8/6/2019 649912

1/19

The Past and Present Society

Rome and the Class Struggle in the Greek States 200-146 B. C.Author(s): John BriscoeSource: Past & Present, No. 36 (Apr., 1967), pp. 3-20Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/649912Accessed: 19/11/2010 03:24

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Oxford University Press and The Past and Present Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve

and extend access to Past & Present.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ouphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=pasthttp://www.jstor.org/stable/649912?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ouphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ouphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/649912?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=pasthttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup

8/6/2019 649912

2/19

ROMEAND THE CLASS Sl RUGGLEIN THEGREEKSTATES200-146B.C.CLASS DIVISIONS IN THE GREEKWORLD WEREEXTREMELYCLEAR-CUT.The distributionof wealthwas very uneven,and it is possible tospeakof twoparties n everystate,therich andthepoor,thefew andthe many. These descriptionsare commonin ancientwriters.Therewere,nodoubt, hosewhodid notfiteasily ntoeithercategorybut the schematisms far more fruitfulthan many modernones.Strifebetweenthese two classeswas a continual eatureof Greekhistory,andchangesof constitutionwerethe symptomof the victoryof one or otherof the classes. Oligarchywasthe ascendancy f therich, democracy f the poor.The classstrugglen the Greekstates,however,wasby no meansa purelyinternalmatterfor the statesconcerned; t also affectedrelationsbetweenstates. In the fifth centurythe democratshadlookedprincipally o Athens for support,the oligarchs o Sparta.2In the fourthcenturyPhilip II of Macedonsupported he upperclasses,andthis continuedo be the policy of the rulersof Macedondown to AntigonusDoson. The policywasreversedby Philip V,whocame o thethroneof Macedonn 22I B.C. He is known o haveencouragedivilstrifeand ohaveattemptedowoopopularavourbywearingcommondress and portrayinghimself as a man of thepeople.3 In 200 B.C. Rome went to war with Philip, and therefollowed heseriesof wars hat edto Rome'scompletedominationfthe Mediterraneanrea. Rome'spolicyin this periodtowards herival actions n the Greek tates s thesubjectof thispaper.

It will be convenient irstto summarizehe eventsof these years.In 200 B.C. Rome declaredwar on Macedon)ostensiblyto forcePhilip to ceasehis attackson otherGreekstates; in fact Rome hadseen the growingpower of Macedonand was afraid that Philip,either by himself or in conjunctionwith Antiochus,the king ofSyria,would invadeItaly and threatenRome'sdominationof the1 One thinks particularly of the famous passage in Thucydides, iii. 82-3.There are innumerablereferences n Aristotle'sPolitics.2 Cf. pp. I9-20 below.3 Cf. Polybius (hereinafterreferredto as Pol.), vii. II. I0, I2. 9, I3. 6-7,I4. 2-5, X. 26; Livy, xxvii. 3I. 3, XXXii. 2I. 3; Plutarch,Aratus,xtix. 2 ff.

8/6/2019 649912

3/19

4 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 3 6peninsula. Philip was defeated by Titus Quinctius Flamininus at thebattle of Cynoscephalae n I97 and forced to evacuate all his posses-sions outside Macedon itself. He was, however, left his kingdom andbecame an ally of Rome. The Roman senate issued a famousdeclaration, proclaiming Greece to be completely free, withoutgarrisons or tribute - though three of Philip's chief garrison townscontinued to be occupied by Roman troops until I94. In I95Flamininus freed the city of Argos from the domination of Nabis,the tyrant of Sparta.Meanwhile Rome had been troubled by the aggressions ofAntiochus of Syria. He had advanced along the coast of Asia Minorin I97, and by I96 had crossed the Hellespont. Negotiations withhim produced no solution. Before long Roman troops were back inGreece; the Aetolians were dissatisfied with the settlement madeafter the defeat of Philip and called in Antiochus to "free" Greecefrom Roman control. Antiochus arrived inadequately prepared andwas defeated in I9I at the battle of Thermopylae. He retreated toAsia and was again defeated at Magnesia in I90. The peace settle-ment imposed by Rome drove Antiochus back beyond the Taurusmountains, and gave large parts of Asia Minor to Rhodes andPergamum, Rome's chief allies amongst the Greeks.In the I80S Rome had to deal with renewed expansionist moves byPhilip and with a complex series of problems in the Peloponnese.In I79 Philip died and was succeeded by his son Perseus. The latterembarked on a policy of retrenchment at home and of renewingfriendly relations with other Greek states. Spurred on by reportsthat Perseus was making military preparations or a new war againstRome, the Romans declared war on Macedon. Perseus was defeatedat Pydna in I68 and the Macedonian monarchy was dismembered.Rome was now undisputed mistress of the Mediterranean. In thenext twenty years she was occupied with various disputes in differentparts of the Greek world. Military intervention was avoided untilthe senate decided that the last remaining independent power of anysize, the Achaean League, should be destroyed. Rome went to warin I47; the next year the Achaeans were defeated, the Leaguedismembered and the city of Corinth razed to the ground.

IIRome was governed by an oligarchy. The people as a whole chosethe magistrates,but they were organizedfor this purpose in assemblieswhich gave a dominant influence to men of wealth. The importantpolitical decisions were made by the senate, a body which was

8/6/2019 649912

4/19

ROME AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE200- I 46 B C scomposed argely f ex-magistrates, ho, once theybecamemembers,remained o for life. Rome's dominationof the Italian peninsulareliedto a largeextent on her support rom the upperclasses n theallied states of Italy.4 The natural sympathiesof the senatorialgovernment ould thus be expected o be on the side of the upperclasses in the Greek cities. And since Philip V was courting hemasses,Rome might well feel that support or the rich was a usefulweapon n winning he war. Contrariwise,he upperclasses n theGreek tatescouldnaturally e expected o lookto Rome or support.It was Fustel de Coulangeswho first expounded he view thatRome consistently upported he upper-class lements n the Greekstates. Indeedhe sawthe existenceof the classstruggle n Greeceasthe chief reason for Rome's eventual dominationof the Greeks.5This view, accepted by many later scholars,6was challerlgedbyPasseriniwho argued hat Romanpolicy towards he Greek statescould not be correlatedwith a predilection n favourof the upperclasses.It is easy enough to findprima facie evidencefor the theory ofFustel de Coulanges. In I97, for example, he men of Opousweredivided into two factions. One called in the Aetolians"but thericher actionshut out the Aetolians, nd sendinga messenger o theRomancommander, eld the city until he came".8 Aetoliaat thistime was an ally of Rome,but her constitutionwas democratic,9nd

4 On the Roman constitution cf. P. A. Brunt, "The Roman Mob", Past andPresent,no. 35 (December,I966), pp. 4-8. On Italy cf. A. H. McDonald, "ScipioAfricanus and Roman Politics in the Second Century B.C.", iI. Rom. Stud.XXXiV (I944), pp. II-33; E. Badian, ForeignClientelae 264-70 B.C.) (OxfordI958), p. I47; P. A. Brunt, "Italian Aims at the Time of the Social War", 71Rom. Stud., lv (I965), p. 92.

5 Fustel de Coulanges, QuestionsHistoriques Paris, I893), pp. I2I-2II.6 G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani, v, I (Turin, I923), p. 98 * F. W. WalbankPhilip V of Macedon Cambridge) 940), p. 65 * Badian,ForeignClientelae,p. 78and "Rome and Antiochus the Great: a Study in Cold War", Class. Phil., xlv(I958), p. 93 (= Studies n Greekand RomanHistory [Oxford, I964], p. I29)-A. Aymard, "L'organisationde la Macedoine en I67 et le regime representatifdans le monde grec", Class. Phil., xlv (I950), p. I00 M. Holleaux, Rome, aGrece et les monarchieshellenistiques Paris, I92I), pp. 228 ff. Holleauxis rathermore cautious in Cambridge ncientHistory,viii (Cambridge, 930), p.

7 "I moti politico-sociali della Grecia e i Romani", Athenaeum,new ser., xi(I933), pp. 309-35. Passerini'sview was accepted by M. I. Rostovtzeff, Socialand EconomicHistory of the Hellenistic World (Oxford, I94I), pp. 6II-2 andI460 n. I4, and, apparently, by P. Meloni, Perseo e la fine della monarchiamacedone Cagliari,I953), p. 254 n. 2.

8 Livy, xxxii. 32. 2-3.9 Cf. n. 20 below.

8/6/2019 649912

5/19

6 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 3 6it wasnot long before he becameRome's eadingopponentn Greece.In I94 Flamininus eorganized hessalyon timocratic ines:

the states were in complete chaos and confusion and had to be brought intosome reasonablemethod of government.... Flamininus chose the senateand the judgesmainly on the basis of wealth and gave the greatest nfluence othat element in the states which found it to their advantage hat everythingshould remain peaceful and undisturbed. 0In I92, Livy tells us, the mass of the people ooked o Antiochus osave them from Romandomination,while the upperclasseswere onthe side of Rome. "The masseswere eager or changeand entirelyon the side of Antiochus'';l and "it wasevident o all thatthe leadingmen and the aristocracywere in favourof the Romanallianceandwerecontentwiththe existing ituation,while he multitude nd hosewhose affairswere not all they could desire were in favour of acomplete hange''.l2 In I90 the Phocaeans imilarly ivided:"somewere tryingto sway the minds of the masses n favourof Antiochus. . . but the senateandthe upperclasseswereof the opinion hattheyshould remain oyal to Rome''.l3 The same divisionof opinion sfound in the yearspreceding he war with Perseus:"the sympathiesof a largeproportion fthe peoplewereon his side''l4and"themasseseverywhere,as usually happens, were on the worse side, beinginclined owardsPerseusand the Macedonians''.l5Finallyone maynote the actionsof L. Mummiusafterthe defeatof the AchaeansnI46: "he dissolveddemocracies, nd establishedmagistrates lectedon the basisof wealth".6

IIIThis list of evidence,however, s by no meansthe whole story.There are a number of instances where Rome did not give hersupport to the right-wingelements n the Greek states, and anyaccountof Romanpolicy must explain hese.l7Livy, xxxiv. 5I 4-6 11Livy,xxxv. 3. 12 Livy, xxxv. 34 3

3 Livy, xxxvii. g; cf. Pol., xxi. 6. 14 Livy, xlii. 5. I. 15 Livy, xlii. 3o. .6 Pausanias,vii. I6. 9.17 Some of the counter-examples dduced by Passeriniand others are largelybased on Livy's use of the word principes. Passerini assumed that this alwaysmeant oprimates, nd thus, for example, when Ismenias, the leader of the anti-Romanfaction n Aetolia n the I70S, iS describedas a princeps e can be assumedto have been a supporterof the upper classes (Livy, xlii. 38. 5: in 43. 7 he iscalled nobilisac potens. Cf. Meloni, Perseo,p. I47 n. I.). The assumption isunjustified. Livy uses princeps and principes n non-Roman contexts veryfrequently a list will be found n Pauly-Wissowa,Real-Encyclopadie,.v. princeps,

vol. xxii, columns 2004-5) and it is clear that in most cases it means simply"leaders", without implying that they are leaders of the upper-class party.I can find only four passages Livy, xxxii. 38. 7, xxxv. 34. 3, xlii. 30. I, xlii. 44. 4)where the class meaning is apparent;and the last two of these are dubious, forone must always reckon with the leaders of the people not being in completeaccord with their own followers. See furthern. 63 below.

8/6/2019 649912

6/19

ROME AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE200-I46 B.C. 7I have said it was naturalthat the upper classes in the Greek statesshould look to Rome as their natural champion. It was they whoparticularlywanted to resist Philip's advances, andthe latter had triedto gain support among their political opponents. I believe that in theI9OS Rome's natural preference was for oligarchic governments-other things being equal but she was prepared o take support fromwhatever source it came, and never dreamed of pressing herideological predilections to the point where they endangered her ownbest interests.The two main powers in Greece, Macedon apart, were the greatconfederations of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues. In the First

Macedonian War, concurrentwith Rome's struggle against Hannibal,the Achaeans had been allies of Macedon, whilst the Aetolians hadbeen Rome's principal helper.l8 The Aetolians had, however, madea separate peace with Philip in 206, and their alliance with Rome hadcometo an end. The two Leagues were of verydifferent character. 9The Achaean League, though nominally democratic, was in factcontrolled by men of means. The Aetolian League had a moredemocratic basis, and it was its leaders Scopas and Dorimachus whowere responsible for making the alliance with Rome in 2I2/I.20 In205/4 Scopas and Dorimachus were given a special commission toenact laws. They proposed the abolition of all debts, but this wassuccessfully resisted by one AlexanderIsius. Scopas and Dorimachusthen left Aetolia, Scopas to serve as a mercenary in Egypt.2lPasserini appearsto arguefrom these event that the Aetolian Leaguein the I90S shifted decisively to the right, and that because theradicals had been friends of Rome, their opponents became herenemies.22 It is true enough that the Aetoliansrejected the extremeproposals of Scopas and Dorimachus, and it is alsotrue that Alexander

18 On the alliance with Rome cf. A. H. McDonald, 1. Rom. Stud., xlvi(I956)5 pp- I53-7.19For the Achaean League, cf. F. W. Walbank,Commentary n PolybSus,(Oxford, I956), p. 222- K. von Fritz, The Theoryof theMixed ConstitutionnAntiquity New York, I954), pp. 4 ff. The constitutionof the League is mostfully discussed by A. Aymard, Les assemblees e la confederation chaienne(Bordeaux, 938).

20 On the Aetolian League, cf. J. A. O. Larsen,RepresentativeGovernmentnGreekandRomanHistory Berkeleyand Los Angeles, I955), pp. 70-I; Walbank,Commentary n PolybSus,p. 453-4. It is true that by the end of the thirdcenturyimportant decisions were taken by a small "innercabinet", but it wasnot controlledby men of wealth,and it is misleading o call it an oligarchy: hus,e.g., F. W. Walbank,Aratus of Sicyon (Cambridge, 933), p. 25.21 Pol., xiii. I-2. On Scopas' ater activities cf. Pol., xv. 25. I6 ff., xvi. 39 ff.,xviii. 53-5; Livy, xxxi. 43.

22 Passerini, Op. Cit. (n. 7), pp. 3I9-20. It is not all that relevant thatAlexanderIsius was extremelyrich (Pol., xxi. 26. 9).

8/6/2019 649912

7/19

8 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 3 6Isius was one of the leading Aetolian opponents of Rome in the I9OS.But the Aetolians after 204 were still far more radical than theAchaeans, and it is wrong to think that Aetolia in the I9OS was ruledby an exclusively upper-class government.Aetolia came back into alliance with Rome in I99.23 The Achaeansjoined a year later. This decision encountered violent oppositionwithin the Achaean League,24but this does not seem to have had anyconnection with differences over internal policy. The decisionwhether to support Rome or Philip was discussed on its own merits.Rome was glad to accept both Achaean and Aetolian support and wasnot at all concerned with the internal politics of the states who werewilling to support her in the war with Macedon.This is made even clearer in the case of Nabis of Sparta. Nabistook to extremes the radical policies advanced in the third century byAgis IV and Cleomenes III and had established an extreme left-wingregime in Sparta. Polybius detested Nabis and all he stood for, andhas given us a very lurid picture of his characterand activities:

For he utterly exterminated hose of the royal houses who survived n Sparta,and banishing those citizens who were distinguished for their wealth andillustriousancestry,gave their propertyand wives to the chief of his supportersand to his mercenaries,who were for the most part murderers,mutilators,highwaymenand burglars.26On the evidence of this passage Passerini argued that Nabis wassimply a personal tyrant out for his own ends, and not a man with anadvanced social programme.26Polybius, however, is not an unbiassedwitness. He detested left-wing political movements,27and it is notan unusual method of attacking a policy one does not like to obscurethat policy and claim that its exponents are merely evil men workingfor their own ends. Nabis' own claims may be more significant.These occur in a speech to Flamininus in I95: they are reported byLivy, and though, no doubt, the composition of the speech is Livy'sown, the source is Polybius.28 "My title of tyrant and my actionsare laid as accusations against me, because I summon slaves tofreedom, because I give land to the impoverished masses". And he

23 Livy,xxxi.4I.24 Livy, xxxii. I9 ff. For comments on the policy, cf. Pol., xviii. I3-I5;A. Aymard, "Le fragment de Polybe 'sur les traitres'", Rev. tft. Anc., xlii

(I940), pp. 9-I9.26 Pol., xiii. 6, cf. xvi. I3. On Nabis cf. V. Ehrenberg, Real-Encyclopadie,

vol. xvi, columns I47I-82. See now B. Shimron, "Nabis of Sparta and theHelots, Class.Phil., lxi (I966), pp. I-7.26 Op. cit. (n. 7), pp. 3IS-8.27 Cf. Pol., vi. 43, XX. 5-7; Walbank,Commentaryn Polybius, p. I2-I3.28 Livy, xxxiv. 3I. II ff. Freeing of slaves also in Pol., xvi. I3. I.

8/6/2019 649912

8/19

ROME AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE200-I46 B.C. 9compares his policy with that of Rome: "You choose your cavalryonthe basis of wealth, and your infantry too; you desire that a few shouldbe pre-eminently rich, and the mass of the people should be sub-servient to them".We may allow Nabis to have been a genuine, if violent socialreformer. His policy towards Rome and Macedon was undoubtedlypurely expedient. In I97 Philip offered Nabis the possession ofArgos, on condition that if Philip defeatedthe Romans, Nabis wouldrestore the city to him.29 Nabis occupied the town, and introducedthere a social revolution of the same sort that he had instituted atSparta itself. This achieved, Nabis made a complete volte-face andoffered his services to Flamininus.30 Flamininus, despite theobjections of Attalus of Pergamum, was only too glad to accept.Once the war with Philip was over, however, Roman policy changed,and in I95 Flamininuswent to war to free Argos from Nabis' control.But even this was not a war undertakento rid the Peloponnese of anunwelcome socio-political system. The object was, in part, to freeArgos from Nabis in order to weaken the growing power of theSpartan eader, and, secondly, to placatethe feelings of Rome's Greekallies. They were not, in the event, very much placated. The peaceterms imposed on Nabis by Flamininus left the former in charge ofSparta and did not even go so far as restoringthose exiled by Nabis.3lFlamininus did not want to eradicate Nabis because that would haveleft the AchaeanLeague in virtually complete control of the Pelopon-nese. His aim was a balance of power, not upper-class constitutionalgovernment, and he preferred to tolerate the continued existence ofa revolutionary government in Sparta ratherthan allow the AchaeanLeague excessive power in the Peloponnese.The Achaeans and others were upset by Flamininus' refusal toeradicate Nabis.32 They had hoped that Rome's victory would meanthe end of a social system they detested and feared. Passerini,consistently with his view that Nabis' regime was simple tyrannyandnot genuine social revolution, held that the Achaeans were moreafraid of Nabis' expansionism than of his social aims.33 This viewis scarcely born out by Livy's own words: "As for the Achaeans,

29 Livy, xxxii. 38 ff.30 Livy, xxxii. 40.31 Livy, xxxiv. 34; Plutarch,Flamininus, iii. On the exiles, cf. A. Aymard,

Les premiers apportsde Romeet de la confederationchaienne Bordeaux, 938),pp.24 -4.32 Livy, xxxiv. 4I. 4 ff., 489 5-6*33 At Athenaeum,new ser., xxiii (I945), p. tI8 Passerini is less inclined topress this point.

8/6/2019 649912

9/19

NUMBER 3 6O PAST AND PRESENTwhateveroy the restoration f Argos o the Leaguebrought hem,wasrendered ncompleteby the fact that Spartaremained nslavedandNabis was left as a thorn n theirside".34 Before he finalsurrenderof Nabis the thoughtsof the allies had clearlybeen directed o thepoliticalnatureof his regime: "his examplewould incite many inotherstatesto attack he freedomof their own citizens".35 Foreigndomination,t is true,waspartof theirfear,but only because he fearwas of the exportof revolution. Their mainconcernwas the dangerof politicalupheaval n their own cities.Thus Rome was not ourer-concernedith the internalpolitics ofthe Greekstateswhere here were other,and more mportant ssuesat stake. Where his was not so, she felt able to indulgeher naturalpreferenceor the upper classes. Flamininus' ehaviour n Boeotiain I96 is an interesting ase in point.36 In that yearhe agreed hatthose Boeotianswho had servedwith Philip should be permitted oreturn o Boeotia. Their leaderBrachylleswas immediately lectedto the chief magistracy. The pro-Roman arty, ed by Zeuxippus,wanted o murderBrachylles nd asked or Flamininus' ermission.Flamininus epliedthat "he himself would not take part in such adeed, but he was not standing n the way of those who wanted o doit".3 The murder rovoked waveof anti-Romaneeling n Boeotiaand Zeuxippus led the country. Romansoldiers n Boeotiaweremassacred. Flamininusmposed everepunishments n the Boeotiansfor this outbreak, ut Zeuxippuswas not recalled.Polybius'words uggest hat the pro-Roman artywas upperclass.They complainto Flamininusof "the people's present hostilitytowards them and the general lack of gratitude shown by themasses".38 It looksas if in this caseFlamininuselt able o encouragethe intriguesof the pro-Roman pperclasses. But even so, he wasnot willing o take his encouragemento the extentof forcinga wholepeople nto openopposition, nd t wasfor thatreason hathe did notattempt o recallZeuxippus.39In I94 the immediate roblemshad been settled,and Flamininus'actionsshortlybeforehis departurerom Greece ndicatehis naturalpreferences. He made constitutional lterations:

3 4 Livy, xxxiv. 4I . 4.3 5 Livy, xxxiv. 33*836 Pol., xviii. 43, Livy, xxxiii. 27-g for all this.37 Pol., xviii. 43- IO.38 Pol., xviii. 43- 839But in I88 he felt safe enough to attempt to recall Zeuxippus and nearlysucceeded in causing a war between Boeotiaand Achaea(Pol., xxii. 4).

8/6/2019 649912

10/19

ROME AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE200- I 46 B C. I Ihe spent his time in administering usticeandaltering he arrangmentsmade nthe states by the arbitraryconduct of Philip or his representatives: hey hadincreased he powerof the supportersof theirown faction by deprivingothersof liberty and justice.40

Whohadbeensuppressedndhow becomes lear romLivy's urtherremarks. Flamininus advocated concordiabetween the variousclasses of society. This presumablymeant that the lowerclasseswere to accept governmentby the upperclasses. The only placewherewe know he detailsof Flamininus'eorganizations Thessaly.There, as we have seen, "the states were in complete chaosandconfusionand had to be brought nto some reasonablemethodofgovernment". Flamininus'olutionwasto "choose he senateandthe judges mainlyon the basis of wealth,and to give the greatestinfluence to that element in the states which found it to theiradvantagehateverythinghouldremainpeaceful ndundisturbed".1It is not completelycertain whether Flamininus restrictedthefranchise tself to the upperclasses,or merely he officesof state;orwhether he introduceda timocraticassemblymodelled on that ofRome, whose mainprinciple,accordingo Cicero,was that the willof the majority houldnot prevail.42

IVAs we have seen, Flamininus efusedto eradicateNabis becausehe was afraidof the increasing owerof the AchaeanLeague. T}lesamedesire o maintain balance f powerappears o havemotivatedRomanpolicy during he long and complexdisputebetweenSpartaand the AchaeanLeague in the I80S. In I92 Nabis had beenmurdered ndthe Achaean eaderPhilopoemenook Sparta ntotheAchaeanLeague. Facedwith the invasionof Antiochus,Romewasin no position o object. Then, in I89, the Spartans ttacked ne ofthe Laconian oast-towns ontaining he Spartan xiles who,thoughbanishedby Nabis or his predecessorMachanidas, ad not beenrestoredby Philopoemenn I92. The matterwas referred o thesenatewho gavea reply so ambiguoushat both sides interpretedtas favouring their own case. Philopoemenproceeded to forceSparta to dismantleher walls, recall the exiles and abolish theLycurganconstitution.43The senateby no means welcomed his40 Livy, xxxiv. 48. 2.41 Livy, xxxiv. SI. 4-6.42Cicero, De re publica, i. 39. On whetheror not there was a full assemblyin Thessaly, cf. Aymard,op. cit. (n. 6), p. I05.43 Livy, xxxviii. 30-4, Pol., xxi. 32, cf. xxii. 3. 7; Plutarch, Philopoemen,vi;Pausanias,viii. 5I. 3.

8/6/2019 649912

11/19

I2 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 3 6rightwardsmove in Sparta. In I87 some Spartansbroughtcom-plaintsto the senate about Philopoemen's ctions,and the consul,M. AemiliusLepidus,wrote o the Achaeans riticizingheirconduct.MeanwhilePhilopoemen ad despatched n embassy o Rome, andthis returned n I85 to reportthat the senate was displeasedwithwhathad happened, hough hey werenot takingany action.44 Thesenate now instructed Q. Caecilius Metellus to investigate thesituation. NVhen Metellus arrived the pro-Roman DiophanesattackedPllilopoemen'shandlingof both Spartanand MessenianaSairs, but Philopoemenand his supportersArchon and Lycortasdefended heir policy. As before, the different actionswithin theAchaeanLeague eem to havehad no relation o class-divisions.Metellus asked for a special assembly o be convened,but wasrefusedon the grounds hat t was llegal or the Achaeanso summonan assembly n such circumstances nlessthey had receivedwritteninstructions rom the senate. There are reasons or thinking hatPhilopoemen nd his friendswererather wisting he sense of the lawinvolved,but the senatehardly larifiedmatterswhen,afterdiscussingthe rebuff o Metellus, t told the Achaeanso givethe sameconsidera-tion to Roman envoys as Rome did to the representatives f theAchaeanLeague.45In I84 Areus and Alcibiades,describedas representativesf the"old exiles", disputedwith the Achaeansbefore the senate. The"oldexiles"areclearly hoseexiledby the tyrants ndrestoredn I89.In the followingyear,however,we find the "old exiles"divided ntotwogroups. Onesection, ed by Lysis,wanted omplete estitution fthe exiles'property; he other, ed by AreusandAlcibiades, roposedthat only a portion of the property hould be restored. They, itseems, were willingto countenance ome redistribution f wealth.46

The result of the mission of Areus and Alcibiadeswas that thesenate nstructedAppiusClaudius ulcher o investigatehe situation,but before he arrived the Achaeanshad condemnedAreus andAlcibiades o death for undertaking n embassy o Rome on theirown account.47 When Appius arrived,a long debate ensued, and44 Pol., xxii. 7. 7; Diodorus, xxix. I7.45 Pol., xxii. I0. On the legal issues involved, cf. Aymard,Les assembletese laconfe'de'rationchaienne, p. I88-204. The law probably said that a synkletoswas to be called f written instructionscamefrom the senate. It was interpretedto mean that it could not be held if there were no such instructions. For thesenate's rebuke,cf. Pol., xxii. I2. I0, Livy, xxxix. 33. 8.46 Pol., xxii. II-I2 for the dispute before the senate in I84. On the politicSposition of Areus and Alcibiades, cf. B. Niese, Geschichte er griechischen ndmakedonischentaaten seit der Schlachtbei Chaeronea,ii (Gotha, I903), p. 42n 4, 49-47 Livy, xxxix. 35. 8; Pausanias,vii. 9. 2.

8/6/2019 649912

12/19

ROME AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE200- I 46 B C I3Appius appears to have threatenedthe use of force. Eventually theAchaeansagreed to repeal the sentence on Areus and Alcibiades, butasked the Romans themselves to be responsible for any changes theywished to institute in Sparta.48 The matter was thus referredbackto the senate who found themselves faced with a situation morecomplicatedthan ever. Spartawas now representedby four differentgroups of ambassadors. There were the two sections of the

8/6/2019 649912

13/19

NUMBER 364 PAST AND PRESENTmuchconcernedwith whathappened. Soon afterthis Spartadidsecedefromthe League.4

By I82 Lycortashad recoveredboth Messeneand Sparta,55ndsomeof the exilesreturnedo Sparta.56Charons foundin Spartashortlyafterthis,57andit seemsto followthatthe exilesof I92 andI89 musthavebeenrecalledn accordancewiththe agreementmadein I83, andthat t is asectionofthe"oldexiles"whoform hesubjectof furtherdisputesbetweenthe Achaeansand the senate.8 Asenatorialnstructionn I8I orderingheirreturnwasignored59ndin I80 Lycortaswasstill surethatthe senatewouldnot enforce tsdecision. Ambassadorseresentto Rome)butoneoftheirnumber,Callicrates,nsteadof defendingAchaea, old the senate hatif theywanted heirwill respected, hey mustgive positivesupport o thepro-Romansn the Greek tates.60 The senateagreed, xpressedtsviewclearly,andthe exilesreturned.The issues betweenSpartaand Achaeawere complex,but theywere very cIoselyconnectedwith decisionsabout the social andpolitical constitutionof Sparta. The senate, however, did notconcernitself with these questions. Rome'spolicy had been tocreatedivisionswithinthe Leagueandto useambiguous epliesandveiled threatsto keep the Achaeans n a state of suspicionanduncertainty. And, as we can see, even the right-winggroupsinSparta ouldquarrelwithAchaea. As in the previousdecadeRomesaw her maininterestas being the preservationf the balanceofpower n the Peloponnese. The internal tructure f Spartawasoflittleconcerno her.

VPolybius egardedhespeechof CallicratestRomeasbeingof thegreatest mportance.6lHe took the view that before I80 Romedealtwith the Achaeanson equaltermswhilstafterthat date thesenategaveactive upportohertoadiesogetherwillenforced. Thejudgement eemstoo extreme-as we haveseen Rome'sattitudebeforex80wasnowherenearasopenandhonestasPolybiusappears

54 Cf. Pol., xxiii. I7 I; Niese, GesehichreergriechischenmdmakedonisehenStaaten,iii, p. 49 n. 3.5 5 Pol., xxiii. I 6- I 756 Pol., xxiii. I8. I-2.57 Pol., xxiii. I8. 4, 24* 7-68 Cf. SyllogeInscriptionumGraecarum, rd edn., no. 634, where Callicratesis honoured orsecuringthe restitutionof the "oldexiles".59Pol., xxiv. 2. Pausanias,vii. 9. 5-6 is quite unintelligible.6? Pol., xxiv. 8. 8 ff.61 Pol., xxiv. IO. Cf. Badian,PoreignClientelae, . 9I.

8/6/2019 649912

14/19

ROME AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE200-I46 B.C. ISto have believed. It is true, however, hat Callicrates tiffened hesenate'sdeterminationo enforce ts will by showing hat therewerepeople in Greecewho would get its wishes obeyed. And in thefollowingyearsthe senatedid give activesupport o pro-Romansnthe Greek states. This is seen particularly learly in the yearsfollowing he ThirdMacedonianWar. Charopsn Epirus,Lyciscusin Aetolia,Chremasn Acarnania ndMnasippusn Boeotiawere allgiven supportby Rome,and their opponentswereexiled. Polybius'description f thesemenappearso indicatehattheywereproponentsof the sort of tyrannical olicy exercisedby Nabis. It is doubtfulfthe same is true of Callicrates. His differenceswith LycortasandPolybiusseem to have been simply aboutthe attitudeto be takentowardsRome, and were not concernedwith the internalpolicyofthe AchaeanLeague.62 But the senate'spolicy after the defeatofPerseuswas ruthless:one thousand uspectAchaeans,Polybiusthemost famousof them,were deported o Italy.Onceagain he senate ooked o whatshe now regarded sher owninterest the eliminationof her politicalopponents n the Greekstatesand the vigorous hampioning f her friends irrespectiveftheir internal policies. Previously she had refused to eradicatepopular egimes;now she went furtherand actually upportedhem.The natureof the regime n eachstatedepended o a greatextentonthe attitudeswhichthe variousgroupsor partieshad takentowardsPerseusat the timeof the Third MacedonianWar. It seemsthat inmanystates the conservatives ere, at the least, lukewarm owardsRomeandthattheiropponents ooktheopportunityo supportRomeandgainpoliticalpower or themselves.3

VIThe Achaeanexiles were at last permitted o returrl n I50.64There followed n a short while the Achaeanwar which led to thedestruction f Corinthand the dissolution f the AchaeanLeague n62 The evidence of all this is fully set out by Passerini, p. cit. (n. 7), pp. 327 ff.When I speakof Rome'spolicy I refer to thatof the senatorialmajority. Thereare reasons for thinking that a minority disapproved. For the attitude ofL. Aemilius Paullus and M. Aemilius Lepidus, cf. Pol., xxxii. 6- see also il.Rom Stud , l iv ( 964), p. 75.63 Livy (xlii. 30. I) says that the plebsweregenerallyon Perseus'side, but the

principes were divided. But on the ambiguity of principes,cf. n. I7 above.The plebswere no doubtforced to change their attitude towardsPerseusby thefact of Roman force. The demagogic eadersmay have had some difficulty nconvincing their naturalfollowers.

64 Pol., xxxv. 6 = Plutarch,Cato maior, x. For the date, Pausanias,vii. IO.I2.

8/6/2019 649912

15/19

I6 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 3 6its existing form. The war has appeared to several writers to havebeen brought about by a newly prominent group of demagogues whofelt that they had to outbid the restored exiles in nationalistic andanti-Roman sentiments.65 Examination of the details of the wardoes not, I think, support this interpretation.The antecedents of the war are complex. In about I 56 Athens hadattacked Oropus. Oropus appealed to the senate who asked Sicyonto act as mediator in the matter.fi6 Sicyon imposed a fine of fivehundred talents on Athens, and the Athenians sent the heads of thethree great Athenian philosophical schools to Rome to plead theircase. The senate reduced the fine to one hundred talents. Whatfollowed is obscure, but it seems that the Athenians refused to paythe fine, and installed colonists of their own in Oropus. At thispoint Oropus promised the Spartan Menalcidas ten talents if hewould persuade the Achaeans to help her against Athens. Half ofthis Menalcidas in his turn promised to Callicrates. 7The Achaeans appear to have been successful in restoring theOropians to their own land. Menalcidas, however, refused to payCallicrates who proceeded to accuse him before the Achaeans ofworking in Rome to separate Sparta from the Achaean League.Menalcidas gave three of his talents to the Achaean Diaeus whohelped him to get acquitted on this charge.Menalcidas now made a fresh embassy of his own accord complain-ing about a boundary dispute.68 The senate replied to Menalcidasthat all matters except those involving capital cases were to be dealtwith by the Achaean League. Diaeus, now Achaean strategos, wasconfident that Rome was not interested in Sparta and claimed thatthe senate had given the federal body jurisdiction n all cases. Spartawas forced by threat of war to condemn to death those whom Diaeusheld to be responsible for anti-Achaean actions in Sparta, and in

65G. Niccolini, La confederazionecaea (Pavia, I9I4), p. I82. C5. Fustel deCoulanges, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 20I ff.66Pol., XXXii. II, XXXiii. 2; Pausanias, vii. II. 2 ff.; Sylloge InscriplionumGraecarum, rd edn., no. 675. The embassy of philosophers: Pol., xxxiii. 2;Plutarch, Cato maior, xxii; Cicero, Academica, i. I37; Gellius, vi. I4. 8-I0.The narrativegiven here is that of Pausanias orrected o make t consistentwithSylloge,3 no. 675. Cf. W. S. Ferguson, HellenisticAthens (London, I9II),

p. 327.67 Pausanias,vii. II. 7-8 (but cf. preceding note). For the narrativeof theAchaeanWar, see especially G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani, v, 3 (Florence,I964), pp. I27 ff. Only fragmentsof Polybius' account survive and for mostof the details we have to rely on Pausanias vii. I0-I6).

88 Pausanias, vii. I2. 4. This probably refers to the same territory overwhich there had been a dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis in I64/3(Pausanias,vii. II. I-3; C5. Pol., xxxi. I8; Sylloge3,no. 665).

8/6/2019 649912

16/19

ROME AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE200-I46 B.C. I7I4869Menalcidas again journeyed to Rome to present his case to thesenate. Callicrates and Diaeus were sent to represent the League.The senate despatched ambassadors and instructed them to detachseveral important states from the League. But the actual reply thatit gave in public was so ambiguous that both sides were encouragedto think that their requests had been granted,70and the Romanambassadors spent such an inordinate time in reaching Greece thatfightillg broke out between Sparta and Achaea, as a result of whichMenalcidas committed suicide.71 When the ambassadors arrivedthey announced that Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Heraclea andOrchomenos were to be detached from the League. There was a riotand the ambassadorswere maltreated.72Despite this, Rome made strenuous efforts to avoid going to warwith the Achaean League. Sex. Julius Caesar, the next Romanambassador, was instructed to act with moderation. Polybius saysthat the senate's aim was to humble the Achaeans,not destroy themaltogether.73 But the senate did not rescind its decree that theLeague should be emasculated by the separation of so many of itsimportant members.74 Critolaus, the Achaean strategos, refused tocome to an agreement, and war was declared. It is noticeable thatMetellus Macedonicus made considerable efforts to persuade theAchaeans not to go to war. Irl I48 he had asked ambassadors ontheir way to Asia to stop the Achaeans from fighting Sparta.75 Twoyears later he himself sent four ambassadors o Achaea, but they metwith nothing but abuse.76The war thus took place, and the Achaean forces, though supportedby Boeotia, Euboea, Locris and Phocis, were inevitably defeated.77Corirlthwas razed to the ground and the AchaeanLeague disbanded.

69 It may be helpful to enumerate he strategoi f the last years of the AchaeanLeague: I5I/0 Menalcidas, I50/49 Diaeus, I49/8 Damocritus, I48/7 Diaeus,I47/6 Critolaus, Diaeus suffectus.? Cf. above pp. II and I3.

71 PaUsanias, vii. I3e72 Pausanias,vii. I4; cf. Pol., xxxviii. 9. Polybius addsthat they exaggeratedwhathad happened. Dio (fr.72) and Livy (ep. li) areprobably rying to justifyRome'saction in saying that the detached cities were those that had previouslybelonged to Philip. Other sources: Justin, xxxiv. I-2; Eutropius, iv. I4;Florus, i. 32- Zonaras, X. 3I.73 Pol., xxxviii. 9 6-74 Cf. Niese, Geschichteergriechischenndmakedonischentaaten, ii, p. 344.7 5 Pausanias,vii. I3. 2.7 6 Pol., xviii. I 2- I 3.77 Achaeanallies: Pausaniasvii. I4. 6, cf. ii. I. 2; Pol., xxxviii. 3. 8; Livy, ep.1ii. For the sources on the warcf. T. R. S. Broughton,The Magistratesof theRomanRepublic New York, I95I), i, pp. 465, 467.

8/6/2019 649912

17/19

I8 NUMBER 36AST AND PRESENTA largepartof Greecebecameanappendage f the Romanprovinceof Macedonia.8

Theseeventsdo not support he viewthatthe returnof the exilesfromRomeprovokedhe democratic arty nto violentanti-Romanfeeling n an attempt o outbidrivals n nationalisticentiment. Infactwehavenoinformationbout hepoliticalpositionof thevariouspersonalitiesnvolved. ThemeasuresakenbyDiaeusafter hedeathof Critolausn I46 the freeingof slavesandforcedcontributioIlsfrom herich79 cannotbe usedasevidence,ortheyweredesperatemeasuresn a timeof extremecrisis. The onlyknown ormerexilementioneds Stratios,who was accusedby Critolausof secretlyintriguingwith one of the ambassadorsent by Metellus80ndwholaterbeggedDiaeus o accept hetermsofferedby Metellusafter hedeath f Critolaus.8lEarlierThearidas,hebrother f Polybius,wasemployeds an ambassadory the Achaeans, erhapsn an attempttoplacateRoman eeling.82Thus whilewe canin generaldistinguishbetweenpro-andanti-Romans,t is difficult o go muchfurther. Callicratess linkedbyPolybiuswith Charopsand otherdemagogues, ut their domesticpoliciesmay have differedconsiderably.AgainMenalcidaswas apro-Roman,83ut that didnot stophim quarrelling ith Callicratesandngratiating imselfwith the supposedlyanti-RomanDiaeus.84Andn I49 CallicratesndDiaeustogetherweremeant o representtheAchaeansbeforethe senatein opposition o Menalcidas.85Itlookssif complexpersonal ivalries layeda considerableart n theeventshatprecededhe warandthe principal haractersannotbefittednto neat categories. It is not the case either that Romeattackedhe AchaeanLeaguebecauset wasshowingdangerouseft-wingendenciesor thata new democraticlementattemptedo putanndto Romandomination asedon supportof the upperclasses.78 For the detailsof the statusof Greeceafter I46, cf. S. Accame,II dominioomanon Greciadallaguerraacaicaad Augusto Rome, I946), ch. i and ii.9Pol., xxxviii. I5. Also postponementof the repaymentof debts: Pol.,XXViii. I; Diodorus,xxxii. 26. 3.80 Pol., xXXViii I3* 4 ff81 Pol., xxxviii. I7. I4.82 Pol., xxxviii. IO. I, II; Pausanias,vii. I4. 3.Cf. Pol., xxx. I6. 2.84 Pausanias,vii. I2. I. De Sanctis (Storia dei romani, v, 3, pp. I29, I 32)rgueshatDiaeus'fatherwasDiophanes,thepro-Romanopponentof Philopoe-en,nd that Diaeus himself was originally pro-Roman. But there is novidencehat Diaeus was Diophanes' son - all we know is that Diophanes'atherascalledDiaeus: andevenif he was,he neednot havefollowedthe sameolicys Diophanes.

8S Pausanias,vii. I2. 8.

8/6/2019 649912

18/19

ROME AND THE CLASSSTRUGGLE200- I 46 B C. I9The senatehad decidedthat its interestswere best servedby removingthe last vestiges of independent action by the Greek states. It wasnot overwhelminglyconcernedwith internalpolitics: it was only afterthe war that Mummius destroyedthe democraticstructure such asit was - of the Achaeancities.8 6

VIIThe picture which emerges from these fifty years is consistent.Rome did not set out with the intention of establishing oligarchicgovernmentsin Greece, and she did not have consistent support fromthe oligarchs and consistent opposition from the democrats. Thenatural preference of the senate and its representativeswas for theupper classes and for forms of governmentin which the upper classeswere dominant. Other things being equal, it was to this end thatRoman policy was directed. The activities of Flamininus inThessaly in I94 are perhapsthe best example. But in this turbulentperiod it is only rarelythat other things were equal. Rome's objectwas to win the wars in which she was engaged and to maintain thecontrol over Greek affairswhich her military successes bestowed onher. To this end the senate was glad to accept support from thosewho were willing to give it to her, irrespectiveof their position in theinternal politics of their own states. She had no scruples in usingNabis againstPhilip or supportingthe demagoguesafter I67.We have seen, too, that differenceswithin the Greekstates concern-ing the policy to be adoptedtowardsRome did not necessarilycoincidewith differenceson domesticpolicy. There is nothingvery surprisingabout this. Many upper-classpoliticians would have been confidentthat they could maintain their position without Roman protection,and preferredto govern their states in complete independenceratherthan under Roman control. Others will have seen that Romandomination was inevitable and preferredto be on the winning side.Others, again, were willing to use Roman support as a means ofsecuringtheir success in political disputes within the upper classes.It is interesting to compare these conclusions with those whichemerge from study of the Athenian Empire in the fifth century B.C.Thucydides tells us that in the PeloponnesianWar (43I-404 B.C.) thedemocratic elements in the Greek cities sought help from Athens,their opponents from Sparta.87 In an epoch-making article de SteCroix has shown that one of the chief reasons for the success of theAthenian Empire was that Athens gave active support to the

8 6 Pausanias, vii. 16. 9.87 Thucydides, iii. 82. I.

8/6/2019 649912

19/19

20 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 36democratic parties in the allied states.88 The democrats knew that itwas only because of Athenian support that they were able to maintaindemocratic forms of government in their own cities. Athens, as ademocracy, had a natural preference for democratic government andthis coincided with her self-interest as head of an empire.89Under the Roman Empire the picture is very different. There wasnow no question of a struggle for leadership in the Mediterraneanworld Rome's mastery was unchallenged. It is not surprising thatunder these conditions Rome's natural preferences came to the fore,and that both in Italy and in the provinces it was the richer classes whowere dominant. The old senatorial aristocracy, t is true, no longercontrolled affairs and men from lower orders could rise and holdpositions of influence.90 But the lot of the mass of the people scarcelyimproved at all. The result of Rome's victory was indeed to stem thetide of democracy and the ultimate victory belonged to the upperclasses. But it would be wrong to infer that that was Rome's objectfrom the very beginning.Corpushristi ollege,xford ffohn riscoe

88 G. E. M. de Ste Croix, "The Character f the AthenianEmpire",Historia,iii (I954-5), pp. I-40. Cf. id., "Notes on Jurisdiction n the AthenianEmpire",Class. Quart., lv (I96I), pp. 94-II2, 268-80; H. W. Pleket, "Thasos and thePopularity of the Athenian Empire", Historia, xii (I963), pp. 70-77. Theobjections of D. W. Bradeen, "The Popularity of the Athenian Empire',Historia, x (I960), pp. 257-69 and T. J. Quinn, "Thucydidesand the Popularityof the AthenianEmpire", Historia,xiii (I964), pp. 257-66 do not seem to me tohave invalidatedde Ste Croix's case.

89 We know of a few cases where Athens tolerated oligarchic governments:in each case the oligarchs appear to have either seceded from Athens ormurderedor oppressed heir political opponents. Cf. Xenophon, AtheniensiumRespublica,ii. I I, Thucydides, i. I I5. 2-3, iii. 27. 2-3.

90 Cf. K. Hopkins, "Elite Mobility in the Roman Empire", Past and Present,no. 32 (December, I965), pp. I2-26.