6 24 Feinberg Lecture

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  • 7/27/2019 6 24 Feinberg Lecture

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    Philosophy 338 | Summer 2009 Brandon Morgan-Olsen| 6.24

    Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights

    1.

    Nowheresville thought experiment: world with no rights, butfull of compassionate people

    Nowheresville would not have satisfied Kant (no actions donefrom duty).

    So, add duties. Doesnt this bring rights along automatically? Doctrine of the logical correlativity of rights and duties

    (i) all duties entail other peoples rights

    (ii) all rights entail other peoples duties

    Is (i) correct? Etymologically, yes. Logically, no. Numerousduties (both legal and non-legal) are not correlated with rights,because to be a duty just means to be required. My example: duties to self. Feinbergs: legal duty (positive

    law), duties of charity [Feinbergs underlying assumption: rights govern claim-making

    on others.]

    Now addpersonal desertand sovereign monopoly of rights Personal desert: weak version, as fittingness between

    ones character/action and anothers favorable response.Ex: rightness of grades, without possibility of complaint.

    Sovereign right-monopoly: duties owed to, e.g., God alone(exaggerated Leviathan story). Complicatedsocial/economic relationships governed only w/ respect tosome outside authority.

    2. What is missing in Nowheresville is morally important.

    Major absence is activity of claiming.

    Legal use of claim-rights [articulated on 180]; doesnt dojustice to the fact that claims seem more basic than duties.

    Confusingness of claim/right distinction. Feinberg: right as kindof claim, claim as an assertion of right. Right as primitive.Call to use the idea of claiming in informal elucidation of theidea of a right.

    Distinctions:

    (i) making claim to: the performative sense of claiming;performative claiming (has legal consequences)

    (ii) claiming that: propositional claiming (generally nolegal consequences); this claiming is mechanism for givingrights their special moral significance. Respect for othersin terms of their ability to make claims.

  • 7/27/2019 6 24 Feinberg Lecture

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    Philosophy 338 | Summer 2009 Brandon Morgan-Olsen| 6.24

    (iii) having a claim: having a claim consists in being in aposition to claim [to make claim or claim that]; links claimto activity rather than some [weird thing].

    Rights as valid claims (rather than as claims, simpliciter).

    Interesting claim/right distinction in international law. (Claims as

    natural needs, even if cant be currently fulfilled). [This way of talking avoids the anomaly of ascribing to all

    human beings now, even those in pre-industrial societies, sucheconomic and social rights as periodic holidays with pay 184.HA! Burn.]

    Manifesto sense of right (no necessary correlation with duty).

    Feinberg prefers valid over justified (b/c valid implies withinsystem of rules).

    Moral right/legal right distinction (different set of rules toadjudicate).

    Entitlements to vs. claims against; different dimensions?Feinberg: all claim-rights necessarily involve both.