 injuredLockers and ceiling destroyedNo explosion

No exploslon

No explosion

11 killed, 70 injured;substantial damage

Detected by dogExtortion attempt; timer

stoppedIndvidual stated intent toblow up plane

Removed by police

Device extinguished afteremithng smoke

—Thrown by individual on field

Extortion attemptExtortion attempt/locatedby dogs

Extortion attempt

—Removed by bomb squad

Removed

——

—Bomb was in an unclaimed

c-4Gelatin dynamite in aerosolcans, blasting caps

8 sticks of dynamite

3 sticks of dynamite, timer anddetonators

—

Incendiary (gasoline)Molotov cocktail

——

Smokeless powder, timer,initator

—

3-m long bamboo with powderand fuse

Cardboard container withexplosive powder, fireworksfuse

—Probable incendiary (in 55-galdrum)

Probably firecrackersIncendiary (?)

suitcase destined for Tel Aviv— Probably firecracker— Crude pipe bombRemoved —— Firecrackers— —Discovered by janitor; Time bombdisarmed by bomb squad

Checked bags unclaimed after Black powder and gasolineflight, timers turned off(inadvertently)

Removed —

— Dynamite and RDXa

a FAA estimate Other agencies diagree with this assessment

SOURCE FAA CIVII Aviation Security Service

parcel can be placed aboard a specific aircraftfor subsequent pickup, are treated in the sameway as freight or maiI by most airlines.

As a result of the hijacking threat in the mid-1970’s, a set of procedures were developed todeal with passengers, checked baggage, andcarry-on baggage. Figure 24 (from FAA reportFAA-R D-78-66) shows a schematic of the pas-senger and carry-on luggage-screening systems.Passengers must pass through a magnetom-

eter, which will trigger an alarm upon detec-tion of a significant metal mass, such as a gunor knife. If the alarm is triggered, the passengeris instructed to remove any metal objects, s u c has keys, and repass through the magnetometer,If an alarm still rings, he is searched by a hand-held magnetometer and subject to a patdownsearch if the alarm persists. FAA estimates thatthe probability of detection of guns or knivesby the magnetometer, hand magnetomer, andpatdown, are 0.90, 0.95, and 0.95, respectively,adding up to an overall detection probability


v13 NNOSU3d

u =\ I

~ ? ,

d dL = - - - - - - - - - - - - -~

D k I G r i l

------

~lE~,,,,,,,,--f:

iI

Iii

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 6

— —3Nl13dld

b = 413 iNNOSti3d


Figure 24.—Passenger/Hand-BaggageScreening Station

oo

o = Screening contractor personnel

o= Law enforcement officer

SOURCE: FAA report No. FAA-RD-78-88

of 0.81. * The system is not designed to detectbombs, but FAA estimates that the probabilityof detecting a bomb is 0.17.

Carry-on baggage is screened, either by an X-ray examination or by visual hand search (onlyat small airports or when the X-ray machines

● The total probability of detection must be less than the prob-ability of detection by the magnetometer, as no subsequentsearches are conducted on those passengers who do not triggerthe magnetometer Total detection probability is thus

PDT = ( PD 1) (PD,) (PDN)

are nonoperable). FAA estimates that the prob-abiIity of detecting guns and bombs in carry-onbaggage is 0.81 and 0.19, respectively.

FAA estimates are probably high, especiallyfor the X-ray detection of illegal materials inhand baggage. Magnetometers are set to awide range of sensitivities; one may trigger ona small keyring while another may fail to trig-ger on a sizable metal mass. X-ray attendantsare generally paid at, or near, the minimumwage, have little training, and must deal withthe problem of maintaining alertness for longhours while performing an extremely dull job.While an attendant may well recognize a gun,particularly at the start of a shift, it is doubtfulthat a carefully constructed explosive devicewould be detected.

Notwithstanding the above limitations, theuse of magnetometers and X-ray machines,coupled with a search profile of likely hi-jackers, has resulted in the recovery of an im-pressive amount of hardware, and the arrest ofsubstantial numbers of people, as shown intable 67 (from FAA report FAA-R D-77-28), aswell as the virtual halt of hijackings of U.S.domestic airlines.

T h e c u r r e n t procedure for screeningchecked baggage consists simply of ensuringthat baggage can only be checked by a pas-senger with a valid ticket. When checking bag-gage at curbside or at the check-in counter, the

Table 67.–Results of Civil Aviation Security Program Passenger Screening

1972 1973 1974 1975Passengers (millions) ., . . ., . . ., 192 203 201 202P a s s e n g e r s d e n i e d b o a r d i n g . . , . , 8,265 3,459 2,663 (a)Referrals to law enforcement . . . ., ... (a) (a) (a) 12,270Persons arrested. ... ... ., ., . . .,Aviation offenses detected

3,658 3,156 3,501 2,464

Carrying weapons or explosives aboard aircraft 774 736 1,147 1,364Giving false information ., ., ., ., . . . . 244 658 1,465 227

Weapons detectedFirearms. . . 1,313 2,162 2,450 4,783Explosive devices . . ., ... ... ., 13 3,459 14,928 b 158Ammunition, fireworks, ... ., ., ., . . (a) (a) (a) 17,047Knives . . . . . . . . . 10,316 23,290 21,468 46,318Other ., ... , ., ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,203 28,740 28,864 55,830

aData 1101 collected In this formbThls figure IS a piece count which Includes hreworks and ammuntmn

SOURCE Fws[ Second, and Ttwd Sem/-Anrwa/ Reports 10 Corrgress on (he E((ecfweness of Passenger Screemng procedures, FAA CIVII Awat!on SecuritySerwce

f “ -[4 n 1 r) _ g o - 11


passenger must show his ticket. The systemcan be totally defeated by anyone willing tobuy a ticket he does not use, by convincingsomeone to check a piece of luggage for him,or by a suicidal passenger.

EL AL does hand search each piece ofchecked baggage before it is boarded, as dothe British and French for Concorde flights.Spot checks are made at most airports, partic-ularly if the passenger is identified as matchingthe hijacker profile, or in times of high per-ceived bombing threat.

In recognition of the fact that all but onecasualty in recent years in domestic airlines orat domestic airports have been due to bombsplaced in lockers, most airports have eitherremoved the lockers entirely or placed thembehind the security inspection gate.

In summary, most bombings take place attargets that have no means of detect ingbombs. Some high-value targets check incom-ing parcels and require identification. Airportprocedures are quite effective in finding gunsin carry-on luggage or on the person of a pas-senger, but much less effective in findingbombs. The probability of finding a bomb inchecked baggage is low and essentially nil forcourier service, mail, or freight.

Current Anti bomber Procedures

The predetonation anti bomber proceduresfollowed by security personnel at airports aretypical of the entire security industry. Effort isprimarily directed at prevention — the best pro-cedure is to not allow bombs to reach the se-cured areas of the airport or the aircraft.

The anti bomber procedures of most law en-forcement personnel are primarily aimed atthe apprehension and conviction of criminalbombers normally starting after a criminalbombing has occurred. The actual range andintensity of the effort will vary with the severi-ty of the bombing and wil l be somewhat dif-ferent for different parts of the country.

The first step in the postdetonation in-vestigation is to secure the area of the bomb-ing, both to ensure that no further danger ex-

ists from unexploded material and to preservewhatever clues remain in the area.

After the area is secured, a search is madefor physical evidence. This search has twoobjectives —evidence of the presence of theperpetrator and evidence of the bomb. Tracesof the perpetrator include small pieces ofclothing, hair, fingerprints, footprints, and pos-sible tire tracks. Fingerprints, in the rare casesthey are found, provide a clue to the identityof the perpetrator; the other evidence wouldbe primarily used to tie the suspect to thecrime after he has been apprehended by othermeans. Evidence from the bomb includes un-detonated explosives and parts of the con-tainer, the detonator, and the timing system.Debris from the explosive is also collected forlaboratory analysis.

If the bomb does not fully detonate, thedate-shift code information may be recovera-ble, providing a clue to the source of explo-sives and a list of the last legal purchasers. Ifthe device fully detonates, the parts of thetimer and container can provide some informa-tion to start an investigation, but the leads sogenerated are quite indirect. The debris ismore likely to furnish intelligence information,such as connecting a particular bombing withsimiIar bombings.

The next step in the investigation is a labora-tory analysis of the debris, and a followup in-vestigation to attempt to trace the perpetratorfrom whatever clues are available. The labora-tory attempts to characterize the physical evi-dence obtained, including an attempt to deter-mine the type of explosive used. The labora-tory evidence could provide clues in the searchfor the perpetrator, but more likely providesconfirmatory evidence and inteliigence.Armed with the data provided by the search ofthe bomb scene and laboratory analysis, the in-vestigator attempts to trace and apprehend theperpetrator.

In addi t ion to phys ical ev idence, law en-forcement agencies quest ion wi tnesses , a t-tempt to get information from informers, andexercise the resources brought to bear to solveany major crime.


The amount of time spent by law enforce-ment investigators at the bomb scene, in thelaboratory, and working in the investigationdepends on the seriousness of the bombing,the workload, and to some extent, the loca-tion. A bombing homicide would commandconsiderably more resources than a vandalblowing up a mailbox.

In addition to the postdetonation investiga-tions described above, law enforcement agen-cies engage in undercover inf i l t rat ion ofbomber groups, undercover contracting for theservices of bombers, surveillance of expectedtargets, and gathering of intelligence concern-ing expected perpetrators or groups of perpe-trators. Sometimes an informant volunteersvaluable information. Clues from collateralcrimes, such as theft of explosives or buyingtimers with a bad check, sometimes provideadditional clues. Perpetrators are even occa-sionally apprehended in the act of placing abomb by routine law enforcement patrol ofthe area.

A further mechanism which tends to facili-tate law enforcement efforts is the occurrenceof accidental detonations whiIe bombs are be-ing fabricated or placed, Table 68, taken fromFBI data, shows the number of premature deto-

Table 68.- Premature Detonation Statistics

Year Incidents Injuries Deaths

1974, ., ., ., ... ., 29 31 111975, . ., . . . . 37 53 21976. , ., ., ., 42 42 111977. , ., ., . ., ., 29 34 21978. , ., . . . . ... ., ., 33 43 5

SOURCE FBI data

nations and the casualties caused by those det-onations for the period 1974 through 1977.During that period, approximately 23 percentof al I deaths by bombings and 14 percent of al Iinjuries were to perpetrators as a result of pre-mature detonations. A premature detonationoften provides considerably more evidencethan a bombing, as the explosion often takesplace in the residence or vehicle of the perpe-trator and with the perpetrator present. This in-formation can lead to the arrest of other mem-bers of the perpetrator group.

Given the paucity of clues to work with, lawenforcement personnel are not able to effec-t ive ly combat cr iminal bombers . Perpet ratorsof fewer than 10 percent of all bombings arebrought to tr ial. Considerably fewer than halfof those tried are convicted, resulting in a rateof only a few percent for the successful solvingof criminal bombings.

DISCUSSION OF TAGGANT UTILITY

Given that identification taggants are ableto survive the detonation and be recovered,that detection sensors can be developed whichwill detect taggant vapors in the parts-per-tril-lion concentration regime, and that taggantscan be safely added to explosives, what wouldbe the utility to law enforcement and securitypersonnel of the taggant program? Possibleutility attributes would include increased intel-ligence information, methods to decrease thetheft of explosives, increased rates of appre-hension and conviction of criminal bombers,deterrence of potential bombers, and an in-creased rate of detection of bombs at poten-tial target sites. These issues are discussed inthis section; the discussion is primarily quali-tative, as little quantitative data is available.

I n t h e i n i t i a l d i s c u s s i o n , t h e a s s u m p t i o n i smade that perpetrators make no response to ataggant program. The range of responses avail-able to perpet ra tors , the i r l ike l ihood of use,and their effects on a taggant program are dis-cussed in the following section.

Deterrence

Supporters of a taggant program believethat both identification and detection taggantscan cause some port ion of the cr iminalbomber population to reconsider a planned in-cident and decide to either abandon the planor modify it in a way beneficial to society. Thedeterrent effect of the identification and de-tection taggants is quite different, and should


be considered separately. The deterrent effectthat an identif ication taggant may have on acriminal bomber would be to lead him to per-ceive an increased l ikelihood of his postdeto-nation arrest and conviction. This dif fers sig-nif icantly from the deterrent effect of the de-tect ion taggants , in which the bomber per-ceives a decreased likelihood of a successfulcompletion of the criminal bombing as well asan increased arrest probability.

A good deal of study has been conducted onthe general subject of the efficacy of punish-ment on behavior modification, and on the de-terrent value of prison sentences (or death) oncriminals. The results are not clearcut, how-ever, and it is not possible to make a quantita-tive estimate of the percentage of bomberswho would be deterred by knowledge thatcommercial explosives contain identificationtaggants. It seems reasonable to expect somedeterrence, however, a point made by most ofthe law enforcement personnel contacted, ei-ther personally or by questionnaire. Most lawenforcement personnel felt the effect wouldbe small or moderate, although approximately30 percent predicted a substantial deterrent ef-fect (over 25 percent of bombers would be de-terred). The deterrence effect was felt to bemost effective in preventing revenge bombings(almost 50 percent of the law enforcement per-sonnel estimated a substantial effect) andcrime-of-passion bombings (40 percent) andleast effective in preventing bombings by ter-rorists, criminals, and psychopaths (approxi-mately 25 percent of the respondents felt asubstantial deterrent effect would be presentfor these bombers from identification tag-gants). These results are shown in more detailin appendix B.

A dedicated terrorist is primarily interestedin attracting attention to his cause (and less soin self-protection); a professional criminal rec-ognizes the risk of arrest as a cost of doing bus-iness; a psychopath may either feel invincibleor doesn’t care about the personal aftermathof his crime. These criminal bombers may notbe greatly deterred by the increased probabil-ity of arrest that identification taggants wouldprovide; however, they may well modify their

bombing plans if detection taggants signifi-cantly decrease the probability that they willsucceed in their bombing mission. Whether thebombers would be deterred from committing acrime, or would modify the type of crime, isuncertain, and would depend, to some extent,on the type of bomber, as well as the targettype.

Many targets, such as residences, vehicles,and commercial establishments, would not beprotected by detection taggant sensors (about80 percent of bombings in 1977 and 1978 wereof this type); the deterrence effect of detectiontaggants for bombers who plan to attack thatclass of target would therefore be small. Forbombings which currently are planned againstthe remaining targets, the presence of detec-tion taggants in commercial explosives and de-ployed sensors could modify the plan in sever-al ways. Fear of detection taggants could leadbombers to shift to unprotected targets, or aless vulnerable, more accessible portion of thetarget complex (a bomb could be plantedagainst an outside wall, rather than within aGovernment building, for instance). Alterna-tively, fear of detection taggants could lead toone of the countermeasure responses de-scribed in the next section.

Some guidance on the deterrent effect thata program of detection taggants and sensorscould provide to high-valued targets can begained by analogy to the effectiveness of thecurrent anti hijacking procedures at airports.Hijacking statistics are summarized in table69. Between 20 and 30 commercial airlinersoriginating from domestic airports were hi-jacked each year between 1969 and 1972. In1973, a series of antihijacking measures be-came fully implemented in the United States,which included 100-percent passenger screen-ing by magnetometers, X-ray examination ofcarry-on luggage, and development of a hi-jacker personality profile. The number of hi-jackings dropped dramaticalIy — to a single in-cident in 1973 and an average of 4.5 per years i rice.

Some foreign countries have instituted anti-hijacking procedures as well, although not as

Ch. V1—Taggant Utility Review ● 157

Table 69.–Comm8rcial Airliner Hijacking Statistics by Year

Hijackings U.S. Hijackings foreignYear origin origin

1949 -67, . . . . . . . . . . .1968 . . . 1969 ,.. .,, .,,..,.1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1971 . . . . . .1972... . . . . .1973a. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1974 .,,. . . . . .1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1976, . . . . . . . . .1977, ,, .,,.... . . . .1978 .,,. . .

91536202427

13645 b

8 b

45144850292917171115NAC

NA

a U.S antijacking measures became fully effectiveb U.S airlines irrespective of point of origincNot avadable

SOURCE FAA report No FAA.RD-77-66

uniformly as has the United States. As a result,the foreign hijackings declined approximately60 percent when the 1969-72 period is com-pared with the 1972-77 period, while hijackingsfrom domestic airports declined almost90 per-cent in that same period.

While part of this drop may have been duet o a d d i t i o n a l m e a s u r e s s u c h a s t h e u s e o farmed sky marshals for a period on the mostvulnerable routes and the gradual erosion of afriendly welcome for hijackers at some foreigncountries, a good deal of it is probably due tothe deterrent effect of a visible screening sys-tem In fact, large numbers of weapons havebeen reported recovered from trash contain-ers, potted plants, and other hiding places, as aresult of the weapon carrier being confrontedwith an operating screening system. That thedeterrent is not 100-percent effective is clearlyshown by the number of weapons currentlyconfiscated by the screening process, as shownin table 67.

I n summary, it is not possible to quantify thenumber or percentage of bombers who wouldbe deterred by a taggant program. identifica-tion and detection taggants will probably detersome bombers, particularly revenge bombersand those committing crimes of passion. De-tection taggants will deter bombers from at-tacking protected targets, perhaps at the ex-pense of more frequent attacks on unpro-

tected targets. Law enforcement personnel in-dicated that, overall, about the same magni-tude of deterrence would be expected for eachtype of taggant, perhaps reflecting the largervalue of detection taggants for those targetsprotected by detection sensors, and the totallack of deterrent for those not visibly pro-tected.

Bomb Detection—Target Protection

Detection taggants should greatly increasethe probability of detecting explosives con-taining the taggants and thus increase the pro-tection of the targets at which detection sen-sors would be deployed, either permanently orin response to a heightened perceived threat.Again, no data exists that would allow quanti-tative estimates of the detection effectiveness.As indicated in the previous section, FAA esti-

. .

Photo credit U.S. Department of Transportation

Typical airl ine passenger screening point


mates that the current passenger and carry-onbaggage scanning systems at airports have anoverall probability of detecting guns or knivesof over 80 percent, while they estimate lessthan a 20-percent detection probability for ex-plosives. If the assumption is made that a de-tection sensor would have the same effective-ness in detecting bombs that the current sys-tems have for detecting guns, a fourfold in-crease in effectiveness would be expected. Ifthe Aerospace Corp. prototype specificationof 0.9999 probability of detection is met by thefielded system, then essentially full protectionwould be available to those targets protectedby a detection taggant sensor, The term fullprotection must be qualified– it refers tobombs that are fabricated from tagged com-mercial explosives and do not have a sufficientseal to prevent escape of the taggant mole-cule. No protection is offered for bombs fabri-cated from untagged explosives (homemade,taggant removed, foreign supply, explosivesfabricated prior to the taggant program) orfrom explosives with a sufficient seal.

It is unlikely that a detection taggant pro-gram would result in a significant increase inthe number of bombs detected, as few of thecurrent bombings are directed at the type ofhigh-value, limited-access targets at which de-tection sensors would be located. The utility ofthe detection taggant system would be in elim-inating, or greatly decreasing, the low numberof bombings which occur at these targets, eachof which can cause catastrophic damage andcasualties.

The above discussion addressed the utilityof fixed detection taggant sensors. Portablesensors have an additional function — locatinga bomb whose approximate location is knownor suspected. Law enforcement and securitypersonnel are often notified of a bomb threat,through tips, calls claiming credit for plantinga bomb, and extortion. Current procedure is toevacuate the premises and then conduct atime-consuming search, using personnel andperhaps trained dogs, in an attempt to locatethe bomb. The disruption caused by a bombthreat can be quite costly; a recent evacuationof the World Trade Center in New York is esti-

mated to have cost several million dollars inlost time. The use of a portable sensor couldsignificantly cut down on the time for a searchand increase the probability of finding a bomb.It is possible that the existence and deploy-ment of portable detection sensors would de-ter some bombers from planting bombs, partic-ularly as an extortion device, as well as act todeter bomb hoaxes. BATF reported 105 hoaxdevice incidents in 1977 and 47 in 1978, so re-ducing the number, or reducing the time lostfrom each, could have a significant economicimpact.

The additional utility of portable detectionsensors was noted by law enforcement person-nel returning the questionnaire. Approximately65 percent felt that a portable sensor, needingno skilled operator, would have a high utility(deter over 25 percent of bombers), while lessthan 50 percent felt that a stationary sensorwould have high utility. Similarly the respond-ents felt that portable units were superior tononportable units for each type of target sug-gested. The differences were small for targetssuch as airports, large Government buildings,and nuclear power stations, but ranged up tomore than 5 to 1 for targets such as schoolsand bus and train depots.

An important limitation to the detection ofexplosives by any means should be noted. It ispossible to defeat any type of detector. There-fore, failure to detect a bomb cannot be takenas proof that no bomb exists. The easier it is todefeat the sensor, the greater the limitations tothe utility of the system. A system that de-tected 50 percent of the bombs would there-fore be useful only as a screen. A system thatdetected 99.9 percent of the bombs would notonly screen out twice as many bombs, butcould be used to give a high probability thatno bombs were present, significantly decreas-ing search time for bombs, more easily detect-ing hoaxes, and giving more useful decisiondata for dealing with threats or extortion at-tempts.

Ch. V1—Taggant Utility Review . 159

Bomber Apprehension

The current procedure for the apprehensionof criminal bombers consists of three phases:

1. the postdetonation search of the area forphysical evidence and subsequent labora-tory analysis;

2. the investigation, based on the results ofthe analysis of the physical evidence; and

3. intelligence gathering, used as an input tothe investigation or to direct surveil lance

of suspected perpetrators or expected tar-gets.

A great deal of effort is currently spent onthe postdetonation search and analysis ofphysical evidence from a criminal bombing.The purpose of this search is to attempt to gen-erate leads to help in the apprehension andconviction of criminal bombers, either directlyfrom clues found in the debris or as a result ofintell igence information gathered from a num-ber of bombings.

The search for evidence phase includes a de-tailed analysis to try and determine the type ofexplosive used and to find and examine anyparts of the bomb, such as elements of the tim-ing device, which may have survived the deto-nation. This evidence, together with any evi-dence of the presence of the perpetrator (suchas hair or footprints) serves as the startingpoint for the investigative phase. Laboratoryanalysis is currently successful in determiningthe type of explosive used approximately 50percent of the time, but experts indicate thatthe manufacturer can be identified in less than10 percent of current cases undergoing inten-sive analysis. Parts of the detonator and timingdevice usually survive the detonation, and inmany cases, currently provide the best initialleads from which to launch an investigation.

The investigative phase consists primarily oftrying to generate some type of lead to the per-petrators from the physical evidence gathered,

as well as tracking leads provided by inform-ants or witnesses and attempts to correlate thecharacteristics of the bombing with similar in-stances. A great deal of effort may be ex-pended, for instance, in investigating thesources of a common clock used as the timingmechanism.

The addition of identification taggants to ex-plosives would aid the investigatory efforts oflaw enforcement personnel in a number ofways, provided that the taggants survive thedetonation and are recoverable from the ex-plosive debris. In order for the taggant infor-mation to be useful, however, the bombingmust be of sufficient importance (in terms ofproperty damage, notoriety generated, or casu-alties produced) to warrant a thorough investi-gation. In such cases, identification taggantswill provide much more definitive informationat much less effort by the investigating team.Equally important, the information can bemade available quickly— in a matter of hours,if necessary, rather than the days or weeks itmay take to generate whatever data can begenerated by conventional means. The tag-gants provide a good starting point for an in-vestigation as they directly indicate the type ofexplosive used, manufacturer, and time ofmanufacture, and provide a list of the lastlegal purchasers. This information may leaddirectly to a bomber who purchased the explo-sives legally, provide a limited number ofsuspects for intensive investigation, tie re-ported thefts of explosives to bombings, pro-vide leads to an unreported theft of explosives,or provide indirect information to limit thescope of an investigation, such as to a specificgeographical region of the country. Some ofthe ways in which identification taggants cancontribute to an investigation are shown sche-matically in figure 25.

There will be some cases in which the per-petrator legally buys the explosive, and subse-quently uses it to commit a criminal bombing.In some of these cases, the bomber would nototherwise be identified with the bombing; in


Figure 25. —Schematic Illustration of IdentificationTaggant Utility in Criminal Investigation

[Direct

1 “ ’r 1

L ‘1

I Indirect I

SOURCE: Off ice of Technology Assessment.

others, the taggants add a strong I ink in a chainof evidence, which may help to obtain a con-viction. A chain-of-evidence example recentlyo c c u r r e d a t S p a r r o w ’ s P o i n t , M d . , w h e r e abomb, p lanted in a p ickup t ruck, k i l led thedriver. A search was made of the bomb sceneand the phys ical ev idence subsequent ly ex-amined in the BATF national laboratory. Thelaboratory analysis indicated that the explo-sive used in the incident had been tagged aspart of the pilot-plant taggant program. Thelist of legal purchasers of that lot of explosivesincluded James McFillin, one of the prime sus-pects in the bombing. McFillin was foundguilty on December 19, 1979.

Even in those cases where the list of lastlegal purchasers does not contain an obvioussuspect, it provides a means of identifying alimited number of people for a subsequentthorough investigation.

In some cases, explosives will be legally pur-chased, but with phony identification or by athird party not directly involved in the commis-sion of the bombing. When phony identifica-tion is used, an intensive investigation couldstill provide a viable lead to the purchaser. Al-though the purchaser’s real name and addresswould not be directly provided by the list ofpurchasers, a location, a time of purchase, anda witness to the purchase would have beenprovided. Similarly, for the cases involving athird-party purchase, that intermediary mightbe identifiable, providing a good lead to theperpetrator. It may also be helpful to know thetime frame when explosives used in a crimewere obtained.

Some of the explosives used in criminalbombings are currently stolen, and it may bethat a taggant program would increase theincidence of explosive theft, as discussed inthe next section. Identification taggants wouldprovide information of considerable utility toan investigation of a criminal bombing, evenfor explosives that turn out to have beenstolen. The list of last legal purchasers shouldprovide information as to the source fromwhich the explosives were stolen. In somecases the theft of explosives will have been re-ported. Identification of the source of the ex-plosives provides intelligence information onthe sources and disposition of explosives forcriminal bombings. It may also provide a leaddirectly to the perpetrators of a bombing, byestablishing a connection between specificthefts and specific bombings. It may be diffi-cult to establish a motive or any other usefullead for an isolated theft, but tying it in withspecific bombings may provide that lead, par-ticularly if the explosives are stolen with thehelp of an employee.

In some cases, the explosive theft may notbe reported, perhaps due to the surreptitioustheft by an employee of small amounts of ex-plosives over a period of time. Identifying asource by the use of taggants could result inleads to the explosives thief, and through him,perhaps to the criminal bomber.

While not directly related to an investiga-tion of a criminal bombing, identification of a


particular facility as the source of stolen ex-plosives would help pinpoint those facilities,or types of facilities, that are in need of in-creased security for their explosives.

The value of the list of last legal purchaserswilI depend somewhat on the length of the Iist.A trace which indicates that the full taggant-batch of explosives was sold directly to a mineby the explosives manufacturer obviously pro-vides a more immediately useful lead than atrace which shows thousands of purchasers ofa lot of smokeless powder. Even the list withthousands of legal purchasers would provide abetter starting place for an investigation thanthe types of information generally availablewith present methods. For example, investi-gators attempt to trace timing mechanismseven though thousands of people may havepurchased the model of clock that was used,and there are no records available that wouldturn up their names.

It is rather unlikely that the trace would turnup a Iist of thousands of names as likely perpe-trators of a significant or catastrophic bomb-ing, even if black or smokeless powder wasused as the filler. The types of bombings likelyto warrant a detailed investigation are unlikelyto be caused by 1 lb of gunpowder, whichwould eliminate most of the people on the listeither by narrowing the Iist to those purchasingmore than 1 lb of the same lot, or by providingmultiple traces of the multiple lots used in thefiller. When effects such as the geographicaldistribution of the tagged gunpowder lot arealso taken into consideration, the list of viablenames is likely to be much smaller than wouldappear to be the case on the surface.

BATF traced the number of entities thatwere involved in the manufacture, distribu-tion, and ultimate end use of the unique tag-gant lots produced during the pilot test pro-gram; the number ranged between 2 and 68.The size of the uniquely tagged batch variedfrom 12,000 to 26,000 lb, with the number ofentities directly, but weakly, related to the tag-gant batch size. The batch involving the mostentities (68) included the manufacturer, 3 pri-mary distributors, and 21 secondary and 43 ter-tiary distribution points.

The above discussion is pertinent when thetaggant trace produces information directly in-dicating a suspect, a group of suspects, or asource of explosive theft. I n some instances itmay not be possible to directly narrow the listof possible suspects. Examples would includeunobserved theft with no inside help, pur-chases from which no obvious leads turned up,or traces in which the list of last legal purchas-ers was too large to provide a reasonable start-ing point for investigations of all of the indi-viduals involved. I n these cases, the identifica-tion taggant traces, including the manufac-turer, time of manufacture, specific prod-uct, and Iist of distributors and ultimate pur-chasers would stilI provide indirect informa-tion of use to the investigation. Examples of in-direct information might be data that limit theinvestigation to a small geographic region ofthe country, identification of the type andmanufacturer of the explosives, and an indica-tion of when the explosives were acquired bythe bomber. Even the indirect information pro-vides more data to the law enforcement inves-tigators than currently available, after exten-sive laboratory and field investigation of post-detonation debris.

I n addition to providing both direct and indir e c t l e a d s t o t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f c r i m i n abombings , taggants can cont r ibute cons iderable intelIigence information.

Intelligence Concerning CriminalBomber Activities

The gathering and integrating of intelligenceconcerning the activity of criminal bombersand groups of bombers is a time-consumingprocess which is a necessary activity of controlby law enforcement agencies. Identificationtaggants would greatly facilitate law enforce-ment intelIigence activities, particularly inmonitoring the range of activities of bombergroups, the theft and disposition of explosives,cooperation between various bomber groupsand between domestic bomber groups and for-eign organizations, and keeping track of cur-rent sources of explosives for criminal bomb-ers. Intelligence information is particularly


useful in combating the repeat bomber, andmay provide the only effective method to gen-erate leads to the most sophisticated bomb-ers — professional criminals and terrorists.

Strategic data banks, receiving informationf rom a va r i e ty o f domest ic and fo re ignsources, have successfully identified patternsand trends that have led to a better under-standing, and arrests and convictions, of mem-bers of international narcotics rings, high-fi-nance swindlers, and terrorists. Taggants couldenhance the utility of such data banks to faciIi-tate identification of terrorist objectives, lead-ing toward arrests and convictions of terroristbombers. Taggants, by identi fying knownsources of terrorist bombs, and bombs used byother criminal organizations as well, wouldhelp intelligence analysts differentiate amongseveral groups which may claim, or which mayseem to be responsible for a particular bomb-ing incident, separating out the group directlyresponsible. The British taggant system, whichapparently consists of identifier threads dis-persed in the explosives, is used primarily as anapparatus for gathering intelligence aboutcriminal bombers. A few specific examples ofhow intelligence information could be used forbomber control are instructive.

Some criminal bombers operate in a singlelocation, with no activit ies beyond that area.Others range over a fa i r ly w ide geographicarea. If taggants recovered from a bombing in-dicate that the explosives were purchased inthe area of the bombing, then a local group ori n d i v i d u a l i s p r o b a b l y r e s p o n s i b l e . O n t h eother hand, i f the explos ives were s to len orpurchased in one part of the country, and usedin another, that would indicate that either agroup with a considerable geographic span ofactivity was involved, or that there was coop-eration between various groups of criminalbombers.

BATF current ly keeps a record of theamount of explosives stolen, recovered, andexpended in bombings. While it is possible totrace and allocate cap-sensitive high explo-sives that are recovered in their original car-tridges (by the date-shift code stamped on thecartridge), it is extremely difficult to identify

the source of explosives that have been deto-nated. Recovery of taggants would allow amuch more accurate record to be kept of theuse to which stolen explosives are put.

At present there appears to be little coopera-tion among domestic groups responsible forcriminal bombings (terrorists and professionalcriminals, in particular) or between thesegroups and foreign organizations. That is notthe case, however, for foreign groups that en-gage in bombings or other terrorist activitiesabroad. Some terrorist activities abroad haveinvolved groups from two or even three differ-ent countries, separated widely in geography.Intelligence analysts predict that coordinatedactivity of that sort may soon be seen in theUnited States. Taggants could help to identifycases of intergroup activity. As an example, ex-plosives may be stolen, and the modus operan-di of the theft or a claim of credit for theft in-dicates that one group was responsible. If thetaggants recovered from the debris of a crimi-nal bombing (identified as having been causedby a different perpetrator) indicate the use ofthose explosives, then a link may be postulatedto exist.

A final example illustrates the predictivevalue of bombing intelligence that would beavailable from a taggant program. Analysis ofthe explosives used in a series of bombingscould indicate they were all from the same tag-gant lot. Analysis of the pattern of the bomb-ing could be useful in predicting a geographicarea for a subsequent bombing, or in predict-ing a time for a bombin g by the group in-volved, allowing increased surveillance of indi-viduals in the group (if identified) or of poten-tial targets.

Prosecution of Criminal Bombers

There is rarely a single piece of evidencethat so clearly ties a perpetrator to a criminalbombing that additional evidence would notenhance the case for the prosecution. A lim-ited amount of data on the use of the date-shift code indicates that taggants may forge animportant I ink in the chain of evidence againsta criminal bomber, resulting in a higher rate of

Ch. V/— Tagganf Utility Review ● 163

convictions than would be possible withoutthat link. For undetonated bombs the date-shift code provides the same information asidentification taggants would provide for thepostdetonation case. No total review of thecases involving explosives recovered from mal-functioning bombs has been conducted. H o w -ever, a limited set of 55 cases was examined byBATF. In that sample, six cases were forwardedfor prosecution (10.9 percent). That is twice thepercent forwarded in cases that did not in-clude date-shift code data. SimiIar results wereobtained by MSA during a review of BATFdata. Of the 10 bombing attempts they re-viewed, the date-shift code proved useful in 4 0percent of the cases, was not useful in 50 per-cent of the cases, and was of questionableutiIity in 10 percent. WhiIe the results werep o s i t i v e in both cases , the ext remely smal lsample size makes it impossible to draw signif-icant conclusions. The Institute of Makers ofExplosives (I ME) has informed OTA that testi-mony from manufacturers to establish thesource of explosives with a given date-shiftcode is occasionally requested in criminalprosecutions, but that such requests are veryinfrequent. I ME estimates that less than 1 per-cent of al I traces lead to a prosecution.

As one specif ic example, the prosecution inthe McFill in case believes that taggants were akey piece of evidence in that case, and that thetaggant evidence was valuable in court.

Taggant Utility by Type of Perpetrator

Taggants may well be more effective in con-tributing to the direct arrest and conviction ofcertain types of criminal bombers than ofothers, due to the varying ability of differenttypes of perpetrators to develop effectivecountermeasure responses to taggant pro-grams, as well as to the nature of the bombingsand targets. These countermeasures and theireffects in limiting taggant utility are discussedin detail in the next section.

Vandals are not likely to be greatly affected,as their bombings generally cause l i t t le dam-age, and would not normally initiate the field,

laboratory, and investigative procedures nec-essary to utilize the information availablefrom identification taggants. On the otherhand, bombings by professional criminalsoften involve homicide and bombings by ter-rorists generate considerable public attention,both of which are Iikely to initiate extensive in-vestigations. To the extent that the more so-phisticated of these groups make use of coun-termeasures, an operational taggant programmay not add much to the Iikelihood of their ar-rest and conviction. Psychopaths are likely toengage in bombings that initiate a thorough in-vestigation, may well attack targets protectedby detection sensors, and are unlikely to havethe resources to generate effective counter-measures. Taggants should be particularly ef-fective in their control.

The law enforcement respondents to thequestionnaire indicated a differing utility fortaggants against the various bomber cate-gories. As an example, almost 60 percent esti-mated that identification taggants would re-sult in a significantly higher arrest rate for re-venge bombings, and over 40 percent esti-mated significantly higher arrests for crime-of-passion bombings by psychopaths, while lessthan 25 percent est imated a signif icant lyhigher arrest rate for bombings by terroristsand organized crime. A significantly higherrate means an increase in the arrest rate bymore than 25 percent. Similar estimates weremade for the use of detection taggants.

Utility of Taggants to Updatethe Taggant Program

BATF plans to implement the taggant pro-gram only for those explosive materials thathave been identified as being used extensivelyby criminal bombers. I f analysis of bombingdebr i s shows that tagged explos ives are notused in a large number of cases, then the BATFplan would need modification. Similarly, ifsome explosives that are tagged are not iden-tified as being used in bombings, then those ex-plosive materials should be considered as can-didates for exclusion from the program.


Nonbomber Control Utility of Taggants

The Bureau of Mines is very interested in theuse of identification taggants to determine thetypes of explosives used when an accident oc-curs in a mine. Some mine operators are sus-pected of using nonpermissible explosives inunderground coal mines. Permissible explo-sives have been specifically tested for lowflame emission and certified for use in under-ground coal mines— other explosives may notbe used. If nonpermissibles are identified as

POSSIBLE BOMBERIN RESPONSE TO A

The above discussion assumes that criminalbombers do not respond to the introduction ofa taggant program. There are a number ofcountermeasures the bomber can take, how-ever, which may decrease the utility of a tag-gant program. Only a limited subset of bomb-ers would respond to the taggant program, andthose criminal bombers who seek to evade theeffects of a taggant program are likely to en-counter additional risks or require substantialtraining and technical knowledge.

Among the possible responses of a criminalbomber to an identification taggant programare:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

removal of the taggant,fabrication of homemade explosives,switch to incendiary devices,use of blasting agents, if they are nottagged,theft of explosives,black-market purchase of explosives,use of explosives manufactured beforethe taggant program is implemented, andresorting to another type of unlawful ac-tivity, such as assassination or kidnapp-ing.

In addition to the above responses, the ef-fectiveness of detection taggants can be de-feated by providing a seal between the explo-sives and the detection taggant sensors. It isalso possible that the detection taggant sen-

being used illegally, the appropriate action canbe taken.

Similarly, taggants could be used to identifythe cause of an explosion. If an explosion wereto occur at a natural gas plant, for instance,then it might be difficult to determine if the ex-plosion were an accident or caused by a bomb.The resolution of cause is important both tolaw enforcement personnel and to the insur-ance industry. A similar resolution of causecould be of interest in investigating possible in-surance fraud cases.

COUNTERMEASURESTAGGANT PROGRAM

sors c o u l d b e p u r p o s e l y tr iggered, or“spooked,” by placing detection taggant mate-rials, or chemicals which the detection taggantsensor could not distinguish from detectiontaggants, in or on nonexplosive material.

The appropriateness and effectiveness ofthe various responses, in terms of possiblelimitation to the utility of a taggant program,are a function of the resources, motivation,and aim of the various types of criminal bomb-ers. Table 70 briefly summarizes the likelyresponse countermeasures of each type ofbombers, and how effective those responsesare Iikely to be. Effectiveness in this sense in-cludes both the likelihood of successfully ac-complishing the response and the appropriate-ness of the action in fulfilling the primary aimof the criminal bomber. It is interesting to notethat approximately half of the law enforce-ment respondents to the questionnaire esti-mated that the less sophisticated bomberswould initiate no response to an identificationtaggant program, while almost 40 percent feltthat even the most sophisticated bomberswould not initiate response countermeasures.Each of the response countermeasures is brief-ly discussed below.

The baseline 3M identification taggants con-tain both a magnetic layer and a fluorescentlayer to aid in recovery after a detonation. Thetaggants could therefore be removed from

Ch. V—Taggant Utility Review “ 165

Table 70.–Possible Perpetrator Response Counter mesuresasuros to Taggant Program

Criminal Terrorist Mentally disturbed Other

Unsophis- Sophis- Disen -Countermeasures ticated ticated Political Separatist Reactionary chanted Vengeful Pathological Vandals Experimenters

T a g g a n t r e m o v a lFabrication of explosives.I n c e n d i a r y d e v i c e s .Use of blasting agents if

untagged. . . .T h e f t , c o m m e r c i a lTheft, military . . . . . .Illegal sources. . . .Use of exploswes

manufactured beforeimplementation of tagging

Vapor seals. . . . .Other tactics ., . . . .

— a M b

H—

MHL

HML

L-MMM

—LM

—LM

LL-M——

——

L-M

—LM

L-ML-ML-M

LM-H

LH

L MM

HH—H

HM-H

LH

MM-H

LH

ML-M

L—

LL-M

LL-M

L—

LMLL

— —— —

HL-ML-M

ML-M

H

L—H

L ——LH

— —LM

— ——— — —

aUnlikely to be attemptedb Letters indicate possibility of succes in the attempted countermeasure L = lOW , Medium medium, H = high


powdery explos ives by us ing a magnet ; theprocess would be both easy and safe, andwould require less than an hour for a typicalbomb. In order to hinder this countermeasure,taggants have been manufactured wi thout amagnetic layer. I f a powdery explosive weretagged with a mixture of magnetic and n o n -magnetic taggants, then the use of a magnetwould enable a criminal to remove only a por-tion of the taggants; the remainder would bepresent after an explosion, although theywould be somewhat more cliff icult to recoverthan the baseline taggant. If the criminal weredeter red f rom at tempt ing magnet ic removalby the knowledge that about half the taggantsw e r e nonmagnet ic , t h e n p o s t d e t o n a t i o nrecovery would be only marginally more dif -ficult than the baseline case.

Another possible technique for removingtaggants from an explosive is to use a blacklight to identify the taggants by their fluores-cence, and then remove them with a tweezer.This process is safe, but more difficult thanmagnetic separation, and would probably re-quire many hours of painstaking effort for atypical bomb. Unlike magnetic separation, itcould be used to remove taggants from explo-sives that are tacky rather than powdery. It hasbeen proposed that the encapsulation of thetaggants be made opaque, and matched to thecolor of the explosive, in order to render suchremoval impossible. Since the encapsulant

would be melted by the heat of a detonation,postdetonation recovery would not be af-fected. Although it should not be difficult todevelop an opaque encapsulant, this has notyet been done. Opaque encapsulation wouldmake quality control, both of manufacturingtaggants and of mixing them with explosives,more difficult, and its cost impact has notbeen evaluated.

The explosives could be acetone dissolved,the taggants and other solid materials removedby filtering, and the explosive reconstituted,but that complex operation would be withinthe capabilities of only the professional terror-ists and criminals and would be roughly equiv-alent in danger and difficulty to fabrication ofexplosives from raw materials. It was the nearunanimous opinion of law enforcement per-sonnel that criminal bombers would not at-tempt this complex removal/reconstitutionprocess. Reconstituted explosives would alsobe less reliable (less likely to detonate) thanthe original explosives. If detonators weretagged, some taggants would still be presentafter the detonation of bombs using reconsti-tuted or homemade explosives, unless the evenmore difficult task of fabricating detonatorswas attempted.

Removing taggants from some gunpowdersis considerably simpler than removal from ex-plosives. Many gunpowder grains are consider-


ably larger than the identification taggants, asshown in f igure 26. Separation may thereforeb e a c c o m p l i s h e d s i m p l y b y s c r e e n i n g , a l -though the manufacturing process may p r e -clude that approach in some cases. Alterna-tively, it may be possible to agglomerate thetaggants into clumps whose size roughlymatches the specific grain size. However, thecost impact of such a solution was not ad-dressed during this study.

The detection taggant vapors are micro-encapsulated into extremely small spheres,which form powder with fineness approachingthat of talcum powder. Removal of these tag-gants from tacky or powdery explosives isclearly impractical and most likely impossible.There is some evidence that the taggant grainstend to adhere to gunpowder grains. The te-nacity of adhesion (response to attempts todislodge the taggants) has not been tested. It isprobable, however, that the extremely smalltaggant powder cannot be simply separated byphysical means; similar materials, such asgraphite, do not respond. Attempts to “wash”the grains off with a solvent are likely to affectthe properties of the smokeless powder.

The only viable removal technique, there-fore, appears to be removal of individual iden-tification taggants from gunpowders. As wasshown in table 70, the more sophisticated crim-inals and terrorists could accomplish the re-moval with moderate to high success, whilethe less sophisticated terrorists and experi-menters would have a somewhat lower successrate. One result of the greater practicability ofremoving taggants from gun powders may be toproduce a shift in explosive materials used incriminal bombs by sophisticated bombersfrom high explosives to gunpowders. As gun-powder are significantly less energetic thancap-sensitive high explosives, such a shiftcould result in a significant loss of efficiencyfor the bombers.

In summary, taggant removal would tend tosomewhat decrease the effectiveness of a tag-gant program in the control of the most sophis-ticated bombers, attacking targets not pro-tected by a detection sensor, but at some lossin efficiency by the criminal bomber. It is

Figure 26.—Size Comparison ofthe 3M identification Taggant and

Some Smokeiess Powders

*

i ’ m t i n u t o .

Ch. V/— Taggant U Review ● 1 6 7

possible to make identification taggant clumpswhich simulate the grain size of the largerpowder grains, thus making taggant removalan ineffective countermeasure, but the cost ofdoing so has not been calculated. Aternative-Iy, taggants could be incorporated in the grainof some, but not all powders.

Fabrication of Homemade Explosives

As noted in table 70, only the most sophis-ticated bombers would have a significant suc-cess in fabricating explosives. Even to thesecriminal bombers, the fabrication of home-made explosives would involve a somewhath igher danger o f premature detonat ion thanwith commercial explosives. It is true that anumber of “cookbooks” are available that de-scribe methods of making explosives from un-controlled materials, but many of these textslist the ingredients without describing a safeand effective fabrication process, or containerrors that could result in a high accident rateor unreliable detonation. The present inci-dence of premature detonations with commer-cial explosives, while fabricating and placingbombs, is high, accounting for almost 25 per-cent of all deaths and 15 percent of injuriesfrom bombings. If homemade explosives areused, the number of deaths and injuries to per-petrators of bombings may climb substan-tially—acting as an effective bomber controlmechanism.

Fabrication of detonators is a much morecomplex and dangerous activity than fabrica-tion of explosive materials, and could prob-ably be accomplished only in a well-equippedcentral facility. The widespread use of home-made detonators would, therefore, require thedevelopment of a central illegal manufactur-ing and distribution network, implying a de-gree of cooperation among perpetrator groupsthat does not currently exist.

It was the opinion of law enforcement offi-cials contacted that the establishment of a tag-gant program would tend to drive the more so-phisticated criminal bombers toward the useof homemade explosives. The example pro-vided by criminal bombers in Europe, particu-

larly Britain and West Germany, is illustrative.Approximately 85 percent of criminal bomb-ings in West Germany and a majority of thebombings in Britain and Ireland use home-made fillers. As the bombing statistics includeboth explosive and incendiary devices, the per-centage of explosive bombs using homemadeexplosives may be somewhat less, but may stillconstitute a majority in all three countries. It isinteresting to note that most bombs, includingthose with homemade explosives, use commer-cial detonators.

I n summary, the more sophisticated criminalbombers would tend to use homemade explo-sives more frequently in response to the intro-duction of a tagging program. Such use wouldtend to have some detrimental effect on theutility of a taggant program although the ef-fect would be limited by the increased risk ofpremature detonation, and the reduced relia-bility and effectiveness of bombs fabricatedfrom homemade explosives. Commercial deto-nators would still be needed, further limitingthe effectiveness of this response counter-measure, as would the elimination of sometypes of targets. The main threat is that over aperiod of time, the criminal bombers mightbecome increasingly sophisticated in the fabri-cation of explosives and even of detonators,and that a degree of cooperation and coor-dination could develop between the variousterrorist and professional criminal groups. TheBritish indicated that they face just that prob-lem —the coordinated IRA improves its tacticsand ability to fabricate explosives almost instep with the development of law enforcementcontrol mechanisms.

Use of Incendiary Bombs

A substantial number of current bombing in-cidents use incendiary materials for bombfiller. Tagging of incendiary materials is notpracticable, so legislation of a taggant pro-gram may cause a shift toward the greater useof incendiaries in place of explosives. How-ever, incendiary bombs cannot be relied on tocause catastrophic damage or casualties, andare therefore an appropriate filler only for


some types of perpetrators and against sometypes of targets. It may also be harder to fabri-cate a rel iable delay fuze for incendiarybombs.

Use of Blasting Agents

BATF has indicated that it does notdirectly tag blasting agents such as

pIan toA N F O .

There are several reasons for their position, Inthe first place, very few criminal bombings arecurrently committed using blasting agents asthe explosive filler. In addition, tagging theblasting caps, boosters, and detonating cordgenerally used to initiate the blasting agentswould stilI ensure that taggants were present atblasting-agent bombings, unless homemadedetonators and boosters were used. Finally, asblasting agents represent over 80 percent ofthe commercial explosives currently used inthe United States, directly tagging the biastingagents would have a very large cost impact.Some shift to the use of blasting agents mighttherefore occur if a taggant program were im-plemented. However, there are a few draw-backs to the use of blasting agents. As detailedin appendix E, the blasting agents are not nor-malIy cap sensitive and wou Id therefore re-quire a booster of some sort. Commercialboosters, very large detonators, at least onetype of rocket motor used by hobbyists, orseveral large cherry bombs used togetherwould be su f f ic ient boosters . The fabr icat ionof a bomb using a blasting agent would there-fore require the acquisit ion and assembly ofmore components than would a bomb us ingcap-sens i t ive explos ives or gunpowders . Theassembly process would not prove a large ob-stacle to the more sophisticated bombers, butmight well prove one to the other types ofbombers. Similarly, the increased risk asso-ciated with blasting-agent bombs would de-pend on the knowledge and patience of thebomber.

Blasting-agent b o m b s w o u l d b e u s e f u lagainst targets where the blast was the primarydamage mechanism, but somewhat less usefulthan cap-sensitive explosives against targets inwhich fragment damage was the pr imarythreat. More blast and better fragmentation

would be expected from blasting-agent pipebombs than from gunpowder pipe bombs, butthe assembly process would be more complex.

Blasting agents have a density of approxi-mately one-half that of cap-sensitive explo-sives; approximately twice the volume wouldtherefore be needed, a possible limitation insome circumstances.

Theft of Explosives

Explos ives can be s to len, e i ther f rom themilitary or from sources of commercial explo-sives. Some of the explosives used in criminalbombings are currently stolen and more maywell be stolen if a taggant program is initiated.Theft of explosives would mean that the perpe-trator would be required to commit a collater-al crime, increasing the chance for error, thenumber of leads generated, and the ultimatechance of capture. As detailed previously, theuse of taggants should contribute significantlyto the rate of solution of explosive thefts, in-creasing the chance of capture above the cur-rent rate.

In addit ion, protection of explosives fromtheft could be improved, and may well have tobe, to prevent a wholesale shift to theft as asource of explosive material if a taggant pro-gram is instituted. Security procedures for ex-plosives storage, transportation, and use areprimarily geared to prevent casual or surrep-titious theft. Storage magazines have doublelocks and other features which would requiresome limited amounts of time and skill to de-feat. Inventory controls currently would un-cover thefts of large amounts of explosives(case lots). Transportation regulations are pri-marily to protect the people Iiving along thetravel route from accidental detonation. All ofthese could be altered to decrease the proba-bility of explosive theft. Magazines could bemade quite difficult to enter, all explosivematerial could be required to be stored over-night in a secure magazine (some constructionsites use quite flimsy magazines, some manu-facturers store sublet amounts of detonators inthe assembly building overnight), and trans-portation of explosives could require armed

Ch. Taggant Utility Review ● 1 6 9

guards . T ighter inventory cont ro ls , inc ludingaccountabil i ty for each st ick of explosive atthe blaster level, could also be required. All ofthese controls, however, have cost impact; itwould require investigation to determinewhether their cost would be justified by theirmarginal utility in the face of the current, andpredicted, bomber threat. Possible costs for in-creased security of explosives were not in-cluded in the OTA study. As noted above, abenefit of identification taggants is that theywould help to pinpoint the places from whichexplosives used in crimes are stolen, and thusserve as a guide to where security most needsto be tightened.

As noted earlier, military explosives aremore securely guarded than commercial explo-sives, so criminal bombers may be expected tomore frequently attempt to steal commercialexplosives. As noted in table 70, the more so-phisticated bombers are likely to have moder-ate to high success in stealing commercial ex-plosives (although at increased risk) while theless sophisticated bombers can expect low tomoderate success. No group would be ex-pected to have significant success in stealing

military explosives, an indication of the suc-cess Iikely for theft of commercial explosives ifincreased explosive security measures are im-plemented.

Illegal Sources

Explosives could be purchased on the blackmarket or illegally imported from abroad. Bothcourses of action subject the bomber to in-creased risk of capture, from informants or un-dercover agents in the former case and as a re-sult of smuggling, in the latter. Only terroristsor professional criminals with substantial re-sources and the ability to plan in advance arelikely to be able to import explosives fromabroad, or likely to make the proper black-market connections.

The term black market, in this context, doesnot refer to a sophisticated nationwide net-work but to a local array of entrepreneurs whodeal in an i l l ic i t product for prof i t . Thiscriminal element exists in nearly every major

American city, and when asked could providestolen commercial explosives or explosive ma-terials as quickly as they could provide stolendrugs, jewelry, or television sets. A taggant pro-gram, it is believed by analysts and law en-forcement experts, would increase the demandfor stolen explosives, thus increasing the localmarket. However, experts of the two majormetropolitan police agencies and two Federallaw enforcement organizations with whom de-tailed discussions on this subject were heldagree that initial increases in the black-marketdemand would be low, as the sophisticatedbombers are more likely to turn to one of theother countermeasures as a source of explo-sives. Moreover, taggants could help in tracingany black marketeer who dealt in stolen, buttagged, explosives.

Use of ExplosivesBefore a Taggant

ManufacturedRequirement

One further countermeasure is possible, atleast initially— the use of explosives manufac-tured prior to implementation of a taggant pro-gram. This response requires planning wellahead and storage of the explosives for a peri-od of time. Storage would increase the risk ofaccidental detonation (particularly if the ex-plosives had to be moved several times) and ofthe explosives being found. In addition, mostcommercial explosives have a limited usefullifetime. Gels, slurries, and emulsions have alimited useful life on the order of 6 months,while dynamites have a Iifetime of a few years[more for the lower power dynamites). Gun-powder, boosters, detonators, and detonatingcord have a useful life of tens of years.

Detection Taggant Seal

Detection taggants emit a vapor; their eff i-cacy depends on its being able to permeate thecontainer in which they are placed and be de-tected in the free air stream. It is possible tocreate a seal around the explosives, thus de-feating the detection taggant system, but theconstruction of such a seal is dif f icult, cannotbe accompl ished wi thout speci f ic technicalknowledge and equipment, and cannot be ac-


complished without the time and resources toconstruct such a seal. Ordinary sealing mecha-nisms, such as placing the explosive in a paintcan, using baggies, home sealing units, or usingactivated charcoal apparently will not work,even if several are used in conjunction, as thetaggants were specifically chosen for theirability to penetrate the microencapsulatedmembrane and the sensors are able to detecttaggants at a parts-per-trillion concentrationlevel. It should be noted, however, that testsunder field conditions to confirm these labora-tory results have not yet been conducted.

Only the more sophisticated of the criminalbombers are even likely to attempt to achievevapor seals, and they stand only a low to mod-erate chance of succeeding. One of the prob-lems faced in trying to construct a seal is thelack of feedback – without a taggant vapor de-tector, or other sophisticated laboratory instru-ment, the bomber will not be able to tell if hisseal is sufficient.

“Spooking” of DetectionTaggant Sensors

Detection taggant sensors could be purpose-ly triggered or “spooked” by placing detectiontaggants, or other materials so similar chemi-cally to the detection taggant that the sensorcould not make the distinction, in nonexplo-sive materials. If several suitcases or packageswithin a short period of time triggered the de-tection taggant sensor for no apparent reason,those operating the sensor might well con-clude that it was malfunctioning, and discon-nect it. Large amounts of taggant materialmight also be used to “saturate,” and at Ieasttemporarily disable, the sensor. It would thenbe possible to introduce tagged explosives intothe protected area. This countermeasurewould require that the bomber obtain a supplyof the detection taggant material; access todetection taggants can and should be madecliff icult.

Shift to Other Unlawful Activity

Finally, bombers can turn to other crimes,such as murder, assassination, or kidnapping.

These crimes, however, are often not as spec-tacular as bombings and all involve a higherrisk to the perpetrators than do bombings. Inaddition, a direct action against a visible targetrequires more motivation and a different tem-perment than does an indirect crime such as abombing. The switch to other tactics is an ap-propriate response only for a subset of crimi-nal bombers; only some of the types of bomb-ers who would attempt to switch tactics in re-sponse to a taggant program wouId be success-ful. The small-scale criminal, the experimenter,and the disenchanted would be unlikely toturn to the other crimes. Some of the mentallydisturbed would, with low to moderate suc-cess. The professional criminal can be consid-ered a craftsman at his trade; he may not beable, either physically or emotionally, to ad-just to other methods of attaining his ends. Ter-rorists are the most Iikely to switch tactics,based on foreign experience, and would prob-ably be moderately to highlythough at greatly increased risk.

Summary

successful, al-

There are a variety of response counter-measures which the criminal bomber can at-tempt in an attempt to decrease the utility ofthe identification and detection taggants pro-grams, The amount of success expected foreach response varies with the skill, resources,and aim of the different types of criminalbombers. Most of the countermeasure re-sponses carry with them an increased risk ofcapture, increased probability of an unreliableor premature detonation, or decreased effec-tiveness of the explosive. The effect of theadded risk should not be underestimated —bombing is an attractive crime because of thelow risks currently associated with it. if thoserisks escalate, then the attractiveness de-creases, probably resulting in significantly re-duced numbers of bombings and significantlyreduced severity of the bombings. Domesticand foreign law enforcement officials wereemphatic in their opinions that increasingbomber risk was a realistic and important con-trol mechanism.

Ch. V—Taggant Utility Review “ 171

In a similar vein, the importance of reducingthe effectiveness of bombs should not be over-looked. Taggants have their optimum effec-tiveness in the protection of high-value targetsand the investigation of significant bombings.It is in just those types of situations that reduc-ing the effectiveness of bombs will have themost payoff.

Nevertheless effective countermeasures arepossible. Bombers with sufficient skill andtraining can completely overcome the effectsof a taggant program if they have adequatetime and resources. The greater the sophistica-tion of the bomber, the smaller the risks andthe smaller the loss of effectiveness resultingfrom countermeasures.

However, it should be recognized that whilethe countermeasure responses are entirely pos-sible, it is by no means certain that significantnumbers of bombers wilI actualIy use them.

OTA consulted numerous explosives ex-perts, all of whom agreed that countermeas-ures such as those described were possible, atleast for some of the types of criminal bomb-ers. However, the law enforcement experts andexperts on terrorism which OTA consulted alsounanimously agreed that most criminal bomb-ers, including terrorists, would fail to make useof the countermeasures. This assessment ap-pears to be based on an assessment of the typeof personality that is generally involved inbombings, as well as the general level of skillof the bombers. An instructive analogy is air-craft hijacking. It is possible to smuggle aweapon on an aircraft by a number of means,but, in fact, since the antihijacking programstarted there have been thousands of weaponsfound annually by the screening process, hun-dreds of weapons found abandoned near thecontrolled boarding gates, but essentially nocases of aircraft hijacked with the use of smug-gled weapons.

FOREIGN EXPERIENCE IN CONTROL OF BOMBERS

Discussions were held with British, WestGerman, and Irish law enforcement officials inan attempt to gain insight into the methodsused to combat and control criminal bombingsin those countries. The bombing problem i n

those countr ies, and most of the rest of Eu-rope, is considerably different than the domes-tic problem; it is appropriate that the controlmethods also differ.

Essentially all bombings committed in thethree countries are carried out by terrorists; inBritain and Ireland the bombings are almostentirely by one group of separatist terrorists —the IRA.

Commercial explosives are rigidly controlledin all three countries. In West Germany thiscontrol is primarily administrative— permitsare needed for the transportation, storage, anduse of explosives. I n addition, a much more in-tensive surveillance of suspected criminals ispracticed, together with a very intensive in-telligence operation and a relatively strictborder inspection procedure. As a result,

almost al l explosives used in bombings arehomemade (85 percent), although some mili-tary and commercial explosives are used. Themilitary explosives are stolen from militarybases or recovered from maneuver areas, whilethe commercial explosives and detonators ap-pear to come primarily from Eastern Europe.

In Ireland and Britain the controls are moredirect. Commercial explosives are stored,transported, and maintained by the army orpolice, who personally supervise the detona-tors and check to ensure that no undetonatedexplosive remains in the area. The army or po-lice accountability for the explosives extendsto the individual detonators and sticks of ex-plosive. As a result, almost all criminal bomb-ings use homemade explosives.

The number of bombing incidents per yearin West Germany is about one-fourth of thenumber of domestic bombings reported to the

FBI or BATF data banks, which results in aboutthe same bombing rate on a population basis,but a far higher rate per unit area, since West


Germany is about the size of Oregon. This geo-graphic concentration, the single class ofbombers, the almost universal use of home-made explosives and an effective centralizedcriminal control authority have allowed theWest Germans to develop field and laboratoryinvestigative techniques that apparently resultin higher arrest and conviction rates than is thecase in the United States.

The number of bombings in the Republic ofIreland is quite low; no data was available con-cerning numbers of bombings in Britain or ar-rest and conviction rates in either country.

The British use a tagging system that appar-ently consists of different colored threads in-terspersed in the explosive The threads do notsurvive the detonation, but the system cannotbe defeated by simply discarding the cartridge,as can the current U.S. date-shift code. TheWest Germans use a system similar to the date-shift code, while the Irish dye their explosives(from the single plant) to indicate a destina-tion.

The experience of these three countries of-fers some insight into the problem of controlof domestic bombers and to potential bombercountermeasures.

As a result of law enforcement efforts tocontrol the source of commercial explosivesand to institute other efforts to combat bomb-ers, there are essentially no bombers otherthan terrorists in any of the three countries.Given the different conditions in the UnitedStates, it is improbable that all other bomberswould be eliminated, but their relative num-bers could be expected to decline dramat-ically, if a taggant progam were implemented.

As a result of the control of commercial ex-plosives, bombers in the three countries relylargely on homemade explosives. As noted ear-lier, this countermeasure is likely to be seen inthe United States, as well, if a taggant programis initiated. The result of this shift in explosiveswill el iminate some bombers, make some tar-gets difficult to attack, due to decreased effec-tiveness of the explosives, and significantly in-crease the risk of an accident to the perpetra-tor.

Finally, a possible long-term effect of thetaggant program, as is the case in Europe dueto explosive controls, may be the developmentof a highly skilled group of bombers, as well asmore coordination and cooperation betweenbomber groups.

APPENDIXES

A—Letter of Request

B—Detection and Identification Taggants and Criminal Bombings—Summary and Questionnaire

C—OTA Recovery TestsD—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of

Taggants in ExplosivesE—Suitability of ANFO as a Filler for Criminal BombsF—Derivation of Bombing Statistics TablesG—Glossary

APPENDIX A–LETTER OF REQUEST

ABAHAM RIBICOFF, CONN., CHAIRMAN

JOHN GLEN, OHIOJIM SASSER, TENN.DAVID H. PRYOR, ARK.CARL LEVIN MlCH.

CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.JOHN C . DANFoRTH, MO. UNITED STATES SENATEWILLIAM S. COHEN MAINEDAVID DURENBERGER, MlNN.

COMMITTEE ONRICHARD A. WEGMAN GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTORWASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 7, 1979

The Honorable Morris K. UdallChairmanTechnology Assessment BoardOffice of Technology AssessmentU. S. CongressWashington, D. C. 20510

Dear MO :

As Y O U K N O W , the Committee on Governmental Affairs ispresently considering S. 333, the Omnibus Antiterrorism Actof 1979. Section 303 of the legislation would mandate theuse of identification and detecTion taggants in explosivematerials.

During the course of our consideration of the bill,several issues have been raised pertaining to the viabilityand cost of the tagging program.- While there has been agreat amount of technical reserach in this field, we believeit would be useful to have an independent review and evalua-tion of the available data concerning the use of explosivetaggants.

Specifically, we request that the Office of TechnologyAssessment review this data, and address the following issues:

● the safety of the use of taggants in production,storage, and handling of explosive materials;

● the effectiveness of the tagging program in deter-ring crime and aiding in criminal investigationand prosecution;

175

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The Honorable Morris K. Udall May 7, 1979Page Two

●

8

●

the regulatory impact of requiring the use of ex-plosives taggants (including record-keeping, costto the explosives industry, and cost to the con-sumer) ;

the potential effects of a partial applicationof tagging requirements (such as excluding blackand smokeless powders and including all other ex-plosive materials, excluding military, and mater-ials for homemade bombs and common nitrate) ;

the issues relating to the survivability oftaggants, including effects of detonation,retrieval, and possible removal before detona-tion; and

possible alternatives to tagging explosivesand initiators.

Because of the Committee’s tight schedule and the desireto enact comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation promptly,we would appreciate receiving a report from OTA not later thanAugust 6, 1979.

Many thanks for your

—

cooperation

Abe Ribicoff

Sincerely,

b ’

Jacob Javits

and assistance.

APPENDIX B—DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATIONTAGGANTS AND CRIMINAL BOMBINGS—

SUMMARY AND QUESTIONNAIRE

This paper is a short statistical summary of anempirical survey conducted by OTA for the evalua-tion of taggant effectiveness,

Using a listing of the International Association ofChiefs of Police, a systematic sample of 980 nameswas selected (from a total of 10,800 names on thelist). Each of the subjects sampled–assumed to beboth knowledgeable and interested in the problemof bombings — received a mail questionnaire cover-ing five related areas of inquiry (see attachment).The questions probed issues such as the profile ofthe criminal bomber, the estimated effects of thetaggants program on deterrence, detection, andconviction, and preferred location and types ofdetection taggants sensors.

Of the 980 questionnaires mailed out, only 1 1 4have been returned in time for this analysis, a re-turn rate of less than 12 percent. No assumptioncan be made that these 12 percent of the respond-ents are a random and unbiased subsample of the980 subjects in the original sample, and most likelythey represent the people most highly involved in,and motivated to deal with, criminal bombings. Inthat sense, the findings of this analysis must beviewed as tentative. However, these 114 question-naires serve as a valuable instrument to bring tolight some of the experiences, attitudes, and assess-ments of people who deal, often on a rather fre-quent basis, with criminal bombings. A furthersource of error may have been introduced by anerror in the explanatory material accompanying thequestionnaire. That material indicated that the tag-gant trace would identify the last legal purchaser,rather than indicating that the trace would providea list of the last legal purchasers. Following is anoverview of their responses.

Background of Subjects

Over half (51 percent) of the subjects worked inan urban area, with an additional 37 percent in sub-urban areas. The majority (41 percent) came fromrelatively small cities (population up to 25,000),with only 20 percent from metropolitan areas witha population of 500,000 and more. Due to a lack ofsignificant differences between the subjects byplace of work; and due to the relatively smallnumber of respondents, the data will not be ana-lyzed by the type of area and its population size.

Bomber Profiles

As estimated by the sample, a wide variety ofcriminal bomber types, rather than one specifictype, is responsible for the total number of bomb-ings in their jurisdictions (table B-1). Eighty-fourpercent of the sample thought that each type ofbomber is encountered infrequently (accountingfor only up to 25 percent of the bombings). Domes-tic terrorists, organized crime figures, and peoplemotivated by revenge were mentioned as some-what more frequent types (between 25 to 75 per-cent of the cases) and, most noticeably, revengewas seen more than any other motive as a very fre-quent (over 75 percent) motivation for bombings.

Similarly, the consensus of the sample was thatthere is a fairly evenly distributed use of the vari-ous types of explosives (table B-2). While ANFO,plastic explosives, and cast or pressed military ex-plosives were thought to be infrequent, there wasless agreement about the other types. Commercialexplosives, smokeless and black powders, and to alesser degree, homemade explosives were men-tioned by the subjects as frequently, and even veryfrequently, used in bombings in their areas.

A potentially important question refers to thevarious bomber types and their preferences fortypes of explosives (table B-3).

While again, in general, the various bombers willuse all the available explosives, when looking onlyat the “frequent” and “very f requent” use ofthose explosives, an interesting preference-profileemerges: al I offenders show a preference for com-mercial explosives, and black and smokeless pow-der, but their highest use is by offenders acting outof revenge. Terrorists and organized crime usecommercial explosives more often, while peoplecommitting crimes of passion or revenge opt morefrequently for the powders.

An issue of some importance is the target of thebombing. As indicated by the sample (table B-4),bombers attack a variety of targets; however, thereare some patterns in the attacks. Government andlaw enforcement facilities, transportation facilities,and residences are mostly infrequent targets, whilecommercial and industrial facilities, people andvehicles, and schools are very frequent targets.

Some patterns emerge when looking at the tar-get-preference of the various bomber types (tableB-5). Combining the “frequent” and “very fre-

177


Tablo B-1 .–Typo of Criminal Bomber’ (percent)

Bomber type

Revenge,disgruntledemployee,

International Domestic Organized Crimes of maliciousterrorists terrorists crime Psychopaths passion mischief Others Total

Infrequent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98. % 83. 86. 93. 96. 58. 90. (321) 84.Frequent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . O 7. 11. 5. 2. 10. 5. (23) 6.Very frequent . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. 10. 3. 2. 2. 32. 5. (37) 10.

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . (56) (58) (56) (59) (54) (78) (20) 38114,7 15,2 14.7 15.5 14.2 20.5 5,2

aBased on pt 11, Q 1Infrequent = betweenO1025 percent Frequent = 25 to 75 percent Very frequent = 75 to 100 percent

Table B-2,–Typo of Explosive Used’ (percent)

Explosive type

ANFO and Castother non-cap- or pressed

sensitive Plastic military Smokeless Black HomemadeCommercial explosives explosives explosives powder powder materials Other Total

Infrequent . . . 59. % 96. 97. 93. 68. 62. 83. 95. (446) 799Frequent . . . . 21. 4. 3. 6. 21. 19. 12. 0. (65) 11.7Very f requent . 20. 0. 0. 1. 11. 19. 5. 5. (47) 8.4

Total. . . . (81) (68) (68) (71 ) (73) (81) (75) (41) 55814.5 12.2 12.2 12.7 13.1 14.5 13.4 7.4

aBased on pt 11, Q 2Infrequent = between O to 25 percent Frequent = 25 to 75 percent Very frequent = 75 to 100 percent

Table B-3.–Most Frequently Used Typos of Explosives by Type of Bomber~ (percent)

Bomber type

Terrorists Organized crime Psychopaths Crimes of passion Revenge, etc. Total

Commercial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15. % 32. 18. 24. 33. (281) 33.ANFO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. (257) O.Plastics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. 2. 4. 2. 2. (260) 2.Military explosives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9. 8. 4. 2. 4. (262) 6.Black and smokeless powder . . . . . . 13. 11. 17. 29. 48. (278) 37.

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263. 265 260. 258. 292. 1,338

aBased on pt 11, 0 2IbThe percentages Indicate for each cell the propoportion of responses estimating a frequent use (over 25 Percent) of the Particular explosive, by the particular type of bomber The numbers m parentheses

refer to the frequency of all responses within the cell

Table B-4.–Typo of Bombing Targets” (percent)

Type of target

Commercial/ Gov’t, lawVehicles, Transportation industrial enforcement

people Schools Residences facilities facilities facilities Other Total

Infrequent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73. % 77. 83. 96. 68. 91. 93. (401) 82.Frequent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12. 8. 12. 3. 12. 6. 5. (42) 9.Very frequent. . . . . . . . . . . 15. 15. 5. 1. 20. 3. 2. (47) 9.

Total. . (78) (83) (75) (69) (75) (68) (42) 49015.9 16.9 15.3 14. 15.3 13.9 8.6

aBased on pt 11, II 3Infrequent = between O to 25 percent Frequent = 25 to 75 percent Very frequent = 75 to 100 percent

Appendix B—Detection and Identification Taggants and Criminal Bombings —Summary and Questionnaire . 179

Table B-5.–Most Frequent Targets, by Typo of Bomber (percent)

Bomber typeTerrorists Organized crime Psychopaths Crimes of passion Revenge, etc. Total

Vehicles, people ... . . . . . . . . . 10, % (51) 22. (51) 4. (47) 27. (56) 28. (58) 20.5 (263)Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0. (56) o. (53) o. (49) o. (49) 20. (59) 4.5 (266)Residences, ., . . . . ... . ., 6. (50) 14. (49) 14. (50) 17. (52) 26. (61) 16, (262)Transportation facilities . . . . . . . . . . 8. (51) 0. (49) 2. (51) o. (50) 6. (51) 2.8 (252)Commercial/industrial facilities. . . . 2 2 . ( 5 1 ) 17. (52) 10. (50) 6. (51) 30. (64) 17.5 (268)Government, law enforcement

facilities ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 . ( 4 7 ) 4. (49) 4. (47) 4. (49) 13. (55) 8. (247)Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0. (33) 0. (32) 0. (33) 0. (31) 15. (41) 3.5 (170)

Total ... . . . . . . . . . . . 339 335 327 338 389 1,728

aBased on PI II O 3/bThe Percentaaes Indicate for each cell the proportion of responses estimating a frequent use (over 25 percent) of the particular explosive, by the particular type of bomber The numbers in parentheses

refer 10 the frequency of all responses within the cell

quent” categories, the most common targets forterrorism are commercial and industrial establish-ments, followed by Government; organized crimefocuses on people and vehicles, and industry andcommerce; psychopaths, as expected, act morerandomly, mainly victimizing residences; crimes ofpassion are directed against people and residences;and revenge bombings are directed against com-mercial and industrial facilities, and people andvehicles. It appears that the preferences for targetsfollow an underlying assumption about the motiva-tions of the various bomber types.

Thefts of commercial explosives, legal purchase,and homemade supply seem to be the most fre-quent sources of explosives; while import and mili-tary theft are the least frequent forms (table B-6).

The most frequent source of explosives for ter-rorists and organized crime is theft. People actingout of revenge, and psychopaths prefer homemadeexplosives; for crimes of passion the offender pur-chases explosives legally or prepares them at home(table B-7).

Finally, a question about the tagging programbrought some inconsistent responses; in estimatingthe expected frequency of various sources bybomber after tagging went into effect, the samplepredicted .a large shift toward increased use of

military (untagged) explosives through theft; and ofhomemade and imported explosives. However,they did not predict an appreciable decline in thetheft of commercial (tagged) explosives, or theirlegal purchase (table B-8). Comparing tables B-7and B-8, the sample predicted a clear shift for ter-rorists toward homemade explosives, and for orga-nized crime and terrorists toward military theft, butfew other discoverable patterns emerged.

To summarize, there seems to be a consensusabout a wide range of motives for criminal bomb-ings, as well as their targets, the explosives used,and their sources. The profile of the bomber, andsome characteristic patterns of his modus operandithat emerge are consistent with general predictionsas to the behavior rationality and psychologicalmotivation of such offenders.

Present Law Enforcement Effectiveness

As estimated by the sample, both the arrest andthe conviction rates for criminal bombings arelower than those for all other crimes (table B-9).

Estimated Utility of Identification Taggants

When asked about the utility of the program, allrespondents viewed taggants as a useful additional

Table B-6.–Source of Explosives Used (percent)

Theft of Theft ofLegal commercial Blackmarket military

purchase explosives purchase explosives Homemade Importation Total

In f requent . . . 72. % 57. 83. 89. 68. 98. (309) 76.9Frequent, . . . . 11. 23. 12. 8. 18. 2. (51) 12.7Very frequent. . . 17. 20. 5. 3. 14. 0. (42) 10.4

T o t a l . . . (76) (70) (65) (66) (72) (53) (402)18.9 17,4 16.2 16.4 17,9 13.2

aBased on PI II O 4Infrequent = between O to 25 percent Frequent = 25 to 75 percent Very frequent = 7510100 percent


Table B-7.–Most Frequent Sources of Explosives, by Type of Bomber’ (percemt)

Bomber type

Source of explosives Terrorists Organized crime Psychopaths Crimes of passion Revenge, etc. Total

Theft of commercial explosive. , . . . . 30. % (44) 29. (45) 9. (45) 5. (44) 20. (49) 18.5 (227)Theft of military explosive. . . . . . . . . 2 0 . ( 4 5 ) 9. (44) 5. (44) 2. (43) 6. (49) 8.4 (226)Legal purchase. . . . . . . . . . . . 7. (45) 18. (45) 11. (44) 16. (45) 32. (56) 17.4 (235)Black-market purchase . . . . . 9. (43) 19. (47) 2. (43) 5. (40) 11. (47) 9.5 (220)Homemade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14. (44) 11. (44) 17. (46) 14. (43) 35. (55) 19. (232)Importation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. (44) 6. (46) o. (44) o. (43) 2. (47) 2.2 (224)

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 272 266 258 303 1,364

aBasedon pl 11, Q 4/bThe percentages indicate for each cc// the proportion of responses estimating a frequent use (over 25 percent) of the particular explosive, by the particular type of bomber The numbers m parentheses

refer to the frequency of all responses within cell

Table B-8.–Estimated Most Frequent Sources of Explosive by Bomber Type, Following the Institution of Tagging Programs’ (percent)

Bomber type

Sources of explosives Terrorists Organized crime Psychopaths Crimes of passion Revenge, etc. Total

Theft of commercial explosive. . . . . 39. % (41) 41. (54) 22. (51) 17. (48) 30. (54) 29.4 (248)Theft of military explosive. . . . . . . . 3 2 . ( 4 0 ) 37. (38) 20. (49) 14. (50) 19. (52) 23.6 (229)Legal purchase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14. (42) 10. (50) 25. (55) 25. (53) 20. (60) 19.2 (260)Black-market purchase . . . . . . . . 2 7 . ( 4 1 ) 22. (49) 18. (50) 14. (50) 19. (53) 19.7 (243)Homemade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 . ( 4 1 ) 24. (49) 25. (51) 25. (53) 36. (61) 29.8 (255)Importation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 . ( 4 2 ) 24. (51 ) 8. (48) 2. (50) 6. (51) 13.2 (242)

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 291 304 304 331 1,477

aBasedon Pt 11, Q 5The percentages indicate for each cell the proportion of responses estimatiog a frequent use (over 25 percent) of the particular explosive, by the particular type of bomber The numbers m parentheses


Table B-9.–Estimated Rates of Arrest and Conviction’

Estimated rates of arrestFor criminal bombings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....24.08For other crimes. ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....38.85

Estimated rates of convictionFor criminal bombings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....39.35For other crimes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....46.82

aBased on pt Ill O 1NOTE BATF considers these estimates unduly optimistic At present some 8 percent of criminal

bombings are forwarded for prosecution

clue in investigation and conviction, though theyestimated it to increase arrest rates most notice-ably for offenders acting out of revenge or passionand having very Iittle effect on the arrest of ter-rorists (table B-10).

As for the deterrent value of taggants, it wasviewed to be most effective for those acting out ofrevenge and least effective, as expected, for psy-chopaths (table B-1 1).

In response to a tagging program, some counter-measures by the bombers are expected. For exam-ple, the sample estimated that if packaged explo-sives would be tagged, but black and s m o k e l e s spowders would not, an average of 55 percent of thebombers would shift to using powders.

Table B-l O.–The Estimated Increase in the Arrest Rate forCriminal Bombers, Due to the Use of Identification Taggants’

Increase in arrest rate

Type of bomber UP to 25% UP 25-75% UP over 75% Total

Terrorists. ., . . . . . . . . . 79. % 15. 6. 53Organized crime . . . . . . 74. 13. 13. 54Psychopaths, . . . . . . . . . 60. 19. 21. 53Crimes of passion . . . . . . 53. 23. 24. 55Revenge, etc.. ... . . . . 44. 30. 26. 61

Total, ., ... . . . (170) (56) (50) 27661.6 20.3 18,1

aBased on pt IV, II 2

Table B-n ,–The Estimated Deterrent Effect of IdentificationTaggants on Criminal Bombers’

Magnitude of deterrent effect

Type of bomber Up to 25% Up 25-75% Up over 75Y0 Total

Terrorists. . . . . . . . . . . . 80. % 11. 9. 55Organized crime . . . . . . . 75. “ 15, 10. 60Psychopaths. . . . . 79. 16, 5. 58Crimes of passion . . . . . 70. 19, 11. 56Revenge, etc. . . . . . . . 54. 27. 19. 63

Total. ., . . (208) (52) (32) 29271,2 17,8 11.

aBased on pt IV, (1 4

Appendix B—Detection and identification Taggants and criminal Bombings—summary and Questionnaire . 181

The main consensus of the sample was that pro-fessional bombers (terrorists and organized crime)would be more likely to work on some counter-measure than wou Id the nonprofessional offenders.The first two types would most Iikely shift to otherkinds of explosives (not tagged) or remove the tag-gant if it required a reasonable amount of work.However, psychopaths and people motivated bypassion or revenge were predicted most likely to donothing in response to the taggants (table B-1 2). Themost frequent countermeasure overall was shiftingto another type of explosive, and the least frequentone was the removal of the taggant if it involves 10hours/lb of explosives.

Estimated Utility of Detection Taggants

Tagging explosives would have, as estimated bythe respondents, a varying deterrent effect, de-pending on the type of bomber. It would be mosteffective for those acting out of revenge or passion,least effective for psychopaths and terrorists (tableB-1 3).

Taggants were also viewed as being instrumentalin the direct or indirect apprehension of thebomber. It was estimated to lead most frequentlyto apprehension of the nonprofessional offenders,(i.e., psychopath, crimes of passion, and revenge) asexpected (table B-1 4).

Table B-12.–The Most Frequent Indicated Change in Tactics by Type of Bombers, Due to the Use of Identification Taggants’ (percent)

Bomber type

Change in tactics Terrorists Organized crime Psychopaths Crimes of passion Revenge, etc. TotalT a g g a n t r e m o v a l ( 1 h r / t b ) 40. % (47) 35. (43) 18. (44) 11. (44) 17. (46) 245 (224)Do nothing ... . ., 3 6 , ( 4 5 ) 37. (46) 49 (45) 52 (48) 47. (55) 44.3 (239)Taggant removal (10 hr / lb) . , 2 3 . ( 4 3 ) 22 (41) 10. (42) 10, (41 ) 9 (44) 14.7 (21 1)Shi f t to o ther exp los ive, . , 5 9 . ( 4 2 ) 62. (45) 39. (44) 32. (41) 40 (47) 46,6 (219)Shift to other unlawful activity 19. (42) 22, (40) 15, (40) 20. (39) 34 (47) 22,6 (208)

Total ., ., ... 219 215 215 213 239 1,101

aBased on pt II O 6The percentages Indicate for each cc//the proportion Of responses estimating a frequent use (over 25 percent) of the particular explosive, by the particular type of bomber The numbers in parentheses


Table B-13.–The Estimated Deterrent Effect of DetectionTaggants on Criminal Bombers’


Type of bomber UP to 25% Up 25-75% Up over 75% Total

Terrorists, . . ... , . . . 85. % 9. 6. 69Organized crime . . . . . . 72. 18. 10. 58Psychopaths, ., ., . . . . . 90. 8. 2. 59Crimes of passion . . . . . . 75. 10. 15. 67Revenge, etc. . . . . . . . . . 54. 31. 15. 67

Tota l . . , . , . , . , (240) (49) (31) 32075. 15.3 9.7

aBased on pt V, O 1

Table B-14.-The Estimated Increase in the Arrest Rate forCriminal Bombers, Due to the Use of Detection Taggants~

Increase m arrest rate

Type of bomber UP tO 25% UP 25-75% UP over 75% Total

Terrorists. . . . . . . . . . . . 72. % 21. 7. 60Organized crime . . . . . 74. 19. 7. 58Psychopaths. . . . . . . . 60. 16.Crimes of passion . . . . . 49. ; ; : 24. : ;Revenge, etc. . . . . . . . . . 41. 32. 27. 75

Total. . . . . ., . (183) (79) (52) 31358.2 25.2 16.6

aBased on pt V, O 2

The most effective sensor to deter and appre-hend bombers was judged to be the portable one,requiring no special operator (table B-1 5). The otherthree types were viewed as considerably less effec-tive, especially the stationary, special-operatedsensor.

Detection taggants are also expected to prompta variety of countermeasures by the potentialbombers (table B-16). The more frequently usedmeasures, as estimated by the sample, would beshifting to other explosives (untagged), removingthe taggant or sealing the package, if it is relativelyeasily accomplished. Terrorists and people actingout of revenge showed a clear preference for thefirst form; organized crime offenders for the sec-

Table B-15.–The Estimated Deterrent Effect of DetectionTaggants, by Type of Sensors Used


Type of sensor Up to 25% Up 25-75% Up over 75% Total

Stationary, with skilledtechnician. . . . . . . . . . 58.% 22. 20. 59

Portable, with skilledtechnician. . . . . . . . . 41. 35. 24, 59

Stationary, no need forskilled technician. . . . . 50. 28. 22. 60

Portable, no need forskil led technician, ... 35. 25. 40. 65

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . (Iii) (69) (63) 24345.7 28.4 25.9

aBased on pt V O 3


Table B-16.–The Most Frequent Indicated Change in Tactics by Type of Bomber, Due to the Use of Detection Taggants~ (percent)

Bomber type

Change in tactics Terrorists Organized crime Psychopaths Crimes of passion Revenge, etc. TotalTaggant removal, special knowledge,

equipment required . . . . . . . . . . . 33. % (45) 33. (42) 17. (35) 18. (34) 17. (43) 24.6 (199)Taggant removal, with relative ease. . 5 1 . ( 4 1 ) 51. (43) 26. (35) 23. (39) 27. (44) 35.9 (206)Shift to other explosive. . . . . . . . . . . 6 3 . ( 4 1 ) 45. (53) 24. (42) 19. (36) 33. (45) 37.8 (217)Shift to targets less likely to have

sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 . ( 4 4 ) 24. (38) 31. (39) 18. (34) 27. (44) 29.1 (199)Shift to other unlawful activity. . . . . . 2 0 . ( 4 0 ) 26. (39) 9. (35) 8. (36) 23. (43) 17.6 (193)Do nothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 . ( 3 7 ) 30. (37) 34. (35) 27. (33) 29. (38) 29.4 (180)

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 252 225 212 257 1,194

aBasect on @ V, Q 4The percentages Indicate for each cc// the proportion of responses estimating a frequent use (over 25 percent) of the particular exploswe, by the parlcular type of bomlw The numbers In parentheses

refer to the frequency of all responses wlthln the cell

end. Psychopaths and crimes of passion werejudged to be unaffected.

Finally, the sample was asked to recommend thefour sensor types (based on cost) for the varioustarget locations (table B-1 7). OveraIl, the most fre-quently recommended type was the portable andless expensive sensor (33 percent); and the most fre-quently mentioned locations to be protected werenuclear power stations and airports (both 14.8 per-cent). The only location for which the portable, ex-pensive sensor was more often (31.4 percent) rec-ommended was nuclear power stations. The expen-sive, nonportable sensor was suggested to any ap-preciable degree for use only for airports, largeGovernment buildings, and nuclear powerplants,while the less expensive portable set was the over-whelming preference for small Government build-ings, schools, public stadiums, buses, and pol icestations. Apparently, the respondents based theirrecommendations on cost factors, coupled with thefrequency and likelihood of attacks and damage inthe various locations.

Summary

Even though the response rate to the mail ques-tionnaire was low, resulting in a small and statis-tically nonrepresentative sample, some valuablefindings emerged from the study.

In the assessment of the respondents, criminalbombings are characterized by a heterogeneity ofall the elements involved: a variety of bombers, dif-ferent kinds of targets, a choice of explosives, and awide offering of sources to obtain them. No onekind of bomber is overwhelmingly responsible for amajority of the bombings; bombers do not concen-trate on one type of target or use one type of ex-plosive. However, within this complex picture,some patterns are discernible. Certain types ofbombers show a preference for certain targets, ex-plosives, and sources. Depending on their motiva-tions, the various bomber types are also expectedto respond differently to the proposed taggant pro-gram. While the sample in general estimated tag-gants to reduce bombings (by deterrence, appre-

Table B-17.–Type of Sensor Recommended by Location*

Sensor type

Portable cost Portable cost Non portable NonportableLocation $15,000 $50,000 cost $15,000 cost $50,000 Total

Airports . . . . . . . . . . . ., ., . . . 29.7% 24.8 25.6 19.8 (121) 14,8L a r g e G o v e r n m e n t b u i l d i n g s , 29.5 27.5 18.4 24.5 (98 12.S m a l l G o v e r n m e n t b u i l d i n g s 53.8 14.1 24.4 7.7 (78) 9.5Nuc lear power s ta t ion . . . . , . , 25.6 31.4 16.5 26.4 (121) 14,8Schools , ., ., ., ., ., ., 63.6 12.1Public stadiums . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13.6 10.6 (66) 8.58.2 21.5 16.5 3.8 (79) 9.7

Bus, train depots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.9 11.1 27.8 4.2 (72) 8.8Large commercial buildings , . . . . . . 42.2 18.3 28.2 11.3 (71) 8.7Police bomb investigation. . . . . . . . . 57.4 31.5 6.5 4.6 (108) 13.2None, no ability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25. 0. 75. 0. (4) .5

Total ... . . . . . . . . . . . (360) (186) (160) (112) 81844. 22.7 19.6 13.7

aBased on pt V, O 5

Appendix B—Detection and Identification Taggants and Criminal Bombings—Summary and Questionnaire “ 183

hension, conviction, difficulty in obtaining un-tagged explosives, etc.), there is evidence in theirviews that the taggants will be more effective withcertain bomber types than with others. In addition,the taggants were also predicted to initiate a chainof countermeasures, with varying degrees of prob-able success.

In summary, the study points to some new direc-

tions in appraising the present scene of criminalbombings, and evaluating taggant effectiveness.The majority of the findings, which point to thehypothesized direction, should increase their valid-ity, and the confidence in their suggestive value,though the methodological/sampling problems pre-vent the study from serving as a definitive, verify-ing answer to the issues researched.

QUESTIONNAIRET E C H N O L O G Y A S S E S S M E N T B O A R D Congress of the United StatesMORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZ.. CHAIRMAN

TED STEVENS. ALASKA. VICE CHAIRMAN O F F I C E O F T E C H N O L O G Y A S S E S S M E N TEDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS. GEoRGE E. BROWN, JR., CALIF.ERNEsT F. HOLLINGS, S.C. JoHN O. DINGELL. M ICH. W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. 20510ADIAI E. STEVENSON, ILL. LARRY WINN, JR., KANS.ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH CLARENCE E. MILLER, OHIOCHARLES McC. MATHIAS. Jr., MO. JOHN W. WYDLER, N.Y.

JOHN H. GIBSONS

JOHN H. GIBBONSDlrector

DANIEL DesimoneDEDEPUTY DIRECTOR

The Congress has before it draft legislation which would

require the addition of detection and identification taggants to

commercial explosives. Detection taggants are material which

would be detected by a suitable sensor to indicate the presence

of explosives. Identification taggants are material which would

survive the explosive detonation and provide informat ion which

would identify the last legal purchaser of the explosives used.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and FireArms Control (BATF) has

been supporting the development of taggants for the past several

years. Testimony before the Congress has displayed a considerable

diversity of opinion as to the utility, cost and safety of a tagg~t

requirement t.

At the present time considerable progress has been made in

identification taggants research. Small plastic chips, consisting

of several pigmented layers, have been developed by 3M which

survive the detonation of most commercial explosives. The sequence

of the pigmented layers provides the code to trace the explosives

type, the manufacturer and time of manufacture. A record keeping

network, by which the manufacturers, distributers, and retail

sellers keep track of the code species would then allow law

enforcement officials to trace the last legal purchaser of the

explosives used in a bomb.


Research is less advanced on detection taggants. A number

of approaches are being pursued. The best system so far developed

consists of microencapsulated organic liquids which emit a distinctive

vapor, coupled with a sensor tuned to detect those specific taggant

molecules at a parts per trillion concentration level.

The Office of Technology Assessment has been asked by the

Congress to analyze the proposed legislation and resolve the

differences surfaced in the congressional testimony. Your response

to the enclosed questionnaire is being sought as a part of the analysis

of the utility of taggants. The questions bear on the issues of the

profiles of the criminal bomber and the impact the proposed program

would have on the efforts of law enforcement personnel to deter,

apprehend, and convict criminal bombers.

The results of the study must be available to the Congress

when it returns from the August recess. Would you therefore

please fill out the enclosed material and return it as soon as

possible. The information about where you work is necessary for

demographic analysis; all individual replies will be treated as

confidential information.

In answering the questions below, your estimates would be

appreciated where data is not available. Please feel free to comment

on any point of the questionaire.

Indicate the approximate range of your answers by the following

code:

A - almost none, O-5%

B - i n f r e q u e n t l y , 5 - 2 5 %

c - frequent or usual, 25-75%

D - very frequent, 75-95%

E - Almost always, 95%-100%

Appendix B—Detection and Identification Taggants and Criminal Bombings—Summary and Questionnaire ● 185

DATA BASE (Where you Work)

I. Population of city or county

s t a t e

Check one: urban area suburb rural

II. Bomber Profiles

1. Type of Criminal Bombers. The term criminal bomber”

can cover a large spectrum of types of bombers. What type

would you estimate is responsible for the bombings in

your area, over the last 4-5 years.

International terrorists

Domestic terrorists

Organized crime

Psychopaths

Crimes of passion

Revenge, disgruntled employess,malicious mischief

Others ( )

2 . Types of explosives used in bombs. A variety of

materials can be used as explosives. How often are the

following explosives used in your area.

Commercial explosives such as dynamites ,

water gels

A.NFO or other non-cap sensative explosives

Plastic explosives such as C-4

Cast or pressed military explosives such

as Composition B, TNT, RDX

Smokeless powder

Black powder

Homemade materials

Others

61-401 0 - 80 - 13


Please estimate how often each type of bomber in your area uses

each type of explosive

Terrorists

Organized Crime

Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion

Revenge, Disgruntledemployees, maliciousmischief

*c!)m

- + - + - - t -

I I

I

--t

I

3. Targets

Please indicate the frequency with which each type of target

is attacked by criminal bombers in your area.

Vehicles or people

Schools

Residences

Transportationfacilities

Commercial, Industrialfacilities


Government, law enforcementfacilities

Other

Please indicate approximately how frequently each type of

bomber in your area attacks each type of

ITerrorists

Organized Crime

,Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion

Revenge, Disgruntled I IEmployees, maliciousmischief

t a r g e t

l=!o

I

i

I

I

4. Sources of ExplosivesPlease indicate the relative frequency of each of the

following as a source of supply of explosives for the

criminal bombers in your area:

Legal Purchase

Theft of commercial explosives

Blackmarket Purchase

Theft of military explosives

— . .

—


Home-made

Importation

Please estimate the relative frequency of the various

for each group of bombers in your area:

Terrorists I I IOrganized crime

1 I 1

Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion1 1 1

Revenge, DisgruntledEmployees, malicious I I Imischief I I I

— —

—

sources

al‘d$!!

5 . If explosives were tagged, would you expect bombers to

alter their pattern of acquiring explosives? Please estimate

the expected relative frequency of the various sources for

each type of bomber in your area if a tagging program were

instituted (military explosives would not be tagged).

- - - - - - - - - - 1

Organized Crime IPsychopaths

Crimes of Passion

Revenge, DisgruntledEmployees, maliciousmischief

— —

Appendix B—Detection and Identification Taggants and Crinmal Bombings—Summary and Questionnaire ● 189

III Law Enforcement Ef festiveness at Present

1. In answering the following questions, please

estimate to the nearest 10%

a. What is the rate of arrests for criminal bombingp

b. What percent of arrested bombers are convicted

c. What is a typical arrest rate for other crimes

d. What is a typical conviction rate for other crimes

IV: Estimated Utility of Identification Taggants

1 . Would the use of identification taggants provide a useful

additional clue in an investigation of criminal bombings?

Comment:

2 . In your estimation, would the use of identification taggants lead to

an increase in the arrest rate for criminal bonbers?

Please estimate for each type of bomber in your area.

Terrorists

Organized Crime

Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion

Revenge, DisgruntledEmployees, MaliciousMischief

Comment:

3 . Would the use of identification taggants lead to increased

conviction rates for criminal bombers?

Comment:


4 . Would knowledge of the fact that identification taggants are

used in explosives deter criminal bombers? Please estimate for

each type of bomber in your area.

Terrorist

Organized Crime

Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion

Revenge, DisgruntledEmployees, MaliciousMischief

Comment:

5. Some people have proposed tagging packaged explosives, but

not tagging black or smokeless powder. If this were done,

approximately what proportion of the bombers who now use packaged

explosives would shift to using powder to make bombs?

6. Countermeasures

The use of identification taggants in exploves could alter

the current method of operation of criminal bombers. Please

estimate how likely each of the indicated change in tactics

would be for each of the types of bombers encountered in your area.

Taggant removal, if removal takes1 hour per pound of explosives

1Do nothing

Taggant removal if removal takes10 hours per pound of explosives

Shift to another type of explosives(foreign, stolen, home-made)

Shift to another type ofunlawful activity

Appendix B—Detectjon and Identification Taggants and Criminal Bombings—Summary and Questionnaire . 191

v. Utility of Detection Taggants

1. Would knowledge of the fact that detection taggants are

used in explosives deter criminal bombers? Please estimate for each

type of bomber in your area

Terrorists

Organized Crime

Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion


2 . How frequently would the use of detection taggants in explosives

lead to the arrests of criminal bombers either through direct

apprehension of a bomber with explosives in his possession, or

through an indirect means such as a clue being provided by a bomb

discovered unexploded? Please estimate for each type of bomber

in your area.

Terrorists

Organized Crime

Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion


3 . A number of types of sensors are being investigated for use in

conjunction with the detection taggant source. Please indicate the

frequency with which criminal bombers are likely to be detered or

apprehended due to the use of detection taggants coupled with

sensors possessing the following characteristics:

Stationary installation only; must be .———

operated by a skilled technician


Sensor is easily portable, (can be used also

in a fixed installation); must be operated

by a skilled technician

Stationary installation only; requires

no special operator, only someone in

the area to react to an alarm or other

simple indicator

Sensor is easily portable; requires no

special operator

4 Counter measures

The use of detection taggants in exploslves Could alter tie

current method of operation of criminal bombers. Please

estimate how likely each of the changes in tactics would be for

each type of bomber in your area.4J 5

a): NLI . ! +

I I

Package seal or taggant removalif specialized knowledge and I Iequipment is required ! rPackage seal or taggant removalif relatively easily accomplished

Shift to another type of explosive I I(Foreign, stolen, home made)

I 1Shift bombings to targets lesslikely to have sensors

Shift to another type of I Iunlawful activity

Do Nothing


5 . Sensor Location

Please indicate the location where you believe detection

sensors should be placed. For this question, simply

check all locations appropriate for each c o s t

portability category.

I

o00

Airports Im u

Large Government Bldgs. I

Small Government Bldgs.

Nuclear Power Stations

Schools

Public Stadiums, arenas

Bus, train depots

Large Commercial Bldgs.

Police Bomb Investigators

None, No-Utility

I

m

M lom u

o00

o“2

IJJU2

8

* Sensors to be used by investigators in searching for bombs

APPENDIX C–OTA RECOVERY TESTS

Introduction

As indicated in chapters I I and Ill, a number oftests, demonstrations, and training exercises havebeen conducted by BATF, the Aerospace Corp.,FBI, 3M, BOM, IME, local police departments andothers in which attempts were made to recover the3M identification taggants from the postdetonationdebris. These tests usually had limited objectives,such as demonstrating that taggants could befound by trained law enforcement personnel; as aresult, Iittle or no control was placed on the testsand Iittle or no documentation was attempted. Asan example, BATF conducts 2-week t ra in ingcourses at its academy at Glenco, Ga. Over 50 testbombings of automobiles have been conductedwith tagged explosives as part of that training exer-cise, but no data has been collected on recovery.

Due to the different aims, purposes and proce-dures used, similar tests conducted by differentgroups resulted in widely varying recovery rates. Asan example, table 11 of chapter II shows that BATFand Aerospace were able to recover taggants fromautomobile bombing demonstrations under bothrelatively benign and very adverse conditions. I nsimilar I ME tests, shown in table 13 of chapter 11,difficulty was encountered in recovering taggantsfrom automobile detonations, even under benignconditions.

As none of the tests were well-controlled ordocumented, it was extremely difficult to analyzethe reasons for the differences, or even quantifythe recovery expectations under any conditions.OTA therefore accepted an offer by BATF to con-duct a controlled series of tests under OTA control.

Test Objective

The objective of the test series was to obtainquantified data on the postdetonation recovery ofthe 3M identification taggants under carefully con-trolled test and recovery conditions. Such datawould provide an indication of the recoverabilityof the taggants under those conditions (althoughprobably not a statistically valid demonstration). Itmight also provide insight into recovery under simi-Iar conditions, and help to resolve the dichotomyof prior test results. It was originally hoped thattests could be run against a variety of targets, in-cluding buildings and automobiles; due to time andfiscal constraints, however, it was necessary tolimit the target to automobiles. Test facility restric-tions limited the placement of the automobiles tounpaved surfaces; the surfaces used were hard-

packed, gravel-laden earth. Within the constraintsit was hoped that the tests would resolve the fol-lowing four specific questions:*

1.

2.

3.

Is it reasonable to presume that sufficient tag-gants can be recovered f rom automobi lebombings under real-life conditions to enablea determination to be made as to the origin ofthe tagged explosives? Even if taggants are re-covered from each test condition, no morethan a presumption of recoverability may bemade. A more extensive test ing programwould be necessary to determine the condi-tions under which the taggants are recover-able. Parameters of a definitive test serieswould include weather, fire, fireman response,and between-test replication variability. Fail-ure to recover taggants under each of the testconditions would lead to a presumption thatthe taggants could not be expected to provideinformation on the origin of explosives in carbombings. Success in some of the tests wouldindicate that information would presumablybe avai lable f rom a subset of automobi lebombings; definitive testing would be requiredto precisely define that subset.Are there conditions that are more likely thanothers under which automobile bombings willyield taggants sufficient to establish the ex-plosives’ source? The specific condition to betested is the relative strength of the explosive.Test conditions may also permit a limited as-sessment of the effects on recovery of the skillor dedication of the investigator, the weather,and the effects of fire and subsequent fire-fighting efforts.What is the magnitude of the effort necessaryto recover sufficient postdetonation taggantsfor explosive source determination? If, in fact,heroic efforts are required (as was reportedlythe case in one of the Aerospace/BATF tests)then the utility of taggants in automobilebombings would be limited to the bombings ofhigh-value targets and would not be of valueto routine investigations normally carried outby bomb squads, These limitations would ap-ply only to those conditions under whichheroic efforts were necessary. This questiononly has meaning if the taggants are, in fact,recovered, even after heroic efforts.

● These quest ions are repeated verbat im from a pretest plannining docu-ment and have been modified only to reflect the unavaliability of pavedsurfaces

194

Appendix C—OTA Recovery Tests “ 195

4. Are the taggants field readable? One of the ad-vantages of the 3M taggants is their ability tobe easily and quickly read by agents in thefield. If, in fact, large amounts of debris mustbe collected and laboratory processed, thenthe taggants are not field readable, at least forthose automobile bombings which are similarto the test conditions. If the 3M taggants arenot field readable, then perhaps some of theother tagging methods, rejected for that rea-son, should be reconsidered.

Similarly, OTA believed that if taggants were notrecovered in usable quantities in the tests, thiswould not necessarily indicate that taggants couldnot be recovered under more favorable conditions;for example, a bombing that damages but does notdestroy a building. However, the presumption thattaggants could not be recovered under some real-world conditions would affect OTA’s analysis ofthe utility of taggants, and the greater the range ofconditions in which taggants could not be recov-ered —or could be recovered only after heroic ef-forts –the greater the negative impact on estimatesof taggant utility.

Test Conditions

Bombs, each consisting of approximately 2 lb ofdynamite, were placed in five automobiles andremotely detonated. The automobiles were locatedon hard-packed, relatively level earth. Three wereon dirt roads and two were on bare patches of hard-packed ground. No brush or debris was in the im-mediate vicinity of the automobiles. Specific testconditions are summarized in table C-1. By compar-ing the results of tests 1 through 3 it is possible torelate recovery to the power of the dynamite; bycomparing the results of tests 1 and 4, it is possibleto assess the effects of a fire and subsequent fire-fighting activities, by comparing tests 3 and 5, it ispossible to assess the effects of the added confine-ment provided by the engine block.

The explosives for the tests were chosen by OTAfrom a larger inventory of factory-tagged explo-sives provided by the Aerospace Corp. A 0.05 -per-

,

cent concentration of encapsulated taggants wasused in each case, except that in test 4 the explo-sive contained 0.05 percent of each of two separateunencapsulated taggants. The explosives were as-sembled into a bomb and covered with a brownbag by Dr. Edward James of the OTA analysis teamand placed in the target by Dr. James, with the as-sistance of a different FBI agent for each test; theFBI agents could not see the explosive cartridges.The choice of explosives and placement decisionswere made by David Garfinkle and Dr. James, theOTA test coordinators, and were unknown to any-one else. Samples were removed from each bombfor analysis to ensure that taggants were, in fact,present in each type of dynamite and to validatethe identity of the postdetonation recovered tag-gants.

Recovery Procedures

An attempt was made in the recovery process tosee if differences in training and experience re-sulted in differences in the probability of recover-ing taggants. To test the question of field recoveryskill, two sweeps were made of each target. Thefirst sweep was made by an “amateur” team, toroughly simulate the procedure and skill that mightbe expected from a typical bomb squad. The sec-ond sweep was made by a trained BATF team. Theamateur team, in each case, consisted of a memberof the OTA study group, another non-BATF volun-teer, and one BATF agent. The non-BATF volun-teers, one to a team, included Randall Bowman ofNRA, Robert Hodgdon of the Hodgdon Powder Co.,Officer Larry Linville of the Washington Metropoli-tan Police Bomb Squad, and Dennis Kline, an FBIagent. The team was given approximately 5 min-utes of instruction and 1 hour for the search. Thesearches of all but the firebombing site (test 4) wereconducted between approximately 3 and 4 p.m.,with the use of blankets, black Iights, and magneticbrooms contained in the Aerospace Corp. devel-oped kits, shown in figure C-1. The amateur teamssearched for taggants with the black light, did amagnetic sweep, and collected debris for labora-tory analysis.

Table C-1 .–Specific Test Conditions, OTA Recovery Tests

Test Placement Dynamite Test condition

1 Under driver’s seat Collier C, low power 5-gal gas in tank, no fire2 ... Under driver’s seat Unigel, medium power 5-gal gas in tank, no fire3. . . . . . . Under driver’s seat Power Primer, high power 5-gal gas in tank; no fire4., ., Under driver’s seat Collier C, low power 1-gal gas adjacent to bomb, fire, firefighting5 ., ., Between engine and firewall Power Primer, high power Dry tank, no fire



Figure C-l .–Portable Kits, Developed bythe Aerospace Corp., Were Utilized in the

OTA Taggant Recovery Tests

Photo credit: U.S. Department of the Treasury

The six-man BATF professional teams then con-ducted a thorough second sweep of each target, in-c luding further col lect ion of debr is , magnet icsweeping, and taggant black-light search. For thissearch, the area was divided into grids, and the col-lected material was carefully identified by the gridnumber. Figure C-2 shows the grid used in test 3.Each BATF search took approximately 3 hours.

Laboratory Analysis

A preliminary analysis was conducted at the testsite by a team from the BATF national laboratory.

A few taggants were identified from the first threetests conducted (actually tests 5, 1, and 2) to dem-onstrate field laboratory identification. The materi-al was then taken to the BATF national laboratoryand quantitatively analyzed. The time necessary torecover more than 20 taggants for each test was re-corded, as was the location of the debris fromwhich the taggants were collected. The taggantswere then mounted on slides and the codes read.Identification of the explosives was then madefrom the taggant code. Most of the laboratory anal-ysis was conducted by Mr. Richard Strobel of theBATF national laboratory, although a volunteerteam from NRA separated four of the taggantsfrom the test 3 debris.

Test Results

The results of the tests are summarized in tableC-2. Over 20 taggants were recovered in the labora-tory from the debris of each automobile bombing.Laboratory time ranged from less than Vi hour toapproximately 4 hours (plus 5 hours preliminarytime to refine procedures). Taggants were recov-ered from the amateur sweep in three of the fivetests. In one test, the amateur and professionalsweep material became mixed up during transpor-tation to the BATF national laboratory as a result ofa deep chuckhole. In the final case, the amateursearch material was inadvertently stored separate-ly from the other recovered debris and not exam-ined. Photo micrographs of the recovered taggantsare shown in figures C-3 through C-7, one for eachtest. Some of the mounted taggants from test 5

F igure C -2 . - BATF Search Grid

‘ b . F i i bA s

a. General recovery grid b. Recovery within automobile

Appendix C—OTA Recovery Tests ● 197

Table C-2.–OTA Recovery Test Results

Number ofTest Condition taggants recovered Source of taggants Laboratory time (hours)

1, . Collier C, low power, under driver’s seat 282. ..., Unigel, medium power, under driver’s seat 23 + 1 contaminant3. . . . . . . Power Primer, high power, under driver’s seat 21 total

12 type A, 9 type B4, ., Collier C, low power, under driver’s seat, fire, 23

firefighting

5. . . . . . . Power Primer, high power, between engine 26 + contaminantsand firewall (training tags from

collection equipment)

Amateur search 1 1/2Amateur search 1/2

Unknown 1 1/2

BATF team, primarily from 3automobile interior andunder automobile

Amateur search 4 hours + 5 hours preliminary timeto define procedures, This was

first material processed in laboratory.


Figure C-3.—Recovered Taggants From Test 1(low power)

Figure C.4.—Recovered Taggants From Test 2(medium power)

were accidently brushed off the mounting SIide;other recovered taggants are shown.

No taggants were individually recovered in thefield, recognized as such, and field read.

All the explosives were correctly identified byBATF as a result of the color code on the taggants.The letter from BATF to OTA, which gives the iden-tification information, is shown as an attachment.The test nomenclature in the letter differs fromthat used in test. The letter refers to the scenes inchronological order; in the text the tests have beengrouped for ease of comparison. The following con-version of the letter “scene” designation to the text“test number” designation is necessary:

Scene 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Test 5Scene 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Test 1Scene 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Test 2

Figure C.5.—Recovereci Taggants From Test 3(high power)

Scene 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Test 3Scene 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . Test 4


bombs, and placed the bombs in the target. (FBIagents inserted the detonators and initiated the ex-plosives.) No one else knew which explosives wereused on each automobile, or even which explosivesfrom a larger selection were chosen. OTA, with as-sistance from NRA, observed the laboratory proce-dures and participated in the separation process.

BATF supplied the automobile targets, the testsite, and the agents for field recovery and labora-tory analysis of the taggants. The explosives weresupplied by the Aerospace Corp.

IME was invited by OTA to participate in the testseries. Due to the short time available for the testplanning, IME was not able to fully participate.They did provide some valuable guidance, how-ever, in a working session attended by OTA, BATF,SAAMI, NRA, and I ME representatives.

Discussion of Results

Too few recovery tests of the 3M identif icationtaggants were conducted under real-world condi-tions to allow a definitive judgment to be made ofrecovery. In addition, only one type of target,automobiles, was used in the tests. However, theease with which taggants were recovered, underthe rather severe test conditions, indicates that tag-gants could be expected to be recovered under awide range of bombing conditions, given the propertraining and effort by field and laboratory inves-tigators. A number of points should be made as aresult of the test series.

In the first place, the taggants do not appear tobe field recoverable and readable, at least underthe test conditions. Approximately 25 peoplelooked for taggants, for a total of approximately 35man-hours, in both daylight and nighttime condi-tions, without visually recovering a single taggant.This was the case even though taggants were easilyrecoverable from the debris in the laboratory.BATF operating procedure, which calls for visualsearch, is not only ineffective, it is counterproduc-tive. Investigators are likely to become disen-chanted when they can’t visually find a taggant,and not collect samples for laboratory analysis.BATF procedures should stress the importance ofthe collection of debris for analysis. It has beenclaimed that the earth at the test site is unusuallyrich in magnetic materials and materials whichfluoresce naturally, and that the tests were par-ticularly severe from the visual recovery stand-point. Visual recovery may, in fact, be possible insituations such as an automobile bombing on alarge paved area, or a small bomb in a large build-ing. It appears likely, however, that taggants will be

Appendix C—OTA Recovery Tests ● 199

missed quite often if visual recovery means are em-phasized.

The second point is that taggants appear to be re-coverable from bombings, with a modest, but coor-dinated, effort on the part of field and laboratorypersonnel. Even under conditions of partial con-finement, taggants from a high-energy dynamitewere easily recovered. Similarly, taggants from alow-power dynamite were recovered even after asevere fire and firefighting activity. Additional testswould be required before the effects of full con-finement, such as in a pipe bomb, or before the ef-fect of fire after a high-energy detonation, could beknown. Similarly, no tests have been conductedwith large charges, or with tagged boosters and det-onators used to detonate an untagged blastingagent.

It appears that the power of the explosive doesnot significantly affect recovery probability or thelaboratory time necessary to separate taggantsfrom the debris. Confinement and the occurrenceof fire, however, do significantly affect laboratoryrecovery time, as the size of the taggants de-creases.

Some difficulty was encountered in reading thecolors of the taggant layers, even by experts from3M. The pigments currently available, however,have been substantially improved, hopefully lead-ing to fewer errors in interpreting the code.

The tests were conducted and field recoverycompleted on three of the five tests under near

ideal weather conditions. A light rain fell beforedebris was collected from two tests, however, in-cluding the unconfined Power Primer and the casein which a fire followed the detonation. The lightrain did not appear to hamper recovery, even forthose severe test conditions; a heavy rain might,however, have more effect.

It should be noted that the automobile tests con-ducted represent rather severe tests of recovery (atleast neglecting confinement). It is reasonable toinfer, therefore, that taggants couId probably be re-covered from building bombings, bombings in theopen, and most other nonconfined bombings.

It is interesting to note that no fires occurred as aresult of the bombings, when fuel was in the fueltanks, even for the most powerful commercial ex-plosive (excluding boosters). While a sample ofthree is hardly significant, the tests do indicate thatfires do not occur as a matter of course in automo-bile bombings.

Finally, it should be noted that these tests pro-vide a possible explanation of the wide divergenceof prior test data. Most of the tests in which BATF/Aerospace recovered taggants involved a labora-tory recovery procedure; this was particularly truefor the severe automobile bombings. Most of theunsuccessful tests by IME and others have eithernot included laboratory analysis, or have had thelaboratory separation process conducted by peo-ple with no training in separating the taggants.


D E P A R T M E N T O F T H E T R E A S U R Y

B U R E A U O F A L C O H O L, T 0 B A C C 0 A N O F I R E A R M S

W A S H I N G T O N , D . C . 2 0 2 2 6

September 28, 1979

Refer TO

DS : RD : WDWMr. David Garfinkle 7555

Office of Technology Assessment600 Pennsylvania AvenueWashington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Garfinkle:

The following test results were obtained from thetaggant survival studies conducted for you atFort Belvoir, Virginia, on September 13, 19790

Scene 1 was a 1949 Ford pickup truck. A 3- to 4-hourlaboratory analysis of the bomb debris collected byDr. Ed James (OTA), Mr. Randall Bowman (NRA), andSpecial Agent Marcus Davis (ATF) resulted in theisolation of 26 taggants bearing code F5959592M8.This identifies the explosives used in this case asAtlas Power Primer, size l-1/4~t

x 8’?, Date/ShiftCode 01-12-77-R2. Many contaminate training taggantswere also in portions of the bombing debris. Theseprobably came from a single contaminated recoverykit. The red layer in this early pre-pilot testversion of the 3M taggant contains an organic pigment,and noticeable variation in hue was observed. Thisproblem has subsequently been corrected in laterversions of the 3M taggants.

Scene 2 was a late model Ford Galaxy. A l-hour,20-minute laboratory analysis of the bomb debriscollected by you, Mr. Robert Hodgdon (Hodgon PowderCompany), and Special Agent Eugene Reagan (ATF)resulted in the isolation of 28 taggants bearingcode F3913142M0. This identifies the explosivesused in this case as a Hercules permissible dynamite,either Red HA, size l-1/4 x 8“, Date/Shift CodeJul 12 78 Jl, or Collier C, size 1-1/4” x 8“,Date/Shift Code Nov 21 78 J1. Both explosiveswere tagged with the same taggant code.

Scene 3 was an Oldsmobile station wagon. A 25-minutelaboratory analysis of the bomb debris collected byMr. Steve Kornish (OTA), Officer Larry Linville(Washington, DC Metropolitan Police Department), and

Appendix C—OTA Recovery Tests . 201

Special Agent Ivan Kalister (ATF) resulted in theisolation of 23 taggants bearing code F5989142M0.This identifies the explosives used in this case asHercules Unigel Tube Shell, size 2“ x 16”, Date/ShiftCode Jun 27 78 J1. One contaminate training taggantwas also found in this debris.

Scene 4 was a Chevrolet Malibu sedan. Twenty–onetaggants were recovered--l7 by our laboratory’schemist in 45 minutes, and 4 by the NRA’s observers,Ms. Susan Rogers and Mr. James Flechenstein, in anunspecified time. Twelve of these taggants bear codeF9986726M0, and 9 bear code F5984642M0. These taggantsidentify the explosives used in this case as AtlasPower Primer, size 1-1/4” x 8“, Date/Shift Code1O-24-78-R2. This material was specially producedfor The Aerospace Corporation by Atlas Powder Companywith an unencapsulated taggant species of one codeand a taggant of a different code from which theencapsulating material had been stripped by solventaction.

Scene 5 was the Chrysler-product station wagon whichwas “fire-bombed” and permitted to burn until youdirected the Fort Belvoir Fire Department to respond.A 3-hour laboratory analysis of bomb scene debriscollected during an 8-man, 2-hour ATF search underthe direction of Special Agent Eugene Reagan, resultedin the isolation of 23 taggants bearing code F3913142M0.This identifies the explosives used in this case aseither Hercules Red HA, size 1-1/4” x 8“, Date/ShiftCode Jul 12 78 Jl, or Collier C, size 1-1/4” x 8“,Date/Shift Code Nov 21 78 Jl, both with the same taggant.

These taggants and those mounted by Mr. Bowman of theNRA from field and first-day laboratory recoverieswere given to you on September 24, 1979, for youruse and examination. If we can be of any furtherservice to you in documenting the results of thesetests, please contact me.

W. David WilliamsExplosives Scientist

61-401 0 - 80 - 14

APPENDIX D–PRODUCTS LIABILITY IMPLICATIONSOF LEGALLY REQUIRING THE INCLUSION OF

TAGGANTS IN EXPLOSIVES

by James A. Henderson, Jr., Boston University School of Law;William L. Groner, Research Assistant,

3rd Year Law Student, Boston University School of LawOctober 9,1979

ANALYSIS OF EXPLOSIVES INDUSTRY’S EXPOSURE TOPRODUCTS LIABILITY

Limits and Purposesof the Present Analysis

The analysis in this section covers the exposure~to civil liability for damages under existing law of1) manufacturers and other commercial suppliersof explosives; 2) manufacturers and other commer-cial suppliers of components that go into the pro-duction of explosives; 3) manufacturers and othercommercial suppliers of accessories ordinarilyused with explosives, such as blasting caps andfuses; and 4) commercial transporters and users ofexplosives. The analysis does not cover the com-mercial suppliers of a range of products sometimesreferred to by legal commentators as “explosives,”including firearms and ammunition, volatile andcaustic flu ids, fireworks, and bottled beverages.

The term “products liability” includes all civilliability for damages arising out of injury to personor property caused by unsafe, defective products,including liability based on theories of negligence,warranty, misrepresentation, and strict liability.“Products liability” does not include criminal lia-bility, or civil liability based on express contractualobligations other than express warranty. The phrase“exposure to Iiability” refers to the conceptualbases and limits of liability; the author does nothave access to factual data relating to frequency ofclaims, payouts to claimants, availability of liabil-ity insurance, and the like, in the explosives indus-try. The Final Report of the Interagency Task Forceon Products Liability (Dept. of Commerce, Oct. 31,1977) indicates that the industrial chemicals indus-try, the closest industry to explosives in that study,is more often than not a leader in terms of the aver-age number of new claims per firm per year. (SeeFinal Report, table I I l-l 3.)

The main objective of this appendix is to exam-ine the products Iiability implications of legalIy re-

UNDER EXISTING LAWquiring the inclusion of taggants in explosives. Suchexamination can meaningfully be undertaken onlyin the context of an adequate understanding of theexisting legal environment into which such a tag-gants requirement would be inserted. The analysisin this section should render such an understandingpossible for those, including some members of Con-gress and their staffs, who may not be intimately fa-miliar with the subject of products liability. A sum-mary of the elements bf this analysis is provided atthe end of the section to facilitate review and quickreference.

The Major Doctrinal Bases of Liability

Negligence

Negligent conduct is conduct that is riskier thana reasonably prudent person would engage in. Themere fact that conduct creates risk does not makeit negligent conduct. All human activities involvesome risks of injury, and certain levels of risk aresocially acceptable. Driving a car, for example, is arisky activity; but everyone who drives a car is notfor that reason necessarily negligent, because a cer-tain type and amount of driving is not only accept-able but necessary. It is only when a driver drivestoo fast, or while intoxicated, that his or her partic-ular mode of driving behavior becomes negligent.(See generally United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).)

Translating these basic notions over to the explo-sives industry, obviously the activities of manufac-turing, supplying, and using explosives are risky ac-tivities. But they become negligent activities only ifthose engaging in them do not take sufficient pre-cautions to reduce (but not necessarily to elimi-nate) the risks. Thus, the plaintiff who seeks to hold

202

Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives ● 203

the dynamite manufacturer liable in negligence forharm caused by an allegedly defective stick of dy-namite will not be allowed to reach the jury unlesshe proves that the manufacturer failed to take rea-sonable steps to avoid product defects, and that asa consequence of such failure the defendant pro-duced a defective stick of dynamite which ulti-mately and proximately caused the plaintiff’s in-juries. (See, e.g., Soso v. Atlas Powdet Co., 238 F.2d388 (8th Cir. 1956).) If the plaintiff succeeds in prov-ing these elements, then in the absence of any legaldefenses (which are considered in the next section)he will be entitled to recover from the defendantmanufacturer, (See, e.g., Morris v. E.I. du font deNemours & Co., 109 S.W.2d 1222 (Mo, 1937).)

Given the difficulties and complexities of proofin the plaintiff’s attempting to demonstrate the un-reasonableness of the defend ant-m anufacturer’sproduction methods, it is not surprising that somecourts have permitted an inference of negligentmanufacture to be drawn from the fact that the de-fendant produced and distributed a defective ex-plosive. (See, e.g., Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chemi-cal Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960), applying thedoctrine of res ipsa loquitur. ) However, some courtshave refused to recognize this special rule. (See,e.g., Matievitch v. Hercules Powder Co., 3 Utah 2d283, 282 P.2d 1044 (1 955), refusing to apply res ipsaloquitur doctrine.) Presumably, in States recogniz-ing it, this special rule would also be available toplaintiffs in actions brought against explosives han-dlers. (See, e.g., Tassin v. Louisiana Power & LightCo., 250 La, 1016,201 So.2d 275 (1967 ).)

These same negligence principles apply to otheractivities engaged in by explosives manufacturers,including marketing their products. Thus, a dyna-mite manufacturer will be liable in negligence forunreasonably failing to warn of hidden dangers as-sociated with use of its products. (See, e.g., Eck v. E.1. du Pent de Nemours & Co., 393 F.2d 197 (7th Cir,1968).) And these principles apply to all other non-manufacturer suppliers of explosives with respectto their own commercial activities. Thus, a retailerwho sells explosives to persons obviously incompe-tent to handle such risky products is negligenttoward those eventually injured by an accidentalexplosion. (See, e.g., Flint Explosives Co. v. Edwards,84 Ga. App. 376, 66 S.E.2d 368 (1 951 ).) And explo-sives handlers are Iiable for harm caused by theirnegligent conduct. (See, e.g., Tassin v. LouisianaPower & Light Co., supra. See also separate section,infra, on explosives users. )

Warrant y

Warranties are legal obligations incurred bycommercial sellers as an incident to the sale ofgoods, or products. They are by and large creaturesof statute— in most States today, versions of theUniform Commercial Code, article 2. Three basictypes of warranties are relevant here: 1) expresswarranties, in which the seller actualIy promisesthat the product will perform in a prescribed man-ner (see Uniform Commercial Code, 2-31 3); 2) im-plied warranties of merchantability, in which theseller promises nothing but is held by the law“impliedly” to have warranted that its products arefree from defects (see Uniform Commercial Code $2-31 4); and 3) implied warranties of fitness for par-ticular purpose, in which the seller knows of specialrequirements of the buyer, and of the buyer’s reli-ance, and supplies a product that fails to meetthose requirements (see Uniform Commercial Code 2-315). All three types of warranties have beenheld to accompany the sale of explosives. (See, e.g.,Hercules Powder Co, v. Rich, 3 F.2d 12 (8th Cir.1924), cert. often. 268 U.S. 692 (1924) (express war-ranty that fuse would burn at rate of 1 ft per m in-ute); Arfons v, E. 1. du Pent de Nemours & Co., 261F.2d 434 (2nd Cir. 1958) (implied warranty that fuseand dynamite were nondefect ive) ; and U n i t e dStates Casualty Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 4 N.J,Super. 444, 67 A.2d 880, rev’d on other grounds 4N.J. 157, 72 A.2d 190 (1 950) (fuse unfit for purchas-er’s particular purposes),)

Comparing these warranty theories with the neg-ligence theory considered earlier, two importantdifferences should be observed. On the one hand, itis not necessary for the plaintiff in a warranty caseto prove, as the plaintiff must prove under negli-gence, that the defendant explosives seller actedunreasonably. It is sufficient that the productfailed, for whatever reason, to meet the standardsimposed by law at the time of sale: promised per-formance (express warranty); freedom from defects(implied warranty of merchantability); and suitabili-ty to purchaser’s special needs (implied warranty offitness for particular purpose). On the other hand,however, the plaintiff must prove other elementsnot required in a negligence case. In some jurisdic-tions, for example, the plaintiff must prove privityof contract— i.e., that he purchased the explosivesdirectly from the defendant. (See, e.g., Green v.Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 95 F. Supp. 127 (W. D,Ark. 1951 ) (negligence action allowed against ex-


plosives manufacturer; warranty action barred be-cause of lack of privity). Many courts today do notrequire privity to be established in products liabil-ity actions based upon warranty theories. (See, e.g.,Henningsen v. Bloom field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,161 A.2d 69 (1960).)

Misrepresentation

Misrepresentation is a tort theory of recoverythat overlaps somewhat with express warranty. Amain difference between them is that the tort doc-trine is not dependent upon the existence of con-tractual privity between the plaintiff and defend-ant. As set forth in Restatement of Torts, Second, $402 B, the essence of the tort is a misrepresentation(whether or not innocently made) to the public by acommercial seller of a product that harms some-one who justifiably relies thereon. Commercial sell-ers of explosives who misrepresent their productsare Iiable for harm proximately resulting. (See, e.g.,Marsh v. Usk Hardware Co., 73 Wash. 543, 132 Pac.241 (191 3).)

Strict Liability in Tort

Strict liability in tort is liability for harm causedby defective products and ultrahazardous conductirrespective of fault on the seller’s or actor’s partand irrespective of the requirements, such as privi-ty of contract, that sometimes accompany warran-ty theories. Members of the explosives industry areexposed to two major forms of strict liability intort: 1) strict liability imposed primarily on com-mercial transporters and users of explosives basedupon the fact that those activities are considered“abnormally dangerous” (see Restatement of Torts,Second, $8519 and 520); and 2) strict liability im-posed on the sellers of explosives based upon thefact of their having sold defective products (see Re-statement of Torts, Second 402 A). Considerationof the first of these types of strict liability will bedeferred to a later section dealing specifically withthe liabilities of commercial transporters and users.The focus in this section will be on the strict liabil-ity of commercial selIers of defective explosives.

According to section 402A of the Restatement ofTorts, Second, in order to recover in strict liabilityan injured plaintiff must establish that the productwas in a defective condition unreasonably danger-ous at the time it left the defendant seller’s controland that such defective condition proximatelycaused the plaintiff’s injuries. The rule applies toall commercial sellers in the chain of distribution,including retailers and wholesalers. The essential

element of proof is that the product was defectiveat the time of sale by defendant. Full considerationof the different ways a product can be said to be“defective” will be deferred to later sections deal-ing with recurring fact patterns in cases involvingallegedly defective explosives. The important pointhere is to understand that the focus in a strict liabil-ity case is on the product, rather than on the de-fendant’s conduct. Even if an explosives manufac-turer exercises due care to avoid flaws in its explo-sives, it will be held liable if flaws occur and causeharm. (See Restatement of Torts, Second 402A(2)(a).) A clear majority of American jurisdictionsrecognize strict Iiability for sellers of defectiveproducts. (See CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. 4060), and anumber of courts have applied that doctrine incases involving allegedly defective explosives. (See,e.g., Hall v. E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345F. Supp. 353 (E. D.N. Y. 1972); Clay v. Ensign-BickfordCo., 307 F. Supp. 288 (D.C. Colo. 1969); Canifax v.Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App.2d 44, 46 Cal.Rptr. 552 (1965); Cooley v. Quick Supp/y Co,, 2 2 1N.W.2d 763 (Iowa, 1974).)

The Major Defenses

The major defenses available to members of theexplosives industry in products liability actions fallinto three basic categories: 1) disclaimers, 2) con-tributory fault, and 3) intervening cause. The thirdis not technically a defense, inasmuch as the plain-tiff must prove that his injuries were proximatelycaused by the defendant’s conduct. As a practicalmatter, however, the defendant raises the issue ofintervening cause, arguing that the negligent con-duct of explosives users constitutes a break in thechain of proximate causation. Thus, interveningcause may be treated as a “defense” for presentpurposes.

Disclaimers

A disclaimer is a term in a contract purporting toexempt the disclaiming party from liability for fu-ture events to which liability would otherwise andordinarily attach. Although no authority has beenfound addressing the question of the effectivenessof disclaimers in cases involving defective explo-sives, it is very likely that the rules which applygenerally in products liability apply here as well, A sa general rule, in products liability cases in whichthe plaintiffs are individuals physically injured byallegedly defective products, disclaimers are setaside by courts as being against public policy,whether the plaintiff seeks to recover on the basis

Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives . 205

of negligence (see, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code$ 1-102(3); R. Hursh & H. Bailey, American Law ofProducts Liability $ 2:7 (2d ed. 1974)); express war-ranty (see, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code $ 2-316(1 )); implied warranty (see, e.g., Heriningsen v.Bloom field Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69(1960)); misrepresentation (see Clements Auto co. v.

Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971));or strict liability (see, e.g., Restatement of Torts,Second, $402 A, comment m; Vandermark v. FordMotor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d168 (1964)). On the reasonable assumption thatthese same rules apply in cases involving allegedlydefective explosives, plaintiffs physically injured inaccidental explosions should not be barred simplybecause of the inclusion of disclaimer language inthe contracts of sale and distribution.

On the other hand, there is more reason to ex-pect that disclaimers will be given effect as be-tween business entities in cases where the harm suf-fered is economic rather than physical. Two busi-ness entities, dealing at arms length from roughlyequal bargaining positions, arguably should be al-lowed to allocate responsibilities between them bycontract, Some courts have given effect to dis-claimers in indemnity and contribution actions be-tween business entities. (See, e.g., Williams v. Chrys-ler Corp., 148 W.Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1 964); butsee Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark, 883, 430 S.W.2d778 (1 968).) Thus, were a large explosives distribu-tor to seek indemnity from the manufacturer afterbeing held liable in a products liability actionbrought by an injured victim of an accidental ex-plosion, the court might give effect to a disclaimerin the contract of sale between the explosives man-ufacturer and the distribute.

Contributory Fault

Certainly when the basis of the plaintiff’s actionagainst the explosives seller is negligence, contribu-tory fault on the part of the plaintiff will reduce (oreliminate, if comparative fault is not applicable)the plaintiff’s recovery, (See, e.g., Da/by v. Hercu-/es, Inc., 458 S.W.2d 274 (Mo. 1970).) When theplaintiff seeks recovery on the basis of warranty,courts today are likely to speak in terms of theplaintiff’s conduct breaking the chain of proximatecausation, especially when the plaintiff is shown tohave been aware of the defective condition of thedefendant’s product. (See, e.g., Uniform Commer-cial Code 2-316 (3)(b), comment 8, & 2-715, com-ment 5.) The majority rule in products liabilitycases involving strict liability in tort is that only theform of contributory fault commonly referred to as

“assumption of the risk, ” in which the plaintiffknows or has reason to know of the defective con-dition of the product, will reduce or bar the plain-tiff’s recovery. (See, e.g., Restatement of Torts, Sec-ond, $402 A, comment n; but see Codling v. Paglia,32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N. Y.S.2d 461(1973 ).) This general rule reflects a policy favoringliability of commercial sellers of defective prod-ucts in all cases except those involving fairly grossbehavior on the part of plaintiffs.

Examining recent products liability cases involv-ing allegedIy defective explosives sold to commer-cial users, it appears that courts have been sympa-thetic to defendants’ arguments that the users oftheir products, rather than the products them-selves, are to be blamed for the accidents. These ju-dicial sympathies manifest themselves in severalways. Courts have been willing to weigh user mis-conduct fairly heavily as an independent bar to re-covery. (See, e.g., Hercules Powder Co. v. Hicks, 453S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1970).) And they have been willingto give such misconduct weight in deciding that theplaintiff’s circumstantial proof of product defectwas insufficient. (See, e.g., Hopkins v. E. l. du Pentde Nemours & Co., 212 F.2d 623 (3rd Cir, 1954), cert.den. 348 U.S. 872 (1954 ).) The main reason for thiswillingness to weigh user misconduct more heavilyin explosives cases than in cases involving othertypes of products appears to be the fact that explo-sives are not, as a general rule, “consumer prod-ucts” in the same sense as household appliances.(But see p. 217, intra. ) Commercial users of explo-sives are generally assumed to be expert, and canbe relied upon to reduce the incidence of acciden-tal explosions. Of course, when explosive productsare sold to obviously incompetent users, such asyoung children, contributory fault plays much lessof an important role in reducing or barring theseller’s liability. (See, e.g., Wendt v. Balletto, 26Corm. Super. 367,224 A.2d [561 (1966).)

Intervening Cause

The main difference between this “defense” (seeearlier comment) and the defense of contributoryfault just considered is the fact that in cases involv-

ing intervenin g cause, the plaintiffs are not thesame persons who misused or mishandled the ex-plosives. Although the victims in these cases are in-nocent of personal wrongdoing, they will be deniedrecovery against the sellers of allegedly defectiveexplosives if the conduct of those using the explo-sives was so negligent as to constitute an interven-ing, or superseding, cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries.(See, e.g., Hercules Powder Co. v. Hicks, 453 S.W,2d


583 (Ky. 1970).) In contrast, where an innocent thirdparty brought a strict liability action against thosein charge of storing explosives, the Supreme Courtof Alaska rejected the defendant’s interveningcause argument as a matter of law, even in the faceof proof that vandals had broken into the storagearea and deliberately set off the explosion. (SeeYukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1978).)

Actions Against Manufacturers andOther Commercial Sellers of Explosives

The objective in this and the following sectionswill be to examine the significant fact patterns thattend to recur in this area. The focus will not be onlegal doctrine, but on the basic fact patterns andthe reactions of courts to them.

Product Flaws

As developed earlier, an injured plaintiff stands agood chance of recovering against the manufac-turer and other commercial sellers of explosives ifhe can prove the existence of a product defect inexistence at the time of sale by the defendant. Aflaw is a type of defect which consists of the inad-vertent failure of a product unit, or batch of units,to conform to the intended product design. Flawsare what Iaypersons most often think of as “de-fects.” The flaws most frequently encountered inexplosives cases are “bad batches’ ’– for example,sticks of dynamite some of which contain toomuch, and some too little, explosive ingredientsdue to improper mixing during manufacture.

The greatest source of difficulty confrontingplaintiffs in flaw cases is not so much conceptualas practical. Because explosives always “self-de-struct” in use, it is uniquely difficult for plaintiffs toobtain direct evidence of product flaws, Whenother types of products break unexpectedly, ex-perts can sometimes reconstruct the products anddetermine the existence of flaws. But with explo-sives, such reconstruction is almost never possible.Consequently, plaintiffs in cases in which acciden-tal explosions are caused by alleged flawed explo-sives are almost always forced to rely upon circum-stantial, rather than direct, evidence of the exist-ence of product flaws.

A classic example of how a plaintiff can success-fully build a case based on circumstantial proof ispresented in Morris v. E. /. du Pent de /Vemours &Co., 109 S.W.2d 1222 (Me. 1937). The plaintiff inthat case claimed that the defendant explosives

manufacturer, through its employees, had negli-gently mixed a batch of dynamite so as to cause thestick used by the plaintiff to explode prematurely.The plaintiff’s proof, which the court held to be suf-ficient to reach the jury, consisted of the following:1) purchase of the dynamite from the defendant bythe plaintiff’s employer; 2) careful handling andstorage of the dynamite up to the time it came intothe plaintiff’s hands on the day of the accident, 3)careful handling of the dynamite by the plaintiff upto the time of the premature explosion; 5) diffi-culties experienced by other employees with dyna-mite from the same batch; and 6) expert testimonyto the effect that the dynamite that injured theplaintiff was unevenly mixed. Of course, becausethe plaintiff proceeded on a negligence theory, therecord also included testimony on both sides relat-ing to the issue of due care in manufacture. Today,under a strict Iiability in tort theory, this last de-scribed evidence would not be necessary. But theplaintiff must still prove the existence of a defect,even under strict Iiability theories. And on the issueof circumstantial proof of defect, the Morris case isstill good law.

Where the plaintiff is unable to build a solid cir-cumstantial case, courts are apt to rule in favor ofthe defendant manufacturer as a matter of law. Es-pecially where there is evidence of mishandling ofthe explosives at the time of the accident, the plain-tiff may meet with judicial disapproval regardingthe sufficiency of his proof of defect. (See, e.g.,Soso v. At/as Powder Co., 238 F.2d 388 (8th Cir.1956); Hopkins v. E. /. du Pent de Nemours & Co.,212 F.2d 623 (3rd Cir. 1954), cert. den. 348 U.S. 872(1954).) Another source of difficulty often encoun-tered by plaintiffs in these flaw cases is the neces-sity of accounting for the conditions of storage andhandling between the time of sale by the defendantand use by the plaintiff. That this may even defeatclaims based upon strict liability in tort is sug-gested by Clay v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 307 F. Supp.288 (D. C. Colo. 1969), in which the trial court con-cluded that the fuse was defective at the time ofthe explosion but held that the plaintiff failed toprove that the defect originated with the defendantmanufacturer.

Product Designs

Although products liability actions based on al-legedly defective designs are escalating in frequen-cy in many other product areas, they are relativelyinsignificant in actions against explosives manufac-turers. Obviously, explosives are supposed to ex-plode. When they explode prematurely, the tenden-

Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives “ 207

cy is to explore the possibility of a product flaw, ormishandling. The only type of case that could besaid to involve the defective design of an explosivewould be one in which the explosive was deliber-ately made too strong, or too weak. But even there,the tendency would be to treat such a case as in-volving the failure of the defendant adequately towarn users of the explosive characteristics of itsproducts.

Marketing

The cases involving claims by injured plaintiffsbased on the manner in which explosives are mar-keted may be grouped into three basic categories:1) cases in which the defendant’s product fails toperform as promised by the defendant; 2) cases inwhich the defendant fails to warn users of hiddenrisks associated with its product; and 3) cases inwhich the defendant selIs or distributes the explo-sives to persons who are obviously incompetent tohandle them, Cases in the first of these categoriesmay involve express warranties. (See earlier discus-sion, pp. 203-204, supra. ) They may also involvenegligence, as in Raatikka v. O/in-Mathiesort Chemi-cal Corp., 8 Mich. App. 638, 155 N.W.2d 205 (1967),where the seller of dynamite advised the plaintiffto use too much explosive in the primer.

By far the most significant category of marketingcases involves alleged failures to warn explosivesusers of risks that are not obvious. Although oftenbased upon allegedly negligent omissions by de-fendants (see Restatement of Torts, Second, $ 388),failure to warn is also generally recognized as abasis for imposing strict liability. (See genera//yRestatement of Torts, Second, 402 A, comments hand j.) As a general rule, manufacturers and othercommercial product sellers owe a duty to warn ofrisks that are not Iikely to be obvious to personswho will foreseeably use their products, and that,with such warnings, the users are in a position toavoid. Because users of explosives are presumablyknowledgeable regarding many of the risks associ-ated with those products, the manufacturer’s dutyto warn tends to be drawn somewhat more narrow-ly than in other product areas. (See, e.g., Croteau v.Borden Co., 277 F. Supp. 945 (E. D. Pa. 1968), aff’d395 F.2d 771 (3rd Cir. 1968); Hercules Powder Co. v.HiCkS/ 453 S.W. 2d 583 (Ky. 1970).)

One source of controversy concerning the explo-sives manufacturer’s duty to warn is the question ofthe proper addressees of the warnings. Some courtshave held that it is sufficient if the supervisory per-sonnel in charge of directing blasting operations re-ceive warnings, negating any requirement that the

manufacturer attempt to warn those actually usingthe explosives. (See, e.g., Bryant v. Hercules, Inc.,325 F. Supp. 241 (W. D. Ky. 1970). ) Other courts haveheld that the manufacturer of explosive productsmust attempt to warn those actually using thoseproducts of risks that may be hidden to them, not-withstanding the fact that information is suppliedto the manufacturer’s immediate vendee. (See, e.g.,Eck v. E. l. du Pent de Nemours & Co., 393 F.2d 197(7th Cir. 1968); Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz.426, 581 P, 2d 271 (1978 ).) In other product areas,with the exception of prescription drugs, courtsgeneralIy require warnings to be gotten to the actu-al users. (See, e.g., Hubbard-Ha// Chemical Co. v. -Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965) (industrialpoison); McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co.,11 N.Y.2d 62, 226 N. Y.S.2d 407, 181 N.E.2d 430(1962) (heat blocks for use in rescue operations).)

Regarding the third category of cases focusingon the explosives seller’s manner of marketing itsproducts —cases in which explosives are sold topersons obviously incompetent to handle them–retailers are occasionally exposed to liability onthat basis. (See, e.g., Wendt v. Balletto, 26 C o r m .Supp. 367, 224 A.2d 561 (1966) (sale to minor); FlintExplosives Co. v. Edwards, 84 Ga. App. 376, 66S.E.2d 368 (1951) (sale by unlicensed retailer to in-experienced users). ) However, courts have been re-luctant to hold explosives manufacturers responsi-ble for failing to follow up on the ultimate distribu-tion and manner of use of their products. (See, e.g.,Doss v. Apache Powder Co., 430 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir.1970); Flint Explosives Co. v. Edwards, 86 Ga. App.404,71 S.E.2d 747 (1952 ).)

Actions Against Manufacturers andOther Commercial Sellers of

Explosives Components

“Component” is a term of art in products liabilitylaw; in the present context it is synonymous with“ingredients. ” Commercial sellers of explosivescomponents are entities that manufacture and sellthe chemical ingredients of explosives. Most often,the ingredients are sold to explosives manufactur-ers.

Product Flaws

No cases have been found in which an action hasbeen brought against a commercial seller of explo-sives components on the grounds that the compo-nent was flawed at the time of sale. This paucity ofreported decisions undoubtedly reflects the earl ier


described circumstance that most product flaws inconnection with explosives occur as a result of theimproper mixing of ingredients by the explosivesmanufacturer. (See p. 206, supra. ) And those few in-stances of flawed explosives that might be theoret-ically traceable to flawed components would poseinsurmountable problems of proof as a practicalmatter. However, as a matter of legal theory thereis little doubt that the selIer of a product c o m p o -nent proven to have been flawed at the time of salewould be liable to persons injured because of suchproduct flaw. (See, e.g., Clark v. Bendix Corp., 345N. Y.S.2d 662, 42 A.D.2d 727 (1973); Barnhart v.Freeman Equipment Co., 441 P.2d 993 (Okla. 1968).)Whether courts would give effect to a disclaimer inthe contract of sale of the component, as betweenthe component seller and the explosives manu-facturer, is not clear. (See pp. 204-205, supra. )

Product Designs

Here, too, it is unlikely that a plaintiff injured inan accidental explosion would bring an actionagainst the selIer of a component based on a theoryof defective design. TypicalIy, the explosives manu-facturer decides what it needs in the way of ingredi-ents, and orders them specifically by description.The components supplied to explosives manufac-turers are basic chemical compounds; it is difficultto envision a design-based theory of recoveryagainst the component selIer in the typical case.

In other product areas, suppliers of product com-ponents have been held liable for the designs of thefinished product, even where the component wasnot dangerous by itself. A recent decision by theSupreme Court of Mississippi (Dunson v. S.A. Allen,Inc., 355 So. 2d 77 (Miss. 1978)) held that the sup-plier of a component could be held liable whensuch component is intended to be used only in con-junction with a second component and when socombined, the combination of the two is unreason-ably dangerous. The finished product in that casewas a pulpwood cutter, and the component was athinning shear attachment. Even though the dan-gers posed by the combination could be eliminatedonly by a modification in design of the larger ma-chine, the seller of the component was held liablebased on its knowledge of the dangers and its in-volvement in manufactur ing a component de-signed specificalIy for use in the finished product.

In contrast, the manufacturer-seller of bulk sul-furic acid was held not to owe a duty to the generalpublic to make sure that commercial purchasers ofits product did not combine the acid with otheringredients to produce unreasonably dangerous

chemical combinations. (See Walker v. StaufferChemical Corp., 19 Cal.App. 3d 669, 96 Cal. Rptr.803 (1971 ).) The plaintiff in that case was injuredwhen a drain-cleaning product containing the de-fendant’s sulfuric acid exploded during use. On bal-ance, the bulk sulfuric acid manufacturer seemscloser to the seller of explosives components thandoes the manufacturer of the machinery compo-nent. Assuming that the explosives manufacturer isknowledgeable regarding what it wants in the wayof components, and assuming that the componentmanufacturer delivers exactly what is ordered, it isunlikely that liability would extend to the seller ofbasic chemical constituents of explosives. Whenthe seller of basic components has reason to knowthat the buyer is relying on the seller’s judgment inrecommending what type of component to use, lia-bility may extend to the component seller. (See,e.g., Kramrner v. Edward l-lines Construction Co., 16I Il. App. 3d 763, 306 N.E. 2d 686 (1974) (seller sup-plied wrong grade of lumber for scaffolding).) Butassuming the absence of such reliance in mostsales of basic components to explosives manufac-turers, liability probably wouldcomponent selIers.

Marketing

Given the presumed expertiseufacturers, it is difficult to see

not extend to the

of explosives man-how sellers of ex-

plosives components in the typical instance couldbe held to a duty to warn of the risks associatedwith their products. Even when the purchaser of ex-plosives components is an individual, liability onthe basis of failure to warn will be denied if the useris an explosives expert. (See, e.g., Croteau v. BordenCo., 277 F. Supp. 945 (D. C.E. D. Pa. 1968), Aff’d 395F.2d 771 (3rd Cir. 1968) (plaintiff was a lab techni-cian conducting an experiment on a solid rocketfuel component).) However, when the manufac-turer of a component knows or has reason to knowof the purchaser’s ignorance of the risks, or knowsthat the purchaser is combining the componentinto a dangerous combination without adequatewarnings to users ignorant of the risks, liability maybe imposed on the component seller for failing towarn. (See, e.g., E. l. du Pent de Nemours & Co. v.McCain, 414 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969) (liability im-posed even where component sold by defendantwas inert–defendant’s name was on the label ofthe finished product).)

On balance, it is unlikely that sellers of explo-sives components would be Iiable for failure towarn in the normal situation in which the compo-nents are sold to explosives manufacturers. This


conclusion is somewhat strengthened by the earlierdescribed reluctance of courts to impose dutiesupon explosives manufacturers to follow up salesof their products with efforts to reduce careless-ness in their handling and use. (See p. 207, supra. )

Actions Against Manufacturersand Other Commercial Sellers

of Explosives Accessories

“Accessories” refers to products normally usedin connection with explosives, including blastingcaps and fuses.

Product Flaws

I n contrast to the situation with regard to explo-sives components, a number of cases have been re-ported in which injured plaintiffs have sought to re-cover from manufacturers and other sellers of ex-plosives accessories on the basis of product flaws.(See, e.g., Huffstutler v. Hercules Powder Co., 305F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962) (blasting caps); Demerit v.Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5thCir. 1960) (blasting caps); United States Casualty Co.v, Hercules Powder Co., 4 N.J. Super. 444, 67 A.2d880 (1949); rev’d on other grounds, 4 N.J. 157, 72A.2d (190) (1950) (fuse),) To no less extent than otherproduct manufacturers and sellers, commercialsuppliers of explosives accessories are exposed toliability (in many jurisdictions, strict liability) forharm caused by flawed products. As in the case ofexplosives manufacturers, the difficulties encoun-tered by injured plaintiffs are in proving that a de-fect was present at the time of sale. (See p. 206,supra. ) Indeed, the difficulties are Iikely to be com-paratively greater in cases involving blasting caps,due to their smaller size and relatively greater mo-bility, and the correspondingly greater likelihoodthat injured plaintiffs will be unable to prove thatthe product was handled normally between thetime of original purchase and the time of the acci-dent, (See, e.g., E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.Duboise, 236 Fed. 690 (5th Cir. 1916); Hicks v. E. 1.du Pont de Nemours & Co., 246 F. Supp. 589 (D.C.Okla. 1965).)

I n t e r e s t i n g l y e n o u g h , p l a i n t i f f s w h o h a v ebrought similar actions against fuse manufacturersappear to have fared somewhat better in reachingthe jury with circumstantial proof of product de-fects. (See, e.g., Hercules Powder Co. v. Rich, 3 F.2d12 (8th Cir. 1924); United States Casua/ty Co. v. lier-cules Powder Co., 4 N.J. super. 444, 67 A.2d 880(1949) rev’d on other grounds, 4 NJ. 157, 72 A.2d

190 (1950). But see Clay v, Ensign-Bickford Co., 307F. Supp. 288 (D.C. Colo. 1969) (plaintiffs proveddefect at time of accident but not at time of sale).)One practical difference between blasting capsand fuses that may help to explain this differencein treatment is the fact that fuse ordinarily is sold inreels, from which the users take whatever lengthsare required under the varying circumstances ofuse. Thus, more often than in the case of blastingcaps, the unused portion of the fuse may be exam-ined for defects after the accident, and if defectsare discovered the plaintiff can argue that the fusethat caused the accident had the same defects.Another reason plaintiffs may fare better in fusecases is the fact that eyewitnesses are able to tes-tify regarding the behavior of the fuse at the timeof the accident, in ways that directly point to theexistence of a defect, (See, e.g., Hercules PowderCo. v. Rich, supra, (fuse burned too quickly); Cooleyv. Quick Supply Co., 221 N.W.2d 763 (Iowa, 1974)(user could not tell if fuse was burning).)

Product Designs

Design cases would appear more likely to arisehere than in the case of explosives and compo-nents, given the somewhat more mechanical natureof some accessories. For example, one can envisionan action being brought on the ground that a par-ticular type of blasting cap was designed so as toallow accidental detonation too easily. However,no reported cases have been found in which theplaintiff proceeded against the manufacturer orother commercial seller of an explosives accessoryon the basis of an al Iegedly defective design.

Marketing

injured plaintiffs have brought actions againstaccessory manufacturers and selIers on the groundthat adequate warnings did not accompany theproducts into the hands of the ultimate users. Withrespect to fuses, plaintiffs typically argue that theywere not adequately warned of the burning charac-teristics of the products. Especially where the fuseis sold as “safety fuse, ” such arguments have beensuccessful. (See, e.g., Canifax v. Hercules PowderCo., 237 Cal. App.2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965);Cooley v. Quick Supply Co., 221 N.W.2d 763 (Iowa1974).) The plaintiffs in the blasting cap cases havemore frequently been persons outside the class ofprofessional users originally intended by the manu-facturer to use the products, who have argued thatthe defendant failed adequately to warn againstthe possibility of the caps exploding accidentally.


RefIecting the tendencies for courts to refuse to ex-tend the responsibilities owed by explosives manu-facturers (see p. 205, supra) and components manu-facturers (see p. 208, supra) to untrained, incompe-tent persons into whose hands these dangerousproducts sometimes come, some courts have re-fused to hold blasting cap manufacturers for failingto label their products as explosives. (See, e.g., Ballv. E. /. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 519 F.2d 715 (6thCir. 1975); Littlehale v. E. l. du Pent de Nemours &Co., 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967).) However, at leastone court has not only recognized the duty of blast-ing cap manufacturers to warn children of the ex-plosive nature of their products, but has suggestedthat injured plaintiffs may join in a single tort ac-tion against all major members of the blasting capindustry, together with their trade association. (SeeHall v. E. /. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F .Supp. 353 (E. D.N.Y. 1972) .)

Actions Against CommercialTransporters and Users of Explosives

Commercial transporters and users of explosivesare subject to strict liability for harm to persons

and property caused by their activities to an extentthat in some ways can be said to exceed the strict li-ability of sellers of defective products. Althoughthis rule is not strictly speaking a rule of “productsliability, “ it deserves brief mention in this analysis.The general rule is set forth in sections 519 and 520of the Restatement of Torts, Second. In essence,persons engaged in activities considered to be “ab-normally dangerous” are strictly Iiable without re-gard to the degree of care exercised. The rule ap-plies whether or not the abnormally dangerous ac-tivity is commercial; but a clear majority of its ap-plications involve commercial activities. A numberof courts in recent years have imposed strict liabili-ty in tort for harm to the persons and property ofothers caused by transporters and users of explo-sives. (See, e.g., Ward v. H. B. Zachry Const. Co., 570F.2d 892 (lOth Cir. 1978); Yukon Equipment, Inc. v.Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska,1978) (storers of explosives strictly liable even whenexplosion caused by vandals); Iannone v. CayugaConst. Corp., 411 N. Y.S.2d 59966 A.D.2d 745 (1978)(blasters strictly liable). Cf. O’Connor v. E.). DiCarlo& Sons, Inc., 378 N.E.2d 695 (Mass. 1978) (conse-quential damage from blasting is actionable onlyon proof of negligence). )

HOW WOULD THESE EXPOSURES TO LIABILITYCHANGE IF CONGRESS REQUIRED THE INCLUSION

OF TAGGANTS IN EXPLOSIVES?

Factual Assumptions

be carriedA number of factual assumptions willthrough the following analysis of the potentialchanges in the products Iiability exposure of the ex-plosives industry. At the end of the analysis, eachassumption will be hypothetically altered to permitconsideration of alternative outcomes. These as-sumptions are included here to render manageablewhat follows. They are not meant to reflect anyjudgment by the author regarding the merits of theissues to which they relate.

Congress will require the inclusion of both identifi-cation and detection taggants. Identif ication tag-gants are small pieces of coded material, capableof surviving an explosion in sufficient numbers tobe retrieved mechanically. They are mixed with theother ingredients of explosives at the time of manu-facture. When retrieved foIlowing an explosion,they allow the manufacturing source and date ofmanufacture of the explosive to be determined.

Detection taggants are small pieces of materialthat emit traces of a gas capable of being detectedby sensors. Explosives containing detection tag-gants presumably could be discovered prior to det-onation by the use of gas-sensitive monitoring de-vices. Although the author understands that de-tection taggants are still in the relatively earlystages of development, the present analysis will as-sume their required inclusion in the interest ofcompleteness.

The designs of the taggants required to be includedwill be specifically described by regulation. Two basicregulatory approaches are available by which todescribe the taggants which would be required tobe included in explosives: 1) design standards, inwhich the design specifications of the taggants aredescribed with relative specificity; and 2) perform-ance standards, in which the taggants are describedin terms of expected performance — e.g., their capa-bility of being retrieved after an explosion, or de-tected before one. With respect to most consumer


products, performance standards are preferredover design standards because they leave the pro-ducers relatively free to provide consumers withchoices among designs. In the present context,however, it may be assumed initially that uniformi-ty in the design of taggants is more desirable thanvariation, and therefore that design standards willbe adopted by regulation after adequate testing.

Congress will exclude black and smokeless pow-ders from the list of explosives required to contain tag-gants. The following analysis will focus on solid ex-plosives, such as dynamite. Because the inclusionof taggants in explosive powders could presentsomewhat different products liability issues, thatpossibility will be deferred until later.

Government-supervised testing indicates explosivescontaining taggants are “safe” for normal handling.The assumption here is that Congress will not re-quire the inclusion of taggants in explosives if test-ing reveals accompanying safety hazards. How-ever, the word “safe” must be put in quotations be-cause of the inherent Iimits of any testing p r o -gram — all possible conditions of use cannot be an-ticipated and tested against. Thus, notwithstandingthis assumption, experts are likely to be availableto plaintiffs who will testify in good consciencethat on the facts of a particular case the taggantsplayed a role in causing an explosion involved in aparticular case.

Taggant manufacturers will sell the taggants directlyto explosives manufacturers. The author is aware of aproposal to have the Federal Government purchasetaggants and then sell them to explosives manufac-turers. That alternative will be addressed in a sub-sequent section.

Congress will provide no special immunities orother legislative adjustment of liabilities. Again, theauthor is aware of suggestions that Congress adjustthe exposures to liability of members of the explo-sives industry, and wilI return to consider those pos-sibilities in a later section.

Changes in Explosives Manufacturers’and Sellers’ Exposures to Liability

In the following analysis, the question of wheth-er these manufacturers and sellers of explosivescan successfully raise as a defense the fact thatthey are required by law to include taggants in theirproducts will be deferred until the underlying ques-tions of whether injured plaintiffs could succeed inproving defects have been addressed.

Claims That the Taggants CausedAccidental Explosions—Proof of Defect

At the outset, it must be recognized that in casesin which injured plaintiffs claim that taggantscaused accidental explosions, technically they willbe asserting alleged defects in design rather than inproduction. It will be recalled from an earlier dis-cussion that a flaw consists of an inadvertent fail-ure of a product unit to conform to the intendedproduct design. (See p. 206, supra. ) Because tag-gants are to be included in explosives intentionally,technically they are not flaws, but part of the prod-uct designs. Will, or should this circumstance makea difference in the way courts react to the plain-tiff’s proof and arguments in cases involving acci-dental explosions? Functionally, taggants that areproven to cause accidental explosions are quiteflaw-like. (The question of whether plaintiffs willactually succeed in proving that the taggantscaused the explosions will be addressed shortly. )That is, from the point of view of the injured user ofthe explosives, the taggants would act very muchlike flaws – i.e., they would constitute bits of “for-eign” material that would not enhance, but ratherwould detract from, the intended performance ofthe explosives. Presumably, any instability pro-duced by their inclusion would be a feature againstwhich normally careful handling would constituteinadequate protection. On the assumption thattheir inclusion causes accidents, they would be thefunctional equivalent of “designed-in flaws, ”

The interesting question is whether, putting toone side the functional equivalency of these tag-gants to product flaws, defendant manufacturerswould be permitted to argue, as a matter of publicpolicy, that the benefits to society at large suffi-ciently outweigh the risks presented to explosivesusers as a justification for the inclusion of taggants.(Again, the narrower question of whether it shouldmatter that the Government forces this decision onexplosives manufacturers will be deferred untillater.) What makes this question particularly in-triguing is the fact that influential legal commenta-tors have recognized that a “cost-benefit” analysisis appropriate in determining whether product de-signs are unreasonably dangerous. (See, e.g., Wade,On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973 ).)

On balance, the circumstances surrounding theinclusion of taggants in explosives appears to besufficiently different from most cases involving al-legedly defective product designs to cause this


writer to doubt that courts would give much weightto such policy arguments on behalf of defendants.In most product design cases, the risks and benefitsto be balanced off against each other accrue to thesame more or less limited group of persons atypi-cally, the product users. With respect to taggants,the group put to risk —the users— are a much small-er group than the group benefited —society atlarge. In product design cases in which one distinctgroup is benefited and another put at risk, courtshave tended to impose liability on product design-ers, in part on grounds of basic fairness. (See, e.g.,Passwaters v. Genera/ Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270(8th Cir. 1972).) Admittedly, in most cases of thissort the nonusers are the ones who are put to riskand the users the ones who benefit. But it wouldnot be surprising if courts were to react similarly inthese taggant cases, where the situation is the re-verse.

Taking these considerations together—the func-tional similarity of taggants to production flaws(presumably, they cause the product suddenly andwithout warning to self-destruct) and the generaltendency for courts in products liability cases to besuspicious of allowing one group of persons to beput at risk so that a different group can benefit– itis likely that courts would treat these cases as theywould treat flaw cases. That is, if the plaintiff suc-ceeds in proving that the taggants caused an acci-dental explosion, the plaintiff will have proved theproduct to be defective and unreasonably danger-ous notwithstanding efforts of manufacturers toargue “the greater good for the greater number. ”This conclusion draws support from the increasingreliance by courts and commentators on the test of“reasonable consumer expectations” to determinethe defectiveness issue. (See generally Restatementof Torts, Second, 402 A, comment i; Hubbard,Reasonable Human Expectations: A NormativeModel for Imposing Strict Liability for DefectiveProducts, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 465 (1978).) Certainlyfrom the point of view of the user of explosives, astick of dynamite that explodes unexpectedly andwithout fault on the user’s part could be said to failto meet that user’s “reasonable expectations.” (Fora consideration of the efficacy of warning usersthat the explosives may accidentally explode, seepp. 216-217, infra. )

Assuming that a plaintiff will succeed in estab-lishing a prima facie case if he can prove that thetaggants caused the accidental explosion, it re-mains to be considered whether it is likely that hewill succeed in his proof. It will be recalled from anearlier treatment of the liability of explosives man-ufacturers and sellers that the major problem con-

fronting injured plaintiffs in cases involving prod-uct defects is establishing the existence of a defectby means of circumstantial evidence. (See p. 206,supra. ) Would the required inclusion of taggants inexplosives reduce those difficulties or proof? Thatis, putting aside for a moment the question ofwhether defendants would be allowed to raise as adefense the fact that they are required by law to in-clude taggants in their products, (see pp. 215-216,infra. ) would plaintiffs be more I ikely to reach triersof fact with arguments that the explosives them-selves, rather than mishandling, caused the acci-dental explosions?

Although the magnitude of the reduction inplaintiffs’ problems of proof brought about by theinclusion of taggants cannot be predicted with anydegree of certainty, the answer to this question isalmost certainly, “Yes, plaintiffs’ problems of proofwould be reduced. ” In accidental explosion casesup to now, plaintiffs almost invariably have beenunable to offer direct evidence of the presence offoreign material due to the fact that the explosivesin question “self-destruct” in use. Once taggantsare required to be included, direct proof of theirpresence will almost always be available– indeed,their presence based on the Federal requirementwould probably be presumed.

Of course, the mere fact of the inclusion of thetaggants in the explosives would not make a casefor an injured plaintiff unless there were proof thatthe taggants caused the explosion. Would suchproof be available to plaintiffs in the face of exten-sive, Government-supervised product testing show-ing taggants to be “safe”? I n part, the answer heredepends on a factor difficult for this writer to pre-dict at this time– i.e., the degree of unanimityamong scientific professionals on the question ofwhether taggants may pose risks of accidental ex-plosions. On the reasonable assumption that in thisinstance, as with most relatively novel technicalquestions relating to probable risks, some divisionof opinion is likely to be present among experts,then the proof needed by plaintiffs will likely beavailable in the form of expert testimony. In gen-eral, this expert testimony could be expected totake two basic forms: 1) testimony that the pres-ence of even a “normal” concentration of taggantscaused the accidental explosion; and 2) testimonythat in a given case an “abnormal” concentrationof taggants was present and caused the explosion.

Regarding the first form of expert testimony, onthe assumption that some members of the scientif-ic community believe that taggants may at leastcontribute to instability under certain conditions, aqualified expert will probably be available who is


willing to testify in good conscience that based onthe surrounding circumstances, including proof ofcareful handling, the presence of normal concen-tration of taggants caused the accidental explo-sion. Without the taggants, the plaintiff’s expertwould be forced to rely more heavily on specula-tion regarding the presence of explosion-inducingforeign material, making it easier for the judge tointervene on behalf of the defendant as a matter oflaw. With the inclusion of the taggants, the expertcould more easily anchor his opinion to a specifichypothesis. Courts would continue to direct ver-dicts for defendants in cases where the plaintiff’sother circumstantial proof was weak. But the pres-ence of the taggants could be expected to causethis to happen somewhat less frequently. However,if in a case there is nothing, or almost nothing, inthe way of circumstantial evidence of what causedthe explosion, opinion of an expert that the explo-sion “may have been caused” by the taggants is un-likely to be sufficient, standing by itself, to supporta conclusion of causation. (See genera//y 2 F.Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 1117-1118(1956).)

With regard to the second form of expert testi-mony, to the effect that an abnormally high con-centration of taggants caused the accidental explo-sion, the possibility exists that high concentrationcould be established by evidence other than thefact of the explosion itself: either the expert couldtestify to an abnormally high number of taggantsrecovered at the explosion site; or the expert couldtestify to an abnormally high concentration of tag-gants in other undetonated explosives from thesame lot, which should be more easily traceablegiven the taggant requirement. (It should be ob-served that proof of an abnormalIy high concentra-tion would be proof of a “flaw” in the classicsense —see p. 206, supra. ) If either type of inde-pendent proof of an abnormalIy high concentrationwere available, the plaintiff would very probablyreach the trier of fact on a defect theory. In addi-tion, the plaintiff should reach the trier of fact ifthe taggants recovered were shown to be too large,or otherwise misshapen in ways that could contrib-ute to accidental explosions, If no such independ-ent evidence were available, as a practice matter itis difficult to see how the plaintiff’s case would bestrengthened simply by an assertion that a highconcentration of taggants, or odd-shaped taggants,existed. With no direct evidence of the existence offlaws, the mere fact of explosion ought not to suf-fice to permit the trier of fact to conclude that theexplosive was defective. Admittedly, the fact thattaggants are present in the explosives in the first

place adds “one more thing that can go wrong.”But in the absence of independent proof of highconcentration, (which, perhaps significantly, thespecial recoverability of taggants would help makepossible), as a practical matter the plaintiff’s casewould only be as strong as his circumstantial evi-dence.

In connection with the foregoing analysis of theeffects of the presence of taggants on the plaintiff’sproof of defect, it should be noted that the utilityto the plaintiff of the first type of expert testi-mony—testimony that a normal concentration oftaggants caused an accidental explosion — dependson the assumption made at the outset that explo-sives manufacturers would not succeed in raising“Government coercion” as a defense. If manufac-turers were to succeed with that defense, then itwould be to their advantage, and not the advan-tage of plaintiffs, to blame accidental explosionson normal concentrations of taggants,

Claims That Detection TaggantsFailed to Function Properly

The basic fact pattern envisioned here is one inwhich the plaintiff claims to have been injured byan illegal use of explosives because detection tag-gants failed to operate to prevent the explosivesfrom being used illegally. This sort of case raises ahost of issues that are probably not worth pursuingin-depth at this point given the fact that detectiontaggants are very much more in the developmentstage than are identification taggants. It will beuseful, however, to sketch the basic framework ofanalysis.

It will be recalled from an earlier discussion thatnormally explosives manufacturers are not liablefor harm caused by abnormal uses of their prod-ucts. (See p. 207, supra. ) Thus, if dynamite wereused by a terrorist in such a way as to harm others,the manufacturer of the dynamite would not be Iia-ble even if the dynamite could be traced to itssource, However, the situation might be different inconnection with detection taggants. That is, if aninjured plaintiff were to prove that a detection tag-gant failed to function as intended, allowing theplaintiff to be harmed under circumstances wherean adequate performance by the taggant wouldhave prevented the harm, the manufacturer of theexplosives in question might be exposed to liabilityfor having sold a flawed product. In a somewhatanalogous situation, courts have imposed liabilityfor explosion damages on commercial sellers ofbottled gas containing insufficient odiferous con-taininant to permit detection of the gas in the air by


sense of smell. (See genera//y Annotation, Duty andLiability in Connection With Odorization of Natu-ral Gas, 70 A. L. R.3d 1060 (1 976). ) To be sure, the de-fendants in a detection taggant failure case wouldhave an argument of intervening cause, based uponthe criminal conduct of the users of the explosives.(See, e.g., Watson v. Kentucky & Ind. Bridge & Ry.Co., 137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146 (1910); see genera//y

P P. 205-206, Supra. ) However, the Supreme Court ofAlaska recently imposed strict liability on a storerof explosives, notwithstanding the fact that the ex-plosion was deliberately set off by thieving van-dals. (See Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman’s FundIns. Co., 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1978). See a / s oK/ages v. Genera/ Ordnance Equipment Corp., 367A.2d 304 (Pa. Super. 1976) (plaintiff watchman wascriminally assaulted after mace gun failed to sub-due an attacking felon).)

A major difficulty facing plaintiffs in such caseswouId be proving the existence of a product defect.Rival hypotheses as to the cause of the breakdownin detection would include: 1 ) explosives aged be-yond the useful life of the detection taggants; 2) ex-plosives somehow “cleansed” of detection tag-gants; 3) explosives that never contained detectiontaggants in the first place (not included in taggantrequirement, homemade, illegally imported, or pre-taggants); 4) enclosure of explosives in containerthat “defeated” taggants (might expose manufac-turer to design or failure to warn liabilities); 5)breakdown in detection devices (court might holdexplosives manufacturer and device manufacturerjointly liable); and 6) breakdown in personnel incharge of detection operation. Although the list ap-pears formidable, some of these hypotheses mightbe eliminated by independent evidence. If such evi-dence were available, an injured plaintiff mightreach the trier of fact in an action against the explo-sives manufacturer.

Significance of the Fact ThatManufacturers Are Required by Law toInclude Taggants

The question to be considered here is whetherdefendant manufacturers and sellers of explosivescould argue effectively in defense of liability foraccidental explosions that the taggants were re-quired by law to be included in their products. Inaddressing this issue, the discussion will first centeron the basic analytical principles involved, apartfrom considerations of the extent to which a Fed-eral taggants requirement should be given defer-ence over the products liability law of the States.

Thereafter, attention will focus upon the questionof possible preemption of State law.

A possible source of confusion may be elimi-nated at the outset. The fact that these taggantcases are technically design cases, discounted inimportance in the earlier discussion of whethermanufacturers would be allowed to escape Iiabilityon the basis of their actions promoting “the greatergood, “ is here highly relevant. By hypothesis, whenthe Government orders products made to Govern-ment design specifications, the defense here beingconsidered is limited to those aspects of the manu-facturer’s product that conform to those designspecifications. Whether the manufacturer will beliable for product units that do not conform to theGovernment design specifications –e.g., individualsticks of dynamite that contain too high concentra-tions of taggants —may be relatively less affectedby the fact that the Government has requested, ordictated, the relevant design. Thus. in Foster v. Day& Zimmerman, 502 F. 2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974) an armyreservist recovered from the manufacturer of aflawed hand grenade notwithstanding the fact thatthe hand grenade had been made according toarmy design specifications.

One area in which courts have frequently ad-dressed the possibility of a defense to tort liabilitybased on conformance to Government-imposed de-sign requirements involves products made to Gov-ernment contract specifications. It can be arguedthat the defendants in these contract specificationcases were not “required” by law to produce theproducts later alleged to be defective, in the samesense that the explosives manufacturers would be“required” to include taggants in explosives. Tosome extent, however, that distinction gives wayunder analysis. It is a fact of economic life that thecompanies who produce the sorts of products typi-cally purchased in large quantities by Governmentcannot survive without gett ing their share ofGovernment business. Moreover, as a technicalmatter even the explosives manufacturers are notbeing required to produce explosives containingtaggants —they are “free” to.decide not to sell ex-plosives at all. Thus, the products liability cases in-volving the availability to producers of the “madeto Government specification” defense are relevantto the present analysis. Indeed, to the extent thatthe degree of coercion is marginally less in the con-tract cases, judicial recognition of such a defensein that context provides that much stronger supportfor a defense in the context of a statutory taggantsrequirement.

A decision frequently cited for the propositionthat a manufacturer will not be Iiable for the design

Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives 215

characteristics of a product made to Governmentspecifications is Littlehale v. E. I. du Pent d eNemours & Co., 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967), aff’ing268 F. Supp. 791 (S. D.N. Y. 1967). The plaintiff in thatcase was a civilian employee injured by a specialtype of blasting cap made 13 years earlier by thedefendant to Government design specifications.The district court entered summary judgment infavor of the defendant, stressing the fact that theproduct design was dictated by the Government.The court of appeals affirmed, emphasizing thelack of any duty to warn such an unforeseeableuser. (It appears the plaintiff had begun by combin-ing flaw, design, and warning theories, but aban-doned the first two during trial.) Subsequent deci-sions have tended to question whether the Lit-tlehale decision actually supports the principle thata product cannot be defective by reason of thoseof its design characteristics that conform to designspecifications dictated by the Government. In S u -chromajcz v. Hummel Chemical Co., 524 F.2d 19 (3rdCir. 1975), for example, the court read Littleha/e a sstanding for the principle that a manufacturer’sduty to warn is Iimited to foreseeable users.

A recent decision that cites Litt leha/e for the“Government specifications is a defense” principleis Sanrter v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976), aff’d per curiam 154 N.J.Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (1977), pet. certif. denied75 N.J, 616, 384 A.2d 846(1978). The plaintiff in thatcase was a civilian driver of a Government surplusJeep, injured in a rollover accident, who claimedthat the design was defective because it lackedseat belts. The trial court denied recovery as a mat-ter of law, chiefly on the ground that the designconformed to Government specifications, met thespecial purposes for which the military originallyhad ordered and purchased it, and therefore wasnot defective. And in Hunt v. Blasius, 55 111.App.3d14, 12 Ill. Dec. 813, 370 N.E.2d 617 (1977), aff’d 74111.2d 203, 23 Ill. Dec. 574, 384 N.E. 368 (1978), thecourt ruled as a matter of law for the defendantmanufacturer and installer of a roadside signpostwhose allegedly defective design conformed tospecific design specifications imposed as a condi-tion of purchase by the State.

Several possible limitations on the availability ofthese precedents to explosives manufacturers inthe present context must be noted. First, an excep-tion to the general rule of nonliability would al-most certainly be recognized in cases where themanufacturer knew or had reason to know that theGovernment specifications were dangerously defi-cient. (See Ryan v. Feney & Sheehan Building Co.,145 N.E. 321 (NY. 1924).) Admittedly, cases recog-

nizing this exception have tended to be ones inwhich the defendant could be said to have “volun-teered” its services; and in the cases envisioned bycourts to fall into the exceptional category, theGovernment agencies are probably ignorant of thedeficiencies of the designs. Neither of these cir-cumstances appear to be present in connect ionwith the inclusion of taggants, and thus the excep-tion to the nonliability rule probably does not ap-ply.

A second caveat is based on the fact that boththe Sanner and Hunt decisions, supra, are dis-tinguishable on their facts from the taggants caseon another ground besides the fact that the designrequirements were not imposed by statute. In thosecases, and in most of the others that have recog-nized the non liability rule, the Government agen-cies purchased the products exclusively for theirown use. To impose I iability on the product sup-pliers would be, in effect, to impose liability on thegovernmental agencies by way of an increase inprices paid for products designed specifically andexclusively for Government use. The initial assump-tion here is that the Federal Government will notlimit the application of the taggants requirement toproducts for its own use. Thus, were explosivesmanufacturers held liable for harm caused by theinclusion of taggants, the accident costs would beshared by all users of explosives; Government oper-ations would be “singled out” to bear the costs oftaggant-related accidents.

It remains to consider the significance of the factthat the taggants requirement is imposed by statuterather than by contract. In this connection, onepossible source of confusion must be eliminated. Along-recognized rule in tort law is that compliancewith Government safety regulations is no bar to Iia-bility for one’s negligent conduct. (See Restatementof Torts, Second, S 288(c). ) That proposition, how-ever, is very different from the one here being con-sidered. The rule in 288(c) relates to the situationin which the Government mandates a certain levelof safety precautions, and a reasonable personwould take additional precautions. The rule of non-viability being considered here relates to the verydifferent situation in which the Government man-dates action which a court would, in the absence ofthe mandate, find to be negligent. It is one thing tohold an actor liable for not being safer than theGovernment minimally requires him to be; it isquite another to hold an actor liable for a danger-ous course of conduct which his Government re-quires him to take. In the first case, the governmen-tally imposed requirement leaves the actor free todecide whether to act more safely than the Govern-


ment requires; in the second, the requirement doesnot leave him free to make that decision.

The main difference theoretically between theGovernment imposing design specif ications bycontract and by statute lies in the legislature’spower to change the common law by the latter, butnot the former, method. Thus, when taggants are re-quired by statute to be included in explosives, i naddition to considering whether it is fair to hold thedefendant liable for complying with the require-ments of his Government, courts must considerwhether the legis lature has, by implicat ion,changed the common law rules that determine lia-bility. Viewed properly, the question is whether thetaggants requirement reflects a legislative judg-ment on the same issue that the courts are beingasked to resolve in the liability action. If it does,then courts are required (putting constitutional as-pects to one side for the moment –see pp. 222-223,irtfra) to give deference to the legislative judgment.In many instances of Government-imposed designchanges, a legislative judgment that the designchanges will increase the safety of those affectedby the product could be inferred from the fact ofthe mandated change. To hold a defendant liablein tort for doing something the legislature has de-cided is safer than not doing it would be contradic-tory.

IS the taggant requirement similar to these othersafety requirements? That is, does that requirementreflect a legislative judgment that their inclusionreduces — or at least does not increase — the risks ofaccidental explosions? Given the legislative historyof the measure, it could be argued that it does notreflect such a judgment. Indeed, it can be arguedthat the taggant requirement reflects a legislativedecision actually to increase slightly the risks of ac-cidental explosions in the interests of increasingpublic safety against intentionally criminal explo-sions. (See discussion, pp. 211-212, supra. ) If thecourts were to view the taggant requirement in thisway, presumably they would be free to address forthemselves the question of liability for those in-creases in risks.

Assuming that some courts, at least, do not feelthemselves bound by an implicit judgment by thelegislature regarding the reasonableness of taggantinclusion from the standpoint of user safety,whether the “Government requirement” defensewill be available in taggant cases brought againstexplosives manufacturers will probably depend onwhether those courts view products liability pri-marily as a means of deterring unreasonable con-duct, or as a means of compensating innocent ac-cident victims. If the focus is on deterring unrea-

sonable conduct, the defense will probably beavailable; after all, holding manufacturers liablewill not cause them to violate Federal law. On theother hand, if the focus is on compensation, it ismore cliff i cult to see the direct relevance of the tag-gants requirement. If manufacturers are forced topay for harm caused to innocent victims by in-stable products, in the end society will bear thecosts through higher prices paid for the goods andservices whose production requires the use of ex-plosives. To the extent that members of this largersegment of society are general Iy the ones who alsobenefit from the anticriminal aspects of taggantsinclusion, the results of imposing liability mayseem fairer to some courts than the results of deny-ing liability. To some extent, even a denial of liabili-ty would cause accidental explosion costs to be re-flected in the prices of goods and services, the pro-duction of which is dependent on the use of explo-sives, Commercial users of explosives, for example,presumably insure themselves against portions ofthe costs of accidental explosions, and pass the in-surance costs on to their customers. And commer-cial users are liable to others injured by their ac-tivities. (See p. 210, supra. ) However, the impositionof liability on explosives manufacturers wouldseem to accomplish the cost-spreading objectivemore fully.

One further issue must be addressed in connec-tion with the possibility of a “Government speci-fications” defense, Because the inclusion of tag-gants would be required by Federal law, courts ap-plying State law rules of products liability would berequired to determine whether the Federal law had“preempted” — superseded –State law. The sub-stance of such an analysis would be essentially sim-ilar to the analysis just described when a Statestatute is involved. The major difference would bethat the Federal courts would become involved inreviewing the State court decisions interpreting theintent of Congress.

The Efficacy of Warnings and Disclaimers

It is most unlikely that explosives manufacturerswould be allowed to exempt themselves from lia-bility by disclaimers included in their sales con-tracts. (See pp. 204-205, supra. ) Would warningsfare any better in court? That is, would manufactur-ers be allowed to escape liability by warning usersthat their explosives contain explosion-inducin g

taggants? Again, the answer here is likely to be inthe negative. It will be recalled from an earlier dis-cussion that warnings serve to apprise persons ofrisks which they are in a position to avoid. (See p.


207, supra. ) Presumably, users of explosives con-taining taggants would not be in a position to avoidtaggant-related risks by modifying their use of ex-plosives, In effect, manufacturers would be warn-ing users that flaws exist which may, more or lesson random basis, cause harm, Viewed in this light,such “warnings” appear to be more Iike “disclaim-ers in warning cloth ing, ” and presumably wouldnot be given legal effect by many courts. However,it is to be expected that sales of explosives wouldbe accompanied by such “warnings,” and it cannotbe said with certainty that some courts would notbar recovery on that basis, (Or perhaps on the basis,equally dubious on these facts, that the users“assumed the risks” of accidental explosions. Seep. 205, supra. )

Changes in Explosives HandlersExposures to Liability

It will be recalled from an earlier discussion thatprofessional users and handlers of explosives areheld to particularly high standards of care, ap-proaching strict liability in some jurisdictions, (Seep. 210, supra. ) The addition of identification tag-gants could have four types of effects on their ex-posures to liability. First, to the extent that they arealready held strictly Iiable, an increased incidenceof accidental explosions would as a practical mat-ter increase their strict liability. Second, to the ex-tent that the inclusion of taggants were to requirespecial care in handling, explosives users wouldpresumably be exposed to great negligence-basedliability. Third, the inclusion of taggants would fa-cilitate tracing explosives detonated by terrorists(or by children, into whose hands the explosivescame) to their sources, opening up the possibility ofan argument of inadequate care taken to preventthe escape of such dangerous instrumentalities.And finally, the presence of taggants might providethe basis for users of explosives to escape negli-gence-based liability by blaming accidental explo-sions on the taggants, and might allow explosivesusers to succeed in indemnity actions against ex-plosives manufacturers.

Exposure to Liability ofTaggant Manufacturers

Claims That the Taggants CausedAccidental Explosions—Proof of Defect

The question of whether plaintiffs will succeedin proving that taggants caused accidental explo-

sions was addressed in the preceding section andthe analysis will not be repeated here. Assumingthat some plaintiffs succeed in Iinking taggants toaccidental explosions, what will be the taggantmanufacturers’ exposure to Iiability? Presumably, ifa plaintiff proves that a particular batch of tag-gants was abnormal in some way— perhaps thepieces were too big, or varied too greatly in size—he would have a good chance of reaching the trierof fact with a claim based on a flawed component.(See pp. 207-208, supra. )

If no such proof of abnormal taggant configura-tion were available, the plaintiff would be left toproceed on the basis that the taggant manufacturersupplied a defectively designed component part.The defendant would argue that it is in the sameposition as the supplier of any basic ingredient sup-plied in bulk to a product manufacturer– if thecombination of ingredients turns out to be danger-ously defective, it is the product manufacturer’s,and not the component part manufacturer’s, re-sponsibility. It will be recalled from an earlier dis-cussion that suppliers of traditional ingredients ofexplosives would probably succeed with such anargument. (See p. 208, supra. ) However, courts mayview the taggant manufacturer as being closer tothe manufacturer of the machine component in theDunson decision discussed earlier (p. 208, supra. )The defendant in that case was held liable for a“dangerous combination of components” on thebasis of its knowledge of the dangers and its in-volvement in manufactur ing a component de-signed specificalIy for use in the final product.

In response to plaintiffs’ attempts to draw theminto the orbit of responsibility for the (presumably)dangerous and defective explosives containing tag-gants, taggant manufacturers could be expected toargue that they did not design their product specifi-cally for use in explosives, but rather as a productof many and varied industrial applications. Viewedin this manner, they would appear closer to the sell-ers of basic, general-purpose ingredients of explo-sives. They could also be expected to rely on thedisclaimers included in their contracts of salewhich, when reviewed in Iight of this analysis, ap-pear consciously designed to “build a record” tosupport their assertions of a general-purpose prod-uct. However, it might be shown that taggant man-ufacturers would never have gotten into the manu-facture of taggants in the first place without theprospect of their being required to be included inexplosives, notwithstanding their protestations tothe contrary. (This writer lacks information on thisissue– he advances these considerations merely aspossibilities.)


Claims That Detection TaggantsFailed to Function Properly

On the assumption that it could be proved thatdetection taggants failed to function properly (seepp. 213-214, supra), plaintiffs injured because ofsuch failures might have causes of action againstthe manufacturers of those taggants. (For a discus-sion of the liability of component manufacturersgenerally see pp. 207-208, supra. ) Some of the diffi-culties facing plaintiffs in such actions have al-ready been described. (See pp. 213-214, supra. )

Significance of the Fact ThatExplosives Manufacturers Are Requiredby Law to Include Taggants

Much of the legal material relevant to this issueis contained in the earlier treatment of explosivesmanufacturers’ liabilities, and will not be repeated.(See pp. 214-216, supra. ) At least two factual differ-ences in the positions occupied by taggant manu-facturers in contrast to explosives manufacturersdeserve attention: 1 ) taggant manufacturers, unlikeexplosives manufacturers, are not required by lawto be involved with taggants; and 2) taggants man-ufacturers, unlike explosives manufacturers, exer-cise control over the design of the taggants. D othese differences suffice to take taggant manufac-turers out of the rule of nonviability that may applyto explosives manufacturers based on the fact ofGovernment regulation?

In attempting to persuade a court that the nonvi-ability rule based on Government specificationsought not to extend to taggant manufacturers,(even if the court decides to extend it to explosivesmakers) a plaintiff might argue as follows: “No one,including the Government, urged (much less re-quired) taggant manufacturers to begin to developsuch a product. Sensing a substantial profit to bemade, those manufacturers on their own developedthe taggant designs in question, patented them, andthen worked diligently to persuade Congress to re-quire them in explosives. In the cases relied uponby the defendants (see pp. 214-215, supra), the Gov-ernment went to the producers and requested bidson specifically described projects. The Govern-ment did not exactly require the manufacturers toproduce the products; but it is an economic fact oflife that producers of most products rely for theirsurvival on getting their share of Government con-tracts. (Indeed, as a technical matter explosivesmanufacturers are not required to include tag-gants — they are “free” to choose to go out of busi-ness. ) Moreover, in the cases relied on by the de-

fendants, the Government made all the significantdesign choices. If taggant manufacturers are al-lowed to invoke the nonviability rule, the court willhave extended the excuse of “we had no controlover the design” to companies that in fact dreamedup the idea of explosives taggants in the first place,controlled completely their development and ulti-mate design, and then with substantial effort con-vinced Congress to require other manufacturers toinclude them in their products under penalty oflaw.”

The writer wishes to make clear that in advanc-ing this argument hypothetically, he takes no posi-tion regarding its intrinsic merit. Whether courtswould listen to such an argument is a differentquestion. On balance, this writer is inclined to be-lieve some of them, at least, would accept it, andnot allow the taggant manufacturers to argue thatthey should not be liable because they made thetaggants to Government specifications.

The Efficacy of Disclaimers

It is likely that the taggant manufacturers’ dis-claimers would not be given effect as disclaimers inactions brought by injured plaintiffs. (See pp.204-205, supra. ) Whether they would be given ef-fect in the context of contribution or indemnity ac-tions between themselves and explosives manufac-turers is less clear. It will be recalled from an earlierdiscussion that business entities dealing from equalbargaining positions are often left by courts to allo-cate Iiabilities between them. (See p. 205, supra. )However, it is not clear that the bargaining posi-tions in this instance are equal, given the fact thatthe explosives manufacturers cannot go withouttaggants. In a sense, the taggant manufacturerswould have the explosives manufacturers “over thebarrel,” and courts might refuse to give effect todisclaimers for that reason.

Returning to the InitialFactual Assumptions

The objective here is to return briefly to some ofthe factual assumptions made at the beginning ofthis second section, to consider the implications ofalternative assumptions. The first assumption, thatCongress will require the inclusion of both identifi-cation and detection taggants is omitted. If detec-tion taggants are not required to be included, itmay reasonably be assumed they will not presentproducts liability problems, The last assumptionmade earlier, that Congress will not provide immu-


nities or other legislative adjustments of Iiabilitieswill be treated separately in the next section.

What If the Designs of the Taggants AreNot Specifically Described by Regulation?

It will be recalled from an earlier discussion thattwo types of standards are available with which todescribe the taggants that would be required to beincluded in explosives — design standards and per-formance standards. (See pp. 210-211, supra. ) If per-formance standards were used in the relevant regu-lations, their major impact would be in connectionwith the issue of whether the manufacturers of ex-plosives and taggants could argue against liabilityon the ground that the Government required tag-gants to be included in explosives. (See pp. 214-216,supra. ) Performance standards wouId give the man-ufacturers greater control over the designs of thetaggants to be included, and would weaken thenonliability argument. Of course, from the explo-sives manufacturers’ viewpoint, control in this con-text may be illusory if only one taggant manufac-turer’s product meets the Government perform-ances standards and it is not feasible for the indi-vidual explosives manufacturers to develop theirown. At least from the taggant manufacturer’sviewpoint, however, performance standards wouldgive them even more control — and continuing con-trol — compared to the situation that would be pre-sented by design standards.

What If Congress Includes Black andSmokeless Powders in the List ofExplosives Required to Contain Taggants?

The major source of added difficulty in this cir-cumstance is the fact that these powders, unlikemost of the other explosives considered to thispoint, are “consumer products” in the normal senseof that term — i.e., consumers purchase and usethese powders in small quantities in connectionwith a fairly broad range of sporting and recrea-tional purposes. Generally speaking, courts havetraditionally been more willing to impose liabilityon the makers and selIers of consumer productsthan on the makers of other types of products.Moreover, it may reasonably be assumed, at leastfor purposes of this analysis, that including tag-gants in loose-packed powders presents greatertechnical problems —e. g., physical separation ofthe taggants from the powders– than would be thecase with sol id-packed explosives such as dyna-mite. The combination of these two factors — a con-sumer product that poses greater technical prob-

lems – might very well increase the exposure to lia-bility of both explosives and taggant manufactur-ers as a practical matter.

One major battleground, not particularly signifi-cant in connection with the sale of solid-packed,taggant-treated explosives to professional users(see pp. 216-217, supra) would be failure to warn.Persons (including nonuser bystanders) injured dur-ing the course of consumer use of taggant-treatedpowders would argue that they were not sufficient-ly warned of the risks accompanying such use, anda percentage of such cases could be expected toreach the jury. (On the subject of failure to warnsee genera//y p. 207, supra. ) Moreover, consumersw o u l d i n c l u d e i n s u c h a c t i o n s c l a i m s b a s e d o np r o d u c t f l a w s ( p o w d e r c o n t a i n e d a b n o r m a l l y h i g h ,o r l o w , c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f t a g g a n t s , o r w r o n g s i z etaggants —see genera//y pp. 206, 213, supra), a n ddefective product designs (taggants are defectivelydesigned component parts) (see genera//y pp. 206-207 and 211-213, supra), and a percentage of thoseclaims could be expected to succeed.

What If Congress Decides That ExplosivesContaining Taggants Pose “SociallyAcceptable” Levels of Risk?

The change in the assumption here is that insteadof determining that taggants pose no practical risksof accidental explosions — i.e., are “safe” for nor-mal handling –Congress determines that the levelsof risk presented by including taggants are not in-significant but are nevertheless socially accepta-ble–i.e., that some explosives will accidentallydetonate, but that the antiterrorism benefits to so-ciety derived from including the taggants outweighthe costs of accidental explosions. With this hypo-thetical change in the assumption, the exposures toliability of explosives and taggants manufacturers(absent judicial recognition of the defense of gov-ernmental coercion and absent a special immunityprovided by Congress–see the next section, infra)would almost certainly increase over what it wouldhave been based on the former assumption. It willbe recalled from an earlier discussion that even afinding by Congress that taggants are “safe” is un-likely to insulate manufacturers from liability as apractical matter. (See p. 216, supra. ) By hypothesis,plaintiffs would be helped more if Congress were toconcede in its findings the existence of a measur-able, but acceptable, risk of accidental explosions.The question of whether courts would allow manu-facturers to rely upon the social acceptability ofthe risks in arguing against liability was consideredearlier, (see pp. 211-212, supra), and that analysis

220 Taggants in Explosives

will not be repeated. On the strength of the earlieranalysis, it is unlikely that an explicit declarationby Congress that the benefits to society outweighthe risks of accidental explosions would change thecourts’ reactions to this aspect of the problem.

What If Taggant Manufacturers SellTheir Products to the FederalGovernment, Which in Turn SellsThem to Explosives Manufacturers?

In an earl ier discussion of the signif icance of thefact that explosives manufacturers are required toinclude taggants, i t was recognized that in most ofthe cases in which manufacturers appear to havebeen exempted from liability on that basis, theGovernment actually purchased the products lateralleged to be defective. (See p. 215, supra. ) Superfi-cially, at least, it would appear that both explosivesand taggant manufacturers would be able toequate themselves more easily with the sellers inthose cases were the Government to purchase thetaggants and then resell them to explosives manu-facturers.

One basis for questioning whether it would bethat simple, however, is the other half of the earlierdistinction between the precedents and the instantsituation — i.e., the Government agencies in thosecases originally purchased the products for theirown use. It could plausibly be argued that there is asignificant difference between the Government

purchasing specially designed products for its ownuse and later allowing the public to gain access tothose products, on the one hand, and the Govern-ment acting merely as a conduit between privateinterests, on the other. To impose liability in thefirst situation arguably would burden unduly theability of the Government to obtain at reasonablecosts products specially suited to its operational —e.g., military— needs. To impose liability in the sec-ond situation would not have those consequences,assuming that the Government passed on its coststo the explosives manufacturers. Indeed, it can beargued that to refuse to impose Iiability merely be-cause the Government acted as a sales conduitwouId be to exalt form over substance.

If the Government were to act as a sales conduitfor the taggants, would the Government be ex-posed to products liability? The answer here wouldalmost certainly be in the negative, given the avail-ability of sovereign immunity. It has been held thatstrict products liability actions do not fall withinthe consent to suit provisions of the Federal TortClaims Act. (See In Re Bomb Disaster At Roseville,Cal., on April 28, 1973, 438 F. Supp. 769 (E. D. Cal.1977).) And were a plaintiff to pursue a claim innegligence on the basis of inadequate testing ormistake in judgment in deciding to include tag-gants, the claim would almost certainly come with-in the preclusion of IiabiIity for the “exercise or per-formance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-cretionary function or duty” in 28 U. S.C. A.S2680(a).

ASSUMING THAT THE TAGGANTS REQUIREMENT WILL INCREASETHE PRODUCTS LIABILITY EXPOSURES OF THE EXPLOSIVES

INDUSTRY, WHAT ADJUSTMENTS OF THOSE EXPOSURESMIGHT CONGRESS

The purpose here is not to make recommenda-tions regarding whether, or how, legislatively to ad-just the exposures to liability of the parties af-fected by the proposed taggants requirement, butrather to explore the major alternatives availableto Congress in this regard and to explore briefly thesignificant implications of each. In developingthese alternatives in the sections that follow, theunderlying assumption will be that Congress ischiefly concerned with the possible allocations ofaccidental explosions costs generated by the inclu-sion of normal concentrations of properly manu-factured taggants in explosives, and is ready in anye v e n t t o a l l o c a t e t h e a c c i d e n t c o s t s o f a b n o r m a l

CONSIDER MAKING?

concentrations and improperly manufactured tag-gants —the costs of product “flaws” in the tradi-tional sense of that term—to the manufacturersand sellers of taggants and explosives responsiblefor such abnormalities.

Congress Could Decide to Shift theAccident Costs of “Normal Taggant

Inclusion” to the Federal Government

The main policy argument in support of this al-ternative is that the costs of accidental explosionscaused by the inclusion of normal concentrations


of properly manufactured taggants are costs direct-Iy attributable to the decision of Congress to re-quire such inclusion in the interests of public safe-ty, and therefore they should be borne by the Fed-eral Government and spread generally to the pub-lic through the tax system, At least three basic vari-ations of this alternative are available:

The Existing Tort System RemainsUnchanged; When Manufacturers’ LiabilityIs Based on “Normal Taggant Inclusion, ”They May Obtain Indemnity From theGovernment

Under this approach, manufacturers (and othercommercia l sel lers) would be the defendantsagainst whom the act ions would in i t ia l ly bebrought. In cases in which they are held liable intort based upon the inclusion of normal concentra-tions of properly manufactured taggants, theywould be indemnified, thus shifting the liabilitylosses to the Federal Government. A number ofquestions may be raised concerning the efficacy ofthis approach, among which are the following: 1)manufacturers would still be open to the expenseof defending these actions —would such expensesbe reimbursed? 2) How would the basis of the de-fendant’s liability be determined? Might Congressrequire a special verdict mechanism in all suchcases — i.e., a specific finding by the trier of fact asto the role played by taggants in the explosion? 3)Would every case have to go to trial? What if settle-ments were reached? 4) Would such an approachcreate sufficient financial incentives favoring afinding of taggant involvement that manufacturerswould manipulate the trial process to help assuresuch a result? 5) Would triers of fact, some ofwhom can be assumed to know of the indemnityplan, be tacitly encouraged to “blame the tag-gants” in cases involving accidental explosions?

One further issue that is inherent in indemnityactions which would have to be addressed is that ofcollateral estoppel. A decision in the action againstthe manufacturer that normal concentrations ofproperly manufactured taggants did not cause theexplosion would preclude relitigation of that fac-tual issue in an indemnity action against the Gov-ernment. (See Park lane Hosiery Co., Inc. V . Shore439 U.S. 322, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552, 99 S. Ct. 645, (1979 ).)But a finding that a normal concentration of prop-erly manufactured taggants caused the explosionwould not necessarily bind the Government in a nindemnity action. A sensible statutory procedureinvolving indemnity actions against the Govern-ment would almost certainly include consent by

the Government to be bound by the factual deter-minations in the actions against the manufacturers.

Immunity From Liability Is Granted toMembers of the Explosives Industry for AllAccidental Explosions; Plaintiffs BringActions Against Government; GovernmentMay Obtain Indemnity From ManufacturerIf “Normal Taggant Inclusion” Is Notthe Basis of Liability

This is the reverse of the variation considered inthe preceding section, and resembles somewhatthe approach to the liability question adopted re-cently in the National Swine Flu Immunization Pro-gram of 1976 (42 U. S.C.A. 8 247b(j) - (1) (1976 ).) Intheory it reaches the same allocations of Iiability asthe preceding variation, but the actions are broughtin the first instance against the Government, notthe explosives industry.

One significant difference between the circum-stances surrounding the Swine Flu Program and thecircumstances surrounding the inclusion of tag-gants in explosives relates to the relative signifi-cance of causal factors other than the Government-instigated activity. In connection with the SwineFlu Program, it could be assumed that a majority ofthe cases brought successfully by injured plaintiffswould not involve indemnity — i.e., that a majorityof those persons injured were injured as a result ofthe inherent risks of the Program rather than thenegligence of the manufacturers. With the taggantsprogram, the situation may be quite the reverse.Here, it might be assumed that a relatively smallpercentage of accidental explosions are actuallyattributable to the normal inclusion of taggants. Ifthat is the case, then the approach here being con-sidered would, in contrast to the Swine Flu Pro-gram, in most cases send plaintiffs initially to the“wrong place” from which to seek relief.

Two results of this misdirection of focus, neitherparticularly desirable, might result: either taggantswould typical ly be exonerated in the act ionsbrought against the Government, in which case in-demnity actions would become routine and the as-sociated transaction costs a source of waste; or thetriers of fact in the actions against the Government,sensing something of a “giveaway,” would tend toblame the taggants in many more cases than couldbe supported on the data. In theory, of course, thelatter circumstances would not arise. In practice, itcould well be a real possibility.

The problem of whether f indings in act ionsagainst the Government would be binding in in-demnity claims against manufacturers would have


to be resolved differently from the way it could beresolved when suits are brought initially againstmanufacturers. Under the variation discussed here,the Government could not consent on behalf of themanufacturers that they be bound. But a statutoryprovision calling for making the appropriate mem-bers of the explosives industry parties to the ac-tions could be worked out.

Limited Immunity From Liability IsGranted to Members of the ExplosivesIndustry for Accidental ExplosionsCaused by Normal Taggants Inclusion;Government Is Liable for ExplosionsCaused by Normal Taggant Inclusion

This variation is a combination of the two pre-ceding, and could be accomplished by either oftwo procedures. One method would be for plain-tiffs to bring “normal” taggant cases against theGovernment and all others against the appropriatemembers of the explosives industry. One drawbackto this is the inefficiency connected with bringingtwo separate actions, if it turns out that the plain-tiff sued the wrong defendant first. A further prob-lem is that once the indemnity idea is abandoned, atheory which would make the findings in the firsttrial binding on the defendant in the second wouldbe more difficult to work out.

The second method would be for the plaintiff tosue both the Government and the appropriate in-dustry members in a single suit. This would havethe advantages of bringing all the parties togetherin a single proceeding. But if the action werebrought in Federal court, accommodations wouldhave to be made with the existing rules of diversityjurisdiction and jurisdictional amount. For the ac-tion to be brought in State court, Congress wouldhave to consent to such suits.


Inclusion” to Explosives Users

The main policy argument in support of thisalternative is that the actual risks posed by normalinclusions of taggants in explosives may be signifi-cantly smaller than the practical increases in manu-facturers’ exposures to liability resulting therefrom,causing an unfair shifting to manufacturers of acci-dent costs that have been traditionally, and argu-ably should continue to be, borne by the users of

e x p l o s i v e s . U n d e r t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e , w h e n c o m m e r -cial users or their employees are injured because ofnormal taggant inclusion, the losses would remainwhere they fall due to the accident. When innocentbystanders are thus injured, the users would pre-sumably be strictly Iiable in tort. (See p. 210, supra. )Admittedly, explosives users are not to blame forthe very few accidental explosions that are in factcaused by normal taggant inclusion; but there is nopractically feasible way to allow them to seek re-covery for those accidents without unfairly shiftingmuch greater accident costs, unrelated to taggantinclusion, to explosives manufacturers. (Obviously,the greater Congress’s confidence in the safety ofnormal taggant inclusion, the more attractive thisalternative becomes.)

The following variations on this theme deservemention here.

The Existing Tort System RemainsUnchanged Except That CongressEstablishes a Presumption That TaggantsDo Not Cause Accidental Explosions,Subject to Being Rebutted by Proof ofAbnormal Taggant Concentrations orImproper Taggant Manufacture

Under this variation, plaintiffs would succeed inal I of the cases in which they have traditionally suc-ceeded under existing law, and would succeed incases in which they can prove a “taggant flaw” inthe literal sense of that term — i.e., cases in whichthey can prove that the concentration of taggantswas too high (or low, if that were to cause the ex-plosion), or that the taggants themselves were ab-normal in some way. The major legal difficulty withthis approach would be presented in the form of at-tacks by injured plaintiffs against such a provisionon the ground that it constitutes an unconstitution-al deprivation of rights in violation of due processof law. The recent Supreme Court decision in Useryv. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. I (1976), how-ever, would seem to support the validity of such apresumption. The plaintiffs in that case were coalmine operators challenging on due process groundsthe constitutionality of the Coal Mine Health andSafety Act. The Supreme Court upheld the Act’svalidity, including the establishment of an irrebut-table presumption that certain coal miners’ lungdiseases were work-related, concluding that dueprocess requirements are satisfied in connectionwith Iiability-related presumptions if there is “a ra-tional connection between the fact proved and theultimate fact presumed.” (428 U.S. at 4.)


Admittedly, the “rational connection” to whichthe court refers would become strained in the pres-ent context if Congress were not factually to con-clude that normal taggant inclusion was “safe” fornormal handling of explosives. But assuming thatCongress views as remote the chances of normalconcentrations of taggants causing explosions, apresumption of no causal connection should with-stand judicial scrutiny. “When it comes to eviden-tiary rules in matters ‘not within specialized judi-cial competence or completely common place,’ “the Court concluded in Usery v. Turner ElkhornMining Co., [supra], “ ‘it is primarily for Congress toamass the stuff of actual experience and cull con-clusions from it. ’ “ (428 U.S. at 33-34, quotingUnited States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63,67 (1965 ).)

Congress Could Grant to ManufacturersImmunity From Tort Liability for AccidentalExplosions Caused by Normal TaggantInclusion

If the “rebuttable presumption” approach werebelieved to present constitutional problems of thesort considered in the preceding section, this varia-tion might provide an alternative approach to ac-complishing the same objective without relianceon presumptions. Thus, if Congress were ready toaccept the policy argument advanced at the outsetof this section, it might be more straightforward tospeak in terms of an immunity granted on the basisof a policy judgment rather than a presumptionbased on a factual judgment. Of course, plaintiffscould be expected to attack this alternative on theground that it denies to them the constitutionallyguaranteed right to equal protection of the laws.An attack of this sort was recently brought in Fed-eral court against a somewhat similar provision inthe Federal law limiting the liability of nuclearplant operators.

In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina E n v i r o n m e n t a lStudy Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978), the Federal no-fault compensation scheme created for the benefitof victims of nuclear accidents resulting from theoperation of federally licensed nuclear power gen-eration facilities was challenged on due processand equal protection grounds. The district courtheld the statutory ceiling of $560 million on liabili-ty from one accident to be, inter alia, violative ofthe equal protect ion requirement because thestatute “place(d) the cost (of the encouragement ofnuclear power) on an arbitrarily chosen segment ofsociety, those injured by nuclear catastrophe. ” 431F. Supp. 203 (W. D.N.C. 1977). The U.S. Supreme

Court reversed, holding the ceiling on liability to be“classic example of an economic regulation. ”

fi38 U.S. at 83.) The Act was rational, according tothe Court, in view of Congress’s purpose of en-couraging private development of nuclear energy,and this was “ample justification for the differencein treatment between those injured in nuclear ac-cidents and those whose injuries are derived fromother causes. ” (438 U.S. at 93-94.) Although thefacts are somewhat different, (a limited remedywas available to injured plaintiffs under applicablelegislation), it can be argued that the Duke Powerdecision supports extending the immunity de-scribed herein.


Inclusion” to Manufacturers ofTaggants and Explosives

Congress could reach at least two conclusionsthat would support this alternative. First, Congresscould assume that the costs of these taggant-related accidental explosions will be passed on bythe manufacturers to their customers in the form ofincreases in prices and conclude that such a dis-tribution of those costs is appropriate; and second,Congress could assume that the manufacturers arein positions of control over the techniques ofdesign and manufacture affecting the levels ofrisks presented by normal taggant inclusions, andconclude that imposing l iabi l i ty wi l I pressuremanufacturers to exercise their control in ways toaccomplish reductions in those risks.

A starting place for accomplishing these objec-tives would be for Congress to grant no immunities,nor extend any rights of indemnity, to manufac-turers of taggants and explosives. In addition, someor al I of the following changes in existing law mightbe considered:

Nonviability Based on the Fact of theGovernment’s Involvement Could BeEliminated Legislatively

It will be recalled that in cases involving tag-gants, manufacturers may have available to themarguments that they should not be liable due to thefact that taggants are required by law to be in-cluded in explosives. (See pp. 214-216, supra. ) IfCongress concludes that these accident costsshould be borne by the manufacturers, the possibil-ity of such a defense could be eliminated legisla-tively.


Manufacturers’ Liability for AccidentalExplosions Caused by Taggants CouldBe Established Legislatively

It will be recalled from an earlier discussion thatsome courts, at least, could be expected to hold themanufacturers liable in cases where the plaintiffsucceeds in proving that the taggants caused an ac-cidental explosion. (See pp. 211-213, supra. ) H o w -ever, to clear up any doubt on the question, Con-gress might consider making it clear in the statute.

A Presumption That Accidental ExplosionsAre Caused by Taggants Could BeEstablished, Subject to Being Rebuttedby Proof of User Mishandling

This would be a drastic change in existing lawwhich, in combination with the preceding two,wouId practicalIy assure that every plaintiff injuredin an accidental explosion would reach the trier offact regardless of the actual cause of the explosion.The practical effect of this change in existing lawwouId be to make manufacturers almost insurers ofthe safety of those using and affected by explo-sives. (For a brief description of the basis for con-stitutional challenge of this change by the manu-facturers, see pp. 222-223, supra. )

consider the possibility of establishing specificrules governing questions of indemnity and contri-bution between these manufacturing groups. (Cf .pp. 211-213 and 217, supra. ) On the basis of “whoprofits?” and “who controls?” the activity in ques-tion, taggant manufacturers might be required toindemnify explosives manufacturers.

Congress Could Decide to Dividethe Costs Among the Interested

Parties, Apportioning Such Costs ina Variet y of Ways

The possible variations under this alternative arenumerous, and will not be explored in their variety.One possibility, however, deserves mention if forno other reason than the fact that it has becomesomething of a favorite with State legislatures inaddressing areas of tort liability, such as medicalmalpractice, perceived to be in various stages of“crisis.” Congress could decide to place a dollarlimit on claims arising out of accidental explosionsfound to have been caused by normal inclusions oftaggants. Were this approach adopted it would, ineffect, divide the costs of such accidents betweenmanufacturers and users/victims.

The Question of Indemnity andContribution Between TaggantManufacturers and ExplosivesManufacturers Could Be AddressedLegislatively

Especially if the alternative of shifting the costsof manufacturers were adopted, Congress should

SUMMARY

Exposure of the Explosives Industry toProducts Liability Under Existing Law

Liability of manufacturers and other sellers of explo-sives. Basically the same rules of Iiability that applyto manufacturers and commercial sellers of otherproducts apply to manufacturers and commercialsellers of explosives. Defendants are liable on thebasis of negligence, breach of warranty, misrepre-sentation, and strict liability in tort. Two fact pat-terns predominate in actions against explosivesmanufacturers: those involving product flaws, andthose involving failures to warn, In product flaw

cases, plaintiffs may rely on strict liability in mostjurisdictions; in failure to warn cases, a basic negli-gence analysis is most often employed. Two factu-al characteristics unique to explosives cases ac-count for the somewhat different judicial treat-ment afforded these cases compared with productsliability cases generally. First, explosives invariably“self destruct” during use, forcing plaintiffs to relyto an unusual extent upon circumstantial evidenceof product flaws. And second, explosives are not“consumer products” in the usual sense of thatterm —the typical purchasers and users of explo-sives are presumably experienced professionals.This second characteristic tends to affect negative-


Iy not only the plaintiff’s opportunity c i r c u m s t a n -tial ly to prove the existence of a product f law, butalso the l ikel ihood of his succeeding with an argu-ment that the defendant fai led adequately to warnof hidden dangers.

Liability of manufacturers and other sellers of explo-sives components. “Components” in the presentcontext is synonymous with “ingredients. ” Manu-f a c t u r e r s a n d o t h e r c o m m e r c i a l s e l l e r s o f e x p l o -s i v e s c o m p o n e n t s a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y l i a b l e ( a n d i nmost States, str ictly l iable) for f laws in their prod-ucts, but practical problems of proof tend to pre-clude such l iabil i ty in most cases. Although sellersof components in other product areas have beenheld liable both for defective designs and failure towarn, the factual bases of such liability— relianceby others on the component seller’s unique knowl-edge and judgment regarding the risks associatedwith uses of its product — are not typically presentin situations in which basic, general-purpose chemi-cal compounds are sold in bulk to explosives manu-facturers.

Liability of manufacturers and other commercialsellers of explosives accessories. “Accessories” refersto products normally used in connection with ex-plosives, including blasting caps and fuses. Whenthe injured plaintiff can prove that he was injuredin an accidental explosion due to a flawed acces-sory, most jurisdictions will hold the commercialselIers of that accessory strictly Iiable. However, asa practical matter, proof of physical defect is dif-ficult, especially with respect to blasting caps. Anumber of actions have been brought on the basisof the defendant’s failure to warn. When fusemanufacturers fail adequately to warn of the burn-ing characteristics of their products, they are heldliable to users injured by that failure. Judicial reac-tions to arguments that blasting cap manufacturersshould warn children and other incompetent usersthat their products are explosive have been mixed.One court not only recognized such a duty, butsuggested that the entire blasting cap industry,together with their trade association, could bejoined as defendants in a single action.

Liability of commercial transporters and handlers ofexplosives. Commercial transporters, handlers, andusers of explosives are subject to strict liability forharm to persons or property caused by accidentalexplosions.

How Would These Exposures toLiability Change If Congress Required

the Inclusion of Taggants inExplosives?

Changes in explosives manufacturers’ and sellers’exposures to liability. TechnicalIy, normal concen-trations of taggants pose questions of productdesign rather than product flaws. However, tag-gants that cause accidental explosions are func-tionally quite flawlike, and some courts can be ex-pected to treat them like flaws. Thus, unless thedefendants are permitted to rely on arguments ofgovernmental coercion (a question to be addressedshortly), their exposure to liability will be increasedto the extent that plaintiffs can prove that taggantscaused accidental explosions. Expert testimonysupporting such a causal relationship could taketwo basic forms: 1) testimony that a normal con-centration of taggants caused the explosion, and 2)testimony that an abnormal concentration of tag-gants caused the explosion. It is likely that plain-tiffs will, in appropriate cases, find experts willingto offer both types of testimony.

It is difficult to predict the legal significancecourts wi l l at tach to the fact that defendantmanufacturers are required to include taggants inexplosives. A strong argument can be made, sup-ported by precedent, that this element of govern-mental coercion should constitute a defense. How-ever, the situation surrounding the inclusion of tag-gants may be sufficiently different from the situa-tions in prior cases to allow courts to impose liabili-ty. In any event, because the taggants requirementis imposed by Federal law, courts will be faced withthe question of whether State laws governing tortliability have been preempted.

The exposure to liability of taggant manufacturers.If the plaintiff can prove that a particular batch oftaggants was flawed, causing an accidental explo-sion, the taggant manufacturer wiII probably be Iia-ble. Whether taggarits manufacturers will be Iiabiefor explosions caused by “normal” taggants de-pends on whether courts view taggants as compo-nents specially designed for inclusion in explosivesexclusively, or whether courts view taggants asgeneral-purpose products suitable for a range ofdifferent applications not all of which are neces-


sarily dangerous. On balance, the former approachseems more plausible, and therefore taggantsmanufacturers may be exposed to liability to in-jured victims of taggant-caused accidental explo-sions. Although courts are unlikely to give effect todisclaimers vis-a-vis injured plaintiffs, the questionof whether they wilI give effect to disclaimers vis-a-vis explosives manufacturers is more in doubt.

Whether courts will allow taggants manufactur-ers to depend on the basis that taggants are re-quired by Federal law to be included in explosivesis not clear. It can be argued persuasively that tag-gants manufacturers should not be allowed such adefense even if courts were to make that defenseavailable to explosives manufacturers.

What Adjustments to These Exposuresto Liability Might Congress

Consider Making?

Congress could decide to shift the accident costs of“normal taggant inclusion” to the Federal Govern-ment. Three approaches to this end might be con-sidered: 1) allow defendant companies held liablein tort actions because of the inclusion of normalconcentrations of taggants to seek indemnity fromthe Government; 2) grant to the companies immuni-ty from tort l iabil ity for al l al legedly defective ex-p l o s i v e s , a l l o w a l l a c t i o n s b a s e d o n a l l e g e d l yd e f e c t i v e e x p l o s i v e s t o b e b r o u g h t a g a i n s t t h eG o v e r n m e n t , a n d t h e n a l l o w t h e G o v e r n m e n t t oseek indemnity f rom the companies w h e n “ n o r m a ltaggant inclusion” is not the basis of the Govern-ment’s liability; or 3) grant immunity to the com-

panies limited to liability for accidents caused by“normal taggant inclusion, ” and allow those casesto be brought against the Government.

Congress could decide to shift the accident costs of“normal taggant inclusion” to explosives users. Twoapproaches to accomplish this end might be con-sidered: 1 ) Congress could create a presumptionthat taggants do not cause accidental explosives,subject to being rebutted by proof of abnormal tag-gants concentrations or improper taggants manu-facture; or 2) Congress could grant to manufac-turers and sellers immunity for accidental explo-sions caused by normal taggant inclusion.

Congress could decide to shift the accident costs of“normal taggant inclusion” to manufacturers of tag-gants and explosives. A range of alternatives areavailable to accomplish this end, among them: 1)nonliability based on the fact of Government coer-cion could be eliminated legislatively; 2) manufac-turers’ liability for accidental explosions caused bytaggants could be established legislatively; 3) a pre-sumption that accidental explosions are caused bytaggants could be established legislatively, subjectto being rebutted by proof of user mishandling; and4) the question of indemnity and contribution be-tween taggant manufacturers and explosives manu-facturers could be addressed legislatively.

Congress could divide the costs among the inter-ested parties. This objective could be accomplishedby placing a dollar limit on claims arising out of ac-cidental explosions found to have been caused bynormal taggants inclusion, effecting a division ofaccident costs between manufacturers and users/victims.

APPENDIX E–SUITABILITY OF ANFO ASA FILLER FOR CRIMINAL BOMBS

2700 Merced Street . San Leandro, Ca. 94577

16 January 198024-1393/0 084

Congress of the United StatesOffice of Technology AssessmentWashington D. C. 20510

Attention: Mr. Peter Sharfman

Reference: Your Letter of 11 January 1980

Dear Sir:

Referring to questions put to me by Mr. David Garfinkle ofScience Applications, Inc. about the initiation and the damagepotential of explosive devices loaded with ANFO, I would liketo answer you with the following statements.

ANFO generally consists only of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil ata weight ratio of about 95 to 5, but may be used to designateother types of ammonium nitrate based explosives. The density isapproximately 0.78 gicms, the energy density E. = 2.9 X 103 J\cm3,and the ratio of specific heats of the gaseous products is I’ “= 2.554.Under ideal conditions (i.e. quantities of several hundred kg and astrong initiation source) ANFO detonates at a rate of 5 km\s ‘witha Chapman-Jouguet pressure (at the shock front) of 55 kbar. Insmall samples (e.g. 10 to 20 kg) . even if confined, the detonationvelocity is considerably lower, depending on confinement conditionsand initiation, and typically between 1.9 and 2.8 km/s. Theshock front pressure in these cases is also considerably lowerthan 55 kbar. Samples with small dimensions and negligibleconfinement will not detonate at all, (e.g. cylindrical samplesin thin plastic confinement 5 cm or less in diameter, orunconfined layers of 5 cm or less in thickness) .

2700MERCEDSTREET ● SAN LEANDRO,CALIFORNIA 94577 ● (415) 357-461OTWX 910-366-7033

227


24-139 3/0 084Page 2

The ANFO commercially sold and used in the U.S.A. can generallynot be initiated by a detonator only. A “booster” made ofabout 50 to 500 g of high explosives such as Composition C4,which can be initiated by a detonator only, is generally usedto start the detonation. A criminal use of this type ANFOin quantities of 1 or 2 kg does not seem reasonable since theefficiency of a destructive explosive device under thesecircumstances would generally not be significantly improvedbeyond that resulting from the booster alone.

It is possible, however, to produce high explosives similarto ANFO which can be detonated by a detonator only. SomeANFO sold and used in the Federal Republic of Germany formining and quarrying purposes has this property called “capsensitivity”. It is also possible to modify the compositionof the blasting agent such that it becomes cap sensitive,e.g. by replacing the fuel oil by hydrazine hydrate. Thesensitivity of ANFO can be increased by certain additives,e“9” aluminum powder or potassium perchlorate. In somecases, the sensitivity of the ANFO-like blasting agent can beincreased by crushing the ammonium nitrate prills. Most ofthe premixed ANFO commercially sold in the U.S.A., however,does not become cap sensitive by crushing the prills. ANFOobtained by first crushing prilled ammonium nitrate commerciallybought in the U.S.A. and then mixing it with fuel oil will also,in general, not be cap sensitive. If either the ANFO or theammonium nitrate used to mix it were obtained from certainareas outside the U.S.A. , crushing of the prills may renderit cap sensitive. In all these cases of “cap sensitivity”,however, a high powered detonator (e.g. one containing 1 g basecharge) is still needed, and also a certain amount of specialinformation is required, whereas modern propellants as well as alltypes of black powder can be initiated by a heat source only,like match heads, squibs, or even only an electrically heatedwire or a spark.

Appendix E—Suitability of ANFO as a Filler for Criminal Bombs ● 229

Page 3 2 4 - 1 3 9 3 - 0 1/ 0 0 8 4

The initiation requirements for various configurations aresummarized in Table 1 below. It should be noted that thistable is intended to give a general overview and that itcannot present all limitations, exemptions, or specialcircunwtances.

Table 1

REQUIRED FOR INITIATION

MATERIAL CONFINED UNCONFINED

Small amounts of Booster charge of (NO Reaction)commercial ANFO 50-500 g high(-- 2 kg.) explosive

Large amounts of Booster charge of Booster charge ofcommercial ANFO 50-500 g h i g h 50-500 g high(> 50 ka) explosive, explosive

Sensitized ANFO or Detonator with Detonator withspecial mix at least lg at least 1 gblasting agent base charge or base charge or

6“ prima cord 6“ prima cord(50 grainift.) + (50 grain\ft.) +small detonator small detonatorlike below like below

Military explosive Small detonator Small detonatorlike Comp. B or with about .25 g with about . 25 gComp. C - 4 base charge base charge

Modern propellant Heat source like (No explosion; onlyor black powder matchhead, squib, violent burning

hot wire, or spark possible)


24-139 3/0 084Page 4

To compare the damage producing capability of destructiveexplosive devices, one has to consider air blast, fragmentation,and potential incendiary effects. Assuming the initiationproblems can be resolved for an explosive device containingonly a few kg of a blasting agent similar to ANFO, then theair blast caused by this device could do approximately asmuch air blast damage as a device with the same weight ofTNT (see Figure 1). The density difference between ANFOand TNT (approximately 0.8 vs. 1.6) would require a largerconfinement volume for a device containing ANFO.

Comparing fragmentation of a device loaded with TNT versusone loaded with a blasting agent similar to ANFO, the latterwould produce a smaller number of fragments larger in sizeand with a somewhat lower velocity than the TNT device. Thetotal damage producing capability of the fragments of theANFO device would probably come fairly close to that of theTNT device. Neither one of the two device types would produceany significant incendiary effect.

The damage producing capability of propellant or black powderloaded devices will generally be significantly smaller thanthat of devices loaded with an ANFO-like blasting agent dueto the following reasons:

(a) The rate Of energy release is much higher inhigh explosives, including blasting agentslike ANFO, than in propellants includingblack powder. Expressed, e.g. in Megawatts,a 5 cm diameter device loaded with ANFO deliversenergy at a rate of about 10,000 MW; a guncartridge of the same diameter delivers energyat a rate of about 500 MW.

(b) The rate of detonation of high explosives,including blasting agents like ANFO, is onlyweakly depending on ambient conditions whereasthe propellant burn rate strongly depends onthe ambient pressure. Propellants includingblack powder which are initiated in a metallicshell will frequently violently rupture theshell at a time when only a fraction of thepropellant energy has been released, producing

Appendix E—Suitability of ANFO as a Filler for Criminal Bombs . 231

2 4 - 1 3 9 3 / 0 0 8 4P a g e 5

only very few medium velocity fragments andonly a moderate pressure wave . The burn rateof the still remaining mass of propellant willat the time of the shell rupture drop to a verylow rate imposing no other danger than a firehazard. A high explosive or blasting agentdetonated in a metallic confinement like abomb shell will always produce a number ofhigh velocity fragments and a strong air blast.

To summarize, it can generally beproducing capability of an explosi

expected that the damageve device loaded with an

ANFO-like blasting agent, if it is properly initiated, issomewhat smaller than that of a device of equal weight loadedwith TNT, but significantly larger than that of a device ofequal weight loaded with black powder or modern propellants.

Very truly yours,

f l ? & 4 F -Roland R. FranzenSenior Staff Engineer

Attachment: Figure 1


Figure 1 .—Airblast Pressures From TNT and

60

40

20

10~ 8 . 0

& 6.0al

~ 4.0@~a5= 2.00~z

1.00.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.1

Field Mixed AN/FO Fired on Ground

This figure was copied from: L. D. Sadwin,J. F. Pittman, Airblast Characteristics of ANFO.U.S. Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, MDApril 1969.

-pound TNT hemispheres

2 6 0 - f i e l d m i x e d 500-Pound field mixed AN/FO l,000=pw@fla+d mixed AN/F@

Ambient atmosphericpressure = 11.88 PSI

\

1 2 14 6 8 10 20 40 60

Scaled ground range, feet/( pounds) ’/3

APPENDIX F—DERIVATION OFBOMBING STATISTICS TABLES

Chapters 1, 11, and VI contain a number of tablessummarizing the current and projected bombingthreat. These tables were compiled from data origi-nating from a number of sources, including BATF,the FBI, FAA, and a number of other law enforce-ment agencies.

BATF and the FBI compile overall bombing sta-tistics. The data, however, are available only in theform of periodic summary documents (semiannual-ly from BATF and quarterly from the FBI) in com-piled, tabular form, or in the form of individualcase files. Both data banks are computerized, butthe formating does not make it possible to retrieveand analyze the data in a meaningfuI way. Manage-ment Sciences Associates had previously at -tempted an analysis of the BATF and FBI databases as reported in reference F-1, and had beenunsuccessful in retrieving the data in a mannerwhich allowed meaningful analysis. OTA reviewedthe BATF case f i le data, and concluded thatanalysis of the raw data files was not feasible, forthe following reasons:

●

●

●

the files did not contain all the data neededfor the OTA analysis;files concerning cases currently before thecourts could not be made available to OTA;the amount of effort necessary to analyze theindividual data files was not commensuratewith the time and funds available for the OTAanal ysis.

OTA conducted a similar, although less inten-sive, review of the FBI data files and concludedthat detailed analysis of the FBI files would havethe same limitations as cited above for the BATFfiles; in addition, fewer bombing incidents are con-tained in the FBI file.

The OTA analysis was therefore based primari lyon the compiled summary reports. OTA had no rea-son to suppose that the data from any of these Gov-ernment sources were more or less reliable than theothers, and so made use in each case of the datasource whose formating was most appropriate forthe analysis in question.

In this appendix, the original tabular data fromthe FBI, BATF, and FAA are shown, and the way inwhich the tables in chapter VI were compiled fromthese sources is explained. The tables in chapters Iand 11 were derived in turn from the chapter VItables.

Table 54

The BATF data in table 54 are taken directlyfrom tables 1 and 9 of the BATF 1978 Explosives in-cidents Report, (ref. F-2) reproduced below. Thefirst five rows come from table 1, the last threefrom table 9. The FBI data comes from table 1 ofthe 1978 FBI Bomb Summary, (ref. F-3) also repro-duced below.

Table 9 of the BA TF 1978 Explosives IncidentsReport shows 435 injuries in 1978. This includes 250fireworks accidents (listed as “unknown targets”),and OTA therefore reduced the figure to 185 in-juries from bombings.

Table 55

The explosive trend data in table 55 are alsofrom the same FBI table 1. The only differences arethat a column of total explosive bombings and at-tempts has been added and the property damagevalues have been rounded off to the nearest thou-sand dolIars.

Similarly, figure 22 shows the same data in agraphical format,

Table 56

Table 56, on the determination of the explosivefiller used in criminal bombs, comes from twoBATF sources. The 1978 “all identified fillers” dataare based on table 13 of the 1978 BATF report (ref.2). A total of 1,767 cases is shown for 1978 in thattable. This represents al I of the explosive and incen-diary bombings, criminal accidents, and unignitedand undetonated actual bombs recovered during1978, as shown by the first five rows of table 1 ofthe 1978 BATF report (ref. F-2). If those fillers whichwere not identified and the flammable liquids cate-gories are removed, the number of cases involvingidentified, explosive filIers from actual explosivebombings, recovered explosive bombs, and crimi-nal accidents are 824. If the 1978 numbers for eachtype filler is divided by 824, then the percentagesshown are found (rounded off to the nearest per-cent). The BATF category called “dynamite” in-cludes dynamites, gels, slurries, and emulsions. The1978 laboratory identified filler data are takenfrom page 43 of the BATF Annual Report for FY 78

233

234 ● Taggants Explosives

(ref. F-4). The “average” column is just arithmeticaverage of the other two columns. OTA believesthese data give as accurate a feeling for the percen-tage of bombings for each filler type as can be de-rived, short of a case-by-case examination.

Table 57

The data shown in table 57 are derived from twoBATF sources. The total number of bombingsagainst substantial targets was derived from table 9of the 1978 BATF report (ref. F-2). The table shows1,409 incidents, which corresponds to the numberof actual explosive and incendiary bombings dur-ing 1978 plus the number of criminal accidents, dueto premature initiation, from table 1 of that report.From that was subtracted the number of bombingsagainst unknown targets, mailboxes, and openareas, from BATF table 9, to yield 1,298 bombingsagainst substantial targets. The breakout betweenincendiary and explosive bombings was also ob-tained from data in BATF tables 1 and 9. Table 1shows 896 explosive bombings (67 percent) and 446incendiary bombings (33 percent). If the criminalaccidents from the use of explosive and incendiarybombs are assumed to have occurred with thesame relative frequency, then the total number ofincendiary bombings a n d c r i m i n a l a c c i d e n t sagainst substantial targets is equal to 33 percent ofthe 1,298 figure, or 428, while the number for explo-sive bombings is equal to 870.

The breakout of number of explosive bombingsby type of filler was arrived at by using the percent-age filIer data from column 3 of table 56 and multi-plying the percentage for each category by thetotal number of explosive bombings of substantialtarget figures given above.

Neither the FBI nor the BATF data summariesbreak down deaths and injuries by the type ofbomb filler used. However, A. Atley Peterson, Spe-cial Assistant (Research and Development) to theDirector of BATF, gave a breakdown of deaths, in-juries, and property damage by type of bomb fillerbefore the 4th International Conference on Terror-ist Devices and Methods in England during M a y1979 (ref. F-5). These data are shown in table 57.Peterson’s figure for total injuries, like OTA’s table54, excludes 250 injuries from fireworks accidents,which are included in table 9 of reference F-2.

The row entitled “total for those fillers whichwould be directly tagged” aggregates figures forblack powder, smokeless powder, and cap-sensitive

dynamite, gels, slurries, and emulsions, correspond-ing to BATF planning documents and also to theOTA baseline case.

Table 58

Table 58 is BATF table 9 (ref. F-2) slightly modi-fied. The words “property damage” were added tofootnote a. Also, the number injured in 1978 frombombings of “unknown” targets was reduced to ex-CIude 250 injuries from fireworks accidents.

Table 59

Table 59 is an OTA compilation based on BATFtable 9 (ref. F-27). The percentage data are based onthe average of the 1977 and 1978 bombings. Thestatistics for residences and vehicles and for com-mercial establishment come directly from thattable. To get the percentage of identified substan-tial targets unlikely to be protected by a detectionsensor, the unknown, other, mailbox, and open areabombings were removed from the data. That left1,189 bombings of substantial targets (i.e., eliminat-ing open area and mailbox bombings) in 1977 and1,161 in 1978 in which the target was identified. Itwas then assumed that residences, vehicles, andcommercial establishments would be unlikely to beprotected by a detection sensor, while the othertarget categories might well be.

Table 60

Table 60 is an OTA-generated categorization ofcriminal bomber attributes.

Table 61

Table 61 was generated by the following process.First, a calculation was made of the proportion ofbombings attributable to various types of bombers.This calculation was made by taking FBI data onapparent motives for the year 1974 (p. 9 of the FBIBomb Summary 1974, ref. F-6), 1975 (p. 16 of the FBIBomb Summary 1975, ref. F-7), 1976 (table 9 of theFBI Bomb Summary 1976, ref. F-8), 1977 (table 9 ofthe FBI Bomb Summary 1977, ref. F-9), and 1978(table 8 of the FBI Bomb Summary 1978, ref. F-3)and averaging them. The FBI used different catego-ries in each year, and they were combined into thefour OTA categories as shown in the tabulationbelow:

Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables 235

Terrorist categoryAnt ies tabl i shmentExtremistForeign politicalPol i t icalAnt l re l ig IousCivil rightsProtestPubl ic i ty

SabotageSubvers ion

Criminal categoryLaborRacketeer ingMonetary gainExtort ionFraudInt imidat ionDivers ion

Mentally distrubedAnimosi tySuicideRepr isa lsRevenge

Vandals and experimentersMalicious destructionMischiefVandal i sm

1975 1976 1977 1978

From the average for these 5 years, a calculationwas made of the proport ion of al I bombings com-m i t t e d b y e a c h t y p e o f p e r p e t r a t o r : t e r r o r i s t s 1 2p e r c e n t ; c r i m i n a l s 1 1 p e r c e n t ; m e n t a l l y d i s t u r b e d38 percent; and vandals and experimenters 39 per-cent. The assumption was made that these propor-tions, calculated from bombings in which a motivehad been attributed, apply also to those bombingswhere no motive is assigned by a law enforcementagency. The average number of actual explosivebombings for that 5-year period, taken from table 1of the FBI Bomb Summary 1978, was then multi-plied by these proportions to yield the data in table61.

OTA feels that the 5-year average is more appro-priate than presenting year-by-year trends as theFBI categories have changed over that period, witha substantial revision apparent between 1976 and1977. In addition, the percentage of bombings towhich the FBI assigns a motivation has changeddrastically over that period. In 1974, 96 percent ofthe bombings were attributed, while only 33 per-cent were attributed in 1978.

Table 62

Table 62 is taken directly from BATF tables 17and 23 (ref. F-2), except that the BATF categories ofTNT and dynamite were combined in the category“cap-sensitive high explosives, ” and RDX is in-cluded in the military explosives category.

Table 63

Table 63, on methods of entry for explosive theft,is simply BATF table 18 (ref. F-2). The first footnotehas been slightly modified.

Tables 64,65,66,67

Tables 64, 65, 66, and 67 are taken directly froman FAA document FAA-RD-77-28 (ref. F-10). Table64 is table 4 of the FAA report; table 65 is table 5 ofthat report; table 66 is table 7 of that report; andtable 67 is table 15 of the FAA report. The onlychange in the tables occurs in table 66. Footnote aindicates that the identification of the explosiveused in the LaGuardia bombing as dynamite andRDX is an FAA estimate; other agencies have of-fered different opinions.

Table 68

The premature detonation statistics in table 68are from the 1974 through 1978 FBI bomb summa-ries, references F-6 (p. 3), F-7 (p. 6), F-8 (p. 12), F-9 (p.4), and F-3 (p. 9).

Table 69

The commercial airliner hijacking statistics intable 69 are from reference F-11, FAA report, FAA-RD-78-66, table 5, for the years 1949-76. The 1977data are taken from the FAA semiannual report toCongress on the Effectiveness of the Civil AviationSecurity Program for the period July through De-cember 1978. The 1978 data were obtained directlyfrom FAA officials.

Table 70

Table 70, concerning possible perpetrator coun-termeasures, was generated by OTA.

REFERENCES

F-1 – J Roth, Evaluation of the Needs and Benefits ofthe Explosive Tagging Program, MSA report 317-1, March1978.

F-2 – BATF, Explosives Incidents, 1978 Annual Report,F-3 – FBI, Uniform Crime Reports: Bomb S u m m a r y

1978.F - 5 – A A P e t e r s o n , 4 t h A n n u a / / n t e r n a t i O n a / C o n f e r -

ence on Terrorist Devices and Methods, England, ,May1979.


F-6— FBI, Uniform Cr ime Reports : Bomb Summary1974.

F-7 – FBI, Uniform Cr ime Reports : Bomb Summary1975.

F-8 – FBI , U n i f o r m C r i m e R e p o r t s : B o m b S u m m a r y1976,

F - 9 — F B I , U n i f o r m c r i m e R e p o r t s : B o m b S u m m a r y1977 .

Table 54.–Minimum Bombing Incidents Statistics Summary’

BATF FBI

item 1977 1978 1977 1978

Explosive bombings, number . . . . . . . . . 1,037b 896 b 867 768Undetonated explosive bombs, number 319 287 118 105Incendiary bombings, number . . . . . . . .Unignited incendiary bombs, number .,Criminal accidents, numberc . . .,Property damage from bombings,

millions of dollars c d ., . . . . . . ., $Injuries ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .People killed by bombings ` . . . . .

339 446 248 34981 71 85 7921 67 – –

10 $ 17 $ 9 $ 980 185 162 13538 23 22 18

a BATF reported 3, 177 told incidents m 1977 and 3 256 in 1978 Total incidents include ac”cldents threats seized and recovered exploswes, and hoaxes as well as actual explosive and m.cendlary bombings The OTA study was concerned only with exploswe bombings

bof these 953 In 1977 and 787 m 1978 were against substanual far9etsclncl”des both exploslve and Incendiary bombmgs OTA was unable to oblam SeParate f19Wes for

number of cnmmal accidents Injuries, deaths and property damage caused by exploswe and m-cendlary bombs incendiary bombs and bombings would not be affected by the proposed lagganl

d~~~~~~~alue probably considerably higher due 10 lack of dala !lle Updates

SOURCE LMTF 1978 E@oswes Mcldem Report, FBI UrrIlorrn Cwrre Reporl 80~LJ Re@T,1978

A c c i d e n t - C r i m i n a l 21 .70 67 2.1%

B o m b i n g ( D e t o n a t i o n ) 1037 32 .6% 896 27. 5%

Bombing (Nondetonation) 319 10. 08 287 8.80

Incendiary (Ignited) 339 10. 7% 446 13 .7%

I n c e n d i a r y ( N o n i g n i t e d ) 81 2.5% 71 2.2%

S t o l e n E x p l o s i v e s 327 10. 3% 362 11. 1%R e c o v e r e d E x p I o s i v e s 751 23.7% 870 26. 7%

Seized Explosives 102 3.28 117 3 .6%

T h r e a t s ( T r e a s u r y f a c i l i t i e s 33 1. 0 22 .78Hoax Devices 105 3.3% 47 1 .4%

F-10— J. Bengston, P. Cutchis, and J Henry, Protectionof Airports Against Explosives, report No, FAA-R D-77-28,January 1977

F-11 — N. Asher, P. Frazier, C Kennedy, and J. Kiernan,Analysis of Past Airline Hijacking and Bombing Incidentsand the Present Defense Against Such Attacks, report NoFAA-R D-78-66, December 1977,

TABLE 9

BOMBINGS BY SPECIFIC TARGETSFUR 1977 - 1978

( A c t u a l D e t o n a t i o n s o r I g n i t i o n s

TOTAL

INCIDENTSTYPE TARGET 137-7 1978—L. —. ..—

R e s i d e n t i a l 352 294C o m e r c i a l 367 375A i r p o r t s / A i r c r a f t 7 5Police Faci1ities/ 14 29

V e h i c l e sEducational 106 97G o v e r n m e n t ( L o c a l ) 2 4 9G o v e r n m e n t ( F e d e r a l ) 2 6 2 2M i l i t a t y 4 3

I n s t a l l a t i o n sU t i l l t i e s 51 57Banks 22 18V e h i c l e s 216 252Open Areas 36 40Mai1 boxes 48 69Othe r 90 137

Unknown 2 34 2

T o t a l 1,397 1, 409

NO. KILLED1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8-—

17 77 6l —

. —

— —— 1. —— —

l —— —

11 71 2

— —— —

—

.

38 23

— —P r o p e r t y

NO. INJURE D Damage

1977 l978 1977.-–

66 57 1 , 0 2 2 . 3 2 , 9 8 2 . 248 46 6 , 6 4 0 . 1 8 , 7 1 7 . 7

l — . 2— — 5 . 8 70.4

13 5 43 .1 532.31 4 145.6 70.14 1 2 . 4 6 . 6

— 1 — 0 . 0

1 2 628 .0 1 , 7 2 7 . 7— — 225.2 49 .324 25 363 .3 2 , 1 1 9 . 4

8 13 . 5 4 . 21 2 25 .88 27 1 , 2 0 6 . 8 869.9

5 252 22 .6 E.0

—

180 435 1 0 , 3 3 1 . 7 1 7 , 2 1 2 . 1

1 . F i g u r e s a r e i n t h o u s a n d s a n d a r e e s t i m a t e d .2. T h i s c a t e g o r y i n c l u d e s t h o s e i n c i d e n t s w h e r e t h e t y p e t a r g e t w a s

e i t h e r u n k n o w n o r n o t r e p o r t e d .

Table 1. Bombing

Year

1972

1973

1974

1975

1916

1977

1978

— —

INCIDENTS

TotaIActual andAttemptedEmmblnSs-

1,962

1,955

2,044

2,074

1,570

1,318

1,301

-–. K!

Explo.

714

742

893

1,006

852

867

768

Actual—

Incend

793

787

758

613

405

240

349

.- ——— —ProperlyDamage(Dollar Personal

—-v&. ~—. — 1nJug-

7, 991,815 176

7,261,832 181

9, 886,563 207

27,003,981. 326.

11, 265,426 213

8,943,102 163

0, 161,485 133

Includes three major bombing incidents resulting in unusually high personal injuriesand deaths and substantial damage 1. property.

Death —

25

22

24

69*

50

23

18

Accident-!Joncr Nocriminal 62 2. 68 71 2 .28

— —

TOTAL 3 ,177 100% 3 ,256 10C%

TOTAL KILLED ‘TOTAL INJURED TOTAL DAMAGE AJMOUNT

1977 127 374 $ 6 1 , 3 0 0 , 0 0 0

1978 69 707 $ 2 7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0

—

—

Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables . 237

Table 55.–Explosive Bombing Incident Trends, 1972-78

Total actual and Total actual andattempted ex- attempted incen - Property damage Personal

Year plosive bombings Actual Attempted diary bombings Actual Attempted (dollar value) injury Death— .1972 . . . . . .-: 951 714 237 1,011 793 218 $7,992,000 176 251973 . . . . . . . 995 742 253 960 787 173 7,262,000 187 221974 . . . . . . . 1,129 893 236 915 758 157 9,887,000 207 241975 . . . . . . . 1,326 1,088 238 748 613 135 27,004,000a 3 2 P 6 91976 . . . . . . . 1,040 852 188 530 405 125 11,265,000 212 501977 . . . . . . . 985 867 118 333 248 85 8,943,000 162 221 9 7 8 . . . . . . , 873 768 105 428 349 79 9,161,000 135 18

a includes three major bombing incidents resulting in unusually high personal injuries and deaths and substantial damage to property

SOURCE FBI Uniform Crime Reports Bomb Summary 1978

Figure 22.—Annual Bombing Statistics, 1972-77

I I 1 I 1 i I I3,000 “

Including incendiary 2,000 -z 1 , 0 0 0 (1 ,301)

873)1 I I I Explosive only~ I

. ,1

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

a. Number of incidents (includes attempts)

Table 1 BOMBING

Year—

1972

1913

1974

1975

1976

1971

1978

INCIDENTS

TotalACTUALAttemptedBombings

1,962

1, 955

2, 044

2, 074

1,570

1,318

1,301

, 1972 through

ActualExplo

114

742

093

1, 088

852

861

768

Incend

793

781

758

613

405

248

349

Attempt

Explo

237

253

236

238

188

119

105

A~ce~d

218

113

1s7

13s

125

85

19

PropeflyKhmage(collar

—~zlhg~

7,991,815

7, 261,832

9,996,563

7, 003, 981,

1,265,426

8,943, 300

9, 161,485

%rsonal~n~r~ -

176

181

207

326.

212

162

135

.I, eludes lhree ma]or twnbint Incidents resull!w In unusually h@ personal lnluriesand deaths and .ubshtial damage to propc~.

Death

25

22

24

69.

so

22

18

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

b. Property damage (includes incendiary bombings)

(/3az. - 3003. -C. - 250% 200$

e 150

; 1(135)

4 nn

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

c. Personal injury (includes incendiary bombings)

k r m r , 4

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

d. Deaths (inciudes incendiary bombings)

238 ● Taggants in fx~losives

Table 56. -ldontified Explosive Fillers Used in Bombs TABLE 13

Types of Explosivcs Filler Used

Lab Identified All Identified With in the Destructive Device

fillers 1978 fillers 1978 Average —— —

Black powder, . . 13% 21% 17?40Smokeless powder 16 19 17.5Military , ., . . ., . . 2 7 4.5Cap sensitive ... . . . 32 30 31Blasting agents. . . – t 5Chemicals – 1 .5Others. . . . . . . . 36 21 28.5

T y p e o f F i l l e r

Flammable Liquid

Black Powder

NUMBER

1977 1978

279 468

PERCENTAGE 2

1977 1978 --

36. 4% 36. 2%

222 171 29 .00 13. 2%

SMOKELESS Powder

Military Explosives

D y m m i t e 3

B l a s t i n g A g e n t

Chemical

O t h e r 4

133 157

19 54

17. 4% 12. 2%

2 .4% 4 .2%

30 251 4 .0% 19. 4%

SOURCE. BATF data. 3 .0% .6%23 8

10 7 1 .3% .5%

TABLE 1

T y p e s o f E x p l o s i v e I n c i d e n t sBy Number and Percentage

50 176 6.58 13.7%

1.

2.

3.

4.

T h i s c a t e g o r y i n c l u d e s f i h e r s t h a t w e r e p l a c e d i n s o m e S p e c i f i ct y p e o f c o n t a i n e r s u c h a s a p i p e , m e t a l b o x , o r a t t a c h e c a s e .T h e s e p e r c e n t a g e s d o n o t i n c l u d e 1 , 0 3 1 i n c i d e n t s i n 1 9 7 7 a n d 4 7 5incidents in 1978 in which the type of fi1ler was not made available,o r t h e l a b o r a t o r y r e s u l t - s f o r r e c e n t i n c i d e n t s w e r e n o t c o m p l e t e d .The method in which the filler was determined has been revised for1978. D y n a m i t e w i t h i n t h e s t i c k s a r e c o u n t e d a s a f i h e r .T h i s c a t e g o r y i n c l u d e s t h o s e f i l l e r s w h i c h c o u l d n o t b e p l a c e d i nt h e c a t e g o r i e s p r o v i d e d .

TYPE OF INCIDENT‘

Accident- Criminal 21 . 7t

32 .6%

10 .0%

10 .7%

2 .5%

10. 3%

23.7%

3 . 2

1. o%

3.3%

2.08%

100%

67

896

287

446

71

362

870

117

22

47

71

3 ,256

2.1%

27. 5%

8 .8%

13. 7%

2 . 2 $

11 .1%

26.7R

3.6%

. 7

1 .4%

2.2%

B o m b i n g ( D e t o n a t i o n ) 1037

BOmbing (Nondetonation) 319

Incendiary (Ignited) 339

Incendiary (Nonignited) 81

S t o l e n E x p l o s i v e s 327

R e c o v e r e d E x c l u s i v e s 751

S e i z e d E x p l o s i v e s 102

T h r e a t s ( T r e a s u r y F a c i l i t i e s ) 33

Hoax Devices 105

1%> MILITARY

9 7 % , l M K m w u [

31% DYNAMITES ( J. . ,. . . . . . . . . . . .. 1 \

A c c i d e n t - N o n c r i m i n a l 62

—

TOTAL 3 ,177

TOTAL KILLED TOTAL INJURED—

1977 127 374

1978 69 707

12% SMOKELESS POWDER \

7%BlACK POWDER \100%

TOTAL DAMAGE AMOUNT

$61,300,000

$27,500 ,000 1978279 SAMPLES

2% MILITARY

16% DYNAMITES

26% UNKNOWN /14% SMOKELESS

13% BLACK POWDER

27% OTHER

27% DYNMITES

17% UNKNOWN

SD% OTHER

2% MILITARY

11% BLACK POWDER Field lab

Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables ● 239

Table 57. -Bombing Casualties and Damage in 1978 by Type of Bomb


Filler material substantial targets Deaths Injuries $ millions

Air fillers. ., 1,298 23 185 $172lncendiary ., 428 3 13 3.7B l a c k p o w d e r 148 4 19 2SmoKeless p o w d e r 152 3 23 2Milltary explosive 39 0 7C a p s e n s i t i v e . 270 7 26 2.3O t h e r 3 40 2.4Unknown ~ 3 57 7 4

Total for those fillers which

would be directly tagged 570 14 68 3.7

TABLE 9

127

1976 69

21

1037

31!4

339

81

327

751

102

33

105

62

3 ,117

—

374

707

.70 67 2. 1%

32 .6% 9 6 27 .58

10. % 287 8 .8%

10.7% 446 13. 7%

2. 5% 71 2.2%

10. 3% 362 11. 1%

?3 .7b 870 26. 7%

3.2% 117 3 .6%

1. L!% 22 .7%

3.3% 47 1.4$

Res Ident 1.31 352 294c O m - * r c l a l 367 375Ai r~r ts /Ai rcraf t 7 5Po) Ice Faci 11 ties/ 14 29

V e h i c l e sEriucat ional 1D6 97G o v e r n m e n t ( L o c a l ) 2 4 9

G o v e r n . . e n t ( F e d e r a l ) 2 6 2 2Mi 1 I tary 4 3

Ins ta l la t ionsuti 1 i t ies 51 57Banks 22 18V e h i c l e s 216 252O P A r e = 36 40Mai 1 Boxes 48 69Other 90 137

? . u% 71 2. 2s

1.2.IGo% 3, ?56 1008

Unknohm 2 34 2

T o t a l 1 , 3 9 7 1 , 4 0 9

PROPE:R7Y 1NO. KI LL!D W. INJURED D,W.WE1977 ““- ‘- ‘- “‘- ‘ --- ‘-”-

—

1771

1—11

1—

—

38

19 /5 IY / / IY /5 IY / / -lY /: –

7 66 57 1 , 0 2 2 . 3 2 , 9 8 2 . 26 48 46 6 , 6 4 0 . 1 8 , 7 7 7 . 7

— l — .2 .2— — 5.8 70.4

— 13 5 43.1 532 .31 1 4 145.6 70 .1

— 4 1 2.4 6 . 6— — 1 — 0.0

— 1 2 628 .0 1 , 7 2 7 . 7— — — 225.2 49 .3

7 24 25 363.3 2 , 1 1 9 . 42 8 13 .5 4 . 2

— 1 2 25.8 2.1— 8 27 1 , 2 0 6 . 8 869.9

— 5 252 22.6 0 . 0

23 180 435 1 0 , 3 3 1 . 7 1 7 , 2 1 2 . 1

— —

Figures are in tho~sands and are es t imated.T h i s c a t e g o ~ i n c l u d e s t h o s e i n c i d e n t s w h e r e t h e t y p e t a r g e t w a se i ther u n k n o m o r m t r e p o r t e d .


KilProperty

INCENDIARY

BLACK POWDER

SMOKELESS POWDER

MILITARY

DYNAMITE

OTHER

UNKNOWN

TOTALS

led, Injured, andDamage by Explosives

CY1978

—K

—3

4

3

—

7

3

3—

BOMBINGS

I

13

19

23

7

26

40

57

PROPERTYDAMAGE.$

3,659,760

174,739

150,000

21,0511

3,359,433

2,442,s63

7,404,765

ACCIdEXPLo

I—K

—8

—

3

6

1

16

12—

156—

2

17

4

321

20

TALONSPROPERTYDAMAGE-$

300,000

—

7,000

5,545,100

4,396,000

23 185 17,212/330 46 522 10,246,103

—K

—11

4

6

6

8

19

15—69

—

Slide used to illustrate a presentation on explosives tagging by A. Peterson,

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire arms U.S. Treasuray Department, at the forthInternational Conference on Terrorist Devices, and Methods England. May 7. 1979.

TOTALS

1

171

19

25

24

: 30

361

77

707

PROPERTYDAMAGE$

3,959,760

174,739

150,200

28,050

3,359,433

7,967,963

11,800,765

27,460,931

Appendix F—Derivation ot Bombing Statistics Tables ● 241

Table 58.–Bombings by Specific Targets for 1977-78 (actual detonations or ignitions)—.

Total incidents No killed No injured Property damage a

Type taret 1977 1978 1977 1978 1977 1978 1977 1978Residential . . . . . . . . . . . 352Commercial . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367Airports/aircraft 7Police facilities/vehicle: : : : : 14Educational . . . . . . . . . . . . 106Government (local) . . . . . . . 24G o v e r n m e n t ( F e d e r a l ) 26M i l l i t a r y I n s t a l l a t i o n s 4Utilities . . . . ., 51Banks . . . . . . . . 22Vehicles . . . . . ., 216O p e n a r e a s . , . . . . , . . . 36Mailboxes . . . . ., 48Other ., . . . . . . . . . . 90Unknown b . . . . . . . . 34

294 17 7 66 57 $ 1,022.3 $2,982.2375 7 6 48 46 6,640.1 8,777.7

l – 1 —2; — — — — 5:: 70”:97 — — 13 5 43,1 532.3

9 — 1 1 4 145.6 70.122 — — 4 1 2.4 6 6

3 — — — 1 — 0.057 l – 1 2 6280 1,727.718 — — — — 225.2 493

252 11 7 24 25 3633 2,119440 1 2 8 13 5 4.269 — — 1 2 25.8 2.1

137 — — 8 27 1,206.8 869.92 — — 5 2 22.6 0.0

Total. . . . 1,397 1,409 38 23 180 185 $10,331.7 $17,212.1

ap~Opefly ~amage flgufes are In thousands and arekmatefd

hh!s category includes those ,nc(dents where the type target was e,ther unknown or no! reporled

SOURCE BATF 1978 Exp/os,ves /rrcrJenfs Reporl

TSLE 9

BOMBINGS BY SPECIFIC TARGETS

FOR 1977 – 1978(Actual Detonations or Igni t ions)

——- ——-

TOTAL PROPERTY 1

INCIDENTS NO. KILLED NO. INJURED DAMAGETYPE TARGET 1977— — — . . — - —

R e s i d e n t i a l 352Commercial 367A i r p o r t s / a i r c r a f t 7P o l i c e F a c i l i t i e s / 1 4

V e h i c l e sEducational 106Government (Local) 24Government (Federal) 26M i l i t a r y 4

Ins ta l la t ionsUti1i t ies 51Banks 22V e h i c l e s 216Open Areas 36Mail Boxes 48Other 90

Unknown 2 34

1978 1977 1978 1977 1978 1977 1978— — . . _ — . — — — — — — —.—— - ——.—————

294375

529

979

223

5718

2524069

137

2

17 77 6l —

— —

— —— 1— —— —

l —— —11 7

1 2— —— —

— —

66 5748 46

l —— —

13 51 44 1

— 1

1 2— —24 25

8 131 28 27

5 252

1 , 0 2 2 . 36 , 6 4 0 . 1

. 25 . 8

43.1145.6

2.4—

628.0225.2363.3

. 525.8

1,206.8

22.6

2 ,982 .28 ,777 .7

. 270.4

532.370.16.60.0

1 ,727 .749.3

2 ,119 .44 . 22 . 1

869.9

0 . 0

T o t a l 1 , 3 9 7 1 , 4 0 9 38 23 180 435 10 ,331 .7 17 ,212 .1.

1 . Figures are in thousands and are est imated.2 . This category includes those incidents where the type target w a s

ei ther u n k n o w n o r n o t r e p o r t e d .


Table 59. -Percent of Bomber Targets That Would Be Protected by a Detection Sensor

Total bombings Injuries Deaths

Average number of bombings of known, substantial target b . . . . . . . . . 1,175 150 29B o m b i n g s o f r e s i d e n c e s , v e h i c l e s . 557 (47%) 86 (58%) 21 (72%)B o m b i n g s o f c o m m e r c i a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t s . 371 (32%) 47 (31 %) (22%)Total unlikely to have sensors . . . . . . . . . . 928 (79%) 133 (89%) 28 (94%)

alnclu~ ~{h mcendia~ and exploswe tmmbmgs tor 1977 and 1978.br)~ fIWS and malit)oxas are excluded fmm ttrese aala.SOURCE. BATF /978 tioloswes Incluems #leom.

TABLE 9

BOMBINGS BY SPECIFIC TARGETSFOR 1977 - 1978

( A c t u a l D e t o n a t i o n s o r I g n i t i o n s )

TOTALINCIDENTS NO. KILLED

TYPE TARGET 1977 1978 1977 1978—

Residential 352 294 17 7Commercial 367 375 7 6A i r p o r t s / A i r c r a f t 7 5 l —PO lice Facilities/ 14 29 — —

VehiclesEducational 106 97 — —Government (Local) 24 9 —1Government (Federal ) 26 22 — —M i l i t a r y 4 3 ——

InstallationsU t i 1 i t i es 51 57 l —Banks 22 18 — —Vehicles 216 252 11 7Open Areas 36 40 1 2Mail Boxes 48 69 — —Other 90 137 — —

Unknown 2 34 2 ——

— — — — — — — —

Total 1,397 1,409 38 23

PROPERTY 1

NO. INJURED DAMAGE1977 1978 1977 1978

66 57 1,022.3 2,982.248 46 6,640.1 8,777.7l — .2 .2— — 5.8 70.4

13 5 43.1 532.31 4 145.6 70.14 1 2.4 6.6— 1 — 0.0

1 2 628.0 1,727.7— — 225.2 49.324 25 363.3 2,119.48 13 .5 4.21 2 25.8 2.18 27 1,206.8 869.9

5 252 22.6 0.0

180 435 10,331.7 17,212.1

.1. Figures are in thousands and are estimated.2. This category includes those incidents where the type target was

either unknown or not reported.

Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables “ 243

Table 60.- Attributes of Criminal Bomber Groups

ExpriencePerpetrator and traning Resources Motivation Individual or group Reaction capability Freaquency

CriminalUnsophisticated . . . L L M I M MultiSophisticated . . . . . . . . . . . . H M H I H Multi

TerroristPolittcal . . . . . . . M-H M-H M-H G M-4 MultiSeparatist . . . . . . M-H M H G H MultiReactional . . . L L H G L-M Multi

Mentally disturbedD i s e n c h a n t e d . . . . L L L-IW I L SingleVengeful . L L M-H I i--M SingleP a t h o l o g i c a l , . L-M L H I L -M Varies

otherV a n d a l s L L L-M I L Single.E x p e r i m e n t e r : ~ M L L-M I L.M Single

L.Low. M. Mooerate High” Individual G-GroupSOURCE. Office of Technology Assessment

Table 61,-Estimated Number of Significant Bombings byGroup of Perpetrators (average of years 1974-78)

Estimated numberPerpetrator group of bombingsTerrorists. ., ., ., 107Criminals. . . . . . 98Mentally disturbed ... ., ... 340‘ V a n d a l s a n d e x p e r i m e n t e r s . . 348

SOURCE. FBI data.


Target

TOTAL

Residences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Private Residence

Apartment Houseother Private Property”

Commercial Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . .Commercial BuildingOffice BuildingIndustrial BuildingTheaterMotel and Hotel

Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .AutoOther VehicleAircraft

School Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Law EnforcementFire Department

Public Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recreation Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . .

Government Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Federalstate

Constructiom Sites and Equipment. . . . . . . .

Telephone Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilities . . . . . . . .

Millitary Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Churches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Postal Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . .

International Establishments . . . . . . . . . .

Court Houses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Newspaper Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Open Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Unknown (Premature Deter.ationi . . . . . . . .

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

/Total

2.044

560420

6179

458356

38302212

257182

732

187

7269

3

63

44

38

37

3610

818

30

20

3

19

15

15

7

5

1 1 7

29

21

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

1 . . .

2 . . .1 . . .1 . . .

..- . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

...J 6

1 . . .

It. . .

1

. . . . .

. . ., . . .II

. - 1 . . .

. . . . .

~. . . . . .

I. . . . . .

.25—

142

9

;. .. .

. .2

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. .

1

. ,

. .

. .

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1—

—30—

1. . .

1

133

. . .3

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

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1

. . .1

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1

1

. . .

. . .

. . .

2

3—

11

1. .

. . .

11

. .2

. .

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,..—. .

,..

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,..,..,..

,..

l . .

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, . .

4

, . .

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1—

/.#/‘ +—24—

13

;

135

1031

816. .

2

. .

. .

34

. .

1

5

11

. .

5

. .

. .

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. .

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3

. .

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$ -

/~<

70 I—

331352

9274’63

358

. .

52

131

10

6

30

25

22

10

11

11

. .

11

4

11

. .

1

4

. .

96

6

9—

—53—

212

20. .. .. .

1

2. .

1

. .

. .

. .

12

2

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

4

5

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

2—

69

413816

568873

2437. .

27

292

2

29

2

2

333

5

2

3

2

4

2

. .

4

1

. .

3

. .

3

51

s. .. .

177

. .

. .1

;. .

. .

1. .

2

. .

2

. .

. .

. .2

2

. .

. .

3

. .

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4

. .

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. .

1

. .

1

—13—

2. .. .

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1

31

. .

. .

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. .

2

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

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1

. .

. .

. .

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—2—

. .,..,..

,..!..,..!..!..

,..,..,..

,..

,... . .

, . .

2

. . .

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. . .

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,..

. . .

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. . .

. . .

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—90—

1323

18241

. .

54

. .

. .

1. .

. .

1

1

2

1. .

1

3

1

. .

2

. .

1

. .

1

. .

1

9

13

. .—

:2

71

. .

31

. .

. .x

21

. .

4

2. .

1

2

2

. .

1. .

1

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

5

6

1


BOMBING INCIDENTS BY TARGET AND APPARENT MOTIVE /’

Target

TOTAL

Residences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Private ResidenceApartment Houseother Private Property

Commercial Operations . . . . . . . . .Commercial BuildingOffice BuildingIndustrial BuildingTheaterMotel and Hotel

Vechicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .AutomobileOther VehicleAircraft

School Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . .

Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . .BuildingVehicleOther

Government Property . . , . . . . . . .Federalstate

Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recreation Facilitates . . . . . . . . . .

Telephone Facilities . . . . . . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilities . . . . .

Tranportation Facilitates . . . . . . . .

Construction Sites and Equipment . . . .

Postal Facilities and Equipment . . . . .

Churches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military Facilities. . , . . . . . . . . .

International Establishments . . . . . . .

Medical Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . .

Courthouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Newspaper Facilities . . . . . . . . . .

Open Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,

Unknown (Premature Detonation). . . . . .

other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2,074

582364

77121

485387

39371210

273201

693

165

76223321

6224

43

41

33

26

6

25

20

17

16

14

11

10

4

1

101

37

26

1T

F

314

93

, . ., . ., . .

21

, . .

4

35

, . .

11

. . .

. . .

s

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

1

2

. . .

. . .

..<

. . .

1

. . .

. . .—

L.++

/1F

. .. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

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. .

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. .

. .

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. .. .. .. .. .2

. .

. .

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l..

..!

. .

. .

/4,.%

/>

$..4c—C7—

12. . .. . .

10

:. . .. . .

12

. . .

10

. . .21

. . .

. . .. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

I

. . .

. . .

2

. . .

. . .

1

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. . .

2

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/

p

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/ 4—a

1,..,..

us3

, . .,..

221

1

23:

911

. . .

u

. . .

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2

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1

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211

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F

11. . .. . .

192

132

. . .

48

. . .

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2

. . .

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10

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4s! 57

I

I4 13 2s . . .s . . .

36 29 3

. . . . .

25 . . .

4 1

; . i.

4 . . .6

18 :::

3 . . .

10 . . .

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16 7

. . . . .

14 2

6 1

11 . . .

6 1

4 . . .

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80 1

12 ..<

15 . .

G

073819

u8

11.43

.3732

1

16

61316

2. .

3

30

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1

4

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2

1

2

3

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6

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1

:

J

!

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f

;

1. .. .

98. .. .. .

. .2. .

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.

c1. .. .

9. .. .. .. .

21. .

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1

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-1-9236

24 414 1

7 1

34 4s 13 , . .

. . 12 . . .

14 15 11 . . .

8 1

3 15 1

. . . . .

s . . .2 . . .4 . . .

3 s

10 . . .

1 . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

4 . . .

1 . . .

3 . . .

2 . . .

1 2

1 . . .

. . . . .

1 . . .

. . . . .

8 3

1 3 9

8 . .


Table 9BOMBINGS INCIDENTS BY TARGET AND APPARENT MOTIVE

1976.

Target

TOTALS

Residences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Private ResidenceApartment HouseOther Private Property

Commercial Operatitons . . . . . . . . . . . .Commetcial BuildingOffice BuildingIndustrial BuildingTheaterMotel sad Hotel

Vehicles . . . . . . .AutomobileOther VehicleAircraft

School Facilities. . .

Law Enforcement . .BuildingVehicleOther

Government PropertyFederalStateLocal

Persons, ● . . ● . .

Public Utilities. . . .

Recreation Facilities

Telephone Facilities.

Other Communication

. * * * .**.**.*.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . * . . * . * * .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

● ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

Facilities. . . . . . .

Transportation Facilities ● . . . ● . . . .

Construction Sites and Equipment_ . * . . . * .

Postal Facilities and Equipment. . . . . . .

churches. ● ● ● ● . ● . . . ● ● . ● . . . . ● .

Military Facilities. . . . . . ● ● . . . ● . ● .

International Establishment ● . ● . . ● . ● ●

Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Courthouses . . ● ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Newspaper Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Open Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Unknown (Premature Detonation) . . . . . . .

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. 570

433262

40112

335279

2123

75

192142

482

124

47101720

3813

19

62

28

22

25

2

14

28

26

10

s

10

4

s

2

77

42

20

19 I 5 I 9 I 7a

3 . .. . . . .. . . . .

3 . .. . - , .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .

1 1.0. 1.*. .*

2 .*

. . . . .2 . .2 . .

● . . . .1 . .1 . .

. . . . .

1 . .

. . . . .

1 . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

● ** .*

. . . w.

. . . J

1 . .

. . . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1-

. .

. .

1. .. .. .. .

1. .. .

2

. .

. .

. .

.*

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

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. .

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. .

. .

. .

s1

● *

2642

. .2

111

● ✎

2. .

2

11

. .

12

5

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

1

. .

1

3

. .

1

1

● ✎

. .

3

1 1 !. . . 11 5 4 9. . 1 .0. 1 {● . . . . . 6 . . . 1

1 10 3 10 6. . 0 1 1. . s 2 1,2! 67I37J39I31417 I 16 I S3J78

1 1 10 3. . . . . . 1 1

1 1 2 7

4 5 1 132 . * . . * .

, . . . . . 21 I 2 i d ...1 ...1 ...1...1 d ...1

1 ! Ii!1..* ● . . ..* ● . . . . . ● . .

● . . 2 4 3 2 5 51 1: : : : . . . 1 1 2.


Table 9: BOMBING TARGETS ANDAPPARENT MOTIVES. 1977

TOTALResidences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

private ResidenceApartment Howeother Private Property

Commercial operations . . . . . . . . . . . .Commercial BuildingOffice BuildingIndustrial BuildingBankTheaterMotel and Hotel

Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .AutomobileOther VehicleAircraft

School Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Law Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .BuildingVechicleOcher

Government Property . . . . . . . . . . . . .FederalStateLocal

Persons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recreation Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Telephone Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilities. . . . . . . .

Transportation Facilities . . . . , . . . . . .

Construction Sites and Equipment . . . . . . .

Postal Facilities and Equipment. . . . . . . .

Churches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

International Establishments. . . . . . . . . .

Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Courthouses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


open Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Unknown (Premature Detonation . . . . . . .

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 . 3 1 8292193

2178

282186

28252611

6

17511947

9

100

3613

518

66151140

78

28

17

13

1

23

32

15

6

9

3

. . .

4

2

78

29

29

I41 . . .4 . . .3 ..*

15 1

: :::1 12 . . .

I. . . . . .

91’. . .6 . . .

, . . . . .

3 . . .

1 11’. . .

, . . . . .

!.. . . .. . . . .

s . . .

19 . . .

1 . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

1 . . .

I . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

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. . ;. . .

i● . ,. . .

!

2! . .. . . .. . . .

I1 2

“ij ::. . . .

JJ:.1” iI

/. . . .. . . . . .

1

I

. . . . .

. . . . .

II. . . . . .. . . ..!I. . . ..%I:::! :::I. . . . . .

1 1

...1 , .,

,.. . . .

,.. . . .

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! . . . * .

! . . . . .

I,.. . . .,.. . . .,.. . . .

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. . .. . (

. . .

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1

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1

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.,

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1

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,.(

!.4

. .

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3

. .

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. . 1

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. . .

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—

~~ ! 6QZ

I

. : . : :13 49

5 113. . . 11. . .

1 1 :. . . 6. . . . . .

: : :. . . 1

27 41

. . . 61

. . . :

1 9

: ~ 2:

. . . I 31

1 I 14

2I

12

I2 9

. . . l.. .

J 16

2 18

1 13

. . . I 6

11 5

,.. I 1. . . . . . .I,.. 1 3

. . . 2

2 44

2 11

1 11I

u.412

72

:1

,.,

32

,..

!..

1!..1

. .4. .

3

z

. .

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1

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. .

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6

7

I

.

● Unlessafeasiblemotivecanbedeterminedforeachbombingincident,the motive is listed ❉■ theUnknown Ca te rgo r y .


Table 9: BOMBING TARGETS ANDAPPARENT MOTIVES, 1978

Target

TOTALResidences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Private ResidencesApartment HouseOther Private Property

Commercial Operations . . . . . . . . . . . .Commercial BuildingOffice BuildingIndustrial Building

TheaterMotel or Hotel

Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .AutomobileOther VehicleAircraft

School Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Law Enforcement

BuildingVehicleOther

Fire Department and Equipment

Government Property . . . . . . . . . . . . .FederalStateLocal

Persons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Utilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recreation Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Telephone Facitlties . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilities. . . . . . . .

Transportation Facilities . . . . . . . . . . .

Construction Sites and Equipment . . . . . . .

Postal Facilities and Equipment. . . . . . . .

Churches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

International Establishments . . . . . . . * .

Medical Facilities 9 * * * . * . * . . * . . . .

Courthouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


Open Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Unknown (Premature Destination) . . . . . . .

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3013412165372

270180

: :181011

17814236

. . . . . .

101

41381123

43

3111

218

61

31

19

21

2

37

10

14

9

7

7

3

3

5

46

33

31

/ 7—

2—

431

13

. .1

. .

75. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

0

. .

1

. .

● .

2

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

● *

. .

. .

2

. .

● ✎

—~

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .11. .● .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .2

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

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—● Unlew a feasible motive can be determined for each bombing incident, the motive is listed ❉■ the Unknown category.


Table 1: BOMBING

Y e a r

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

INCIDEN

TotalActual andAttemptedBombings

1,962

1,955

2,044

2,074

1,570

1,318

1,301

1972 through 1

Actual

Explo.

714

742

893

1,088

852

867

768

Incend.

793

787

758

613

405

248

349

78

A t t e m p t

EXplo.

237

253

236

238

188

118

105

Attempt

Incend

218

173

157

135

125

85

79

PropertyDamage(Dollar

Value)

‘t, 991,815

7,261,832

9,886,563

27,003, 981*

11,265,426

8,943,300

9,161,485

PersonalInjury

176

18?

207

326*

212

162

135

Dea l

25

22

24

6 9

5 0

2 2

1 8

•Includes three major bombing incidents resulting in unusually high personal in jur ies

and deaths and substantial damage to property.

61-401 0 - 80 - 17


Table 62.-Stolen and Recovered Explosive Summary

Amount stolen Amount recoveredType 1977 1978 1977 1978

Blasting agents, Pounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,834 42,172 21,260 23,623Black powder, pounds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 379 277 723Smokeless powder, pounds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 163 16 1,361Boosters, pounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,177 9,528 2,804 362Military explosives, pounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 640 701Cap-sensitive highexplosives, pounds . . . . . . . . . . 36,498 44,316 43,738 41,097Primer, units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,300 4,333 2,733 344Blasting caps, units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61,531 66,614 40,719 44,456Det. cord/safety fuse/igniter cord, feet . . . . . . . . . . 183,224 113,510 84,554 101,117

Total, explosives, pounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61,003 101,217 71,470 74,966Blasting caps, units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61,531 66,614 40,719 44,456Oct. cord/safety fuse/ignitor cord, feet. . . . . . . . . . 183,224 113,510 84,554 101,117

SOURCE. BATF 1978 Explosives incidentsReport

TABLE 23

The Amount of Explosives Recovered andSeized by General and Specif ic types for

1977 - 1978

—.— .—. . . . . . . . . . . — .AMOUNT RECOVERED

TYPE< GENERAL 1977— — — . — — — — . . . . . . . . 1978

High Explosives 49,915 42,501

L OW Explosives 295 8 ,842

Blast ing Agents 21,260 23,623

Blasting Caps 40 ,719 44,456

- - - - -Det. Cord/Safety Fuse/ Ig.Cord .- 84,554 101, 117 ..—AMOUNT RECOVERED

TYPE-SPECIFIC .- 1978

Blasting Agents 21,260 23,623

Black Powder 277 723

Smokeless Powder 16 1,361

Photo lash Cartridges Powder 2 150

Potass ium Chlorate — 6,300

Boosters 2,804 362

Military Explosives 156 697 .

RLIX 484 4

TNT 699 86

Dynamite 43,039 41,008

Primer 2,733 344

Blasting Caps 40,719 44,456

Det. cord/Safety Fuse/Ig. cord 84,554 . 101,1171 9 7 8

TOTAL EXPLOSIVES RECOVERED: 71,470 lbs. 74,966 lbs.DET. CORD/SAFETY FUSE/IGNITOR CORD: 84,554 ft. 101,117 ft.BLASTING CAPS: 40,719 ea. 44,456 ea.

TABLE 17

The AMOUNT of Explosives Stolen ByGeneral and Specific Types

for 1977 - 1978

— — —AMOUNT STOLEN

T Y P E - G E N E R A L 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8

High Explosives 40,024 58,327

Low Explosives 145 718


Blasting Caps 61,531 66,614

Det. Cord/Safety Fuse/Ig. Cord 183,224 113,510

——— —-———AMOUNT STOLEN

TYPE - SPECIFIC 1977 1978— — . — — —


Black Powder 145 379

Smokeless Powder 0 163

Boosters 2,177 9,528

Military Explosives 44 123

TNT 5 17

D y n a m i t e 36,498 44,316

P r imer 1,300 4,333

Blasting CapS 61,531 66,614

Det. Cord/Safety Fuse/Ig. Cord 183,224 113,510

— — — . .

1977 1978— — — — —— — — — —‘TOTAL EXPLOSIVES STOLEN:

— — —61,003 its. 101,217 lbs.—

D E T ’ . COIU)/SAFE’IY ~SE/IGNI~ co~: 183,224 ft. 113,510 ft.BLASTIW CAPS: 61,531 ea. 66,614 ea.

—

Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables 251

Table 63.-Expiosives Thefts by Method of Entry-Number of Incidents and Percentages for 1977-78

Number Percentage

Entry method 1977 1978 1977 ‘1978

Locks cut. . . . . . . . . . 59 71 31.1 26.9Locks pried . . . . . . . . 36 50 18.9 19.0Door pried . . . . . . . 10 10 5.3 3.9Key, . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 23 7.4 8.8Window entry. . . . . . . . . 7 3 3.7 1.1Inside help. . . . . . . . . . 3 0 1.6 -Wall entry . . . . . . . . . . . 10 16 5.3 6.1Burning. . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.0 ,4Roof entry . . . . . . . . . . . 7 ; 3.7 1.1Ooor blown. . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 .5 .8Floor entry . . . . . . . . . . . 0 .4Vent entry . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ; .5 1.1Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 80 21.0 30.4Unknown. . . . . . . . . ., 137 99 - -— — —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . 327 362 100 100

a~h~ ~~@W @ ~~ l~t~ 137 unknOWO fTI@M!d IIICIOOIMS k)f 1977 and fho w incl*fl~

for 1978.~Is hgure ref lects those mcteonts whars the enw method could not bc Placad m the abovecal~fles.

SOURCE. 8ATF 1978 Gr@/ves /llC/d6WS R@@rT

TABLE 18

Explosives Thefts by Method of Entry - Numberof Incidents and Percentages for 1977–1978

—ENTRY METHOD

.——— - .—.——— -——NUMBER PERCENTAGE 1 ‘—

1977 1978 1977 1978—.

Locks Cut 59 71 31 .1%

Locks Pried 36 50 18. 9%

Door Pried 10 10 5.3%

Key 14 23 7 .4%

Window Entry 7 3 3.7%

Inside Help 3 0 1.6%

Wall Entry 10 16 5.3%

B u r n i n g 2 1 1 .0%

Rooff Entry 7 3 3.7%

Door Blown 1 2 .5%

Floor Entry 0 1 —

V e n t E n t r y 1 3 .5%

O t h e r 2 40 80 21 .0%

Unknown 137 99 — —— — . — . —.

Total ----- 327-— _ 362 100%

1. These percentages do not include 137 incidents for 1977 and99 incidents for 1978.

2. This figure reflects those incidents where the entry Methodcould not be placed in the above categories provided.

(from reference 2)

26. 9%

19. 0%

3 .9%

8 .8%

1 .1%

- —

6 .1%

.4%

1 .1%

.8%

.4%

1 .1%

30. 4%

-—-

100%


Table 64.–Explosions Aboard U.S. Aircraft

Date Carrier Aircraft Aircraft location Bomb location Outcome Device—- -—

1 1/1/557/25/57

1/6/60

5/22/62

11/12/67

11/19/68

8/29/69

9/7/70

9/12/70

12/29/71

3/8/729/21/7312/17/73

8/26/74

9/8/74

2/3/75

12/19/75

7/2/76

7/5/76

UALWA

NA

co

AA

co

TW

PA

TW

—

TW—PA

TW

TW

PA

—

EA

—

DC-6BCY-240

DC-6B

707

727

707

707

747

707

Turbo Cmdr

707Navion

707

707

707

747

AlouetteHelicopter

Electra

Helicopter

11 minutesafterTO Baggage47 minutesafterT0 Lavatory

184 minutes afterT0 Underseat passengercompartment

39,000ft Towel container in rearlavatory

102 minutes after TO Rear baggagecompartment

24,000 ft Lavatory

Ground after hijack(Damascus, Syria)

Ground after hijack(Cairo, Egypt)

Ground after hijack(Dawson Field, Jordan)

In hangar

Parked on groundParked on groundOn ground, Rome

On ground, Rome

Over Ionian Sea

Explosives thrown incockpit after evacuation

—

—

Seat in cabin

CockpitEngine manifoldAttack while loading



In air, Burma Lavatory (suicidalpassenger set fire)

On ground Near fuel tank

Parked next to fence External, near rightlanding gear

On ground External, under tail

Airplane disintegrated–44 killedPassenger thrown out of lavatory–

hole in aircraft side; plane landedsuccessfully

34 killed, airplane disintegrated

Tail blown off-45 killed

3 bags destroyed; aircraft saved

Fire and explosion in lavatory;extinguished by crew; plane landedsafely

No casualties from explosion



Aircraft destroyed, hangar damaged;no casualties

No casualties (plane empty)Not knownFire damage; 30 killed,

many injuredFire, confined to local area;

no casualtiesHigh-order explosion; 88 killed,aircraft lost

Extinguished by crew; minimumdamage

$10,000 damage to aircraft

Explosion and fire destroyed mainfuselage

Extensive damage

DynamiteDynamite

Dynamite, dry cells

Dynamite

Black powder (?)

—

Grenades &canister explosive

—

—

—

c-4—White phosphorous

grenadesc-4

—

Petrol and butane

Blasting caps

Dynamite (8-10sticks)

Dynamite

SOURCE: FAA Civil Aviation Security Service

Table 65.-location of Explosions Aboard Aircraft, 1949-76

Worldwide U.S. aircraft

Location of explosion Number Percent Number Percent

stowed . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 21 21Baggage. . . . . . . . . . . (8) - (4) -Cargo or freight. . . . (5) - – –

Ground attack. . . . . . . . . 5 8 4 21External attachment. . . . . 7 11 3 16Passenger or crew

compartment. . . . . . . 33 52 42Lavatory. . . . . . . . . . . (lo) - (4) -Passenger compartment (19) - (2) –Cockpit. . . . . . . . . . . . (4) - (2) –

Unknown. . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8 0 0— — .Total ... , ... , . . . . 63 100 19 100

SOURCE. Data supplied by FM Civil Aviation Security Service.


Table 66.-Explosions and Devices Found at U.S. Airports, 1972-75

(late Airport Location Effects Comment Device- .— --- . .3/7/ 723 / 8 / 7 2

11/19/72

3 / 2 4 / 7 2

12/1/72

12/31/723 / 2 0 / 7 3

3 / 2 9 / 7 38 / 9 / 7 3

1 1/30/73

3 / 1 / 7 47/21/74

8 / 1 / 7 4

8 / 6 / 7 48 / 9 / 7 4

8 / 2 6 / 7 49 / 1 6 / 7 4

3/15/753/22/753 / 2 7 / 7 57/22/7510/17/7510/20/75

11/6/75

11/27/75

12/29/75

KennedySeattle

Denver

San Carlos, Calif.

Grand Rapids,Mich.Austin

Los Angeles

MilwaukeeLos Angeles

Nashville

KennedyNew Orleans

Kennedy

Los AngelesJohnstown-Camoria, Pa.

O’HareBoston

San FranciscoHonolulu

Kingsford, MichTampaMiamiMiami

Buffalo

Miami

La Guardia

Cockpit of TWA 8-707Baggage compartment (UAL

flight)Attache case carried by

individualHanging from belly ofhelicopter

Paper towel container interminalConcession areaOn runway during approach

of Continental Airlines planeLockerLocker

Locker

Locker(unknown)

Cargo building

LockerHangar

Men’s roomAirline baggage room

Near ticket counterLost & found baggage areaStorage areaBaggage cartLockerDominican Airlines office

Baggage claim area (2 bags)

Bahamasair aircraft. Behindwall panel in lavatory

Locker

No explosionNo explosion

No explosion

Hole in ground at remotelocation

No explosion

Moderate damageNone

1 injury-moderate damageDid not detonate

Did not detonate

3 injured–moderate damageNo explosion

No explosion

3 killed, 34 injuredHangar and aircraft destroyed

Commode damagedSubstantial damage

Minor damageOid not detonateNo explosion1 injuredLockers and ceiling destroyedNo explosion

No explosion

No explosion

11 killed, 70 injured;substantial damage

Detected by dog c-4Extortion attempt; timer Gelatin dynamite in aerosol

stopped cans, blasting capsIndividual stated intent to 8 sticks of dynamite

blow up planeRemoved by police 3 sticks of dynamite, timer and

detonatorsDevice extinguished after –emitting smoke

— Incendiary (gasoline)Thrown by individual on field Molotov cocktail

Extortion attempt —Extor t ion a t tempt / located –

by dogsExtortion attempt Smokeless powder, timer,

initiator— —Removed by bomb squad 3-in long bamboo with powder

and fuseRemoved Cardboard container with

explosive powder, fireworksfuse

— —— Probable incendiary (in 55-gal

drum)— Probably firecrackersBomb was in an unclaimed Incendiary (?)suitcase destined for Tel Aviv

— Probably firecracker— Crude pipe bombRemoved —— Firecrackers— —Discovered by janitor; Time bombdisarmed by bomb squad

Checked bags unclaimed after Black powder and gasolineflight; timers turned off(inadvertently)

Removed —

— Dynamite and RDXa

aFM .$@mla[e mher agermes disagree wllh IINS aW.eSSMen[

SOURCE FM CIVII Aviahon Security Service


Table 67.-Results of Clvil Aviation Security Program Passenger Screening

1972 1973 1974 1975

Passengers (millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 203 201 202Passengers denied boarding. . . . . . . . . . ... 8,265 3,459 2,663 (a)Referrals to law enforcement . . ., ., ., . . (a) (a) (a) 12,270Persons arrested. . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . 3,658 3,156 3,501 2,464Aviation offenses detected

Carrying weapons or explosives aboard aircraft . . . 774 736 1,147 1,364Giving false information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 658 1,465 227

Weapons detectedfirearms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313 2,162 2,450 4,783Explosive devices , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3,459 14,9280 158Ammunition, fireworks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (a) (a) (a) 17,047Knives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., 10,316 23,290 21,468 46,318Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,203 28,740 28,864 55,830

%ata notcolbuOa m tfus farm.~hls figure M a pIOCa COIMI WIM Inctua$ firawoms and ammunfian.SOURCE. first. SownQ, and Tiwd Sonn-Awu# RIWWS IO Congmson the Effa#veness olFa,ssangw ScnwnIng tYOcodLUtss, FM CM Awafkm Sacunfy

s61vlca.

Table-68.-Pramatura Detonation Statistics

Year Incidents Injuries Deaths1974 ......., . . . . . . 29 31 111975 ...., ., . . . . . . . . . : : 37 53 21976 .., ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 42 111977, ., . . ., . . . . . . . . . 29 34 21978, . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 43 5

SOURCE. FBI data.


BOMBING INCIDENTS BY TARGET

TOTAL

ResIDENCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Private ResidenceApartment HouseOther Private Property

Commercial Operations. . . . . . . . .Commercial Building8uild!ngOffice BuildingInsustrial BuildingTheaterMotel and Hotel

Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .AutoOther VehicleAircraft

School Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Law EnforcementFire Department

Public Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recreation Facilities . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation Facilities . . . . . . . .

Government Property . . . . . . . . . .FederalStateLocal

Construction Sites and Equipment. . . .

Telephone Facilities. . . . . . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilities . . . .

Military Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . ,

Churches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Postal Facilities and Equipment . . . .

International Establishments. . . . . .

Court Houses . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . .

Newspaper Facilities . . . . . . . . . .

open Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Unknown (Premature Detonation) . . . . ,

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TotalA c t u a l AttemptedBombings

2 , 0 4 4

6179

45a356

38302212

257182

732

187

’7269

3

63

44

38

37

3610

818

30

20

3

19

15

15

10

7

5

1

117

29

21

Actual

Explo.893

1101155

143161797

8431

1

91

18. . . .

54

21

24

13

63

11

22

17

. . . .

8

5

8

6

2

1

1

54

29

15

11

kend.

758

2324120

14313

7

:

5629

. . . .

69

38. . - .

1

3

s

14

233

s

2

2

2

8

1

1

4

1

. . . .

39

. . . .

3

AU

Explo.

236

2524

43444

. . . .

2911

. . . .

16

8. . . .

8

17

8

7

214

2

1

. . . .

s

1

3

2

I

3

. . . .

18

. . . ..4

n o t

Incend.

157

537

. . . .

275212

1321

11

53

. . . .

3

1

3

. . . .1

. . . .

1

. . . .

1

4

1

3

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

6

. . . .

. . . .

38,950

25,980

223,278

65,90044.15013,320

490,450

69,323

9,000

49,842

97,200

623

113.750

47 750

100

2,500

595

3,325

216,300

PersonalInjury

207

1712

2

18. . . .

171

64

. . . .

24

4. . . .

3

34

. . . .

28

. . . .

. . . .1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

2

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

11

31

. . . .

Death

24

. . . .1

. . . .

1. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .

1. . . .. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .—

6

. . . .

3

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

11

. . . .


Target

TOTAL

Residences. . . . . . . . . . . . . .Private ResidenceApartment HouseOther Private Property

Commercial Operations. . . . . . . . .Commercial BuildingOffice BuildingIndustrial BuildingTheaterMotel and Hotel

Vehicles . . , . . . . . . , . . . . .AutomobilleOther VehicleAircraft

School Facilities . . . . . . . . . . .

law Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . .BuildingVehicleOther

Government Property. . . . . . . . . .FederalStateLocal

Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Utilities. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recreation Facilities. . . . . . . . . .

Telephone Facilities . . . , . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilities. . . . .

Transportation Facilities. . . . . . . .

Construction Sites and Equipment, . . .

Postal Facilities and Equipment . . . .

Churches . , , . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military Facilities. . . . . . . . . . .

International Establishments . . . . . .

Medical Facilities. . , . . . . . . . .

Courthouses . . . . . . . , . . . . .

Newspaper Facilities . . . . , . . . .

open Area. . . . . . . . . . . . , . .

Unknow (Premature Detonation). . . . ,

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● . .

TotalActual andAttemptedBombings

2,074

582384

77121

485387

39371210

273201

693

165

76223321

62241127

43

41—33

26

6

25

20

17

16

14

11

10

4

1

101

37

26

Act

Explo.

L & L

1152792

2142522

9s

9637

1

87

1211

8

147

16

28

33

21

26

5

15

11

13

2

4

10

8

3

1

55

36

21

1

Incend

x1993620

1087

:4

5416

. . . .

40

712

8

427

4

1

4

. . . .

1

7

3

2

12

s

1

i

. . . .

. . . .

27

1

4

Attempt

Expla

24108

4216

. . . .1

3213

2

18

174

s

:

12

6

4

. . . .

. . . .

3

4

1

2

4

. . . .

1

1

. . . .

15

,.. .

1

Attemptlncend

135

4641

23. . . .

31

. . . .

193

. . . .

12

231

111

1

1

4

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

2

1

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

.., .

. . . .

4

. . . .

. . . .

PropertyDamage(Dollar

Value)

27.003.961

398,586284,470

37,365

4,465,308679,380

14, 528, 58862,30020,160

191, 0591,049, 145

10, 000

8 3 3 ,

313, 22530, 8

9, 860

334,300101, 10084,284

59,625

2 5 2 . 3 7 5

35, 390

13,333

11,060

886,800

713, 000

5, 840

5,730

154, 209

87,846

39, 300

6, 515

100

580

35, 573

24,270

326

2819

. . . .

9067

. . . .

. . . .

91

. . . .

8

14s

. . . .2

. . . .

29

. . . .

4

. . . .

. . . .

53

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

4

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

4

u

2

Death99

182

. . . .

20. . . .

1. . . .. . . .

21

. . . .

. . . .

1. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

10

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

11

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .


1976

Residence . , . . . . . . . . . .Private ResidenceApartment HouseOther Private Property

Commercial Opetation. . . . .Commercial Buildingoffice_ BuildingIndustrial BuildingTheaterMotel and Hotel

Vehicles. . . . . . . . . . . . . .AutomobileOther VehicleAircraft

School Facilities . . . . . . . . .

Law Enforcement. . , . . . . . ,BuildingVehicleOther

Government Property. . . . . . .FederalStateLocal

Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

public Utilities . . . . . . . , . .

Recreation Facilities , . . . . . .

Telephone Facilities . . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilities .

Transpotation Facilities. . . . .

Construction Sites and Equipment

Postal Facilities and Equipment .

● ✎ ☛ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

Churches . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . .

Milltary Facillties. . . . . . . . . . . . . ,

International Establishments~ . . . . . . . .

Medical Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Courthouses . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . .

Newspaper Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . .

Open Area . . . . . . . . . . ... , ., , .

Unknown (Premature Detonation). , . . , .

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Actual andAttemptedBombings

1 . 5 7 0

433281

40112

335279

2123

7s

192142

482

126

47101720

3813

619

82

28

21

25

2

14

26

26

10

5

10

4

5

2

77

42

20

Actual I Attempt

Exple.952

821592

1369

1373

7525

2

75

655

74

12

37

20

15

24

1

9

21

23

7

3

5

2

s

2

48

42

15

405

13520

7

9094

. . . .2

3512

. . . .

31

286

1. . . .

s

4

5

4

. . . .

1

. . . .

2

1

1

2

. . . .

1

● . . .

. . . .

16

. . . .

1

1 2 s1 8 8

I26 I 38

2 312

3114

. . . .

. . . .

188

. . . .

14

11s

411

32

3

2

1

. . . .

3

2

2

1

. . . .

4

... *

. . . .

... *

8

... *

1

1

2222

. . . .

. . . .

143

. . . .

6

134

111

9

. . . .

,,. .

. . . .

. . . .

2

1

. . . .

1

. . . .

1

1

. . . .

. . . .

5

. . . .

3

PropertyD a m a g e

(DollarValue}

11 ,265 , .468

3or, 501622, 360

58,976

3, 350, 711254, 925612,550

13, 300319,500

161,071126, 368

1, 075, 000

361,683

4, 97534,31075,443

5, 939360,005265,445

623, 450

177..973

6, 070

17,722

350

29, 388

566.150

17.504

46, 250

15, 350

150, 350

625

1,122,030

. . . . . . . . . .

1, 362

3,950

443, 335

Personallnjury

212

1362

t 23. . . .

22

. . . .

4

L :

7

. . . .

. . . .7

. . . .

. . . .1

59

1

1

. . . .

. . . .

I

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

4

. . . .

21

1

9

42

3

8. . . ..,. .

1. . . .

1. . . .. . . .

2. . . .. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .22

1

... ,

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .1

11

t


:**:*:C7AL.

+CSIC=K- . . . : . . . . . . ● . ● . . , . “ “private Res;dence~MtruwK HouseCl$.er Prlrate Property

C:mmerclat Qwattom . . . . . . . . . . . sC~mmerclal !3wldingOtflce 9uLldINC{wtrta! Butldkag9Mk~.eater>1OCO1 and Hotel

:??lc!es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ . .AucomoblloL%her VehicleAwcraft

3rh~wl Facahtles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

b- CnforcemeftC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .%Uldingt“ehtcleoth4r

Cowcrnmonl Proporty. . . . . . . . . . . . . .Fe4eralZtatebcal

?Wsoru. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Psllc L“tllil]es . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . .

R:crcatmn Facliltles. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

re!ephone FaclIities . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

~ser Commumcallon Facilities. . . . . . . .

Trsportatton FactlKles . . . . . . . . . . .

C,ms(ruction Sites and Equipment . . . . . . .

?cstal Factlutes and Equipment . . . . , . . .

Churckes . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . .

Mil,[art. F~llt~les . . , . . . . . . . . , . . -

!P,er~~lona~ Establishments. . . . . . . . 0 0

‘*lesJcaA Facll; ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . , .

c!nKmNs@ . . . , . . . . . # . . . . . . . , .

Sewspapec ~acll;tle~+ , . . . . , . . . . . . .

-n Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

c~~ (premamre Detonation) . . . . . . .

~~er . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , # ,

T(xti{Ctud aJwUtamptsd3ombin$s

1,318

292193

2178

282186

282s2611

6

17s119

479

100

3613

s18

661311!0

78

2a

17

13

1

23

32

15

6

9

3

. . . .

4

2

78

29

29

Ac?lal

E*% Im

669

99

11116Ii?1st5

8723

2

70

729

12

H

49

20 I

1’+

13

. . . .

18

27

11

4

4

2

kcexl.-m-

:694

44a231

. . . .

1716s

1s

223

. . . .

. . . .s

7

1

2

. . . .1

2

5

1

1

1

. . . .

. . . . . . . .

4 . . . .

1 1

58 13

29 . . . .

21 3

.-m{

qllo.118

13

:

2364221

95

. . . .

12

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

:

13

6

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

2

. . . .

3

. . . .

4

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

s

,.. .

. . . .

!nc erd.8s

1822

8. . . .

I51

. . . .

632

3

416

2. . . .. . . .

9

1

1

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

2

. . . .

s

[DOUG“/alfJe)

3.943, 300

4e6, ?.9:, 655

16,130

1. %0, 145247,775572,648408,429209,810651,200

221, S64191,887

IW

546,368

8, 38S12,2009,500

59, 42s18.250

179,140

270,996

I :94 ● --

14, :2s

12,200

300

342,300

356,475

3, a37

~, 560

400

2s, 300

. . . . . . . . .

1 !0, 450

3, mo

1, 3s0

7, ?s0

la9, 102

>~r~o@tn]ury

192

9

;

“ 206

. 1. . . .. . . .

. . . . .

3. . . .. . . .

5

2. . . .

2

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

62

J

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

7

34

2

Death

22

1. . . .. . . .

2t

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

14

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

2

. . . .


~~blc 3: BOMBNG NCIDENTS TARGETS, 1978

rawxTOTAL

fteei&ncaa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .privat. WeldenceApatiment HouseOth.r Pmvate Pxtp.rry

Commercial OParatlcms . . . . . . . . . . . , ,Cammemiai Building(mea RllldingIrldustrlal adding

Tti.aterMotel or Hotel

VdtIcles . . . . . . . . .AutomobileOther VeMcleAlrcdt

8chool FaciUtle9. . . . .

public Safety . . . . . .Law Enforcemmt

BuildingVehicleOther

Fire Department and

Government Property . .FederalStatebca.1

Persona . . . . . . . . .

public Utilities . . . . .

Recreation Facffltles . .

Telepimne Facilities . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

Equipment

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .Other Communication Facilltleg , . . . . . , .

Tnnapotiion Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . .

Construction Sites and Equipment. . . . . . . .

Postal Faciiitles and Equipment . . . . . . . .

Churchea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , .

Military Facilit;ea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Luhmatiooal EwabIlshmeote . . . . . . . . . .

Medal Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

cOurumSO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Newap~r F~ueq . . . . . . . , , . . . . .

-n Ar= . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . .u~ (Premamre C8tooaticm) . . . . . . . .

Othr. . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TotiActual uAttempte&mbinq1, 301

341216

53R

270180

2X30181011

17814236

. . . . . .

101

41381123

43

3111

218

61

31

19

21

2

37

10

14

9

7

7

3

3

5

46

33

31

A

Explo.768— .

84

::

lot1417Is72

7s17

. . . .

7s

511

33

72

12

29

21

14

1s

1

29

7

13

6

5

3

1

1

s

31

32

26

Id

bced349-

9225

7

61572

:

4613

. . . .

18

s6

. . . .

. . . .

I. . . .

5

8

5

3

3

1

5

3

. . . .

3

2

1

2

. . . .

. . . .

8

1

2

Attemot

Sxp’blc5

11

;

8241

;

74

. . . .

4

:. . . .. . . .

2. . . .. . . .

19

5

2

3

. . . .

2

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

3

. . . .

2

. . . .

s

. . . .

3

-Incenc

79

2371

10. . .

2. . .

1. . .

142

. . .

4

. . .41

. . .

1. . .

1

5

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

1

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

a

. . .

. . .

?ropertyDamage(KklllarVa!ue)

.3, 161. 4a5

547, ‘rrS57,33036,813

1,870,4201,854,731

220, 27s114,902

24,00075,200

142,366631,300

. . . . . . . . .

877,862

33,35024, 310

2, Soo5,670

17, 07s200

51,340

121,295

372,800

S9, 785

9,220

17s, 000

261, 9S0

1, 28S, 450

5,589

7,480

26,900

12, 0s0

2 , 0 6 0

. . . . . . . . .

13,960

101,035

7,150

112, 240

-s4

15. . . .

10 . . .

3. . . .

s. . . .. . . .

8

2. . . .

1. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

21

1

. . . .

1

. . . .

2

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

3

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

3

43

3

2. . .. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

1. . .. . .. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

9

. . .

1

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

s

. . .


Table 69.–Commercial Airliner Hijacking Statistics by Year

Hijackings U.S. Hijackings foreignYear origin origin1949-67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1973a. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91536202427

13345

8

45144850292917171115NAc

NA

au S antlhlpcklng~easureska~ fu~ysrffectrwbus ~~lnes,~resm~veotwlntofmgln,cNotavailable

SOURCE. FAArermlN o.FM-RG77-66.

Table 5.-Hijacking and Associated Bombing Costs for U.S. and Foreign Airlines by Flight Origination(hijacker and bomber fatafftiasat$300,000 each)

U.S. originationss Foreign originationsTotal costs, Enplanements, Costperenplane- Total costs, Enplanements. Cost per enplane-

Year No. $millions millions ment(dol lars) No. $millions millions merit (dollars)

1949 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 $ 0 . 0 0 18.0 $0.000 3 $ 0 . 2 3 10.0 $0.0231950 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 20.7 0.000 3 0.01 12.0 0.0011951 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 26.8 0.000 0.01 17.0 0.0001952. . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 29.7 0.000 ; 0.61 18.0 0.0341953 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 29.7 0.000 0.00 20.0 0.0001954 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 38.2 0.000 ; 0.00 23.0 0.0001955. . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 45.0 0.000 0 0.00 26.0 0.0001956 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 49.6 0.000 0 0.00 31.0 0.0001957. . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 53.3 0.000 0 0.00 37.0 0.0001958 . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7,41 53.1 0.140 6 7.07 38.0 0.1861959 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 60.3 0.000 6 0.33 42.0 0.0081960 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 62.3 0.000 7 0.93 48.0 0.0191 9 6 1 . . . . . . . . , . . 4 0.19 63.0 0.003 6 1.47 53.0 0.0281962 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 67.8 0.000 2 0.07 58.0 0.0011963 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 77.4 0.000 1 0.00 64.0 0.0001964 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 88.5 0.000 0 0.00 73.0 0.0001965 . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0.00 102.9 0.000 0 0.00 77.0 0.0001966 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 118.1 0.000 3 0.63 91.0 0.0071967 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 142.5 0.000 4 0.01 101.0 0.0001968. . . . . . . . . . . 15 0.13 162.2 0.001 14 0.45 115.0 0.0041969. . . . . . . . . . . 36 0.54 171.9 0.003 48 6.59 134.0 0.0491970. . . . . . . . . . . 20 0.77 169.9 0.005 50 60.95 141.0 0.4321971 . . . . . . . . . . . 24 1.01 173.7 0.006 29 6.43 159.0 0.0401972. . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.40 191.4 0.013 29 11.01 176.0 0.0631973 . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0.00 202.2 0.000 17 52.06 201.0 0.2591974 . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0.93 207.5 0.004 17 29.12 216.0 0.1351975 . . . . . . . . . . . 6 0.38 205.1 0.002 11 0.81 228.0 0.0041976 . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0.68 223.3 0.003 15 18.15 247.0 0.073

T o t a l . . . . . . . . . 1 4 5 S14.44 2,858.3 SO.005 275 S196.95 2.456.0 S0.080

SOURCE BATF


Table 70.–Possible Perpetrator Response Countermeasures to Taggant Program

Criminal Terrorist Mentally disturbed OtherUnsophis- Sophis- Disen-

Countermeasures ticated ticated Political Separatist Reactionary chanted Vengeful Pathological Vandals ExperimentersTaggant removal . . . . . . . . –a M M H L-M – – – – L-MFabrication of explosives. . . L H H M M L L L L L-MIncendiary devices. . . . . . . H — L L M M M M M-H L-MUse of blasting agents if

untagged. . . . . . . . . . . . L H H M M L L L L MTheft, commercial . . . . . . . M H M-H M-H L-M L-M L-M L-M – MTheft, military . . . . . . . . . . L L L L – – L – –Illegal sources. . . . . . . . . . L H H H – – – — — —Use of explosives

manufactured beforeimplementation of tagging L H M L – – – – – –

Vapor seals. . . . . . . . . . . . – L-M L-M – L – – L – –Other tactics . . . . . . . . . . . – L-M H H H – L-M M – –

aUnllkely to be attemptedbLener5 Indlcafe Wsslbdlly of success m the attempted countermeasure L = IOW, M = medium: H = high.


APPENDIX G—GLOSSARY

This glossary defines, for easy reference, some ofthe terms used in this study in ways that may differeither from normal English usage or from the tech-nical vocabulary of the explosives industry.A N F O . A m i x t u r e o f p r i l l e d ( o r p e l l e t i z e d ) a m m o n i -

um ni t rate and fuel o i l , which is the most com-monly used “blasting agent” (q. v.). About halfthe ANFO used commercially is mixed in a fac-tory, and half is mixed at the site where the ex-plosion is to take place. Sometimes other simi-lar blasting agents are called ANFO.

Black powder. See “gun powder.”Blasting agent. An explosive material that is too in-

sensitive to be detonated with a #8 detonator.Because blasting agents are generally cheaperto buy, safer to store, and (because of regula-tions) easier to ship than cap-sensitive explo-sives (q. v.), their annual commercial use far ex-ceeds that of any other explosive materials. Themost common blasting agent is ANFO (q.v.), butmany gels, slurries, and emulsions are alsoblasting agents.

Bomb. In this study, a “bomb” refers to a device de-s i g n e d t o c a u s e d e a t h , i n j u r y , a n d / o r p r o p e r t ydamage by means of an explosion. In the usageof many law enforcement agencies, incendiarydevices (designed to cause death, injury, orproperty damage by means of fire) are also con-sidered bombs. The context makes it clearwhenever this report refers to incendiary as wellas explosive bombs.

Bombing. In this study, a “bombing” refers to an in-cident in which an explosive device actuallydetonates and causes death, injury, or damage.

Cap-sensitive. An explosive material is said to becap-sensitive if it can be detonated by a #8 det-onator. Dynamites are cap-sensitive; blastingagents are not cap-sensitive; confined gunpow-der (q.v.) are cap-sensitive. In normal commer-cial practice, a cap-sensitive booster is used todetonate a non-cap-sensitive explosive materi-al.

Catastrophic bombing. A bombing which causesdeath, injury, and/or substantial property dam-age.

Compatibility. A foreign substance (such as a tag-gant) is said to be compatible with an explosivematerial if the presence of the foreign materialdoes not have any deleterious effect on the per-formance or safety of the explosive material un-der any conditions whose occurrence can rea-sonably be foreseen.

Criminal. Used in two senses in this study. In OTA’scharacterization of different kinds of bombers,

“criminals” are those who have an economicmotivation for committing crimes. Elsewhere, a“criminal bombing” is any bombing in violationof the law.

Detection taggant. See taggant.Device. A bomb. The distinction sometimes made

between a device and a bomb is not meaningfulin the context of this study.

Encapsulation. In the context of this study, the coat-ing of a taggant at the time of its manufacturewith an inert material.

Explosive. In this study, an explosive material that iscap-sensitive and more energetic than a gun-powder (q.v.). Typical explosives include dyna-mites, some gels, some slurries, and high explo-sives such as TNT.

Explosive material. A material that is manufacturedfor the purpose of being exploded, generally ina blasting or shooting application. Explosivematerials include blasting agents, explosives,gun powders. (q.v.)

Explosives incident. In the data collection proce-dures of some law enforcement agencies, explo-sives incidents include stolen explosives, recov-ered explosives, accidents, hoaxes, and undeto-nated bombs, as well as bombings (q.v.).

Gunpowder. In this study, the term is used to referto any of the propellants commonly used bythose who engage in shooting for sport. Thesecomprise black powder (which, strictly speak-ing, is what the term gunpowder means), smoke-less powder, and Pyrodex@ (a black powdersubstitute).

High explosive. An explosive material that is bothcap-sensitive and highly energetic.

Identification taggant. See taggant.Incendiary. See bomb.Permissible explosive. An explosive with a low flame

o u t p u t s p e c i f i c a l l y a p p r o v e d b y t h e B u r e a u o fMines for use in underground mining.

Powder fines. Grains of gunpowder or fragments ofsuch grains that are smaller than the grains ofwhich the gunpowder is primarily composed.

Pyrodex@. See gunpowder.Reactivity. Two materials are said to be reactive if

mixing them under a specified set of conditionscauses a chemical reaction. If the reactivity of aforeign substance and an explosive material ex-ceeds a specified standard, they may or maynot be incompatible, but must be presumed tobe incompatible in the absence of informationabout the nature and conditions of the chemi-cal reaction.

Smokeless powder. See gunpowder.

262

Appendix G—Glossary . 263

Substantial target. A person or structure as the targetof a bomb. This study uses the term because anumber of bombings are directed against mail-boxes, open fields, or other targets suggestingthat the purpose of the bomber is to create anexplosion without causing very much actualdamage.

Taggant. A microscopic particle added to a com-mercial explosive in order to facilitate law en-forcement. Identification taggants carry a codemaking it possible to trace the batch of explo-sives, and the chain of legal distribution; theyare intended to survive a bombing, be recov-

ered from the debris, and assist in tracing thesource of the explosives used. Detection tag-gants permit a suitable sensor to detect thepresence of the taggants (and hence the explo-sives) through suitcases, packages, etc. Tag-gants of various kinds have been used for iden-tification and detection purposes not related tocommercial explosives (and additional suchuses have been proposed), but in this study allreferences to taggants or tagging refer to the ap-plication of this technology to commercial ex-plosives.

U.s . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1980 0 - 61-401