7 x 11.5 long titleassets.cambridge.org/97805215/39746/index/9780521539746_index.pdf582 Author Index Stoker, T. M., 151, 575 Stornetta, S., 576 Strang, Gilbert, 86, 576 Su, Xuanming,

Author Index

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, 494, 502, 509, 561Akerlof, George A., 15, 163, 224, 271, 302,

322, 561Alchian, A., 206, 212, 561Allen, D. A., 7, 561Allen, Franklin, 198, 218, 225, 561Anderson, G. F., 185, 194, 573Anderson, L. R., 436, 561Anderson, R. M., 542, 561Aoki, Masahiko, 206, 561Arrow, Kenneth J., 7, 15, 289, 334, 400, 436,

523, 536, 561–562Ashenfelter, O., 347, 562Attiyeh, G., 450, 562Axelrod, Robert, 55, 69, 562Ayres, Ian, 194, 226, 334, 562, 572

Babcock, L., 18, 563Bailey, E. M., 151, 568, 575Baker, George, 251, 562Balazs, E., 523, 562Balinski, Michel, 487, 494, 562Ballou, Dale, 179, 562Banerjee, A., 221, 562Barbera, S., 409, 562Basu, Kaushik, 44, 562Baumol, W. J., 9, 43, 198, 518, 523, 562Bebchuk, L. A., 218, 220, 224, 229, 231, 563Bernstein, J., 297, 572Bernstein, P., 230, 297, 563Bertrand, M., 226, 229, 230, 563Binmore, K., 44, 51, 69, 86, 97, 333, 563Blair, R. D., 512, 563Borda, J.-C., 394, 399, 563Brams, S. J., 390, 399, 563Brickley, J. A., 218, 220, 222, 230, 563, 568Burns, S., 194, 569

Calvert, R. L., 69, 563Camerer, C. F., 18, 563Cameron, S., 302, 563

Campbell, D. E., 112, 400, 536, 563Carlin, Wendy, 198, 563Carmichael, H. L., 173, 176–177, 231, 564Carr, Jack L., 158, 564Chen, Yan, 465, 494, 509, 564Chiappori, P.-A., 7, 564Chichilnisky, G., 151, 564Chou, Y. K., 18, 564Clarke, E. H., 451, 564Coase, R. H., 151, 430, 564Coles, J. L., 218, 563Comment, Robert, 223, 564Condorcet, Marquis de, 399, 564Conley, J., 112, 564Cook, C., 244, 565Cooter, R. D., 347, 565Corchon, L. C., 465, 565Cornes, R., 436, 565Costa, D. L., 177, 565Cramton, P., 44, 148, 151, 374, 565

d’Aspremont, C., 334, 565Dana, J. D., 259, 565Danilov, V. I., 268, 457, 565Davies, J., 86, 97, 563Debreu, Gerard, 523, 536, 565Demirguc-Kunt, A., 162, 565Demsetz, H. D., 206, 212, 334, 565Dewatripont, Mathias, 162, 163, 565Diamantaris, D., 112, 564Diamond, Peter, 194, 565Dixit, A. K., 251, 565Downs, A., 51, 565Dranove, David, 183, 194, 565Dray, Phillip, 7, 565Dreze, J., 523, 565Dutta, P. K., 194, 223, 565Dyer, D., 381, 565

Easterbrook, F. H., 219, 230, 566Eckard, E. W., 221, 562

579

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580 Author Index

Ehrenberg, R. G., 177, 566Ellerman, A. D., 151, 575Ergin, Haluk, 494, 566

Farber, H. S., 18, 566Farrell, J., 268, 566Fay, S., 165, 566Foley. D., 465, 566Franciosi, R., 450, 562Frank, R. H., 44, 51, 566Freeman, R. B., 227, 566Freixas, Xavier, 279, 566Fried, J. M., 218, 220, 224, 229, 231, 563Friedman, J., 69, 566Fudenberg, D., 69, 566

Gale, Douglas, 198, 218, 225, 479, 494, 561,566

Gerard-Varet, L.-A., 334, 565Gibbard, Alan, 409, 566Gibbons, Robert, 44, 69, 251, 562, 565,

566Gintis, Herbert, 536, 566Goeree, J., 44, 566, 568Green, J. R., 115, 347, 451, 457, 566,

571Gribbin, John, 6, 566Gribbin, Mary, 6, 566Grossman, S. J., 219, 220, 567Groves, T., 451, 457, 567Gruber, J., 182, 567

Hahn, F. H., 566Hall, B. H., 230, 567Hall, B. J., 227, 448, 567Hall, J., 217, 567Hammons, C. W., 522, 567Hansen, L., 565Hansmann, Henry, 219, 567Hanushek, E. A., 179, 567Harrison, B., 230, 567Hart, O., 219, 220, 567Haubrich, Joseph, 217, 567Hausman, W. J., 399, 572Heal, G., 151, 564Heckman, J., 302, 563Hendel, I., 272, 567Herstein, I. N., 115, 567Hicks, J. R., 102, 567Hill, Christopher, 34, 567Hirshleifer, J., 322, 567Hogg, T., 576Holmstrom, B., 220, 228, 251, 347, 567Holt, C. A., 44, 568Hoxby, Caroline M., 179, 568Hsaio, W. C., 182, 568Huberman, G., 176, 568, 576Hurwicz, Leonid, 347, 465, 555–556, 568Hussey, P. S., 185, 194, 573

Illing, G., 372, 568Isaac, M., 450, 562

Jackson, M., 409, 556, 568Jaffee, Dwight, 279, 568Jarrell, G. A., 220, 222, 230, 568Jensen, M. C., 217, 219, 220, 226, 230, 568Joskow, P. L., 151, 568, 575Judson, R. A., 151, 575

Kagel, J. H., 381, 383, 565, 568Kahn, C., 176, 568Kahn, M. A., 542, 561Kandel, E., 206, 568Kane, E. J., 162, 565, 569Kanter, R. M., 230, 569Kaplan, S. N., 220, 228, 567Kaserman, D. L., 512, 563Katzner, D. W., 112, 569Kelly, J. S., 400, 409, 563, 569Kephart, J. O., 576Kerr, S., 148, 151, 565Kirby, K. N., 334, 569Kleiner, M. M., 227, 566Klemperer, Paul, 44, 333, 372, 374, 377, 563,

565, 569Kluh, U., 372, 568Kmietowicz, Zosia, 535, 569Kohler, Heinz, 199, 569Koopmans, T. C., 97, 142, 569Kotlikoff, L. J., 194, 569Kotowitz, Y., 230, 569Krauss, L. M., 8, 569Kreps, D. M., 44, 69, 115, 569Krishna, Vijay, 357, 569Krueger, A. B., 227, 297, 569Kuhn, H. W., 97, 570

Laffont, J.-J., 7, 9, 15, 251, 334, 347, 451, 457,566, 570

Lazear, E. P., 173, 179, 194, 206, 227, 570Lee, D. R., 43, 570Leibenstein, Harvey, 155, 570Leland, H. E., 230, 570Levin, D., 383, 568Levin, Jonathan, 206, 570Levitt, S. D., 194, 562Lichtenberg, F. R., 220, 570Liebman, J., 217, 567Litan, R. E., 162, 570Lizzeri, Alessandro, 272, 567Lowenstein, G., 18, 563Lucking-Reiley, David, 357, 570Lueck, D., 7, 561

Makowski, L., 347, 570Malatesta, P., 223, 571Malkiel, B.G., 221, 228, 571Mann, D. P., 257, 571






Author Index 581

Manne, H. G., 221, 571Martimort, D., 7, 15, 251, 570Mas, A., 227, 569Mas-Colell, A. M. D., 115, 571Maskin, E. S., 69, 268, 333, 383, 409, 556,

566, 571Mathewson, Frank, 158, 564Mayer, Colin, 198, 563McAfee, R. P., 7, 302, 378, 383, 571McConnell, J. J., 226, 571McKelvey, R. D., 38, 571McKenzie, Lionel W., 536, 571McLeod, B. W., 231, 564McMillan, John, 7, 9, 224, 251, 333, 334, 377,

571McPhee, J., 236, 571Megginson, W. L., 333, 571Milgrom, Paul R., 6, 160, 162, 206, 216, 224,

225–226, 244, 312, 333, 347, 377, 522, 569,572

Milleron, J.-C., 465, 572Milnor, J., 115, 567Mirlees, James, 15, 251, 347, 572Mishel, L., 297, 572Mishkin, F. S., 162, 163, 572Moe, Terry, 177, 572Molho, Ian, 272, 322, 572Montero, J. P., 151, 575Moore, J., 556, 572Morgenstern, O., 115, 576Mullainathan, S., 226, 229, 230, 563Murphy, Kevin J., 217, 227, 230, 231, 251,

562, 567, 568, 572Muscarella, C. J., 226, 571Myerson, R. B., 43, 372, 572

Nalebuff, Barry, 194, 226, 334, 572Nasar, Sylvia, 43, 572Netter, J. M., 220, 222, 230, 333, 568, 571Neufeld, J. L., 399, 572Novshek, W., 86, 97, 572

O’Neil, Thomas, 423, 573Olson, Mancur, 251, 572Osborne, M. J., 44, 51, 69, 573Ostrom, E., 560, 573Ostroy, J. M., 347, 570Owings, M., 182, 567

Palfrey, T. R., 38, 571Peranson, E., 499, 574Perry, T., 217, 573Petrosky, Henry, 3, 573Phlips, Louis, 259, 573Podgursky, Michael, 179, 562Postlewaite, A., 556, 573Poundstone, W., 51, 573Prendergast, Canice, 251, 573Prowse, Stephen, 220, 573

Quigley, N. C., 158, 564

Radner, R., 206, 230, 573, 577Rajan, R. G., 227, 573Rapoport, Anatol, 55, 69, 573Rapoport, R. B., 399, 572Rashid, S., 542, 561Reinhardt, U. E., 185, 194, 573Repullo, R., 465, 556, 572, 573Riley, J. G., 302, 322, 372, 567, 573Rob, R., 451, 573Roberts, D. J., 6, 160, 162, 206, 216, 224,

225–226, 244, 312, 347, 465, 522, 569, 572,573

Rochet, J.-C., 279, 566Roemer, J.E., 562Romer, T., 162, 163, 224, 561, 573Rosenthal, Robert, 43, 574Rosovsky, Henry, 177, 574Ross, S., 15, 251, 574Roth, A. E., 333, 479, 494, 499, 512, 574Rothschild, M., 322, 574Rubinstein, A., 69, 574Ryngaert, M., 51, 223, 574

Saari, D. G., 409, 574Salanie, B., 7, 564Samuelson, L., 436, 563Samuelson, P. A., 436, 574Samuelson, W., 69, 268, 372, 573, 574Sandler, T., 436, 565, 574Santiesteban, M., 334, 569Sappington, D. E. M., 9, 155, 251, 574Satterthwaite, Mark A., 409, 574Scherer, F. M., 220, 575Schmalensee, Richard, 151, 568, 575Schmeidler, D., 556, 568Schwartz, J. A., 374, 565Schwert, G. W., 223, 564Scully, G. W., 575Sen, A. K., 397, 399, 516, 522, 523, 565, 575Sen, Arunava, 417, 575Shapley, L. S., 479, 494, 566Sheffrin, S. M., 122, 575Shleifer, Andrei, 214, 218, 220, 223, 230, 575Shoven, J. B., 163, 575Singh, Simon, 257, 575Sjostrom, T., 409, 556, 571Smart, S. B., 163, 575Sonmez, Tayfun, 333, 485, 487, 494, 502, 509,

512, 561, 562, 564, 566, 574, 575Sotomayor, M. A. O., 479, 574Sotskov, A. I., 268, 457, 565Spence, A. Michael, 15, 271, 302, 322, 575Stavins, R. N., 151, 575Stern, S., 173, 575Sternberg, T., 347, 374, 575Stiglitz, Joseph E., 9, 15, 138, 143, 251, 271,

279, 302, 322, 536, 568, 574, 575–576






582 Author Index

Stoker, T. M., 151, 575Stornetta, S., 576Strang, Gilbert, 86, 576Su, Xuanming, 512, 576Sutton, J., 18, 576

Tadelis, Steven, 206, 570Terry, R. L., 218, 563Thaler, R. H., 18, 381, 563, 576Thompson, D. N., 243, 576Tideman, T. N., 451, 576Tirole, Jean, 162, 163, 251, 334, 565, 570, 576Todd, P., 173, 575Truchon, M., 112, 563Tucker, Albert W., 51, 97, 570Tullock, G., 451, 576Turnovsky, S., 565

Ullen. T. S., 347, 565, 576Unver, M. U., 333, 485, 512, 574, 575

Varian, H. R., 259, 576Vickrey, W., 15, 21, 347, 372, 576Vishny, R. W., 218, 220, 223, 230, 575Vives, Xavier, 198, 224, 576Von Neumann, J., 115, 576Votruba, M. E., 512, 576

Waldfogel, J., 163, 575Waldrup, M. M., 347, 576

Waldspurger, C. A., 340, 347, 576Walker, D. I., 218, 220, 224, 229, 231, 563Walker, M., 347, 457, 465, 568, 576Walking, R., 223, 571Weinberg, Samantha, 14, 576Weingast, B. R., 162, 573Weintraub, E. R., 97, 577Weisman, D. L., 9, 155, 574Weiss, A. N., 279, 575, 576Wen, Quan, 69, 577Wheelan, Charles, 13, 184, 214, 523,

577Whinston, A. M. D., 115, 571Whinston, G. C., 334, 569White, Lawrence J., 577White, M. J., 162, 566, 577Williams, S. R., 206, 577Wilson, R., 569Wissink, J. P., 257, 571Woessman, Ludger, 179, 577Wolak, F. A., 228, 577

Xing, X., 494, 574

Zeckhauser, R., 194, 577Zenios, S. A., 512, 576Zenner, M., 217, 573Zhou, Lin, 509, 577Zimbalist, Andrew, 12, 378, 577Zingales, L., 227, 573






Subject Index

abstract models, 7–8accidents, 180, 184, 194, 304–5, 307;

probability of, 131–2, 133, 303, 313.See also insurance

acid rain, 18–22, 327. See also sulfur dioxideadjustment costs, 137, 454; pollution

abatement and, 18–21, 144–6adverse selection, 13, 14–15, 162, 178,

184advertising, 244, 292African Americans, lynching of, 7Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(1978), 165agency problem, 197, 213. See also

principal-agent problemsagency theory, 231–55; basic model, 237–9;

diversification and, 231–2; effort supplyfunction and, 238–9; optimal contract and,237, 239–44; participation constraint and,237; risk-neutral managers, 239–41

agents, 370; in matching problems, 468,472

agricultural reform, in China, 7, 235airplane travel, 3, 13, 34, 180, 258allocations, 26–8, 35–6, 104–5, 328; of

dormitory rooms, 499–510; efficient, 424,426–7, 430, 501–2, 503–5, 507; resource, 12,139–42, 338–9, 454–5, 550. See alsomatching problems

amusement park pricing, 235Anglo-Dutch auction, 374, 377antibiotics, resistance to, 535arbitrage, 227, 265arithmetric progression, 371Arrow-Debreu economy, 523–38, 543, 548;

budget constraint in, 524, 527, 529, 530;endowment and, 524–5; externalities in,533–5; feasibility in, 526–7, 530, 532; profitcalculation in, 526; welfare theorem and,529–31, 534

Arrow-Pratt measure, 124

asset, 11, 112–13, 157, 379, 448, 455;bankruptcy and, 164–5; corporate, 212;value of, 266–8

asset efficiency, 260, 262–3, 264; in auctions,328, 333, 341, 342, 345, 378, 379

assignment problem, 468, 469, 499. See alsomatching problems

asymmetric information, 10–15, 267, 272,285–9, 297–8, 302; encryption and, 257; ininsurance, 312–20, 322; in used-carmarket, 269, 271

athletes and athletics. See sportsAtlantic Salmon Federation, 560atomic bomb research, 6AT&T, 153, 517auctions, 148, 326–34; all-pay, 364;

bargaining in, 331–3; Dutch auction, 329,349, 350, 352–3, 356, 361, 374; efficiencyand, 329–33, 341; English (oral) auction,335, 349–51, 361, 374–5, 377, 383;equilibrium in, 335–7, 353–6, 359, 363–4;expected revenue for, 362–3; generalmechanisms, 344, 345; interdependentvalues, 377–83; multistage, 375; outcomeequivalence in, 351–2; probability in,354–5, 363; procurement, 376, 377; radiospectrum, 327, 333, 372, 374, 375, 377;reservation values in, 326, 330–2; revenueequivalence in, 358–77, 379–80; standardauction mechanism, 359, 375–6; tensignificant, 327–9; winner’s curse in, 380–3.See also first-price, sealed-bid auction;Vickrey auction

Australia, 226, 423automobiles, 5, 48, 214, 225, 280, 340;

auctions of, 377; drunk driving, 8;insurance for, 12, 162, 180, 183, 303–4;repair of, 6; taxis, 16–18, 517; theft of, 186;used-car market, 269–72; Volkswagen, 287,328; warranty for, 138

average cost taxation, 432–3, 464–5

583






584 Subject Index

balance of trade, 140bankruptcy, 164–5, 218, 227, 228banks and banking, 158, 197, 221, 226;

auction of assets, 328, 329, 333–4, 374;savings and loan debacle, 155–63

barbers, and haircut prices and, 258bargaining, 223, 261–3, 265–7, 331–3, 453–7baseball, 12, 40, 378, 381beggar-thy-neighbor policies, 49benefit taxation, 433–6, 446Bethlehem Steel, 165beverage cans, 518bidder signal, 378. See also auctionsbinary choice model, 188, 244, 454boards of directors, 198, 213, 218, 223, 229bonds, 161, 166, 171, 517, 523bonus, 198, 215–16, 217, 222, 225, 230Borda, J.-C., 394Borda (rank order) rule, 394–6borrowing, 155, 164–5, 274–7Boston, 178, 186Boston mechanism, 494British Telecom, 153budget balance, 9, 265, 457, 462budget constraint, 5, 72–3, 521, 522, 547,

560; in Arrow-Debreu economy, 524, 527,529, 530; consumer choice and, 73, 76, 79,80; preferences and, 99; quasi-linear utilityand, 106, 108; retirement and, 171–3;worker contract and, 209

budget surplus, 446, 447bundling, 318; quality and, 280–90;

self-selection constraints and, 285, 286–7burglary, 113; insurance against, 185–6Bush administration, 9buyer-seller relations. See two-person

exchange

Caesarian section, 182calculus, 126, 292, 371–2; overview of, 76–86California, 209, 516Canada, 158, 182, 197, 198capitalist markets, 518capital market, 213, 219–21capital outlay, 515, 535carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, 12, 148, 421.

See also pollutionCardozo Law School, 14cars. See automobilescartels, 49–50, 375casualty insurance companies, 448catastrophe bonds, 517, 523celebrity, 224, 292centipede game, 37–40, 43CEO (chief executive officer), 198, 215, 217,

225, 228, 229; compensation for, 214;golden parachute for, 220, 226; self-dealingby, 223–4. See also owner-managementrelationship

chain rule, 85–6charter schools, 178–79Chicago, 45, 327China, 7, 235, 328, 518–19Chrysler Corporation, 560civil litigation, 340–1, 376coalitions, 399, 447–9Cobb-Douglas utility, 528, 550, 553college admissions, 438, 480–96, 517;

fairness in, 488–90; single-test placement,490–4; stable matching in, 480–2, 492–3;student optimal deferred acceptance(SODA), 481–5, 486, 487, 490, 492–3; testscores and, 486, 487–91, 494

college optimal deferred acceptance(CODA), 483, 485–6, 487, 490, 492–4,499

colleges and universities, 291; dormitoryroom allocation, 499–510; tenure andperformance of professors, 174–6

collusion, 377command-and-control regulation, 5, 143common property, 556–60. See also public

goodscommon values, 334–5, 377–9, 380community benefit, 423, 556–7. See also

social welfarecommunity wealth, 132–3compensation, 214, 249, 291; agency theory

and, 232, 237, 239–40; golden parachutes,220, 226; pay-for-performance, 177–9;performance bonus, 198, 215–16, 217, 222,230; piece rates, 226, 236–7; retirementand, 166, 167, 170–1; stock options,216–19, 224, 227. See also wages

competition, 153, 178, 179, 339, 514–23; ininsurance market, 130–3, 303–24; marketresponsiveness, 516–18; in productmarket, 215; reputation and, 6, 515–16;social benefits of, 50

competitive equilibrium, 338–9, 428–31, 433,524, 528, 531–3; efficiency and, 543, 545–6;nonconvex economies and, 538–42. Seealso Arrow-Debreu economy; equilibrium

composite commodity theorem, 98–102compromise, 392–3computers, 297, 340, 347confessions, prisoner dilemma and, 45–6constrained maximization, 75–6, 80–1, 86,

88, 243–4constrained optimization, 339–40constraints, 10, 86–7, 88, 455; resource, 455;

self-selection, 285, 286–7, 288, 296, 300,315–16. See also budget constraint;participation constraint

consumer, 5, 48, 287–9, 423, 520–1; franchisestandards and, 244; surplus and, 108–12,259; warranties and, 257, 515; welfare of,11, 148, 153, 154






Subject Index 585

consumer choice/preference, 73, 87,107, 285, 292; in auctions, 332–3; chainrule and, 86; maximization and, 76, 79;monopolists and, 280–3; nonnegativeconsumption and, 81–2; tangencyand, 85

consumption plan, 139–42, 172, 528, 538–40,545

continuum dilemma, 62–4, 122continuum of effort supply, 190contracts, 7, 47, 186, 213, 237, 340–1;

doctor-hospital, 496, 498; insurance, 164,165, 232, 303, 307–9, 310, 314–15; manager,216, 218, 238, 239–44, 247–8; up-or-out,174, 176; worker, 167, 208–9, 235–7

cooperation: in cartels, 49–50; equilibriumtheories and, 46–7, 55, 56–8, 66, 69

copayment, 183corporations: assets of, 212; hostile takeovers

and, 50–1; international overview, 197–8.See also partnership; shareholders

cost minimization, 521Cowie, Tyler, 517credit rationing, 272–80; borrower and,

274–7; lender and, 277–9crime, 1, 14, 185–6, 422–3Cuba, 199currency devaluation, 49Czechoslovakia, 516Czech Republic, 329

dead hand pills, 223decentralization, 34, 140, 225decision making, 385; uncertainty and,

112–24; unilateral, 432, 440, 450. See alsopreference revelation; voting schemes

deductibles, 183deferred acceptance algorithm (DAA), 472–6,

479demand, 80, 182; price-taking behavior and,

545–8, 554–6; quasi-linear utility and,106–7, 109–11

democracy, 14, 402, 516deposit insurance, 155–6, 158, 162Depository Institutions Act (1982), 155, 158,

162deregulation, 156–7, 329. See also regulationdictatorial rule, 391–2, 405, 412, 414, 416, 549dilution provision, 220, 223disarmament, 49Walt Disney Corporation, 216, 223diversification, benefits of, 231–2division of a cake, 26–8, 35–6. See also

allocationsDNA testing, 14doctors/physicians, 7, 182, 185, 535;

matched with hospitals, 496–9dominant strategy, 34, 419; equilibrium,

31–2, 260–6, 458–61, 544–5; in prisoner’s

dilemma, 46, 47, 54; truthful revelation as,345, 443, 446–7, 450, 458, 503, 506

dormitory room allocation, 499–510Dresher, M., 51drug-resistant microbes, 535drunk driving, 8Dutch auction, 329, 349, 350, 352–3, 356, 361,

374DWG (firm), 223

Earth Day (Central Park), 432Eastern Europe, 329, 516East Germany, 214, 516economic sanctions, 47–8economies of scale, 10The Economist, 9, 35, 46, 48, 184, 186, 223education and training, 166, 291, 292–5,

296–7, 302. See also public schools;colleges and universities

efficiency/efficient outcome, 23–30, 422, 535,548, 559; in allocations, 26–8, 139–40;asset, 260, 262–3, 264, 333, 341, 342, 378,379; in auctions, 329–33, 346; ofcompetitive equilibrium, 321–2; dominantstrategy equilibrium and, 458–61;economic system design, 519–20; fairnessand, 24, 379, 489; incentive compatibilityand, 457–66, 543–6; in insurance markets,132–3, 134, 179; of majority rule, 389;mandatory retirement and, 166–7, 168; inmatching, 468, 471; in publicgoods/projects, 424–8, 430, 442, 455–6,457–66; quasi-linear utility and, 103–5; inroom allocations, 501–2, 503–5, 507;Samuelson efficiency condition, 427–8,430–1, 432, 434–5, 449, 459; takeovers and,220. See also asset efficiency

effort supply function, 238–9Eisner, Michael J., 216, 223electric utilities, 18, 144–5, 179–80, 281, 327,

329; arbitrage and, 227–8Electrofax, 258encryption, 257English Crown, 430English (oral) auction, 335, 349–51, 361,

374–5, 377, 383Enron, 224, 227–8Environmental Protection Agency, 49, 327–8environments (scenarios), 548, 550equilibrium, 30–40, 170, 268; Arrow-Debreu

economy, 523–38; asymmetricinformation, 285–9, 302, 312–20; inauctions, 335–7, 353–6, 359, 363–4;centipede game, 37–40; dominant strategy,31–2, 260–6, 458–61, 544–5; efficiency of,321–2; full information, 283–4, 297–8,309–12; insurance and, 131, 307–9; in labormarket, 294–6, 297–302; in partnerships,202; pollution rights and, 146, 147; pooling






586 Subject Index

equilibrium (cont.)equilibria, 294–5, 298–9, 312, 314;repetition and, 53–70; in resourceallocation, 139–42; separating equilibria,294, 295–6, 299–302, 313, 316. See alsocompetitive equilibrium; Nashequilibrium

equity insurance, 181. See also fairnessEurope, 182, 230, 327, 328, 372, 377European Union, 214, 329exchange economy, 524, 525, 529–31, 544–5;

nonconvex, 538–42. See also two-personexchange

expected monetary value (EMV), 112–13,116, 117–19, 128–9, 249, 274

expected utility, 114, 249, 266, 500, 502extensive form (of a game), 41externalities, 421, 533–5

fairness, 24, 379, 488–90fair odds, 120–1, 123–4, 128, 129–30, 193–4famine, food distribution and, 516Faroe Islands, 560feasibility/feasible outcome, 25, 389, 463,

526–7, 530, 532.Federal Reserve, 158fertilizer plant, 214FHLBB, 158, 160Field Museum of Natural History, 327fire and panic, 45fire insurance, 184–5Firestone Tires, 227first-price, sealed-bid auction, 349, 352–6,

374, 377, 381, 383; misrepresentation in,365–7; revenue equivalence and, 359–60,361, 362–3, 364

fishing, 556–9, 560Flood, M., 51Ford, Henry, 224–5Ford Motor Company, 224–5France, 197, 198, 329franchises, 12, 218–19, 232, 243, 244, 341fraud, 162, 224free market economies, 518free-rider problem, 220, 229FSLIC (Federal Savings and Loan

Corporation), 157, 159, 160full information equilbrium, 283–4, 297–8,

309–12

GAAP (generally accepted accountingpractices), 228

“gambling for resurrection,” 157–61GBM. See Groves bargaining mechanismGeneral Motors, 225General Tire, 225Germany, 197, 198, 214, 328, 374Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, 391, 396,

404–11, 422; general proof of, 411–18;

pivotal mechanism and, 450–3; strategyproofness of, 404–9, 419

Glass-Steagall Act (1999), 197global maximum, 73–4, 83, 460global warming, 12, 454golden parachutes, 220, 226Google, IPO of, 329government, 288–9, 321–2, 448, 560; auction

by, 326, 328, 330, 334; economic modeland, 423, 430

government regulation. See regulationGPA (grade point average), 501, 557Great Britain, 197, 198, 327, 328, 329Greenland, 560greenmail, 223grim trigger strategy, 56–7, 59–60, 63–4Groves bargaining mechanism (GBM),

261–3, 265–66, 453–7

H. J. Heinz corporation, 222haircut prices, 258Hammer, Armand, 224WR Hambrecht & Co., 329health care, 515health insurance, 182–4, 185, 232hidden action, 10, 13, 136–95, 236, 448; in

corporations, 197; mandatory retirement,165–74; pollution rights, 143–52; resourceallocation, 139–42; savings and loandebacle, 155–63; telecommunicationsregulation, 152–5

hidden characteristics, 11–13, 137, 256–324,331, 421, 514; in auctions, 326, 328; creditrationing, 272–80; price discrimination,257–9; in product quality and bundling,280–90; retirement and, 167; in two-personexchange, 259–69; used-car problem,269–72. See also signaling, in job market;insurance markets

hidden information, 11, 13, 137, 236, 257,514, 536, 552. See also asymmetricinformation

HMOs (health maintenance organizations),185, 194

Hollywood film industry, 186home mortgages, 155, 156, 164, 167homeowners insurance, 180, 181, 185–6,

194homestead exemption, 164–5Hope Scholarships, 13hospitals, 182, 183; doctors and, 496–9household endowment, 526household preferences, 423House of Representatives, U.S., 390housing construction, 515–16Hurwicz-Schmeidler theorem, 549

IBM punch cards, 259implementation, 551






Subject Index 587

impossibility theorem, 459incentive compatibility, 141, 260, 263–4, 315;

in auctions, 336, 343–4; constraints, 285,296, 300, 458–9, 460, 461; efficiency and,457–66, 543–6. See also self-selectionconstraints

income, 106, 108, 172–3. See alsocompensation; wages

India, fertilizer plant in, 214indifference curve, 84–5, 253, 305, 519–20,

545–6, 550–1individual preference, 9, 113, 385, 433; in

partnership, 200; ranking of, 389, 394–6,402. See also consumer choice; preferencerevelation

individual rights, 469individual security, 61individual strategy, 41, 53individual welfare, 2, 3–4; social cost pricing

and, 4. See also self-interestIndonesia, 4information: asymmetric, 10–15, 267, 272,

285–9, 297–8, 302, 312–20, 322; fullinformation equilibrium, 283–4, 297–8,309–12; inside, 4–5; transmission of, 2, 5–6,141, 229. See also hidden information

Innocence Project (Cardozo Law School), 14innovation, 209, 535; competition and, 153,

516–18insider trading, 221–2insurance, 12, 14–15, 120, 124–35;

asymmetric information and, 312–20, 322;automobile, 12, 162, 180, 183, 303–4;catastrophe, 517; competitive markets,130–3, 303–24; contracts, 164, 165, 232,303, 307–9, 310, 314–15; efficiency in,132–3, 134; effort supply continuum, 189,190–4; fair odds in, 121, 128, 129–30, 193–4;formal model, 186–8; full information,309–12; health, 182–4, 185, 232;homeowners, 180, 181, 185–6, 194;incomplete, 192–3; individual variablesand parameters, 187, 306; legal-defense,14–15; model, 303–7; moral hazard and,179–95, 312; policy, 308; preventive careand, 179, 180–1, 182, 187–8, 190; riskaversion and, 119

interdependent values, 377–83interest rates, 165, 171, 517; credit rationing

and, 272–3, 274, 275–8; savings and loandebacle and, 156, 157, 161, 163

Internet auctions, 328, 329, 349, 377investment, 120. See also shareholdersinvestment banks, 329, 333–4invisible hand, 33–4IPO (initial public offering), 329Iraq, 9; economic sanctions against, 47–8Israel, 34, 35Italy, 224

Japan, 8, 197, 198, 230, 328Johnson, E. Ross, 224joint ventures, 36

Keating, Charles H., 163kidney transplants, 328, 510–12Korean conglomerates, 224Kuhn-Tucker multiplier, 97, 339–40. See also

Lagrangian multiplier

labor costs, 535. See also wageslabor market signaling, 5, 290–303; education

and, 291, 292–5, 296–7, 302; equilibria and,294–6, 297–302. See also workers

Lagrangian multiplier, 86–97, 339–40; linearfunctions, 89–96; planning and, 87–8;Pythagorean theorem and, 91, 96–8

large numbers, law of, 306Latin America, loans to, 158legal-defense insurance, 14–15legal profession, 175legal system, 214–15. See also litigationleisure consumption, 7, 233, 243, 292, 526;

opportunity costs and, 207–8; inpartnerships, 202, 203, 205, 209;retirement and, 166, 168, 169

lender, credit and, 277–9. See also loansLeontief utility, 102, 550, 552licensing fees, 218–19limited liability corporation, 212Lindahl equilibrium, 465linear functions, 89–96. See also quasi–linear

utilitylinear pricing schedule, 280linear taxi fares, 16–18litigation, 376; tort damages, 340–1loans, 13, 158, 162; credit rationing,

272–80; home mortgages, 155, 156, 164,167

loop, in algorithms, 506, 507, 511, 512looting, 162lynching of African Americans, 7

maintenance, 515–16majority rule, 386–91, 397–9, 400, 402manager, 328; contracts for, 216, 218, 238,

239–44, 247–8; incentive for, 216–19,231–2; profit maximization and, 341; asresidual claimant, 137, 207, 208, 218, 235,244, 251, 341; risk aversion and, 231,244–54. See also agency theory; CEOs;owner-manager relationship

Mandarins, in China, 519mandatory retirement, 165–74; formal

argument, 167–71; intertemporal budgetconstraint, 171–3

manipulation, 404, 447–8, 469; of voting, 391,392, 398–9

Mannesman (firm), 374






588 Subject Index

marginal rate of substitution (MRS), 84–5,107, 139, 202, 305, 313–14, 339, 514;Arrow-Debreu economy and, 520–1,529, 531; in nonconvex economies, 538–41

market: capital, 213, 219–21; completenessof, 531; discipline in, 229; mechanism, 448;opportunity in, 119–20, 127. See alsoArrow-Debreu economy

marriage model, 468, 469–70, 484. See alsomatching, stable

matching, 467–512; college admissions,480–96; deferred acceptance algorithym(DAA), 472–6, 479; dormitory roomallocation, 499–510; hospital-doctor,496–9; kidney transplants, 510–12;marriage model, 468, 469–70, 484;one-sided, 499; optimality theorem, 475,485; preference ordering in, 475, 477–8,482, 485, 493–94, 496, 506; stable, 470–1,475, 476–7, 478, 480–2, 492–3, 496–7;student-advisor, 469–80

material feasibility condition, 526–7maximization, 100, 450; constrained, 75–6,

80–1, 86, 88, 243; global, 73–4, 83, 460; ofquadratic, 72–6; unconstrained, 72–5,76–8. See also profit maximization

maximum incentive, for managers, 231–2medical malpractice, 212Mexico, 158minimization, 84, 521misrepresentation, 365–7, 491, 497–8, 543–4,

547monitoring costs, 210, 229monopolies, 153, 329, 330, 334, 430; price

discrimination and, 258–9, 280–1; profitmaximization and, 282–3, 285–6;telecommunications, 517

monotonic preferences, 26moral hazard, 13, 177–8; binary choice

model, 188–90; formal model, 186–8;insurance and, 179–95, 312

movie producers, insurance and, 186mutual funds, 230

naive mechanism, 18, 21naked call options, 160Nash equilibrium, 32–3, 36, 54–5, 355, 383,

432, 458, 548; benefit taxation and, 435;centipede game and, 38–9; exchangemechanism and, 266–8; grim triggerstrategy and, 56–7, 63; in partnerships,205–6; rationality assumption and, 39, 55,64; subgame-perfect, 40–4, 60, 62, 549–53;Walker mechanism and, 461–5

National Education Association (NEA), 177,178, 179

National Intern Matching Program (NIMP),497, 499

nonconvex economies, 538–42nonimposition, 409normal form (of a game), 40

O’Brien, Ken, 251oil industry, 47, 48, 157, 224, 226, 328;

auctions in, 378, 380, 381opportunity costs, 207–8, 521optimality theorem, 475, 484, 485. See also

efficiencyoptimization, constrained, 339–40oral auction. See English (oral) auctionowner-employee relationship, 199, 207–12owner-manager relationship, 212–31,

331, 559–60; capital market and, 213,219–21; manager discipline in, 213–14;managerial shirking, 222–7; performancebonuses, 215–16, 217,222, 230. See also agency theory; managers

ownership shares, 36, 197–8. See alsoshareholders

participation constraint, 260, 262, 265–6,282, 286, 461; in auctions, 342, 345–6;dominant strategy equilibrium and, 458–9,460; in room assignment, 500

partnership, 174, 198–207, 209, 212, 228;dissolving of, 35–7, 265; leisureconsumption in, 202, 203, 205, 209; model,199–200; reputation and interactions,204–5; two-person, 202–4

pay-for-performance, teachers’, 177–9performance bonus, 198, 215–16, 217, 222,

230physicians. See doctors/physicianspiece rates, 226, 236–7pivotal mechanism, 341, 440–53; continuum

of options, 449–50; defects of, 446–9;Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and,450–3; surtax imposed by, 442, 443–7;theorem proof, 444–6

plurality rule, 393–4poison pill, 223Poland, 328, 516Polaroid Corporation, 259policy options, 402–3pollution, 4, 18–22, 48–9, 516, 535; CO2

emissions, 12, 148, 421; marketable rights,143–54; profit maximization and, 146–50

pollution permits, 327–8pooling equilibrium, 294–5, 298–9, 312, 314Posner, Victor, 223power sharing, 392preference revelation, 396–418, 423, 461;

dictatorial rule, 391–2, 405, 412, 414, 416,549; in general, 402–11;Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, 404–11;principle of, 418–19; social choice rule,






Subject Index 589

403–4, 405, 410, 418, 419; strategyproofness and, 404–6, 413, 415, 419;unanimity lemma, 406–7, 412, 413;value-restricted, 396–9. See also truthfulrevelation

preferences: in matching problems, 475, 477,482, 485, 493–4, 496, 506;misrepresentation of, 497–8, 543–4, 547;ordering of, 389, 394–6; quasi-linear,102–12, 424, 426, 450–1, 458;self-regarding, 26, 531; voting schemes,385–401. See also consumerchoice/preferences

President’s Council of Economic Advisors,157

preventive care, 179, 180–1, 182, 187–8, 190price discrimination, 257–9, 280, 281prices, 5, 524, 544, 547; cap regulation, 153–5;

competition, 156; manipulation of, 514;stock repricing, 216–17. See also social costpricing

price taking, 545–8, 554–6principal-agent problem, 6, 10–11, 12–13,

17, 137, 176, 232–3. See also agency theoryprisoner’s dilemma, 32, 33, 42, 45–53, 161–2,

432; examples of, 47–51, 64–9;infinitely-repeated, 55–6, 60; repeated,with terminal date, 54–5

private goods, 142, 404, 536; public goodsand, 421–2, 424, 428, 429, 441, 449, 460

private information, 11, 448. See also hiddeninformation

private ownership, 339, 521, 543private values, 334–5, 378–9privatization, 328–9probability, 121–2, 306, 447; in auctions,

354–5, 363, 382; insurance and, 187, 313procurement auction, 376, 377production, 525, 535productivity, 176; education and, 293, 295,

296–7product markets, 214, 215professionals, 177–8, 202, 212professors: research and, 174, 176, 177; as

student advisors, 468, 469–79; tenure and,174–6

profit maximization, 282–3, 315, 515, 521–2;agency theory and, 233–4, 239–40, 249–50;feasibility and, 527; informationequilibrium and, 283, 285–7;owner-manager relations and, 213, 219,222, 226, 230, 341; pollution abatementand, 146–50

progressive piece rates, 236–7property rights, 518, 560public goods/projects, 9, 420–66, 536;

auction of, 328–9; competitive marketequilibrium, 428–31; continuum of, 423–4;

economic model and, 422–40; efficiencyin, 424–8, 430, 442, 455–6, 457–65; Grovesmechanism and, 453–7; pivotalmechanism and, 440–53; private goodsand, 421–2, 424, 428, 429, 441, 449, 536;pure, 421–2, 536; Samuelson efficiencycondition and, 427–8, 430–1, 432, 435;taxation and, 432–6, 442, 443–7, 453–4,456, 464–5; voluntary contributions, 431–2

public opinion, 48public school, 177–9, 390, 494publishing, 176, 287purchasing power, 172Pythagorean theorem, 91, 96–8

quadratic, maximizing of, 72–6quadratic profit functions, 149–50quality, 6, 175, 244, 290, 292, 515; bundling

and, 280–90; information equilibrium and,283–9; self-selection constraints and, 285,286–7, 288; in used-car market, 270, 271

quasi-linear preferences, 102–12, 342, 424,426, 450–1, 458; consumer surplus and,108–12; demand and, 106–7; efficiencyand, 103–5

quotas, for fishing, 560

radio spectrum auction, 327, 333, 372, 374,375, 377

RAND corporation, 183random effects, 6, 137–8, 502rank order voting, 394–6rate of technical substitution (RTS), 521rationality assumption, 39, 55, 64rationing, 141regulation, 4–5, 33, 516, 559; deregulation,

156–7, 329; managerial, 213–14; of savingsand loans, 156–7, 158, 161–2; oftelecommunications industry, 152–5

repetition, equilibrium and, 53–70reputation, 6, 204–5, 515–16research, 174, 176, 177research and development (R&D), 198, 225,

230reservation values, 260–4, 269, 270, 326,

330–2, 350–1; private vs. common values,334–5; revenue equivalence and, 361–3,365, 366–70; in Vickrey auctions, 334–5,336, 342, 440–1

residual claimant, manager as, 137, 207, 208,218, 235, 244, 251, 341

resource allocation, 12, 139–42, 454–5, 550;in Vickrey auction, 338–9

resources: common property, 556–60;utilization, 89

responsibility system, 7retaliation strategy, 34–5retirement. See mandatory retirement






590 Subject Index

revelation principle, 418–19. See alsopreference revelation; truthful revelation

revenue equivalence, in auctions, 358–77,379–80; applications of, 374–7;equilibrium payoffs, 363–4; integralcalculus proof, 371–2; proof of, 365–71;theorem, 359–60, 380

risk, 14; degree of, 274; excessive, 226;insurance and, 183–4, 303–4, 312. See alsoinsurance

risk aversion, 117–18, 125, 212, 305; inmanagers, 231, 244–51; negative secondderivative and, 118–19

risk neutrality, 117–18, 137; managerial, 235,239–41, 242, 243, 244, 252–4

risky assets, 113risky investments, 157–61RJR Nabisco, 224room assignment problems, 499–510royalty payments, 244Russia, 224, 329, 516

Safelite Glass Corporation, 226sales receipts, 14salmon fishing, 560Salomon Brothers (firm), 225Samuelson efficiency condition, 427–8,

430–1, 432, 434–5, 449, 459savings and loan crisis, 155–63; risky

investments and, 157–61; zombieinstitutions, 157–8, 160

Scholes, Myron, 225schools. See education and training; public

schoolssealed-bid auction, 121, 349, 353–6, 359, 363,

374, 377, 379–80. See also first price, sealedbid auction

second-order condition, 426second-price auction. See Vickrey auctionSecurities and Exchange Commission, U.S.,

221self-dealing, by managers, 223–5self-interest, 2, 6–7, 8, 33–4, 331, 432;

prisoner’s dilemma and, 32, 46; in shirking,3, 17

self-regarding preferences, 26, 531self-selection constraints, 285, 286–7, 288,

296, 300, 315–16separating equilibrium, 294, 295–6, 299–302,

313, 316serial choice: with guarantee (SCG), 504–10,

511, 512; with no guarantee (SCNG), 500–4serial choice algorithm (SCA), 487, 488,

490–4sharecropping, 137–8shareholders, 197–8, 212–13, 225, 543;

dilution provision and, 220; insider tradingand, 221–2; managers and, 214, 215, 217,

218, 232; shirking and, 224, 228–30;takeovers and, 50–1, 222

shirking, 3, 16, 17, 138, 166–7, 212, 244;managerial, 222–30; by workers, 236

signaling, 270; in auctions, 378, 380;education and, 291, 292–5, 296–7, 302; injob market, 290–303; wages and, 5, 291,294, 299–302

Silicon Valley (California), 209single-test placement, 490–4Sloane, Alfred P., 225Smith, Adam, 33, 43social benefits, 186, 535. See also public

goods; social welfaresocial choice rule, 402, 403–4, 410, 418, 451,

551, 553; strategy-proof, 404, 405, 414, 419social cost, 182, 183, 291social cost pricing, 4, 7, 89, 96, 166, 534–5;

Groves mechanisms and, 453, 456; publicgoods and, 440, 446, 449, 514; in Vickreyauction, 337–41, 345

social welfare, 12, 50, 96, 142, 161, 558Southwestern Bell, 333Soviet Union, 6, 222, 329, 516. See also RussiaSpain, 327spectrum auction. See radio spectrum

auctionspillover benefit, 2, 421, 428, 431, 448, 535sports, 175, 251, 340, 518; baseball, 12, 40,

378, 381stable matching. See under student matchingStalin, Joseph, 7standard auction mechanism, 359, 375–6standards, in franchises, 244status quo, in voting schemes, 390–1, 402,

454stock options, 216–19, 224, 227, 228strategy, 34–5, 40, 41, 53; grim trigger, 56–7,

59–60; tit-for-tat, 55, 58–9, 64–5, 68. Seealso dominant strategy

strategy proofness, 404–9, 413, 415, 419, 476;in room allocations, 503, 506

strictly concave functions, 82–4student loans program, 13student matching: acceptability in, 472–6,

480; college admissions, 480–96; dormitoryroom allocation, 499–510; marriage modeland, 469–70; placement model, 486–7;stable matching, 470–1, 475, 476–7, 478,480–2, 492–3, 496–7; student-advisor,469–79. See also colleges and universities

student optimal deferred acceptance(SODA), 481–5, 486, 487, 490, 492–3, 499

subgame, 42. See also Nash equilibrium,sub-game perfect

suicide, insurance and, 181, 312sulphur dioxide (SO2), 18–22, 144–52, 327–8.

See also pollution






Subject Index 591

surtax, 442, 443–7, 453–4, 456Sweden, 327Switzerland, 327

take-it-or-leave-it offer, 267–8, 284, 327takeovers, 214, 219–20, 560; hostile, 50–1,

213, 219, 222–3, 229tangency approach, 84–5taxation, 15, 243, 341, 430; average cost,

432–3, 464–5; benefit, 433–6, 446; Grovesmechanism and, 453–4, 456; pivotalmechanism surtax, 442, 443–7

taxis, 16–18, 517teachers: college professors, 174–6, 468,

469–79; in public schools, 177–9teamwork, 199technology: innovation and, 209, 298;

investment in, 535; standards for, 375–6telecommunications, 152–5, 333, 375, 517television, 6, 144, 378, 516, 518tenure, for professors, 174–6terrorists, harboring of, 35tit-for-tat strategy, 55, 58–9, 64–5, 68T-Mobil, 374tort damages, 340–1total derivative, 85trade embargo, 47–8transfer payments, 461, 462–3T-Rex skeleton auction, 327truthful revelation, 9, 261–2, 398, 402, 422,

440; in auctions, 326; as dominant strategy,345, 443, 446–7, 450, 458, 503, 506; inmatching problems, 478, 485, 503; taxthreat and, 434–5, 445, 453; Vickreymechanism and, 19–21; in voting, 391. Seealso preference revelation

Turkey, 487two-person exchange, 259–69; dominant

strategy equilibrium and, 260–6; Grovesbargaining mechanism, 261–3, 265–6

unanimity lemma, 406–7, 412, 413uncertainty, 138; decision making and,

112–24unemployment insurance, 13–14uniform probability distribution, 121–2,

354–5unilateral decisiveness, 432, 440, 450unique majority winner, 397–9United Kingdom, 197, 226, 499United Nations, Iraq and, 47, 48United States, 34, 197–8, 214, 215, 230, 329;

Congress of, 156, 158, 161–2; DefenseDepartment, 143; Department of Interior,378; health care in, 182, 185, 194; House ofRepresentatives, 390; takeovers in, 220

universities. See colleges and universitiesup-or-out contract, 174, 176used-car market, 269–72utility function, 100, 111, 503, 521, 522. See

also expected utility; quasi-linearperferences

utility-of-wealth function, 113, 114, 118,122–3, 305; insurance and, 125, 126–7,128–9; marginal, 116, 117

value-restricted preferences, 36–7, 396–9values, interdependent, 377–83veto power, 393Vickrey auction, 334–49; constrained

optimization in, 339–40; direct auctionmechanism, 342, 345; English auctioncompared, 350–1; equilibrium bids in,335–7; resource allocation in, 338–9;revenue equivalence in, 361, 362–3; socialcost pricing and, 337–41, 345, 440–1;uniqueness of, 342–5

Vickrey mechanism, 19–21, 22Volkswagen, 287, 328voluntary contributions, 431–2voting schemes, 385–401; compromise in,

392–3; dictatorial, 391–2, 405; majorityrule, 386–91, 397–9, 400, 402; manipulationin, 391, 392, 398–9; plurality, 393–4; powersharing, 392; rank order, 394–6; status quoin, 390–1; variable numbers in, 387–92. Seealso preference revelation

voucher auction, 329voucher system, for schools, 178–79

wages, 166, 209, 226, 535; signaling and, 5,291, 294, 297–302. See also compensation

Walker mechanism, 461–5Wall Street, 227, 228warranty, 5–6, 138, 257, 515–16Washington Post, 13wealth, 187, 228, 304. See also

utility-of-wealth functionwelfare theorem, 529–31, 534Western Europe, 214. See also Europewinner’s curse, in auctions, 380–3worker contracts, 167, 208–9, 235–7workers, 235–7; job-market signaling,

290–303; mandatory retirement, 165–74;motivation of, 226–7; owner-employeerelationship, 207–12

World Health Organization, 535

Xerox Corporation, 258, 259, 340

zero-profit conditions, 308–9, 312, 313, 316zeroth good, 98






Documents

7 x 11.5 long titleassets.cambridge.org/97805215/39746/index/9780521539746_index.pdf582 Author Index Stoker, T. M., 151, 575 Stornetta, S., 576 Strang, Gilbert, 86, 576 Su, Xuanming,