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French Strategy in 1914: Joffreis Own

Doughty, Robert A.

The Journal of Military History, Volume 67, Number 2, April 2003, pp.

427-454 (Article)

Published by Society for Military History

DOI: 10.1353/jmh.2003.0112

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HISTORIANS have long misunderstood French strategy in August1914 and General Joseph Joffres role in shaping it. Many authorsespecially British and Americanhave viewed Plan XVII as the embodi-ment of French strategy in 1914 and have routinely described the

French as doing little more than charging blindly into Alsace and Lor-raine.1 Even those who have studied French strategy carefully have con-

1. See Holger Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary,19141918 (London: Arnold, 1997), 67; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great

Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), 254; Spencer C. Tucker, The Great War,19141918 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 2224; John Keegan, The

First World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 3639; Michael J. Lyons, WorldWar I: A Short History (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2000), 6871, 7779.

The Journal of Military History 67 (April 2003): 42754 Society for Military History

Robert A. Doughtyis a colonel in the U.S. Army. He has served as the Head ofthe Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy for seventeen years andhas published several books, including Seeds of Disaster: The Development ofFrench Army Doctrine, 19191939. He currently is working on a history ofFrench strategy and operations in World War I.

French Strategy in 1914: Joffres Own

Robert A. Doughty

Abstract

In August 1914, General Joseph Joffre controlled the design and exe-

cution of French strategy. After concentrating the French army on thenortheast frontier in the opening days of the war, he waited until after

the Germans began their advance to complete the design of his strat-

egy and did not fully inform his political superiors or his military sub-

ordinates until he published General Instructions No. 1 on 8 August.

As Joffre implemented his strategy, he complied with the provisions

of the Franco-Russian alliance by attacking into Alsace and Lorraine,

but he sent his main thrust through central Belgium toward

Neufchteau and Arlon where he hoped to avoid the powerful enemy

force driving toward his left and strike the enemys less dense, more

vulnerable center. French strategy in 1914 was Joffres own.

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sidered Plan XVII the virtual incarnation of theoffensive outrance.2

Othersespecially the Frenchhave recognized that Plan XVII was aconcentration plan with operational alternatives,3 but most have paid lit-

tle attention to Joffres relative freedom of action and his power to deter-mine strategy once his forces were deployed.4

In fact, Joffre played a decisive role in shaping French strategy. AfterJuly 1911 he revised French concentration plans so he could assembleforces close to the German frontier and then deploy them for an attacknorth or south of German fortifications between Metz and Thionville ornorth into Belgium toward Neufchteau and Arlon. Once the war began,he marshaled his forces carefully so they would act in concert with theRussians, but he did not complete the design of his strategy until after

the Germans began their advance and he thought he discerned theirscheme of maneuver. Moreover, he did not inform his subordinates untilhe published General Instructions No. 1 on 8 August. As Joffre imple-mented his strategy, he aimed to avoid the powerful enemy force drivingtoward his left through central Belgium and strike the enemys lessdense, more vulnerable center in eastern Belgium. Thus, French strategyin August 1914 was neither a blind-charge into Alsace-Lorraine nor anincarnation of the offensive outrance. French strategy in 1914 wasJoffres own.

The confusion over French strategy has persisted for more thaneighty years even though Joffre and key members of his staff explainedto an investigative commission of the Chamber of Deputies in May 1919that Joffre personally shaped French strategy. The commission metshortly after the war to determine why the French had abandoned thecrucial Briey basin near Metz in the early weeks of the war. As Francessenior generals paraded in front of the commission, Joffre and several ofhis prewar subordinates explicitly and clearly denied Plan XVII dictatedFrench strategy or operations.5 General douard de Castelnau, the First

2. Samuel R. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and FrancePrepare for War, 19041914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969),220. See also Douglas Porch, The March to the Marne: The French Army, 18711914(London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 22831.

3. See Henry Contamine,La victoire de la Marne, 9 septembre 1914 (Paris: Gal-limard, 1970), 6970, 122; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle,La Grande Guerre des Franais,19141918 (Paris: Perrin, 1994), 7077.

4. For examples of French-language sources emphasizing Joffres role, seeAntonin de Selliers de Moranville,Du Haut de la Tour de Babel (Paris: Berger-Lev-

rault, 1925), 7894, 1069; F. Gambiez and M. Suire,Histoire de la Premire GuerreMondiale, vol. 1, Crpuscule sur lEurope (Paris: Fayard, 1968), 17275.5. The testimony of Joffre and his staff makes the evidence about French strat-

egy substantially different from the evidence cited by Terence Zuber when he deniedthere was a Schlieffen Plan. See Terence Zuber, The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,War in History 6 (July 1999): 262305.

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MILITARY HISTORY 429

Deputy Chief of the General Staff from January 1912 to December 1913,stated, I do not believe the French general staff ever had an operationsplan. We spoke of a concentration plan.6When Joffre appeared before

the Commission, he explained the difference between a concentrationand an operations plan. He explained further that Plan XVII resulted inunits assembling on the frontier ready for combat, and that he made sub-sequent decisions about objectives and maneuver only after receivingintelligence about the enemys disposition and actions.7

Before the Commission, as well as in his memoirs, Joffre acknowl-edged his having kept secret his intentions from his political superiors,his subordinate commanders, and his staff. He defended having done soby arguing it was impossible to fix a definite maneuver for execution a

long time in advance.8

Since a wide variety of information, as muchdiplomatic and political as military in Joffres words, would arrive incre-mentally after mobilization, any plan completed in peacetime wouldrequire modification.9 Hence, the final decisions about strategy andoperations could not be made until the military and political situationbecame apparent in the opening days of the war. Moreover, establishinga plan of operations in peacetime, he suggested, would permit meddlingof the government in military operations.10 Not drafting an operationsplan and refusing to divulge his intentions, he concluded, still appears

to me today to be justified.11

In previous decades, Joffres obstinance and secretiveness wouldhave made little difference, but on the eve of the Great War French polit-ical leaders gave him more power over the French army than anyone hadpossessed since the time of Napoleon. During the late 1880s, the Frenchhad improved the efficiency of their army by organizing a general staff,but political leaders, fearing a coup against the Third Republic, hadrefused to appoint a general officer as head of the army during peace-time. Instead, they appointed one general officer as Chief of the General

Staff and another as the Vice President of the Superior Council of War, abody which had the Minister of War as its president and included

6. Dposition de M. le gnral Castelnau, in France, Assemble Nationale,Chambre des Dputs, Onzime Lgislature, Session de 1919, no. 6026,Procs-ver-baux de la Commission dEnqute sur le rle et la situation de la mtallurgie en

France (Dfense du Bassin de Briey1re Partie) (Paris: Imprimerie de la Chambredes Dputs, 1919), 343, 331, 346.

7. Dposition de M. le marchal Joffre,Procs-verbaux de la Commission dEn-qute, 2e Partie, 142, 163.

8. Joseph Joffre,Mmoires du marchal Joffre, 19101917, 2 vols. (Paris: Plon,1932), 1:143.

9. Joseph Joffre, 19141915: La prparation de la guerre & la conduite desoprations (Paris: Chiron, 1920), 2425; Joffre,Mmoires, 1:144.

10. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:145.11. Ibid., 1:190.


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Frances senior generals. The former worked closely with the Minister ofWar and administered the day-to-day activities of the army. The latterhad no command authority but was the designated commander of

French forces in the event of war and had responsibilities associatedwith preparing the army for war. Though the Superior Council includedthe generals who would command Frances forces in war, neither theCouncil nor the Vice President could make decisions; they could onlyprovide advice to the Minister of War.12

Efforts to increase the effectiveness of the High Command increasedamidst the increasingly tense international environment engendered bythe second Moroccan crisis. After the Minister of War, General FranoisGoiran, provided an unsatisfactory explanation in June 1911 of the rela-

tionship between the government and its senior generals, the govern-ment fell,13 and Adolphe Messimy became the new Minister of War in theJoseph Caillaux government two days prior to the appearance of the Ger-man gunboat,Panther, off the Moroccan port of Agadir. Energized by theensuing crisis and armed with a mandate to reorganize the High Com-mand, Messimy dismissed General Victor Michel, the Vice President ofthe Superior Council of War, appointed Joffre as his successor, and endedthe duality of the High Command by uniting the functions of the VicePresident of the Superior Council and the Chief of Staff.14After the Cail-

laux government fell in the middle of January 1912 and the RaymondPoincar government assumed power, Alexandre Millerand followed Mes-simy as the Minister of War and soon increased Joffres authority overthe French army. On the day Millerand entered office, he met with Jof-fre and expressed his reservations, according to Joffre, about the Chiefof Staff of the Army working for the Minister of War rather than the Chiefof the General Staff. Shortly thereafter, Millerand used a presidentialdecree to abolish the functions of Chief of Staff of the Army and createinstead the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, who worked for Joffre.15

As Joffre noted in his memoirs, this action completely ended theduality of the High Command and gave him enormous powers over the

12. David B. Ralston, The Army of the Republic: The Place of the Military in thePolitical Evolution of France, 18711914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Instituteof Technology, 1967), 19093, 32729, 331, 33537; Porch, The March to the Marne,17076.

13. See Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy, 12829; Paul-Marie de laGorce, The French Army: A Military Political History, trans. Kenneth Douglas (NewYork: Braziller, 1963), 1089; Ralston,Army of the Republic, 32829;Journal Officiel

de la Rpublique franaise (Ch. Db.), 30 juin 1911, 254041.14. Adolphe Messimy,Mes souvenirs (Paris: Plon, 1937), 72, 75, 82; Dposition

de M. le gnral Messimy, Procs-verbaux de la Commission dEnqute, 1re Partie,13032;Journal Officiel de la Rpublique franaise (29 Juillet 1911), 644445.

15. Journal Officiel de la Rpublique franaise (21 Janvier 1912), 71112.

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army by shifting powers from the Minister of War and Chief of Staff of theArmy to the Chief of the General Staff. It was the first time, said Joffre,

that such powers were confided to a single man; I had authority over

the training of the army, its doctrine, its regulations, its mobilization,its concentration. For questions of promotion, the new minister toldme it was his intention to consult me. For the first time . . . , theleader [who would be] responsible [for the army] in wartime wouldhave the authority in peacetime to prepare for war.16

Though the government and the Minister of War could have circum-scribed Joffres powers,17 French political leaders did not demand beforeAugust 1914 that he reveal his strategic or operational intentions. Instead,they abided by the relationship between political and military authorities

spelled out in the October 1913 regulations on the operations of largeunits. Approved by a presidential decree and based on a report submittedby the Minister of War, the first paragraph of the regulations said:

The government, which has responsibility for the vital interests ofthe country, alone has the authority to fix the political objective of awar. If the struggle extends to several frontiers, it designates the prin-cipal adversary against which should be directed the greater part ofthe national forces. It consequently distributes the means of actionand all types of resources and places them entirely at the disposition

of the generals charged with being commanders-in-chief of the vari-ous theaters of operation.18

On the very day that France ordered mobilization, Messimywhoagain served as Minister of War during the first Ren Viviani governmentfrom 13 June until 26 August 1914met with Joffre and discussed theirrelationship. They agreed, The political direction of the war belongsproperly to the government. The conduct of operations belongs exclu-sively to the commander-in-chief.19 Like the ministers who had pre-ceded him, Messimy made no attempt to place strategy under the

umbrella of the political direction of the war and instead left it withJoffre.To his substantial authority over the French army Joffre added con-

siderable experience in dealing with political leaders. Unlike mostFrench officers, he often had dealt with civilian authorities as he climbedthe ladder of success. After demonstrating in the colonies strong engi-neering and leadership skills, he returned to France and had an unusual

16. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:28. For a sharp criticism of Poincar and Millerandsyielding to the military technicians, see Joseph Caillaux, Mes mmoires (Paris:Plon, 1943), 209, 21112.

17. Porch, The March to the Marne, 237.18. France, Ministre de la Guerre, Dcret du 28 octobre 1913 portant rgle-

ment sur la conduite des grandes units (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1913), 4.19. Messimy,Mes souvenirs, 232.


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sequence of assignments that enabled him to work smoothly with polit-ical leaders and avoid interference from them. One of the most signifi-cant of these was his service as Director of Engineers from 1904 to 1906,

but he also commanded 6th Division (which had its headquarters inParis) and then II Corps (located in Amiens, one hundred kilometersnorth of Paris). After being appointed Director of Rear Services in Janu-ary 1910, he gained an especially sophisticated understanding of logis-tics and railway transportation, an understanding that served him well inhis victory on the Marne. He also gained a seat on the Superior Councilof War and became the youngest member of that body.20

Much like general officers in other countries who have served innational capitals and been responsible for important engineering, logis-

tical, and transportation activities, he developed skills and methods forworking with political leaders that other senior officers did not possess.French politicians, including those on the left, had a relatively highdegree of confidence in him. Unlike general officers such as Castelnau,Ferdinand Foch, or Paul Pau, who were known for their conservative orCatholic views, he was known for his republican views, something he didlittle to affirm and nothing to disavow. Some officers referred to him asthe crab not only because of his thick girth but also because he nevermoved to the right politically.21 Yet, he was never as vocal or open about

his views as officers such as Maurice Sarrail, and he avoided public dis-agreements with political leaders. As he dealt with the leaders of theThird Republic, he rarely made unreasonable demands on them orignored them, and he shrewdly avoided placing them in embarrassingcircumstances by giving them impossible choices. This tactic reducedthe chance of anyone interfering with or intruding upon his prerogatives.Only after the heavy losses and failed offensives of 191416 did the polit-ical leaders who had misread him recognize his strong will and indepen-dence, and some eventually became his strongest critics. Messimy in

particular regretted having elevated him to such a powerful position.22

Armed with considerably more power than his predecessors and acrafty understanding of French politics, Joffre took advantage of theincreasingly tense international situation and shaped French strategy tohis liking. As he considered alternatives, he preferred an offensive strat-egy rather than a defensive one followed by an offensive. This preferencestemmed partially from his personal faith in the offensive, a faith hewould demonstrate again and again in the twenty-nine months he com-

20. Plaque, Caserne de la Ppinire, Cercle militaire, Paris; Ren Alexandre,Avec Joffre dAgadir Verdun (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1932), passim.

21. Yves Gras, Castelnau ou lArt de Commander, 18511944 (Paris: ditionsDenoel, 1990), 137.

22. Dposition de M. le gnral Messimy, Procs-verbaux de la CommissiondEnqute, 1re Partie, 14243.

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manded French forces in the Great War, but it also accorded with thesentiments of Frances political leaders. At one key meeting, for exam-ple, in January 1912, the President of the Third Republic welcomed Jof-

fres emphasis on the offensive and said, We are henceforth resolved tomarch straight at the enemy without any hesitation. The offense, whichsuits the temperament of our soldiers, shall assure us victory.23 Joffrespreference for the offensive also came from his recognition of the strate-gic advantages of the Franco-Russian alliance. He remained confident inthe benefits of a two-front war against Germany, and the strategy he pur-sued in the opening days of the warmost notably the attack intoAlsace-Lorraineclearly fit within the context of coordinated offensivesby French and Russian forces.

France, long recognizing the advantages of forcing Germany to fighton two or more fronts, had completed an agreement in 1891 with theRussians and a military convention almost two years later.24 Staff talksbetween the French and Russians ensured both countries understoodand implemented the provisions of the military convention. Althoughthe poor performance of the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War andtheir strong interest in the Balkans created doubts in France about thewisdom of an alliance with Russia, staff talks, as required by the con-vention, occurred in 1900, 1901, 1906, 1907, and 1908. In 1910, the two

powers affirmed the discussions of previous meetings and emphasized,Defeat of the German armies remains, no matter what the circum-stances, the first and principal objective of the allied armies. At thismeeting the French representative, General Laffon de Ladbat,described Frances intention to launch an all-out and immediate offen-sive against Germany at the beginning of a war.25 Subsequent discussionswith the Russians emphasized the importance of both powers attackingsimultaneously. One participant in the discussions concluded, Even ifbeaten the French army will have opened the way for the Russian offen-

sive and assured the final success [of the two allies].26

Subsequent stafftalks in 1911, 1912, and 1913 confirmed Germanys defeat as the first

23. Procs-verbal, Conseil suprieur de la Dfense nationale, Sance du 9 jan-vier 1912, 2, carton 2N1, Service Historique de lArme de Terre, Paris (hereafterS.H.A.T.).

24. A copy of the Military Convention of 17 August 1892 is included in Messimy,Mes souvenirs, 4078; Joffre,Mmoires, 1:12829; and Raymond Poincar,Au ser-vice de la France, 10 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1926), 1:29192.

25. Procs-verbal de lentretien entre les Chefs dtat-major gnraux desarmes franaises et russes, 7/20 et 8/21 septembre 1910,Documents DiplomatiquesFranaise (D.D.F)., 2e srie, vol. XII, annexe no. 573, pp. 91113.

26. Le lieutenant-colonel Pell, Attach militaire de France Berlin, au gnralBrun, Ministre de la Guerre, 24 mars 1910,D.D.F., 2e srie, vol. XII, annexe no. 467,p. 717.


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and principal objective of France and Russia and the defeat of Ger-manys allies as subordinate objectives.

Staff talks and constant pressure on Russia to launch an offensive

against Germany, if war came, encouraged Frances political and militaryleaders to abide by the military convention and launch an offensive assoon as possible.27When Joffre participated in the staff talks in 1912 and1913, he clearly communicated his intention to attack from northeast-ern France. He and the Russian representative agreed in July 1912 thatin the event of war Germany probably would direct the principal part ofits forces first toward France and would leave only minimal forces facingRussia. Recent improvements of German railroads in the Eifel, a Germanregion northeast of Luxembourg, confirmed in Joffres mind the Ger-

mans intention to attack France first. According to the minutes of themeeting, Joffre insisted, The allied plan . . . should strive for simultane-ous attacks on the two sides [of Germany] to achieve the maximum com-bined effort. He assured the Russian representative that France wouldabide by article three of the military convention which required Franceto have 1,300,000 soldiers participate in a vigorous and determinedoffensive against Germany.28

A year later, in August 1913, Joffre was even more explicit. The min-utes of the meeting state:

General Joffre declared that France will engage on its northeasternfrontier nearly all its forces, of which the number will exceed bymore than 210,000 men the number required by the text of the Con-vention, that the concentration of combat elements on this frontierwill be accomplished, for the most part, by the tenth day of mobi-lization, and that offensive operations by this group of forces willcommence on the morning of the eleventh day.29

Joffre and the Russian representative also agreed:

With regard to the conduct of operations, it is especially necessary

that the allied armies obtain a decisive success as rapidly as possi-ble. A check of the French armies at the beginning of a war will per-mit Germany to transfer to the Eastern Front part of its forces whichalready have fought against France. If, on the contrary, Frencharmies obtain a success rapidly against the forces concentrated byGermany before them, this success will equally facilitate operationsby the Russian armies since the forces concentrated by Germany on

27. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:130.28. Procs-verbal de lentretien du 13 juillet 1912, entres les Chefs dtat-major

des armes franaises et russes, 13 juillet 1912, D.D.F., 3e srie, vol. III, annexe no.200, p. 260.

29. Procs-verbal des entretiens du mois daot 1913 entre les Chefs dtat-major des armes franaises et russes, 24 aot 1913,D.D.F., 3e srie, vol. VIII, annexeno. 79, p. 88.

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the Western Front cannot possibly be transferred toward the east.Thus, it is essential that French armies have numerical superiorityover German forces in the west. This condition will be realized eas-ily if Germany has to guard its eastern frontier with large forces.30

Simply stated, Joffre believed, The military value of the alliance residesabove all in the possibility of obtaining simultaneous attacks in the eastand the west.31 The direction of Frances attack, however, remaineduncertain. A vigorous and determined offensive from northeasternFrance could send forces into either Alsace-Lorraine or Belgium or both.

As part of the effort to coordinate simultaneous attacks, Franceand Russia worked diligently to establish reliable wireless contact. Asearly as 1909, the two allies had two wireless telegraph routes, one con-

necting Bobruisk to Paris directly and the other connecting Bobruisk toSebastopol and then to Bizerta.32Another link evidently connected Biz-erta with Paris. By July 1913 wireless communications between Parisand Bobruisk were open each day between 0600 and 0800 and 2000 and2400 hours. As a backup, the links between Sebastopol and Bizerta wereopen each night between midnight and 0200 hours.33 By August 1914,the framework of French strategyin the sense of its being part of analliance strategywas firmly in place, as were the communications toensure continued coordination.

Within this alliance strategy, the French depended more on the Rus-sians than on the British, but Paris courted London for years before theGreat War. As early as December 1906, Georges Clemenceau had notedin a meeting of the Superior Council of National Defense: In the currentpolitical situation, it is impossible to imagine France entering a conflictwith Germany without having the support of England.34 Despite thisstrategic reality, British authorities made two points very clear from the

30. Procs-verbal des entretiens du mois daot 1913 entre les Chefs dtat-major des armes franaise et russe, 24 aot 1913,D.D.F., 3e srie, vol. VIII, annexe

no. 79, p. 90.31. Note sur laction militaire de la Russie en Europe (n.d.). According to a

handwritten note attached to the document, the note was given to the President ofthe Council of Ministers on 3 August 1912, probably by Joffre, on the occasion of theministers departure for Russia. Carton 7N1538, S.H.A.T.

32. Ambassade de France, LAttach Militaire, no. 13, Le Lieutenant-ColonelMatton, attach militaire, lambassade de la Rpublique franaise en Russie, au min-istre de la Guerre (tat-Major de larme, 2e Bureau), 21 fvrier/6 mars 1909, carton7N1535, S.H.A.T.

33. tat-Major de lArme, 2me Bureau, Section Russe, Communications entrela Russie & la France (Traduction de la Note Russe), Mars 1911; CommunicationsFranco-Russe, juillet 1913; and Communications Franco-Russes, juillet 1913; all arein carton 7N1538, S.H.A.T.

34. Projet de Procs-verbal, Sance du Conseil suprieur de la Dfense nationaledu 31 dcembre 1906, tenue au Palais de llyse sous la prsidence de M. Fallires,Prsident de la Rpublique, p. 10, 2N1, S.H.A.T.


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earliest moment in the negotiations between the two military staffs.First, France should violate Belgian neutrality only after Germany haddone so. Second, the military discussions and arrangements were, as one

paper stated, not binding on the [British] Government.35

In 1906efforts to arrange the participation of British forces in a campaign againstGermany accelerated.36 By July 1911 the French expected the British tosend six infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and two mountedbrigades, totaling some 150,000 men and 67,000 horses.37 The value ofthis small force was explained in an intelligence assessment in 1912: Inthe event English troops participate in operations with ours, the activeforces placed in the line by France and England clearly will be superiorto the German forces.38 In his August 1913 meeting with the Russians

Joffre had emphasized the importance of having numerical superiorityover the Germans in the west,39 but the participation of the Britishremained uncertain, since the British, as the French recognized, couldbe delayed for political or naval reasons.40 In 1919 Joffre acknowl-edged, Personally, I was convinced that they would come, but in the endthere was no formal commitment on their part. There were only studieson embarking and debarking and on the positions that would be reservedfor their troops.41

With the broad outlines of French strategy shaped by Joffres own

preference for the offensive and by the requirement to launch a massiveoffensive simultaneously with Russia, he carefully considered the Ger-mans capability to advance through neutral Belgium. Concern aboutsuch a move had long percolated through the High Command. As early

35. See Demandes formuls par le Colonel Sir George Clarke, Secrtaire Per-manent du Comit de dfense de lEmpire britannique, n.d.; Letter from Major Gen-eral N. G. Lyttelton, Chief of the General Staff, 26 July 1907; both in carton 7N1782,S.H.A.T.

36. Rsum des questions examins par les tat-majors franais et anglais, Note

remise par le Gnral Brun aux Affaires trangres, 10 mai 1906, carton 7N1782,S.H.A.T.; Le lieutenant-colonel Huguet, Attach militaire lAmbassade de laRpublique Franaise en Angleterre, Note sur la composition de larme anglaise des-tine oprer sur le continent dans le cas dune guerre entre la France et lAllemagne,22 janvier 1906, carton 7N1782, S.H.A.T.

37. Memorandum de la Confrence du 20 juillet 1911, carton 7N1782, S.H.A.T.38. 2e Bureau, Comparison des forces qui pourraient se trouver en prsence sur

le thatre du Nord-Est en cas de conflit avec lAllemagne, 19 octobre 1912, carton2N1, S.H.A.T.

39. Procs-verbal des entretiens du mois daot 1913 entre les Chefs dtat-major des armes franaises et russes, 24 aot 1913,D.D.F., 3e srie, vol. VIII, annexeno. 79, p. 90.

40. Ministre de la Guerre, .-M.-A., 4e Bureau, Note pour ltat-Major de lAr-me (3e Bureau), 4 mars 1913, carton 7N1782, S.H.A.T.

41. Dposition de M. le marchal Joffre, Procs-verbaux de la CommissiondEnqute, 2e Partie, p. 159.

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as February 1892 Plan XII included a contingency for the Germans vio-lating Belgian neutrality.42 Intelligence about a German war game in1906, as well as a meticulous study of the role German fortifications at

Metz-Thionville could play in a drive across Belgium, increased Francesconcern about such a maneuver.43 In February 1908, General Henri deLacroix, Vice President of the Superior Council of War at the time, pre-sented an analysis to the Council which emphasized the Germans tra-dition of enveloping their opponents flanks and which foresaw theirpassing through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium, sending two armiesaround the flank of French fortifications, and driving south along theMoselle and Meuse valleys.44When completed in March 1909, Plan XVIplaced more emphasis than previous plans on the possibility of the Ger-

mans moving through Luxembourg or Belgium.When Michel became Vice President of the Superior Council of Warin 1910, he had reservations about Plan XVI and much greater concernsthan de Lacroix about a German move through Belgium. To respond tothis threat, Michel suggested a new strategy: defend on the right fromBelfort to Mzires and launch a vigorous offensive on the left towardAntwerp, Brussels, and Namur.45 Since French forces could not occupysuch a vast front without the full and complete integration of thereserves, Michel also proposed a reorganization of the army, primarily

through the adoption of what he called the demi-brigade, a formationused during the wars of the French Revolution to integrate active andreserve forces. In essence, an active regiment and a reserve regimentwould form a demi-brigade, thereby doubling the size of each brigade,division, and corps.46 Michel presented his ideas on reorganizing thearmy to the Superior Council of War on 19 July 1911,47 and the attitude

42. A. Marchand, Plans de concentration de 1871 1914 (Paris: Berger-

Levrault, 1926), 108.43. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:11617.44. Note lue par le gnral de Lacroix, la sance du conseil suprieur de la

guerre, du 15 fvrier 1908,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexeno. 2, pp. 67.

45. Conseil suprieur de la guerre, Concentration et plan doprations, rapportau ministre au sujet de ltude dun projet doprations, fvrier 1911, Les armes

franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 3, pp. 711. Michels report is alsoreproduced in Dposition de M. le gnral Michel,Procs-verbaux de la Commission

dEnqute, 1re Partie, pp. 97102.46. Note du 15 juin 1911, rdige par le gnral Michel, vice-prsident du con-

seil suprieur de la guerre, et soumise aux dliberations du conseil suprieur de laguerre le 19 juillet 1911,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no.4, pp. 1216.

47. Conseil suprieur de la guerre, Procs-verbal de la sance du Mercredi, 19juillet 1911, pp. 2045, carton 1N10, S.H.A.T.


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of Frances most senior general officers toward his proposal is apparentin one officers reference to him as loony.48 One of the generals told

Messimy, the newly appointed Minister of War who had a mandate to

reorganize the High Command, Michel is a national danger.49

Unim-pressed by Michel or his proposal, Messimy replaced the unfortunategeneral with Joffre.

Shortly after becoming Chief of the General Staff and Vice Presidentof the Superior Council of War, Joffre reconsidered French strategy. Dis-missing Michels concept for defending along the entire Belgian frontierbut remaining attentive to the likelihood of the Germans advancingthrough Belgium, he modified Plan XVI to cover more of the frontier. Toincrease the number of divisions immediately available, a prerequisite

for covering a longer front, he shifted forces from the second line and theItalian border. In his memoirs, Joffre claimed to have increased the num-ber of divisions available immediately from thirty-eight to fifty-eight. Hethen arranged to shift Fifth Army farther to the left, as far west as Mz-ires, and push Sixth Army closer to Verdun and the Belgian frontierwest of Luxembourg.50 These changes placed two French armies (sevencorps) near the Belgian border and provided some protection against thepossibility of the Germans attempting to envelop the French flank bydriving around Verdun or as deep as Sedan or Mzires. Joffre also

placed greater emphasis on an immediate offensive; he intended toattack as soon as possible. He published the new variation of Plan XVI on6 September, only six weeks after becoming Chief of the General Staff.51

During the next several months, Joffre continued to contemplate thepossibility of a German advance into Belgium. After carefully consider-ing French and German alternatives, he sought permission in a meetingof the Superior Council of National Defense in January 1912 to advanceinto Belgium at the first news of a German attack.52 Composed of thePresident of the Republic, President of the Council of Ministers (Pre-

mier), Minister of War, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Chief of the Gen-eral Staff, the Superior Council was not a decision-making body, but thePremier, Joseph Caillaux, made it clear that French forces could notenter Belgium until after the Germans had violated its neutrality. Cail-

48. Dposition de M. le gnral Michel,Procs-verbaux de la Commission dEn-qute, 1re Partie, p. 103.

49. Messimy, Mes souvenirs, 72, 75; Dposition de M. le gnral Messimy,Procs-verbaux de la Commission dEnqute, 1re Partie, p. 132.

50. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:2224.51. Ministre de la Guerre, Modifications apporter au plan XVI, 6 septembre

1911,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 5, pp. 1718.52. Procs-verbal, Conseil suprieur de la Dfense nationale, Sance du 9 jan-

vier 1912, carton 2N1, S.H.A.T.

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laux emphasized, Not one French soldier will put a foot on the soil ofBelgium if the Germans respect the treaties [of neutrality].53

After the Caillaux government fell a few days later and Poincarbecame Premier, Joffre again sought permission to enter Belgium. At a

late-night meeting in February 1912 of the Superior Council of NationalDefense, Joffre reviewed military agreements with Russia and Britainand offered a detailed assessment of alternatives for offensive operations

53. Caillaux,Mmoires, 21314.

Forts along the France-German frontier, mid-1914.


Huy

Stenay

Charmes

Baccarat

Chimay

Neufchteau

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on the northeastern frontier. By striking in Belgium, the French, heargued, could avoid the enemys fortifications at Metz-Thionville,threaten their lines of communication, and use the British more effec-

tively. He also explained that enemy fortifications and natural obstaclesseverely limited the opportunity to attack into Alsace and Lorraine. Heconcluded, The situation will be infinitely more advantageous if we arepermitted to extend our left beyond our frontier into the Grand Duchyof Luxembourg and onto Belgian territory.54

Despite the attractiveness of Joffres appeal, Poincarlike his pre-decessor, Caillauxrefused to let French forces enter Belgium prior toGerman violation of its neutrality. The Premier insisted that Belgiumnever would agree to Frances violating its neutrality and that a violation

would probably result in Belgium joining Germany. More importantly,such a violation could cause Britain to withdraw from its commitment toFrance, since the possibility of Germanys invading Belgium had been animportant reason for British acceptance of military agreements withFrance. Poincars only concession was his willingness to accept a viola-tion of Belgiums neutrality if a certain menace of German invasionexisted.55 Two premiers, Caillaux and Poincar, had adamantly opposedviolating Belgiums neutrality, and Joffre had no choice but to accepttheir decision.

Still believing French forces had to advance into Belgium, Joffreknew better than to disobey his political superiors and initiate prepara-tions for an advance. Consequently, as he acknowledged in his memoirs,he concealed his intentions.

Officially, in a document distributed to a large number of people, Icould take into account only those operations that would take placeoutside Belgium. Since I was obliged to consider the possibility of aviolation of Belgian neutrality, I preferred to say nothing [about anadvance into Belgium] in an operations plan, contenting myself with

a concentration [plan] with various alternatives. And I confinedmyself to announcing my intention to attack in the general directionof the northeast as soon as all French forces were assembled.56

In other words, the alternatives in Plan XVII provided sufficient guide-lines for French forces to plan and prepare, but Joffre provided no detailson his intentions, especially those concerning the violation of Belgianneutrality. As he confessed in his memoirs, however, he always con-

54. Confrence tenue au Ministre des Affaires trangres, 21 fvrier 1912,C.S.D.N., pp. 56, carton 2N1, S.H.A.T.; Joffre,Mmoires, 1:11921.

55. Confrence tenue au Ministre des Affaires trangres, 21 fvrier 1912,C.S.D.N., p. 6, carton 2N1, S.H.A.T.; Poincar,Au service de la France, 1:22325; Jof-fre,Mmoires, 1:12224.

56. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:190.

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sidered the maneuver into Belgium Frances most desirable course ofaction.57

As for the Germans marching across Belgium, the key indicator was

the number of active enemy corps. By August 1914, the German armyaccording to French calculationshad twenty-six active corps. If theGermans defended East Prussia against the Russians and defended Lor-raine against the French, they did not have enough corps, the Frenchbelieved, to concentrate sufficient forces for a drive deep across centralBelgium, west of the Meuse-Sambre rivers through Lige, Namur,Charleroi, and Maubeuge. Joffres staff assured him that if the Germanstried to go beyond the Lige-Namur line, they would dangerously over-extend their front and have an insufficient density for a vigorous

action.58

The Germans could extend their forces and amass a large forcefor an advance west of the Meuse-Sambre rivers only by integratingreserve units in the front line and using them the same way they usedactive units. As Joffre noted in his memoirs, the French expected theGermans not to integrate their active and reserve units and instead touse their reserves the same way the French expected to use their obvi-ously inferior troopsin the second line.59 Thus, Joffre accepted thelikelihood of Germanys violating Belgian neutrality and advancingaround the flank of the Verdun-Toul-pinal-Belfort fortifications, but he

did not think the Germans had sufficient forces to advance beyond theLige-Namur-Charleroi-Maubeuge line. The Germans could drive deepinto Belgium, Joffre believed, only if they weakened their center in east-ern Belgium and Luxembourg.60

After publishing modifications to Plan XVI in September 1911, Jof-fre and his staff spent more than a year and a half revising French plansfor concentrating forces on the frontier in the event of war. Finally, on18 April 1913, Joffre presented his new concept to the Superior Councilof War which supported it unanimously. Even though the July 1911 and

January 1912 decrees on the High Command required Joffre to consultthe Superior Council on the establishment of new strategies, Joffre dis-cussed only the concentration plan and provided the Council no clearoutline of his strategy.61 When the Minister of War approved the pro-posed concept, Joffre proceeded with completing and publishing the

57. Ibid., 1:241.58. Ibid., 1:139.59. Ibid., 1:135.60. Ibid., 1:278.61. Journal Officiel de la Rpublique franaise (29 Juillet 1911), 6444;Journal

Officiel de la Rpublique franaise (21 Janvier 1912), 711; Conseil suprieur de laguerre, Procs-verbal de la sance du Vendredi 18 avril 1913, p. 66, carton 1N10,S.H.A.T.


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concentration plan. On 7 February 1914, Joffres staff finished the mainparts of Plan XVII and issued copies to each designated army comman-der; the staff finally completed all annexes in the plan on 1 May.62

Plan XVII envisaged Frances concentrating five armies in the north-east and clearly stated, The intention of the commander-in-chief is todeliver, with all forces assembled, an attack against the Germanarmies.63 Other than this expression of offensive intentions, however,the plan had no clear statement of Joffres strategy and included onlyinstructions for concentrating the field armies and options for attacks.From right to left, Joffre placed First, Second, Third, and Fifth armiesalong the German, Luxembourg, and Belgian frontiers. Fourth Armyremained in reserve behind Second and Third armies. Fifth Army, which

had five infantry corps and a cavalry corps, occupied a broad front begin-ning east of the point where the eastern border of Luxembourg touchedFrance and extending west beyond Mzires to Hirson. Joffre also hadfour Reserve Division Groups, each with three divisions. After posi-tioning the First Group on the right of First Army and the Fourth Groupon the left of Fifth Army, he placed the Second and Third groups behindSecond and Third armies.64 Thus, Plan XVII had about the same forcesalong the Luxembourg and Belgian frontier as Joffres modified version ofPlan XVI had had.

Joffre placed his forces, he later explained, so they occupied astrategic central position, permitting an offensive or defensive towardthe east . . . , toward the north in the left flank of the enemy if hemarched toward Paris across Belgium, or toward the south, in his rightflank, if he passed through Switzerland.65 To provide this flexibility,each army commander received specific instructions in Plan XVII whichincluded the mission of the armies on his flank and provided options forpossible attacks. First and Second armies were ordered to prepare toattack south of Metz-Thionville. While First Army would prepare for an

attack north from Baccarat toward Sarrebourg and then Sarreguemines,Second Army would prepare for an attack northeast from Nancy towardSaarbrcken. Third Army served as the connecting link between Jof-fres right and left and focused on Metz-Thionville; it would either invest

Metz or throw back any enemy forces coming from the Metz-Thionvillefortifications. Focusing on Luxembourg and Belgium, Fifth Army pre-pared to attack north of Metz-Thionville into Luxembourg or into Bel-gium. Since Fifth Army had the mission of preparing to attack the rightwing of the main enemy force, the direction of its attack depended on

62. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:16980, 18889.63. E.M.A., Plan XVII, Directives pour la concentration, 7 fvrier 1914, Les

armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 8, pp. 2122.64. E.M.A., Plan XVII, Directives pour la concentration, pp. 2135.65. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:14647.

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whether the Germans entered neutral Luxembourg and Belgium. If theGermans did not violate the territory of Luxembourg or Belgium, FifthArmy would attack north of Thionville into Lorraine but would retain

sufficient forces along the Belgian frontier to protect against a subse-quent German drive deep into Belgium. If the Germans entered Belgium,Fifth Army would advance north into Belgium toward Florenville andthen Neufchteau. In this latter case, Fourth Army would enter the linebetween Fifth and Third armies and march into Belgium toward Arlon.If the Germans did not violate the territory of Luxembourg or Belgium,Fourth Army would enter the line between Second and Third armies andparticipate in the Lorraine attack. These offensive options provided thefield armies sufficient information to complete much of their planning

even if they did not know Joffres overall strategy.A secret annex to Plan XVII dealt with the British, known as ArmyW.66As explained earlier, the value of the British assistance came lessfrom their offensive capability than from their enabling the Allies toachieve numerical superiority over the Germans in the west. If theBritish arrived on time, Joffre expected them to move into position onthe left of Fifth Army in the vicinity of Hirson (fifty kilometers west ofMzires).67 Since the time required to transport the British to the con-tinent corresponded with the time required to mobilize the entire

French army, Joffre could expect assistance, but given the possibility ofa delay in the British decision to mobilize or problems in transportation,he knew the British might not participate in initial operations. Addition-ally, the secrecy and sensitivity of the conversations between France andBritain prevented any open mention of British assistance.

The assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to theAustrian throne, in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, unleashed a chain ofevents which drew most of Europe into war, compelled France to mobi-lize its forces, and led Joffre to complete his strategy. As the interna-

tional crisis worsened, France took the precautionary step of directingall general officers on Saturday, 25 July, to report to their posts and onthe next day recalled all officers from leave and cancelled all scheduledmovements of troops.68 On Monday, as Joffre explained in his memoirs,My first thought was to strengthen liaison with our [Russian] allies.Shortly thereafter, the French ambassador and military attachapproached the Russian general staff to emphasize the importance of acombined offensive and asked if France could count on them.69When

66. W, Prvisions de ltat-major de larme (4e bureau) relative la dure de laconcentration W, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 7, p.20.

67. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:14849.68. Ibid., 1:2089.69. Ibid., 1:211.


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Austria declared war on Serbia on Tuesday, 28 July, the French orderedall troops on pass or leave to report to their units.70After learning on 29July that the Germans had strengthened their covering forces on the

Franco-German border, the Viviani government on the following dayapproved placing part of Frances covering forces along the border butkeeping them ten kilometers from the frontier. To avoid escalating thecrisis, only those troops who were close enough to march to the frontier,rather than ride, moved forward.71 When Austria and Russia began fullmobilization on 3031 July, Joffre demanded permission on 31 July toplace the entire covering force along the border. After citing Germansteps toward mobilization, he insisted that further delays could result inFrances having to abandon part of its territory.72 That afternoon, after a

meeting of the Council of Ministers, the Premier, Ren Viviani, approvedsending the entire covering force to the border but ordered it to remainten kilometers from the frontier.73

On Saturday, 1 August, the Council of Ministers decided it could notdelay mobilization any longer and authorized the Minister of War toissue the order that afternoon.74 At 1530 hours Messimy signed themobilization order and twenty-five minutes later the news flashed viatelegram across France.75 That same day, Germany declared war on Rus-sia, and the next day, 2 August, the day prior to the German declaration

of war on France, small groups of German troops crossed the Frenchborder at several points. Though the Minister of War had emphasizedearlier the importance of not having anyone enter Germany, he imme-diately reversed himself and informed Joffre that he had absolute lib-erty of movement for executing his plans even if this results in thecrossing of the German frontier.76 But he did not permit French forcesto enter Belgium. At 1730 hours, Joffre sent an order to the commandersof the six corps in the covering force which said, The intention of thecommander-in-chief is not to launch a general offensive until his forces

are assembled. That warning order gave specific missions to each of thecorps in the covering force; of these corps, VII Corps prepared toadvance toward Mulhouse, which was on Joffres far right, twenty-five

70. Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, p. 74.71. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:21415, 21721; Messimy,Mes souvenirs, 13942; Les

armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, p. 76.72. Joffre, Note, 31 juillet 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes,

annexe no. 17, p. 58.73. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:22123; Messimy,Mes souvenirs, 14446.74. Poincar,Au service de la France, 4:47980.75. Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, pp. 8081.76. Ministre de la Guerre, Communication tlphonique du ministre de la

Guerre au gnral Belin, 2 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes,annexe no. 27, p. 67.

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kilometers forward of the French frontier in Alsace, while XX Corps pre-pared to advance toward Nancy, which lay in France twenty kilometersforward of the Charmes gap between the Toul and pinal fortifications.77

Later that evening, as indications of Germanys having violated Belgiumsneutrality mounted, Joffre ordered Fourth Army, which was assemblingto the rear of Second and Third armies, to enter the line between Thirdand Fifth armies and prepare to attack north. He also informed FifthArmy of the change.78

Joffre refused, however, either to reveal his concept of operations tohis political superiors and his subordinate commanders or to commithimself to a course of action. Since the enemys strategy and operationsremained uncertain, It was still too early, as Joffre explained in his

memoirs, to announce formally my intention to operate in Belgium.79

He nonetheless did meet with his army commander on the afternoon of3 August and partially revealed his intention to launch two attacks, oneon his right and the other on his left. When General Yvon Dubail, com-mander of First Army and a participant in the staff talks with Russia,asked for additional troops for an attack into Alsace, Joffre refused toprovide more information and opaquely responded, Thats your plan,not mine.80

On the morning of 4 August, Messimy wired Joffre that Germany had

declared war on France and Italy had declared its neutrality. Notwith-standing the declaration of war, the minister rigorously and formallyforbade any move into Belgium even by cavalrymen and aviators.81 Bythe time this telegram had arrived, however, the Germans had enteredBelgium in force. The Belgians immediately appealed for help andinformed Paris and London that French and British troops could enterBelgium.82 The next day, 5 August, Joffre sent aircraft and dirigibles over

77. Ministre de la Guerre, Groupe dArmes du Nord-Est, Instruction gnralesecrte pour la couverture, 2 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1,annexes, annexe no. 31, pp. 6970.

78. G.Q.G., IVe arme, Variante la concentration, 2 aot 1914,Les armesfranaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 33, pp. 7273; G.Q.G., Ve arme,Variante la concentration, 2 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1,annexes, annexe no. 32, pp. 7172.

79. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:236.80. Charles Lanrezac,Le plan de campagne franais et le premier mois de la

guerre (2 aot3 septembre 1914) (Paris: Payot, 1921), 6061. Dubail does not men-tion the incident in his memoirs. Yvon Dubail, Quatre Annes de Commandement,19141918 (Paris: L. Fournier, 1920), 1:1213.

81. Messimy, La guerre est dclare, 4 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 40, p. 78.

82. Bruxelles, Klobukowski, 4 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1,annexes, annexe no. 44, p. 80.


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Belgium and authorized cavalry to enter Belgium.83 He also formallyassumed command of the French army and sent a message to all soldierssaying, I am counting on everyone doing his duty, all his duty.84

On 6 August, with Frances covering force in place and its armiesassembling on the northeast frontier, the stage was set for Joffre to com-plete the design of his strategy, which depended on simultaneous attacksfrom France and Russia. Though Joffre continued to have doubts aboutthe British, Grand Duke Nicholas, the Russian commander, soon dis-pelled fears of Russian timidity when he said on 5 August, I am resolvedto launch an offensive as soon as possible, and I will make an all-outattack.85 After subsequent messages from the French ambassador inRussia indicated that Nicholas would begin his offensive on 14 August,86

Joffre resolved to launch a large offensive into Alsace-Lorraine on thesame day. He also insisted on unleashing on 7 August a smaller attackinto Alsace which would occur prior to his main attack and which woulddemonstrate to the Russians, as well as to the French, the readiness andwillingness of the French army to fight. Although the commander of VIICorps, which had responsibility for the attack into Alsace, reported alarge concentration of enemy troops in the area, Joffre refused to delaythe attack and ordered the corps forward.87

VII Corps offensive, which was little more than a large-scale raid,

encountered no strong resistance during the twenty-five kilometeradvance toward Mulhouse, and French soldiers entered the city withoutopposition at 1500 hours on 8 August.88 Despite the initial wave of joythroughout France at the news of the victory, indications of future diffi-culties appeared when the small force failed to make further gains andthe Germans drove it back on 10 August. Meanwhile, Joffre learned thatthe British, who had begun mobilization on 5 August, probably could bein France ready to advance on 21 August.89 This information influenced

83. Ministre de la Guerre, Instruction commune au corps de cavalerie et au 2ecorps, 5 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 54,p. 86.

84. Grand tat-Major Gnral, Ordre gnral no. 2, 5 aot 1914, Les armesfranaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 53, p. 86.

85. Ptersbourg, Palologue, Offensive de larme russe, 5 aot 1914, Lesarmes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 52, p. 85.

86. Ptersbourg, Palologue, Arme Russe, 6 aot 1914,Les armes franaises,Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 70, p. 96; Messimy,Mes souvenirs, 18889.

87. 7e C.A., Compte rendu supplmentaire, 5 aot 1914,Les armes franaises,Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 66, p. 94; G.Q.G., Commandant en chef com-mandant arme pinal, 6 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes,annexe no. 73, p. 98.

88. Dubail,Quatre annes de commandement, 1:20.89. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:243.

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his decision to sequence his attacks with the drive into Lorraine on hisright being followed by the drive into eastern Belgium on his left.

On 8 August, Joffre issued General Instruction No. 1, which finally

revealed his strategy and his concept of operations, the goal of which wasthe destruction of enemy forces, not occupation of territory. Not sur-prisingly, he intended to send the First and Second armies on his rightinto Lorraine, south of the Metz-Thionville fortifications, and the Third,Fourth, and Fifth armies on his left into Belgium and Luxembourg, northof the fortifications.90 A few days later Joffre formally scheduled theattack on the right for 14 August (the same date as the Russian attack),and he soon settled on 21 August for the attack on his left. He intendedfor the attack on the right to be a supporting attack and the attack on the

left to be the main attack. Aware of the possibility of a deep envelopmentby the Germans, Joffre also ordered the Fourth Reserve Division Groupto occupy a fortified position near Hirson on his extreme left and guardagainst an attack from the north or east.91 This order enabled the Frenchto watch the Chimay Gap and provided insurance against a Germansweep as deep as the eastern bank of the Meuse-Sambre rivers.

Although intelligence provided important information about thelocation and activity of German forces, the enemys strategic schemeremained uncertain.92 Despite reports of the Germans attacking Lige,

Joffre continued thinking the Germans would not make their mainattack any deeper than Sedan or Mzires. When Joffre learned thatBritish forces would arrive late and perhaps not be ready for action until26 August and that they would consist of four rather than six infantrydivisions, he decided not to wait for them.93 Fifth Army appeared strongenough on his left to deal with a German drive deep across Belgium. Amore pressing concern emerged when Castelnau, the Second Army com-mander, said he could not advance into Lorraine until 17 August, threedays later than the date coordinated with the Russians for the synchro-

90. G.Q.G., Instruction gnrale no 1, 8 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 103, pp. 12426.

91. Ibid., p. 126; Armes de lEst, Ordre particulier pour le 4e groupe de divi-sions de rserve, 8 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexeno. 105, p. 127.

92. The report stated that seventeen enemy corps faced France, but its list ofpossible corps raised the number to eighteen. G.Q.G., Groupement connu des forcesallemandes actives, 9 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes,annexe no. 125, pp. 14243.

93. Ministre de la Guerre, Transport des troupes anglaises, 9 aot 1914, Lesarmes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 122, p. 140; G.Q.G., Legnral commandant en chef M. le prsident de la Rpublique, no. 297, 9 aot 1914,

Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 124, pp. 14142; Joffre,Mmoires, 1:243.


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nized offensives. Not surprisingly, Joffre refused to change the date, andCastelnau soon agreed to attack on 14 August.94

With the date of the attack on his right fixed, Joffre issued final

orders to his subordinate commanders. In essence he sent two armiesforward between Toul and pinal through the gap separating the Verdun-Toul and pinal-Belfort fortifications. First Army would make the mainattack on the right with its four corps. To support First Armys attack,Joffre ordered Second Army to advance with two corps on First Armysleft95 and, with its other units arrayed in echelon farther on the left, toguard against the possibility of a German thrust from Metz.96 Thoughsimple in concept Joffres attack into Alsace-Lorraine was extremely dif-ficult to execute; as the two armies advanced their fronts became pro-

gressively larger. First Armys task was particularly difficult, for it had toattack in divergent directions (northeast toward Sarrebourg and easttoward Donon, thirty-five kilometers west of Strasbourg) across a frontthat stretched more than eighty kilometers over rugged terrain. Thoughin less difficult terrain, Second Armys front eventually extended seventykilometers. That Joffre would even consider such a complex operation isan indication of his inexperience. At this point, however, peacetimemaneuvers shaped Joffres thinking more than wartime experience.

Also in preparation for the attack, Joffre reorganized the units on his

extreme right. After relieving the VII Corps commander, Joffre placedthat corps, two additional infantry divisions, a cavalry division, and FirstReserve Division Group in the newly formed Army of Alsace and madeGeneral Pau its commander.97 He gave Pau the mission of securing theFrench right flank, thereby freeing First Army to concentrate on itsattack into Lorraine. With the formation of the Army of Alsace, theFrench had (from south to north) the Army of Alsace, First Army, andSecond Army. In an indication of his priorities, Joffre pulled two corpsout of Second Army (Castelnau originally had five plus a reserve division

group) and kept them under his own control for possible use on the Bel-

94. IIe Arme, Le gnral de Castelnau, commandant la IIe arme, au gnralcommandant en chef, 8 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes,annexe no. 115, p. 133; G.Q.G., Le commandant en chef au gnral commandant lar-me Neufchteau, 9 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes,annexe no. 128, pp. 14546; IIe Arme, Le gnral commandant la IIe arme augnral commandant en chef, 10 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1,annexes, annexe no. 166, p. 177.

95. G.Q.G., Le commandant en chef au gnral commandant la Ire arme, 11aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 178, p. 189;G.Q.G., Le commandant en chef au gnral commandant la IIe arme, 11 aot 1914,

Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 179, pp. 18990.96. IIe Arme, Instruction gnrale et secrte no 1, 12 aot 1914, Les armes

franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 207, pp. 21314.97. Les armes franaises, Tome 10, vol. 1, pp. 52829, 672.

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gian frontier.98 One of these corps, IX Corps, would participate in the firstphase of the upcoming offensive and then be transferred north.

On the morning of the fourteenth Joffres offensive on his right

began. The previous day the French ambassador in St. Petersburg hadverified that the Russians would begin their offensive at dawn on thefourteenth,99 and as Joffre noted in his memoirs, [S]urpassing all ourhopes, Russia entered the battle at the same time as us.100 First Armysent two corps east into the Vosges and two corps northeast toward Sar-rebourg while Second Army had two corps advance on First Armys left.The remainder of Second Army (one corps and a division reserve group)advanced more slowly, moving in echelon and guarding against a Ger-man thrust from Metz into the left flank of the advancing French forces.

As the battle unfolded on the right, Joffres intentionas he finallyexplained to Dubail and Castelnau on 21 Augustwas for First and Sec-ond armies to retain and draw toward them an important part of theopposing forces,101 since the main French effort consisted of a maneu-ver farther north into eastern Belgium and Luxembourg.102

Just prior to the First and Second armies attack into Alsace-Lor-raine on 14 August, several factors, including the German cavalrysattempt to seize bridges across the Meuse River south of Namur, led to afresh assessment by the French High Command and the realization that

the Germans intended to strike deeper into Belgium than previouslythought possible.103 Joffre informed his subordinate commanders on 15August and the British commander the following day that the enemywould make his main effort with his right wing and strike north of Givet,which lay along the Meuse River forty kilometers north of Mzires.104

98. Gras, Castelnau, 149; G.Q.G., Le commandant en chef au gnral comman-dant la IIe arme, 11 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes,annexe no. 179, pp. 18990.

99. Messimy, Mes souvenirs, 190; Palologue, Ptersbourg, Message tlphon

par 2e bureau, 13 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexeno. 225, p. 235.

100. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:265.101. G.Q.G., Instruction particulire no 18 pour: larme dAlsace, la Ire arme,

la IIe arme, 21 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexeno. 816, p. 693.

102. IIe arme, Message tlphonique, 21 aot 1914, Les armes franaises,Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 707, p. 604.

103. Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, pp. 32829; Ier C.A., Engagement Dinant, 14 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no.292, pp. 29899.

104. G.Q.G., Instruction particulire no 10 aux commandants des IVe et Vearmes et du corps de cavalerie, 15 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol.1, annexes, annexe no. 307, pp. 3078; G.Q.G., Note pour le commandant en chef desforces anglaises, 16 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes,annexe no. 349, pp. 34142.


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450

While such an attack would take advantage of the road network runninggenerally from northeast to southwest and could place Germans deep inthe French rear, Joffre still did not expect significant German forces to

cross the Meuse. To placate General Charles Lanrezac, the Fifth ArmyCommander who was increasingly concerned about enemy forces to hisfront, Joffre moved three divisions to his extreme left and authorizedLanrezac to march forward between the Sambre and the Meuse rivers.105

At a meeting on 16 August with Sir John French, commander of theBritish Expeditionary Force, Joffre learned the British would not be com-pletely ready until the twenty-fourth, but he remained confident of

Allied success. Over the next few days, as additional reports arrivedabout a sizeable German force crossing the Meuse, Joffre saw opportu-

nity, not danger. [The enemys] shift toward the north, he laterexplained, could be accomplished only by weakening the German cen-ter in Luxembourg.106

On the morning of 18 August, three days prior to the French driveinto eastern Belgium, Joffre issued additional instructions to the threearmies on his left and adjusted their mission and composition to corre-spond with his latest understanding of the enemys location.107 He aimedthe Third and Fourth armies at enemy forces in eastern Belgiumbetween Bastogne and Thionville. By attacking and defeating this group,

which he believed had less density108 than the group heading towardGivet, he hoped to strike what he later identified as the most sensitivepoint in the German disposition, unhinge the main enemy force,109 andhalt the German advance. He also modified the composition and missionof Fifth Army and aimed it toward the main German force which theFrench expected to move north of Givet. After Third and Fourth armiesdefeated the enemy forces between Bastogne and Thionville, Joffreexpected Fourth Army to turn northwest and strike the enemys mainforce in the left flank.110 Defeat or victory thus rested in the hands of

Third and, especially, Fourth armies. To ensure their success, Joffre

105. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:26768.106. Ibid., 1:278.107. G.Q.G., Instruction particulire no 13, aux commandants des IIIe, IVe et Ve

armes, 18 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no.450, p. 424; G.Q.G., Bulletin de Renseignements, 18 aot, 6 heures, 18 aot 1914,Les

armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 447, p. 422.108. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:283.109. G.Q.G., Situation gnrale, 23 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1,

vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 1044, p. 842.110. G.Q.G., Instruction particulire no 13, aux commandants des IIIe, IVe et Ve

armes, 18 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no.450, p. 425.

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transferred XI Corps from Fifth Army to Fourth Army and IX Corps fromThird Army to Fourth Army,111 thereby giving Fourth Army six corps.

After issuing the attack order on 18 August Joffre held Third and

Fourth armies in place for the next two days. On the nineteenth, cavalryreconnaissance and aerial observers reported few enemy forces to theimmediate front of the two armies but found more enemy advancingtoward the northwest, forty to fifty kilometers forward of French out-posts.112 An intelligence report from Joffres headquarters that dayincluded a Belgian report of important enemy forces, probably GeneralKarl von Blows Second Army, crossing the Meuse just south of Lige.113

In mid-morning Joffre gave Fourth Army permission to secure passagesacross the Semois River, which meandered through the difficult terrain

of the Ardennes just over the frontier north of Sedan. Joffre, however,warned the army commander, I draw your attention to the necessity ofnot revealing our maneuver prior to the moment when it isunleashed.114As the day progressed and reports of enemy forces mov-ing across the front of Third and Fourth armies increased, the FourthArmy commander requested permission to advance into Belgium,115 butJoffre said no and asked his army commanders to be patient. Intelligencereports indicated, Joffre explained, that the Germans had not yet madeimportant movements across the Meuse between Huy (twenty-five kilo-

meters southwest of Lige) and Givet (seventy kilometers southwest ofLige and forty kilometers north of Mzires) and that enemy forces inthe Huy-Givet region seemed to be marching toward the Belgian army.He explained that the Germans wanted to bait the French into attack-ing prematurely and that he wanted to avoid this trap.116

Finally, at 2030 hours on 20 August, the day the Germans unleashedtheir counterattack against First and Second armies on the French right,Joffre ordered Third and Fourth armies to attack on the following day.Convinced that he understood the German scheme of maneuver, Joffre

111. G.Q.G., Instruction particulire no 10 aux commandants des IVe et Vearmes et du corps de cavalerie, 15 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol.1, annexes, annexe no. 307, p. 308; G.Q.G., Gnral commandant en chef gnralcommandant arme Varennes, 18 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1,annexes, annexe no. 459, p. 429.

112. Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, pp. 35455.113. G.Q.G., Bulletin de renseignements du 19 aot, 19 aot 1914,Les armes

franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 513, pp. 47374.114. G.Q.G., Commandant en chef commandant arme Stenay, 20 aot 1914,

Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 586, p. 529.115. IVe Arme, Message tlphon par le gnral Maistre au commandant Bel,

20 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 635, p.556.

116. G.Q.G., Commandant en chef commandant de larme de Stenay, 20 aot1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 589, p. 530.


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THE JOURNAL OF452

ordered Fourth Army to cross the Semois River and advance northeasttoward Neufchteau and Third Army to advance toward Arlon and pro-tect the right flank of Fourth Army against a German counterattack.117

He subsequently informed the two army commanders, The enemy willbe attacked wherever he is encountered.118 To facilitate the task ofThird Army, Joffre split it into two armies, Third Army and Army of Lor-raine. The latter army consisted of that portion of Third Army south of

Verdun; it had the mission of guarding against an enemy incursion fromthe vicinity of Metz.119 By forming the Army of Lorraine, Joffre simplifiedthe task of the Third Army commander and left him free to concentrateon his mission in Belgium. That same day, he also told the commandersof First and Second armies and the Army of Alsace that they had accom-

plished the first part of their mission by holding and drawing to theman important part of the opposing forces.120

As Third and Fourth armies charged into Belgium on 21 August, theFrench expected to outnumber the enemy. This expectation soon provedfalse. While Fourth Army sent six corps into Belgium (including IX Corpswhich advanced only a short distance), plus a cavalry corps, Third Armysent three corps, plus a cavalry division. The Germans, however, hadtheir Fourth and Fifth armies between Metz and the northern tip of Lux-embourg; these armies included ten corps, two cavalry divisions, six

reserve brigades, and the garrison of Metz. The Germans thus had teninfantry corps while the French had nine. Since the German Fourth andFifth armies were near the center of the gigantic Schlieffen sweepthrough Belgium, they had moved more slowly than the First, Second,and Third armies which were farther to the west, but they had learnedof the French march into Belgium and Luxembourg on 21 August andprepared themselves for a significant encounter. In contrast the Frenchknew little about the enemy to their front, had inadequate maps, andremained overly optimistic about their chances of success. As the

French rushed forward on the first day of the offensive, Third Armyencountered the Germans first, but the initial enemy positions consisted

117. G.Q.G., Ordre au commandant de la IVe arme, 20 aot 1914,Les armesfranaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 593, p. 532.; G.Q.G., Le commandanten chef au commandant de la IIIe arme, 20 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 592, p. 531.

118. G.Q.G., Le commandant en chef au commandant de larme de Stenay, 21aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 696, p. 599.

119. G.Q.G., Ordre particulier no 14, 21 aot 1914, Les armes franaises,Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 700, pp. 6012.

120. G.Q.G., Instruction particulire no 18 pour: larme dAlsace, la Ire arme,la IIe arme, 21 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexeno. 816, p. 693.

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only of small detachments.121 Confident of success, Joffre told the Minis-ter of War, [T]he moment of decisive action is near.122

Evidence that the moment might not favor France appeared only

a few hours later when the Second Army commander, Castelnau,reported a deteriorating situation in Lorraine and a possible retreat andwarned, The situation appears very grave to me.123Although troubledby this report, Joffre remained optimistic. He believed the Germanscould launch a strong attack on his right only by shifting forces fromtheir center in eastern Belgium and Luxembourg. Such a shift, hethought, would make the enemys center even more vulnerable to theattack by Third and Fourth armies.124 Subsequent events proved him dis-astrously wrong.

In conclusion, while Plan XVII moved French forces to the Franco-Belgian and Franco-German border, Joffre did not reveal his wartimestrategy and the operations to support that strategy until after his forceswere located along the border and hostilities began. Moreover, he did notinform his subordinate commanders until 8 August when he publishedGeneral Instruction No. 1. Though he sent some French forces intoAlsace-Lorraine on 7 and 14 August, he restricted the size of those forcesand delayed sending even larger forces into Belgium until 21 Augustwhen more information about German movements became available.

Thus, Plan XVII provided for the concentration of French forces inAugust 1914 and identified several operational alternatives, but Joffrepersonally shaped Frances strategy and operations after the campaignbegan. Since he designed Plan XVII and determined French strategy andoperations after the war began, Frances strategy in 1914 was clearly hisown. And that strategy aimed to comply with the provisions of theFranco-Russian Alliance by delivering an early offensive into Alsace-Lor-raine and then striking a decisive blow against the supposedly vulnera-ble German center in eastern Belgium and Luxembourg.

In the final analysis, Joffres strategy suffered from several flaws, themost serious of which stemmed from assumptions that the Germanswouldnot drive across Belgium deep into the French rear, and that theywouldnot integrate reserve units into their leading forces. Joffre and hisstaff expected the enemy to advance through Luxembourg and Belgium,but they expected the Germans to weaken their center as they pushedtoward Lige, Namur, and Givet and the French Third and Fourth armies

121. Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, pp. 36869.122. Armes de lEst, Gnral commandant en chef ministre de la Guerre, 21

aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 2, annexes, vol. 1, annexe no. 103, p.93.

123. IIe Arme, Compte rendu, 21 aot 1914,Les armes franaises, Tome 1,vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 727, p. 620.

124. Joffre,Mmoires, 1:283.


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to encounter weak resistance in the enemys center. Instead of encoun-tering a weakened center in eastern Belgium, however, French forcesstruck large enemy units in strong defensive positions. To make matters

worse, Joffre failed to concentrate his forces and instead sent them off intwo distinctly different directions, one east into Alsace-Lorraine and theother northeast into Belgium toward Neufchteau and Arlon. To complywith the provisions of the Franco-Russian Alliance, he sent significantforces into Alsace-Lorraine even though he had emphasized the difficul-ties and futility of such an advance when he sought to convince Caillauxand Poincar to let French forces violate Belgiums neutrality. While Jof-fre could and, in fact, did adjust the composition and objectives of theforces he eventually sent into Alsace-Lorraine in the opening days of the

war, his splitting of his forces caused him to violate the fundamental pre-cept expressed in Plan XVII: to deliver, with all forces assembled, anattack against the German armies.125 Tragically for France, Joffres strat-egy was hardly better than the simplistic strategya blind charge intocentral Germanyusually associated with Plan XVII.

125. E.M.A., Plan XVII, Directives pour la concentration, p. 21.

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