Enduring features Dynamic features

strategic geography and the region‟s dependence on seaborne trade, via established sea lines of communication (SLOC)

new threats to maritime security, naval developments, changing patterns of trade and new developments in maritime transportation, and trends in the exploitation of marine resources.

ocean politics•maritime regime building •mechanisms for resolving conflicts of interest in the maritime domain•

Sam Bateman 2011 Solving the Wicked Problems of Maritime Security1.

wicked problems= highly resistant to resolution = pressing and highly complex issues for policy formulation that involve many causal factors and high levels of disagreement about the natureof a problem and the best way to handle it

Wicked problems in SEA maritime security “tame” security problems

different interpretations of the Law of the Sea underpinning regional maritime securitya.the lack of good order at seab.numerous conflicting claims to maritime jurisdiction, c.implications of increased naval activity in the region and the lack of agreed maritime boundariesd.

piracya.humanitarian assistance b.threat of maritime terrorism.c.

Defining Maritime Security

Issues including non-traditional security threats (environmental threats and illegal fishing)○

National or multilateral scope of traditional maritime security threats (defence against military threats and the protection of national interests and sovereignty at sea)

○

how far regional forums can go with sharing threat perceptions, and promoting measures of preventive diplomacy and confidence-building

○

Broad (Indonesia, Philippines, Japan, China) vs. narrow (Thailand, SK, Singapore) definition of maritime security○

regional countries disagreement on a definition of maritime security. •

common interest in countering piracy and maritime terrorist threats ○

for Search and Rescue (SAR) and other marine safety services, particularly in regional “choke points”, such as the Malacca and Singapore straits.

○

Common concern: security and safety of shipping and seaborne trade•

Differences over the rights and duties of states in maritime zones, particularly over the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)○

maritime geography of East Asia puts a premium on the Law of the Sea in the region○

The chain of seas between mainland Asia and the off-lying Japanese, Philippine and Indonesian archipelagos, and the islands and groups of islands within these seas

=> multiplicity of maritime boundaries since these waters are virtually all subject to the jurisdiction of one state or another

common understanding of zonal rights and duties among states.

controversial issues with the Law of the Sea in the seas of East Asia○

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

convention that provides the basis for the jurisdiction a country may exercise at sea

Defines the rights and duties of a state in different maritime zones and establishes the nature of state sovereignty and sovereign rights over ocean space and resources

provides the principles and norms for navigational rights and freedoms, flag state responsibility, countering piracy, rights of visit, hot pursuit and regional cooperation, all of which are relevant to the maintenance of security and good order at sea.

○

three Asian countries (Thailand, Cambodia and North Korea) are not yet state parties.○

basic conflicts of interest between countries on Law of the Sea issues

the “built-in” ambiguity of UNCLOS in several of its key regimes.

UNCLOS problems:○

Law of the Sea•

6008.2 Regional Maritime Strategic EnvironmentSunday, March 11, 2012

11:30 PM

READINGS Page 1

i.e., use of territorial sea straight baselines by regional countries□

Baselines the starting point for claiming maritime zones and the basepoints for the generation of the limits of maritime jurisdiction

normal baseline is the low water line along the coast, but in certain limited circumstances, countries may use straight baselines

□

disagreement over what constitutes customary practice with particular regimes

Nearly all East Asian countries have systems of straight baselines which do not accord with a strict reading of UNCLOS which limits their use to deeply indented coastlines, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.

○

abuse of these provisions: baseline systems of Vietnam and Myanmar and China’s straight baselines around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea = trying to increase the size of their area of maritime jurisdiction

○

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) = US limited recognition to the significance of UNCLOS

The United States is not yet a party to UNCLOS = deep seabed mining issues + maritime operations by US forces ○

China and India > fully support UNCLOS + more restrictive on the rights and duties of states in the EEZ and the innocent passage of warships in the territorial sea

○

Innocent passage

allowing foreign warships the right of innocent passage through their territorial sea= significant limitation on their sovereignty and a potential threat to their national security

coastal and archipelagic states require prior notification or authorization of the innocent passage of warships

40 states over the world including Cambodia, China, South Korea, North Korea, India, Indonesia,the Philippines and Vietnam

China 's mindset from that of a continental power to that of amaritime power = maximum freedoms of navigation with greater advantages to be obtained from not giving prior notification of transits by their warships through the territorial sea of another state while allowing foreignwarships to transit in their own territorial sea without notification

○

EEZ need to find a balance between the rights and duties of the coastal state and those of other states

coastal states have sovereign rights over natural resources, both living and non-living, and other economic activities, such as the production of energy from water, currents and winds

jurisdiction with regard to artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; and the protection and preservation of the marine environment (including the conservation of species), as well as other rights and duties, as provided for in relevant provisions of UNCLOS

All other states have freedom of navigation and overflight in an EEZ, as well as the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms

difficult in practice to define an operational test to distinguish between an action that has due regard to the rights and duties of the other party, and one that does not

○

ensures the safety and security of shipping and permits countries to pursue their maritime interests and develop their marineresources in an ecologically sustainable and peaceful manner in accordance with international law (RSIS)

○

UNCLOS + subsidiary regimes for maritime security, safety and marine environmental protection

1974 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention + International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code

•

the 1979 Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR); and the 2005 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)

many gaps in the level of ratification of these important conventions

○

Part IX of UNCLOS

mandates a relatively high level of cooperation between countries bordering enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, (East and South China seas)

cooperation => far from even a minimal level of effectiveness.

All East Asian seas are “semi-enclosed seas” (Article 122 of UNCLOS)

Fail? The Regional Seas Programme (RSP) East Asian Seas Action Plan steered by the Coordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA)

The lack ofpolitical will and the diversity of bordering countries

Success? The Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia

projects for marine environmental management and the sustainable

mainly in coastal areas under clear national jurisdiction and

○

Good Order at Sea•

READINGS Page 2

Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA) funded by the Global Environment Fund (GEF)

management and the sustainable development of livingresources

clear national jurisdiction and the PEMSEA has kept clear of projects in disputed areas

issues which make the provision of good order at sea a wicked problem the region lacks a strong political framework that bridges the strategic and cultural divides and reflects the common interests1.of all stakeholdersinsufficient common interests where the expectations of regional countries might converge2.

conflicting sovereignty claims exist and maritime boundaries have not been agreed between neighbouring states○

few maritime boundaries have been fully delimited in the seas of East Asia

no boundaries at all around the Philippines and Taiwan

○

China and Japan over the Takeshima/Tokdo islets in the Sea of Japan (or East Sea);□

China, Taiwan and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea;□

various disputes in the South China Sea□

sovereignty disputes in East Asian seas

complicates both good order at sea and effective regime-building= barrier to effective cooperation between neighbouring countries

○

Emmers: nationalism + resources = inhibit cooperative solutions to sovereignty disputes ○

Maritime jurisdiction•

South China Sea

most wicked of the sovereignty disputes in the Asia Pacific due to the multiple nations involved and the complexity of the issues.

2010: China, the US and Vietnam

C and V: key players due to the extent of their sovereignty claims, recent assertive actions and the recurring tensions between them.

US: new player rebuilding its regional interests = national interest in preserving freedoms of navigation through the SCS

China's ambiguous “U-shaped dotted line” claim.

problems of maritime boundary-making

conventional straight-line maritime boundaries are unrealistic => concave areas of coast (the Gulfs of Thailand and Tonkin), off-lying archipelagos and numerous islands subject to conflicting sovereignty claims

Maritime jurisdiction + sovereignty disputes => strong nationalistic element that prevents effective cooperation.

managing ocean space are transboundary in nature, fences cannot be established in the sea

Increased Naval Activity

higher defence spending

More ships, submarines and maritime aircraft in relatively confined and disputed regional waters

1.

Increased military activity at sea = increased risks of an accidental incident between naval forces, particularly one involving a submarine => proliferation of submarines challenges preventive diplomacy, maritime confidence building and ensuring the safety of submarine operations

2.

a high opportunity cost by diverting resources from important programmes for economic development, social improvement, environmental management and poverty alleviation

3.

•

ASEAN ARF the East Asian Summit (EAS) ASEAN PlusThree (APT) ADMM Plus

ASEAN Maritime Forum

Surabaya in July 2010 non-security centric = promotion of business through maritime cooperation and establishment of maritime linkages to support the ASEAN connectivity.”

ARF ISM on Maritime Security

Surabaya in March 2009 and this was followedby subsequent meetings: in Auckland in March 2010 and Tokyo inFebruary 2011

Annual platform for the discussion of maritime security issues, includingincreasing cooperation and capacity-building, as well as for addressingspecific concerns, such as piracy and armed robbery against shipsand the smuggling of goods and personsTokyo: three priorities 1. information/ intelligence exchange and sharing of best practices, including transparency around naval capacity and operations; Confidencebuilding measures based on international and legal 2.

○

Regional Forums•

READINGS Page 3

including transparency around naval capacity and operations; Confidencebuilding measures based on international and legal frameworks, arrangements and cooperation

2.

capacity building of maritime law enforcement agencies in the region3.

Maritime Security Expert Working Group○

OTHERSHeads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies (HACGA) meetings => Track 1.5=> Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) which established an Information Sharing Centre in Singapore in 2007

1.

CSCAP Track Two forum = actively pursued maritime security through a series of study and working groups addressing various aspects of the topic + memoranda related to maritime security covering issues such as law and order at sea, the law of the sea,

2.

cooperation in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, and the safety and security of offshore installations

Wicked Problems for the ForumsMeasures to reduce the risks of larger navies and greater naval activity in the region1.dialogue to promote a common understanding of key law of the sea issues, particularly rights and duties in EEZ and navigation al regimes

2.

ways and means of achieving a higher level of cooperation in the seas of East Asia.3.

Way Ahead: Asian Peace Research Institute?

Huang 2008 Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia2.

lessons from attempts at regime building.

ambitious attempts at regime building by extraregional powers are unlikely to succeed, because of major-power rivalries

1. inaction on the part of regional states who wish to preserve their nonalignment

China’s economic influence in the region + suspicion toward American and Japanese motives= deter smaller states from allowing any of the major powers to play too great a role in regional regime building

offers of external operational assistance run up against sovereignty concerns related to direct intervention by foreign powers

2. littoral states do not wish their waters patrolled by other countries

reluctance due to enduring postcolonial nationalism and to popular antagonism toward the United States

evidence of a strong desire to preserve the status quo under existing international law

3. resistance to new precedents that might compromise future actions or negotiations

if a littoral state is to participate in a formal maritime security regime, it must be prepared to give up some of its political freedom of action in exchange for greater security.

littoral states appreciate the assistance of outside states—but only within limits that are highly circumscribed and not politicized

The region is unreceptive to regime building that sets off power rivalries and sovereignty concerns

the efforts of the littoral states themselves have been Cooperation facilitated by the absence of an overarching framework, which

READINGS Page 4

more modest in scope, characterized by bottom-up cooperation that incrementally builds operational cooperation

would be political baggage.

ReCAAP, for its part, was successful only because it was seen by extraregional powers as neutral and was limited to operational information sharing and low-level, nonmilitary assistance.

•

The annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singaporei.The Western Pacific Naval Symposium ii.

share ideas and build understanding through multilateral forums1.

ReCAAP i.Singapore’s new C2 center ii.

support intraregional initiatives2.

Bilateral and multilateral exercises build the operational expertise of local navies, improving their abilities to secure thestraits + interoperability >

i.

CARAT and SEACAT between the U.S. and Southeast Asian naviesii.Five Power Defence Arrangements exercises among the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singaporeiii.PSI exercises and discussions iv.

promote confidence and increase interoperability through exercises3.

takes place within normal bilateral frameworks, and outside powers have not protested such interactions;i.political sensitivities can also be somewhat lessened by rendering the assistance in low -key, behind-the-scenes waysii.Humanitarian civic assistance= promote mutual understanding and goodwilliii.

offer technical assistance to build capacity 4.

Ratification of UNCLOS i.UNSC resolutionsii.UN and IMO effortsiii.

external powers can work through international organizations5.

Options for extraregional states (in line with the need for multilateralism and neutrality)

Liss 2010 Oceans of Crime: Maritime Piracy and Transnational Security in SEA and Bangladesh

3.

PIRACY (Including robbery at sea and the hijacking of vessels)

a sign and a reflection of security threats and bureacratic loopholes as well as of other political, social, and economic developments undermining security

Waters of insular SEA (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand) as the most pirate infested waters of the world + Bangladesh (piracy hotspot in the wider Asian region)

Post CW= political, economic and social changes => root causes of piracy

A close examination of piracy= can be understood as both a symptom and a reflection of a number of geopolitical and socioeconomic problem and security problems prevalent not only in SEA and Bangladesh but also in other pirate infested areas around the world and in countries and regions beyond those in which pirate attacks currently occur

ROOT CAUSES Declining fish stocks

Radical, politically motivated groups

Organized crime networks

Use of flags of convenience (Note: A flag of convenience ship is one that flies the flag of a country other than the country of ownership.

Cheap registration fees, low or no taxes and freedom to employ cheap labour are the motivating factors

behind a shipowner's decision to 'flag out'.Pasted from <http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/sub-page.cfm> )

Lack of state control over national territory

Problems in relations and cooperation between countries

Activities of Private Security Companies (PSCs) to piracy

4. Medcalf and Heinrichs 2011 Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in Indo-Pacific Asia

FACTORS THAT MAKE ASIA DANGER ZONE FOR INCIDENTS AT SEA• More crowded, contested and vulnerable sea lanes of Indo-Pacific Asia• Strengthening of naval and air forces• Changing deterrence and warfighting strategies of China, US and Japan = expanded maritime patrolling and intrusive surveillan ce

READINGS Page 5

• Changing deterrence and warfighting strategies of China, US and Japan = expanded maritime patrolling and intrusive surveillan ce• Nationalism and resource needs reinforce territorial claims in the ECS and SCS= harder to manage sovereignty disputes• Chinese forces assertiveness at sea

1. The region is ill-prepared to cope with the perils arising from incidents at sea.

Indirect CBMs

Ship visits, combined exercises, operational cooperation on transnational issue s like piracy, wide ranging defence exchanges and dialogue

Direct CBMs Continuous communication channels and formal Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreements

a.

2. Maritime CBMs are flimsy and little-used (military dialogues, real time communication channels, formalized rules of the road)

Storey 2008 Securing SEA's Sea Lanes: A Work in Progress5.

• VIOLENCE AT SEA remains a problem in SEA where a number of political, geographic and economic factors make the region's seas a particularly opportune space for sea-borne criminals

○ Competing priorities and sovereignty concerns inhibit full cooperation in maritime security programs○ Threat of US involvement = catalyst for improved cooperation ○ Led to a decline in incidents of maritime crime

• Cooperative efforts to address maritime violence = real but qualified success?

SOURCES OF MARITIME VIOLENCE

Failures of governance

Various aspects of weak political control, poor governance, and the lack of state capacity= undermine govt's ability to control events outside of immediate environs

Weak political control= corruption and poor governance = lack of regional cooperation due to absence of trust, extreme sensitivity over national sovereignty and lack of interoperability

Poor socio-economic conditions

Cause and effect of weak political control and poor governance

Maritime crime supplement meager incomes of coastal communities/ AFC led to decrease in govt defense spending

Diffuse set of technological and geographical factors

Easy access to high speed boats, satellite navigation, cell phones, Internet, automatic and heavier weapons

Narrow waterways, small islets, riverine access= benign envt in which to exploit technological capabilities

6. Graham 2011 Shipping Glut Portends Piracy, Safety Risks

• Overcapacity in the shipping industry + worsening global economic outlook = compound piracy and marine safety risks in the Southeast Asian region

READINGS Page 6

READINGS Page 7