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Philosophy of Science Association

Social Life and Social Science: The Significance of the Naturalist/Intentionalist DisputeAuthor(s): Nancy C. M. HartsockSource: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,Vol. 1980, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1980), pp. 325-345Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192597

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Social

Life and

Social

Science:

The

Significance

of the

Naturalist/Intentionalist

Dispute1

Nancy

C. M. Hartsock

The

Johns

Hopkins

University

1.

Introduction

In

recent

years,

historicist

understandings

of

science

have

come

to

prominence

in

philosophy

of

science

and

philosophy

of

social science.

These

approaches

have

been credited with

putting

forward a

persuasive

case that

social

scientific

theories,

like

societies,

are themselves

historical

entities.

(Laudan

1979,

p.

43;

McMullin

1979, p.

57).

Historicist

studies have

forced

a

re-evaluation of

a

number

of

important

issues,

among

them the

question

of

how

methodologies

are

to

be eval-

uated,

and

questions

about

how

the relation

of

theory

to

observation is

to be

understood.

(Laudan

1979,

pp.

47-48).

Despite

their

successes, however,

historicist

approaches

fail

in

two

important

ways:

1)

they

are

unable

to solve

the

problems

posed

by

meth-

odological

relativism,

and

2)

they

fail to

go

beyond

treating

theories

as

personages

to the

important

questions

of

how

these

theories

arise

from

particular

social

structures.

Historicist

arguments

of

theorists

such as

Kuhn or

Feyerabend

lead toward

relativism since

by

treating

scientific

rationality

as

radically

context-dependent,

they

are left

with

no

firm

foundation

for

evaluating

one

context

against

another. An

extension of

what one

critic

has

termed the starkest form

of

this

position

holds

that

each scientist is

thus

in

a

radically

singular

historical

situation;

he

has

(it

would

seem)

no

methodological

norms

from

the

past

on

which he can

rely.

He knows that

prejudice

has served

in

the

past

where

precept failed, that since argument can easily be a

'hindrance to

progress',

reliance on

'interests,

forces,

propaganda

and

brainwashing

techniques'

may

serve

him better.

(McMullin

1979,

p.

73

quoting

Feyerabend 1975,

pp.

24-5).

McMullin

asks, But

what

is

to

guide

the

scientist in

such

cases?

(McMullin

1979,

p.

73).

One

impact

of

historicist

arguments, then,

has

been

to

emphasize

the

inadequacy

of

intra-scientific

standards for

research

while at the same

time

failing

t

indicate

extra-scientific

standards

which

might

be

appro-

priate.

PSA

1980,

Volume

2,

pp.

325-345

Copyright

Q

1981

by

the

Philosophy

of Science

Association



326

Second,

the

historicist

case as

usually

presented

treats theories as

historical

entities,

or

personages ,

but much less often

examines

them

with

a

view to

understanding

the

ways they

are

infused

with

and struc-

tured

by

the social life and social values of a

particular

society.

(Laudan

1979,

p.

43,

and

McMullin

1979, p.

57

both

fall into this

difficulty.)

I

hold,

however,

that the

more

interesting

question

is

the

latter,

a

response

to

which would

require

attention

to the

social

institutions and

history

which form the milieu in which

scientific

interests and theories are

formulated, diffused,

and

evaluated. Atten-

tion

to the

history

of

theories

is

no

substitute

for attention

to

their

pre-history,

to

the social

conditions which make some ideas

plausible

and

others

implausible,

the

conditions which

enable

some

theories

to

make it

and

prevent

others from

doing

so.

Giving

attention

only

to

the

historical

existence

of

the

theory

provides

an

incomplete

account

of

its

historicity,

and

leaves

many

important

questions.unanswered.

My

point

here

is

not to

argue

that

because historicist

understandings

of

philosophy

of

social

science

are,

as

presently

formulated, important-

ly

flawed,

they

should be abandoned.

Rather,

what

is

necessary

to

over-

come

the

difficulties is

a

more

radically

historicist

understanding

of

social

theories

and

social

science. In

particular

I will

suggest

that

the

older historicist tradition

represented

by

Marxist

theory

can

contribute

importantly

to a

historicist

understanding

of

scientific

theories

in

the social sciences

in

a

way

which avoids both

the

problems

posed

by

relativism and

the

problems

which result

from

ignoring

the

pre-history

of

theories.

The rest of

my

argument will be devoted to demonstrating the utility

of

this more

radically

historicist

approach

by

re-examining

the

debate

about whether

the

social sciences and

natural

sciences share

a

unity

of

method

or

are

deeply

incommensurable.

I

hope

to

demonstrate

that

the

series

of

opposed

assumptions adopted

by

both

sides

in this debate

are

not

only

remarkably complementary

but

also bear

an

intriguing

relation

to

some

of

the most

fundamental institutions

structuring

social

life.

Moreover,

I

will

argue,

attention to the

shape

of

social

life allows

for

an

accurate

prediction

of

both the

positions

each

side

in the

debate

can be

expected

to

take,and

of

the

underlying

coherence

of

the

conflicting

claims.

I am

suggesting,

then,

that social

scientific

theories

should be understood

not

only

as

historical

entities,

but

also

that these theories, born as

they

are in the context of the life of a

society,

can be

expected

to

replicate

some

of

the

most

important

aspects

of

that life.

In

addition,

if

one

more

explicitly

understands

social

theory

in the context

of

social

life

as a

whole,

one can

lay

the

basis

for

moving

beyond

the relativism which

results

from

an

insuf-

ficient

historicism.

Section

2

will

briefly

summarize

the

problems

which have

been

iden-

tified

with the

positions

taken

by

both

naturalists

and

intentionalists.

Section

3

will

explore

some

general

relations

between

social

life

and

epistemology

and will

address

the

epistemological

consequences

of a

social

life structured

by

commodity

exchange.

Section 4

will

put

for-

ward an arguient that the conceptual categories in which the naturalist



327

vs.

intentionalist

debate is couched

correspond

closely

to and

depend

for

their

underlying

coherence

on the

categories

of

thought

required

and

generated

by

the

activity

of

commodity

exchange.

By

re-understand-

ing both the naturalist and the intentionalist positions in these terms

one

is

in a

better

position

to understand

the

logic

by

means

of

which

each

side takes the

positions

it

does,

and

why

each of the two

posi-

tions

in the

argument

have attracted such

large

followings

in

the

philosophy

of

social science

in Western

capitalist

countries.

Section

5 will

address the

possibilities

for

an alternative

epistemological

ground

for

social

science

and

will

put

forward

a

number

of

suggestions

for

further work

leading

toward

a

non-relativist

and

radically

histori-

cist

understanding

of

theory.

2.

Criticisms

of the

Naturalist/Intentionalist

Dispute

Fay and Moon (1977) have argued persuasively that the dualism which

has dominated

thinking

in

philosophy

of social science has made

it

impossible

to

give adequate

answers

to

the fundamental

questions

raised

by

the notion of a

science

of

behavior. These

include

1)

the

relation

between

interpretation

and

explanation

in social

science,

2)

the nature

and

roles of

social scientific

theory,

and

3)

the role of

critique

and

the

need to

account for irrational

social

phenomena.

In

each

case

naturalist

and intentionalist

positions

make for

obverse errors.

The

naturalists,

holding

that the

physical

sciences

in

principle

provide

a

proper

model for

the

development

of

social

science,

ignore

the

irre-

ducible

dimension

of

human

intentionality

in

human

action.

Intention-

alists,

while

they

recognize

the

impact

of

the

importance

of

rational-

ity for scientific understanding, ignore the need for causal explana-

tions.

Thus,

humanists

/intentionalists7

have failed

to

appreciate

the

explanatory

task

of

social

sciences

and

naturalists

have mis-

understood

the

crucial role

which

interpretation

plays

in the social

sciences.

(Fay

and

Moon

1977, p.

216).

Neither

response

is correct.

With

respect

to

their second

question,

Fay

and

Moon find

that inten-

tionalists

fail to

address the

role of

theories

in

any

serious

way,

despite

the

fact

that

social

scientists do indeed

develop

and use

theories.

Naturalists,

on

the other

hand,

assume that the role

of

theories in

social

science will

be the same

as that

of

theories

in

the

natural

sciences. But in so

doing

they

once

again

lose

sight

of the

intentional (and normative) character of human action. Once again,

neither

side

provides

an

adequate

account

of

the nature of

social

science

theories.

Third,

neither the

naturalists nor the

intentionalists are able to

account for

the

existence

of

irrational

social

phenomena,

in

which

an

actor's

account

of

his own

beliefs,

fears, values,

or

actions

may

be

mistaken.

Issues

such as

those

to

which both Freud and Marx

devoted

a

great

deal of

attention,

i.e.,self

misunderstanding

at both the

individual

and

societal

levels,

become

impossible

to

address. Inten-

tionalists,

by

holding

that the

social

scientist must assume

1)

that the

beliefs and

practices

of

actors fit

together,

and

2)

that

social

scientific explanation must employ the same concepts as an articulate



328

participant

in

the

activity,

rule out the

possibility

of

understanding

conflict,

mechanisms of

repression,

and

irrationality.

Naturalists

make the obverse

mistake,

and rather

than assume that

social life can

be

understood

entirely

in rational

terms,

rule out the

role of ratio-

nality

altogether.

(Fay

and Moon

1977,

pp.

225-227;

see also

Harding

1981,

sections

2-3

for

a more

detailed

summary.)

The

possibilities

6?

either

position

forming

a

ground

for

an

adequate

philosophy

of

social science

has

been further called

into

question

by

feminist

criticism. Naturalist and

intentionalist

approaches,

it

is

argued,

despite

their

opposing

views

on

many

issues,

share

important

assumptions,

assumptions

which bear

close

relation

to

male rather

than female

experience.

(Harding

1981,

section

6.)

In

both

approaches,

attention

is

focussed

on the

lives

of

others

than

the

inquirer,

and

methodologically,

the

inquirer

and

objects

of his

inquiry

are to

be

separated

by

a

rationally-controlling

theoretical and

procedural

screen.

(Harding 1981,

p.

309).

The need

for

and comfort

with such

a

screen

separating

the

inquirer

from

other humans

corresponds

much more

closely

to male

rather

than

female needs.

(Harding

(forth-

coming);

Hartsock

(forthcoming);

Chodorow

1978).

These

represent

interesting

and

important

criticisms

of the natur-

alist/intentionalist

debate and

the

impasse

it

presents

for

theories

of

social

science.

What

these criticisms

fail

to

do,

however,

is to

explain

why

the

dispute

rages

on,

and

why

the

dual

positions

have

taken

the

specific

forms

they

have.

Fay

and

Moon

have

pointed

to

the

impasse

human

rationality

and

intentionality

have created for

the

philosophy

of

social

science. But

they

fail

to ask

why

human

intentionality

and

rationality

pose

such

problems.

Harding

argues

that the

barrier between

the

inquirer

and the

object

of

inquiry

points

to

a

one-sided

reliance

on

masculine

experience

as the model

for

scientific

inquiry.

But

the

nature of

this

barrier,

along

with the

relation

of the

inquirer

to

the

object

of

inquiry

(whether

natural

or

social)

has varied

over time.

Yet one

of

the

constants is

the fact that science

has

consistently

been

held to

be

a

masculine

activity.

The

self-other

dichotomy

has

ranged

from

Bacon's

image

of the

scientist

as the torturer

of

nature

(Merchant

1980,

p.

296

quoting

Bacon

1623)

to Winch's

argument

that

the

social

scientist is

the

interpreter

of

the social

lives

of others who

themselves

set the terms

of

interpretation

(

Winch

1958).

How can

one account

for

the

particular

forms the self-other

dichotomy

takes

for

both

naturalists and intentionalists?

I will

argue

that

the

answers

to both

these

questions

are in fact

very

similar,

and that

a more

radically

historicist

approach

to the

naturalist/intentionalist

dispute

itself

can

help

to answer these

questions.

3.

Social Life

and Social Science:

Commodity

Exchange

and

the

Exchange

Abstraction

Let

us

begin

by

taking

seriously

Marx's

injunction

that all

mys-

teries which

lead

theory

to

mysticism

find

their

rational solution in

human

practice

and

in the

comprehension

of this

practice.

(Marx

1888,

p.

121).

Marx

held thatthe

source

for the

critique

of

capitalism

is



329

to

be

found

in

practical

activity

itself,

The

epistemological

(and even

ontological) significance

of

human

activity

is

made

clear

in

Marx's

argument

that

not

only

persons

are

active

but that

reality

itself

consists of

sensuous human

activity,

practice.

(Marx

1888,

p.

121).

Thus

Marx can

speak

of

products

as

crystallized

or

congealed

human

activity

or

work,

of

products

as

conscious human

activity

in

another.

form.

He

can

state

that even

plants, animals,

light,

etc. constitute

theoretically

a

part

of

human

consciousness,

and

a

part

of human

life

and

activity.

(Marx

1932,

p.

112).

As Marx

and

Engels

summarized

their

position,

As

individuals

express

their

life,

so

they

are.

What

they

are,

therefore,

coincides

with their

production,

both

with

what

they

produce

and

with how

they

produce.

The nature

of

individuals

thus

depends

on

their

production.

(Marx

and

Engels 1932,

p.

42).

Such

a

starting

point

has

definite

consequences

for

Marx's

theoryof

knowledge.

If

human

beings

are not

what

they

eat

but

what

they

do,

especially

what

they

do in

the

course

of

production

of

subsistence,

each

means

of

socially

organizing

and

structuring

activity

should

be

expected

to

carry

with it

both social

relations

and relations

to

the

world of

nature

which

express

the social

understanding

contained

in

that

mode of

production.

And in

any

society

with

systematically

divergent

practical

activities for

different

groups,

one

should

expect

the

growth

of

logically divergent

world

views. That

is,

each

division

of

labor,

whether

by

gender

or

class,

can

be

expected

to have

consequences

for,

among

other

things,

scientific

knowledge.

All

this

is

to

say

that on

the

basis

of

the Marxian

account,

one

can

explore

the

suggestions

1)

that

the

critique

of

political economy

and the

critique

of

epistemology,

share

common

methodological

foundations

(cf.

Sohn-Rethel

1970,

p.

6)

and

2)

that

the

critique

of

political

economy

can contribute to the

discussion of

some central

epistemological problems

in the social

sciences.

These claims

are

best

explicated

by

looking

more

closely

at

Marx's

account of

the life and

thought

of

the two

major protogonists

in

capitalist

society,

the

capitalist

and the worker.

The

life of

the

capitalist

is

fundamentally

structured

by

his

parti-

cipation

in

commodity exchange;

his

world is

constituted

by

this

series of

transactions

--the

buying

of

commodities from A and

selling

them to

B,

and the

buying

of

fresh

ones

from

A.

This life

experience

is

not

without

consequences

for

epistemology.

If

human

knowledge

depends

on

human

action,

the

capitalist

understanding

must be cons-

tructed on

the

model

provided

by

commodity exchange.

And

if

the

ruling

ideas of

society

are

simply

the

ideal

expression

of

the dominant

material

relationships,...the

relationships

which

make

the one class

the

ruling

one,

the

experience

of

commodity

exchange

which structures

the

experience

of

the

capitalist

class

should

be

expected

to

structure

social

understanding

more

generally.

(Marx

and

Engels

1932,

p.

64).

The

activity

of

commodity exchange

is

fundamentally

tied to the

structure

of

the

commodity

itself,

and

Alfred Sohn-Rethel

has

claimed

that

the formal

analysis

of

the

commodity

holds the

key

not

only

to

the

critique

of

political

economy,

but

also

to

the

historical

explana-tior of the

abstract

conceptual

mode

of

thinking

and

the

division

of



330

intellectual

and manual

labor,

which came into existence with

it,

(Sohn-Rethel 1970,

p.

33),

i.e.,

the

development

of

speculative

philo-

sophy

in

ancient Greece. He

hopes

to show as well

that the rise

of

modern science is

inherently

connected to modern

capitalism

(Sohn-

Rethel

1970,

p.

125).

My

claim

here is less

sweeping

--

simply

that

a formal

analysis

of

the

commodity

form

and the

exchange

of

commodities

can allow

us to

understand the

real

underlying

dimensions

of the


debate.

The most

fundamental

feature

of a

commodity

is

its

duality,

a

duality

which reverberates

through

the transaction as

a

whole,

and in which

exchange,

as

such,

brings only

one side

of the

dualism

into

play.

The

dualism takes a

number

of

forms:

1)

the

opposition

of

quantity

to

quality

and the

related

separation

of

exchange

from

use,

2)

the

separa-

tion of

nature and

interchange

with

nature

from

society

and

social

interaction,

3)

the

opposition

of the

persons

who are

participants

in

the

transaction,

and

4)

the division

of

mind

from

body,

ideal

from

material,

thought

from

action. Yet

exchange

provides

a medium

for

social

synthesis,

one

which

can

only

be4partial because

exchange

as

such is constituted

by

these

dualities.

It

may

be

objected

that

these

dualities

can be found

in

non-capital-

ist

modes

of

production,

and that

this casts

some

doubt

on the

hypo-

thesis that the

activity

of

commodity

exchange

is at

the root

of the

epistemological categories

in

which

the naturalist/intentionalist

dispute

takes

place.

But it

must

be remembered

that

commodity

pro-

duction

and

exchange

are not co-extensive

with

capitalism

either.

One

must

distinguish

societies in which

commodity

production

and

exchange

occurs but is not the dominant economic

mode,

from those

in

which

exchange

is the dominant means

of

social

synthesis,

i.e.,

in more

Marx-

ist

terms,

one must

distinguish

societies

characterized

by

simple

com-

modity

production

from

those structured

by

capitalist

production.

One

might,

as

an

empirical

question,

investigate

the

extent

to

which

dual-

istic theories

gained

prominence

in

periods

more rather

than

less

structured

by

commodity

exchange.

For

exchange

to

operate,

specific

and concrete

objects,

the

pro-

ducts

of

individuals'

labor,

must

be

transformed

into commodities

--

that

is,

they

must

be

given

values

which

make them

commensurable

--

exchange

values,

in addition

to the

value

specific

to each

object,

its use value.

The former

is abstract

in

contr?st

to

the

latter,

since

only

quantity

is

important

to its

determination.

Thus,

the

very

con-

cept

of

exchange

value

is

characterized

by

an

absence

of

qualities

and

differentiation

of

commodities

only

according

to

quantity,

especially

quantity

expressed

as

money.

It is

just

this

qualitylessness

that

gives

commodities

their

reality

in

exchange,

their concrete

uses

at

that

point

being

only

stored

in the

minds

of

people

(Sohn-Rethel

1970,

PP.

52,

19,

46).

Moreover,

commodity

exchange

cannot

take

place

unless this

con-

structed

duality,

the

separation

of

exchange

from

use,

is

strictly

observed. Either can take place only while the other does not. The



331

purely

social

character of

exchange

results from

this

stringent

sepa-

ration

of

exchange

from use.

While

exchange,

especially

its

money

form,

has

no

meaning

apart

from

the social

relations in which it is

embedded,

use covers all the

material

processes

by

which

we live as

bodily

beings...comprising

the

entirety

of

what Marx terms

'man's

interchange

with nature'

both

in his

labour

of

production

and his

enjoyment

of

consumption.

(Sohn-Rethel

1970,

p.

27).

The

duality

contained

inthe

commodity

itself

and

in the

transaction

is

replicated

in

the

opposition

of

the

persons

who

are

participants

in

the

transaction. As each

commodity

owner

approaches

the

market,

each

recognizes

the other as an

owner

of

private property.

That

is,

there is

a

reciprocal

exclusion

of

ownership

concerning

two sets

of

commodities.

In

addition,

each move made

by

one

participant

is countered

by

the

other. In

exchange,

the

needs,

feelings,

thoughts

involved

on both

sides are

polarized

on

the basis

of

whose

they

are. Not what

two

people

need or feel or

think but

whose

need,

feeling

or

thought

will

prevail

is what

shapes

the

relationship.

Sohn-Rethel

concludes: Thus

one

can

justifiably

say

that

commodity

exchange

impels solipsism

between its

participants.

(Sohn-Rethel

1970,

p.

41).

It

is,

fundamentally,a

relation

between

strangers

who

in

a

formal sense

during

the

transaction share

nothing

more than their common

interest in

the

transaction.

The

motives, needs,

feelings,

and

desires

of

each are his

own and

not the

other's. To

go

even

further,

if

their needs

were the

same,

the

exchange

would be

impossible,

and the

transaction could

not

take

place.

We

have,then,

action

in

common

but

a

deep separation

of

motives,

needs,

and reasons

for

acting.

These

dualities,

however,

are

artificial. The need

for a

series

of

counter-factual

assumptions

which

remove the

commodity

from

time

and

space

and from

the

effects these historical and

material forces

may

have

on it

is

symptomatic

of

the

artificiality

of the

constructed

dualisms.

In

the

market,

the

processes

of

nature must be

assumed to stand still.

Commodities are

considered to

be

immutable

so

long

as

their

price

remains

unaltered

(despite

the

fact

that

they

do

change:

cheeses

ripen,

vegetables

rot).

From

the

perspective

of

commodity

exchange,

nature

in

the

marketplace

is a

force

both

totally

separate

from and even

op-

posed

to the

human

sphere.

Whereas

in

the actual use

of

objects,

the

consumption

of

commodities,

time

and

space

are

intrinsically

involved

with human

activity,

exchange

empties

time

and

space

of

any

material

contents

and

substitutes

instead the

purely

social

question

of

who

owns

the

commodity.

Time and

space

take on a

character of

absolute histo-

rical

timelessness

and

universality

which must mark

the

exchange

abstraction

as a

whole and

each

of

its

features.

(Sohn-Rethel

1970,

p.

49).

As

Marx

summed

up

the

immateriality

of

commodity

exchange:

Not

an atom of

matter

enters

into the

objectivity

of

commodities

as

values;

in

this it

is

the

direct

opposite

of

the

coarsely

sensuous

objectivity

of

commodities

as

physical

objects.

We

may

twist and turn

a

single

commodity

as we

wish;

it

remains

impossible

to

grasp

it

as

a

thing

possessing

value.

(Marx

1867b,

p.

138).

Despite the fact that the

coarsely

sensuous

objectivity

present in



332

use

of

commodities is

absent

from the

activity

of

exchange,

this

objec-

tivity

remains

in

the minds

of

the

commodity

exchangers,

occupying

them

in

their

imagination

and

thoughts only. (Sohn-Rethel 1970, p.

36).

What is

critical for

my

argument

here

is

that in

exchange

mind

and action

necessarily

part

company

and

go

in

different

directions,

the one

private,

the other

social,

the

one concerned with the

quanti-

tative value

of

the

commodity

(getting

the best

price),

the

other with

the

specific

means

by

which the

particular

commodity

will be consumed.

The

separation

of

mind from

action, then,

is

built

into the

heart of

commodity

exchange.

This

split

between

the two leads toward

a

neces-

sary

kind

of

false

consciousness,

a false consciousness

which,

basing

itself

implicitly

and

perhaps

unconsciously

on

the

experience

of

exchange,

treats

the

private

activities

of

mind

or

imagination

as

profoundly

different

egtities

than those

engaged

in

by

means

of overt

(sensible)

activities.

The

commodity

form

and its

consequences

for

the

activity

of

exchange

reveal the act

of

exchange

as

abstract

movement

through

abstract

(homogeneous,

continuous,

and

empty)'

space

and time of abstract

sub-

stances

(materially

real but bare of

sense-qualities)

which

thereby

suffer

no material

change

and which

allow for none but quantitative

dif-

ferentiation

(differentiation

in abstract,

nondimensional

quantity).

(Sohn-Rethel

1970,

p.

53,

italics

in

original).

The

categories

of

thoqght

which

grow

from

the

activity

of

exchange

express

the

exchange

relation

and as such

do not

penetrate

but

only

express

the

mystery

of

the

commodity

form

as

it is

experienced

in the

act

of

exchange:

the

dependence

on

quantity,

the

separation

and

oppo-

sition

of

nature and human

social

relations,

the

separation

of

persons

from

each

other,

and

perhaps

most

important,

the

rigid

separation

of

mind and

action.

The contention

that material

life structures

the

understanding

of

social

relations,

then,

after

an

analysis

of the activ-

ity

of

exchange

has

as its

epistemological

consequence

a

dualism

based

on the

separation

of

exchange

from

use,

and

the

privileging

of

the

activity

of

exchange.

The

epistemological

result

is a

series

of

opposed

and hierarchical dualities

--

mind/body,

ideal/material,

social/natural,

self/other

--

replicating

the dualities

inherent

in

exchange.

The

abstractness

(partiality)

inherent

in

all

commodity

exchange

lays

the basis

for a more

thorough-going

fetishism

in societies

funda-

mentally

structured

by

commodity

exchange.

Thus,

the

exchange

abstrac-

tion

is

related

to

but broader

than what

Marx

termed

the

fetishism

of

commodities.

Commodity

fetishism refers to

the

process by

which

people

come to believe

that

social relations

among

people

can

only

take

place

by

means

of

things.

In

its

extreme

form,

fetishism

holds that

relations

between

people

can

only

be

seen and understood

as relations

between

the

things

they

own,

and

is the

mist

by

which

the

social

character

of

labor

appears

to

us

to

be

an

objective

character

of the

products

them-

selves.

(Marx

1867a,

p.

74).

There

is,

it

will be

objected,

more

to

life than

this. Marx

himself admitted

that

the

level

of

exchange,

or

circulation

presented

an

illusory

account

of human

social

relations.

The critical

step

to

be

made here is to

recognize

that

participation



333

in

the

activity

of

exchange

is critical to the

experience

of the

capit-

alist,

and

thereby

in a

capitalist

society,

the

experience

of

the

society

as

a whole. If this is

true,

one should

expect

to find the

out-

lines of this dualistic social existence in many places, including

social scientific

theories.

Moreover,

historicist

understandings

of

scientific theories

suggest

that these theories

ought

not

be

granted

uniquely

privileged

status. Let us re-examine the

positions

taken

by

naturalists

and intentionalists in the

light

of

the

perspective provided

by

this

account

of

the

epistemological

consequences

of

commodity

exchange.

4.

The

Exchange

Abstraction

in

Philosophy

of

Social Science: The

Naturalist

and Intentionalist Positions

What

is

critical

for

understanding

the

underlying

dimensions

of

the

naturalist/intentionalist debate is the fact that in exchange, mind and

action not

only

part

company

but

go

in

opposite

directions.

While

action

is concerned

with the social

interaction which

constitutes the

exchange,

the minds of the

participants

are on the

private

use to

which

they

plan

to

put

the

commodity

or

the

money they

are about

to

receive.

The

naturalist

choice

to

focus

on and

locate the

ground

for

understand-

ing

social life

solely

on the

side

of

action

is matched

by

the inten-

tionalist focus on mental

events.

Either

position

confines the

philo-

sopher

of

social

science to

only

one

side

of

the dichotomies constructed

by

commodity

exchange.

The content

of

the

positions

taken

depend

on

whether the

focus is

on

mind or

action.

But because mind and action

are

mutually

exclusive and

incommensurable

in

the

activity

of

commodity

exchange, neither naturalists nor intentionalists can give more than

one-sided

and

incomplete

(though

obverse)

accounts

of

human

activity.

I

do not

mean to

indicate

by

these

arguments

that all naturalist or

intentionalist

arguments

neatly

fit

this

pattern.

Fay

and Moon

(1977)

have

usefully distinguished

several varieties of

programs.

My

argument

instead

is that

despite

important variations,

both sides in

the debate

tend

to

adopt

a

one-sided

perspective

on

social behavior.

To

the extent that

naturalists focus

on

the action

side

of

the

dualisms,

one can

expect first,

a

focus on

quantity

rather

than

the

specific

qualities

of

the behavior in

question.

The issue for

the

acting

participants

centers

on

the

quantity

of

one

commodity

which can

be exchanged for a quantity of another. The specific uses to which

each will

be

put

are

irrelevant to

the

activity

of

exchange.

For

naturalist

philosophers

of

social

science,

this

focus

emerges

first as a

concern

that

explanations

be

general,

an

effort

to

argue

that

scientific

explanation,

if

it

is to

qualify

for

the

name,

must not

be tied

to

any

specific

instance

of

the

phenomenon

in

question.

Second,

the

opposition

of

nature to

human

society,

and the

fiction

that the

commodity

is

re-

moved

from

time

and

space

and

the

ravages

of

nature,

for

the naturalist

takes the form of

an

effort to

remove the

objects

of

inquiry

from

such

material

processes.

Thus,

the

naturalist

searches

for

universal

laws

not

limited

by

time

and

space.

Third,

the

opposition

of

persons

to

each

other

in

exchange appears

for

the

naturalist in the form

of

an

argument that the intentionality or rationality of social actors should



334

be

ignored,

at

least

from

the

perspective

of science.

Instead,

science

is to focus

on

the

specific

observable actions

by

which actors

evince

their

intentions

or

desires.

Moreover,

to

the extent

that

intentional

phenomena

are

considered

at

all,

they

are

likely

to be

lumped together

into

emotional

states which can

be

broadly

characterized

as either

approval

or

disapproval

(to

buy

or

not

to

buy?).

The

perspective

is

one

characteristic

of

exchangers

who

care

only

whether

the transaction

is

completed.

The

other's

reasons for

acting

are of little

signifi-

cance.

Ernest

Nagel

(1961)

provides

an

excellent

example

of the naturalist

argument.

He

holds that the

hallmark

of

satisfactory

scientific

explan-

ation

is its

generality;

indeed,

to

count

as

an

explanation,

it

is

essential

that it

be more

general

than what is

explained.

(Nagel

1961,

p.

37).

In

addition,

he is

concerned

to

distinguish

accidental uni-

versals

from

nomological

universals : the

former

being

invalid

for

scientific

explanation

because

they

contain

designations

for particular

individual

objects,

and

for

definite dates

or

temporal periods.

The

latter,

however,

free

from these

specifics

of

time,

place,

and

partic-

ularity,

are

appropriate

for

scientific

inquiry.

Nagel

recognizes

the

problems

such a

hard

construal would

pose

for

scientific

explanation,

since

even

such

things

as

Kepler's

laws of

planetary

motion mention the

sun. In

order

to

avoid this

difficulty

he

distinguishes

predicates

which

he

terms

purely

qualitative

from

those which

are

not,

where

purely

qualitative

indicates that

a

statement

of

its

meaning

would

require

no

reference to

a

particular

object

or

spatio-temporal

loca-

tion.

Then,

he

adds

the

distinction between fundamental

and deri-

vative law-like

statments,

the

former

containing

no individual

names,

the latter

being

logically

consequent

on some set

of

the

former.

In

this

way,

he

attempts

to

rescue

Kepler's

laws

of

planetary

motion

by

suggesting

that

they

ean

be

seen

as

derivative

of

fundamental

laws

such

as

Newtonian

physics.

The first two

parts

of

the

action

side

of

the

exchange

abstraction, then,

are

clearly

present.

The

third

aspect

of

action

in

exchange,

the

opposition

of

persons

to

each

other,

is also

present

in

Nagel's

account.

He

argues

that the behavioral

sciences

should

focus

on

actions rather than

mental states. The

latter

are

held

to be

fundamentally

inaccessible

to scientific

inquiry.

Thus,

the

solipsism

and

opposition

of

persons

to

each other in

exchange

are

held

to

provide

the model

for

understanding

all

social action.

Nagel

responds

to

those

who hold

that

the human

sciences

are

intrinsically

value-laden with the

argument

that the

categories

in those

sciences

are not

exclusively

subjective

(Nagel

1961,

p.

476),

and

that one

need

not

conclude

that in a

manner

unique

to

the

study

of

purposive

hutian

behavior,

fact and

value are

fused

beyond

the

possibility

of

distinguishing

between

them.

(Nagel

1961,

p.

491).

He

replies

to

those who

stress the

importance

of

mental

events and

states with the

statement that

what

is to

be

rejected

is

not their

existence,

but their

relevance

as

scientific

data

(Nagel

1961,

p.

477).

Finally,

we

find

the

expected

flattening

of

human

needs,

desires,

and values

into

simple

approval

or

disapproval

(Nagel 1961, pp.

492f.).

Intentionalists have

adopted

the

opposite

strategy

in

choosing

to





336

to

some

extent take

the form

of

explication

of

concepts.

Winch

argues

that it

is

critical

to

the

construction

of

such an

interpretive

social

science that there can be no private language and that the criteria for

use of

language

must

be

publicly

accessible,

i.e.,

that

language

must

be rule

governed.

He

adds that

only

when one can

suppose

that another

could in

principle

discover

the

rules

one

is

following

can one

be

said

to

follow a

rule

(Winch

1958,

pp. 33,

30).

The

proper

subject

mat-

ter of

social

science,

then,

is

held

to

be

meaningful

behavior,

which

in

turn

is

held

to

be

rule

governed,

closely

associated with notions

such

as

motives or

reasons,

and

accessible

by

means of

language

(Winch

1958, p. 45).

Thus,

Winch is

led to

argue

that

intersubjectivity,for

him,

the

placing

of

oneself in

the

position

of

another

in order to feel

the other's

motives,

intentions,

and

mental

state,

is

aided

by

language.

In

addition,

the

social

scientist

may

be

aided

by

an

understanding

of

the concepts which belong to the activities under investigation, most

especially,

the

concepts

of

an

enlightened participant

(Winch

1958,

p.

89).

This

approach

gives

great

play

to

the subtleties

of

mental

events

and

states,

whether those

of

the

participant,

or

those which

can

be

read out of

language.

By way

of

the

critique

of

political

economy,

we are

now in a

posi-

tion

to

understand

why

human

intentionality

and

rationality

have

posed

such

problems

for

philosophers

of

social

science,

and

why

the

dichotomy

between the

inquirer

and

object

of

inquiry

has taken the

particular

forms it has

in the


debate. The

philosophy

of social

science has

replicated

at

the

level of ideas

one

of

the most

important activities structuring contemporary social life -- commodity

exchange.

By

taking

a

more

radically

historicist

approach,

then,

I

have

shown

that both

naturalist and

intentionalist

arguments

share the

same

pre-historical roots,

since

each

group

of

philosophers

located

the

ground

for

understanding

social

relationson

opposite

sides

of

the

dual-

ities

contained in

the

activity

of

commodity

exchange. By

understand-

ing

exchange

as

the fundamental

experience

which structures

these

ac-

counts

of

the

proper

subject

matter and criteria

for

adequacy

in social

science,

it

is

possible

to

see the

underlying

coherence

of

each

point

of view.

And since mind and action

part

company

in

exchange

and

go

in

opposite directions,

the

impasse

into

which the

naturalist/intentional-

ist

dispute

has led

philosophy

of

science should

not

be

unexpected.

This is not to say that either side should be dismissed as holding

positions

which are

simply

false: the failures

of

the

arguments

about

the correct

understanding

of

social life are

rooted in the

fact that

in

exchange

two

(contradictory)

processes

take

place.

The

three

prob-

lems

Fay

and Moon

(1977)

pointed

out can now be summarized

in the

statement

that

in

a

one-sided

stress

on

action,

naturalists

system-

atically

lose

sight

of

the

role of

the human

mind;

and that

by

their

one-sided stress

on

the activities

of

mind,

intentionalists

fail

to

address the

reality

of

systematic

regularities

in human

affairs.

The

inadequacies

of

both

approaches

are marked

by

the

implicit

(and

false)

positions

taken

by

each side. Naturalists

hold that

even

if

humans

are

rational,

this

is

irrelevant

to

scientific

understanding

of

their

behavior; intentionalists support the views that a)beliefs and actions

can

be

expected

to

cohere,

and that

b)

participants

in social

inter-



337

interaction do not

systematically

misunderstand

their

activities.

I

should

note that

I

have assumed rather than

demonstrated

that

ideas

grow

from social existence. Yet the fact that debates in the

philosophy

of

social

science

have

the

exact structure

one

would

expect

if

it were

the case

that social

existence

structured social

under-

standing

provides

a

powerful

argument

for

adopting

such

a

position.

5.

Epistemological

Alternatives

for Social

Science

If

both

naturalist and

intentionalist

positions

provide

deeply

flawed and

incomplete

bases for

social

science,

where can one look

for

an

adequate ground

for

the

philosophy

of

social

science? Given

the

nature of

the

problams

which have been

uncovered

with

two

major

tra-

ditions,

and

given

the

roots of those

problems

in

social

life,

one

can-

not

expect

an alternative

philosophy

of social science to be

easily

developed.

Here I

can

only

suggest

some avenues

for

future

work.

If

political

economy

has

effects on

epistemology,

and

if

it is

necessary

to

break

theoretically

with forms of

thought

connected with

commodity

exchange,

it

may

be useful to

begin

consideration

of

alternatives

by

referring

to

other

epistemological

models which

can

be derived

from

political

economy.

Marx,

for

example,

held that

labor,

described as

a

dialectical and

interactive

unity

of

human

and natural

worlds,

mind and

body,

and the

cooperation

of

self

and

other,

could

form

the

basis

not

only

for an

epistemology

not

dependent

on

the

structure of

commodity

exchange,

but

also for a

particularly privileged

epistemological position.

As

Marx

described it in

Capital,

the

life-activity

of

the

worker,

unlike

that of

the

capitalist,

is

profoundly

structured

by

production,

i.e.,

by

the

use

of

labor

power

rather than

the

buying

and

selling

of

labor

power

along

with other

commodities.

The worker as

worker

inhabits

a

world in

which

the

emphasis

in

action

is

on

change

rather than

stasis

--

both

the

transformation of

some commodities into

others in

production,

and

the

natural

changes

(deterioration,

ripening,

etc.)

of

the

commodities

themselves.

It is

a

world in which

interaction

with

natural

substances

(the

various

commodities and

capital

equipment

supplied

by

the

capitalist)

is

central,

and in

which the

qualities

of

things

used

in

and

by

the

production

process

rather

than their

quanti-

tative equivalence is important. Within the labor

process,

commonality

and

cooperation

with

others

is

required,

and

workers

engaged

in a

joint

enterprise

have common

interests

(unlike

the

situation in

exchange

where

parties

have

conflicting

interests and

share

a

common

interest

only

in

completing

the

transaction).

There is

as well a

unification

rather

than

separation

of

mind and action

inherent

in

the

labor

process

itself.

It

is

true that

organization

of

the

labor

process

in

capi-

talism

represents

a

series of

efforts to

break

apart

these unities

and

commonalities--of

head

and

hand,

human and

natural

worlds

(Braverman

1974).

Yet

despite

these

efforts,

and

despite

the

distortions

and

damage

which

result from

alienated

labor,

the

life-activity

of

the

worker

contains

echoes

of

a

different

and more

complete

world than that

accessible by means of commodity exchange.



338

While this is

not

the

place

for

a

systematic

exposition

and eval-

uation

of

Marxist

theory,

one can

reflect that

the

theory

does

provide

more

adequate

answers to

the

questions

asked

by

Fay

and Moon than

do

either naturalists or intentionalists. On the

question

of

interpre-

tation vs.

explanation

(or,

intentional action vs. causal

determin-

ation),

Marx's

account

of

the

production

and extraction

of

surplus

value

provides

a

place

for the

understanding

of

both:

the

specific

sale/

purchase

of

labor

power

is

clearly

an intentional and

specific pheno-

menon,

whereas

the

fact that

its

use-value

produced

more value

than

need be

expended

on

its

purchase

is

a

structural

given.

The

activity

as

a

whole, then,

can

best be understood

by

allowing

for

both

causal

explanation

by

means of

general (although

not

universal) laws,

and

interpretation

of

individual

action.

(I

have worked

out this

argument

in

much

greater

depth

in Hartsock

(1981).)

Second,

Marx saw a

very

specific

and

liberatory

role for

theory

which

based itself

on

the

experience

of

labor,

in contrast

to the

repressive

role

of

theories based on

exchange.

Third,

Marx devoted

a

good

deal

of

attention to

the

problem

of

systematic

self-misunderstanding

at the

societal level. Marxian

theory,

then,

can

respond

more

adequately

to

the

questions

Fay

and

Moon

have

posed

and

thereby

be

of

assistance

in the

development

of a

more

adequate

philosophy

of

social

science.

Finally,

Marx's

theory,

by

privileging

the

epistemology

based

in

the

experience

of

production,

provides

an alternative

to

the

problems

of

relativism

faced

by

other historicist

understandings

of

philosophy

of

social

science:

participation

in the

activity

of

production,

Marx

held,

enabled one to

overcome

a

reliance

on

one

side

of the dualities

characteristic of

commodity

exchange

by embodying

in action the

aspects

which

in

exchange

exist

only

in the minds

of

participants.

Feminist

critiques

of

the

self-other

dichotomy

in

philosophy

of

social

science,

given

the

variety

of

ways

the

dichotomy

has

historically

been

incorporated

into

scientific

inquiry,

pose

difficulties

for

the

Marxist

account.

Marxist

theory

can

help

to

make clear

some

of the

reasons

why

this

dichotomy

takes the

particular

forms it

does

in

natu-

ralist

and

intentionalist

arguments,

but

cannot

explain

why

this

self-

other

dichotomy

existed

in science

in

periods

in

which

political

econ-

omy

was

not

dominated

by

commodity

production

and

exchange.

Perhaps

this

is due

to the fact

that,

as

Marx himself

admits,

We

set

out

from

real,

active

men,

and on the basis of their real

life-process

we demon-

strate the

development

of

the

ideological

reflexes

and

echoes

of this

life-process.

(Marx

and

Engels

1932,

p.

47.

Italics

mine).

Marx's

procedure

was in fact to set

gut

from

men's labor

and

to

ignore

the

specificity

of women's labor.

This is a

significant

failure since

if

the

mental/manual

division

of

labor could

give

rise

to the

exchange

abstraction,

with

the

resulting

problems

of

one-sidedness

for

philosophy

of social

science,

there

is no

reason

to

suppose

that

the sexual

division

of

labor

will not

also

give

rise

to a different

sort

of

partial

understanding.

If we

examined

women's activities

along

the several

dimensions

which

have

proved

important for epistemology, both in commodity exchange and in produc--



339

tion,

we

might

be able

to

discover

the

specific epistemological

con-

sequences

of the sexual division of

labor.

The work done by a woman in the home as well as for wages keeps her

continually

in contact with the natural

world,

a

world

of

qualities

and

change.

Her immersion

in

the world

of

use

-- in

concrete,

many-

qualitied,

changing

material

processes

-- is

more

complete

that

that

of

the male

worker

involved

only

in

production

for

wages.

And

if

life

itself consists

of

sensuous

activity,

the

vantage

point

available

to

women on

the basis

of

their contribution

to subsistence

may

well re-

present

an

intensification and

deepening

of

the

world view available

to

the

producers

of

commodities in

capitalism.

The

female contribution

to

subsistence,

however, represents

only

a

part

of

women's

labor.

Women

also

produce

men

(and

other

women)

on

both a daily and long-term basis. This activity too is not without

consequences.

Much

of

the

repetitive

labor

women

do,

and their

pro-

duction

of

use-values as

well,

operates

to

reproduce

the male

worker

on a

day-to-day

basis.

Women

produce

men

as

well

through

the

process

of

child-bearing

and

rearing,

and this too should be

expected

to have

effects on

epistemology.

Psychoanalytic

evidence indicates

that

motherhood in the

large

sense,

including

pregnancy

and

preparation

for

motherhood,

and the socialization

of

female

children,

results

in

the construction

of

female

existence as centered within

a

complex

relational

nexus

(Chodorow

1978).

In

turn,

the

fact

that women and

not men

mother means

that

the

results

of

the

process

of

differentiation

by

the

infant,

differentiation from a woman

by

both

male and female

children, reinforces boundary confusion in female egos and boundary

strengthening

in

males:

individuation is

far more

conflictual

for

male than

for female

children.

If

material

existence structures

consciousness,

women's

relationally

defined

existence,

bodily

experience

of

boundary

challenges,

and work

producing

both

commodities and human

beings

must be

expected

to result

in a

world view to

which dichotomies

are

foreign,

in

which issues

of

change

involve human

beings

who

change

in both

subtle

and autonomous

ways,

and in

which

more

than instrumental

cooperation

with others

is

required.

In

each

of

these

areas,

the features

of

the

proletarian

vision are

enhanced

for

the woman. The female

experience

in

repro-

duction represents a unity with nature which goes beyond the proletarian

experience

of

interchange

with

nature.

In

addition,

in

the

process

of

producing

human

beings,

relations

with others

may

take the

form of

unity

with

another,

rather than

simply

cooperation.

In

contrast,

the

conflictual construction

of

the

masculine self

in

opposition

to

another who

threatens

one's

very

being

results in an

outlook

characterized

by

a

deep

going

and hierarchical dualism.

Masculinity

must

be attained

by

means

of

opposition

to the concrete

world of

daily

life in

the

household,

by

escaping

from

contact

with

the

female

world

of

the

household

into

the masculine world

of

public

life.

This

experience

of

two

worlds,

one

valuable,

if

abstract and

deeply

unattainable,the

other useless and

demeaning,

if

concrete and

necessary,



340

lies at the heart

of a

series

of

dualisms

--

mind/body,

culture/nature,

ideal/real,

stasis/change.

And

these

dualisms

are

overlaid

by

gender:

only

the first

of

each

pair

is

associated

with the

male.

Thus,

there

is

reason

to believe

that

the sexual

division

of

labor

may

wel have

epistemological

effects

on

the

philosophy

of

social

science.

Perhaps

the

convergence

between the dualisms

of the

commodity

form

and

the dualisms

characteristic of the

stereotypic

male

personality

suggest

that the dualisms of

masculine

gender

historically

precede

and

set

limits

to the

forms class societies can

take.

Perhaps

they

can

be said

to

underlie

the

specific

dualisms

of

the

commodity

form it-

self.

6.

Conclusion

I

have

argued

that

the

insolubility

of

the


debate

in

the

philosophy

of

social science

and the

inadequacy

of

the

positions

taken

by

each side

stem

from their

common reliance

on

exchange

as a model for

both

social

life and

the

philosophy

of

social science.

Exposing

the

implicit

role

of

exchange

allowed

for a

recognition

of

the

underlying

coherence

of naturalist and

intentionalist

positions

on

the

basis

of

their common

pre-history.

What

initially

appeared

as

diametrically

opposed

positions

in

philosophy

of

social science

became

visible as

growing

from

the same

social

roots

and

replicating

some

of

the same

aspects

of

social

life.

I

suggested

that

one

might

search

for

alternative bases

for

philosophy

of

social

science

in the

activities

of

production

and

reproduction

rather

than

exchange.

A

philosophy

of

social science rooted

in these activities

might

help

to

move

historicist

understandings

of

social

scientific

theory beyond

relativism

by

posing

the

question

for

philosophers

of

social

science

of

whether

there

are

some

epistemologically

privileged

vantage

points

on

society.

One

of

the

most

central

questions

which

philosophers

of

science

should

give

attention

to

is

the extent

to which

the

lives

of

workers

in

capitalist

society

and the

lives

of women can

provide

the

ground

for new

insights

into the

real

regularities

which

govern

social

life.

Notes

1My

discussions

with Donna

Haraway

and Sandra

Harding

on

these

issues

have

been

very

fruitful

and have

improved

the

argument

I

present

here.

For

instances

of the

ways

this second

failure is

manifested,

see

the conference

report by

Don E.

Saliers

(1978).

I

should

note that

my

usage

here

is

very

general.

Both

Fay

and

Moon

(1977)

and

Harding

(1981)

clarify

the

distinctions

to be made

among

naturalists

and

intentionalists,

and

in what

follows

I

depend

on

their

accounts.



341

I

should

state

that

my analysis

here both

depends

on and is in

ten-

sion with

Sohn-Rethel's.

He

argues

that

commodity

exchange

is a

char-

acteristic

of

all class societies --

one which comes to

a head or

takes

its most advanced form in

capitalism.

His

project,

which is not

mine,

is to

argue

a)

that

commodity

exchange,

a characteristic

of all

class

societies,

is

an

original

source

of abstraction

,

b)

that

this

abstrac-

tion contains

the

formal

element

essential

for

the

cognitive

faculty

of

conceptual

thinking,

and

c)

that the abstraction

operating

in

ex-

change,

an

abstraction in

practice,

is the

source

of

the ideal

abstrac-

tion

basic to Greek

philosophy

and modern

science

(Sohn-Rethel

1970.

p.

28).

In

addition

to

my

different

purpose

I

have

several

major

differences with

Sohn-Rethel.

First,

he treats the

productive

forces

as

separate

from

productive

relations and ascribes

far too much

auto-

nomy

to

the

former.

(See

his

discussion

on

pp. 84-86,

95).

My

own

position

is

that the

distinction

between

the two is better

understood

as a device Marx

used

for

analytic

purposes.

Second,

Sohn-Rethel

characterizes the

period

preceding

generalized

commodity

production

as

primitive

communism.

But this

is

an

inadequate

characterization

of

the

variety

of

tribal societies.

I use the

term,

abstract ,

in the technical

Marxian

sense

of

the

term to

mean

partial,

incomplete,

and

even,

in a

sense

misleading

since

the

part

is

mistaken

for

the whole.

6Consider,

for

example,

the

philosophical

debate about

the

privacy

of

such

sensations

as

pain.

The Marxian

argument

to

which

I

allude here is

the contention that

the

proletariat

is

capable

of

going

beneath

the

deceptive

categories

of

bourgeois thought

to

the

reality

which

governs

human life in

capitalism.

Lukacs

(1923)

presents

one of

the clearest

expositions

of

the

meaning

of

this claim.

Attention to women's

life-activity

as well as men's

might require

a

re-examination of

such basic

and

seemingly

gender-blind

categories

as

class.

Class in Marxist

theory

is a

category

based

on male

experience,

a

category

which mistakes male

experience

for

the

general

human

exper-

ience.

Marx

himself,

for

example,

argues

that

women and

children are

supplementary

wage

labor

(1867a,

I,

pp.

397-402).

And

more

recently,

writers

such as

Nicos Poulantzas

totally

ignored

those

persons

with-

out

paid

employment

and

by

implication

suggested

that

they

had no

class

position

at all

(1974,

esp.

Part

III,

sec.

3,4,6,9).

9

What follows

is a

very

brief

summary

of

Hartsock

(forthcoming).

See

Harding

(1981)

for a

more

complete

summary

of

the

psychoanalytic

material

to

which

I

refer.

1This

is

supported

by

the fact that

within

Marxist

theory

a

version



342

of the


debate seems to have taken

place,

a

debate structured

by

many

of the same

dualisms as

those

which charac-

terize the works considered here. The naturalist positions are taken

by

Lenin

(1920),

Stalin

(1938),

and

Althusser

(1965);

the

intention-

alist side is

represented

by

such

figures

as Lukacs

(1923),

and

Habermas

(1976).



343

References

Althusser,

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