Topic: The Rising International Terrorism! What is the way out?

Chapter 1

Introduction

In an international framework, terrorism is said to have no generally agreed and legally

binding definition and law, however, terrorism could be seen as an act of hostility that tends

to craft fear, which could be politically, religiously or emotionally motivated, which renders

the unarmed defenceless. It could be seen that the war on terrorism began after September, 11

2001, but there has been cases of terrorism in the past ages. The law against terrorism would

have been enforced but for the outbreak of world war which never allowed it to be enforced1.

With the conclusion of the prevention and punishment of terrorism by the league of Nations

in 1937, terrorism is now known to be an enemy of human right and peace and must be

fought with every human, technological and material resources to ensure that this evil wind

that blows no good to anyone is totally eradicated.

Based on some scholarly works, the plan of terrorism as a complex and dynamic battle

between terror organizations and their target nations is suggested as being gotten from a

pendulum-like model, it is contended that repeated attacks and counter attacks reinforce

psycho-sociological machineries which extinguish willingness to accept non-combatant

courses of action. Two suggestions are raised as a preliminary step deliberated to inverse the

deleterious prospect: (a) focus on motivation (short term and long term), not organizations

and persona. (b) Facilitate an educated inverse of the effect of the Theatre of Terror, based on

the assumption that the news value of reconciling and peaceful messages is increasing as a

function of the increased severity of the repeated terror and anti-terror attacks.

Some official, governmental definitions of terrorism use the criterion of the illegitimacy or

unlawfulness of the act to distinguish between actions authorized by a government (and thus

"lawful") and those of other actors, including individuals and small groups. Using this

criterion, actions that would otherwise qualify as terrorism would not be considered terrorism

if they were government sanctioned. For example, firebombing a city, which is designed to

affect civilian support for a cause, would not be considered terrorism if it were authorized by

a government. This criterion is inherently problematic and is not universally accepted,

because: it denies the existence of state of terrorism the same act may or may not be classed

as terrorism depending on whether its sponsorship is traced to a "legitimate" government;

"legitimacy" and "lawfulness" are subjective, depending on the perspective of one

11.Terrorism’ and Related Terms in Statute and Regulation

government or another; and it diverges from the historically accepted meaning and origin of

the term. Among the various definitions there are several that do not recognize the possibility

of legitimate use of violence by civilians against an invader in an occupied country. Other

definitions would label as terrorist groups only the resistance movements that oppose an

invader with violent acts that indiscriminately kill or harm civilians and non-combatants, thus

making a distinction between lawful and unlawful use of violence. According to Ali Khan, the

distinction lies ultimately in a political judgment.

An associated, and arguably more easily definable, but not equivalent term is violent non-

state actor. The semantic scope of this term includes not only "terrorists", but while excluding

some individuals or groups who have previously been described as "terrorists", and also

explicitly excludes state terrorism. According to the FBI terrorism is the unlawful use of force

or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian

population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. Current

definitions of terrorism mostly share one common element: politically motivated behaviour,

although religious motivation is increasingly being recognized as an important motivating

factor, as high-profile activities of such groups as Al Qaeda underscore the significance of

radical religious ideologies in driving terrorist violence, or at least providing a pretext. To

illustrate: Osama bin Laden issued a Note that domestically, Congress has used the term

“terrorism” often in legislation. Hundreds of federal statutes and regulations refer to

“terrorism” and related terms in a variety of contexts. However, these statutes and regulations

ultimately lead back to an extremely small set of statutory definitions, current criminal law

and immigration definitions being among them. For the text of some of the classic U.S.

statutory definitions of terrorism,

see CRS Report RS21021, ‘Terrorism’ and Related Terms in Statute and Regulation:

Selected Language, by Elizabeth Martin.

Types of Terrorism

In addition to the enduring discussion on the explanations of terrorism, the field has produced

a significant amount of work on the classification of different forms of terrorism. presently,

the most frequently used classifications are political orientation-based typologies. Bruce

Hoffman (1998) distinguishes four different forms of terrorism: ethno-nationalist, left-wing,

right-wing and religious. Muller and his colleagues identified three general categories of

terrorism: political geographical, most notably ethno nationalist, separatist political

ideological, including left-wing, right-wing and single-issue terrorism; and political religious,

including religious fundamentalism and religious cults. They argue that these categories may

overlap in practice, as the ‘ideological mixture’ of certain terrorist groups demonstrates

(Muller, Spaaij and Ruitenberg, 2003: 8). However, as Schmid and Jongman (1988) have

made clear, there are at least ten different ways of classifying terrorism. For the purpose of

this project, it is essential to address two main classifications, each of which represents a

distinctive phase in the historical development of terrorism and terrorism studies. The first

involves the differentiation between state, state-sponsored and non-state terrorism. The

second categorization relates to the geography of terrorism and distinguishes domestic,

transnational and global terrorism.

State, state-sponsored and non-state terrorism

A conventional group of terrorism involves the dissimilarity between state, state-sponsored

and non-state terrorism. The clarification of Schmid and Jongman mentioned in the previous

section includes states as potential actors in terrorist activity. The logic behind this

proposition is clear: in the twentieth century states have been responsible for the ‘democide’

of over 170 million human beings (Rummel, 1995; De Swaan, 2004). De Hoog (2005: 19-20)

views the discrepancy in the destructive capabilities of states on the one hand and non-state

terrorist groups on the other hand as a major reason to exclude illegitimate state violence

from the definition of terrorism. Ganor (2001) draws a similar distinction but on the basis of

different criteria. Comparing the targets of their operations, Ganor distinguishes between war

crimes perpetrated by representatives of the state during conventional wars and terrorist

offences directed at civilians as part of unconventional wars (between an organization and a

State. One could also dispute, however, that the difference between state and non-state

terrorism rotates primarily around the issues of legitimacy and morality. Several scholars

argue that the violence used by ‘terrorist’ groups is illegitimate on the basis that states alone

have a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force (e.g. Kiras, 2004). In this view,

terrorism ‘constitutes a threat to innocent life and rights’ and challenges both the concept of

an international rule of law and national legal systems (Wilkinson, 1986: 32). Wilkinson has

noted the particular irony that ‘a high proportion of terrorist incidents have occurred within

the liberal democratic states of Western Europe where both formal recognition and

implementation of human rights are most advanced’. These findings have been confirmed in

recent statistical analyses (De Hoog, 2005; Eubank and Weinberg, 2001; Li, 2005).

However even with view to the aggression by states, the issue of legitimacy is heavily

disputed. For example, critical theorists discard the ‘war in the name of democracy’

arguments by Western state leaders as subjective rhetoric. By categorizing political violence

and ‘terrorism’ as unlawful, they argue, Western states preserve the monopoly on the

legitimacy of violence in the international system (Kiras, 2004: 481). The issue of legitimacy

is also crucial to the rhetoric and the identity construction of terrorist groups. Left-wing and

separatist terrorists, for example, deny the legitimacy of the state and claim that the use of

violence against it is morally justified. State-sponsored terrorism was of particular interest to

scholars during theCold War, focusing on states as instigators of terrorism in another country

(see deliverable 1). Prominent scholars argued that countries such as the Soviet Union

became increasingly successful ‘in its interventions in support of selected national liberation

movements’ (Wilkinson, 1986: 35). In fact, since 1979 the annual report on global terrorism

published by the US State Department contains a list of suspected states sponsors of

terrorism. In 1999 this list included Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Sudan and Syria.

While in modern years, intellectuals have hinted a decline in state sponsored terrorism (e.g.

Tanter, 1998), mainly related to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the post-9/11 ‘war on

terrorism’ has explicitly targeted alleged ‘rogue states’. In the after effects of 9/11, US

President George W. Bush pronounced war on state sponsors of terrorism, to which he

referred as the ‘axis of evil’, including Iraq, North Korea and possibly also Libya and Iran.

Regardless of the increased risk of serious penalties imposed on alleged rogue states, mainly

as a consequence of the emerging consensus among Western states on the threat of terrorism,

support of terrorist organizations continues to be an attractive strategy for some countries

(Muller, Spaaij and Ruitenberg, 2003).

Domestic, transnational and global terrorism

In addition to the difference between state, non-state and state-sponsored terrorism, another

major scholarly dispute focuses on the categorization of the geographical boundaries of

terrorism. This categorization differentiates between domestic, international and global

terrorism. Scholars such as Wilkinson (1977; 1986), Schmid and Jongman (1988), followed

more recently by Hoffman (1998), Badey (1998) and Li (2005) have all elaborated on the key

characteristics of transnational terrorism vis-à-vis its domestic counterpart. Furthermore,

some scholars differentiate between transnational terrorism and the more contemporary

distinction of global terrorism as supported by, for example, Kegley (2003), Kiras (2004) and

Reinares (2003). A universal distinction with view to the geography of terrorism is the one

between domestic and transnational terrorism. Scholars usually combine three characteristics

of terrorist attacks in order to determine its geographical boundaries: the country in which the

incident takes place, the nationality of the perpetrators and the ‘nationality’ of the target. In

domestic a terrorist attack these three elements coincide: it involves an attack in a specific

country by (a group of) national citizens against a national or local target.

In addition to this distinction between domestic and transnational terrorism, the geographical

category ‘global terrorism’ has been receiving increased popularity among scholars. In

deliverable 1 of the TTSRL research project we concluded that recent high-profile terrorist

attacks on American and European soil have had a profound impact on the debate concerning

the consequences of globalization and, more specifically, the threat of non-state actors to

security and the means for individual states to ensure security. We also observed how policy

perceptions of terrorism are, in fact, moving away from state-based terrorism to transnational

terrorist networks. In this context, Kiras (2004) argues that the technologies, mobilities and

flows associated with globalization allow terrorists to operate in a highly distributed global

network that shares information and allows small groups to conduct highly coordinated,

lethal attacks. Similarly, Zanini and Edwards (2001) have studied the rise of ‘netwar’

terrorism as a consequence of the information age (see also Lesser et al., 1999).

Chapter 2

Fighting Terrorism

We have earlier defined terrorism as ‘politically motivated violence or the threat of violence,

especially against civilians, with the intent to instil fear.’ Terrorist attacks have occurred

throughout the world for centuries. They have primarily utilized conventional weapons, but

there are now concerns that chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons could be used in

terrorist attacks. Emergency preparedness for terrorist attacks and other human-made and

natural disasters is important. However, there needs to be a balanced approach to

strengthening systems and protecting people from public health threats that is proportionate

to the prevalence, magnitude, and severity of these threats.

The response to the September 11, 2001 events was rapid, wide-ranging, and decisive. After

Administration officials attributed responsibility for the attack to Osama bin Laden and the Al

Qaeda organization, there was an announced policy shift from deterrence to pre-emption,

generally referred to as the “Bush Doctrine.” Given the potentially catastrophic consequences

of terrorist attacks employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Administration decision

makers felt that the United States could not afford to sit back, wait for attacks to occur, and

then respond. The nation was mobilized; combating terrorism and crippling Al Qaeda became

top national priorities. Pre-emptive use of military force against foreign terrorist groups and

infrastructure gained increasing acceptance in Administration policy circles. A full-scale

campaign was launched, using all elements of national and international power, to go after Al

Qaeda and its affiliates and support structures. The campaign involved rallying the

international community, especially law enforcement and intelligence components, to shut

down Al Qaeda cells and financial networks. The essential lessons of information and

intelligence management lessons from recent terrorist attacks and the decision for fight back,

draws on evidence from the 9/11 Commission, the Senate investigation of intelligence and

the war in Iraq, the Butler Commission in Britain, and other sources. It identifies and explores

several themes, including the following: relationship between intelligence work and other

information work; inconclusive nature of intelligence; role of executive leadership in

successful intelligence work, including the leader's need for information and decision-making

style; role of organizational culture and human factors; the need for sound information

management practices and systems; and the need to evaluate information for decision making

and other actions.

A U.S. military operation was initiated in early October, 2001 against the Taliban regime —

which had harboured Al Qaeda since 1996 — and against Al Qaeda strongholds in

Afghanistan. A total of 136 countries offered a range of military assistance to the United

States, including over flight and landing rights and accommodations for U.S. forces. As a

result, the Taliban was removed from power, all known Al Qaeda training sites were

destroyed, and a number of Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders were killed or detained. Since then,

according to President Bush in his address to the nation on May 1, 2003, nearly half of the

known Al Qaeda leadership has been captured or killed. Notwithstanding, top Al Qaeda

leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, as well as the Taliban leader Mullah

Mohammed Omar, apparently remain at large, and a resurgence of Taliban warlords and

militia is reportedly occurring in Southern and Northern Afghanistan.2 All too often we are

reminded that terrorism continues to inflict pain and suffering on people’s lives all over the

world. Almost no week goes by without an act of terrorism taking place somewhere in the

world, indiscriminately affecting innocent people who just happened to be in the wrong place

at the wrong time. Countering this scourge is in the interest of all nations and the issue has

been on the agenda of the United Nations for decades.

Experts believe that terrorist cells are operating not just in places where they are welcomed or

tolerated, but in many other areas as well, including Western Europe and the United States.

According to Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (Patterns 2003), as of January 2003 an

aggressive international law enforcement effort had resulted in detention of approximately

3,000 terrorists and their supporters in more than 100 countries and in the freezing of $124

million in assets in some 600 bank accounts around the world, including $36 million in the

United States alone.5 On June 2, 2003, the G-8 leaders publicized plans, subsequently

implemented, to create a Counter-Terrorism Action Group to assist nations in enhancing their

anti-terrorism capabilities through initiatives including (1) outreach to countries in the area of

counter-terrorism cooperation, and (2) providing capacity building assistance to nations with

insufficient capacity to fight terrorism3. At the 2003 G-8 Summit in Evian, France, leaders

established a Counterterrorism Action Group of donor countries to expand and coordinate

training and assistance for countries with the will—but not the capabilities—to combat terror,

focusing on critical areas such as terrorist financing, customs and immigration controls,

illegal arms trafficking, and police and law enforcement. During the fourth regular session of

the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), member states agreed to a

comprehensive work plan not only to strengthen border and financial controls but also to

2 National Security Council (http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html).

3 Patterns of Global Terrorism (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31912.pdf)

address threats to seaport and aviation security as well as cyber security. One sign that depicts

a progress in the anti-terrorism struggle has been the apparent willingness of certain

previously recalcitrant states to distance themselves from international terrorism and/or

development of weapons of mass destruction. Libya renounced its WMD programs on

December 21, 2003, and has cooperated extensively with the United States and the

international community in dismantling those programs. Sudan, in cooperation with U.S. law

enforcement and intelligence agencies, has arrested Al Qaeda members and “by and large”

shut down Al Qaeda training camps on its territory.

Terrorism and Its Threats

Terrorism is not without its threats and consequences. The emphasis is on terrorist attacks that

could have catastrophic consequences. Right perspectives should be taken in order to make

the right decisions about combating terrorism, their needs to be a systematic, means of

assessing the likelihood of such attacks. A process of implementation of the decisions

resulting from risk assessment is essential. That process includes (1) an understanding of the

nature of the threat, (2) an information system linked directly to ‘intelligence’ on terrorism

and (3) organizational structures that can take timely, coordinated, and effective actions.

There must also be sound evidence that the methodology can be successfully applied. A

description of the nature of terrorism, a terrorism risk assessment methodology, information

requirements to fight terrorism and recommendations for successful implementation is what

should be taken into account when fighting terrorism. Increasingly, international terrorism is

recognized as a threat to U.S. foreign, as well as domestic, security. Both timing and target

selection by terrorists can affect U.S. interests in areas ranging from preservation of

commerce to nuclear non-proliferation to the Middle East peace process. A growing number

of analysts expresses concern that radical Islamist groups seek to exploit economic and

political tensions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, Russia, Jordan, Pakistan, and other

countries. Because of their avowed goal of overthrowing secular or Western-allied regimes in

certain countries with large Moslem populations, such groups are seen as a particular threat to

U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Developments in Terrorism

In the Department of State report, Three major styles or trends of terrorism are identified.

First is the coming out of so-called “micro actors,” spurred in part by U.S. and allied

successes in isolating and killing much of Al Qaeda’s leadership. The result is an Al Qaeda

perceived as having a more subdued operational role, but assuming more of an ideological,

motivational, and propaganda role. Second is a trend toward “sophistication”; i.e. terrorists

exploiting the global interchange of information, finance, and ideas to their benefit, often

through the Internet. Third is a growing overlap between terrorist activity and international

crime, which may expose the terrorists to a broad range of law enforcement activities. Also

cited in the report is an overall increase in suicide bombings and a strong connection between

the ongoing unrest in Iraq and the broader terrorism conflict. The report suggests that “terror”

incidents in Iraq accounted for almost a third of all terror incidents in 2005 and more than

half of terror related deaths worldwide that year.

It is clearly known that The Department of State provides to Congress annually a report on

global terrorism. In an edition released, in March 2006 is: Country Reports on Terrorism

20054 Statistical data on terrorist incidents, analyzed in the report, are provided by the

National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). The analysis addresses trends in terrorism and

the evolving nature of the terrorist threat, and presents information on anti-terror cooperation

by nations worldwide. The report and underlying data portray a threat from radical Jihadists

which is becoming more widespread, diffuse, possibly more deadly, and increasingly home-

grown, often with a lack of apparent formal operational connection with Al Qaeda ideological

leaders5, although perhaps inspired by them or assisted through training. Related to the issue

of home grown terrorism is growing concern that limited terrorist sanctuaries may already be

found within the cities of democratic societies. Data released by the NCTC alongside with the

Department of State’s 2006 terror report show that in 2005 roughly 40,000 individuals were

wounded or killed in terrorist incidents, as compared to 9,300 the previous year and 4,271 in

2003. Terror-related deaths in 2005 numbered 14,602 as compared to 1,907 deaths in 2004

and 625 in 2003. The report placed the number of total reported terrorist attacks in 2005 at

4 Country reports on terrorism 2005

5 Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism,by Dana Shea and Frank Gottron.

11,111 as compared to 3,168 in 2004 and 208 in 2003. Foiled attacks are not included in the

data reported.

Some people argue that, however, that NCTC data concerning Iraq casualties, which are

largely the product of sectarian violence, rampant criminal activity, and home grown

insurgency — grossly distort the global terrorism picture and perhaps should not be attributed

to terrorist activity. Looking at the data outside of Iraq, according to the NCTC, the total

number of incidents with ten or more deaths remained at approximately the 2003-2004 level:

70 per year. This suggests that, excluding Iraq, the number of higher casualty terror attacks

remains relatively stable. apart from Iran, and possibly to some degree Syria, the information

imply that, but for a few notable exceptions, active state sponsorship of terror is declining. It

continues to list Iran as the most active state sponsor of terrorism.

As in earlier years, the details cites Iran as the largely active state ally of violence and states

that its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence and Security were

directly involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts. That included providing

Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups with extensive funding, training and

weapons. The Revolutionary Guard, it is asserted, was increasingly involved in supplying

“lethal assistance” to Iraqi militant groups with the effect of destabilizing Iraq. Also

addressed was Iran’s continued development of a nuclear program and that Iran is “also

praises the Saudi Government for its antiterrorism efforts. Some observers might suggest,

however, that the report tends to mute criticism of nations of strategic importance to the

United States, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, that arguably could do much more to curb

terror.

Even though not included on the State Department’s list of state supporters of terrorism,

Lebanon is mentioned in the account for its identification with several terrorist organizations,

including Hezbollah. Also, the report stresses that because the Government of Lebanon does

not apply helpful control over areas in the south and in Palestinian refugee camps, terrorists

can function “relative freely” in such areas. This loss of governmental control is

representative of a broader phenomenon that countries with weak counterterrorism resources

and infrastructure are, more and more, subject to becoming sanctuaries for terrorism.

booming language of previous years’ versions of the report, the 2006 edition states that Libya

and Sudan “continued to take significant steps to cooperate in the global war on terror,” and

shortly after the report’s release, Libya was removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of

international terrorism. As in previous years, Syria is cited for providing political and

material support (presumably weapons) to both Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups,

which also enjoy sanctuary in Syria. Cuba and North Korea are primarily cited for lack of

anti-terror cooperation and past involvement in terrorist incidents, thereby possibly

suggesting a trend of their less active support for terrorism than in previous decades.

However, many perceive North Korea’s nuclear program, with its potential for future sales of

WMD to terrorists, as extremely bothersome.

A core assertion of the State Department’s 2006 report is acknowledgment that because the Al

Qaeda arrangement is increasingly assuming the characteristics of an ideological movement,

it will not be decisively defeated in the near future. However, some indicate elimination of

Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri would go a long way in that direction. As in any long-term

campaign, international cooperation and capacity building programs, such as the State

Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA), are seen as having a central role in

combating terrorism. Most terrorist acts do not take place in the United States, nor do most

terror-related arrests and prosecutions. Likewise, much, if not most, intelligence gathering on

terrorist groups today is not done by the United States. The report also presents countering

terrorism on the economic front as an important component of a successful strategy.

However, some independent analysts suggest that efforts to curb terrorist finances have

reached a point of diminishing returns, as terrorist groups are often self-supporting, and that

the amount of terrorist funds governments seize is insignificant.

Following the let go of the State Department’s report, the Administration declassified and

released extracts from an April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate titled6 Trends in Global

Terrorism, Implications for the United States. Declassified key judgments of the report were

generally consistent with findings in the State Department’s March 2006 Country Reports on

Terrorism 2005 and concomitant NCTC data which cited decentralization of Al Qaeda and

expressed concern over the potential for “spill over” of battlefield skills, technology, and

ordinance from Iraq.

Many observers have been concerned in the overall growth in numbers and political

authority of radical Islamist political parties throughout the world, some of which reportedly

serve — or might serve — as fronts for terrorist activity. Even if the parties are not actively

serving as fronts, some are concerned that the actions and agendas of such groups could

facilitate creation of a political climate in their home countries which views terrorism as a

6 Trends in global terrorism, implications for the United States

politically acceptable tactic and which might make their home countries appear as attractive

locations for active terrorist groups to establish secure bases. Others view political

participation as a sign that these groups may be adopting channels other than violence to

secure their base. Some of these include groups in Indonesia, Pakistan, Malaysia, and in the

Middle East notably Hamas and Hezbollah. Any rise in the power and influence of such

terror-linked or terror-supportive political parties — especially should their representatives be

elected through democratic processes — presents major policy dilemmas for the United

States, since it pits U.S. support for democracy directly against America’s commitment to

aggressively combat terrorism.

Policy Response By the U.S Administration on Terrorism

The structure

Precedent government have employed a variety of methods to combat international terrorism,

from diplomacy, international cooperation, and constructive engagement to protective

security measures, economic sanctions, concealed action, and military force. The application

of sanctions is one of the most frequently used antiterrorist tools of U.S. policymakers.

Governments supporting international terrorism are often prohibited from receiving U.S.

economic and military assistance. U.S. exports of munitions to such countries are foreclosed,

and restrictions are imposed on exports of “dual use” equipment. The presence of a country

on the “terrorism list,” though, may also reflect considerations — such as its pursuit of a poor

human rights record or simply U.S. domestic political considerations — that are largely

unrelated to support for international terrorism.

In general, U.S. anti-terrorism procedure from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s centred on

deterring and punishing state sponsors as opposed to terrorist groups themselves. The passage

of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) signalled an

important shift in policy. The act, largely initiated by the executive branch, created a legal

category of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) and banned funding, granting of visas and

other material support to such organizations. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L.107-56)

extended and strengthened the provisions of that legislation.

Immediately after the Al Qaeda attacks, the U.S. anti-terrorism policy increasingly focused

on pre-empting attacks from Al Qaeda, often by bringing the “war” to the territory of the

enemy. A comparable area of course of action focus involves protecting the homeland from

terrorist attacks and their aftermath by securing the borders, reducing vulnerabilities of

critical infrastructures, enhancing support and resources available to law enforcement and

intelligence, and enhancing consequence management capabilities. A central area of policy

focus remains denying/minimizing access of to rogue states and terrorist non-state actors. On

September 24, 2003, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released its

2003 Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, which detailed spending by federal

agency and activity for combating terrorism and for homeland security.28 After 2003, the

practice of publishing a consolidated federal counterterrorism budget was discontinued; the

homeland security component of the budget is readily accessible.29 In July 18, 2006

congressional testimony, the comptroller General stated that since 2001 Congress has

appropriated about $430 billion for military and diplomatic efforts in support of the Global

War On Terrorism, and stressed that neither the Department of Defence nor Congress had a

clear picture of how much that war was costing in terms of dollars spent and how

appropriated funds were being used.

Predicaments

In an attempt to fighting terrorism in a modern political framework, democratic countries

often face differing goals and courses of action: (1) providing security from terrorist acts, that

is, limiting the freedom of individual terrorists, terrorist groups, and support networks to

operate unimpeded in a relatively unregulated environment; versus (2) maintaining individual

freedoms, democracy, and human rights. Efforts to combat terrorism are complicated by a

global trend towards deregulation, open borders, and expanded commerce. In democracies

such as the United States, the constitutional limits within which policy must operate are

viewed by some to conflict directly with a desire to secure the lives of citizens more

effectively against terrorist activity. A majority, however, strongly holds that no concession of

constitutional rights is acceptable.

one more test for policymakers is the need to identify the architects of scrupulous terrorist

acts as well as those who train, fund, or otherwise support or sponsor them. As the

international community increasingly demonstrates its ability to unite and apply sanctions

against “rogue” states, states will become less likely to overtly support terrorist groups or

engage in state-sponsored terrorism. The possibility of covert provisioning of weapons,

financing, and logistical support remains open, and detecting such transfers would require

significantly increased deployment of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement assets in

countries and zones. At the moment, the U.S. policy focus is on terrorist organizations, such

as Al Qaeda and affiliated networks, and state supporters.33 But in the future, the recent

phenomenon of new types of terrorists appears likely to continue: individuals who are not

affiliated with any established terrorist organization and who are apparently not agents of any

state sponsor. The terrorist Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, who is believed to have masterminded the

1993 World Trade Center bombing, apparently did not belong to any larger, established, and

previously identified group, although he may have had some ties to Al Qaeda operatives.

Also, should organizational infrastructure of groups such as Al Qaeda continue to be

disrupted, the threat of individual or “boutique” terrorism, or that of “spontaneous” terrorist

activity, such as the bombing of bookstores in the United States after Ayatollah Khomeini’s

death edict against British author Salman Rushdie, may well increase where terrorists

operate. Particularly challenging is identification of those “dual use”

items which might creatively be adapted for military-type applications and therefore should

be subject to U.S. export restrictions

Chapter 3

The Rising Terrorism in Africa

As many would agree with me that the battle against terrorist attacks and terrorism in Africa,

did not actually start after the attack on September 11. It started in Sudan in the 1990s, where

Osama bin Laden operated and where an attack against Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak

was organized. Three years later, in 1998, al-Qaeda cells blew up the American embassies in

Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. In retaliation for these attacks, the United States, in addition to

an attack in Afghanistan, bombed a chemical plant in Sudan, claiming that it was producing

elements for chemical weapons for al-Qaeda. From the time of these attacks, moreover, U.S.

policy in Somalia became preoccupied with searching out, capturing, and killing the

perpetrators of those attacks who were believed to have taken refuge there. The seeds of later

U.S. policy and all that has followed in Somalia were planted then. More recently, terrorist

acts in Europe, particularly the train attack in Spain, have been linked to cells in Morocco and

Algeria, which interact with North African residents in Europe, and both countries themselves

have been victims of recent terrorist bombing attacks.

Consequently, after 9/11, U.S. centre of attention on terrorism in Africa became much more

pronounced. For the first time since 1993, the United States deployed a sizeable contingent of

American troops on the continent, with the establishment in late 2002 of the Combined Joint

Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti. In addition, President Bush announced

a $100 million counterterrorism initiative for East Africa and the Horn in 2003. At the same

time, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) spearheaded a series of training and military

support operations in the Sahel, aimed at the Algeria-based GLPF; the program later

blossomed into the much larger Trans-Sahara Counter terrorism Initiative that now involves

both North African and Sahelian states. Counterterrorism efforts became even more

pronounced in U.S. Africa policy after the Islamic Court Movement took power in

Mogadishu, Somalia, in 2006, leading to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, with tacit U.S.

support, and the current fighting that now consumes that blighted country. Most importantly,

the Pentagon announced in 2007 that it would establish a new unified Africa Command

(AFRICOM) to bring together its varied programs on the continent, a sign of increasing U.S.

focus on security in Africa.

Even as the “battle on terrorism” typically relates to internationally linked terrorists, Africans

face other security threats of equal or greater significance, posing a question of focus for

American as well as African counterterrorism efforts. There are several organized rebellions

or revolutions in Africa, while not always classified as terrorists, which wreak terrible havoc

on African people and threaten national stability. These include various militia in eastern

Congo, who have been the target of the International Criminal Court for their crimes against

humanity, the insurgents in the Niger delta of Nigeria, and the Janjaweed militia in the Darfur

region of Sudan. It is notable that the U.S. African Command lists the Lord’s Resistance

Army, the Army for Liberation of Rwanda, and the obscure Afrikaner Boeremag in South

Africa along with a host of Islamic groups as among the “Terror Groups in Africa.”1 Clearly,

noting this broad scope, Africa cannot ignore the threat of terrorism any more than can any

other part of the world. African nations are known to have responded to this menace in

different ways. In West Africa, Sahelian states have welcomed American help in getting

control over their ungoverned spaces but still face unrest from within those territories. Others,

like Kenya and South Africa, facing the growth of Islamic terrorist groups, have struggled to

balance the need for new security legislation with the preservation of newly gained civil

rights and, in Kenya’s case, to avoid the worst repercussions from the recent developments in

Somalia through active diplomacy. Some, like Ethiopia and the previous government of

Mauritania, have used the terrorist threat to solidify policies of suppression and

antidemocratic practices, while solidifying U.S. support for their anti-terrorist policies. And at

least one, Zimbabwe, has turned the issue on its head, countering U.S. and other international

criticism of its anti-democratic practices by labelling its domestic opponents as “terrorists.’’

Two major disputes now appear in the African and American responses to terrorism. Generally,

many Africans and some American critics are very concerned that the new Africa Command and

other U.S. anti-terrorism programs signal an increased militarization of U.S. policy in Africa.

These critics argue that only a continual intensive attack on the root causes of terrorism and

violence, that is, poverty, authoritarianism, discrimination, weak states, and similar conditions,

will effectively combat such threats. They contend that a focus that relies too heavily on security

will encourage authoritarian practices and undermine Africa’s move toward more democratic

governance. The style and focus of the unified Africa Command will be a closely watched

measure of whether the United States pursues its counterterrorism policies with the requisite

sensitivity, breadth of programming, and balance that is required.

The other identified challenge relates to the continued ability of the Africa Union (AU) to

provide leadership in conflict resolution and the timely provision of peacekeepers as it has

done in recent years in Burundi, Darfur, and Côte d’Ivoire. The current debacle in Somalia

may have dragged the AU into an untenable situation that could fundamentally undermine the

promise of that organization as a force for peacemaking and improved governance. This

occurs at the same time that the AU may experience diminishing support from Nigeria and

perhaps South Africa, as leaders change in those countries. Should both of these factors prove

to be the case, U.S. counterterrorism policies, especially in the Horn, will have had lasting

negative effects on Africa’s overall security.

Nigeria and The Growing Terrorism

In Africa, Nigeria is one of the target zones for breeding terrorists. Nigeria, the most populous

country in Africa, has the largest Muslim population on the continent, over 65 million. It is

Africa’s largest oil producer. Tensions between the Muslim and the equally large Christian

population are persistent and often lead to violence. Evidence of successful proselytizing by

either side is an explosive source of such violence, as is any sign that one side or the other is

being subject to either economic or religious discrimination. Political rivalry between the largely

Muslim north and largely Christian south is a constant in Nigeria, with a barely tolerated

agreement on rotating national leadership between the two. Until the election of 2007, northern

Nigerians smarted over a serious decline in their influence in the military and government.

Politicians also often play on religious identities to provoke tension and sometimes violence, for

example, in recent riots in Plateau state where the roots of the tension are more about land than

religion.

The United States mind-sets towards the northern Nigeria, traditionally tend toward sharp

criticism of U.S. policies in the Middle East. The United States is considered to have a generally

negative policy toward Muslim states; in the 1980s, sharp criticisms of U.S. policy toward Libya

were experienced. The criticism has grown since the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The recent concern in

the north that the United States was encouraging Christian president Olusegun Obasanjo to seek a

third term and deny the north its “rightful” turn for leading the country has passed. Nevertheless,

there are some deep-seated negative feelings about the United States, which while not general,

nor is the population openly hostile, merit close monitoring.

Consequently, the Muslim north is known to be poor and ranks below standards elsewhere in

the country in literacy, health status, and economic activity. Of particular significance is the

de-industrialization that has taken place in the north, for example, in the industrial cities of

Kano and Kaduna, due to inefficient production capabilities on the part of indigenous plants

and the influx of cheap consumer goods from China and other Asian countries. Many plants

of long standing have closed. One major textile company that has operated in Nigeria for

decades reports employment in its factories has declined from 22,000 to 7,000 with more cuts

likely. All over Nigeria, not just in the north, the population has in recent decades, despite the

country’s oil wealth, suffered an extraordinary decline in living standards. Per capita GNP

declined by two-thirds between 1980 and 1999. Nigerians are experiencing a level of poverty

not seen in many years. The recent rise in oil prices has improved the macro-economy but has

as yet done little to impact the grass roots.

Apparently, it’s no news that Osama bin Laden once named Nigeria as a prime target for his

Islamic revolution. Yet notwithstanding some fruitful ground, there is little indication so far

that al-Qaeda per se has penetrated much in Nigeria. Mainstream Islam in Nigeria has a long

tradition of its own in structure, continual adjustment, and overall moderation. The main

influences are through two Sufi traditions, the Tijaniyya and the Quadiriyya, which have been

rivals but also sources of reform and stability. Nigeria’s own Islamic beliefs and traditions

have been the target of challenges from abroad. The latest come from the Wahhabis in Saudi

Arabia, Iran (though Nigeria is overwhelmingly Sunni), and to a lesser extent, Pakistan. None

of these have seemingly produced any strong allegiances in Nigeria to international radical

movements. Twelve of Nigeria’s thirty-six states did adopt shar’ia law in the early 1990s,

largely in response to the election of Obasanjo but also in reaction to growing crime and

seeming lawlessness that afflicted the people on the street. Contrary to the fears of some

foreigners and Nigerian Christians, the adoption of shar’ia has not basically changed the

nature of Nigerian Islam nor resulted in any greater confrontation between Muslims and

Christians than before.

Everything mentioned, points out that there is much in Nigeria that is not well known or

understood. Some al-Qaeda cells may well exist. And some other radical movements have

shaken the country. A long existing radical religious sect, the Maitatsine, erupts in violence

every few years. This sect appears to be entirely indigenous with no known outside

sponsorship. In 2006, however, a new group, calling itself the Taliban, launched an attack in

the northeast city of Borno. In April 2007, the same group launched a more serious attack in

Kano, killing thirteen policemen and wounding five more. In the resulting battle, the Nigerian

military reported twenty-five Taliban members were killed. This group remains something of

a mystery. Members were reported to be dressed in long white gowns and speaking a

language not native to the region. Most appear to have escaped, travelling west rather than

back to the northeast, indicting some means of organization and perhaps indigenous support.

One could argue that the biggest unrest in Nigeria is related not to Islam, nor to international

terrorism, but to the militias in Nigeria’s oil-producing region of the Niger Delta. This region

produces at least 80 percent of Nigeria’s wealth, the bulk of its foreign exchange earnings and

almost all of its government revenue. Yet it has been the site of extraordinary environmental

degradation and shows little if any benefits in schools or hospitals or other gains from the

precious commodity it provides. A riverine area, its rivers and streams have been perhaps

irreversibly damaged from oil and gas spills, its soils equally damaged, and the population

left with little employment either from traditional sources such as fishing or farming nor from

the oil industry, which is largely capital intensive and dependent for its personnel on highly

skilled workers, not general local labour. After decades of such conditions and inadequate

response from both oil companies and the Nigerian government, younger members of the

region took up arms, beginning in the 1990s.

Regrettably, what started as a claim for better situations, compensations, and employment has

gone into something very different. The militias, in partnership with fraudulent officials—

including some high-ranking officials— have become engaged in the stealing (known as

bunkering) of oil. The rates of theft are contested, but the proceeds could well exceed $1

billion annually. A large part of the proceeds go into the purchase of ever more sophisticated

arms. Delta militias are now capable of not only hitting local oil stations, and occasionally

local oil company offices, but attacking offshore installations and taking on armed conflict

with the police and the army. They regularly kidnap oil workers of every nationality, usually

releasing them after a time, but some have been killed. At the same time, the militias have

succeeded in shutting down a significant portion of Nigeria’s legitimate production, that is,

200,000 barrels a day and sometimes more from Nigeria’s more than 2 million barrels per day

capacity, contributing to the sharp rise in crude oil prices on the world market.

The calamity in Delta does not provide itself to easy solutions. At first, President Obasanjo

tried a military move towards to the problem, but the Nigerian army not only was

incompetent of thrashing the militia on their home territory of rivers and creeks but

committed so many human rights violations that their presence provoked indignation from

the local population. The police forces are simply too small, too ill-equipped, and, in some

cases, too corrupt to help. Efforts to reduce corruption have been only partially successful.

President Obasanjo cashiered four navy admirals for their involvement in bunkering, but the

process continues, and other officials are surely involved.

Terrorism and The Initiation of African Command

The United States in early 2007, openly declared that it would create a single Africa

combatant command to bring together all the security programs the United States supports on

the continent. African Command became fully operational in the fall of 2008. Previously,

U.S. defense operations for Africa were divided among EUCOMM, which covered West,

Central, and Southern Africa; Central Command, which covered the Horn; and Pacific

Command, which covered the island base at Diego Garcia and maritime programs related to

the Middle East. The decision to create a single African command is logical and should

provide a clearer focus and a more coordinated approach to security programs in Africa.

Nevertheless, the proclamation of the command has raised questions about the objective of

U.S. security intentions in Africa. To some, the combination of stepped-up American

counterterrorism efforts and growing attention to the security of oil production in the region

portend a strong security-oriented emphasis in U.S. policy in Africa. In the minds of these

critics, these concerns will outweigh priorities of promoting democracy, economic

development, justice, and human rights.22 In Africa, there is also concern that stepped-up

U.S. security programs in the region could result in the strengthening of African militaries,

which have only recently withdrawn from politics and which continue to pose a threat to

fragile democracies. There is also suspicion that this portends a more security-oriented

emphasis in U.S. policy in Africa.

The argument was not helped by the reluctance of U.S. planners to articulate Africa

Command’s mission at the outset. Most of the early explanations focused on the processes of

organization and the desirability of coordinating existing and future programs. That raised

some suspicion about what might be the actual purpose. But the real dilemma for Africa

Command is that it is caught between presenting itself as a largely internal bureaucratic

restructuring, and trying to be more bold. Africa Command might have continued to be

described as simply a way for the United States to better organize and coordinate its security

programs in Africa. That might have produced less suspicion and indeed less notice in Africa.

But as plans for Africa Command developed, and as Pentagon spokespersons travelled across

the continent to explain and promote the concept, the Pentagon went out of its way to portray

it as something new and different from other combatant commands. The chair of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, emphasized that the Africa Command will not be a clone

of the other traditional commands. He envisages a greater emphasis on interagency

cooperation in order to “build African capabilities to effectively govern.” He also denied any

interests in sending U.S. troops to Africa.

Policy Tools By The United State to Combat Terrorism

Use of negotiation to help create a global anti-terror alliance is a central component of the

Bush Administration response to September 11 events. For example, diplomacy was a key

factor leading to the composition of the U.S.-led coalition against the Taliban.

Notwithstanding, some suggest that the Administration far-too-long undervalued diplomacy

and that its ability to conduct effective diplomacy has been weakened by its non-multilateral

positions on a host of international issues. Moreover, diplomacy may not always be effective

against determined terrorists or the countries that support them; however, in most cases,

diplomatic measures are considered least likely to widen conflicts and therefore are often

tried first by the United States when crises arise.

Some are concerned that U.S. diplomacy may not be sufficiently pro-active, possibly as a

result of resource or funding limitations. They contend that more extensive, multi-faceted,

ongoing diplomatic relations, including expanded public diplomacy initiatives, might

contribute to improved international anti-terror cooperation, and argue that pro-active

diplomacy is much less expensive than subsequent military or security operations which

might be required if these diplomatic efforts are absent, insufficient, or unsuccessful.

Moreover, they suggest that in a region(s) of the world where personal relationships are

culturally important, it may be desirable to consider more funding for face-to-face diplomacy

at all levels as a long-term investment in future diplomatic relations. Some contend that U.S.

Others didn’t accept this fact. They contend that diplomacy is but one of many tools in the

nation’s portfolio for combating terrorism, and that the current mix of policy emphasis and

resources is a sound one, as evidenced by ongoing success against Al Qaeda’s operatives,

network, infrastructure, and financial sources of support embassies abroad, particularly in

hardship locations in the Middle East where diplomats or their families may hesitate to go,

are often understaffed or underfunded, or have significant numbers of junior officers with

limited diplomatic experience or language skills.

When responding to incidents of terrorism by sub national groups, reacting by constructive

engagement is complicated by the lack of existing channels and mutually accepted rules of

conduct between governmental entities and the groups in question. The United States has a

longstanding policy of not negotiating with terrorists, or hostage takers. Some observers

suggest, however, that in the changed circumstances of the 21st century, communications

with terrorists in some cases may prove beneficial to U.S. interests. In this regard,

practitioners who deal with the psychology of conflict may provide some useful insights.

some instances, legislation may specifically prohibit official contact with a terrorist

organization or its members. Yet for groups that are well-entrenched in a nation’s political

fabric and culture, such as Hezbollah or Hamas, some suggest trying to engage the group

might be more productive than trying to exterminate it.

Some observers, though, are sceptical of the value of engaging with terrorists. Former CIA

director James Woolsey asserted, in a spring 2001 National Strategy Forum Review article,

that increasingly, terrorists do not just want a place at the table, “they want to blow up the

table and everyone who is sitting at the table. On a different level, in the wake of the

September 11 attacks, the Bush administration explored the possibility of enlisting nations

considered state sponsors of terrorism at the time, such as Libya, Sudan, and Syria, in a

broader Islamic coalition against Al Qaeda and its followers. Much cooperation has been

obtained; however, notably in the case of Syria, results have been mixed at best.

The Open Diplomacy

Advocates dispute that open diplomacy can play a vital role in endearing “hearts and minds.”

The pressure of public diplomacy through the media on public opinion may impact not only

on the attitudes of populations and the actions of governments, but also on the actions of

groups engaged in terrorist acts. Effective public diplomacy vis-à-vis the media may help

mobilize public opinion in other countries to pressure governments to take action against

terrorism. From the terrorist viewpoint, media coverage is an important measure of the

success of a terrorist act. To better give effect to the notion of winning hearts and minds, the

Bush government created a situation of Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and

Public Affairs, a post initially held by Charlotte Beers, later assumed by Margaret Tutwiler,

and since July 2005 held by Karen Hughes. Among other efforts, Hughes has created a Rapid

Response Unit designed to assist U.S. officials abroad to respond to the day’s news. Critics

deride Hughes’ quick hit tactics as an overly “campaign like” approach to a years-long

ideological struggle and cite her inexperience in foreign affairs. Supporters, on the other

hand, point to her energy, focus, and the fresh approach she brings to an uphill battle. A

daunting challenge facing Hughes is how to get federal agencies to agree on a single — or

coordinated — message or strategy.

Economic Approvals

Approvals on administrations can be essentially one-sided — such as U.S. bans on trade and

investment relations with Cuba and Iran — or bilateral, such as those endorsed by the United

Nations in response to Libya’s involvement in the Pan Am 103 bombing. In the past, use of

economic sanctions was usually predicated upon identification of a nation as an active

supporter or sponsor of international terrorism. This can be used to aim assets of terrorist

groups themselves. On September 23, 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13224,

freezing the assets of 27 individuals and organizations known to be affiliated with bin

Laden’s network, giving the Secretary of the Treasury broad powers to impose sanctions on

banks around the world that provide these entities access to the international financial system,

and providing for designation of additional entities as terrorist organizations.

Towards the end of October 2002, reports from the U.S. Treasury Department, show that the

solid list had expanded to include designated terrorist groups, supporters, and financiers of

terror. In addition, on September 28, 2001, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution

1373, which requires all states to “limit the ability of terrorists and terrorist organizations to

operate internationally” by freezing their assets and denying them safe haven. The Security

Council also set up a Counter Terrorism Committee to oversee implementation of Resolution

1373. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1390 of January 16, 2002, obligated member states

to freeze funds of “individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities” associated with the

Taliban and Al Qaeda. As of September 11, 2003, in the range of $200 million in terrorist

funds had been frozen worldwide as a result of these initiatives, according to U.S. and U.N.

financial data. The effects of these economic measures are uncertain, because much of the

flow of terrorist funds reportedly takes place outside formal banking channels, in elusive

chains of money brokers. Moreover, much, if not most of the assets were frozen relatively

early on with very little being frozen subsequently, raising the issue of whether such

countermeasures have peaked and lost their sting. Furthermore, much of Al Qaeda’s money is

believed to be held not in banks but in untraceable assets such as gold and diamonds, and

some observers have noted that lethal terrorist operations can be relatively inexpensive.

With respect to nation-states, economic sanctions fall into six main categories of restrictions:

trading, technology transfer, foreign assistance, export credits and guarantees, foreign

exchange and capital transactions, and economic access. Sanctions may include a total or

partial trade embargo, an embargo on financial transactions, suspension of foreign aid,

restrictions on aircraft or ship traffic, or abrogation of a friendship, commerce, and navigation

treaty.

Economic Incentives

Economic enticements can arguably play an influential part in the levels of antiterrorism

collaboration so long as nation states are the receivers of such inducements. Moreover,

counterterrorism policy can include efforts to change economic and social conditions that

provide a breeding ground for terrorists. Some have suggested that most terrorists worldwide

are unemployed or underemployed, with virtually nonexistent prospects for economic

advancement. Some analysts believe that targeted assistance programs to reduce poverty and

increase education (which might also include supporting secular educational alternatives to

the Islamic religious schools) can bring stability to weak countries, make a difference in

lifestyles and attitudes, and can diminish the appeal of extremist groups. A further rationale,

some say, is to project a more positive image of the United States in terrorism-prone lands.

Reviewers, though, dispute that cruel economic circumstances are not the sole or even the

main motivational factors driving the surfacing of terrorism, stressing that resentment against

a particular country or political order, and religious fanaticism, also are important

motivations. Osama bin Laden’s large personal fortune and his far-flung business empire

would seem to contradict economic deprivation as explanation of his involvement in

terrorism. Similarly, all of the 15 Saudi Arabian hijackers implicated in the September 11

attacks were from middle-class families or well-connected ones. The Basque Fatherland and

Liberty organization (ETA) in Spain is a relatively well-heeled terrorist organization.

Ambient economic conditions partly explain certain kinds of terrorist behaviour in specific

situations, but political, ideological and religious factors may often be paramount.

Hidden Deeds

Brainpower collecting, access of terrorist groups, and military operations involve a variety of

clandestine or “covert” activities. Much of this activity is of a passive monitoring nature

aimed at determining the intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of terrorist organizations.

An active form of covert activity occurs during events such as a hostage crisis or hijacking,

when a foreign country may quietly request advice, equipment, technical or tactical support,

with no public credit given to the providing country. Covert action may also seek to create or

exploit vulnerabilities of terrorist organizations, for example, by spreading disinformation

about leaders, encouraging defections, promoting divisions between factions, or exploiting

conflicts between organizations. Some nations have periodically resorted to unconventional

methods beyond their territory for the express purpose of neutralizing individual terrorists

and/or thwarting pre-planned attacks.

Paradigms of such methods might run the scope from intercepting or incapacitating the

delivery of funding or weapons to a terrorist group, to destroying a terrorist’s developing

production facilities, to seizing and transporting a wanted terrorist to stand trial for

assassination or murder. Arguably, such activity might be justified as pre-emptive self-

defence under Article 51 of the U.N. charter. On the other hand, it could be argued that such

actions violate customary international law. Assassination is specifically prohibited by U.S.

executive order (most recently, E.O. 12333), but bringing wanted criminals to the United

States for trial is not. There exists established U.S. legal doctrine that allows an individual’s

trial to proceed regardless of whether he has been forcibly abducted from another country,

international waters, or airspace. Experts warn that bringing persons residing abroad to U.S.

justice by means other than extradition or mutual agreement with the host country can vastly

complicate U.S. foreign relations, sometimes jeopardizing interests far more important than

“justice,” deterrence, and the prosecution of a single individual. Notwithstanding the

unpopularity of such abductions in nations that fail to apprehend and prosecute those accused,

the “rendering” of wanted criminals to U.S. courts is permitted under limited circumstances

by a June 21, 1995 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-39). Such conduct, however, raises

prospects of other nations using similar tactics against U.S. citizens