5th Waffen SS Panzer 'Division Wiking' 1940-1945 ... · divisions, a mechanized division, and a security division ... bones of one Pomeranian grenadier,” Hitler encouraged Croatia

Preface15thApril1945TheLeader’sOrder.OrderOfTheDay.15thApril,1945.LastProclamation:SoldiersOfTheGermanEasternFront!

ForthelasttimeourdeadlyenemiestheJewishBolshevikshavelaunchedtheirmassiveforcestotheattack.TheiraimistoreduceGermanytoruinsandtoexterminateourFolk.Manyofyousoldiersintheeastalreadyknowthefatewhichthreatens,aboveall,Germanwomen,girls,andchildren.Whiletheoldmenandchildrenwillbemurdered,thewomenandgirlswillbereducedtobarrackroomwhores.TheremainderwillbemarchedofftoSiberia.Wehaveforeseenthisthrust,andsincelastJanuaryhavedoneeverythingpossibletoconstructastrongFront.Theenemywillbegreetedbymassiveartilleryfire.Gapsinourinfantryhavebeenmadegoodbycountlessnewunits.OurFrontisbeingstrengthenedbyemergencyunits,newlyraisedunits,andbytheGermanicFolkMilitia.ThistimetheBolshevikwillmeettheancientfateofAsia—hemustandshallbleedtodeathbeforethecapitaloftheGermanReich.WhoeverfailsinhisdutyatthismomentbehavesasatraitortoourFolk.TheRegimentorDivisionwhichabandonsitspositionactssodisgracefullythatitmustbeashamedbeforethewomenandchildrenwhoarewithstandingtheterrorofbombinginourcities.Aboveall,beonyourguardagainstthefewtreacherousOfficersandsoldierswho,inordertopreservetheirpitifullives,fightagainstusinRussianpay,perhapsevenwearingGermanuniform.Anyoneorderingyoutoretreatwill,unlessyouknowhimwellpersonally,beimmediatelyarrestedand,ifnecessary,killedonthespot,nomatterwhatrankhemayhold.IfeverysoldierontheEasternFrontdoeshisdutyinthedaysandweekswhichlieahead,thelastassaultofAsiawillcrumple,justastheinvasionbyourenemiesinthewestwillfinallyfail,inspiteofeverything.BerlinremainsGerman,ViennawillbeGermanagain,andEuropewillneverbeRussian.Formyourselvesintoaswornbrotherhood,todefend,nottheemptyconceptionofaFatherland,butyourhomes,yourwives,yourchildren,and,withthem,ourfuture.Inthesehours,thewholeGermanFolklookstoyou,myfightersintheeast,andonlyhopesthat,thankstoyourresolutionandfanaticism,thankstoyourweapons,andunderyourleadership,theBolshevikassaultwillbechokedinabathofblood.Atthismoment,whenFatehasremovedfromtheEarththegreatestwarcriminalofalltime,theturningpointofthiswarwillbedecided.signed:AdolfHitler.

GermanArmyTheGermanarmyhadanumberofspecialforces,mostofwhicharebest

describedbytheFrenchtermhorsdeligne,thatis“outsideoftheregulararmy.”ForeigntroopshavealwaysfallenintothiscategoryineveryarmyandtheGermanscertainlyendedupwithatremendousforceofforeignsoldiersfightingintheiruniforms.However,theGermanshadthreeothernon-traditionalforcesintheirarmy.Thefirst,theWaffenSS,sprangfromHitler’spersonalbodyguardandmuchlikemanyotherGuardforcesintheworld’slongmilitaryhistory,developedintoacompletelyindependentarmyalluntoitself.Thoughnotintentionally,itmostassuredlyfallsintoa

categoryquitesimilartothatheldbyNapoleon’sImperialGuard,whoserootsalsoarefoundinadictator’spersonalbodyguard.UnliketheImperialGuard,whichwasNapoleon’sfavoredchildren,theSSbelongednottoAdolfHitler,buttoHeinrichHimmler,Reichs-fuhrerderSS.Itwasnotonlyafieldforce,butatoolintheinternalpoliticalstrugglebetweenHitler’scronies.TheSSalso,likeNapoleon’sImperialGuard,containedlargenumbersofforeigntroops.IncontrasttoNapoleon’sImperialGuard,however,theSSwentonamassiverecruitingeffortamongforeignnationalsinanefforttomakeitaslargeaspossible.And,alsounlikeNapoleon’sImperialGuard,theGermanportionsoftheSSweresubjectedtoanideologicalmaniaforracialpuritythatwasfrequentlysweptasidewhenitwasconvenient.LargeportionsoftheSScontainednon-Germanictroops.MuchoftheSSfoughtwithasteadfastnessthatwasfoundinNapoleon’sOldGuard,whilesomepartsformedwithforeignnationalshadverypoorreputationsthatincludedmassdesertions,mutiny,andatrocity.ThesecondportionofforceshorsdeligneintheGermanarmywastheLuftwaffegroundtroops.TheGermandivisionofoperationsbetweenthearmy,navy,andairforcewascontortedbypersonalitiesandthepoliticalpowerbaseonwhichtheReichwasformed.HermannGoringclaimedandwasgivenanythingthathadanyinvolvementwithflying.Asaresult,theGermanparatroopersorfallschirmjagers,werepartoftheLuftwaffe.OperationallytheywerehandledbytheArmy,buttheywereGoring’stoystoplaywithashewished.LiketheSS,however,theyalsodevelopedaferociousreputationasfanaticalfightersandweregreatlyfearedandrespectedbytheirenemies.Unlikethefallschirmjägers,theLuftwaffealsoproducedanumberofLuftwaffeFieldDivisions.Theseunitswereasecondlineformationatbest,thoughtheyfrequentlyendedupinthefrontlinesandinvariablytookaterriblepoundingfortheirtroubles.Theywereunderequippedandundertrainedforfrontlineduties,thougheventuallytheydevelopedreasonablecombatskills.TheywereproducedasHermannGoringattemptedtogarnerfavorfromHitlerbyproducingaseriesofdivisionstoblocktheadvanceoftheRussianarmiesinthewinterof1941/2.Thethirdforcehorsdelignewasasmallnumberofnavaldivisionsthatwereraisedverylateinthewar.ThesurfacenavyhadbeensotornupbytheAlliesthatithadverylittleuse.Thoseshipsthatwereoperationalcontinuedtoretainfulluseoftheircrews,butthosecrewswhoseshipsweregone,thosesupportpeoplewhoweresuddenlywithoutfunction,foundthemselvessweptupandriflesshovedintheirhandsinanefforttostemtheflowoftheRussianhordeswestwardintotheFatherland.Thelastforceisthetraditionalforceshorsdeligneandthosearethemultitudeofcompletelyforeign‘forcesthatfoughtalongsidetheGermans.ThelargestsinglegroupofforeignersintheGermanarmywereformercitizensoftheSovietUnion.TheystartedoutassmallnumbersofvolunteersthatsimplyjoinedupwiththeWehrmachtasitpushedthroughRussia.TheyweredesertersfromtheSovietarmyandtheywereenthusiasticcitizenswhocameforwardandwantedtofightagainsttheircommunistoppressors.Itisbelievedthatfully25percentoftheGermanarmyattheendofthewarwereformercitizensoftheSovietUnion.1

Germanyalsoobtainedalargenumberofforeigntroopsfromthevariouspuppetstatesthatitestablished.ThelargestforcewasprobablytheItalians.AftertheAlliesinvaded,Italiansocietytoreitselfinhalf.ThediehardfascistsremainedtruetoMussoliniandtheGermans,forminganumberofdivisionsandalargenumberofsupportunitsthatfoughtuntiltheendofthewar.GermanyalsoestablishedapuppetstateinSlovakia,whichprovidedthreeinfantrydivisions,amechanizeddivision,andasecuritydivision,allofwhichfoughtontheRussianfront.ThenthereisthepuppetstateofCroatia,whichwasasmuchanendlesslybleedingulcertotheNazisaswasSpaintoNapoleon.Inordertodealwiththis,andperhapsfollowingFredericktheGreat’sopinionthattheentireBalkanswas“notworththebonesofonePomeraniangrenadier,”HitlerencouragedCroatiatoformanarmythatwouldbeentirelycommittedtofightingtheSerbianandcommunistpartisansinYugoslavia.Thereisanamazingspectrumofperformanceandqualitytobeseenasoneexaminesthecombatrecordoftheseforces.MostoftheSSandFallschirmjagersweresurelythemostaggressiveandhardestfightingunitsintheGermanarmy.TheSSwasfrequentlyusedasthefirebrigaderushingfromoneemergencytoanother,pluggingthelineandbeatingbackRussian,AmericanorBritishbreakthroughs.Thefallschirmjagersmoreoftenfoundthemselvesputintothecriticalpositionsinthelineandsimplyrefusedtobepushedoutofthem.TheLuftwaffeFieldandNavalDivisionswerestopgapmeasuresofvaryingmilitaryprowessthatwereneverusedtoleadanyassault.Theforeigntroops,liketheSS,ranthespectrumofqualityfromextremelygoodtomostoftenofmodestvalue.TheyarealsooneofthemostinterestingandsaddestportionsofthehistoryofWorldWarII.Theywere

frequentlymotivatedbynationalismandthedesiretoliberatethemselvesfromoneoppressor,onlytofindthemselvesoppressedbyyetanother.

OriginsTheoriginsoftheSSlierightbackatthegenesisoftheNazimovementinGermanyin1923.Thesewereturbulenttimes,andfewthenwouldhavebeenwillingtobetontheoutcomeofthestrugglefordominationofGermanybetweentheNazisandtheCommunists.Thetwosidesoftenbattledviolentlyinthestreets,andinjuriesanddeathswerefarfromuncommon.ItwasclearthatsomeformofbodyguardelementwasrequiredtoprotectthosewhospokeatNazioutdoormeetings.TheSAStormtroopers,theSturmabteilung,or“Brownshirts’,werelittlemorethananunrulyrabble,mostofthemunemployed:hugswithnorealloyaltytoHitler,butusefulformeetingtheopposingCommunistsheadonincountlessviolentstreetfightswhile,inthemain,beingbynomeanstrustworthyordisciplinedenoughto::rovidereliablebodyguardsforthePartyleadership.Hitler,however,hadbeenimpressedbytheperformanceofatleastsomeofhis‘minders’,andinMarch1923hedecidedtoformanelite,dedicatedbodyguardunitfromanumberofsuchdependablecomrades.Thetaskofformingthistrustedbandwasdelegatedtohisfaithfulchauffeur,JuliusSchreck,andanothertrustedfollower,JosefBerchtold.Tobeginwith,thisgroupwassimplyasmalldetachmentwithintheSA,andwasknownastheStabswache,orHeadquarterGuard.WithinafewweeksithadbeenexpandedandtookonthenameStosstruppAdolfHitler.Thisso-called‘ShockTroop’tookpartintheabortiveMunichPutschof9November1923,providingpersonalprotectionforHitler.OnHitler’sreleasefromLandsbergPrisonfollowingtheabortivePutsch,hedecidedtoreformhisbodyguard,andonceagainturnedtoJuliusSchrecktocreatethisnewunit.Initially,itconsistedofjusteightchosenmen,andthankstoHermannGoringwasgiventhetitleofSchutzStaffel,or‘ProtectionSquad’.ThiswasareferencetoGoring’shighlysuccessfulcareerasafighterpilotduringtheFirstWorldWar,whenthistitlewasusedforaircraftallocatedtoflyingescortduties.ItwasintendedthattheSchutzStaffel,whichrapidlybecameknownbyitsabbreviatedform‘SS’,wouldnotexceedtenmenplusoneofficerineachdistrict,theexceptiontothisbeingtheReich’scapitalcity,Berlin,wheretheSSdetachmentwastobedoublethenormalsize.TheelitestatusoftheSSwasenhancedbytheextremelyhighstandardsofphysicalfitnessandgeneralappearanceofthoserecruitedtoitsranks,butmostimportantly,bythefactthatitsoweditsallegiance,nottotheParty,buttothepersonofAdolfHitlerhimself.

InApril1926,SchreckrelinquishedcommandoftheSStoanotherofHitler’smostloyalfollowers,JosefBerchtold,whohadbythistimerecoveredfromwoundshehadreceivedmarchingbyHitler’ssideduringtheMunichPutsch.Thegeneralranksofthebrownshirtarmy,theSA,werehighlysuspiciousandresentfulofthisneweliteunitwhichappearedintheirmidst,theSSstillatthistimebeingsubordinatetotheSA.ThisresentmentgrewwhenHitlerentrustedthecareoftheso-called‘Blutfahne’,aNaziflagsplatteredwiththebloodofthosemarcherskilledorwoundedduringthePutsch,andwhichhad,totheNazis,acquiredthestatusalmostofaholyrelic,totheSS.TheSAhadpreviouslycaredfortheBlutfahne.Thesituationwasfarfromideal,withtheSA’sresentmentmatchedbytheSS’srancourbyreasonofitssubordinationtotheSA.SSunitsinanyareawereeventuallyrestrictedtoamaximumof10.percentofthesizeoftheSAcontingent,andthisonlywhentheSAunittowhichitwassubordinatedactuallyreacheditsfull,allocatedstrength.TheSAthereforefounditeasytomanipulatethesizeofSSunitsoverwhichithadcontrol,manySAunitsalsotakinggreatdelightinallocatingthemostmenialtasktotheirSScontingents.

ResentfuloftherestrictionsplacedonthedevelopmentoftheSS,Berchtoldresigned,commandpassingtohisdeputy,ErhardtHeiden.Heiden,unfortunately,hadnomoresuccessthanBerchtoldincircumventingthespitefulmachinationsoftheSA,andhetoolastedforonlyashorttimeascommanderoftheSSbeforeheresigned.TheSAnodoubttookgreatpleasureinthis,andanticipatedjustaseasilymanipulatinghissuccessor.Inthistheyweretobegreatlymistaken.Heiden’ssuccessorwasanotherveteranoftheMunichPutsch,oneHeinrichHimmler.Thoughhisappearancewasfarfromimpressive,withhispince-nezspectaclesandratherweedyturnout,Himmlerwasasuperborganiserandwasfiredwithenthusiasmfor,anddedicationto,thesuccessoftheSS.In1928hewasappointedReichsführer-SS.2By1929HimmlerhadpersuadedHitlertoapprovearecruitmentplanfortheSS,andwithinayearithadgrowninstrengthtoaroundonethousandmen,althoughstillsubordinatedtotheSA.In1931thereoccurredanincidentwhichwastogreatlyenhancethestatusoftheSSintheeyesofHitler.TheBerlinSAhadbeengrowingresentfulofwhatitsawasHitler’sfavouritismtowardstheBavarianSA,basedinMunich,whichwasofcoursethe‘spiritualhome’ofNazism.On1April,theSSinBerlinalertedHitlertothefactthattheSAleader,OberfuhrerWaltherStennes,hadrevoltedandoccupiedthepremisesoftheNazinewspaperDerAngriff,publishedbytheGauleiterofBerlin,JosefGoebbels,andhadevictedtheNazipropagandachief.Intheevent,however,therevoltquicklyfizzledoutthroughlackofsupport,andtherebelSAmemberswerequicklypurged.HitlerwasgreatlyappreciativethattheSShadremainedloyalduringthis

potentiallydangerousepisodeandpubliclycongratulatedthem.Himmler’srewardwastobeappointedasHeadofPartySecurity.Fromthispositionofpower,HimmlersetaboutexpandinghisnascentSSempire,sothatbytheendof1932ithadgrowninstrengthtosome50,000men.Bythistime,lifeinGermanyhaddeterioratedintoasituationofneartotalanarchy,witharmedNazisandCommunistsbattlinginthestreets.Hitler’spromisesoffullemploymentandareturnoflawandorderswungthevotesinthe1933electionsinhisfavour,andon30JanuaryReichsprasidentvonHindenburgappointedHitlertotheofficeofChancellor.Withinamonth,theReichstagbuildingwasguttedinanarsonattack,forwhichtheCommunistswere“lamed,andHitlerlostnotimeinissuingaproclamationgrantingpolicepowerstotheSAandtheSS.Thisresultedinover15,000SSmenbeingsworninaspolice‘auxiliaries’,andtheround-upofpoliticalopponentsbegan.TheoriginalSSwasrequiredtoprovidesecurityforthePartyhierarchyingeneral,butatthispointHitlerdecidedtoformaspecialarmedbodyguardunitfromwithintheranksoftheSSwhosepurposewouldbetoprovidehimpersonallywithaprotectiveescort.Thetaskofraisingthis‘elitewithinanelite’wasgiventooneofhismosttrustedfriends,theBavarianSSGruppenführer,Josef‘Sepp’Dietrich.Dietrich,adecoratedcombatveteranoftheFirstWorldWar,settoworkimmediately,andbyMarch1933hadestablishedaguardunitofsome120hand-pickedmenwhichwastobecomeknownastheSS-StabswacheBerlin.InlateApril,thisguardunitmovedintotheoldOfficerCadetInstituteatBerlin-Lichterfelde.Withinjusttwomonthsitwasundergoingexpansion,andtheenlargedunitwasrenamedastheSS-SonderkommandoZossen.AfurtherspecialguardelementknownasSS-SonderkommandoJüterbogwasformedinMay,interestingly,withanumberofattachedArmyofficerstoassistwithtraining,andinSeptemberbothwerebroughttogethertoformtheAdolfHitlerStandarte,eachmemberoftheunitbeingissuedwithacuffbandbearingHitler’sname.FromJulytoOctoberof1933,theseeliteSSguardsprovidedsecurityatHitler’sretreatattheObersalzberg,nearBerchtesgadeninBavaria.On9November1933,onthetenthanniversaryoftheMunichPutsch,thisregimenttookapersonaloathoffealtytoAdolfHitlerandhaditsnameamendedtoLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler,onceagainemphasisingitsuniqueelitestatus.(TheLeib-Hussaren,Leib-Standarte,ofImperialGermanywerethedirectequivalentofthe‘LifeGuards’inothernationssuchasGreatBritain,traditionallyentrustedwiththesafetyofthemonarchorheadofState.)Thewordingoftheoathwasasfollows:Isweartoyou,AdolfHitler,asleaderandChancelloroftheGermannation,loyaltyandcourage.Ivowtoyouandtothesuperiorsappointedtoyou,obedienceuntodeath,sohelpmeGod.ThesimilaritiesbetweenthePraetorianGuardofRomantimesandHitler’snewSSEliteGuardaretooobvioustobecoincidental.Therecruitmentcriteriaforthisunit\vereextremelyselective.Applicantshadtobebetweenseventeenandtwenty-twoyearsofage.aminimumof5ft11intall,laterraisedto6ftMin,andinperfectphysicalhealth.3

Shortlythereafter,theunitterminologyoftheAllgemeine-SS,theSchar,SturmandSturmbann.begantobereplacedbytheequivalentmilitaryterms,suchasZug(Platoon),Kompanie(Company)andBataillon(Battalion)asusedintheWehrmacht,furtherenhancingthemilitarystatusofthearmedSS.Aroundthistime,anumberofothersmall,armeddetachmentswerebeingcreatedatSS-AbschnittlevelthroughoutGermany.Limitedtoasizeof100men(thepolicealsoraisedseveralsuchquasi-militaryunits,knownas‘Hundertschaften’)andincriticalareas,theseunitswerebroughttogethertoformtheso-calledPolitischtBereitschaften.On24September1934,HitlerdecreedthatthePolitischeBereitschaftenbebroughttogethertoformanewarmedSSforcetobeknownastheSS-Verfugungstruppe.InMarch1933,HimmlerhadbeenappointedPolicePresidentofMunichandfoundedthefirstconcentrationcampaiDachau.ThiswasrapidlyjoinedbyothersaiBuchenwaldandSachsenhausen.Thesethoughthoroughlyunpleasantplaces,wereworldsapartfromthedeathcampfestablishedlaterduringtheHolocaust.IiwasintendedthatpotentialenemiesoftheStatewhowereconsidereddangerousbuiwhohadnotbeenfoundguiltyincourtolanyspecificcrimewouldbedetainedirthesecampsfor‘re-education’.Indeedthoughtreatmentwasoftenbrutal,man)weresubsequentlyreleasedwhennolongeiconsideredathreat,aluxuryofcoursenoiavailabletolaterinmates.ItwasaroundthistimethatthefirstoftheWachverbdnde,01GuardUnits,wereformedtostaffthesecampsunderthecommandofSS-OberführerTheodorEicke.By1935,fivefullbattalions,orWachsturmbanne,ofthesetroopshadbeenformedOberbayern(atDachau),Elbe(atLichtenburg),Sachsen(atSachsenburg),Ostfriesland(atEsterwegen)andBrandenburg(atOranienburg).In1937,furtherreorganisationsawthesebattalionsformedintothreefulldeathsheadregiments:SS-TotenkopfstandartenOberbayern(atDachau),Brandenburg(atSachsenhausen)andThuringen(atBuchenwald).Theseunitswouldbecomeofficially

designatedastheSS-Totenkopfverbändein1936.Post-Anschluss,afourthregiment,SS-TotenkopfstandarteOstmark,wasestablishedattheconcentrationcampatMauthauseninAustria,andin1939,afifth,SS-TotenkopfstandarteDietrichEckardt,wasalsoformed.Fromabeginningaslittlemorethanbrutalthugsguardinghaplessconcentrationcampinmates,theSS-Totenkopfuerbande(SS-TV)wouldbecomeawell-trainedmilitaryforce,thoughnolessbrutalinitsmethods,whichwouldinturnprovidetheWaffen-SSwiththeunitthatwouldbecometheformidable3SS-PanzerDivisionTotenkopf.MeanwhiletheSAcontinueditsexpansion,andtheArmygrewevermoreconcernedatrumoursthatthebrownshirtsconsideredthemselvesasarevolutionaryforcewhichwouldreplacetheregularArmy.HitlertoowasbecomingconcernedthattheSAwasslippingbeyondhiscontrol,seeingitsallegiancebeingowedtoitsowncommander-in-chief,SA-StabschefErnstRohm,andRohm’senemieslostnotimeinfeedingHitler’smistrustofhisonce-valuedcomrade.Eventually,Rohmdemandedtheformationofapeople’sarmytoreplacetheregularArmy,whichhewouldpersonallycommand.ThiswasthefinalstrawforbothHitlerandthegeneralsoftheregularArmy.Therewasnowarealdangerofcivilwar,andHitlerwasdeterminedtoeliminatethisthreatfromwithinhisownmovement..Toexecutehisplan,Hitlercalleduphismosttrustedmen,theSS.HecalledameetingofSAleadersfor30June1934,atwhichtheunsuspectingSAleaderswerequicklyarrestedbySStroopsandthosedeterminedastheringleadersexecuted.TheSSofcoursealsotooktheopportunityofsettlingsomeofitsownoldscores,andeventuallyover300wereexecutedinwhatwastobecomeknownasthe‘NightoftheLongKnives’.Anew‘puppet’leader,ViktorLütze,wasappointedtocommandtheSA,withHitlerconfidentthatthisweakandcolourlessindividualwouldprovenothreat.Hewascorrect.TheSAwasreducedtoamerequarterofitsformersizeandatthesametimewasdisarmed.ItwouldnolongerposeathreattoHitlerorbeaseriousobstacletothedevelopmentoftheSS.Onceagain,theSShadproveditselfloyal,preparedtoactoutsidethelaw,andevencommitmurderwhenitsFührersowished.Inreward,HitlerdeclaredtheSStonowbeafullyindependentbranchoftheParty,nolongersubordinatetothedisgracedandhumiliatedSA.Duringthisperiodofstruggle,theSShadmushroomedtosome200,000strong.RecruitmentcriteriahadbeenrelaxedduetotheneedforrapidexpansiontoallowtheSStobetterwithstandthepressureplaceduponitbytheresentfulbrownshirts.WiththethreatoftheSAremoved,however,Himmlerimmediatelysetaboutrestoringitselitestatus.Manymemberswerenolongerconsideredappropriateforthenew,reborn,eliteSS.andover60.000menweredroppedfromitsranks.InOctober1934.anSSofficercadettrainingschooliSS-Junkerschule)wasopenedatBadTolzinBavaria,andwasjoinedin1935bvafurtherestablishmentinBrunswick(SS-JunkerschuleBraunschweig).SeveralhighlyexperiencedformerArmyofficerswererecruitedtoprovidetheSStraineeswithhigh-qualitymilitarytraining.ThefirstfullregimentofSS-VerfugungstruppewascreatedaroundacoreofformermembersofthePolitischeBereitschaftenwhenthreeSturmbannewereamalgamatedunderthetitleSS-StandarteIDeutschlandmMunich.Afurtherregiment,SS-Standarte2Germania,wasformedinHamburg,andfollowingthe1938AnschlusswithAustria,athirdregimentwasformedinViennaunderthetitleSS-Standarte3DerFuhrer.WiththeLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler,theSSVerfugungstruppeandtheSS-Totenkopfverbdndeathisdisposal,Himmlernowhadtherequisiterawmaterial

toprovidethenucleusforthecreationofhisownSSarmy.

5thS.SPanzerDivisionWiking

NordischeDivision(Nr5)1940SSDivisionGermania(mot)SSDivisionWiking1941SSPanzeregrenadierDivisionWiking19425.SSPanzerDivisionWiking1943AftertheMay1940SiegimWesten,orVictoryintheWest,theSSbegananactiveprogrammetorecruitsuitably‘Nordic’or‘Germanic’volunteersfromnorthernandwesternEuropetojoinanumberofWaffen-SSFreiwilligen(volunteer)legions.ThiseffortintensifiedafterJune1941,astheSSexhortedvolunteerstojoinrhecampaignintheSovietUnion.However,allthiswasstillinthefutureandstandardswerestillhighinSeptember1940,whenHitlerconsentedtotheraisingofanewWaffen-SSdivision.OriginallytobenamedSS-DivisionGermania,thebackboneoftheunitwastobeprovidedbytheexperiencedandcombat-testedGermaniaRegimentoftheSS-VTDivision.

ItwashopedthatthebulkofitsstrengthwouldbeprovidedbyDutch,Flemish,DanishandNorwegianvolunteersservinginthevolunteerSSRegimentWestland.ThiswasasoptotheArmy,whichhadbeencomplainingabouttheSSpoachingthebestGermanrecruits.SS-InfanterieRegiment11,oneoftheSSTotenkopfstandarten,replacedGermaniaintheSS-VT.FurtherstrengthwassuppliedbythetransferoftheSS-StandarteNordland.Early1941sawtheadditionofavolunteerunitofFinns,theFinnuchesFreiwilligen-BataillonderWaffen-SSNordost,whichhadbeenraised,inFebruary1941.On20December,HitlerorderedthatthedivisionshouldbeknownastheSS-DivisionWiking.CommandedbyFelixSteiner,oneofthemostinfluentialofficersintheWaffen-SS,Wikinywasthefirst‘international’WaffenSSdivision.Itprovedtobeanexcellentfightingunit,andasthe5.SS-Panzer-DivisionWikingitgainedacombatreputationsecondtonone.However,inspiteofthehopesoftheSStomakeitaGermanicvolunteerformation,GermansalwaysoutnumberedNordicvolunteersinitsranks.

1941

Thedivisionfirstsawactionon29June1941.AssignedtoArmyGroupSouth,ittookpartinthefightingforTarnopolinGalicia.Oppositionfromisolatedpocketsofresistanceandguerrillagroupsaside,theprogressofthedivision’stanksovertheroadsoftheUkrainefromDubnototheoutskirtsofZhitomirwasrelativelyfreeofproblems,asseeminglyendlesslinesofSovietprisonerscapturedinthepocketofLvovweremarchingcowardstherear.Abandonedtanksandgunsclutteredtheroads.4

AcrosstheDnieperInAugust,1941,thedivisionwasattheheadofthearmygroupasitfoughttoestablishabridgeheadacrosstheDnieperRiver.Continuingthedrive,Wikingfoughtitswaythrough

DnepropetrovskandontoRostov.AccordingtooneSSman,thefallofRostovwasgreetedbyitsinhabitantswith‘tremendousenthusiasm’.AsfarastheRedArmywasconcerned,thetruthwasotherwise.First,theGermanshadbeenslowedbyanti-tankobstacles,ditchesandminefields.WikingtroopsfacednotRedArmysoldiersbutfanaticalNKVDmen,theshocktroopsoftheCommuniststate.Thesemenfoughthand-to-handinthestreets,wheretheyrippeduppavingblockstoserveasthickbarricades.Almosteverydoorconcealedboobytrapsandtripwires.Pillboxesspatfireamidflamethrowers,grenades,machineguns,riflesandbayonets.TheWikingwounded,wereeitherbayonetedastheylayinthestreetorweredraggedfromtroop-carriersservingasmakeshiftambulances.Withindays,theSovietshaddriventheGermansoutofthetownandtheyfellbacktodefensivepositionsacrosstheMius,leavingbehindpilesofdead.Againstfuriousonslaughts,theLeibstandarteandtheWikingDivisionheldon,buttheirmenknewthatthepositionwashopeless.WhentheGermanswerepushedoutofRostovbythefirsttrulysuccessfulRedArmycounterattack,WikingmovedbacktothelineoftheMiusRiver,wherethedivisionspentthewintermonths.WHENTHEGERMANSLAUNCHEDTHEIRMAJOROFFENSIVEINTHESUMMEROF1942,WIKINGWASAGAINONEOFTHESPEARHEADDIVISIONS.ITSMAKE-UPHADCHANGED,HOWEVER,ASINDIVIDUALELEMENTSOFTHEWIKINGDIVISIONWEREADDEDANDREMOVEDMANYTIMESINITSEXISTANCE.ASAREPLACE-MENTFORTHEDISBANDEDFINNISHBATTALIONOFTHENORDLANDREGIMENT,THEESTONIANNARWAREGIMENTWASTRANSFERREDTOWIKING.THENORD-LANDREGIMENTITSELFWASDETACHEDTOHELPESTABLISHANEWWAFFEN-SSDIVISION,THENORDLANDDIVISION.ArmyGroupSouth,renamedArmyGroupB,wastoadvanceintothebendoftheDonRiverthenontotheVolgaatStalingrad.Theotherclawinagiganticpincermovementwouldbeanewformation.ArmyGroupA,comprisingFirstPanzerArmy,SeventeenthArmyandThirdRomanianArmy,wouldlinkupwithArmyGroupBsomewhereonthesteppewestoftheVolga,hopefullytrappinganothervasthaulofSovietprisoners.ArmyGroupAwouldthenlungesouthandeasttooverruntheSovietoilfields.Sixmonthsaftertheyhadenduredwintertemperaturesof-30°C(-22°F),WikingsoidietsfoundthemselvesleadingtheFirstPanzerArmyontheKubansteppe,wherethethermometertopped40°C(104°?)intheshade.Insidethetanksandfightingvehicles,theheatwassimplyunbearable.Theterrainslowedupfightingtroopsaswellassupplies.Road.swereriversofdust,andtheriverswerewide,withunpredictablecurrents.Nevertheless,theSSWikingDivisionforcedtheRiverKubaninthefaceofintenseSovietresistanceearlyinAugust.On9August,.PanzerarmeetookPyatigorskatthebottomofthefirstfoothillsoftheCaucasus,andpatrolsweresentouttowardsAstrakhan.However,thiswasasfarasitwent.TheWikingDivisionhadfoughtitswayintoandthroughtheCaucasus.ItwouldremainintheareauntilvonKlcist’sarmygroupwasforcedtopullbackafterthelullofStalingradearlyin1943.Bythistime,ithadbeenconvertedfromamotorizedinfantrydivisionintoaPanzergrenadler,orarmouredinfantry,division.

DivisionalHistory

The5thSSPanzerDivision“Wiking”emergedonOctober22,1943,fromtherenamingofthe5thSSPanzerGrenadierDivision“Wiking”..Atthistime,thedivisionhadaHKL

basedontheDnieperbetweenKanevandCherkassy.On13November1943,theRedArmytoestablishabridgeheadacrosstheDnieperinCherkassy.Intheensuingheavyfighting,shemanagedamonthlatertoconquerCherkassy.Subsequently,thepositionsofthe5thSSPanzerDivisionranfromsouthKanevalongtheDnieperCherkasydirectionandtheninasouth-westerlydirectionSmela.ToDecember31,1943announcedtheDivisionastrengthof14,647men.OnceitwastheRedArmysucceededon28January1944theXI.andtheXXXXII.ArmyCorpsbetweenZvenigorodka-Kanev-includeCherkassy,builttheDivisiononwiththeirrearblockinglinesinthesouthwesternpartoftheboiler.InthewakeoftheGermanEntsatzversuchesonFebruary9,1944receivedtheSSPanzerGrenadierRegiment9“Germania”commandtomoveintothespaceShanderovkatoherethereliefcolumnofIII.TakePanzerCorps.BecauseofRussianresistancebutfailedtheGermanreliefattempt.From16February1944,thetrappedGermanforcesthenbrokeoutintothewest,withthe5thSSPanzerDivision“Wiking”foughtsplitintoseveralcombatgroups.

Onlyabout4,000menreachedtheGermanlineswithoutheavyweaponsandequipment.TheseresidueswereatRISino,about25westofZvenigorodka,assembledandthenmovedon25February1944tofreshenupintheareaeastofLublin.Onthe16thofMarch,theDivisioncametoKovel,wheretherefreshshouldbeperformed.Untilthedivisionofthecity,however,wasabletoachievethishadalreadybeenincludedbytheRedArmy.TheDivisionofrumblinggatheredintheroomMaciejówwithotherGermantroopstothereliefofKovel.HerealsometwiththenewlyestablishedinFranceIII./SSPanzerGrenadierRegiment9“Germania”andtheII./SS-Panzer-Regiment5awiththedivision.On29March1944,theGermanreliefattemptbegan.OnlypartsoftheII./SS-Panzer-Regiment5couldfightitswaythroughbyKovel,butthecontainmentcouldnotbe

definitivelybroken.Afterfeedingthe4thand5thPanzerDivision,the5thSSPanzerDivision“Wiking”camefromtheApril4,1944againtoadvancetoKovel.InheavyfightingsucceededtheGermanunits,liberateKovel.Subsequenttothesestruggles,thedivisionwastransferredtotheSStrainingarea“Heidecamp”tofinallyperformtheabortedrefreshcan.By30July1944,thedivisionwasreinforcedagainonastrengthof17,348men.Inmid-July1944,overtherestofthedivisionandshewastransferredtotheroomBialowieza,about65kmsouth-eastBialystok.On19July1944,thedivisionthenmovedinKamieniecLitewski,about38kmnortheastofBrest,alongtheriverLesnaabeachheadagainstthefastapproachingRussiantroops.However,theDivisionwasunabletostabilizethegapingfrontofArmyGroupCentreonlytemporarily.Itwasentrainedintheretreatofthearmygroupandretirebehindthebow.InlateJuly1944,theymovedintopositionsinStanislawowwithfronttothesouthandwest.OnAugust3,1944,theDivisionattackedwestwardstothefrontgaptotheXXXIX.ClosePanzerCorps.Afterthistaskcouldbesuccessfullymet,thenewHKLwasthedivisionofStanislawowabout10kilometerstothewest.Onthenightof12August1944,theDivisionthenwentontoapositionabout20kmfurthernorthback.On14August1944Russianforcesintheinterfacebetweenthe3rdSSPanzerDivisionandthe5thSSPanzerDivisioncouldbreakandcouldnotbethrownoutoftheHKLalso.OnAugust18,1944,theBattleofWarsawbegan.By24August,thestrengthoftheDivisionhaddroppedto10,335men.Untilthe6thofSeptember,thedivisionhadtowithdrawacrosstheNarew.TheymovedintoanewHVACbetweenSerocktosouthofNieporent.Inordertostrengthenthedivisionherequickly,shewasabattalionUkrainiansand1,000infantrymannotsuppliedtrainedAirForcesoldiers.On2October1944,theDivisionhadastrengthofabout10,000men.OnOctober10,1944,theRedArmyenteredagainontheoffensive.UptoOctober28,1944therewassevereattacksandburglariesintheGermanHKL.InlossyfightingacontextofHKLcouldbeprotectedevenifthedivisionithadtogoback12kmfar.On16November,theUkrainianIII./SSPanzerGrenadierRegiment10tothe14thWaffenGrenadierDivisionoftheSS(Galicianno.1)isreturned.Asasubstitute,thenewlyformedbattalionsoftheI.SSPanzerGrenadierregiments23“Norge”and24“Danmark”andotherAirForcemembersoftheDivisionweresupplied.TheDivisionendofDecember1944wasthenwithdrawnfromthefrontandmovedtoHungary.BeforeTata,thedivisionispresentedthentoattackBudapestready,whichbeganonJanuary1st,1945.First,Tatacouldbeconquered,onJanuary3,Torjan.TheintakeofBicskeon5January1945butfailed.ThentheGermanadvancewasstopped.On10January1945,theGermanattackwasresumedafterregrouping.Asthedivisionhadalreadyapproachedfoughtonabout17kmtoBudapest,theGermanoffensiveofHitlerwasstopped.ThenmovedthedivisioninthespaceCsajágLakeBalaton.Fromhere,itshouldagaintakepartinthere-reliefattemptofBudapestonJanuary18,1945.AfterheavyfightingtheSárvízchannelcouldbeexceededon19January1945byKalóz.ItwasthenturnstothenorthandSárosdbeconquered.On23January1945theDanubewasfinallyachievedinAdony.Finally,theriverValiwasreachedwherethethrustoftheDivisionremainedarefinal.TheperiodbeginningonJanuary29,1945RussiancounteroffensivehasalreadyledtosharpslumpsonthefollowingdayintheGermanHKL.ThenbeganonFebruary1,1945,thediscontinuationofthedivisiononthelineGárdony-Szolgaeghyáza.OnFebruary4th/5th,1945,theDivisionadvancedonthebasis

ofcontinuousRussianpressureinthe“Margaret”positioninadvanceofStuhlweißenburga.Bythepreviousbattles,thedivisionwassofargonethatshewasonlycalledbattlegroup.OnFebruary22,1945,theDivisionwasmovedintothespacearoundSzékesfehérvár.Again,thedivisionwasmadeupbymembersoftheNavyandtheAirForce,sothatitwascalledfromFebruary27,1945asadivision.OnMarch16,1945,theRedArmybegantheirnextoffensive.By10March,thedivisionlostagainmostoftheirheavyweapons.Whenitbecameclearthatthecontainmentofthecityon21March,OberführerUllrichdecided,alsoabandonthecityagainstHitler’scommandandledthedivisiontothenorthwestatLakeBalatonover.OnMarch24,adriplinetoVeszprémwasbrieflyonceformedwheretheDivisionforthelasttimereceivedcompensationfromhome.ThiswastoFlakhelfer,membersoftheSafetyandReliefServiceandtosoldierswhowereover50yearsold.Thiswasfollowedbythecommand,refertotherealmprotectivepositioninspacesoutheastofFurstenfeld.On7May1945theunitsoftheDivisionleftthentheirpositionstomaketheirwaytotheWest.ThebulkofthedivisioncameatthesurrenderatRadstadtinBavariainAmericancaptivity.

BattlesBattlesforKharkovPanzergrenadierDivision

Inlate-November1942thedivisionwasredesignatedthe5thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionWiking.Bynowthedivisionhadgainedareputationasaneliteformation.Inearly1943,itwasorderedtofallbacktotheUkrainesouthofKharkov,recentlyabandonedbyObergruppenführerPaulHausser’sIISSPanzerCorps,andnowthesceneoffiercefightingforitsrecapture.5

ErichvonManstein,thenewcommanderofArmyGroupSouth,threw5SS“Wiking”andthe11thPanzer-DivisionintoactionagainsttheSovietMobileGroupPopov,whichwasthreateningtobreakthroughtothevitalrailline.5SS“Wiking”hadgreatdifficultydealingwiththearmour-heavySovietformation.ThePanzergrenadierregimentsof5SS“Wiking”wereexhaustedandunderstrengthfromthefightingintheCaucasus;inaddition,thePanzerBattalionlackedsufficientarmourtocountertheSovietforce.Despitethis,thedivisionheldofftheSovietassault,protectingthevitalraillineandhelpingbringaboutthedestructionofMobileGroup“Popov”.AftertherecaptureofKharkov,5SS“Wiking”waspulledoutofcombattoberefittedasaPanzergrenadierdivision.ThankstoReichführer-SSHeinrichHimmler’sandPaulHausser’sefforts,ithadbeen

decidedthatallWaffenSSPanzergrenadierdivisionsweretohavearegimentofPanzers,ratherthanonlyabattalion.ThismeantthattheSSPanzergrenadierformationswerefullsizedPanzerdivisionsinallbutname.WiththeupgradecameSdKfz251halftracksforonebattalionofinfantryandanadditionalpanzerBattalionbeganformingon28February1943.ItwouldbeoverayearbeforethenewbattalionwouldreceiveitsbaptismoffireatKovel.Duringmid-1943,5SS“Wiking”underwentamajortransformation.Steiner,nowaGruppenführer,wastransferredtocommandtheIII(Germanic)SSPanzerCorps,currentlyforminginCroatia.HisreplacementwasHerbertOttoGille,whowastoprovehimselfSteiner’sequal.TheremnantsoftheveteranSSRegiment“Nordland”,alongwithitscommanderFritzvonScholz,wereremovedfromthedivisionandusedasthenucleusofthenew11thSSVolunteerPanzergrenadierDivision“Nordland”.Also,theFinnishVolunteerBattalionoftheWaffen-SSwasdisbanded,astheagreedtwoyears’serviceoftheFinnishvolunteershadended.InanattempttooffsetthelossoftheFinnsandtheNordlandregiment,thenewlyformedEstonianvolunteerunitEstonianVolunteerPanzergrenadierBataillon“Narwa”wasattachedtothedivision.

March-December1943InOctober1943,thedivisionwasagainupgraded,beingconvertedfroma

PanzergrenadierdivisiontoafullyarmouredPanzerdivision.Inthesummerandautumnof1943,thedivisionfoughtindefensiveoperationsintheareaofKharkovandtheDnieperRiver.Bytheendofof1943,Wikingwasoneofsixdivisionsoccupyinga96km(60-mile)salientatKorsun,ontheeastoftheDnieper.Hitlerhadtheunrealisticbeliefthatthe56,000meninthesalientcouldthrustinanoffensivetowardsKiev.HehadnotreckonedontheSoviets.GeneralKonev’s2ndUkrainianFrontpunchedthroughthebridgeheadlyingbetweenKremenchug,whichlayfartothesouthwestofKharkov,andDnepropetrovsktotheeastofKremenchug.Konev’sobjectivewastoformawedgebetweenFirstPanzerArmyandEighthArmy.ThelatterwasnomatchforthestrongSovietmuscleandwasforcedtopullbackinthefaceofthesteadyadvanceofthe2ndUkrainianFront.KievInthenorth,thingswerenobetter,withevermorepowerfulSovietforcesthrowingtheGermansoutofKievon6Novemberaftertheyhadestablishedabridgeheadthere.Sovietpridewasfurtherrestoredwiththerecapture,afteratemporaryloss,ofthetown(ilZhitomiron20November.Buildingstherewerereducedtorubbleandthestreetswerelitteredwiththeburnt-outhulksofvehicles.OfconsiderablecompensationwerethelargesupplydumpsandfoodstuffdepotsofFourthPanzerArmy,whichtheGermanshadestablishedinthehighsummeroftriumphtwoyearsbefore.EncirclementThemenofWikingwereassignedtoterritorywheretheprospectswerebleakfortheGermans.FourdivisionswereencircledinthisflatcountrysideundersnowwiththetemperatureinKirovograditselfat-20°C(-4°F).On5January,Konev’s2ndUkrainianFrontlauncheditsattackandtookthecity.Abreakoutwaseventuallyachievedby3rdPanzerDivisionwithfirecoverfromtheartillery;engineersandPanzergrenadiersfollowed,whiletheSovietswerepinneddowninlocalfighting.ForalltheeffortsofthePanzerunitsandtheSS,thetruthwasthattheSovietadvancehad

becomeafloodwiththegreatwinteroffensivedealingthedecisiveblow.TheCherkassyPocketTheconquestofKirovogradstillleftpositionthatHitlerwasdeterminedtoholdandunfinishedbusinessfortheSoviets.Tothenorthwhichwasdefendedbysix-and-a-halfdivisionswithlaythesalientaroundKorsunandCherkassy,aaround56,000men.TheGermanpositionssouthoftheKorsunbulgetookthefullbombardment.FourthGuards,Fifty-ThirdandFifthTankArmiesstruckattheheartoftheGermanline.Fromthenorthofthebulgecamethe1stUkrainianFront.By28January,ithadmetupwithKonev’s2ndUkrainianFront,whichhadadvancedfromthesouth.Menof5.SS-Panzer-DivisionWikingwereamongthe56,000Germantroopstrappedthere.BreakoutBeingtheonlyPanzerunitinthepocket,Wikingspearheadedtheoperationtobreakoutoftheencirclement.IncludedunderitsordersatthetimewasanindependentSSformationofBelgianvolunteers,5.SS-FreiwilligenSturmbrigadeWallonien,whichwouldlaterbecome28.SS-FreiwilligenGrenadier-DivisionWallonien.Thebreakoutwassuccessful,butcasualtieswereheavy—some30,000ofthe56,000Germantroopsescaped.TheWikingDivisionlostallofitsarmourandmuchofitsequipmentintheprocess.TheremnantsoftheWikingdivisionfoughtonasaKampfgruppe,beforebeingtransferredtoPolandwheretheywouldformthenucleusofanew5.SS-Panzer-DivisionWiking.Becauseitwasoutoftheline,itmissedthemassiveSovietsummeroffensiveknownasOperationBagration.Perhapsthemostpowerfulmilitaryattackinhistory,BagrationsmashedtheGermanEasternFrontandvirtuallydestroyedArmyGroupCentre.BythetimeWikingwusagaininaction,theSovietshadpushedallthewaytotheVistulaRiverandtoWarsaw.Alongwiththe3.SS-Panzer-Division‘IbtenkopfandtheArmy’s19thPanzerDivision,WikingfoughttostemtheSovietadvance,stabilizingthefrontalongthelineoftheVistula.AsthevastSovietwaveofdestructionrolledonwardstowardsGermany,northoftheCarpathians,HitlerfoundhimselfobsessedwithHungary.WikingwaspulledfromWarsawinDecember1944,andtransferredsouthtorelieve60,000Germansoldiersandmorethan800,000civilianstrappedintheHungariancapital,Budapest.AttachedtoIVSSPanzerCorps,Wikingpushedforwardfortwoweeks,butcouldnotpenetratethemassedSovietarmieswhichwerebesiegingthecity.EventhoughunitsoftheRedArmywerenowinsightofthesuburbsoftheHungariancapital,IVSSPanzerCorpsreceivedorderstoshiftpositiontotheindustrialandfarmingareaofSzekesfehervarinthesouthwest.ThisisbelievedtohavebeenonthepersonalordersofHitlerhimself.ItwasfromherethatthenextattempttobreakthestrangleholdonBudapestwouldbemade.TheoveralllossofmenandmaterieltotheWikingandTbtenkopfDivisionswasbleedingtheWaffen-SSformationsdry.Aslowcountermovewassetatnaughtbythestrengthofenemyfire,andthecommandpostatSzekesfehervarhadtobemovedbackandallresistancecollapsed.ThenextattackwastobemadebySeppDietrich’sSixthSSPanzerArmy,withdrawnfromthefightingintheArdennesandmovedacrossEuropetoHungary.On25March,theSovietbreakthroughwasallbutcomplete,andthenextdaytheSovietswentintothefinalphasewhichwasthedriveintoAustria.Withthefailureofthefinalattempttorelievethecity,WikingwaswithdrawnintoAustria,whereitfoughtinthefinalbattlestodefendViennain1945.HighprioritywasgiventothedefenceofViennabytheWaffen-SS,althoughtherewasnothingthatevenremotelycomparedwiththedefensivesystemsthathadexistedat

Budapest.RearguarddetachmentsolSixthSSPanzerArmy,withelementsofWiking,Leibstandarteandthe17thInfantryDivision,setupfrequentambushes,minedroadsandblewbridgestoholdofftheSovietArmy.However,nothingcouldstoptheSovietjuggernaut,andordersweregivenfortheremnantsofthedivisiontoretreattowardsGraz.OntheRiverMur,theSovietswerewaitingwithcavalryandT-34tanks.ThosewhosurvivedtheonslaughtmadefortheAmericanlinesatRastad,wheretheysurrendered.

GermanyinDefeatAfterabriefperiodoftrainingforfreshreservists,thenewly(partly)

equipped5thSS-Panzer-DivisionWikingmadeforBialystok,northeastofWarsaw.Thetaskwastobluntthesteadyadvanceof2ndWhiteRussianFront,diemainburdenofthebat-defallingatfirstonthemenofWestland.Szyzoworwasseizedafteraheavyopeningbombardment,butafterdialpoint,thepatternwasdistressinglyfamiliar.Acounterattackwasrepelledbutbroughtshort-termrelief.Russianmanpowerseemedtobeinexhaustible;ifonefrontsectorheld,thentheenemysimplybrokediroughtotheleftandrightofit.

ThegreatestmassoffereeswasconcentratedwithinArmyGroupCentre.Suchamovewasarecipefordisaster.Ofthe38divisionsindiefield,28wereobliteratedand350,000to400,000menwerewounded,killedormissing.Vitebsk,regardedbyHitlerasthemostimportantofthefortifiedareasandwhichhevainlyinsistedonholdinguntiltheeleventhhour,wasoverrun;itsdestructionopenedabreachindieGermanlinemoredian45km(28miles)wide.

Asitturnedout,dieneedsofBialystokwereputonhold,sincedieforcesofGermaniaandWestlandhadtobeswitchedfromonedisasterareatoanotherinthefamiliar‘firebrigade’role.Hopeswerepinnedonthe3rdSSPanzer-DivisionTotenkopf,rushedbytraintotheEasternFrontfromtheRomaniantheatrewiththearmouredParatroopDivisionHermannGoring.TheintentionwastosecurediecityofSiedlice,80km(50miles)eastofWarsaw.

NewPanzerCorps

TheRussiansseemedtoholdthecards,butnotallhadbeenentirelywellwiththeRedArmy.Ithadreceivedajoltwhen,ondieriverVistula’srightbank,theSovietSecondTankArmywasbeateninbattlejustafewmilesfromWarsawatacostof3000killedand6000prisoners,togetherwiththelossofagooddealofarmour.VolumeIVoftheSoviethistory,TheGreatPatrioticWarcontainssomefrankcriticismofitsforces:‘Thetempooftheoffensivehadgreatlysloweddown.TheGermanHighCommandhadbythistimethrownsomeverystrongreservesagainstthemainsectorsofouradvance.Germanresistancewasstrongandstubborn.Itshouldalsoberememberedthatourrifledivisionsandtankcorpshadsufferedheavylossesinpreviousbattles;thattheartilleryandsupplybaseswerelaggingbehind,anddiatthetroopswereshortofbothpetrolandammunition.Infantryandtankswerenotreceivingnearlyenoughartillerysupport…’Inastateofexhaustion,theforcesof1stBelorussianFrontunderMarshalKonstantinRokossovskyfacedtheGermanbridgeheadfrontingWarsaw.Theirlinesofcommunicationwerestretchedandmenandmaterielbelowstrength.ToexploiteventheseweaknessesinhisenemyandtocounterthedefeatofArmyGroup‘NorthUkraine’withitsinevitablefurthergrimconsequencesforArmyGroupCentre,HitlerproposedtostrengthenhisresourcesbyharnessingthefightingprowessofTotenkopfvnththoseofWiking.Theresult,asdecreedbyFieldMarshalWaltherModel,wasthecreationofIVSSPanzerCorps,underthecommandofSS-ObergruppenfûhrerundGeneralderWaffen-SS(General)HerbertGille.Thecorpswastoinclude3rdSS-Panzer-DivisionTotenkopfand5thSS-Panzer-DivisionWiking.GillewassucceededasWikingcommanderfirstbySSOberfuhrer(SeniorColonel)EdmundDeisenhofer,thenbySS-Standarlenfûhrer(Colonel)JohannesRudollMuhlenkamp,whohadbeenformerlyattachedloGermaniaduringthePolishcampaign,andfinallybySSStandartenfûhrerKarlUllrich.InstructionsgiventoWikingbyIVSSPanzerCorpscalledforthedivisiontoedgebackfromthefighliii);toBrest-Litovsk(nowBrest)ontheBug,followedbyanimmediateadvancewesttoWarsaw.Itssouthernflankwouldthenbescreenedagainstthepursuingenemy.AlinktherewouldbemadewiththeTotenkopfwlcuchw;ihassemblingintheareaofSiedliceasacomponentolIVSSPanzerCorps.AsourceofanxietywasthestreamofenemyreinforcementsassemblingneartheancienttownofModlinwhichlay30km(19miles)northofWarsaw.Theprioritywastolinkupwithotherunitsassembledthereandstemthetide.ButnothingcouldstoptheRussianspearheadsdrivingontheheelsoftheGermanrearguards.BrestLitovskwasloston23July.Atfirst,communicationwithTotenkopfcreatedproblemsbeforeitwasabletojointherestofthestrengthsituatedinthebridgeheadintheWarsawsuburbofPragaonalinefromBrest-Litovsk.Eightdayslater,SovietarmourthrustintoOtwockandRadzymin,bringingtheRussianstowithin19km(12miles)ofthePolishcapital,northeastandeastofPragaontheVistula’seasternbankTheareawasasheerfortress,aformidablearrayofpillboxesandfixed-firingpositions,fieldfortifications,minefields,andstringsofantitankandanti-infantryobstacles.NotonlythatbuttheRussianshadstumbledintoavastconcentrationofGermanarmour.InadditiontoWiking,HermannGoringandTotenkopfDivisions,thereweretwootherpanzerdivisions,the19thandthe4th.IntroubletoowastheSovietXITankCorpswhich,whiletryingtothrowtheGermansoutoftheregionofSiedlicetotheeast,wasdangerouslylowonfuelandammunition.Inaddition,SecondTankArmy,comingupagainstthelatestGermanheavytanks,‘Royal’or‘King’Tigers,wasfeelingthe

effectofconsiderablelossesalreadysustainedinthedrivefromLublin.IntheareaofRadzymin-Wolomin,northeastoiWarsaw,theRussiansfaredbetter,pitchinginwithfighter-bomberassaults,thepreludetoabittertankbattlewhichcausedWestlandheavycasualtiesandforcedtheDivisionintoafightingwithdrawaltotheareaofMalopole.BytheendofAugust,therehadbeenthreevicioustankbattles,withMalopolechanginghandsasmanytimes.TotenkopftookthebruntoftheactionagainstaninvigoratedSovietEighthArmywith150-strongbatterysupport.Nevertheless,theWikingDivisionwasabletoestablishanorth-southsolidwedgerunningfromtheBugtoMalopole.AdecisionwastakentosendoutreconnaissancepatrolsasnearaspossibletotheRussianlines.ThepatrolsreportedsignsofmovementbytheRussiansintheareaofCzarnow,andwithinhoursenemytankswereonthemovemakingforakeyGermanbridgeheadatapointontheBug.AnattemptwasmadetocounterattackbutthePanzerswereunabletoadvanceovertheunsuitableterrainandtheattackfailed.The12panzersandassaultguns(SturmgeschutzenorStuGs)involvedintheattackwereblownupafterbeingstrippedofweaponsandequipmentintheignominiousretreat.TheGermansthenquitthebridgehead.Casualtiesonbothsideswereheavy.TheRussianslostfiveSherman-typetanksandT-34s;sevenotherswererendereduseless.ThisdisasterwasfollowedbyathreattoanentiresectoroftheGermancorps,fromtheVistulaintheareaofZbytkitotheBuginthefarnorth.Intheearlyhoursof1SeptemberthesectorwascoveredbyaheavycurtainofRussianfirethatlastedafullhour.ResistancebytheforcesofWestlandwaspuny,necessitatingaseriesofwithdrawalswhichallowedtheRussianstoestablishanotherbridgeheadatPogozelec.Repeatedattemptstoreducethebridgeheadweretonoavail,anditwasenlargedwhentheRussianarmourbrokethroughfromthenorthinthedirectionofMale.Herethefamiliarpropagandaoffensivewasrenewedwithloud-speakerpleastotheWaffen-SStosurrender.IntelligencereachedthedivisionthattheRussianswereamassing12-14rifledivisionsandotherunitsforadrivethroughtothecanalnorthofPraga.TheiraimwastoestablishabridgeheadbetweenWarsawandtheforestsofModlin.TheinterceptionofrationsandothersuppliesparachutedintotheareaalertedtheGermanstothepresenceofpartisanbandslurkinginthesurroundingforests.ThemanpowersituationofIVSSPanzerCorpswassuchthat,foreffectiveoppositiontoanyattack,itwouldbenecessarytodependuponyetmorereservists.Butmostweresogreenthatadditionaltrainingwasrequired.Thiscouldonlybecarriedoutbywithdrawingindividualunitsfromthefrontline,andtheycouldnotbespared.TheRedArmyhadsprungnorthwardsandcapturedPraga,whichbecamethesceneofintensestreet-fighting.TheRussians,consciousofthestrainssufferedbytheirarmour,hadnotcommittedthemselvesinitiallytoatankassault.InfantrycameinfirsttoreconnoitreandthepriceoftheircautionwasanassaultfromtheSS-TotenkopfDivision,manyofwhomweregauntandfatiguedzombieswhohadheldoutforaslongaspossible.

‘HOMEARMY’UPRISINGBythenWarsawwasdeepinitsownverypersonalwar;resistancelightersofthePolish‘HomeArmy’(ArmijaKrajowa,AK)beganwhatwastobea63-daystruggleagainsttheoccupyingGermangarrison.AtfirsttheGermanshadwithdrawnprecipitately,butwithindaystheyreturned,announcingtothecitizensofWarsawthatthecitywouldbedefendedandcivilianlabourconscriptedtobuildfortifications.TheRussiansrolledintodefensivepositionsandtheinfantrydugin.ThemenofAKforthwithlaunchedtheirownoffensiveinsideWarsaw,wagingwaronGermaninstallationsandkeypoints.Thetragedyofthe

‘WarsawRising’ranitscourseuntilthecapitulationofthe‘HomeArmy’on2October.AsaccountsoftheWarsawrisingmakeclear,theinsurrectionwasputdownwithhorrificbrutalitybySSfreebooters,workingwiththenotoriousDirlewangeyandKaminskibrigades.NounitsofWikingwereinvolved.TheRussiansremainedonthebanksoftheVistulauntiltheGermanshadcrushedtherebellion.Accordingtoaccounts,thiswasontheordersofStalintowhomtheAKwasanathema,regardedas‘power-seekingcriminals’loyaltothePolishgovernment-in-exileinLondon.Acounter-argumentpleadedthatanadvancebytheRussiansintoWarsawhadnotbeenanoption,sincebythetimeitfacedtheGermandefencesinfrontofWarsaw,the1stBelorussianFrontwasinastateofexhaustion.Afewdays’respitehadbeennecessaryinordertoreceivemajorreinforcementsinmenandmateriel.

ChangeofCommandAsfarasWikingwasconcerned,animportanteventon9OctoberwasachangeincommandfortheDivisionwhenSS-Standarenfûhrer(Colonel)KarlUllrich,formerlyaPioneerCommanderandRegimentalCommanderwiththeTotenkopfDivision,succeededSS-StandartenfûhrerJohannesRudolfMuhlenkamp.Ullrich’sspeedyarrivalatCorpsheadquartersinaflurryofdustfromanarmouredpersonnelcarrier(Schûtzenpanzerwagen)hadbeendramatic.RadiointelligencehadalertedtheGermanstoRussianplansforanattackoncorpsheadquarters;thenewcommanderandhisstaffhuddledinthecellars.Onthefollowingday,theattackwentaheadatModlin,whereRussianstrengthprovedinsufficienttoenvelopanddestroytheSSdivisions,andasaconsequencetheSovietswereobligedtocallofftheirattack.6

Ontheotherhand,theinfantryresourcesofWikingweredwindlingdisastrously.ReplacementsgarneredfromtheLuftwaffeprovedtobemoretroublethantheywereworthinthemeleeofgroundwarfare.TheRussiantankriposte,whenitcame,involvedT-34sandT-41sspreadoutovera1km(1000yd)widefront.Butinfantrysupportforthetankswasnegligible.TheRussiansgingerlyworkedtheirwayalongtheirlinesofadvance,huggingroadsideditcheswhichweresometimeshiddenfromview.Withhisguncrewsunderrifleandmachine-gunfire,Oberscharfûhrer(Sergeant)Schmalzedgedtwoflakgunstowardstheconcealedditchesandotherpointsofcover.Ittookjustafewburststorouttheenemyandforcethemintoretreat.TheroadtoModlinwaskeptopen.AtapointontheriverNarew,thebiggesttributarytotheVistula,theDivision,whichbythenhadbeenobligedtoacceptfurtherrawrecruitsdroppedbytheLuftwaffe,was

defendingapositionrunningsouthalongasectionoftheriver’s485km(303-mile)length.ItsoonbecameclearthattheseforaysbytheRussiansheraldedtherenewedoffensiveonWarsawitself.Divisionaltroopsbecamehard-pressedintheneighbourhoodoftherailwaylineatLotnisko,wheretheRussianslaunchedatwo-hourbarragepriortotheirmainattack.WiththeirShermantanks,theRedArmyforcesplungeddeepintothesurroundingforestarea.Asteelcurtainofartilleryfirerenderedanycommunicationimpossible,letaloneaccessintothesector.Ambulancessenttopickupthegrowingnumbersofwoundedwereeitherdestroyedorbeatenback.MenoftheWestlandRegimentwerepinneddowninthecemeteryabuttingtheforest.Aneventualbreakthroughwasmadebyatoughinfantrycontingentof1stBattalionof5thSSPanzerRegimentchargedwithwinningbackthosesectionsoftheraillinewhichhadbeenlost.Attheendofoneevening,only40outof400menhadsurvived,thewoundedbeingcrammedpainfullyintoasinglepersonnelcarrier.Theeventualappearanceofpanzersprovidedabreathingspaceduringthebreakout,althoughtheyhadatoughtimebattlingthroughtheunfriendlyforestterrain.

AroundWarsawitself,theRedArmyhadoutrunitssupplysystemandneededtogatherstrengdibeforeassaultingtheGermandefencesencirclingthecapital.TheinsurrectionbythePolish‘HomeArmy’(AK)inWarsawhadcost200,000civilianand15,000AKlives.On2OctoberthePolescapitulated.Therewere10,000deadamongthe26,000Germancasualties.WiththeSovietoffensivecalledtoahalt,theGermanswereabletocrushtheuprising.ThesurrenderwassignedbyGeneralBor-KomorowskiofAK.Warsawwasnow

almostcompletelydestroyed.TheRedArmyhad,backinlateAugust,beenbusylothefarsouth,andhadbroughtaboutthecapitulationofRomania,thusenablingtheRussianstooccupythekeyoilfieldsatPloesti.TheentirecountrywasinSoviethandsbytheendofthemonth.On8SeptembertheSovietoccupationofBulgariawasunderway.ThismonthalsomarkedthefinalexitfromthewaroftheFinns,whoforgoodmeasureturnedontheGermanmountaintroopswhohadrefusedtoevacuateFinnishterritory.Hitler’sattentionhad,perforce,tobeswitchedtowesternEuropewhere,backattheendofJuly,theAmericanshadlaunchedtheirdrivetosmashoutoftheNormandybridgehead.Alas,hecouldnotaffordtohavehisattentiondistracted.AswellastheadvancingRussians,thereloomedtheproblemofGermany’serstwhileally,Hungary.Hitler,ensconcedintheAdlerhorst,(heheadquartersnearBerlinfromwhichhecommandedtheArdennesoffensive,wasshowingfurtherdangersignsofbeingstuckinaStalingrad-liketimewarp.AsthevastSovietwaveofdestructionrolledonwardstowardsGermanynorthoftheCarpathians,HitlerfoundhimselfobsessedwithHungary.AnattemptmadeinearlyOctoberbyAdmiralMiklosHorthy,Hitler’spuppetthere,todefecttotheSovietsidewasquicklyfoiledbytheGermans.Horthywasthenpressedtocontinuedsubserviencethroughthekidnappingofhisplayboyson,Nikolaus.Thenextmovewastoimprisonthe76-year-oldadmiralandreplacehimwithFerencSzalasi,acommittedfascist.MeetingwithHitler.Szalasiagreedthatthecapital,Budapest,mustbeheld‘atanyprice’.ThiswasonlypossibleifHitlerremovedunitsfromtheArdennesFronttoreinforcethedefenceofBudapestandthelineoftheDanubenordiandsouthofthecity.STAVKAorderedMarshalTheodorIvanovichTolbukintopreparetheforcesofthe3rdUkrainianFrontforthecomingbattleofBudapest.Stalin’sorderhadbeenstark:‘TakeBudapestasquicklyaspossible.’Theresponsewasquick;theRedArmyadvancedintoHungaryandonChristmasEve1944itstanksburstintothesuburbsofBuda,strikingtowardsthelandmarkoftheHotelGellert.Thelate-nightshoppersatfirsttookitforgrantedthatthetankswereGerman,butoncetheRedStarswerespotted,therewaspanic.ThehithertopeacefulstreetsbecamebattlegroundsastheGermanTigersrumbledacrossthebridgesoftheDanubetoclosewiththeadvancingarmourofthe3rdUkrainianFront,oneofwhosenotabletriumphshadbeentheactivesupportofMarshalTitointhecaptureofBelgradethepreviousOctober.

TheRussianforces,consistingofthreeassaultgroupsoftank,motorizedandcavalryunits,advancedbutwerethenrepulsed.Simultaneously,the2ndUkrainianFrontofMarshalRodionYakovievichMalinovskywascrossingtheDanubeaboveBudapest.TwodaysafterChristmas,thetwoformationsmetwestofthecity.FiveGermanandfourHungariandivisions,with800,000civilians,werecutoffandsurrounded.Emissarieswent

forwardtodiscussthetermsofcapitulation.ToHitlerthiswastheultimateheresy.Therewouldbenocapitulation.Budapestwouldberecaptured,notevacuated.Thiswasnevertobe;theRussians’giganticrocketassaultblewapartthebuildingsandinfrastructureoftheancientcity,theonslaughtorchestratedbytheblareofSovietloudspeakersurgingtheHungarianstocomeoutpeacefullyandjointheRedArmy.Thosewhohadtimepinnedstripsofredclothtotheiruniforms.Otherswhodidnotwerebutchered.Invain,GeneralHeinzGuderian,theactingArmyChiefofStaff,urgedtheFuhrertoconcentrateallhisforces,includingthosewithdrawnfromthewestafterthedebacleintheArdennes,todefendtheOder.ButHitler,mesmerizedaboveallbythethreattotheoilresourcesaroundLakeBalaton,wouldhavenoneofit.ThefactthattheoilwellswerenolongerabletosupplysufficientoileventomeettherequirementsofArmyGroupSouthwasbrushedaside.Whatwasneeded,theFuhrerproclaimed,was‘thewidervision’,adding:‘Hungarymustbetheobjective.WewillthrowtheRussiansbackacrosstheDanubeandthentherewillbeothervictories.’ItwasHitler’sintentionthatGeneralO.Wohler’sArmyGroupSouthwouldtrapanddestroythe3rdUkrainianFrontbetweenLakeBalatonandtheDanube.ThemajorthrustwouldbelaunchedbySeppDietrich’sSixthPanzerArmy,nowwithdrawnfromtheWesternFront.DietrichwouldattacksoutheastfromthenorthernendofLakeBalatontoalineontheDanubeembracingBudapest-Baja.Fromsouthofthelake,advancingdirectlyeast,wouldcomeSecondPanzerArmywithasupportingattacktobelaunchednorthwardsfromtheYugoslavianborder.BudapestwouldbetakenandtheRedArmyfront‘struckofftheorderofbattle’.InhismemoirsGuderian,withuncharacteristicmildness,summedupthebitterclashbetweenhimselfandHitler:‘Iwassceptical,sinceverylittletimehadbeenallowedforpreparation,andneitherthetroopsnorthecommanderspossessedthesamedriveasintheolddays.’ButargumentwithHitlerprovedfruitless.AnorderfromFuhrerHeadquarters(Fuhrerhauptquartier,FHQ)hadreachedtheWikingDivision’scommandpostnearModlinonChristmasnight,sent,Guderianlatermaintained,withouthisknowledge.ThepersonnelofIVSSPanzerCorpsweretobetransportedforthwithbyrailtotheKomaromarea.HeretheyweretorelieveIXSSMountainCorpsofSS-GruppenfuhrerundGeneraUeutnantderWaffen-SS(Lieutenant-General)KarlvonPfeffer-Wildenbruch,aveteranpolicegeneral,whowasnowunderthreatfromtheencirclingSovietforces.ThemenofGermaniaandWestlandscarcelyhadtimetobreathbeforetheywereformedintotwobattlegroups.ThetoughestassignmentwenttoGermania,orderedforthwithtoinstituteafrontalattackinthedirectionofBudapest.Indarkness,WestlandwastoformupbehindGermania,holdingthepositionfirmwhileGermaniastormedaheadwithenemyantitankguns,assaultgroups,andtanksformingitstarget.Opinionwasdividedonthewisdom,notonlyofafrontalattack,butalsooftyingdownapanzergroupandbattlegroupinonelocation.ThedecisiontosendWestlandatfirstlightintowhatturnedouttobeaheavilyopposeduphillattackwasatfirstsuccessful,butalltoosoonthebattalionswerepinneddownbyheavyfire.ItwasthenproposedtoassailtheRussians’weakestpositionsinthePilismountains,situatedtothenorthofBudapestontherightbankoftheDanube.Themountainnetworkofcaves,steepcliffsandhairpinbendsprovedusefulasoutpostsandstrongpointsfortheRedArmy.AlongthewindingroadseventuallywastobeseenthedetritusofaGermanArmyretreatingindefeat,lorriesandtrucksabandoned,alongwithweaponsandequipment.MaraudingSoviettroopsused

thedebrisascover.EventhoughunitsoftheRedArmywerenowinsightofthesuburbsoftheHungariancapital,IVSSPanzerCorpsreceivedorderstoshiftpositiontotheindustrialandfarmingareaofSzekesfehervarinthesouthwest.ThisisbelievedtohavebeenonthepersonalordersofHitlerhimself.ItwasfromherethatthenextattempttobreakthestrangleholdonBudapestwouldbemade.SS-Obergruppenfuhrer(General)Gille,whofromthebeginninghadbeenopposedtousingSzekesfehervarasanoperationalbase,hadhisfearsconfirmedwhenitbecameevidentthattheRussianshadanticipatedthemoveandheavilyminedthearea,resultinginadistinctlackofprogressfortheGermans.Nevertheless,Ullrich,asWikingscommander,urgedforwardthearmouredgroupofSS-Obersturmbannfiihrer(Lieutenant-Colonel)HansDorrofGennania,andbytheeveningtheyhadbrokenthroughatapointwhereRussianmanpowerwasthinontheground.AbriefingatGermania’scommandpostinSarosd,earlierwrestedfromRussianhands,resultedinaseriouslosstotheDivision.Adirecthitbyanantitankshellkilledseveralofficers,andseverelywoundedHansDorr,wholaterdiedofhisinjuries.Thisincidentdentedthemoraleofthedivisionwhich,fortuitously,wasrestoredbythecaptureofSzekesfehervar,atatimewhentheRussianFifty-SeventhGuardsArmyhadbeenchronicallyshortofreinforcementsandmunitions.ButnothingseeminglycouldnowstopthefinalRussianassaultonBudapestwhichwaslaunchedataround07:00hourson29January1945and,soitwasrumoured,waslikelytobehinderedonlybyonebatteredcavalrydivision.TheoveralllosstoWikingandTotenkopfofmenandmaterielwasbleedingtheWaffen-SSdry.Aslowcountermovewassetatnaughtbythestrengthofenemyfire,andthecommandpostatSzekesfehervarhadtobemovedback.Allresistancecollapsed.AsacontributortoHistoryoftheSecondWorldWar,theAmericanhistorianEarlK.Ziemkewrote:‘OnthemorningofFebruary11,Pfeffer-Wildenbruchissuedordersforabreakout.InagesturereminiscentofPaulus’promotiontoField-MarshalatStalingrad,HitlerhadconferredtheKnight’sCrossoftheIronCrossonhimthedaybefore.Butthegarrisonwasdowntoitslastrationsandammunition,andsplitintotwopockets,bothtoosmallforairdrops.Onthenightofthe11ththetroopstriedtoforcetheirwayoutalongtheItalianBoulevardwhilethestaffstookaroughlyparallelroutethroughasubterraneandrainagechannel.Fewevenreachedthesuburbs.Ofcloseto30,000GermansandHungarians-10,600woundedwereleftbehind-lessthan700reachedtheGermanlines.’

Norelief

InarapidadvancetheRussianshadencircledSzekesfehervarandfromHitlercametheby

nowcharacteristicallyintransigentdemand:‘Szekesfehervaristobedefendedwithoutregardforlosses;thecombatcommanderresponsibleisthecommanderofWestland.’Pleasforreliefwereimpossible;contactcouldnotbemadewithWikingdivisionalHQ,whichwassituatedsome18km(11miles)westofSzekesfehervar.AreconnaissanceregimentalcycleplatoonreportedthatencirclementofthetownbytheRussianswasvirtuallycomplete.TheninrecognitionthatobedienceoftheFuhrerorderwouldamounttoadeathsentenceforWiking,SS-ObergruppenfûhrerGilleatIVSSPanzerCorpsauthorizedawithdrawalwestwardstogetherwiththewounded.TheSoviets’steamrolleradvancehadfoundObersturmbannfûhrer(Lieutenant-Colonel)FranzHackofWestlandinthethickofit:‘Inthecourseoftheday,theSovietRussiansattackusfrontally,supportedbyartilleryand“Stalinorgan”fire.ThebattleragesinandaroundthelittletownofSeregelyes…Wecapturedacomplete“Stalinorgan”withtractorandammunition.OurmenfromtheartilleryandinfantrygununitsunderHauptsturmfiihrer[Captain]PeterWollseifer,turnthemultiplemortararoundandsoontheSovietRussiansgetatasteofareabombardmentfromtheirownrocketweapon.’Akeyroleinthewithdrawalwasplayedby9thSS-Panzer-DivisionHohenstaufen,whichhadalsooriginallybeenrecruitedfromforeignvolunteers.ItshifteditsfronttothenorthernpartofLakeBalatoninordertoholdthesectoropenfortheWikingDivision.Withinhours,thelatterwasabletofindtheprotectionofHohenstaufen’s,front.Allpointswestwerejammed,andpowerfulmotorizedforcesencounterednothingmorelethalthaninfantrysmallarmsandseveralmeagresuppliesofammunition.ThelaunchofHitler’soffensive,codenamed‘SpringAwakening’,hadbegunon18FebruarywhenIandIISSPanzerCorpsentrainedfromWiesbaden,KoblenzandBonn.Hitlerhadsummonedsmartlyuniformedreserveforceswhichseeminglyhadacallonthemostsophisticatedweapons.Butassemblywasonething;fastmovementanother.TheprogressofthenewreserveformationshadbeenmuchhinderedbyAlliedairattacksandfuelshortages,soitwasnotuntilthebeginningofMarchthatSeppDietrichwasabletoassemblehisforcesbetweenLakesBalatonandVelencze.Aswellastwopanzercorps,SixthSSPanzerArmyalsohadunderitscommandtwocavalrydivisionsandWikingandTotenkopfofIVSSPanzerCorps,andaHungarianinfantrydivision.Theplanwasforthemainattacktobemadeon6MarchwithSixthArmyunderGeneralHermannBalck,withDietrich’s6thSSPanzerArmyonhisright.SubsidiaryattacksonthedaybeforewouldbetheresponsibilityofArmyGroupJEacrosstheDravaandSecondPanzerArmytothesouthofLakeBalaton.AstothefateofSixthSSPanzerArmy,SeppDietrichlaterrecounted:‘Myleftflanks[IISSPanzerCorps]hadnosuccessworthmentioning.TheemplacementsalongthewesternbankoftheDanube,thehardstrongenemy,andthemarshyterrain,impassablefortanks,preventedouradvancingandattainingourgoal…Thecentre[IPanzerCorpsandthecavalrydivisions]reportedgoodsuccess;yetwhentankswereemployedtoexploittheinitialsuccesses,theterrainprovedcompletelyimpassable.Theterrain,whichwassupposedtobefrozenhard,andwhichGeneralvonWohlerhadmaintainedtobepassable,waswetandmarshy…’

SixthSSPanzerArmywasequippedwiththeMkVTTigerIIheavybattletank-the‘Royal’or‘King’Tiger-massivelyarmouredandmountingan88mm(3.46in)gun.Inaddition,morethan600tanksandself-propelledgunswereinsupportofthisbidtobatterthroughtheSovietlinesofLakeVelencze.Allthisweaponry,howeversophisticated,proveduseless,andtheburnt-outhulkswereleftstrandedinthewaterloggedplains.Therewasageneralconsensusthatthe‘Royal’Tigershadprovedirrelevant;asarcasticcommentbythetroopswasthatHider’sSchnorkel-equippedUboatswouldhavebeenbetter.ThecoupdegracewasdeliveredbyRussia’sartilleryandattackaircraft.ThefailureoftheSSinHungarycausedconsternation.Hitler,accordingtoGuderian,whohearditfromWohler,was‘besidehimselfandsentHimmlertofindoutwhathadgonewrong.TheFuhrer,accordingtosomeaccounts,remainedobsessiveaboutregainingtheoilfields,untilhewasshownanaerialphotographdepictingthesitesasnothingbutbombcraters.Surprisingly,perhaps,despitethefactthattheentireEasternFrontwasasgoodaslost,moraleamongSStroopsapparentlyremainedhigh,asdidthesenseofdisciplineandspiritofcomradeship.WikingDivision’sSSObersturmfuhrer(Lieutenant)EricBroruprecalled:‘MymostmemorableencountertookplaceonStPatrick’sDay,17March1945,nearSzekesfehervarinHungary.Iwasadjutant…toSS-Sturmbannfûhrer[Major]FritzVogt,holderoftheKnight’sCrosswithOakLeaves.TheRussianshadstartedtheiroffensivethedaybefore,whichwasalsoFritzVogt’s27thbirthday.OurunitwasSS-PanzerAuftdarungsAbteilung5.Ihadestablishedacommandpostinasmallhouseandsetupcommunicationswithaswitchboardandradiowhileshellsfellallaroundus.SS-ObergruppenfûhrerundGeneralderWaffen-SS[General]HerbertOttoGilletelephonedtocongratulateVogtonhisbirthdayandtotellhimhehadjustbeenawardedtheOakLeavestohisKnight’sCross.HisfacelitupandIsaid:“Thiscallsforadrink!”Wehoistedafew,thenthesupplyofficersshowedupbearingsomebottlesofbeer,andalltheotherofficersfoundtimetoshowupforaquickdrink.Allthewhilethewarwasgoingon.aroundus.

Onecompanycommanderwashavingsometroublewiththeenemy,soIsuggestedtoVogtthatIgooutandtrytostraightenthingsout.Vogtlaughedandsaid:“What’sthematterwithyou,doyoufeellikeaherotoday?”Iansweredthathehadjustgothimselfanewmedalandshouldletothershaveachancetowinone.Hereplied:“Okay,butwatchwhatyouaredoing!”Bythistime,ofcourse,wehadallhadagooddrinkandwereinexcellentspirits!IgotanSdKfz250/9(ahalftrackarmouredpersonnelcarrierwith20mm[0.79in]cannonsmounted)andwentintobattle.Wewerefiringhigh-explosiveshellsanditseemedeasy,likeshootingfishinabarrel.ThentheRussiansbroughtupanantitankrifleandshotupmyvehicle,forcingustobailout.Weendedupinhand-to-handcombatwiththem.IhadaPanzerfaustantitankrocketbutitwouldn’tfire.IthereforeuseditlikeaclubandcrackedoneRussian’sheadwithit.Iwasintrouble,though.However,FritzVogtthenappearedwithafewmorearmouredpersonnelcarriersandgotmeout.Hetoldmetotakeacoupleofhoursoff,andlaterheandIwentoffaloneonareconnaissancebehindenemylines.IgottheIronCrossFirstClassforallthis…’AllegationsofcollaborationinWorldWarIIcanwillactasrawnervesontheconscienceofnations.Palatableornot,thetruthisthatthousandsofwillingyoungstersfromsubjugatedcountriesservedNaziGermanyinthevariousechelonsoftheWaffen-SS(‘ArmedSS’).Attheoutbreakofwar,figureswerenegligible.Byitsend,foreignersoutnumberednativeGermansinitsranks.Thereweremanyyoungmenwho,disillusionedbythehelplessnessoftheirgovernmentsinthefaceofdefeat,weredriventoseekafocusfortheirliveswhichtheysawasbeingwithoutpurpose.SS-Obergruppenführer(General)FelixSteiner,whobecamethefirstcommanderoftheWaffen-SSDivision“Wiking”,wrotethat‘allthesepsychologicalfactorsandtheirconcernaboutthefuturedestinyoftheirhomelandscombinedatthistimetoleadapartoftheyouthtomakethedecisiontoentertheGermanWehrmachtasvolunteers.’Ofthementhemselves,headded:‘TheyobservedthegoodbehaviouranddisciplineoftheGermantroopsandbegantomakecomparisonsthatdidnotturnouttobeunfavourablefortheGermans.’Attheimmediatepost-warNurembergtrials,aHerrBrill,aformerSS-Mann(pre-warrankofprivate)intheLeibstandarle,wholaterservedintheErganzungsAmi,whichenrolledWaffen-SSrecruits,stated:‘Inmyoffice,Ireadthousandsuponthousandsofapplicationsforadmission.1cansaythatupto1939theenthusiasmfortheSS,foritsdecentandproperconduct,wasthemainreasonforvolunteering.Themenwantedtodotheirmilitaryserviceinaclean,modern,eliteformation.’7

Glitteringpromises

Butthistoldonlyhalfthestory.Thetruthwasthatatamateriallevel,thebenefitsofworkingfortheSSwereoftentangible.PayandallotmentsforforeignerswerecomparablewiththatoftheGermans.Therewereattractiveinducementstolooktothefutureoncethewarhadbeenwon,glitteringpromisesofcivilserviceprefermentandgrantsofland.Theseweremotivesenough,buttherewerealsothosewhohadanideologicalcommitmenttoNationalSocialismwhichtheyfeitcouldbestbeexpressedthroughserviceintheSS.FromtheGermanviewpoint,therewasastrictlypracticalreasoninplanningforarapidexpanseofWaffen-SSmanpowerfromoutsidetheReich.TherewasasevereshortageofpersonnelduetotheWehrmacht’sniggardlyreleaseofnativeGermanvolunteerswhomithadrecruitedandwishedtoretainforitself.AsWorldWarIIgrewevernearer,theSSwascompelledtolookelsewhereforthepersonneltomannewfielddivisions.Whateverthereasons,thecourtshipoftheyouthofoccupiedcountriesworkedwell.HeinrichHimmlerhadeveryreasontobeawhollysatisfiedindividual.InanaddresstoseniorofficersatPosenon4October1943,theReichsftihrer-SSwasjustifiedindescribinghisWaffenSSexpansionas‘nothinglessthanfantastic’,achieved‘atanabsolutelyterrificspeed’.Thefigures,Himmlerdeclared,spokeforthemselves.In1939,theWaffenSShadconsistedsolelyof‘afewregiments,guardunits,8000to9000strong-thatis,notevenadivision;allinall,25,000to28,000menatthemost.’WorldWarIIhadscarcelybeenayearoldbeforethatstrengthhadreachednearly150,000.Withasix-foldincreaseinmanpower,theWaffen-SSwasnowestablishedas‘thefourthbranchoftheWehrmackf.

Rapidbuild-up

By1940,theSSstoodatfourdivisions.ThishistoryisconcernedwithSSWtkingDivision,the5thDivision,whosepersonnelduringthewarcomprisednotonlyGermannationalsbutalsothoseofFlemish,Dutch,Danish,NorwegianandFinnishorigin.Atfirst,thesedivisionshadbeenlittlemorethanscatteredbattalionsoftheSS-Verfugungstruppen(‘GeneralPurposeTroops’),orSS-VT,whichwaslaterrenamedtheWaffen-SS.Thenfollowedtheirconversionintoregiments,oneofwhichwasGermania,afuturecomponentofthedivisionSS-Wiking.ThebreakdownofthewestEuropeanor‘Germanic’SS,manyofwhomswelledtheranksofWiking,isgivenbyGeorgeH.SteininhisbookWaffen-SS,asfollows:

‘…some50,000Dutch(makingupthelargestgroup);40,000SSmenbeingprovidedbyBelgium,almostevenlydividedbetweenFlemingsandWalloons;20.000fromFrancewithDenmarkandNorwayeachproducingaround6000men.Another1200camefromsuchcountriesasSwitzerland,SwedenandLuxembourg.ThefigureofthoseservingfromFinland,theleastcommittedoftheWajfm-SS,hasbeenputat1000,butvariousaccountsdiffer.’Thebuild-upwasfast,allthemoreremarkablewhenitisrememberedthatintheearlyyearsoftheWeimarRepublic,theSckutzstaffel(SS-ProtectionSquad)hadbeenlittlemorediaiithecruderepositoryforbouncersandstreet-fightersofthefledglingNaziparly.Tlspowerbasehadbeenstrengthenedirrevocablybytheoverthrowofaseriousrival,theSturmabteilung(SA—Stormtroopers)inabloodycoup-whichwouldlaterbecalled‘TheNightoftheLongKnives’-duringthesummerof1934.

Himmler’sobsessionThehourfromthenonbelongedtoReichsfuhrer-SSHeinrichHimmler.

TheMunich-bornformerchickenfarmer,sonofasecondaryschoolmasterlooked,withhispebblespectaclesandprissilydidacticmanner,everyinchthepainfullyconscientious,unimaginativeclerkdestinedtolanguishwithoutpromotioninsomepublicservicebackwater.Buiitwasamistaketoassumethatthiswasdiewholeman.Concealedunderneaththemundaneexteriorwassomethingelse:adangerousindividualwhohadembracedthepseudo-mystictrappingsoftheNazicreed,rootandbranch.8

HimmlersawintheblaekuniformofhisSSthesymbolofanimaginedearlierGermanyofsupermenandhunters,menwholivedbythedagger,productsofatwilightworldofferociousguards,Teutonicknightsandlionheartedheroes.TheverychoiceofthenameWikingforanSSdivisionhadbeenseenbymanyasstakingaclaimtooneofthoselandsindienortherntwilight,ahomeofpagangodswhosebeginningscouldbetracedintheancientrunes.Carriedawaybyanobsessionwhichwasrivalledonlyhishatredofthe

ever-proliferatingJews,HimmlerevenspokeinglowingtermsofthedaywhenmillionsofGermanslivinginAmericawouldbemembersoftheSS.

Hedidnot,however,permithisracialpreoccupationstointerferewithhisownceaselesspursuitofpower.9This,herealized,wasacommodityWhichhadtobesharedwithHitlerhimselfwho,firstandforemost,perceivedtheSSasbothaprivatearmyandapersonal

policeforce.ThiswasinaccordancewiththewordsoftheOrganizationBookof(heNSDAP(NationalSocialistorNaziPart)’):‘TheoriginalandmostimportantdutyoftheSSistoserveastheprotectoroftheFilhrer.’ButtheReicsfuhrer-SSwaskeentopointout:‘BydecreeoftheFührerthesphereofdutieshasbeenenlargedtoincludetheexternalsecurityoftheReich.’Nofurtherdefinitionof‘externalsecurity’wasforthcomingthenbut,despitethevaguenessofthephrasing,afuturemilitaryroleclearlyseemedtobetheintention.ThishadbeenconfirmedbyHitlerasearlyas1934:‘JtwillbenecessaryinfuturewarsforourSSandpolice,intheirownclosedunits,toprovethemselvesatdiefrontinthesamewayasdiearmyandtomakebloodsacrificestothesamedegreeasanyotherbranchofthearmedforces.’

Conscriptionintroduced

ForexistingmembersoftheSS,increasingcareeropportunitieswereintendedinpartassomethingofarewardfortheirroleduringtheanti-SAputschin1934.TheearlyelementsoftheSS-Verfügungstruppenwerethreeregiments,eachcontainingthreebattalions,aswellasamortarcompanyandamotorcyclecompanywhichweresupportedbyasignalsbattalion.Ameagreaffair,certainly.ButhowitwouldshapeinthefuturewasindicatedwhenHitlerannouncedintheReichstagthatconscriptionwouldbeintroducedandtheSS-Verfügungstruppenwouldbethe;recipientofthehighestpossiblestandardoftraining.Twoformerarmyofficers,PaulHausserandFelixSteiner,wererecruitedinordertoimplementthispolicy.ThepostofinspectoroftheSS-Verfügungstruppen(SS-VT)wenttoHausserandwithittherankofSS-Brigadeführer(Major-General).HausserwasacareersoldierwithscanttimeforHimmler’sracialfantasies.Hissoleconcernwasturningoutrock-hardtroopsindefenceofamodernstate.AfterserviceinWorldWarI,HausserhadretiredwiththerankofLicutenant-GeneralonlyoneyearbeforeHitlercametopower.OriginallyhehadthrowninhislotwiththeSA,but,havingsurviveddiebloodbathof‘TheNightoftheLongKnives’,headroitlychangedhisrankfromSAStandartenführer(Colonel)totheequivalentintheSS.WhenitcametoactualSS-VTtraining,SS-Sturmbanführer(Major)FelixSteiner,acharismaticpersonalitywhohadservedasajuniorartilleryofficerinWorldWarI,seemedanobviouschoice.Hetoohadspottedwhat,hesawasanopportunitytofurtherhimselfoncetheNazishadsecuredpower.QuiltingthearmywiththerankofColonelandtransferringtotheSS,Steinerhadnointentionofbeingconfinedwithinarmedoutfitscreatedsolelytocounterinternalunrest.Herecalled:‘Iwasamongthosewhofrequentlyplottedtosetupafieldforceofaratherdifferentnature.IndoingthiswefeltwecouldtherebycontributetoGermany’ssecurityintheinternationalsense.’Themainstumblingblock,asHaussersawit,wasHimmlerhimself,whomhecametodismissas‘anout-and-outpolicemanoftherepressivekindandwhohadnorealideaalallofmilitarymatters’.Nevertheless,eventhemildestsuggestionthattheReichsführer-SSwasbeingsidelinedcouldproveadangerousmove;bothHausserandSteinersensedtheneedtotakesomeofHimmler’sprejudicesonboard.ThusanyrecruitfortheWaffenSS,whileallowedsomedegreeofchoiceastowhichbranchofservicehefavoured,hadtobebetweentheagesof17and22.Olderaspirantswereacceptedonlyinexceptionalcircumstances.Candidateshadto‘haveanacceptablepoliticaloutlook’and‘provide

evidenceofanAryanoriginbackto1800’,orevenearlieriftheywereofficercandidates.

AbsolutepowerSuchstipulationswereluxuriesthatwereonly“practicalintimeofpeace.

Withthecomingofwarandadeclineinfortunes,strictcriteriainevitablybecamerelaxedandeventuallyweredispensedwithaltogether.Thisappliedalsotoforeign‘Germanic’volunteerswithheightrestrictionsbeingloweredtoaminimum1.65m(5ftSin).TheproofofAryandescentwascuttojusttwogenerations.However,thisbynomeansappliedtovolunteersfromsomecountrieswhowererequiredtoservetheWaffen-SSforafixedtermundercontract,asourceofgreatrelieftothosefresh-facedrecruitswhosesenseofidealismwitheredoncetheythemselveshadexperiencedthehorrificprivationsoffightingontheEasternFront.Butinonerespect,SteinerandHitleragreed.Herewasagreatopportunitytodemonstratethatwhatevertheconservativedie-hardsoftheArmycoulddo,theSScoulddoevenbetter.Giventhisimprimatur,recruitmentforaperceivednewandeliteforcewentonapace.InaGermanythathadsufferedsuchsevereeconomicprivationsundertheWeimarRepublic,thechanceofemploymentandtheattendantrestorationofnationalpridewerenottobegainsaid.ThisexplainedthegrowthbothinstatureandinnumbersoftheSSunitswhich,upto1936,hadbeenbutscatteredbattalions.Atfirst,itscandidateshadbeenadisparatebunch.Thesemenweregenerallyex-officersfromWorldWarIwhohadnowheretogo,aswellasrankers,policemenandplainadventurers,notforgettingthemerehangers-on.Fromthisunevenandoftendubiousmaterial,HausserandSteinerhammeredintoshapethemenwhowouldformtheofficerandNCOcadresofthefutureVerfügungstruppen.BythetimeoftheattackonPolandon1September1939,themenoftheSS-VT,whohadbeenshippedtoEastPrussia,wereorganizedintoregimentalcombatgroups.ItwasaftertheinvasionofwesternEuropebetween10and20May1940thatHimmlerseizedtheinitiative.Besidethoseengagedinthepracticalitiesoffightingawar,theReichsführer-SSstoodasacreatureapart.Hecontinuedtodreamdreams,hismajorobsessionbeingtoattractthepurestNordicbloodofEuropeintohisSS.Withhisimaginationsoaringashepouredoverhiseternalfiles,hewasenvisagingwhathebelievedwouldultimatelybecometheGermanicprovinceof‘Burgundia’,consistingoftheNetherlands,Belgiumandnorth-eastFrance.Germanyitselfwouldbeprotectedbythisbulwark,withtheSSpossessingabsolutepower.Inpursuitofthisdream,heensuredthatmembersoftheAllgemeine-SS(GeneralSS)wereinplaceinthecapturedterritoriesofFlanders,HollandandNorway.AnorderwentouttoGeneralGotllobBerger,awilyandpersuasiveSwabianwhowasheadoftheSSmainleadershipoffice,andaspecialistonracialselectionfortheSS.HewastointensifyhiseffortstogainforeignrecruitsforthenewWikingDivision.Itwasnoeasytask.Thestraight-lacedechelonsoftheWehrmachtwereatbest,unenthusiasticattheprospectofa‘secondarmy’andatworstdownrightobstructive.ThesolutionlaywithHimmler,whohappenedtoholdthepostofReichskommissarfürdieFestigungDeutscherVolksturms(ReichCommissarfortheStrengtheningof‘Germandom’).WithpowerfulconnectionsamongGermanslivingabroad,theReichsführer-SSwasabletoactivatecontactsoverawidefield,thusbypassingnormalmilitaryrestrictionsonrecruitingabroad.NotleastamongtheadvantagesofallthisforBergerwasthatsuchvolunteerswouldnotberequiredtoserveintheGermanArmedForces.AndtherewasnothingwhateverthattheWehrmachtcoulddo

aboutit.WesternvolunteersfortheWqffen-SSwereleftinnodoubtastowherethepowerlay,asIlirnmlermadeclear:‘Becertainofthis.TherewillbeinEuropejustoneSS—theGermanioSSunderthecommandoftheReichsführer-SS.Youcanresist,butthatisamatterofindifferencetomeforwewillcreateitinanycase.Wedonotaskyoutoturnagainstyourcountry,nortodoanythingrepugnanttoanyoneproudofhiscountry,wholovesitandhashisself-respect.NeitherdoweexpectyoutobecomeGermansoutofopportunism.Whatdoweaskisthatyousubordinateyournationalidealtoasuperiorracialandhistoricalideal,thatofthesingleandall-embracingGermanicReich,’

NewregimentsWiththeformationofWiking,whichwasoneoftheleadingforeigndivisionsoftheWaffen-SS,SS-Gruppenführer(Lieutenant-General)FelixSteinerbecameitsfirstcommander.Thereweretwonewregiments,Nordland(consistingofDanesandNorwegians)andWestland(FlemishandDutch).ThenewdivisionwasatfirstcalledGermaniabut,sincetherewasaGermaniaregimentalready,andthiswascausingconfusion,thetitlewaschangedtoWiking.WhereNordlandwasconcerned,Himmlerhadanenthusiasticacolyte.ThiswasVidkunQuislingwho,beforethewar,hadservedasaministerintheNorwegianGovernmentandwasarecipientofanhon-ouraryCommanderoftheOrderoftheBritishEmpire,Subsequently,QuislingresignedtocreatedieNorwegianFascistPartyanditwashewhoon13January1941appealedovertheNorwegianradiofor3000volunteersfortheregiment.Theywould,hedeclared,bejoining‘thewaroffreedomandindependenceagainstEnglishworlddespotism’.Theoriginalupperagelimitof25forrecruitmentwasforthwithraisedto40,andHimmlerlostnotimeinflyingtoOslotoinspecttheenthusiasticnewrecruitsandofficiateattheirswearingin.Aftermustering,theyweresenttoWurllemberginsouthernGermanyinordertotrainwiththerestoftheregimentinsimulatedbattleconditions.Someofthenewrecruitswereevenabletoexperiencetherealthing;theyweresecondedtootherSSunitsengagedintheBalkans.

Becauseoftheurgentneedtorecruitmoremanpowerforthewareffort,theNordic

volunteersenjoyedlessstringentserviceconditionsthantheGermans.ThisparticularlygalledHimmlerwithhisgoaloftotalloyaltyfromallhisadherents,butpridehadtobesacrificedinfavourofsheernecessity.TheNordicswerepermittedtojoinona‘hostilitiesonly’basis,ratherthantheusualfour-yearterm.Eventheinitialheightrestrictionof1.65m(5ft5in)waswaivedandtheoathofloyallywasmodifiedinrecognitionofthefactthattheappealamongthevolunteerswastonationalismratherthanNationalSocialism,withthemainaimbeingthedestructionofCommunism.Buttheyreceivedbroadlythesamepayand,withnationaldistinctions,worethesameuniformastheregulars.

Sinisterdirective

Elsewhere,Himmlerwasunstoppable.IthadseemedtotheReichsführerSSthattheDutchwouldbeabletoprovidehimwithexcellentracialmaterialandinthesummerof1940hehadestablishedtheRegimentWestlandwhichwastobeopentovolunteersfromtheNetherlandsandFlanders.Arecruitinginitiativewaslaunchedwithaleafletentitled‘TheWaffen-SSisCalling-YouTooShouldProtectYourHomeCountry’.Itproclaimed:‘Itwouldbeabsurdifyoudidnotstartlightingtheenemybeforehebrutallydemandsentranceatthegardengate.Thisisnotpossibleinalocalwar,andleastpossibleatatimewhencontinentsarcinrevolt.Imagineaborderlandscapecoveredwithsnowdriftsand,breakingfromthe,east,packsofraveningwolveswhichexterminateeverykindoflife.‘Doesnotthispicturefitthepresenttimeaswell?‘Whodoesnotwanttoannihilatetheraveningbeastswhoarebreakinginlnihrhalhcrland?Doyoumeansimplytostandatthethegardengateofyourownhomecountry?Thenitwillhetoolate.Happythecountrythatkeepsthewarfarawayfromitsboundariesanddoesnothesitatetomakesacrificesinbloodtosavethefatherland.’Rabble-rousingsentimentcontrastedwithotherpronouncementsinfinitelymoresinister.AdirectivewasissuedtoallWaffen-SSmembers,thetextofwhichsurvivedtosurfaceattheNurembergTrials:‘Obediencemustbeunconditional.ItcorrespondstotheconvictionthatNationalSocialistideologymustreignsupreme…EverySSmanisthereforepreparedtocarryoutblindlyeveryorderissuedbytheFiihrerorgivenbybissuperior,regardlessofthesacrificeinvolved.’NeitherwastheavowedlyracistethosoftheArmedSSinanywayshirked.TheSSwasconceivedasnNaziaristocracy,asanewrulingclasstocreate‘theNewOrder’whichwouldconsistofaNationalSocialistMilitaryOrderofNordicMen,afightingforce‘…boundbyideologicaloaths,whosefightersareselectedI’romthebestAryanstock’.ThepredominantenemiesweretheJewsandtheBolsheviks.Thecampaignworked.TheReichsführer-SSfeltsufficientlyencouragedbytheenthusiasticresponsefromvolunteerstoraiseyetanotherregiment,SS-Nordwest.ButHimmlertemperedhisenthusiasmwithself-inler-estedcaution.Suchvolunteers,hedeclared,wouldremainfirmlyundercentralNazicontrol,lesttherebeanyhintofdissentintheirranks.ThustheywererequiredtoaffirmtheoathofloyaltytotheWaffenSS:‘IsweartoyouAdolfHitler,asleader,loyaltyandcourage.Ipledgetoyouandtothoseyouplaceinauthorityovermeobedienceevenuntodeath.SohelpmeGod.’Nordwestasaregiment,itturnedout,wastolastuntiltheGermaninvasionofRussia,whenitwasdeemedtohaveserveditspurpose.Itsurvivedinbattalionform,withthebulkofitsstrengthre-allocatedtootherDutchorFlemishunitsoftheWaffen-SS.Atfirst,therewerenoticeablegapsintheranksoncethefirstvolunteershadbeenswallowedup.ThenReichGermansandethnicGermans(Volksdeutsche)weredraftedin.

TheresultwasthatbythetimeoftheinvasionoftheSovietUnionin1941,Wikingcontained1142Germanicvolunteers:630Dutchmen,294Norwegians,216Danes,1Swedeand1Swiss.InthesameyearwouldbeaddedNordest,abattalionconsistingofFinns.GolllobBergerworkedhardinthecoldlandofFinland.HatredandfearofRussiawereplayedupon.Enquiriesinpro-GermanFinnishcirclesrevealedtherewereenoughmeninthecountrytoformatleastoneWaffen-SSbattalion.Subterfugewasnecessary;the1000FinnswhowenttoGermanydidsoas‘workersfortheGermanwarindustry’.TheFinnswereknowntobeafiercelyindependentpeople;tactfultreatmentbyGermanywasthereforenecessary;‘GuidelinesforthebehaviouroftroopsinFinland’wasprepared.Thedocumentproclaimed:‘TheFinnisamemberofaculturedpeople,feelingstrongassociationstotheotherScandinavianpeoples,proudofliisachievementsandwithadistinctsenseofnationalpride.Thefreedomandindependenceofhiscountryarevaluedaboveall.HisfriendlinesstowardsGermansisgenuine.…anythingthatcouldhurthisnationalpridehastobeavoidedandhismilitaryachievementinparticularhastobeacknowledged.’TheFinnishreactionwaslukewarm.ThegovernmentmadethestipulationthattheywouldonlyfightRussians.TheArmyrefusedtotaketheWaffenSSoathorbecommandedbyGermanofficers.Theupshotofthewranglingwasthat,bythestartof‘OperationBarbarossa’,400menweresecondedto5thSS-Wiking.ThusweretheendeavoursofHimmlerandBergerrewarded,butHitler’spreoccupationsremainedelsewhere,beyondeveniheimpendingcampaignindieWest.TheinvasionoftheSovietUnionloomedevernearerinthecalculationofthesupremecommander.

OrderofBattle

Formedon11/9/42bytherenamingoftheSSDivision““Wiking”whileitwasservinginSouthernRussiaastheSSPanzergrenadierDivision“Wiking.”Ithad:1/,2/,3/SSPanzergrenadierRegiment“Germania”1/,2/SSPanzergrenadierRegiment“Nordland”1/,2/,3/SSPanzergrenadierRegiment“Westland”SSPanzerBattalion“Wiking”1/,2/,3/,4/5thSSArtilleryRegimentSSPanzerjagerBattalion“Wiking”SSReconnaissanceBattalion“Wiking”SSFlakBattalion“Wiking”SSPioneerBattalion“Wiking”SSSignalsBattalion“Wiking”SSFeldersatzBattalion“Wiking”SSDivisionSupport(Einheiten)“Wiking”On3/29/43thetwopanzergrenadierregimentsboth:rrmedthreebattalions,andaschutzenregimentwithrwobattalionswasorganized.TheNordlandRegiment“srasdetachedinthesummerof1943tojointhe11thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionNordland.WhentheFinnischesFreiwilligen-BataillonderWaffen-SSwasstooddowninMarchof1943,anddis-randedinJuneandJulyofthesameyear,theEstnischesSS-FreiwilligenBataillonNarwa(Estonian)wasusedtoreplacetheFinnsasthethirdBattalionoftheSS-PanzergrenadierRegimentNordland.TheEstoniansstayedwiththeWikingDivisionwhentheNordlandRegimentwasdetachedtobecomethenucleusofanewdivision.The

EstoniansattachedtoWikingwereactuallyoneofthreebattalionsthenformingupattheHeidelagerSS-Truppenubungsplatz(trainingground)inDebica,Poland,inearly1943asthe1.EstnischesSS-Frw.GrenadierRegiment.Theylostthe1st(Narwa)Battalion,butlateracquiredsufficientmanpowertoconstitutethe3rdSS-FreiwilligerBrigade(45th&46thSSFreiwilligerRegiments)beforebeingformedintoafullSS-GrenadierdivisioninJanuary1944.InOctober1943,theWikingwasreorganizedasapanzerdivision.TheEstoniansbecame3/10thSS-PanzergrenadierRegimentWestland.ByAprilof1944theNarwaBattalionwouldbedetachedfromWikingandrenamed20thSS-Fusilier-Battalion,partoftheEstonian20.SSFreiwilligerGrenadierDivision.Duringit’stimewithWikingDivisiontheEstonianbattalionwascommandedbytheGermanSS-SturmbannfuhrerGeorgEberhardt.Reportsofthebattalion’sstrengthvary,butitmayhavebeenashighas1,280menwhenattachedtoSSPanzer-grenadierRegimentWestland.ThehonorifictitleNarwawasalsoreportedtohavebeenunofficiallycontinuedaspartofitsnewSSFusilierBattaliondesignation.ThePanzerRegimentwasincreasedtotwobattalionsandanewsturmgeschutzbattalionwasraised.On7/1/43thedivisionspanzerbattalionandpanzerinventorywereasfollows:1/5thSSPanzerRegiment1PanzerStaffCompany1MediumPanzerCompany2LightPanzerCompaniesMkII……………………4MkIII(50kz)……..1MkIII(50Ig)………14MkIII(75)…………..8MkIV(kz)………….1MkIV(Ig)………….16Cmd……………………1On8/9/43theOKHorderedtwelveWespeself-propelled105mmgunssenttothedivision.InAugust1943thedivisionwasorganizedandequippedasfollows:DivisionStaff1DivisionStaff(2LMGs)1(mot)MappingDetachment1(mot)“KB”Detachment1(mot)EscortCompany1MotorcycleMessengerPlatoon(6LMGs)1InfantryGunSection(275mmleIG)1SelfPropelledFlakSection(420mmguns)1(motZ)PanzerjagerPlatoon(375mmPAK40)1InfantryPlatoon(280mmmortars,6LMGs&4HMGs)SSPanzergrenadierRegiment1(mot)RegimentalStaff3(mot)Battalions,eachwith3PanzergrenadierCompanies(4HMGs,18LMGs,280mmmortars&2flamethrowers)1HeavyCompany

1MortarPlatoon(680mmmortars)1PanzerjagerPlatoon(375mmPAK40)1InfantryGunSection(475mmleIG)

1Anti-TankRiflePlatoon(3heavyanti-tankrifles)1(motZ)InfantryGunSection(4150mmsIG)1SelfPropelledFlakCompany(1220mmguns)1MotorcycleCompany(375mmPAK40,4HMGs,18LMGs&280mmmortars)1(mot)PioneerCompany(18LMGs&6flamethrowers)SSPanzergrenadierRegiment1(mot)RegimentalStaff1(mot)RegimentalStaffCompany1MotorcycleMessengerPlatoon1PanzerjagerPlatoon(375mmPAK40)1SignalsPlatoon2(mot)Battalions,eachwith3PanzergrenadierCompanies(4HMGs,18LMGs,280mmmortars&2flamethrowers)1HeavyCompany1MortarPlatoon(680mmmortars)1PanzerjagerPlatoon(375mmPAK40)1InfantryGunSection(475mmleIG)1Anti-TankRiflePlatoon(3heavyanti-tankrifles)1(halftrack)Battalion3PanzergrenadierCompanies(4HMGs,34LMGs,280mmmortars&2flamethrowers)1HeavyCompany1InfantryGunSection(475mmleIG)1PanzerjagerPlatoon(375mmPAK40)1Anti-TankRiflePlatoon(3heavyanti-tankrifles)1(motZ)InfantryGunSection(4150mmsIG)1SelfPropelledFlakCompany(1220mmguns)1MotorcycleCompany(375mmPAK40,4HMGs,18LMGs&280mmmortars)1(mot)PioneerCompany(18LMGs&6flamethrowers)SSPanzerBattalion“Wiking”1PanzerStaff(1LMG)1PanzerStaffCompany(2LMGs)3SturmgeschutzCompanies(7StuGsea)SSReconnaissanceRegiment“Wiking”1(mot)StaffCompany1SignalsPlatoon1PanzerjagerPlatoon(375mmPAK40&3LMGs1MotorcyclePlatoon(6LMGs)1SelfPropelledFlakPlatoon(420mmguns)1ArmoredCarCopany(1820mm&24LMGs)1(mot)LightReconnaissanceSuplyColumn2ReconnaissanceBattalions,eachwith2(mot)ReconnaissanceCompanies(280mmmortars,4HMGs,18LMGs&3heavyantitankrifles)1(mot)SupportCompany1PioneerPlatoon(4LMGs)

1PanzerjagerPlatoon(375mmPAK40&3LMGs)1InfantryGunPlatoon(475mmleIG)SSFlakBattalion“Wiking”1(mot)StaffCompany(1LMG)1SelfPropelledMediumFlakCompany(937mmguns)3(motZ)HeavyFlakBatteries(488mm,320mm&2LMGs)1(mot)LightFlakSupplyColumn5thSSArtilleryRegiment1RegimentalStaff1RegimentalStaffBattery1stBattalion1BattalionStaff1BattalionStaffBattery(6LMGs)3SelfPropelledleFHBatteries(6105mmleFHSdKfz124Wespeea)2nd&3rdBattalionStaff&StaffBattery(6LMGs)2(motZ)Batteries(6105mmleFH&2LMGsea)4thBattalionStaff&StaffBattery(6LMGs)2(motZ)Batteries(6150mmsFH&2LMGsea)1(motZ)Battery(6105mmsK18/40guns&2LMGsea)SSPanzerjagerBattalion“Wiking”1SelfPropelledPanzerjagerCompany(975mmPAK40&9LMGs)2(motZ)PanzerjagerCompanies(975mmPAK40&9LMGs)SSPioneerBattalion“Wiking”1(mot)ReconnaissanceCompany(6HMGs&9LMGs)1(halftrack)PioneerCompany(40LMGs&6flamethrowers)2(mot)PioneerCompanies(18LMGs&6flamethrowers)1(mot)BriikoB(4LMGs)1(mot)LightPioneerSupplyColumn(2LMGs)SSSignalsBattalion“Wiking”1PanzerRadioCompany(25LMGs)1(mot)TelephoneCompany(6LMGs)1(mot)LightSignalsSupplyColumn(2LMGs)SSDivisionSupport(Einheiten)“Wiking”4(mot)(120ton)TransportationCompanies(8LMGsea)1(mot)(60ton)HeavySupplyColumn(4LMGs)4(mot)HeavyFuelColumns(4LMGsea)1(mot)SupplyCompany(8LMGs)1(mot)MaintenanceCompany(4LMGs)SSMaintenanceBattalion“Wiking”3(mot)MaintenanceCompanies(4LMGsea)1(mot)HeavyReplacementCompany(4LMGs)SSCommissariatBattalion“Wiking”1(mot)FieldBakery(4LMGs)1(mot)ButcherCompany(4LMGs)1(mot)DivisionalAdministration(4LMGs)1(mot)FieldPostOffice(2LMGs)1(mot)MaintenanceCompany(2LMGs)

SSMedicalBattalion“Wiking”2(mot)MedicalCompanies(4LMGs)1(mot)FieldHospital(2LMGs)3(mot)Ambulances(1LMGea)OtherSSMilitaryPoliceCompany“Wiking”(6LMGs)On10/22/43thedivisionwasrenamedthe5thSSPanzerDivision“Wiking”andthepanzergrenadierregimentswererenamedasfollows:9thSSPanzergrenadierRegiment“Germania”10thSSPanzergrenadierRegiment“Westland”Theremainderoftheunitswererenumbered“5th.”TheNarwaPanzergrenadierBattalionbecamethe310thSSPanzergrenadierRegiment,thenitbecameihe20thFusilierBattalion,wasdetached,andbecamepartofthe20thEstonianFreiwilligenDivision.ThedivisionsufferedextremelyheavylossesinthebattleoftheKorsun-ShevchnekovskiiPocket,whichended2/17/44.InApril1944thedivision’spanzerbattalionandpanzerinventorywereasfollows:1/5thPanzerRegiment1PanzerStaffCompany4PanzerCompaniesPzKpfwMkVPanther79On16June1944thedivisionwasreorganizedbyArmyGroupCenter.The5thSSPanzerReconnaissanceBattalionandthe3/10thPanzergrenadierRegiment“Westland”werenewlyformedatthistime.InMay1944OKHrecordsshowthedivisionorganizedandequippedasfollows:DivisionDivisionStaffDivisionalEscortCompanyMotorcyclePlatoon(6LMGs)SelfPropelledFlakBattery(420mmguns)SelfPropelledAnti-TankPlatoon(3LMGs&375mmPAK40)InfantryGunPlatoon(275mmleIG)MixedPanzergrenadierPlatoon(4HMGs,6LMGs,&280mmmortars)5thSSPanzerRegimentRegimentalStaff1stPanzerBattalion(1-4thCompanies)(MkVPanthers)1PanzerMaintenancePlatoon2ndPanzerBattalion(5-8thCompanies)(MkIVPanzers)1PanzerMaintenanceCompany9th“Germania”SSPanzergrenadierRegimentRegimentalStaff1stBattalion1-3rdCompanies(4HMGs,18LMGs,280mmmortars&2flamethrowers)4thCompany1MortarPlatoon(2LMGs&4120mmmortars)

1PanzerjagerPlatoon(3LMGs&375mmPAK40)2InfantryGunSections(1LMG&275mmleIGea)2ndBattalion(6-10thCompanies)(sameas1stBattalion)3rd(halftrack)Battalion(11-15thCompanies)1-3rd(halftrack)Companies(4HMGs,40LMGs,280mmmortars,2flamethrowers,720mmguns&275mmguns)4thCompany1PioneerPlatoon(13LMGs&6flamethrowers)1InfantryGunSection(1LMG&275mmleIG)1PanzerjagerPlatoon(8LMGs&375mmPAK40)1GunPlatoon(8LMGs&675mmguns)16th(self-propelledflak)Company(1220mm&4LMGs)17th(self-propelledinfantrygun)Company(6150mmsIG&8LMGs)18th(mot)PioneerCompany(2HMGs,12LMGs,6flamethrowers&280mmmortars)10th“Westland”SSPanzergrenadierRegimentsameas9thSSPanzergrenadierRegiment5thSSReconnaissanceBattalionBattalionStaffHeavyPlatoon(6SdKfz234/3with75mmKwK&6LMGs)1ArmoredCarCompany(1820mm&24LMGs)1(halftrack)ArmoredCarCompany(1620mm&25LMGs)2(halftrack)Companies(49LMGs,280mmmortars&375mmguns)1(halftrack)Company1PioneerPlatoon(13LMGs&6flamethrowers)1PanzerjagerPlatoon(8LMGs&375mmPAK40)1InfantryGunSection(275mmleIG&4LMGs)1GunSection(8LMGs&675mmguns)1(mot)ReconnaissanceSupplyColumn(3LMGs)5thSSPanzerjagerBattalionBattalionStaff3SelfPropelledPanzerjagerCompanies(1475mmPAK40&14LMGsea)5thSSPanzerArtilleryRegiment1RegimentalStaff&StaffBattery(2LMGs)1SelfPropelledFlakBattery(4quad20mmguns&2LMGs)1st(SelfPropelled)BattalionStaff&(self-propelled)StaffBattery(3LMGs&320mmguns)2SelfPropelledleFHBatteries(6105mmleFHSdKfz124Wespe)1SelfPropelledsFHBattery(6150mmsFHSdKfz165Hummel)2ndBattalionStaff&StaffBattery(3LMGs&320mmguns)2(motZ)Batteries(6105mmleFH&2LMGsea)3rdBattalionsameas2ndBattalion4thBattalionStaff&StaffBattery(3LMGs&320mmguns)2(motZ)Batteries(6150mmsFH&2LMGsea)1(motZ)Battery(6105mmsK18/40guns&2LMGsea)5thSSFlakBattalionStaff&StaffBattery

3(motZ)heavyFlakBatteries(488mm,320mm&2LMGsea)1(motZ)MediumFlakBatteries(937mm&4LMGsea)1(motZ)SearchlightPlatoon(4600mmsearchlights)5thSSPanzerPioneerBattalionStaff(2LMGs)1(halftrack)PioneerCompany(2HMGs,46LMGs,3heavyanti-tankrifles,280mmmortars&6flamethrowers)2(mot)PioneerCompanies(2HMGs,18LMGs,280mmmortars&6flamethrowers)1(mot)HeavyPanzerBridgingTrain(5LMGs)1(mot)LightPanzerBridgingTrain(3LMGs)5thSSPanzerSignalsBattalion1PanzerTelephoneCompany(14LMGs)1PanzerRadioCompany(20LMGs)1(mot)SignalsSupplyColumn(1LMG)5thSSFeldersatzBattalion5Companies5thSSSupplyTroop1-7th/5thSS(mot)120tonTransportationCompanies(8LMGsea)5/5thSS(mot)20tonLightFlakSupplyColumn5thSS(mot)WorkshopCompany(4LMGs)5thSS(mot)SupplyCompany(8LMGs)5thSSTruckParkl/,2/,3/5thSS(mot)MaintenanceCompanies(4LMGs)5thSS(mot)75tonHeavyMaintenanceSupplyColumnMedical1/,2/5thSS(mot)MedicalCompanies(2LMGsea)1/,2/,3/5thSSAmbulancesAdministration5thSS(mot)BakeryCompany(6LMGs)5thSS(mot)ButcherCompany(6LMGs)5thSS(mot)DivisionalAdministrationPlatoon(2LMGs)5thSS(mot)MilitaryPoliceTroop(5platoons)(15LMGs)5thSS(mot)FieldPostOffice(2LMGs)ThebulkofthedivisionpassedintoAmericancaptivitynearRastadtinMay1945.

Commanders

ObergruppenfûhrerFelixSteiner1940-January1943ObergruppenfûhrerHerbertGilleJanuary1943-August1944OberfûhrerEdumundDelsenhoferAugust1944StandartenfûhrerRudolfMûklenkampAugust1944-September1944OberfûhrerKarlUlrichSeptember1944-May1945

ObergruppenfûhrerFelizSteiner

FelixMartinJuliusSteinerwasbornon23May1896inStallupönen,EastPrussia.HeservedinbothWorldWarIandWorldWarIIandwasawardedtheKnight’sCrossoftheIronCrosswithOakLeavesandSwords.Hesignificantlycontributed,togetherwithPaul

Hausser,tothedevelopmentandtransformationoftheWaffen-SS,asanarmedwingoftheNaziParty’sSchutzstaffel,intoamulti-ethnicandmultinationalmilitaryforceofNaziGermany.

In1919,SteinerjoinedtheFreikorpsintheEastPrussiancityofMemelandwasincorporatedintotheReichswehrin1921.In1933,helefttheReichswehrhavingattainedtherankofMajor.SteinerjoinedtheNaziParty(membershipnumber:4.264.295)andtheSturmabteilungwherehebeganworkdevelopingnewtrainingtechniquesandtactics.In1935,hejoinedtheSchutzstaffelandtookcommandofaBattalionofSS-Verfügungstruppentroops,andwithinayearhadbeenpromotedtoSS-StandartenführerbeingincommandoftheSS-DeutschlandRegiment.AttheoutbreakofwarSteinerwasSS-OberführerinchargeoftheWaffenSSregimentSS-Deutschland.HeledthisregimentwellthroughInvasionofPolandandtheBattleofFrance,forwhichhewasawardedtheKnight’sCrossoftheIronCrosson15August1940.SteinerwaschosenbyHeinrichHimmlertooverseethecreationof,andcommandanelitePanzerdivision,the5thSSPanzerDivisionWiking.In1943,hewaspromotedtothecommandoftheIII(Germanic)SSPanzerCorps.On28January1945,Steinerwasplacedincommandofthe11thSSPanzerArmy,whichformedpartofanewad-hocformationto

protectBerlinfromtheSovietarmiesadvancingfromtheVistulaRiver.On21April,duringtheBattleforBerlin,SteinerwasplacedincommandofArmyDetachmentSteiner,whileAdolfHitlerorderedSteinertoenvelopthe1stBelorussianFrontthroughapincermovement,advancingfromtheNorthofthecity.However,ashiswornoutandexhaustedunitwasoutnumberedbytentoone,Steinermadeitclearthathedidnothavethecapacityforacounter-attack.ItresultedinHitlerfallingintoatearfulrageon22AprilduringthedailysituationconferenceintheFührerbunker.AfterthecapitulationofGermany,SteinerwasimprisonedandindictedaspartoftheNurembergTrials.However,hewasclearedofallchargesofwarcrimesandreleasedin1948.HecontinuedtoliveinGermany,wroteseveralbooks,andparticipatedinorganisingsupportforformerWaffenSSmembers.Aftertheearlywarcampaigns,SteinerwaschosenbySS-ReichsführerHeinrichHimmlertooverseethecreationof,andthencommandthenewvolunteerSSDivision,SS-DivisionWiking.TheWikingwasmadeupofNon-Germanvolunteers,andatthetimeofitscreationconsistedmostlyofDutch,Walloons,andScandinaviansincludingtheDanishregimentFrikorpsDanmark.IntheWikingDivision,Steinercreatedacapableformationfromdisparateelements,andhecommandedthemcompetentlythroughthemanybattlesintheeastfrom1941untilhispromotiontocommandoftheIII(Germanic)SSPanzerCorps.Whilethereareseveralincidentsdocumentedbyhistoriansinwhichthedivisionengagedinmassacres,theWiking’sofficialcombatrecordisclearofanyspecificWarCrimesprosecutions.SteinersaidoftheCommissarOrder“NorationalunitcommandercouldcomplywithsuchanOrder”.Hefeltthatitwasincompatiblewithsoldierlyconductandwouldresultinabreakdowninmilitarydiscipline,andthatitwasincompatiblewithgivingcombatitsmoralworth.Evenifitwasonutilitariangrounds,SteinerfeltthattheCommissarOrderwastobeignored,asdetrimentaltogoodorderanddiscipline.InApril1943,SteinerwasplacedincommandofthenewlyformedIIISSPanzerCorps.Theunitparticipatedinanti-partisanactionsinYugoslavia.InNovember/December1943hiscorpswastransferredtotheEasternFrontandpositionedinthenorthernsectoratLeningradunderArmyGroupNorth.Steiner’sPanzerCorpsplayedaleadingroleduringthesuccessfuldefensivebattlesatNarva.DuringthebattleoftheTannenberglinehisforceswereabletowithstandasuperiorSovietforcewithonly7tanksleft.HisunitthenwithdrewwiththerestofArmyGroupNorthtotheCourlandPeninsula.

ArmyGroupVistulaInJanuary1945,SteineralongwiththeIII(Germanic)SSPanzerCorpswastransferredbyshipfromtheCourlandPockettohelpwiththedefenceoftheGermanhomeland.TheIII(Germanic)SSPanzerCorpswasassignedtoArmyGroupVistulaandputunderthenewEleventhSSPanzerArmy,althoughthisarmyreallyonlyexistedonpaper.OncetheSovietsreachedtheOderriver,EleventhSSPanzerArmybecameinactiveandtheIIISSPanzerCorpswasre-assignedtotheGermanThirdPanzerArmyasareserveduringtheSoviets’BerlinOffensiveOperation.DuringtheBattleofHalbe,thefirstmajorbattleoftheoffensive,GeneralGotthardHeinrici,thecommanderofArmyGroupVistula,transferredmostoftheIIISSPanzerCorps’divisionstoGeneralTheodorBusse’sGermanNinthArmy.SteinerhadalwaysbeenoneofHitler’sfavouritecommanders,whoadmiredhis‘getthejobdone’attitudeandthefactthatheowedhisallegiancetotheWaffenSS,notthe

PrussianOfficerCorps.JosephGoebbelsalsopraisedSteiner.“Heisenergeticandpurposefulandisattackinghisjobwithgreatverve,”Goebbelswroteon1March1945.By21April,SovietMarshalZhukov’s1stBelorussianFronthadbrokenthroughtheGermanlinesontheSeelowHeights.Hitler,ignoringthefacts,startedtocalltheragtagunitsthatcameunderSteiner’scommandArmyDetachmentSteiner(ArmeeabteilungSteiner).Anarmydetachmentwassomethingmorethanacorpsbutlessthananarmy.HitlerorderedSteinertoattackthenorthernflankofthehugesalientcreatedbythe1stBelorussianFront’sbreakout.Steiner’sattackwasduetocoincidewithGeneralBusse’sNinthArmy,attackingfromthesouthinapincerattack.TheNinthArmyhadbeenpushedtosouthofthe1stBelorussianFront’ssalient.Tofacilitatethisattack,SteinerwasassignedthethreedivisionsoftheNinthArmy’sCIArmyCorps:the4thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionPolizei,the5thJägerDivision,andthe25thPanzergrenadierDivision.AllthreedivisionswerenorthoftheFinowCanalontheNorthernflankofZhukov’ssalient.Weidling’sLVIPanzerCorps,whichwasstilleastofBerlinwithitsnorthernflankjustbelowWerneuchen,wasalsotoparticipateintheattack.ThethreedivisionsfromCIArmyCorpsweretoattacksouthfromEberswaldeontheFinowCanaltowardstheLVIPanzerCorps.ThethreedivisionsfromCIArmyCorpswere24kilometres(about15miles)eastofBerlinandtheattacktothesouthwouldcutthe1stBelorussianFront’ssalientintwo.SteinercalledHeinriciandinformedhimthattheplancouldnotbeimplementedbecausethe5thJägerDivisionandthe25thPanzergrenadierDivisionweredeployeddefensivelyandcouldnotberedeployeduntilthe2ndNavalDivisionarrivedfromthecoasttorelievethem.Thisleftonlytwobattalionsofthe4thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionavailableandtheyhadnocombatweapons.BasedonSteiner’sassessment,HeinricicalledHansKrebs,ChiefofStaffoftheGermanGeneralStaffoftheArmyHighCommand(OberkommandodesHeeresorOKH),andtoldhimthattheplancouldnotbeimplemented.HeinriciaskedtospeaktoHitler,butwastoldHitlerwastoobusytotakehiscall.On22April1945,athisafternoonconference,HitlerbecameawarethatSteinerwasnotgoingtoattackandhefellintoatearfulrage.Hitlerdeclaredthatthewarwaslost,heblamedthegenerals,andannouncedthathewouldstayoninBerlinuntiltheendandthenkillhimself.Onthesameday,GeneralRudolfHolstewasgivenwhatfewmobileforcesSteinercommandedsothathecouldparticipateinanewplantorelieveBerlin.HolstewastoattackfromthenorthwhileGeneralWaltherWenckattackedfromthewestandGeneralTheodorBusseattackedfromthesouth.Theseattacksamountedtolittleand,on25April,theSovietforcesattackingtothenorthandtothesouthofBerlinlinkeduptothewestofthecity.

Endofthewar-peacetimeAfterthesurrender,Steinerwasincarcerateduntil1948.HefacedchargesattheNurembergTrials,buttheywerealldroppedandhewasreleased.Hededicatedthelastdecadesofhislifetowritinghismemoirsandseveralbooksaboutthewar.Hediedon12May1966.

Promotions

1June1936tenführerStartedWorldWarIIasSS-Oberführer

9November1940promotedSS-BrigadeführerandGeneralmajoroftheWaffen-SS1January1942promotedSS-GruppenführerandGeneralleutnantoftheWaffen-SS1July1943promotedSS-ObergruppenführerundGeneralderWaffen-SSMentionedintheWehrmachtberichtEntranceintotheSS-VerfügungstruppeasSS-Standar

AwardsIronCrossof1914,1stand2ndclass

WoundBadge(1918)inBlackClasptotheIronCross,1stand2ndclassKnight’sCrossoftheIronCrosswithOakLeavesandSwordsKnight’sCrosson15August1940OakLeaveson23December1942(159thaward)Swordson10August1944(86thaward)GermanCrossinGold(22April1942)EasternFrontMedalOrderoftheCrossofLiberty,1stclasswithBreastStar,OakLeavesandSwords(Finland)SSHonourRingSwordofhonouroftheReichsführer-SSMentionintheWehrmachtbericht(1August1944)

CommandsCommanderoftheSS-Regiment“Deutschland”1June1936to1December19401December1940to1January1943CommanderofSS-GermaniaDivision(mot),On31December1940SS-GermaniaDivisionrenamedSS-WikingDivisionOn9November1942SS-Wikingredesignated5.SS-WikingPanzergrenadierDivision(I),10May1943toNovember9,1944CommanderoftheIII(Germanic)SSPanzerCorps26November1944toMarch5,1945CommanderoftheXISSPanzerArmyCommandoftheIII(Germanic)SSPanzerCorpsacorpsintheThirdPanzerArmyOn21April1945whatremainedofSteiner’scommandredesignatedArmyDetachmentSteiner

HerbertOttoGilleHerbertOttoGille(March8,1897inGandersheim–December26,

1966)AwinneroftheKnight’sCrosswithOakleaves,SwordsandDiamondsandoftheGermanCrossinGold,themosthighlydecoratedmemberoftheWaffenSSduringWorldWarII.BytheendofthewarheheldtherankofSS-ObergruppenfuhrerundGeneralderWaffen-SS.

Militarycareer

BorninGandersheim,GillebeganhismilitarycareerasafirstlieutenantintheartillerybranchduringtheFirstWorldWarandwontheIronCrossFirstandSecondClasses.Heleftthearmyin1919andremainedacivilianworkinginagricultureandasacardealeruntil1931whenhejoinedtheNaziPartyandtheSS.HemarriedSophieCharlotteMenneckeon4January1935andhisonlychild,adaughter,wasbornon9October1935.

In1934hewasre-activatedbytheSScombatsupportforces.HebecameaCompanyCommanderinEllwangen,thenaBattalionCommanderoftheSSregimentGermaniainArolsen.HelaterservedasthecommanderofanartilleryunitinJueterbog.Asthecommanderofthe1stBattalionoftheSS-VArtilleryRegimentGilleparticipatedintheinvasionofPolandandinthewesterncampaign.In1940hetookovertheartilleryregimentofthe5thSSPanzerDivision,ledbySSObergruppenführerFelixSteiner.10

AftertheassaultontheSovietUnion,Gille,asaleaderofanadvanceguard,reachedtheKubanandreceivedtheKnight’sCrosson8October1942.ShortlythereafterhetookcommandoftheWikingDivision(5thSSPanzerDivision)ontheEasternFront.Earlyin1944,GillewasinstrumentalinthewithdrawalofhiscommandandothersoftheencircledGroupStemmermannthrough“HellsGate”duringtheKorsuncauldronencirclement,alsoknownastheCherkassyPocket.TheSovietsgreatlyoutnumberedtheGermanforcesbuttheyfailedtocutofftheirretreat,thoughtheywereabletoinflictseriousdamageontheGermanformations.GillereceivedthediamondsinadditiontohisKnight’sCrosswithOakLeavesandSwordson19April1944.ShortlyafterhisescapefromtheCherkassyPocket,GilleandmembersofhisstaffwereflownintotheencircledtownofKoveltoorganizeitsdefense.UnderGille’ssteadyleadershipthemixedarmyandWaffenSSunitsmaintainedavigorousdefenseuntilthesiegewasraisedbyapproachingGermanunitsfromtheWest.HistroopsstoodstrongontheEastPrussiaborderwiththe3rdSSPanzerDivisionandpreventedtheplannedSovietbreakthroughtoBerlinintheautumnof1944destroyinglargenumbersofSoviettanks.InJanuary1945Gille,asleaderoftheIVSSPanzerCorpscomprisingthe3rdand5thSSPanzerDivisions,wassenttoHungarytoattempttorelievetheencircledcityofBudapest.However,histroopswereunabletobreakthroughtothecity.InMarch1945heledtheIVSSPanzerCorpsinthefailedLakeBalatonOffensiveandfollowingtheSovietcounter-offensivehiscorpswasforcedtoretreatintoAustria.Whentheendofwarwasclear,hemarchedtowardstheU.S.troopsinordertoavoidsurrenderingtoSovietforces.HewasheldbytheU.S.forthreeyears,andreleasedinMay1948.

DespitebeinganearlyNaziPartymember,Gillewasknownforhisapoliticalviews.TheauthorHeinzHöhneinTheOrderundertheDeathHeadcharacterizedGilleasanenigmaand“Nur-Soldat”(soldier–nothingelse)whooncethreatenedanewlyassignedWeltanschauungsoffizier(politicalindoctrinationofficer)withaclean-outsquadtogatherhisuniformsandotherpossessionsandthrowthemandtheofficeroutoftheunit.Gillewashighlyregardedforhisleadershipqualitiesandtacticalabilities.HecommandedWaffen-SSunitsattheregiment,divisionandcorpslevelwithdistinctionduringthewar.Gillewaspopularwithhismenandadmiredforhispersonalbravery.Hewaswellknownfortheunusualwalking-stickhecarried.

Post-WarAfterthewarheworkedforanewspaperuntil1958.Healsoownedasmallbookshop.GillewasthefounderofamagazineforveteransoftheWikingdivision,“WikingRuf”.On26December1966HerbertOttoGillediedofaheartattackinStemmen,nearHannover.HewasalsoburiedatthelocalcemeteryinStemmen.However,hisgravenolongerexists.

PersonallifeOnJanuary3,1935,Gillemarried31-year-oldSophieCharlotteMenneckeandtheyhadtogetheronedaughter(bornonOctober9,1935).

SummaryofhiscareerDatesofrank

Leutnant:January27,1915Oberleutnant:March31,1919SS-Anwärter:December,1931SS-Scharführer:1932SS-Untersturmführer:April20,1933SS-Obersturmführer:April20,1935SS-Hauptsturmführer:November9,1935SS-Sturmbannführer:April20,1937SS-Obersturmbannführer:October19,1939SS-Standartenführer:January30,1941SS-Oberführer:October1,1941SS-BrigadeführerundGeneralmajorderWaffen-SS:November9,1942SS-GruppenführerundGeneraleutnantderWaffen-SS:November9,1943SS-ObergruppenführerundGeneralderWaffen-SS:November9,1944

Notabledecorations

IronCross(1914)2ndand1stClassSS-HonourRingClasptotheIronCross(1939)2ndClass(26October1939)1stClass(21November1939)GermanCrossinGoldon28February1942asSSOberführerinSS-Artillerie-Regiment5Knight’sCrossoftheIronCrosswithOakLeaves,SwordsandDiamondsKnight’sCrosson8October1942asSSOberführerandcommanderofSSArtillerie-Regiment5“Wiking”315thOakLeaveson1November1943asSSBrigadeführerandGeneralmajoroftheWaffen-SS,andcommanderofSS-Panzergrenadier-Division“Wiking”

47thSwordson20February1944asSSGruppenführerandGeneralleutnantoftheWaffen-SS,andcommanderofSS-Panzergrenadier-Division“Wiking”12thDiamondson19April1944asSSGruppenführerandGeneralleutnantoftheWaffen-SS,andcommanderof5thSS-Panzer-Division“Wiking”GeneralAssaultBadge(1941)AnschlussMedalSudetenlandMedalEasternFrontMedal(1941)TheHonourCrossoftheWorldWar1914/1918(1934)DuchyofBrunswick’sWarMeritCrossSecondandFirstClassesFinishOrderoftheCrossofLiberty1stClasswithSwordsMentionedtwicebynameintheWehrmachtbericht(6April1944and2September1944)

OberfûhrerEdaurdDeisenhoferDr.EduardDeisenhofer(27June1909,Freising,UpperBavaria–MIA

31January1945)wasanofficerandcommanderintheGermanWaffen-SSwhoservedwithseveralcombatdivisionsonboththeeasternandwesternfronts,earningseveralhighgradedistinctions,suchastheCloseCombatClasp,andtheKnight’sCrossoftheIronCross.Deisenhofercanbeseenasaninterestingexampleofthe‘educated’SSman,mostofwhomservedintheSD.11

BorninFreising,Bavaria,toamiddle-classfamily,Deisenhoferexcelledinhisstudiesatschoolfromayoungage.Afterhisschooling,hepursuedstudiesinthefieldsofpoliticsandeconomics.HeeventuallyreceivedhisPhDasapoliticaleconomist.Duringhistimeatuniversity,hehadcomeintocontactwiththeNaziParty,andsoonappliedtojointheSA.AfteronlyafewmonthswiththeSA,DeisenhofertransferredtotheSS,beginninghisserviceon1October1930.DescribedbyGottfriedKlingemannasa‘clear-thinkingandjustmanwithanenergeticandtenaciouscharacter’,Deisenhoferquicklyclimbedhiswaythroughtheranks,holdingvariouslowlevelcommandpositions,includingservicewiththeLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerin1934andattheKZDachauin1935.BythisstagehehadreachedtherankofSS-Hauptsturmführer.On30January1936,DeisenhofermarriedEdeltrautHolzapfel.Overthecourseofthenextfewyears,theywouldhavethreedaughters,oneofwhomwaskilledinabombingraidin

May1943.In1936,hewastransferredtoSS-WachtruppeOberbayern.OverthenexttwoyearsheservedinboththeTotenkopfverbändeunitsSSVerbandeSachsenandSSStandarteThuringen.

EarlywarcampaignsTheoutbreakofwarfoundhimservingbackwiththeOberbayern,nowexpandedtoanSSTotenkopfStandarte.TheOberbayernwasinvolvedinpoliceandsecuritymeasuresduringtheInvasionofPoland.AfterthePolishcampaign,OberbayernwasabsorbedintothenewlyformedSSDivisionTotenkopf.Deisenhofer,nowanSS-Sturmbannführer(Major),wasplacedincommandoftheIIBattalionofSS-Totenkopf-Infanterie-Regiment1.HeledthisformationthroughtheinitialphaseoftheCampaignintheWest,receivingtheIronCrossFirstClassforhisbraveryincombat.DeisenhoferwaspulledoutofthelineinlateMayandplacedinchargeofIIBattalionofthenewlyformedDutchandBelgianvolunteerformationSS-Freiwilligen-StandarteNordwest.AftercommandingtheII./Nordwestduringitstrainingandformation,DeisenhoferwastransferredtotheSS-Ersatz-BataillonOst,areplacementandtrainingunitbasedinBerlin.InAugust1941,DeisenhoferwastransferredtothecommandoftheI./SSInfanterie-Regiment9Germania,oneoftheInfantryregimentsoftheSSDivision(mot)Wiking,currentlyservingontheEasternFront.DeisenhofercommandedtheBattalionduringthewinter,beforebeingsentbacktotheTotenkopfdivisioninFebruary1942,thistimetoserveascommanderofI./SS-Totenkopf-Infanterie-Regiment1.TheTotenkopfwasattachedtoArmyGroupNorth,advancingonLeningrad.ThedivisionsawveryheavyfightingnearDemjanskandduringthebattlewascompletelysurrounded(DemyanskPocket).Deisenhoferledhismenwell,actingbravelyandshowingcourageunderfire.WhenhisbadlydepletedBattalionwasformedintopartofalargerKampfgruppe,Deisenhoferwasgivencommand,leadingtheKampfgruppeduringthebreakoutfromthepocket,andengaginginmorethan35daysofhand-to-handcombat,qualifyinghimfortheCloseCombatClaspinsilver.On20April1942,hewaspromotedtoSS-Obersturmbannführer(LieutenantColonel).On17May1942,DeisenhoferwasawardedtheKnight’sCrossoftheIronCrossforhisactionsintheDemyanskPocket.ThetatteredremnantsoftheTotenkopfwerepulledbacktoFrancetoberebuilt.DeisenhoferwasorderedtoBerlinforreassignment.

TrainingdutiesDeisenhoferwasfirstlyreassignedascommanderofanSSmotorcyclereplacementbattalionwhichheleduntilhewasorderedtoSS-JunkerschuleinBadTölz,Bavaria.UponarrivalattheSSofficersschool,Deisenhoferwasinformedthathewastotakeoverastraininggroupcommander.Aspartofthiscommand,hewastotravelbetweenseveraldifferenttraininggroundsincludingtheArmourschool,PanzertruppenschuleWünsdorfandtheLightInfantryschool,bothlocatedatWünsdorf.AttheendofApril1943,DeisenhoferwastransferredtoBerlintooperateasatrainingofficerfortheSSInfantryandMountaintroopInspectiondepartment,apartoftheSS-FHA.InNovember1943hewassenttothe11th(OfficerTraining)Department(AmtXI)oftheSS-FHA.

Divisionalcommand-latewar

InearlyMarch1944,Diesenhoferwasfinallyrelievedfromhisdutiesat

tachedtotheSS-JunkerschuleTölzandsentbacktoacombatformation,thistimeSS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment21ofthe10.SS-Panzer-DivisionFrundsberg.DiesenhofercommandedtheregimentduringtheFrundsbergandthe9.SS-Panzer-DivisionHohenstaufen’ssuccessfulattempttorelievetheencircled1.PanzerarmeeofGeneraloberstHans-ValentinHubeinwhatwasknownastheKamenets-PodolskyPocket.Forhisactionsduringthisbattle,DeisenhoferwaspromotedtoSS-Standartenführer(Colonel).TheFrundsbergwassenttotheNormandyFronttoattempttohalttheadvanceofFieldMarshalBernardMontgomery’s21stArmyGroup,currentlyadvancingonCaen.DeisenhoferledtheregimentthroughheavyfightingincludingthebattlesonHill112andthedefeatofOperationEpsom.InmidJuly,Deisenhoferwasorderedbackeasttotakecommandofthe5.SS-Panzer-DivisionWiking,currentlyengagedinheavyfightingintheareanearModlin.InmidAugust,DeisenhoferwasorderedbacktoBerlintoawaithisnextcommand.Attheendofthemonth,hetookovercommandofthe17.SS-Panzergrenadier-DivisionGötzvonBerlichingen,whichwasengagedinafightingwithdrawaltowardstheSaar.DeisenhofercommandedthedivisionduringtheheavyfightingagainsttheAmericansontheMoselleandinthesubsequentwithdrawaltoMetz.AttheendofSeptember,DeisenhoferwaswoundedinthefightingandorderedbacktoBerlintorestandrecuperate.On31December,hewastaskedwithorganisingaKampfgruppefromtherecruitsoftheSS-TruppenübungsplatztodefendBadSaarow.On1January,DeisenhoferwaspromotedtoSS-Oberführer(SeniorColonel).NeartheendofJanuary,DeisenhoferwasorderedtoArnswaldeinPomeraniatotakecommandofthe15.Waffen-Grenadier-DivisionderSS(lettischeNr.1).Hebegantravellingnorthtotakeoverhisnextcommand,butaSovietgroundattackaircraftattackedthestaffcar,killingDeisenhofer,hisdriverandhisadjutant.BecauseevidenceofDeisenhofer’sdeathislacking,heisclassifiedasmissinginaction,ratherthankilled.Hisremainswerenotfound.

DatesofrankSS-Scharführer:July8,1932

SS-Truppführer:May17,1933SS-Obertruppführer:August21,1933SS-Sturmführer:November8,1933SS-Obersturmführer:April20,1934SS-Hauptsturmführer:September15,1935SS-Sturmbannführer:October2,1938SS-Obersturmbannführer:April20,1942SS-Standartenführer:April20,1944SS-Oberführer:January1,1945

Notabledecorations

GermanCrossinGold(1942)EasternFrontMedal(1942)InfantryAssaultBadge(?)IronCrossSecond(1940)andFirst(1940)ClassesWoundBadgeinBlack(1940)andSilver(?)Knight’sCrossoftheIronCross(1942)SS-HonourRing(?)SudetenlandMedal(1938)AnschlussMedal(1938)CloseCombatClasp(silver)(1942)

ObergruppenfûhrerHerbetOttoGilleDates:*8.März1897,Gandersheim+26.Dezember1966,Stemmen

HerbertGilleenteredintothe1910RoyalPrussianCadetCorps.Whenthewarstarted,hemovedasalieutenantwiththeFieldArtilleryRegiment55intothefield,later,atransfertotheFieldArtilleryRegiment30.Aftermehererenwoundsheretiredin1919asalieutenantinthearmy.Afteryearsasanestatemanager15heenlistedin1934toSS-Verfügungstruppe,whereherosetoSturmbannführerto1937.In1938hegraduatedfromthebattalioncommandertrainingcourseattheInfantrySchoolDöberitzandwassubsequentlycommanderoftheII.BattalionoftheSSRegiment“DerFührer”.InthePolishandFrenchcampaignshewascommanderoftheFirstDivisionoftheSSArtilleryRegiment5.On30January1941hewaspromotedtoStandartenfiihrer.AtthebeginningoftheinvasionoftheSovietUnionGillespiebecamecommanderoftheVorausabteiluntheSSDivision“Wiking”.OnOctober1,1941,hewaspromotedforhiscontributionstothechiefofficeroftheWaffen-SS.AftercrossingtheKubanhewasawardedforleadingtheadvancepartyonOctober8,1941,theKnight’sCrossandshortlyafterwardshewasappointedcorpsartilleryGuide.On1May1943,promotedtoBrigadierGeneralonDecember1,1942GillespietooktheSSDivision“Wiking”.ForthesuccessofhisstruggleDivisionintheBattleofKharkovGillewasawardedtheOakLeavesonNovember1,1943November9,1943,hewaspromotedtogroupleader.DuringtheBattleoftheCherkassycauldronfrom29January1944,GilleandtheSS-Panzer-Division“Wiking”provedtimeandagainasabackboneofboilerdefense.AttheoutbreakoftheGermantroopsfromtheboiler,theboilercommander,GeneralStemmermannfell,andGillespietookovercommandoftheeruptingtroops.Forthisperformance,hisswordswerepresentedon20February1944.TheSS-Panzer-Division“Wiking”wasmovedtoHinterllandtoberefreshed.Gille,however,HitlerorderedbyKovel.ThecitywassurroundedbyRussianforcesandGille

shouldnoworganizethedefenseoftheencircledtroops.AfterGillecouldkeepthecityKovelfor22days,succeededreliefcolumn,includingtherejuvenatedSSPanzerDivision“Wiking”for48hours,liberateacorridorinthecityandGillewasremovingalltroopsfromthefort.Forthis,GillewereawardedthediamondsonApril19,1944.InAugust1944,GillespiewasappointedCommandingGeneraloftheIV.SSPanzerCorpsandappointedonNovember9,1944Obergruppenführer.WhenthewarendedGillefellintoAmericancaptivityfromwhichhewasreleasedin1948.BecausemembershipintheSSGillewassentencedto18monthsinprison,butshehadalreadyservedbytheprisoner.

DatesofrankLeutnant:January27,1915Oberleutnant:March31,1919SS-Anwärter:December,1931SS-Scharführer:1932SS-Untersturmführer:April20,1933SS-Obersturmführer:April20,1935SS-Hauptsturmführer:November9,1935SS-Sturmbannführer:April20,1937SS-Obersturmbannführer:October19,1939SS-Standartenführer:January30,1941SS-Oberführer:October1,1941SS-BrigadeführerundGeneralmajorderWaffen-SS:November9,1942SS-GruppenführerundGeneraleutnantderWaffen-SS:November9,1943SS-ObergruppenführerundGeneralderWaffen-SS:November9,1944

DecorationsIronCross(1914)2ndand1stClassWarMeritCrossSecondandFirstClasses(Brunswick)TheHonourCrossoftheWorldWar1914/1918(1934)SS-HonourRingClasptotheIronCross(1939)2ndClass(26October1939)1stClass(21November1939)GermanCrossinGoldon28February1942asSSOberführerinSS-Artillerie-Regiment5Knight’sCrossoftheIronCrosswithOakLeaves,SwordsandDiamondsKnight’sCrosson8October1942asSSOberführerandcommanderofSSArtillerie-Regiment5“Wiking”315thOakLeaveson1November1943asSSBrigadeführerandGeneralmajoroftheWaffen-SS,andcommanderofSS-Panzergrenadier-Division“Wiking”47thSwordson20February1944asSSGruppenführerandGeneralleutnantoftheWaffen-SS,andcommanderofSS-Panzergrenadier-Division“Wiking”12thDiamondson19April1944asSSGruppenführerandGeneralleutnantoftheWaffen-SS,andcommanderof5thSS-Panzer-Division“Wiking”GeneralAssaultBadge(May1941)AnschlussMedalSudetenlandMedalwithPragueCastleclaspEasternFrontMedal(15September1941)FinnishOrderoftheCrossofLiberty1stClasswithSwordsMentionedtwiceintheWehrmachtbericht(6April1944and2September1944)SSLongServiceAward

SwordofhonouroftheReichsführer-SSWoundBadge(1939)inSilver

StandartenfûhrerJohannes-RudolfMühlenkampMühlenkampwasbornon9October1910inMontigny-lès-Metz,AlsaceLorraine.HewasoneoftheearlymembersoftheNSDAPandtheSS,joiningonApril1933.Mühlenkampwasgiventhepartynumber2800042andtheSSservicenumber86065.Hewasfirstassignedtothe4thSS

StandarteSchleswigHolsteininHamburgbeforebeingmovedtothe2ndSSStandarteoftheSS-Verfügungstruppein1934.Then,Mühlenkamphadbeenselectedtobecomeanofficerin1935.HewassenttotheSSjunkerschoolatBraunschweig.FromApriltoMay1936,MühlenkampcompletedmotorcycletrainingwiththeHeers2ndPanzerDivision,beinghighlysuccessfulinpreWorldWarIImotorcyclecompetitions.Oncompletionofhisofficertraining,Mühlenkampwasassignedtothe2ndBattalionoftheGermaniaRegiment(5thSSPanzerDivisionWiking)asaplatoonleaderonNovember1937.MühlenkamptookovercommandoftheMotorCycleCompanyonMay1938.

WorldWarIIAttheeveofthewar,MühlenkampwastheDivisionalAdjutantoftheSS

VerfügungstruppeDivision,untilDecember1940,whenhewasgiventhecommandoftheReichDivisionReconnaissanceBattalion.MühlenkampwasseriouslywoundedintheheadbyartilleryshrapnelnearJelnja,Russia.HospitalizedbetweenOctoberandFebruary1942,MühlenkampmissedthefirstRussianwinterofthewar.Onhisreleasefromhospital,JohannesMühlenkampwasassignedtothe5thSSPanzerGrenadierDivisionWiking,asPanzerBattalioncommander,untilMarch1943.Whenthenumberofsoldiersfromthebattalionhavebeenincreased,thebattalionwasconvertedintoaregiment.OnAugust1944,Mühlenkampwasgiventhecommandofthe5thSSPanzerDivisionWiking.HecommandedthisunituntilOctober1944.Then,MühlenkampwaspromotedInspectorofWaffenSSPanzertroopsintheSS-Führungshauptamt.Hislastcommandwasthe32.SS-Panzergrenadier-DivisionfromJanuary1945toFebruary1945.

Promotions

SS-Standartenführer:20Apr.1944SS-Obersturmbannführer:30Jan.1943SS-Sturmbannführer:30Jan.1942SS-Hauptsturmführer:30Jun.1939SS-Obersturmführer:9Nov.1937SS-Untersturmführer:20Apr.1936

DecorationsandAwardsRitterkreuzdesEisernenKreuzes:3Sep.1942,asSS-SturmbannführerandKommandeur,SS-Panzer-Abteilung/SS-Division“Wiking”/LVII.Armee-Korps/1.Panzer-Armee/HeeresgruppeAMitEichenlaub(Nr.596):21Sep.1944,asSS-StandartenführerandKommandeur,5.SS-Panzer-Division“Wiking”/IV.SS-Pz.Korps/HeeresgruppeMitteDeutschesKreuzinGold:2.Jan.1942EisernesKreuz1939,1stclass:11.Nov.1939EisernesKreuz1939,2ndclass:3.Oct.1939MentionedinofficialWehrmachtbericht:11Jul.1944(forhisunitsdestructionof103SoviettanksatMaciejow)Verwundetenabzeichen,1939inGold:13.Jan.1943PanzerkampfabzeichenSS-DienstauszeichnungenEhrendegendesRFSSTotenkopfringderSSOrderoftheCrownofKingZvonimir

OberfûhrerKarlUlrich

(1December1910–8May1996)wasanOberführer(SeniorColonel)intheWaffen-SS,whowasawardedtheKnight’sCrossoftheIronCrosswithOakLeavesduringWorldWarII.UllrichwasborninSarregueminesin1910,joinedInfanterie-Regiment19afterhavinggraduatedfromuniversity.HewentfromtheretotheSSVerfügungstruppe(latertheWaffen-SS).UllrichwasanengineeringgraduatewhenhejoinedtheSSEngineerBattalionoftheSS-VT1934.

Hewascommissionedasanofficerwithinayearandpostedtocommandthe3rdCompany,SSPionierBattalion,SS-Verfügungstruppe.

WorldWarIIHewasawardedtheIronCross1stand2ndclassforbraveryduringtheBattleofFrance,thentransferredtotheTotenkopfontheEasternFrontin1941.HewasawardedtheKnight’sCrossforhisleadershipandbraveryduringthebattlesoftheDemyanskpocketinFebruary1942andinOctober1944wasgivencommandofthe6thSSPanzerGrenadierRegimentTheodorEickeandwasawardedtheOakleaveswhileincommand.PromotedtoStandartenführer(Colonel)hewasgivencommandofthe5thSSPanzerDivisionWikingforthefinalbattlesofthewarinHungary.AshorttimebeforetheendofthewarhewaspromotedtoOberführerandhesurrenderedtotheRussiansinMay1945.

Awards

IronCross(1939)2ndClass(18May1940)1stClass(1July1940)Knight’sCrossoftheIronCrosswithOakLeaves

AnnexesOperationBarbarossaJune1941

InOperation‘Barbarossa’,ArmyGroupsNorth,CentreandSouthwithpowerfulLuftwaffesupportstrikeinthreedirections:Leningrad,MoscowandKiev-Rostov.EncirclementsoftheRedArmyareatriumphantfeatureoftheearlydays,butmilitaryoperationsfanningoutoveravastandoftentracklessinterioraresoonbroughttoastandstill.Haltedbydifficultterrain,badweather,inadequatesuppliesandexhaustedbyanunyieldingdefence,thepanzerdivisionsaftercapturingKievaredriventounrewardingbattlesforLeningradandMoscow.Hoepner(FourthPz-Army)22JuneleadsArmyGroupNorth(vonLeeb)toLeningrad.GuderianandHoth(SecondandThirdPz-Armies)22JuneresponsibleforthemainGermaneffort,leadArmyGroupCentre(vonBock)intheMoscowdirection.VonKleist(FirstPzArmy)22JuneleadsArmyGroupSouth(vonRunstedt)toKievandRostov.

TheoutstandingpanzersuccessoftheearlyweeksisanenvelopmentoffiveRussianarmieseastofKievresultingin600,000prisonersforwhichvonKleistandGuderianareresponsible.Inthecourseofasubsequentoperation,‘Typhoon’2October1941,convergentactionbyGuderian,ReinhardtandHoepnerencirclingBryanskandVyasmaprovesequallyrewarding.Seventeenpanzerdivisions,thirteenandahalfmotorizeddivisionslead‘Barbarossa’-butdespiteoptimisticpredictionsofathree-weekcampaign,operationsaredestinedtolastfouryears.Expandedandre-equipped,inlatercampaignsthepanzerforcewillneverthelessfailtomatchRussiannumbersorstrategy.Divisionsareswitchedbetweentheatres,fronts,andcontrollingcorps.FouryearslaterontheCentralFrontinJanuary1945,whentheRedArmypushesacrosstheVistula,onlyfourpanzerdivisionssupportingindifferentlyequippedinfantrydivisionsface163Russiandivisions.AttheconclusionofhostilitiesthepanzerforceistotallyburnedoutandonlyweakbattlegroupsremainattheArmy’sdisposal.Hoepner(4)PzGr4:XXXXIPzKReinhardt,LVIvonManstein:threePzDivs1st,6th,8th:threeMotDivs3rd,36thandSSTotenkopf(latertrappedwithSS‘Polizei’,‘Danemark’andothersatDemjansk).Hoth(3)PzGrS:XXXIXPzKSchmidt,LVIIPzKKuntzen:fourPzDivs7th,12th,19th,20th:threeMotDivs14th,18th,20th:NoSSformationsGuderian(2)PzGr2:XXIVPzKGeyr,XXXXVIPzKVietinghoffXXXXVIIPzKLemelsen,fivePzDivs3rd,4th,10th,17th,18th:31/2MotDivs10th,29th,SSDasReich(laterswitchedtoHoepnerforattackonMoscow)andRegiment‘GrossDeutschland’VonKleist(1)PzGr1:IIIPzKvonMackensen;XIVPzKvonWietersheim;XXXXVIIIPzKKempf;fivePzDivs9th,11th,13th,14th,16th;fourMotDivs16th,25th,SS‘Wiking’,SS(Brigade)‘Leibstandarte’AH,RegtGenGoering.OKHReserve2nd,5thPzDivs:60thMotDivGermanArmyvonBrauchitsch153divisions(seventeenPz,+tworeserve,134motdivs)3,417tanksLuftwaffeKeller,1stAirFleet;IAirCorps/AGrNorth;Kesselring2AirFleet,II,VIIIAirCorps/AGrCentre;Lohr4thAirFleet,IV,VAirCorps/AGrSouth;-3,800aircraftRedArmy/AirForce150-180divs,20,000tanks,butonly1,000T34sand500KVs,10,000aircraft(2,750modemtypes).

Lastcauldron:ArmyandSSinHungary,1945

Followinganunsuccessfulconclusionto‘AutumnMist’(map17)Sixth55PanzerArmy(Dietrich)isswitchedacrossEuropetoreinforceArmyCroupSouth(Wohter)defendingwesternHungary.Thereon26December1944Budapest,thecapitalcityof800,000inhabitantshousingnumerousmilitaryagenciesanddefendedbyupwardsof70,000menincluding13thPzDivisionandFeldhermhalleresponsibletoSSGeneralPfeffervonWildenbruck(IXSSMtnCorps),isencircledbytwoUkrainianfronts.Balck,Gille(1)(SixthSSPz-Army)13February1945.Operation‘Konrad’isthefirstofthreeattemptsbyArmeegruppeBalck(SixthArmy)torelieveBudapest.Startingon1JanuarywithIVSSPanzerCorps(Gille)transferredwithTotenkopfandWikingfromNinthArmy/ArmyGroupCentre,‘Konrad’isafailure;despiteheavyfightingbySSWikingtowithinfifteenmilesoftheperimeter.Budapest

remainsbesieged.‘Konrad2’asecondattemptbyIIIPzK(Breith)9-12Januaryfaresnobetter.Priess(2)PanzerbattlesnextdevelopeastofKomornwhereanunexpectedlypowerfulOperation‘SouthWind’leadbyISSPzCorps-LSSAHand12SSHJ-reduces2ndUKRFront’sbridgeheadontheRiverGran.PzCorpsFeldherrnhallewithremnantsofunitsisolatedinBudapestprovidesmainlyinfantrysupport.Balck,Gille,Breith(3)MeanwhileSixthArmy’sthirdreliefattempt‘Konrad3’followson18January1945,fromanewdirection.ButthereinforcedSSPanzerCorps(Gille)attackingsoutharoundStuhlweissenburgwith1stand3rdPanzerDivisions,SSTotenkopfandSSWikingwhileflankprotectiontothenorthisprovidedbyBreith’sIIIPanzerCorps-6thand23rdPanzerDivisionsandsouthbyPzRecceBns1st,3rd,23rdagainfailstorelievethecity.Abreakoutattemptbythedefenderson11Februaryisequallyunsuccessful;Budapestsurrenderson13February1945.Hitler’sarbitrarydiversionofpanzerdivisionstothissecondaryfrontisneverthelesssettocontinue.Dietrich,Balck,deAngelis(4)SixthSSPz-Army6March1945opensanewoffensive‘SpringAwakening’inwhichSixthArmy(Balck),SecondPanzerArmy(deAngelis)-fourinfantrydivisionsandaweak16thReichsfuhrerSSPanzerGrenadierDivision(Baum)-arealsoinvolvedinHitler’splantoencircletheRedArmywestoftheDanube,recaptureBudapestandretainoil-productioncentresatNagykanisczasouth-westofLakeBalaton.But‘SpringAwakening’faltersinwaterloggedterrainandwhencounter-attackedinstrengthby3rdUKrFrontfailstorecovermomentum.(5)ArenewalofRussianattacksaimingatViennaandtheDanubevalleythreateningGermancommunicationsprecipitatesageneralretreat,by20March,panzerrearguardsarefightingdesperatelytodefendpositionswestoftheiroriginalstart-line.6thArmeegruppeBalck;SixthArmy,HungThirdArmy,Gille,IVSSPzCorps;BreithIIIPz-Corps,HarteneckICavCorps,SSWiking,SSTotenkopf,PzDivs1st,3rd,6th,23rd,threecavdivs,Hungariantanks,infantry,Armytroops.After14January,503,509TigerBns.By20January,274PzKpfwIV-VIs,JagPzandSPs.By6March,138mixedtanks.EighthArmyKreysing(northofDanube)8th,20thPzDivs,remnantbattlegroupsFeldherrnhalle,13thPz.SixthSSPz-ArmyDietrich;PriessISSPzCorps,BittrichIISSPzCorps,SSPz-Divs1st,2nd,9th,12th.Reinforced6March,23rdPzandtwocavdivs.By6March,540tanksandSPguns(320battle-fit).SecondPz-ArmydeAngelis;LanzXXIIMtnCorps,KonradLXVIIICorps,16thSSPzGrenDiv,fourInfdivs(twoMtn).4thAirFleetDessloch;Deichmann,IAirCorps,by6March850aircraft.RedArmy/AirForce1January1945,Malinovsky2ndUKrFront;Tolbuchin3rdUKFront;54Infdivs;fivemechcorps;threearmdcorps,twocavcorps.By6March,407tanks,965aircraft.

GermanyinDefeat1945

Armageddon1945.Panzerdivisionsstarvedofpetrolattimestothepointofimmobility,withfewifanytowingmachines,lackinginammunitionandairsupport,recordlocalsuccessesagainstoverwhelmingodds.Allaresweptintodefeat.TheRedArmyadvancinginoverwhelmingstrengthintheeastemploystankandmotorizedforcespatternedontheGermanmodelandmuchofitstransportsuppliedbyWesternAllies.EquallypowerfulUSandBritisharmiesdoseinfromtheWest.East:FirstandFourthPz-Armies12January1945,facetheeasternthreattoBerlin,but

withonlyfourpanzerdivisionsbetweenthemtosupportaninfantrydefenceoftheVistulaandCarpathianssouthofWarsaw(map18)collapseundermassiveattacks.SecondPz-ArmyMarch1945deployedsouthofBudapestwithnoarmouratallalsogiveswayunderRussianpressure.ThirdPzArmy8February1945afterfailingtoprotectKonigsbergandEastPrussia,withdrawstoPomeraniaandtheOdernorthofBerlinundercommandofArmyGroupVistula;SixthSSPz-Army6March1945,thebest-equippedformation,defeatedinwesternHungary(map19)withdrawstoVienna.Thecityfallson13April.North-east:ArmyGroupCourlandpossessesonlytwopanzerdivisionsinitsorderofbattle.South-west:OnlyasinglepanzerdivisionopposingAnglo-USarmiesisleftinnorthernItaly.West:FifthPz-Army,Europe16December1944followsanabortivejointoffensiveFifth/SixthSSPz-ArmyintheArdennes(map17),withencirclementandsurrenderintheRuhr.Reducedtofortytanks,FiftyPanzerArmycapitulateson18April.BerlinisencircledbytheRedArmyon25April1945(seeThirdPanzerArmy,16April).Hitlertakeshisownlifeonthe30th.KeitelsignstheWehrmacht’scapitulationtotheRussiansinBerlinon9May1945.WiththelastofthepanzerdivisionscontainedinEastPrussiasurrenderingto2ndBRFronton14May,theremnantofaonceomnipotentpanzerforcecountforlittlemorethanflagsonRedArmyandAlliedIntelligencemaps.Dispersedfarandwide,survivingunitsservemostlyintheeastwithArmyGroupsCentreandSouth.

BerlinLVIPzKWeidling;18th,20th,llthSSPzGrDivs.PzDivisionMuncheberg.AGrCentreSchömer;FirstPzANehring,FourthPzAGraser:6th,8th,16th,17th,19th,20th,21st,HG1,FBD,2ndSS,10thSSPzDivs;Brandenburg;10thPzGrDiv.AGrSouthRendulic;SecondPzAdeAngelis,SixthSSPzADietrich:1st,3rd,23rd,25th,FGDPzDivs;1st,3rd,5th,9th,12thSSPzDivs,Feldherrnhalle.AGrVistulaStudent;ThirdPzARaus:4thSS,25thPzGrDiv.EastPrussiaVonSaucken,formerlyGermanSecondArmy:4th,5th,7thPzDivs:GrossDeutschland.North-east.AGrCourlandHilpert,formerlyAGrNorth:12th,14thPzDivs.West:AGrs‘B’,‘G’.‘B’,Model:FifthPzAHarpe,9thPzDiv,FifteenthArmy:PzLehr,116thPz.SeventhArmy;2nd,11thPz.‘G’,Schulz:FirstArmy,17thSS.Southwest:AGr“C”Vietinghoff,TenthArmy;26thPzDiv.29th,90thPzGrDivs.

AllgemeineS.S

TheAllgemeineSS(“GeneralSS”,literally“UniversalSS”)wasthemostnumerousbranchoftheSchutzstaffel(SS)paramilitaryforcesofNaziGermany.ItwasmanagedbytheSS-Hauptamt(English:SSMainOffices).TheAllgemeineSSwasofficiallyestablishedintheautumnof1934todistinguishitsmembersfromtheSS-Verfügungstruppe(whichlaterbecametheWaffen-SS)andtheSS-Totenkopfverbände(concentrationcampguards).Startingin1939,foreignunitsoftheAllgemeineSSwereraisedinoccupiedcountries.TheywerelaterconsolidatedintotheLeitstelledergermanischenSS(English:DirectingCenteroftheGermanicSS)from1940.TheSSwascreatedonApril4,1925andsubordinatedtotheSAonNovember1,1926.ItwasthusasubunitoftheSAandtheNSDAP.Itwasconsideredtobeaneliteorganizationbybothpartymembersandthegeneralpopulation.ThemaintaskoftheSSwasthepersonalprotectionoftheFühreroftheNaziParty,AdolfHitler.Asearlyasthewinterof1925theSSconsistedofapproximately1,000members,butofthisnumbertherewerebarely200activemembers.HeinrichHimmlertriedtoseparatetheSSfromtheSA,andSAleadersgenerallyhadnoauthorityoverSSpersonnelfrom1927onwards.HimmlerbegantosystematicallydevelopandexpandtheSSwithstricterrequirementsformembersaswellasageneralpurgeofSSmemberswhowereidentifiedasdrunkards,criminals,orotherwiseundesirableforserviceintheSS.ByDecember1929,thenumberofactiveSSmembershadgrownto1,000.AstheSSgrewevenfurther,Himmleron29January1930announcedtoSAleaderErnstRöhm,that:TheSchutzstaffelisgrowing,andwillprobablynumber2,000bytheendofthisquarter.FromthatpointontheSSwouldbeconsidered,therefore,defactoindependent.ByDecemberofthatsameyear,theSShadamembershipof2,727.HimmlernowlookedtoanothersourceforrecruitstotheSS:theSA.ManyformermembersofRöhm’sFrontbannjoinedtheSS.In1926ithadbeenspecifiedthattheSShadtosubordinateitselfabsolutelytotheSA,andwiththatanyarbitraryactionoftheSSwasprevented.Withlocalrecruitment,SSmenowedtheirloyaltytotherespectiveSAleader.However,by1929,manySAUnterführershadalreadygoneovertoHimmler’sSS.HitlerassistedHimmlerinhisfirstgreatvictoryovertheSA,bydecreeingonNovember7,1930:“ThetaskoftheSSisfirstthepracticeofthepoliceservicewithintheparty.No

SAleaderisentitledtogiveinstructionstotheSS!”Thisordersplitthetwoorganizationsfromeachother,andconfirmedtherebythedejureindependenceoftheSSfromtheSA.

FormationandserviceAftertheMachtergreifung(seizureofpower)bytheNSDAP,theSSbegan

toexpandintoamassiveorganization.ByMarch1933itincludedover52,000registeredmembers.ByDecember1933theSShadincreasedtoover204,000membersandHimmlerorderedatemporaryfreezeonrecruitment.Himmlerorderedthat“nooneelseistakenon,fromtheendof1933totheendof1935,whoisnotsuitedfortheSS.”On20April1934,GöringandHimmleragreedtoputasidetheirdifferences(largelybecauseofmutualhatredoftheSA).GöringtransferredcontroloftheGestapotoHimmler,whowasalsonamedchiefofallGermanpoliceforcesoutsidePrussia.TheSSwasfurthercementedwhenbothitandtheGestapoparticipatedinthedestructionoftheSAduringtheNightoftheLongKnivesfrom30Juneto2July1934.TheyeitherkilledorarrestedeverymajorSAleader–aboveallErnstRöhm.HimmlerwaslaternamedthechiefofallGermanpoliceinJune,1936.Therein,theGestapowasincorporatedintotheSiPowiththeKripo(CriminalPolice).HeydrichwasmadeheadoftheSiPoandcontinuedaschiefoftheSD.12

InAugust1934,HimmlerreceivedpermissionfromHitlertoformaneworganisationfromtheSSSonderkommandosandthePolitischenBereitschaften,theSS-Verfügungstruppe(SS-VT).Thiswasastandingarmedmilitaryforce,whichinwarwastobesubordinatetotheWehrmacht(“ArmedForces”),butremainedunderHimmler’s

controlintimesofpeaceandunderHitler’spersonalcontrolregardless.Accordingtothisrestructure,theSSnowhousedthreedifferentsubordinatecommands:1.Allgemeine-SS,2.Verfügungstruppe3.SS-TotenkopfverbändeHimmlerfurtherconductedadditionalpurgesoftheSStoincludethosedeemedtobeopportunists,alcoholics,homosexuals,orofuncertainracialstatus.This“housecleaning”removedsome60,000SSmembersbyDecember1935.By1938,theAllgemeineSSnumbered485,000memberswith13,867activeSS-officers.InMay1939,theTotenkopfverbändewasdeclaredtobeapartoftheAllgemeine-SS,adding50,000newmemberstotheorganization(theTotenkopfverbändewouldlaterbeabsorbedbytheWaffen-SSin1942).UpontheoutbreakofWorldWarIIin1939,theSShadsolidifiedintoitsfinalform,mainlytwolargecontingents,thesebeingtheAllgemeine-SSandWaffen-SS.WithHimmlerasChiefoftheGermanPolice,theSSalsocontrolledtheOrdnungspolizei,whichoverthecourseofWorldWarIIwouldbeincreasinglyovershadowedandinfiltratedbytheSS.

Hierarchyandstructure

ThetermAllgemeine-SSreferredtothe“General-SS”,meaningthoseunitsoftheSSconsidered“main,regular,orstandard”.By1938,theAllgemeine-SSwasadministrativelydividedintothesemainsections:

Full-timeofficersandmembersofthemainSSdepartments,includingtheRSHAPart-timevolunteermembersofSSregionalunitsSSsecurityforces,e.g.,theGestapoandSicherheitsdienst(SD)ConcentrationCampstaffsoftheTotenkopfverbandeReserve,honoraryorotherwiseinactiveSSmembers

AfterWorldWarIIbeganin1939,thelinesbetweentheAllgemeine-SSandtheWaffen-SSbecameincreasinglyblurred,duelargelytotheAllgemeine-SSheadquartersofficeshavingadministrativeandsupplycommandovertheWaffen-SS.By1940,alloftheAllgemeine-SShadbeenissuedgreywar-timeuniformsandby1941theblackSSuniformhadbeentakenoutofcirculationbymostoftheSS.

FulltimeSSpersonnelApproximatelyonethirdoftheAllgemeine-SSwereconsidered“fulltime”

meaningthattheyreceivedasalaryasgovernmentemployees,wereemployedfull-timeinanSSoffice,andperformedSSdutiesastheirprimaryoccupation.Thevastmajorityofsuchfull-timeSSpersonnelwereassignedtothemainSSoffices,consideredpartoftheAllgemeine-SS,anddividedasfollows:

SS-Hauptamt(SS-HA):SS-HauptamtPersönlicherStabRFSS(HaPerStab)SSPersonalhauptamt(SSPHA)SSFührungshauptamt(SSFHA)HauptamtSS-Gericht(HASS-Gericht)SS-Reichssicherheitshauptamt(RSHA)SS-Rasse-undSiedlungshauptamt(RuSHA)

HauptamtVolksdeutscheMittelstelle(VOMI)ReichskommissarfürdieFestigungdeutschenVolkstums(RKForRKFDV)SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt(SS-WVHA)

Mainofficecommandersandstaffwereexemptfrommilitaryconscription.Althoughmany,suchasReinhardHeydrich,servedasreservistsintheregularGermanmilitary.MainofficemembersdidjointheWaffen-SS,wheretheycouldacceptalowerrankandserveinactivecombatorbelistedasinactivereservists.By1944,withGermany’sloomingdefeat,thedraftexemptionfortheAllgemeine-SSmainofficeswasliftedandmanyjuniormemberswereorderedintocombatwithseniormembersassumingdutiesasWaffen-SSgenerals.

SSregionalunitsThecoreoftheAllgemeine-SSwerepart-timemusteringformations

spreadthroughoutGermany.Membersintheseregionalunitswouldtypicallymeetonceaweekinuniform,aswellasparticipateinvariousNaziPartyfunctions.Activitiesincludingdrillandideologicalinstruction,marchinginparades,andprovidingsecurityatvariousNazipartyrallies.RegionalSSunitswereorganizedintocommandsknownasSS-Oberabschnitt(region),Abschnitt(district),andStandarten(regiment).Before1934,SSpersonnelreceivednopayandtheirworkwascompletelyvoluntarily.After1933,theOberabschnittcommandersandtheirstaffbecameregardedas“fulltime”buttherankandfileoftheAllgemeine-SSwerestillpart-timeonly.RegularAllgemeine-SSpersonnelwerealsonotexemptfromconscriptionandmanywerecalleduptoserveintheWehrmacht.By1942,mostoftheparttimeAllgemeine-SShadeitherjoinedtheWaffen-SSorhadbeenconscriptedintotheregularGermanmilitary.TheseniorlevelsoftheAbschnitteandOberabschnittewereconsidereddraftexempt,butmostoftheseSSleadersandstaffwerethemselvesmergedintotheofficesoftheSSandPoliceLeaderswhichwereconsideredasquasi-militarycommandswithWaffen-SSauthority,althoughonpaperstillpartoftheAllgemeineSS.Draftexemptionfortheseseniorleadershipstaffswasitselfliftedin1944,andmostoftheremainingAllgemeine-SSpersonnelwereassignedtotheWaffen-SSasreservists.

SecurityforcesFrom1936,thestatesecuritypoliceforcesoftheGestapoandKripo(Crim

inalPolice)wereconsolidatedandplacedunderthecentralcommandofReinhardHeydrich,alreadychiefofthepartySicherheitsdienst(SD),andnamedSicherheitspolizei.Laterfrom27September1939forward,theywereallfoldedintotheReichMainSecurityOffice(RSHA)whichwasplacedunderHeydrich’scontrol.TheordinaryuniformedGermanpolice,knownastheOrdnungspolizei(Orpo)werealsounderSScontrolafter1936butneverincorporatedintotheAllgemeine-SS,althoughmanypolicememberswerealsodualSSmembers.ThedeathsquadunitsoftheEinsatzgruppenwereconsideredpartoftheAllgemeine-SSandundertheoperationalcontroloftheRSHA.Theunitswerethemselvesamixtureofcivilian(SSauxiliary),police,andSSpersonnel,althoughallEinsatzgruppenpersonnelworegreyWaffen-SStypeuniformsintheperformanceoftheirduties.DuringWorldWarII,securityforcepersonnelwereseenasperforming“essentialduties”totheReichandthuswereexemptfromconscriptionintomilitaryservice.Manysuch

personnel,however,typicallyjoinedtheWaffen-SSorservedintheWehrmachtmilitaryreserve.SS-LieutenantColonelAdolfEichmann,forinstance,wasanUntersturmführerintheWaffen-SSReservewhileLieutenantColonelHerbertKapplerwasaReserveFeldwebel(Sergeant)intheGermanArmy.AsGermanybeganlosingWorldWarII,thedraftexemptionforsecurityforceswasslowlylifted,althoughduetothenatureoftheNaziregime,therewasaconstantneedforsecuritypersonnelupuntiltheveryendoftheThirdReich.Forthisreason,manyGestapo,SD,andKripomemberswhoservedasreservistsneversawcombatuntiltheverylastdaysofthewar,ifatall.

ConcentrationcamppersonnelAllConcentrationCampstaffswereoriginallypartoftheAllgemeine-SSundertheofficeoftheConcentrationCampsInspectorate(InspektionderKonzentrationslagerorIKL).FirstheadedbyTheodorEicke,theConcentrationCampswereformedintotheTotenkopfverbändeafter1934,butthenincreasinglybecamedividedintothecampserviceproperandthemilitaryTotenkopfformationcontrolledbytheSS-Verfungstruppe(theearlyWaffen-SS).After1942,theentirecampservicewasplacedundertheauthorityoftheWaffen-SSforavarietyofadministrativeandlogisticalreasons.TheultimatecommandauthorityforthecampsystemduringWorldWarIIwastheSS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt(WHVA).

OtherunitsBylate1940theAllgemeine-SSalsocontrolledtheGermanischeSS,whichwerecollaborationistorganizationsmodeledaftertheAllgemeine-SSinseveralWesternEuropeancountries.TheAllgemeine-SSalsoconsistedofafemalevolunteercorps(knownastheSS-Helferinnen)and,inthelastdaysofWorldWarII,hadauthorityovertheso-called“Auxiliary-SS”whichwerenon-SSpersonnelconscriptedintheSStoserveasconcentrationcamppersonnelinthelastmonthsofWorldWarII.

RanksTheranksoftheAllgemeineSSandtheWaffen-SSwerebaseduponthose

oftheSAandusedthesametitles.However,therewasadistinctlyseparatehierarchicalsubdivisionsofthelargerWaffen-SSfromitsAllgemeinecounterpartandanSSmembercouldinfactholdtwoseparateSSranks.Forinstance,aBrigadeführer(“BrigadierGeneral”)oftheAllgemeineSSmightonlyberankedasaRottenführer(“LanceCorporal”)intheWaffenSS.IfthissameSSmemberwereanarchitecturalengineer,thentheSSHAwouldissueathirdrankofSonderführer(“LeadTechnicalSpecialist”).SSmemberscouldalsoholdreservecommissionsintheregularmilitaryaswellasaNaziPartypoliticalrank.AddtothisthatmanyseniorSSmemberswerealsoemployeesoftheFederalgovernmentincapacitiesasministers,deputies,etc.,andanSSmembercouldintheendhaveasmanyasfiveranksinvariousorganizationsaswellasanumberofadditionaltitles.PeroneSShistorian:Multipleandoverlappingcommandswereverycommonplace…AmancouldholdonepostwhiletemporarilyassignedtoanotherandholdrankintheAllgemeine-SS,Waffen-SSandPolizeisimultaneously…I’mthoroughlyconvincedevenBerlinwasnot100%surewhowasincertainpositionsatexactpointsintime,confirmedbyindividualBDCrecords.

-MarkYerger,Allgemeine-SSIn1944,nearlyeverySSgeneralwasgrantedequivalentWaffen-SSrank,withoutregardtopreviousmilitaryservice.ThiswasmainlyorderedsotogiveSS-generalsauthorityovermilitaryunitsandPOWcamps.Also,intheeventofcapturebytheAllies,SS-Generalswouldbegivenstatusasmilitaryprisonersratherthancapturedpoliceofficials.ThisdistinctionwasobservedbyBritishandAmericanforcesintheWest,buthardlyeverevennoticedbytheSovietRedArmy,inparticularinsituationswhereSSandPoliceLeadersorotherSSunitsinvolvedingenocide,wouldfallintoSoviethands.FriedrichJecklen,whowasgrantedWaffen-SSrankin1944,wascapturedbytheRussiansandheldasacriminalwithnostatusgiventohismilitaryrank.

SS-JunkerschuleBadTölzSSJunkerschuleBadTölzwastheofficers’trainingschoolfortheWaffenSS.ItwastheSSequivalentofBritain’sSandhurstandtheUSA’sWestPoint.Theschoolwasestablishedin1937andconstructedbyAloisDegano,inthetownofBadTölzwhichisabout30milessouthofMunichandthelocationwasseeminglychosenbecauseithadbothgoodtransportlinksandwasinaninspiringlocation.Thedesignandconstructionoftheschoolwasintendedtoimpressthestaff,students,visitorsandpassers-by.AsubcampoftheDachauconcentrationcampwaslocatedinthetownofBadTölzwhichprovidedlabourfortheSS-JunkerschuleandtheZentralbauleitung(CentralAdministrationBuilding).TheSchooloperateduntiltheendofWorldWarIIin1945andafterthewartheformerSS-JunkerschulewasthebaseoftheU.S.Army’s1stBattalion,10thSpecialForcesGroupuntil1991In1934,thearmedbranchoftheSchutzstaffel(SS)thenknownastheSSVT,startedtorecruitofficersintoitsranks.TheGermanArmyanditsPrussianheritage,lookedforofficersofgoodbreeding,whohadatleastgraduatedfromsecondaryschool.BycontrasttheSS-VTofferedmenthechancetobecomeanofficernomatterwhateducationtheyhadreceivedortheirsocialstanding.13

In1936HimmlerselectedformerLieutenantGeneralPaulHaussertobeappointedInspectoroftheSS-VTwiththerankofBrigadefuhrer,hesetabouttransformingtheSS-VTintoacreditablemilitaryforcethatwasamatchfortheregulararmyandtransformedtheofficerselectionsystem.Theschoolwasopenedin1936byAdolfHitlerandwouldusetheregulararmytrainingmethodsandusedformerArmyofficersasinstructorstotraintheirpotentialofficerstobecombateffective.Becauseoftheirbackgroundssomeofthecadetsrequiredbasictraininginnonmilitarymatters.Thecadetswereissuedbooksonetiquettethatcontainedinstructionsontablemanners“Cutleryisheldonlyinthefingersandnotwiththewholehand”andeventhecorrectwaytoclosealetter“HeilHitler!yourssincerelyXXXX”.InstructionwasalsogivenonNaziideologyduringlectures,butmostinstructionwasamixtureofathleticsandmilitaryfieldexercises.TheSSsparednoexpenseinbuildingtheSchool,thefacilitiesincludedafootballstadiumsurroundedbyanathleticsrack;buildingdedicatedtoboxing,gymnastics,indoorballgames,aheatedswimmingpoolandasauna.TheinstructorsmatchedthefacilitiesandatonetimeeightofthetwelvecoachesweretheGermanNationalchampionsintheirfields.

SelectionTheofficercandidateshadtomeetstringentrequirementsbeforebeingallowedintotheofficerschools;AllSSofficershadtobeaminimumheightof5foot10inches(5ft11”fortheLeibstandarte)andhadtoserveintherankspriortobeingconsideredforaplaceattheSS-Junkerschule,andhadtoserveforatleastsixmonthstoayearbeforebeingconsidered.Typically,aWaffen-SSmemberreachingtherankofRottenführercouldchooseeithertoembarkonthecareerpathofanSS-non-commissionedofficerorcouldapplytojointheofficercorpsoftheWaffen-SS.Ifchoosingthelatter,hewasrequiredtoobtainawrittenrecommendationfromtheircommanderandundergoaracialandpoliticalscreeningprocesstodetermineeligibilityforcommissionasanSSofficer.14

IfacceptedintotheSSofficerprogram,anSSmemberwouldbeassignedtotheSS-JunkerschuleandwouldbeappointedtotherankofSS-Junkeruponarrival.Situationsdidexist,however,whereSSmemberswouldholdtheirpreviousenlistedrankwhileattheSS-JunkerschuleandonlybeappointedtotherankofSS-Junkerafteraprobationaryperiodhadpassed.ThisofficercandidatesystemwastoensurethatfutureSSofficershadpriorenlistedexperienceandthattherewereno“directappointments”intheWaffen-SSofficercorpsaswasoftenthecaseinotherSSbranchessuchastheGestapoandSicherheitsdienst.bout150Norwegianswere“directlyappointed”totheWaffen-SSofficercorpsonaccountoftheirtraininginNorway’smilitary.TheunderperformancebymanyofthemeventuallycontributedtofrontlineWaffen-SSofficersmandatorytrainingattheJunkerschule,and141otherNorwegiansgraduatedfromthattraining.)

Curriculum

InstructionattheschoolrangedfromtheplayingofwargamesinsandboxestostudyingHitler’sMeinKampf.ManyCadetshadalreadyservedintheHitlerYouthandbroughtupundertheNazipropagandamachine.NaziideologywasanimportantpartofthecurriculumandoneCadetineverythreewaseliminatedfromthefivemonthcourseduringexaminations.Oneofthegoalsoftheschoolwastoproducefightingofficers,andclassesweregiveninassaulttactics,whichbuiltonthemobiletacticsintroducedtotheGermanArmyattheendofWorldWarI.TheSchooladjutantFelixSteinerisreportedtohavesaid:“Werequireasuppleadaptabletypeofsoldier,athleticofbearingandcapableofmorethantheaverageendurance.”ThetimetableoftheSchoolwasasfollows:tactics,terrainandmapreading,combattrainingandweaponstraining,Generalpracticalservice(weaponstechnology,shootingtraining,warexercises),religiouseducation,military,SSandpolice,administration,physicaltraining,weaponsdoctrine,pioneerteaching,currentevents,tanktactics,vehiclemaintenance,sanitaryengineering,AirForcedoctrine.

S.SVerfugungstruppe

TheSSVerfügungstruppe(SS-VT)(English:SSDispositionalTroops)wasformedin1934ascombattroopsfortheNSDAP.By1940thesemilitarySSunitshadbecomethenucleusoftheWaffen-SS.On17August1938AdolfHitlerdecreedthattheSS-VTwasneitherapartofthepolicenortheGermanWehrmacht,butmilitary-trainedmenatthedisposaloftheFührerinwarorpeace.ThemenweretobetrainedinaccordancewiththerulesoftheSSandmannedbyvolunteerswhohadcompletedtheirserviceintheReichsarbeitsdienst(orRAD,ReichLabourService).TheSS-VTwasformedon24September1934fromamergerofvariousNaziandparamilitaryformationssuchastheSSSpecialDetachments(SSSonderkommandos)andtheHeadquartersGuard(SS-Stabswache)units.TheSS-VTwastobemadeupofthreeregimentsmodeledontheinfantryregimentsoftheGermanArmy(Heer)andaccordingtotheirregulations.Eachregimentwouldcontainthreebattalions,amotorcyclecompanyandmortarcompany.TheunitwasofficiallydesignatedSS-Verfügungstruppe(“Dispositionaltroops”,i.e.troopsatthepersonaldisposaloftheFührer).Theformationwastobeplacedatthe“disposal”ofthearmyintimeofwar.TheexistenceoftheSS-Verfügungstruppe(SS-VT)waspubliclydeclaredon16March1935byHitlerinaspeechattheReichstag.TheSS-VTtrainedalongsideHitler’spersonalbodyguardtheLeibstandarteAdolfHitler(LAH),whichafter13April1934,wasknownastheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler(LSSAH).TheLSSAHcontinuedtoserveexclusivelyasapersonalprotectionunitandhonorguardduringthistimeframe.By1937theSSwasdividedintothreebranches:theAllgemeine-SS(GeneralSS),theSS-Verfügungstruppe,andtheSS-Totenkopfverbände(SS-TV)whichadministeredtheconcentrationcamps.ThemilitaryformationsunderHimmler’scommandon1September1939consistedofseveralsubgroups:

Hitler’sbodyguardunittheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerunderObergruppenführerJosef“Sepp”Dietrich.TheInspectorateofVerfügungstruppeunderHausser,whichcommandedtheDeutschland,

GruppenführerPaulGermaniaandDer

Führerregiments.TheConcentrationCampsInspectorate(InspektionderKonzentrationslager)underGruppenführerTheodorEicke,whichfieldedfourmilitarizedDeath’s-HeadStandartencomprisingcampguardsoftheSS-Totenkopfverbände.ThesewouldbeformedintoadivisionaftertheconquestofPoland,andfoldedintotheWaffen-SSinAugust1940.ThesetroopsworetheSS-TVskullandcrossbonesratherthantheSSVT“SS”runes.Therewereinadditioncombat-trainednon-SSpoliceunitsofObergruppenführerKurtDaluege’sOrdnungspolizeiwhichreportedtoHimmlerinhiscapacityasChiefofGermanPolice.Forthe1940campaignsthesealsowouldbeformedintoadivision,whichwouldbeplacedunderWaffen-SScontrolinJanuary1941andmergedintoitinFebruary1942.

EarlyoperationsElementsoftheSS-VTservedwiththeWehrmachtduringtheoccupation

oftheSudetenland,Austria,andCzechoslovakia.Forthoseoperations,theSS-VTwasunderthecommandofthearmy.TheSS-VTalsoformedanArtilleryRegimentduring

thistimeframewhichwasusedtofillthegapsinanumberofarmyunitsforthoseevents.TheSS-VTregimentsDeutschlandandGermaniaalongwiththeLeibstandarteparticipatedintheinvasionofPoland,withDerFührer(recruitedinAustriaaftertheAnschluss)inreserveatPrague.InSeptember1939,acombinedunitofSS-VTandHeer(Army)troopsconductedoperationsasPanzerDivisionKempfduringtheinvasionofPoland.ItfoughtalongsideArmyunitsatRozan,Modlin,ŁomżaandKmiczyn.ThedivisionwasdisbandednearthePolishcityofNidzicaon7October1939.EventsduringtheinvasionofPolandraiseddoubtsoverthecombateffectivenessoftheSS-VT.Theirwillingnesstofightwasneverinanydoubt;attimestheywerealmosttooeagertofight.TheOKWorOberkommandoderWehrmacht(HighCommandoftheArmedForces)reportedthattheSS-VThadunnecessarilyexposedthemselvestorisksandactedrecklessly,incurringheavierlossesthanArmytroops.TheyalsostatedthattheSS-VTwaspoorlytrainedanditsofficersunsuitableforcommand.InitsdefencetheSS-VTinsistedthatithadbeenhamperedbyfightingpiecemealinsteadofasoneformation,andbeingimproperlyequippedtocarryoutwhathadbeenrequiredofit.HeinrichHimmlerinsistedthattheSS-VTshouldbeallowedtofightinitsownformations,underitsowncommanders,whiletheOKWtriedtohavetheSS-VTdisbandedaltogether.Hitlerchoseacompromisepath.HeorderedthattheSS-VTformitsowndivisionsbutthedivisionswouldbeunderarmycommand.

DevelopmentoftheWaffen-SSInthewakeofthePolishInvasion,therewerefourSScombatregiments:

Leibstandarte,Deutschland,GermaniaandDerFührer.ThelatterthreewerereorganizedintotheSS-Verfügungs-Division,andtheLeibstandartewasexpandedintoamotorizedbrigade.Inadditiontherewerethearmedbutill-trainedTotenkopfstandarten;threeofthesetogetherwithSSHeimwehrDanzigwereorganizedintotheTotenkopf-DivisionunderEicke’scommand.Afurtherdivision,thePolizei-Division,wascreatedfromtheOrdnungspolizei.TheseformationstookpartinOperationFallGelbagainsttheLowCountriesandFrancein1940.TheSS-VTtroopsfirstsawactioninthemaindrivefortheDutchcentralfrontaroundRotterdam.Afterthecityhadbeencaptured,theDivision,alongwithotherdivisions,interceptedaFrenchforceandforcedthembacktotheareaofZeelandandAntwerp.Theywerenextusedtomop-upsmallpocketsofresistanceintheareasalreadycapturedbytheGermanadvance.TheSS-VTwasrenamedthe“Waffen-SS”inaspeechmadebyAdolfHitlerinJuly1940;on1AugustHimmlerestablishedtheKommandoamtderWaffen-SS(Waffen-SSCommandOffice)withinthenewSS-Führungshauptamt(FHA)underGruppenführerHansJüttner.TheTotenkopfDivisionandotherSS-TVcombatunitsweretransferredtoFHAcontrol.InDecember1940theGermaniaRegimentwouldberemovedfromtheVerfügungs-Divisionandusedtoformthecadreofanewdivision,SS-DivisionGermania,comprisingmostly“Nordic”volunteersfromthenewlyconqueredterritories,Danes,Norwegians,DutchandFlemings;itwassoonrenamedWiking.Atthestartof1941theVerfügungs-Divisionwouldberedubbed“Reich”(in1942“DasReich“),andthePolizeidivisionbroughtunderWaffen-SSadministration.TheLeibstandartewouldbeexpandedtoadivisionforOperationBarbarossa.WhentheWaffen-SSdivisionswereassignednumbersmuchlaterinthewarthesefirst

formations,Leibstandarte,DasReich,Totenkopf,PolizeiandWikingwouldberecognizedasSSdivisions1through5.

SS-TotenkopfverbändeSS-Totenkopfverbände(SS-TV),renderedinEnglishas“Death’s-HeadUnits,”wastheSSorganizationresponsibleforadministeringtheNaziconcentrationcampsfortheThirdReich.TheSS-TVwasanindependentunitwithintheSSwithitsownranksandcommandstructure.ItranthecampsthroughoutGermany,suchasDachau,Bergen-BelsenandBuchenwald;inNazi-occupiedEurope,itranAuschwitzinGermanoccupiedPolandandMauthauseninAustriaaswellasnumerousotherconcentrationanddeathcamps.Thedeathcamps’primaryfunctionwasgenocideandincludedTreblinka,BełżecexterminationcampandSobibor.ItwasresponsibleforfacilitatingwhatwascalledtheFinalSolution,knownsinceastheHolocaust,incollaborationwiththeReichMainSecurityOfficeandtheSSEconomicandAdministrativeMainOfficeorWVHA.AttheoutbreakofWWIIoneofthefirstcombatunitsoftheWaffen-SS,theSSDivisionTotenkopf,wasformedfromSS-TVpersonnel.Itsoondevelopedareputationforferocityandfanaticism,participatinginseveralwarcrimessuchastheLeParadismassacrein1940duringtheFallofFranceandthemurderofRussianciviliansinOperationBarbarossa.WhiletheTotenkopf(English:Death’sHead)wastheuniversalcapbadgeoftheSS,theSS-TValsoworetheinsigniaontherightcollartodistinguishitselffromotherSSunits.

FormationOn26June1933,Reichsführer-SSHeinrichHimmlerappointedSS

OberführerTheodorEicketheKommandantofthefirstNaziconcentrationcampatDachau.15EickerequestedapermanentunitthatwouldbesubordinateonlytohimandHimmlergrantedtherequest;theSS-Wachverband(GuardUnit)wasformed.Promotedon30January1934toSSBrigadeführer(equivalenttoMajor-generalintheArmy),EickeascommanderofDachaubegannewreforms.HereorganizedtheSScamp,establishingnewguardingprovisions,whichincludedblindobediencetoorders,andtighteningdisciplinaryandpunishmentregulationsfordetainees,whichwereadoptedbyallconcentrationcampsoftheThirdReichon1January1934.FollowingtheNightoftheLongKnives(attheendJune1934),Eicke,whohadplayedamajorroleintheaffair,wasagainpromotedtotherankofSS-GruppenführerandappointedInspectorofConcentrationCampsandCommanderofSSguardformations.PersonnelfromDachauthenwentontoworkatSachsenhausenandOranienburg,whereEickeestablishedhiscentraloffice.In1935Dachaubecamethetrainingcenterfortheconcentrationcampsservice.ManyoftheearlyrecruitscamefromtheranksoftheSAandAllgemeineSS.SeniorroleswerefilledbypersonnelfromtheGermanpoliceservice.On29March1936,concentrationcampguardsandadministrationunitswereofficiallydesignatedastheSS-Totenkopfverbände.ByApril1938,theSS-TVhadfourregimentsofthreestormbattalionswiththreeinfantrycompanies,onemachineguncompanyandmedical,communicationandtransportationunits.

DevelopmentWhentheSS-Totenkopfverbände(SS-TV)wasformallyestablishedin

1936,thegroupwasorganizedintosixWachtruppensituatedateachofGermany’smajorconcentrationcamps.TheodorEicke,atthisstage,wastechnicallyonlythecommanderoftheDachauconcentrationcamp(needcitation),althoughitwaswithoutquestionthathewastheeffectiveheadoftheentireSS-TV.In1935,astheconcentrationcampsystemwithinGermanyexpanded,groupsofcampswereorganizedintoWachsturmbanne(battalions)undertheofficeoftheInspectorofConcentrationCampswhoanswereddirectlytotheSSheadquartersofficeandHeinrichHimmler.In1937,theWachsturmbannewereinturnorganizedintothreemainSS-Totenkopfstandarten(regiments).By1936,EickehadalsobeguntoestablishmilitaryformationsofconcentrationcamppersonnelwhicheventuallybecametheTotenkopfDivisionandotherunitsoftheWaffen-SS.Intheearlydaysofthemilitarycampserviceformation,thegroup’sexactchainofcommandwascontestedsinceEickeasFührerderTotenkopfverbändeexercisedpersonalcontrolofthegroupbutalso,beingamilitarySSformation,authorityoverthearmedunitswasclaimedbytheSS-Verfügungstruppe(whowouldgetitinAugust1940).ButatthistimeEickeandHimmlerenvisionedthearmedSSTVnotascombatsoldiers,butastroopsforcarryingoutwhatwereeuphemisticallydescribedas“policeandsecurityoperations”behindthefrontlines.ThusEicke’smenweretrainedbyacadreofcamppersonnelwithoutoutsideintervention;thefirstmajortrainingexercisein1935resultedintheclearingoftheentireDachaucampforseveralweekswhiletheTotenkopfmilitaryformationwasorganized.On17August1938Hitlerdecreed,atHimmler’srequest,theSS-TVtobethereservefortheSS-Verfügungstruppe;thiswouldoverthecourseofthewarleadtoaconstantfluxof

menbetweentheWaffen-SSandtheconcentrationcamps.Himmler’sintention,however,wassimplytoexpandhisprivatearmybyusingtheSS-TV(aswellasthepolice,whichhealsocontrolled)asamanpowerpool.Himmlersoughtandobtainedafurtherdecree,issuedon18May1939,whichauthorizedtheexpansionoftheSS-TVto50,000men,anddirectedtheArmytoprovideitwithmilitaryequipment,somethingtheArmyhadresisted.Bytheoutbreakofwaron1September1939Eicke’sSS-TVfieldforcesnumberedfourinfantryregimentsandacavalryregiment,plustwobattalionsclandestinelyplacedinindependentDanzig.However,theirroleintheinvasionofPolandwasnotmilitary;unliketheLeibstandarteandtheSS-VTtheywerenotunderArmyHighCommand(OKH)control,butHimmler’s.“TheirmilitarycapabilitieswereemployedinsteadinterrorizingthecivilianpopulationthroughactsthatincludedhuntingdownstragglingPolishsoldiers,confiscatingagriculturalproduceandlivestock,andtorturingandmurderinglargenumbersofPolishpoliticalleaders,aristocrats,businessmen,priests,intellectuals,andJews.”ThebehavioroftheseStandarteninPolandeliciteddisgustandprotestsfromofficersoftheArmy,including8thArmycommanderJohannesBlaskowitzwhowrotealengthymemorandumtovonBrauchitschdetailingSS-TVatrocities(tonoavail).InthewakeofthePolishconquestthethreeseniorTotenkopf-StandartenwerecombinedwiththeSSHeimwehrDanzigandsomesupportunitstransferredfromtheArmytocreatetheTotenkopf-Division,withEickeincommand.Fromfall1939tospring1940amassiverecruitmenteffortraisednofewerthantwelvenewTK-Standarten(fourtimesthesizeoftheSS-VT)inanticipationofthecomingattackonFrance.Bynow,however,Eicke’sambitionhadarousedHimmler’ssuspicion,andHausser’sandDietrich’sresentment,especiallyhisdesignationofTK-StandartenasreservesforhisTotenkopf-Divisionalone,andhisappropriationofVerfügungstruppemilitarysupplieswhichwerestoredatEicke’sconcentrationcamps.AftertheTK-Division,andEickepersonally,performedpoorlyduringFallGelbHimmlerresolvedtocurbhissubordinate.Cynicallyusingasjustificationseveralwell-publicizedatrocitiescommittedbytheDivisioninFrance,on15August1940hedissolvedEicke’sInspectorateofSS-TotenkopfstandartenandtransferredtheTotenkopf-Division,theindependentTK-Standarten,andtheirreserveandreplacementsystemtothenewlyformedWaffen-SShighcommand.InFebruary1941theTotenkopfdesignationwasremovedfromthenamesofallunitsotherthantheTK-DivisionandthecampTotenkopfwachsturmbanne,andtheirpersonnelexchangedtheDeath’s-HeadcollarinsigniafortheWaffen-SSSig-runes.ThecampsystemexpandedgreatlyaftertheinvasionoftheSovietUnionin1941,whenlargenumbersofRussiansoldierswerecaptured.Someweretransferredtothecamps,wheretheirinhumanetreatmentbecamenormal.TheTotenkopfDivisionstillhadclosetiestothecampserviceanditsmemberscontinuedtoweartheDeath’s-Headastheirunitinsignia.Theywereknownforbrutaltactics,aresultoftheoriginaldoctrineof“nopity”whichEickehadinstilledinhiscamppersonnelasfarbackas1934,togetherwiththefactthattheoriginalTotenkopfstandartehad“trained”themselves.TheDivision’sineffectivenessinFrance,aswellasitswarcrimes,caninpartbeexplainedbyitspersonnelwhoweremorethugsthansoldiers.However,overthecourseofthesavagefightingintheEast(duringwhichtheDivisionwastwiceeffectivelydestroyedandrecreated),theTotenkopfbecameoneofthecrackcombatunitsoftheGermanmilitary.Veryfewofthemenwhowerepartofthe1939StandarteninPolandwerestillintheDivisionby1945.16

Camporganization

In1941,theconcentrationcampsthemselveswerepartofamassivesystembothinGermanyandtheoccupiedterritories.Bythistime,specialdeathcampshadalsocomeintooperationwhileanextensivelaborcampsystemwasprovidingforcedlabortotheSS.Asaresult,theentireconcentrationcampsystemwasplacedundertheauthorityoftheSS-WirtschaftsVerwaltungshauptamt(WVHA)withtheInspectorofConcentrationCampsnowasubordinatetotheChiefoftheWVHA.ThecampsthemselveswerethenadministrativelyseparatedintothreemaindivisionsofLaborCamps,ConcentrationCamps,andDeathCamps.Asafinalmeasure,in1942allcamppersonnelwerefoldedintotheWaffen-SStoallowforeasierrotationofwoundedWaffen-SSpersonnelintocamppositionsandforcamppersonneltobeeasilytransferredintocombatunitsshouldtheneedarise.ThislastmeasurewasfrequentlyusedforSSpersonnelwhoweredeemed“toosoft”fordutyinaconcentrationcamporforthosewhoshowedcompassiontoprisonersorrefusedtoobeyillegalorderssuchasthegassingofprisonersortheshootingofwomenandchildren.ThispolicyofquicktransferintoacombatunitwasalargeincentiveforSSpersonneltoparticipateinatrocities,asthealternativecouldbefrontlineserviceontheEasternFront.Onthereverse,theSSproceduresforcamppersonnelwhorefusedtoengageinwarcrimesprovedthattherewereneveranycaseswhereSSsoldierswereunderthreatofdeathunlesstheycarriedoutatrocities(acommondefenseclaimofcapturedSSpersonnelattheendofthewar).AtthetrialofTreblinkacamppersonnel,itwasinfactproventhattherehadneverbeenasinglecaseintheSSwheresomeonewaskilledforrefusingtocarryoutanillegalorderandthatsuchpersonsweresimplytransferredintocombatwiththeWaffen-SS.Withinthecampsthemselves,thereexistedahierarchyofcamptitlesandpositionswhichwereuniqueonlytothecampservice.EachcampwascommandedbyaKommandant,sometimesreferredtoasLagerkommandant,whowasassistedbyacampadjutantandcommandstaff.Theprisonbarrackswithinthecampweresupervisedbya

Rapportführerwhowasresponsiblefordailyrollcallandthecampdailyschedule.TheindividualprisonerbarrackswereoverseenbyjuniorSS-NCOscalledBlockführerwho,inturnhadonetotwosquadsofSSsoldiersresponsibleforoverseeingtheprisoners.Withinexterminationcamps,theBlockführerwasinchargeoftheSonderkommandoandwasalsothepersonwhowouldphysicallygasvictimsinthecampgaschambers.ThecampperimeterandwatchtowerswereoverseenbyaseparateformationcalledtheGuardBattalion,ortheWachbattalion.Theguardbattalioncommanderwasresponsibleforprovidingwatchbillstomanguardtowersandoversawsecuritypatrolsoutsidethecamp.Thebattalionwasorganizedontypicalmilitarylineswithcompanies,platoons,andsquads.Thebattalioncommanderwassubordinatedirectlytothecampcommander.Concentrationcampsalsohadsupplyandmedicalpersonnel,attachedtotheheadquartersofficeunderthecampcommander,aswellasasecurityofficewithGestapoandSicherheitsdienst(SD)personnelattachedtemporarilytothecamp.Thesesecuritypersonnel,whileansweringtothecampcommander,werealsounderdirectcommandofSicherheitspolizei(SiPo)andRSHAcommandersindependentofthecamps.Asaresult,SDandGestapopersonnelwithintheconcentrationcampswereseenas“outsiders”bythefull-timecamppersonnelandfrequentlylookeddownuponwithdistrustbytheregularSS-TVmembers.InadditiontotheregularSSpersonnelassignedtotheConcentrationCamp,therealsoexistedaprisonersystemoftrusteesknownasKaposwhoperformedawidevarietyofdutiesfromadministrationtooverseeingothergroupsofprisoners.TheSonderkommandowerespecialgroupsofJewishprisonerwhoassistedintheexterminationcampswiththedisposalofbodiesandothertasks.Thedutyofactuallygassingprisonerswas,however,alwayscarriedoutbytheSS.

OperationsEicke,inhisroleasthecommanderoftheSS-TV,continuedtoreorganizethecampsystembydismantlingsmallercamps.ByAugust1937onlyDachau,Sachsenhausen,BuchenwaldandRavensbrückremainedinGermany.In1938EickeoversawthebuildingofnewcampsinAustriafollowingtheAnschluss,suchasMauthausen.Eicke’sreorganizationandtheintroductionofforcedlabormadethecampsoneoftheSS’smostpowerfultools,butitearnedhimtheenmityofRSHAdirector,ReinhardHeydrich,whowasattemptingtotakeovercontrolofDachau.However,HimmlerwantedtokeepaseparationofpowersoEickeremainedincommandoftheSS-TVandcampoperations.ThiskeptcontrolofthecampsoutofthehandsoftheGestapoortheSD.InSeptember1939,EickebecamethecommanderoftheSSTotenkopfDivision.In1940,theConcentrationCampsInspectoratebecamepartoftheAmtDoftheWirtschafts-undVerwaltungshauptamtunderSSObergruppenführerOswaldPohl.EickewasreplacedbyhisHeadofStaff,SSGruppenführerRichardGlückswhocontinuedtomanagethecampadministrationuntiltheendofthewar.17

In1942GlückswasincreasinglyinvolvedintheadministrationoftheEndlösung,supplyingpersonneltoassistinAktionReinhardt(althoughthedeathcampsofBelzec,TreblinkaandSobiborwereadministeredbySS-undPolizei-führerOdiloGlobocnikoftheGeneralGovernment).InJuly1942,GlücksmetHimmlertodiscussmedicalexperimentsonconcentrationcampinmates.AllexterminationorderswereissuedfromGlücks’officetoSS-TVcommandsthroughoutNaziGermanyandoccupiedEurope.HespecificallyauthorizedthepurchaseofZyklonBforuseatAuschwitz.ButasthetideofwarchangedinEurope,conditionsbecameincreasinglyharshforsurvivingcampinmates.In1945SS-TVunitsbegantoreceiveorderstoconcealasmuchoftheevidenceofTheHolocaustaspossible.Campsweredestroyed,sickprisonerswereshotandothersweremarchedondeathmarchesawayfromtheadvancingAllies.TheSS-TVwerealsoinstrumentalintheexecutionofhundredsofpoliticalprisonerstopreventtheirliberation.18

ByApril1945manySS-TVhadlefttheirposts.Duetotheirnotoriety,someremovedtheirdeathheadinsigniatohidetheiridentities.Campdutieswereincreasinglyturnedovertoso-called“Auxiliary-SS”,soldiersandciviliansconscriptedascampguardssothattheTotenkopfmencouldescape.However,manywerecaughtbyAlliedwarcrimeinvestigatorsandtriedatNurembergbetween1946and1949.

SSKZpersonnel.Fromitsinception,Eickefosteredanattitudeof“inflexibleharshness”in

theSS-TV.ThiscorebeliefcontinuedtoinfluenceguardsinallconcentrationcampsevenafterEickehadtakenovercommandoftheSSTotenkopfDivision.RecruitsweretaughttohatetheirenemiesthroughtoughtrainingregimesandNaziindoctrination.SS-TVpersonnellostanycompassionforcampinmates.Withincamps,guardscreatedanatmosphereofcontrolled,disciplinedcrueltythatsubjugatedprisoners.ThisbrutalethosinfluencedsomeoftheSS-TV’smostinfamousmembersincludingRudolfHöß,FranzZiereis,KarlOttoKoch,MaxKögelandAmonGoeth.InthelastdaysofWorldWarII,aspecialgroupcalledthe“Auxiliary-SS”(SS-Mannschaft)wasformedasalast-ditchefforttokeepconcentrationcampsrunningandallowregularSSpersonneltoescape.Auxiliary-SSmemberswerenotconsideredregularSSpersonnel,butwereconscriptedmembersfromotherbranchesoftheGermanmilitary,theNaziParty,andtheVolkssturm.Suchpersonnelworeadistinctivetwinswastikacollar

patchandservedascampguardandadministrativepersonneluntilthesurrenderofGermany.

Combatformations1stTK-StandarteOberbayern.Formed1937atDachau.DuringthePol

ishinvasionconducted“securityoperations”behindthelines.Redesignated1.SS-Totenkopf-Infanterie-RegimentandassignedtotheTotenkopfDivision10/39.2ndTK-StandarteBrandenburg.Formed1937atOranienburg.DuringthePolishinvasionconducted“securityoperations”behindthelines.Redesignated2.SS-Totenkopf-Infanterie-RegimentandassignedtotheTotenkopfDivision10/39.3rdTK-StandarteThüringen.Formed1937atBuchenwald.DuringthePolishinvasionconducted“securityoperations”behindthelines.Redesignated3.SS-Totenkopf-Infanterie-RegimentandassignedtotheTotenkopfDivision,withsomemenformingthecadreofthe10.TK-Standarte,11/39.4thTK-StandarteOstmark.Formed1938atViennaandBerlin.IIISturmbannGötzedetachedtoformthecoreofSSHeimwehrDanzig7/39.GarrisondutyatPrague10/39andinHolland6/40.Designated4.SS-Infanterie-Regiment2/41,assignedto2.SS-Infanterie-Brigade5/41.SS-WachsturmbannEimann.Formed1939atDanzig.DuringthePolishinvasionconducted“securityoperations”behindthelines.Dissolved1940.TK-Reiter-Standarte.Formed9/39inPolandtoconduct“securityoperations”behindthelines.Expandedanddividedinto1.and2.TK-ReiterStandarten5/40.Redesignated1.and2.SS-Kavallerie-Regimenter2/41,combinedintoSS-Kavallerie-Brigade(laterSS-Kavallerie-DivisionFlorianGeyer)9/41.5thTK-StandarteDietrichEckart.Formed1939atBerlinandOranienburg.Designated5.SS-Infanterie-Regiment2/41,assignedto2.SS-Infanterie-Brigade5/41.6thTK-Standarte.Formed1939atPrague.GarrisondutyinNorway5/40.Designated6.SS-Infanterie-Regiment2/41,assignedtoKampfgruppeNord(later6.SS-Gebirgs-DivisionNord)spring41.7thTK-Standarte.Formed1939atBrno.GarrisondutyinNorway5/40.Designated7.SS-Infanterie-Regiment2/41,assignedtoKampfgruppeNord(later6.SS-Gebirgs-DivisionNord)spring41.8thTK-Standarte.Formed1939atCrakow.Designated8.SS-Infanterie-Regiment2/41,assignedto1.SS-Infanterie-Brigade4/41.9thTK-Standarte.Formed1939atDanzig.Reorganized(withelementsofSt.12)intoStandarte“K”(Kirkenes,Norway)8-11/40,redesignated9.SS-Infanterie-Regiment2/41,assignedtoKampfgruppeNordspring41.IncorporatedintoSS-RegimentThule8/42.10thTK-Standarte.Formed1939atBuchenwald.GarrisondutiesinPoland1940.Designated10.SS-Infanterie-Regiment2/41,assignedto1.SS-Infanterie-Brigade4/41.11thTK-Standarte.Formed1939atRadom.GarrisondutyinHolland5/40.AssignedtoSS-Infanterie-Division(mot)Reichtoreplacethe2.SS-Infanterie-RegimentGermania12/40andredesignated11.SS-Infanterie-Regiment.TK-Standarten12-16wereraisedinthewinterof1939-40,butdisbandedthefollowingsummer,theirpersonnelusedtofilloutotherunits.

WaffenS.STheWaffen-SS(ArmedSS)wascreatedasthearmedwingoftheNazi

Party’sSchutzstaffel(“ProtectiveSquadron”),andgraduallydevelopedintoamulti-ethnicandmulti-nationalmilitaryforceofNaziGermany.TheWaffen-SSgrewfromthreeregimentstoover38divisionsduringWorldWarII,andservedalongsidetheHeer(regulararmy)butwasneverformallypartofit.AdolfHitlerresistedintegratingtheWaffen-SSintothearmy,asitwastoremainthearmedwingofthePartyandtobecomeanelitepoliceforceoncethewarwaswon.PriortothewaritwasunderthecontroloftheSSFührungshauptamt(SSoperationalcommandoffice)beneathReichsführer-SSHeinrichHimmler.UponmobilizationitstacticalcontrolwasgiventotheHighCommandoftheArmedForces(OberkommandoderWehrmacht).InitiallymembershipwasonlyopentopeopleofGermanic“Aryan”origin,whoweresaidtobetheHerrenvolk(masterrace),accordingtoNaziracialideology.Theruleswerepartiallyrelaxedin1940,althoughJewsremainedbanned.Hitlerauthorizedtheformationofunitscomposedlargelyorsolelyofforeignvolunteersandconscripts.Bytheendofthewar,non-Germansmadeupapproximately60percentoftheWaffen-SS.Atthepost-warNurembergTrialstheWaffen-SSwascondemnedasacriminalorganizationduetoitsessentialconnectiontotheNaziPartyandinvolvementinnumerouswarcrimes.Waffen-SSveteransweredeniedmanyoftherightsaffordedtoveteranswhohadservedintheHeer(army),Luftwaffe(airforce),orKriegsmarine(navy).AnexceptionwasmadeforWaffen-SSconscriptssworninafter1943,whowereexemptedbecauseoftheirinvoluntaryservitude.

Origins(1929–1939)TheoriginsoftheWaffen-SScanbetracedbacktotheselectionofagroupof120SSmeninMarch1933byJosef“Sepp”DietrichtoformtheSonderkommandoBerlin.ByNovember1933theformationwas800menstrong,andataremembranceceremonyinMunichforthetenthanniversaryofthefailedMunichPutschtheregimentsworeallegiancetoHitler.TheoathspledgedwerePledgingloyaltytohimaloneandObedienceuntodeath.TheformationwasgiventhetitleLeibstandarte(BodyguardRegiment)AdolfHitler(LAH).On13April1934,byorderofHimmler,theregimentbecameknownastheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler(LSSAH).TheLeibstandartedemonstratedtheirloyaltyinJune1934duringtheNightoftheLongKnives,thepurgeoftheSturmabteilung(SA).TheSAhadovertwomillionmembersattheendof1933.LedbyoneofHitler’soldestcomrades,ErnstRöhm,theSArepresentedathreattoHitler’srelationshipwiththeGermanArmyandthreatenedtosourhisrelationswiththeconservativesofthecountry,peoplewhosesupportHitlerneededtosolidifyhispositionintheGermangovernment.HitlerdecidedtoactagainsttheSA.TheSSwasputinchargeofeliminatingRöhmandtheotherhigh-rankingofficersoftheSA.TheNightoftheLongKnivesbetween30Juneand2July1934sawthekillingofapproximately82SAmen,includingalmostitsentireleadership,effectivelyendingthepoweroftheSA.ThisactionwaslargelycarriedoutbytheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler.InSeptember1934,AdolfHitlerauthorizedtheformationofthemilitarywingoftheNaziPartyandapprovedtheformationoftheSS-Verfügungstruppe(SS-VT),aspecialservicetroopunderHitler’scommand.TheSS-VThadtodependontheGermanArmyforitssupplyofweaponsandmilitarytrainingandtheyhadcontroloftherecruitingsystem,throughlocaldraftboardsresponsibleforassigningconscriptstothedifferentbranchesoftheWehrmacht,tomeetquotassetbytheGermanHighCommand(OberkommandoderWehrmachtorOKWinGerman).TheSSwasgiventhelowestpriorityforrecruits.

Evenwiththedifficultiespresentedbythequotasystem,HeinrichHimmlerformedtwonewSSregiments,theSSGermaniaandSSDeutschland,whichtogetherwiththeLeibstandarteandacommunicationsunitmadeuptheSS-VT.AtthesametimeHimmlerestablishedtheSS-JunkerschuleBadTölzandSS-JunkerschuleBraunschweigfortrainingofficerstoleadthenewregiments.BothschoolsusedtheregulararmytrainingmethodsandusedformerArmyofficerstotrainpotentialofficers.Theofficercandidateshadtomeetstringentrequirementsbeforebeingallowedentrytotheschools:allSSofficershadtobeaminimumheightof180cm(about5foot11inches)fortheLeibstandarteandtheyalsohadtohaveservedsometimeintheranks.MembersoftheSScouldbeofanyreligion,butatheistsandJewswerenotallowed.In1937,HimmlerwroteinalettertoapastorthatanSSman’sreligiousdenominationwashisownpersonalchoice.Himmlerwrote,“Atheismistheonlyworld-vieworreligiousviewthatisnottoleratedwithintheSS.”HimmlerresentedthefactthatChristianityortheChristianchurchescouldforbidSSmenfromhavinganyleadershiproleinthechurch.In1936,HimmlerselectedformerLieutenantGeneralPaulHaussertobeInspectoroftheSS-VTwiththerankofBrigadefuhrer.HaussertransformedtheSS-VTintoacrediblemilitaryforcethatwasamatchfortheregulararmy.On17August1938,HitlerdeclaredthattheSS-VTwouldhavearoleindomesticaswellasforeignaffairs,whichtransformedthisgrowingarmedforceintotherivalthatthearmyhadfeared.HedecreedthatserviceintheSS-VTqualifiedtofulfilmilitaryserviceobligations,althoughserviceintheSS-TotenkopfverbändeorSS-TVwouldnot.SomeunitsoftheSS-TVwould,inthecaseofwar,beusedareservesfortheSS-VT,whichdidnothaveitsownreserves.Forallitstraining,theSS-VTwasuntestedinacombatsituation.Thischangedin1938,whentwoopportunitiesarosewiththeAnschlussofAustriainMarchandtheoccupationoftheSudetenlandinOctober.AbattalionoftheLeibstandartewaschosentoaccompanytheArmytroopsinoccupyingAustria,andthethreeregimentsoftheSS-VTparticipatedintheoccupationoftheSudetenland.Inbothactionsnoresistancewasmet.

Obergruppenfûhrer

WasaNaziPartyparamilitaryrankthatwasfirstcreatedin1932asarankoftheSA.Until1942,itwasthehighestSSrankinferioronlytoReichsführer-SS(HeinrichHimmler).Translatedas“seniorgroupleader”,therankofSAObergruppenführerwasheldbymembersoftheObersteSAFührung(SupremeSACommand)andalsobyveterancommandersofcertainSA-Gruppen(SAgroups).TherankofObergruppenführerwasconsideredseniortoGruppenführer.AsanSSrank,ObergruppenführerwascreatedduetothegrowthandexpansionoftheSSunderHeinrichHimmler.HimmlerwasoneofthefirstSSofficersappointedtotherankofSS-Obergruppenführer,andheldtherankwhilesimultaneouslyservingastheReichsführer-SS.AtthetimeHimmlerheldtherankofObergruppenführer,Reichsführerwassimplyatitleandnotyetanactualrank.IntheearlydaysoftheSS,therankofObergruppenführerwasoccasionallyusedtomaketwoSSleadersequalinseniority,soastopreventapowerstrugglewithintheNaziParty.SuchwasthecasewithKurtDaluege,whocommandedmostoftheSSintheBerlinregionbetween1930and1934.ToavoidhavingtheSSsplitintotwoseparateentities,onebasedinNorthernGermanyandtheotherinBavaria,AdolfHitlerpromotedDaluegeto

thenewrankofObergruppenführermakinghimequalinranktoHimmler.AftertheNightoftheLongKnives,theSSandtheSAbecametwoseparateorganizations.TheSAcontinuedtousetherankofObergruppenführer,butthetitlegainedpredominancemainlyintheSS.WiththeNaziPartyinpower,andtheSSastateagencyofGermany,SS-ObergruppenführerwasconsideredthehighestrankoftheAllgemeineSS(equivalenttolieutenantgeneralonUSandUKcharts)withtheexceptionofHimmler’sspecialrankofReichsführer-SS.However,withintheWaffen-SS,therankofSSGruppenführerwasequivalenttoaGeneralleutnantandaSS-ObergruppenführercametobeconsideredtheequivalentofaGeneral;holdersweretitledinfullSS-ObergruppenführerundGeneralderWaffen-SS.Ninety-eightmenweretoholdSS-Obergruppenführerrank,21ofwhomservedintheWaffen-SS.TherankwouldremainthehighestSSgeneralofficerrankuntilApril1942,whentherankofSS-Oberst-Gruppenführerwascreated.TherankofObergruppenführerwasheldbysomeofthemostnotoriousfiguresintheSS,withReinhardHeydrichandErnstKaltenbrunnerbothbearingtherank.KarlWolffwasanotherholderoftherankwhowascapturedalivebytheAlliesafterthecloseofSecondWorldWar.SS-ObergruppenführerwasalsothestandardrankforSSandPoliceLeadersaswellascorpscommandersoftheWaffen-SS

WaffenSSTheWaffen-SS,aswiththeHeer,possessedagreatvarietyofdivisional

structures.Thecomplexitiesofthisvarietywerefurthercomplicatedbyamoreorlesscontinuousevolutionofauthorizeddivisionstructuresthroughoutthewar.Forexample,thefirstWaffen-SSdivisionswereorganizedasmotorizedinfantryones,withlittlearmor.Fouroftheearliestdivisions(SS-LAH,SS-DasReich,SS-Totenkopf,andSS-Wiking’]werethenreformedasPanzer(armored)-divisions,andthreenew-armoreddivisionsjoinedthem(SS-Hohenstaufen,&S-Frundsberg,andSS-Hitlerjugend).FouradditionaldivisionswereraisedasPanzer-Grenadier(armoredinfantry)(SS-Nordland,SS-Reichsführer-SS,SSGotzvonBerlichingen,andSS-HorstWessel).19

ThemotorizedSS-CombatGroupNordevolvedintoSS-Nord,whichsetthestandardfortheestablishmentofanSSmountaindivision.ThiswasusedastheintendedstructureforSS-PrinzEugen,SS-Handschar,SSSkanderbeg,andSS-Kama,thoughthelasttwodidn’tcompleteformation.Similarly,theSS-CavalryBrigadedevelopedintoSS-FlorianGeyer,whichhadastructurecopiedforSS-MariaTheresia(thoughnotforSS-Liitzow,whichhadastructuresimilartoaninfantrydivision).TheSSinfantrydivisions,inparticularthe14th,15th,19th,and20thWajffew-GrenadierDivisionsandthe31stSSVolunteerGrenadierDivision,usedastandardHeerinfantrydivisionstructure,firstfoundinthe1940versionofSS-Polizei(whichbythespringof1944hadreformedintoaPanzer-GrenadierdivisionofthesamestructureasSS-

Nordland).Thiswasalsotheintendedmodelforthe25thand26thWaffenGrenadierDivisions,the27th,28th,and32dSSVolunteerGrenadierDivisions,andthe35thSS-Polizei-GrenadierDivision,noneofwhichcompletedtheirformation,thoughtheydidtakethefieldinasemblanceofwhatwasintended.TheremainingdivisionsoftheWaffen-SSwereessentiallyenlargedbrigadesorcombatgroups,andhaduniquestructures,especiallyastheyoftenfoughtinseveralseparateparts.Thissoundslike,andis,acomplexsubject.ThefollowingrepresentstheidealizedstructureofWaffen-SSearlywarmotorized,Panzer,Panzer-Grenadier,mountain,cavalry,andinfantrydivisions.Eachdivisionusuallydifferedslightlyinonewayoranother,andthedivisionallistinthisbookisthebestwaytotraceeachindividualWaffen-SSdivision.Onlythemajorcombatelementsareincluded;thesupplyregiment,forexample,isnotlistedindetail.Unitsthatarenotdescribedas“motorized”or“armored”canbeassumedtobehorse-drawnordismounted,asappropriate.In1940-41,thefewWaffen-SSdivisionsthatexistedwereorganizedasmotorizedinfantrydivisions.Thesedivisionsconsistedofthefollowingsubunits.Threemotorizedinfantryregiments,eachofthreeinfantrybattalions.Theseregimentsalsohadseparatecompaniesofcombatengineers,antitankguns,heavyinfantryguns(short-rangehowitzers),andmotorcyclereconnaissance.Onemotorizedartilleryregimentoffourbattalions,withtwolighthowitzerbattalions,oneheavyhowitzerbattalion,andonemixedhowitzerandfieldgunbattalion.Onemotorizedreconnaissancebattalion,includingonecompanyofarmoredcars,threeofmotorizedinfantry,andoneofheavyweapons.Onemotorcycleinfantrybattalion.Onemotorizedanti-tankbattalionwiththreebatteriesoftowedantitankguns.Onemotorizedanti-aircraftbattalion,withthreebatteriesof88mmpieces,twobatteriesof37mm,andonebatteryof20mm.Onemotorizedcombatengineerbattalion.Onemotorizedsignalbattalion.Onebatteryofassaultguns.

PanzerDivisionsPanzerdivisionshadtwoinfantryregiments,onemotorizedandonearmored.Eachregimenthadthreebattalions,andoneofthethreebattalionsinthearmoredinfantryregimentwasmountedaboardarmoredhalftracks.

Allfiveremaininginfantrybattalionsweremotorized.Eachregimenthadseparatecompaniesofcombatengineers,heavyinfantryguns,lightantiaircraftguns,andmotorcyclereconnaissance.Theheavyinfantrygunsinthearmoredregimentwereself-propelled.Oneregimentoftanks,withonebattalionofPanzerIVsandonebattalionofPanzerV“Panthers.”Eachbattalionhadfourcompaniesoftanks,eachwithfourplatoons(althoughlaterinthewar,thetankcompaniesofSSLAHandSS-Hitlerjugendwereauthorizedfiveplatoons).Theregimentincludedseparatecompaniesofmotorizedcombat,engineersandarmoredanti-aircraftguns.Oneregimentofartillery,withonelighthowitzerbattalion,oneheavyhowitzerbattalion,onemixedbattalionwithlightcannonandmulti-barrelrocketlaunchers,andonearmoredbattalionwithtwobatteriesofWespe(self-propelled105mmhowitzers)andonebatteryofHummel(self-propelled150mmhowitzers).Onearmoredreconnaissancebattalion,withonecompanyofarmoredcars,threeinfantrycompaniesmountedonarmoredhalftracks,andoneheavyweaponscompanymountedonarmoredhalftracks.Onearmoredanti-tankbattalion,withtwobatteriesofJagdpanzerTVtankdestroyersandonemotorizedbatteryofanti-tankguns.Onemotorizedanti-aircraftbattalion,withthreebatteriesof88mmguns,twobatteriesof37mmautomaticcannon,andonebatteryof20mmautomaticcannon.Onearmoredcombatengineerbattalion,withtwomotorizedcompanies,onemotorizedheavyweaponscompany,andonecompanymountedonarmoredhalftracks.Onearmoredsignalbattalion,withonefieldtelephonecompanyandoneradiocompany,bothwithamixofarmoredhalftracksandunar-moredvehicles.

GrenadierDivisions

Twomotorizedinfantryregiments,eachofthreeinfantrybattalions,withseparatecompaniesofcombatengineers,heavyinfantryguns,lightantiaircraftguns,andmotorcyclereconnaissance.Onemotorizedartilleryregiment,withtwobattalionsoflighthowitzersandonebattalionofheavyhowitzers.Onebattalionoftanks,equippedwithassaultguns,butorganizedinatankmannerwithfourcompanies,eachwithfourplatoons.Onebattalionofanti-tankguns,equippedwithassaultgunsinallthreebatteries.Onearmoredreconnaissancebattalion,withtwomotorizedinfantrycompanies,twoinfantrycompaniesmountedonarmoredhalftracks,andoneheavyweaponscompanymountedonarmoredhalftracks.Onemotorizedanti-aircraftbattalionwiththreebatteriesof88mmpiecesandonebatteryof37mmpieces.Onemotorizedcombatengineerbattalionwithcompanies.Onemotorizedsignalbattalionwithonefieldtelephoneandoneradiocompany.

ArmyGroupSouthOperationBarbarossaAsearlyas1925,HitlersuggestedinMeinKampfthathewouldinvadethe

SovietUnion,assertingthattheGermanpeopleneededLebensraum(“livingspace”,i.e.,landandrawmaterials)andthattheseshouldbesoughtintheEast.Nazismviewedthe

SovietUnion(andallofEasternEurope)aspopulatedby“Untermensch”Slavs,ruledby“JewishBolshevik”masters.MeinKampfsaidGermany’sdestinywastoturn“totheEast”asitdid“sixhundredyearsago”and“theendoftheJewishdominationinRussiawillalsobetheendofRussiaasaState.”Thereafter,Hitlerspokeofaninescapablebattleagainst“pan-Slavideals”,inwhichvictorywouldleadto“permanentmasteryoftheworld”,althoughhealsosaidtheywould“walkpartoftheroadwiththeRussians,ifthatwillhelpus”.Accordingly,itwasstatedNazipolicytokill,deport,orenslavethemajorityofRussianandotherSlavicpopulationsandrepopulatethelandwithGermanicpeoples.BeforeWorldWarII,observersbelievedthatinawarwiththeSovietUnion,GermanywouldattackthroughtheBalticstateswhiletheKriegsmarinewouldseizeLeningradfromthesea.TheyassumedthatpossessingtheentireBalticbasinwouldsatisfyHitler,whowouldnotrepeatNapoleon’smistakeofattackingMoscow.SomehistoriansalsobelievethatadecisiontoinvadeRussiawaspremeditated,basedonHitlerbeingafraidofhavingtofightawarbothagainstthealliesinthewestaswellasagainsttheRussiansintheeast.ThispreventativewarwouldallowtheGermanstoavoidmakingthesamemistaketheyhadmadeinWorldWar1.

1939–1940German-SovietrelationshipTheSovietUnionandGermanysignedanon-aggressionpactinAugust

1939,theMolotov–RibbentropPact,shortlybeforetheGermaninvasionofPolandthattriggeredWorldWarII,whichwasfollowedbytheSovietinvasionofthatcountry.AsecretprotocoltothepactoutlinedanagreementbetweentheThirdReichandtheSovietUniononthedivisionoftheborderstatesbetweentheirrespective“spheresofinfluence”.TheSovietUnionandGermanywouldsplitPolandifaninvasionweretooccur,andLatvia,EstoniaandFinlandweredefinedasfallingwithintheSovietsphereofinfluence.Thepactsurprisedtheworldbecauseoftheparties’mutualhostilityandtheirconflictingideologies.Asaresultofthepact,GermanyandtheSovietUnionhadreasonablystrongdiplomaticrelationsandanimportanteconomicrelationship.Thecountriesenteredatradepactin1940,inwhichtheSovietsreceivedGermanmilitaryandindustrialequipmentinexchangeforrawmaterials,suchasoilorwheat,tohelpGermanycircumventaBritishblockade.Despitetheparties’ongoingrelations,eachsidewashighlysuspiciousoftheother’sintentions.AfterGermanyenteredtheAxisPactwithJapanandItaly,itbegannegotiationsaboutapotentialSovietentryintothepact.AftertwodaysofnegotiationsinBerlinfrom12–14November,GermanypresentedaproposedwrittenagreementforaSovietentryintotheAxis.

MapOperationBarbarosssaTheSovietUnionofferedawrittencounterproposalagreementon25No

vember1940,towhichGermanydidnotrespond.AsbothsidesbegancollidingwitheachotherinEasternEurope,conflictappearedmorelikely,althoughtheysignedaborderandcommercialagreementaddressingseveralopenissuesinJanuary1941.HistoriansalsobelievethatStalin,despiteprovidinganamicablefronttoHitler,didnotwishtoremainallieswithGermany.Rather,StalinmighthavehadintentionstobreakofffromGermanyandproceedwithhisowncampaignagainstGermanyaswellastherestofEurope.

MapOperationBarbarossaArmyGroupsObjectives

GermanyplanstheinvasionJosephStalin’sownreputationasabrutaldictatorcontributedbothtothe

Nazis’justificationoftheirassaultandtheirfaithinsuccess.Inthelate1930s,manycompetentandexperiencedmilitaryofficerswerekilledintheGreatPurge,leavingtheRedArmywitharelativelyinexperiencedleadershipcomparedtothatoftheirGermancounterparts.TheNazisoftenemphasizedtheSovietregime’sbrutalitywhentargetingtheSlavswithpropaganda.GermanpropagandaclaimedtheRedArmywaspreparingtoattackthem,andtheirowninvasionwasthuspresentedasapreemptivestrike.Inthesummerof1940,whenGermanrawmaterialscrisesandapotentialcollisionwiththeSovietUnionoverterritoryintheBalkansarose,aneventualinvasionoftheSovietUnionlookedincreasinglylikeHitler’sonlysolution.Whilenoconcreteplanswereyetmade,HitlertoldoneofhisgeneralsinJunethatthevictoriesinwesternEurope“finallyfreedhishandsforhisimportantrealtask:theshowdownwithBolshevism”.

MapOperationBarbarossaPlanAAlthoughGermangeneralstoldHitlerthatoccupyingWesternRussiawouldcreate“moreofadrainthanareliefforGermany’seconomicsituation,”theFühreranticipatedadditionalbenefits:

WhentheSovietUnionwasdefeated,thelaborshortageinGermanindustrycouldberelievedbydemobilizationofmanysoldiers.Ukrainewouldbeareliablesourceofagriculturalproducts.HavingtheSovietUnionasasourceofforcedlaborunderGermanrulewouldvastlyimproveGermany’sgeostrategicposition.DefeatoftheSovietUnionwouldfurtherisolatetheAllies,especiallytheUnitedKingdom.TheGermaneconomyneededmoreoil–controllingtheBakuOilfieldswouldachievethis;asAlbertSpeer,theGermanMinisterforArmamentsandWarProduction,latersaidinhispost-warinterrogation,“theneedforoilcertainlywasaprimemotive”inthedecisiontoinvade.

On5December1940,HitlerreceivedthefinalmilitaryplansfortheinvasionwhichweredrawnsinceJuly1940alreadyunderthecodenameOperationOtto.Heapprovedthemall,withthestartscheduledforMay1941.On18December,HitlersignedWarDirectiveNo.21totheGermanHighCommandforanoperationnowcodenamed“OperationBarbarossa”stating:“TheGermanWehrmachtmustbepreparedtocrushSovietRussiainaquickcampaign.”TheoperationwasnamedafterEmperorFrederickBarbarossaofthe

HolyRomanEmpire,aleaderoftheThirdCrusadeinthe12thcentury.Theinvasionwassetfor15May1941.TheplanforBarbarossaassumedthattheWehrmachtwouldemergevictoriousifitcoulddestroythebulkoftheRedArmywestoftheWesternDvinaandDnieperRivers.Thisassumptionwouldbeprovenfatallywronglessthanamonthintotheinvasion.

Ina1978essay“DasRusslandbildderführendendeutschenMilitärs”AndreasHillgrubermadethecasethattheinvasionplansdrawnupbytheGermanmilitaryelitewerecolouredbyhubrisstemmingfromtherapiddefeatofFranceatthehandsofthe“invincible”WehrmachtandbyignorancetemperedbytraditionalGermanstereotypesofRussiaasaprimitive,backward“Asiatic”country-acolossuswithfeetofclay.RedArmysoldierswereconsideredbraveandtough,buttheofficercorpswasheldincontempt.TheleadershipoftheWehrmachtpaidlittleattentiontopolitics,theeconomyorcultureandtheconsiderableindustrialcapacityoftheSovietUnionwasignoredasafactor,infavourofaverynarrowmilitaryview.AsaresulttheWehrmachtwasill-informedabouttheSovietmilitaryandeconomiccapacity.ItwasassumedthattheSovietUnionwasdestinedtobedefeated,andthatitwouldtakeGermanybetweensixtoeightweekstodestroytheSovietUnion.

MapOperationBarbarossaPlanBHillgruberarguedthatbecausetheseassumptionsweresharedbytheentiremilitaryeliteHitlerwasabletopushthrougha“warofannihilation”thatwouldbewagedinthemostinhumanefashionpossiblewiththecomplicityof“severalmilitaryleaders”,eventhoughitwasquiteclearthatthiswouldbeaviolationofallacceptednormsofwarfare.IntheSovietUnion,speakingtohisgeneralsinDecember1940,StalinmentionedHitler’s

referencestoanattackontheSovietUnioninMeinKampf,andsaidtheymustalwaysbereadytorepulseaGermanattack,andthatHitlerthoughttheRedArmywouldneedfouryearstoreadyitself.Hence,“wemustbereadymuchearlier”and“wewilltrytodelaythewarforanothertwoyears”.Inautumn1940,high-rankingGermanofficialsdraftedamemorandumonthedangersofaninvasionoftheSovietUnion.TheysaidUkraine,BelorussiaandtheBalticStateswouldendupasonlyafurthereconomicburdenforGermany.AnotherGermanofficialarguedthattheSovietsintheircurrentbureaucraticformwereharmless,theoccupationwouldnotproduceagainforGermanyand“whyshoulditnotstewnexttousinitsdampBolshevism?”HitlerdisagreedwitheconomistsabouttherisksandtoldHermannGöring,thechiefoftheLuftwaffe,that“everyoneonallsideswasalwaysraisingeconomicmisgivingsagainstathreateningwarwithRussia.Fromnowonhewasnotgoingtolistentoanymoreofthatkindoftalkorhewasgoingtostopuphisearsinordertogethispeaceofmind.”ThiswaspassedontoGeneralGeorgThomas,whohadbeenpreparingreportsonthenegativeeconomicconsequencesofaninvasionoftheSovietUnion—thatitwouldbeaneteconomicdrainunlessitwascapturedintact.

MapOperationBarbarossaPlanCBeginninginMarch1941,Göring’sGreenFolderlaidoutdetailsoftheSo

vietUnion’sproposedeconomicdisposalaftertheinvasion.Theentireurbanpopulationoftheinvadedlandwastobestarvedtodeath,thuscreatinganagriculturalsurplustofeedGermanyandallowingtheurbanpopulation’sreplacementbyaGermanupperclass.In

thesummerof1941,GermanNazi-ideologistAlfredRosenbergsuggestedthatconqueredSovietterritoryshouldbeadministeredinthefollowingReichskommissariate:

Ostland(TheBalticcountriesandBelarus,extendedeastwardbyabout500km)Ukraine(Ukraine,enlargedeastwardstotheVolga)Kaukasus(SouthernRussiaandtheCaucasusregion)Moskowien(MoscowmetropolitanareaandtherestofEuropeanRussia)Turkestan(CentralAsianrepublicsandterritories)

NazipolicyaimedtodestroytheSovietUnionasapoliticalentityinaccordancewiththegeopoliticalLebensraumideal(“DrangnachOsten“)forthebenefitoffuturegenerationsofthe“NordicAryanmasterrace.OperationBarbarossawastocombineanorthernassaulttowardsLeningrad,asymboliccapturingofMoscow,andaneconomicstrategyofseizingoilfieldsinthesouthbeyondUkraine.HitlerandhisgeneralsdisagreedonwhichoftheseaspectsshouldtakepriorityandwhereGermanyshouldfocusitsenergies;decidingonprioritiesrequiredacompromise.WhileplanningBarbarossain1940–1941,inmanydiscussionswithhisgenerals,Hitlerrepeatedhisorder:“Leningradfirst,theDonetskBasinsecond,Moscowthird”.HitlerbelievedMoscowwasof“nogreatimportance”inthedefeatoftheSovietUnion,andinsteadbelievedvictorywouldcomewiththedestructionoftheRedArmywestofthecapital.ThislaterledtoconflictbetweenHitlerandseveralGermanseniorofficersincludingHeinzGuderian,GerhardEngel,FedorvonBockandFranzHalder,whobelievedthedecisivevictorycouldonlybedeliveredatMoscowHitlerwasimpatienttogetonwithhislong-desiredinvasionoftheeast.HewasconvincedBritainwouldsueforpeace,oncetheGermanstriumphedintheSovietUnion,therealareaofGermany’sinterests.Haldernotedinhisdiariesthat,bydestroyingtheSovietUnion,GermanywoulddestroyBritain’shopeofvictory.HitlerhadgrownoverconfidentfromhisrapidsuccessinWesternEuropeandtheRedArmy’sineptitudeintheWinterWaragainstFinlandin1939–1940.Heexpectedvictorywithinafewmonthsandthereforedidnotprepareforawarlastingintothewinter.Thismeanthistroopslackedadequatewarmclothingandpreparationsforalongercampaignwhentheybegantheirattack.TheassumptionthattheSovietUnionwouldquicklycapitulatewouldprovetobehisundoing.

GermanpreparationsTheGermanshadbegunmassingtroopsneartheSovietborderevenbe

forethecampaignintheBalkanshadfinished.BythethirdweekinFebruary1941,680,000GermansoldierswerestationedontheRomanian-Sovietborder.Inpreparationfortheattack,Hitlermoved3.2millionGermanandabout500,000AxissoldierstotheSovietborder,launchedmanyaerialsurveillancemissionsoverSovietterritory,andstockpiledmaterielintheEast.TheSovietswerestilltakenbysurprise,mostlyduetoStalin’sbeliefthattheThirdReichwasunlikelytoattackonlytwoyearsaftersigningtheMolotov-RibbentropPact.TheSovietleaderalsobelievedtheNaziswouldbelikelytofinishtheirwarwithBritainbeforeopeninganewfront.HerefusedtobelieverepeatedwarningsfromhisintelligenceservicesontheNazibuildup,fearingthereportstobeBritishmisinformationdesignedtosparkawarbetweenGermanyandtheUSSR.SpyDr.RichardSorgegaveStalintheexactGermanlaunchdate;SwedishcryptanalystsledbyArneBeurlingalsoknewthedatebeforehand,butSorgeandotherinformers(e.g.,

fromtheBerlinPolicedepartment)hadpreviouslygivendifferentinvasiondateswhichpassedpeacefullybeforetheactualinvasion.Inaddition,BritishintelligencegatheringinformationthroughUltrawarnedtheSovietUnionofimpendinginvasionseveralmonthspriorto22June1941.TheGermanssetupdeceptionoperations,fromApril1941,toaddsubstancetotheirclaimsthatBritainwastherealtarget:OperationsHaifischandHarpune.ThesesimulatedpreparationsinNorway,theChannelcoastandBritain.Thereweresupportingactivitiessuchasshipconcentrations,reconnaissanceflightsandtrainingexercises.Somedetailsofthesebogusinvasionplansweredeliberatelyleaked.GermanmilitaryplannersalsoresearchedNapoleon’sfailedinvasionofRussia.Intheircalculationstheyconcludedthattherewaslittledangerofalarge-scaleretreatoftheSovietarmyintotheRussianinterior,asitcouldnotaffordtogiveuptheBalticstates,Ukraine,ortheMoscowandLeningradregions,allofwhichwerevitaltotheRedArmyforsupplyreasonsandwouldthushavetobedefended.ThestrategyHitlerandhisgeneralsagreedoninvolvedthreeseparatearmygroupsassignedtocapturespecificregionsandcitiesoftheSovietUnion.ThemainGermanthrustswereconductedalonghistoricalinvasionroutes.ArmyGroupNorthwastomarchthroughtheBalticsintonorthernRussia,andeithertakeordestroythecityofLeningrad(nowSaintPetersburg).ArmyGroupCenterwouldadvancetoSmolenskandthenMoscow,marchingthroughwhatisnowBelarusandthewest-centralregionsofRussiaproper.ArmyGroupSouthwastostriketheheavilypopulatedandagriculturalheartlandofUkraine,takingKievbeforecontinuingeastwardoverthesteppesofthesouthernUSSRtotheVolgawiththeaimofcontrollingtheoil-richCaucasus.ThepostponementofBarbarossafromtheinitiallyplanneddateof15Maytotheactualinvasiondateof22June1941(a38-daydelay)occurredduetoacombinationofreasons;theBalkansCampaignrequiredadiversionoftroopsandresources;insufficientlogistics(preexistingandthoseincurredbytheBalkansCampaign)hamperedthepreparations;andanunusuallywetwinterthatkeptriversatfullflooduntillatespringcouldhavediscouragedanearlierattack,evenifitwasunlikelytohavehappenedbeforetheendoftheBalkansCampaign.Theimportanceofthedelayisstilldebated.TheGermansalsodecidedtobringrearforces(mostlyWaffen-SSunitsandEinsatzgruppen)20intotheconqueredterritoriestocounteranypartisanactivityinareastheycontrolled.

SovietpreparationsDespitetheestimationsheldbyHitlerandothersintheGermanhighcommand,theSovietUnionwasbynomeansweak.Rapidindustrializationinthe1930shadledtoindustrialoutputsecondonlytothatoftheUnitedStates,andequaltoGermany.Productionofmilitaryequipmentgrewsteadily,andinthepre-waryearstheeconomybecameprogressivelymoreorientedtowardmilitaryproduction.MikhailTukhachevsky,oneoftheprominentmilitarytheoristsintankwarfareintheinterwarperiod,lobbiedtheKremlinforcolossalinvestmentintheresourcesrequiredfortheproductionofweaponsinmassquantities.In1930heforwardedamemototheKremlin,pressingthecasefor“40,000aircraftand50,000tanks”.Intheearly1930s,averymodernoperationaldoctrinefortheRedArmywasdevelopedandpromulgatedinthe1936fieldregulations,intheformoftheDeepBattleconcept.Defenseexpenditurealsogrewrapidly:by1933ithadreached12percentofgrossnationalproduct,from5.2percentin1913;andby1940itstoodat18percent.

On5May1941,StalingaveaspeechtograduatesofmilitaryacademiesinMoscowdeclaring:“WarwithGermanyisinevitable.IfcomradeMolotovcanmanagetopostponethewarfortwoorthreeyearsthatwillbeourgoodfortune,butyouyourselvesmustgooffandtakemeasurestoraisethecombatreadinessofourforces”.Wehaveonlytokickinthedoorandthewholerottenstructurewillcomecrashingdown.—AdolfHitler

WhenBarbarossacommences,theworldwillholditsbreathandmakenocomment.—AdolfHitlerAccordingtoTaylorandProektor(1974),theSovietarmedforcesinthewesterndistrictswereoutnumbered,with2.6millionSovietsoldiersversus3.9millionfortheAxis.However,Glantzreportsabout3.8millionasthetotalforceoftheAxisinJune1941,with900,000ofthemdeployedintheWest.TheoverallsizeoftheSovietarmedforcesinearlyJuly1941,amountedtoalittlemorethanfivemillionmen,2.6millioninthewest,1.8millionintheFarEast,withtherestbeingdeployedortrainingelsewhere.Thesefigures,however,canbemisleading.ThefigureforSovietstrengthinthewesterndistrictsoftheSovietUnioncountsonlytheFirstStrategicEchelon,whichwasstationedonandbehindtheSovietwesternfrontiertoadepthof400kilometers;italsounderestimatesthesizeoftheFirstStrategicEchelon,whichwasactually2.9millionstrong.ThefiguredoesnotincludethesmallerSecondStrategicEchelon,whichasof22June1941wasintheprocessofmovingtowardthefrontier;accordingtotheSovietstrategicplan;itwasscheduledtobeinpositionreinforcingtheFirstStrategicEchelonbyearlyJuly.ThetotalAxisstrengthisalsoexaggerated;3.3millionGermantroopswereearmarkedforparticipationinBarbarossa,butthatfigureincludesreserveswhichdidnottakepartintheinitialassault.Afurther600,000troopsprovidedbyGermany’salliesalsoparticipated,butmostlyaftertheinitialoffensive.On22June,theGermanWehrmachtachievedalocalsuperiorityinitsinitialassault(98Germandivisions),including29armouredandmotorizeddivisions,some90percentofitsmobileforces,attackingonafrontof1,200km(750mi)betweentheBalticSeaandtheCarpathianMountains,againstNKVDbordertroopsandthedivisionsoftheSovietFirstOperationalEchelon(thepartoftheFirstStrategicEchelonstationedimmediatelybehindthefrontierinthethreewesternSpecialMilitaryDistricts)becauseithadcompleteditsdeploymentandwasreadytoattackabouttwoweeksbeforetheRedArmywasscheduledtohavefinisheditsowndeploymentwiththeSecondStrategicEcheloninplace.Atthetime,41percentofstationarySovietbaseswerelocatedinthenear-boundarydistricts,manyoftheminthe200km(120mi)striparoundtheborder;accordingtoaRedArmydirective,fuel,equipment,railroadcars,etc.weresimilarlyconcentratedthere.Moreover,onmobilization,asthewarwenton,theRedArmygainedsteadilyinstrength.Whilethestrengthofbothsidesvaried,ingeneralthe1941belligerentsfoughtwithaslightAxisnumericalsuperiorityinmanpoweratthefront.AccordingtoMikhailMeltyukhov(2000:477),bythestartofwar,theRedArmynumberedatotalof5,774,211troops:4,605,321ingroundforces,475,656intheairforce,353,752inthenavy,167,582asborderguardsand171,900ininternaltroopsoftheNKVD.

Insomekeyweapons-systems,however,theSovietshadaconsiderablenumericaladvantage.Intanks,forexample,theRedArmydominatedoverwhelminglyinnumbers.Theypossessed23,106,ofwhichabout12,782wereinthefiveWesternMilitaryDistricts(threeofwhichdirectlyfacedtheGermaninvasionfront).AdolfHitlerlatersaid“IfIhadknownabouttheRussiantank’sstrengthin1941Iwouldnothaveattacked”.However,maintenanceandreadinessstandardswereverypoor;ammunitionandradioswereinshortsupply,andmanyunitslackedthetrucksneededtocarrysupplies.Also,from1938,theSovietshadpartlydispersedtheirtankstoinfantrydivisionsforinfantrysupport,butaftertheirexperiencesintheWinterWarandtheirobservationoftheGermancampaignagainstFrance,theyhadbeguntoemulatetheGermansandorganizemostoftheirarmoredassetsintolargearmoreddivisionsandcorps.ThisreorganizationwasonlypartiallyimplementedatthedawnofBarbarossa,asnotenoughtankswereavailabletobringthemechanizedcorpsuptoorganicstrength.TheGermanWehrmachthadabout5,200tanksoverall,ofwhich3,350werecommittedtotheinvasion.Thisyieldsabalanceofimmediatelyavailabletanksofabout4:1intheRedArmy’sfavor.However,themostadvancedSoviettankmodels,theT-34andKV-1,werenotavailableinlargenumbersearlyinthewar,andonlyaccountedfor7.2percentofthetotalSoviettank-force.TheSovietnumericaladvantageinheavyequipmentwasalsomorethanoffsetbythegreatlysuperiortrainingandreadinessofGermanforces.TheSovietofficercorpsandhighcommandhadbeenmassacredinStalin’sGreatPurge(1936–1938).Outof90generalsarrested,onlysixsurvivedthepurges,asdidonly36outof180divisionalcommanders,andjustsevenoutof57armycorpscommanders.Intotal,some30,000RedArmypersonnelwereexecuted,whilemoreweredeportedtoSiberiaandreplacedwithofficersdeemedmore“politicallyreliable”.Threeoutofthefiveprewarmarshalsandabouttwo-thirdsofthecorpsanddivisioncommanderswereshot.Thisoftenleftyounger,lessexperiencedofficersintheirplaces.Forexample,in1941,75percentofRedArmyofficershadheldtheirpostsforlessthanoneyear.TheaverageSovietcorpscommanderwas12yearsyoungerthantheaverageGermandivisioncommander.Theseofficerstendedtobeveryreluctanttotaketheinitiativeandoftenlackedthetrainingnecessaryfortheirjobs.ThenumberofaircraftwasalsoheavilyintheSoviets’favor.However,Sovietaircraftwerelargelyobsolete,andSovietartillerylackedmodernfirecontroltechniques.MostSovietunitswereonapeacetimefooting,whichmightexplainwhyaviationunitshadtheiraircraftparkedincloselybunchedneatrows,ratherthandispersed,makingeasytargetsfortheLuftwaffeinthefirstdaysoftheconflict.PriortotheinvasiontheVVS(Voenno-VozdushnyeSily;SovietAirForce)wasforbiddentoshootdownLuftwaffereconnaissanceaircraft,despitehundredsofprewarincursionsintoSovietairspace.

AshortageofmodernaircraftseverelyhamperedtheSovietwareffortinthefirstphaseoftheEastern-frontwar.TheSovietfighterforcewasequippedwithlargenumbersofobsoleteaircraft,suchasthePolikarpovI15biplaneandthePolikarpovI-16.In1941theMiG-3,LaGG-3andYak-1hadjuststartedtorollofftheproductionlines,butwerefarinferiorinallroundperformancetotheMesserschmittBf109orlater,totheFw190whenitenteredoperationsinSeptember1941.Fewaircrafthadradiosandthosethatwereavailablewereunencryptedanddidnotworkreliably.ThepoorperformanceoftheVVSduringtheWinterWarwithFinlandhadincreasedtheLuftwaffe’sconfidencethattheSovietscouldbemastered.ThestandardofflighttraininghadbeenacceleratedinpreparationforaGermanattackthatwasexpectedtocomein1942orlater.HoweverSovietpilottrainingwasextremelypoor.OrderNo0362ofthePeople’sCommissarofDefense,dated22December1940,orderedflighttrainingtobeacceleratedandshortened.Incredibly,whiletheSovietshad201MiG-3sand37MiG-1scombat-readyon22June1941,onlyfourpilotshadbeentrainedtohandlethesemachines.TheRedArmywasdispersedandunprepared,andunitswereoftenseparatedandwithouttransportationtoconcentratepriortocombat.Althoughithadnumerous,well-designedartillerypieces,someofthegunshadnoammunition.Artilleryunitsoftenlackedtransportationtomovetheirguns.Tankunitswererarelywellequipped,andalsolackedtrainingandlogisticalsupport.Maintenancestandardswereverypoor.Unitsweresentintocombatwithnoarrangementsforrefueling,ammunitionresupply,orpersonnelreplacement.Often,afterasingleengagement,unitsweredestroyedorrenderedineffective.Thearmywasinthemidstofreorganizingtheirarmorunitsintolargetankcorps,addingtothedisorganization.Asaresult,althoughonpapertheRedArmyin1941seemedatleasttheequaloftheGermanarmy,therealityinthefieldwasfardifferent;incompetentofficers,aswellaspartiallackofequipment,insufficientmotorizedlogisticalsupport,andpoortrainingplacedtheRedArmyataseveredisadvantage.InAugust1940BritishintelligencehadreceivedhintsofGermanplanstoattacktheSovietsonlyaweekafterHitlerinformallyapprovedtheplansforBarbarossa.Stalin’sdistrustoftheBritishledtohisignoringtheirwarnings,believingittobeatrickdesignedtobringtheSovietUnionintothewar.Inthespringof1941,Stalin’sownintelligenceservicesandAmericanintelligencegaveregularandrepeatedwarningsofanimpendingGermanattack.However,Stalinchosetoignorethem.Althoughacknowledgingthepossibilityofanattackingeneralandmakingsignificantpreparations,hedecidednottoruntheriskofprovokingHitler.HealsohadanillfoundedconfidenceintheMolotov-RibbentropPact,whichtheUSSRandGermanyhadsignedjusttwoyearsbefore.HealsosuspectedtheBritishoftryingtospreadfalserumoursinordertotriggerawarbetweenGermanyandtheUSSR.Consequently,theSovietbordertroopswerenotputonfullalertandweresometimesevenforbiddentofirebackwithoutpermissionwhenattacked—thoughapartialalertwasimplementedon10April—theyweresimplynotreadywhentheGermanattackcame.EnormousSovietforceshadmassedonthewesternborderoftheSovietUnionincasetheGermansdidattack.However,theseforceswereveryvulnerableduetochangesinthetacticaldoctrineoftheRedArmy.In1938,ithadadopted,ontheinstigationofGeneralDmitryPavlov,astandardlinear-defensetacticinlinewithothernations.Infantrydivisions,reinforcedbyanorganictankcomponent,woulddigintoformheavilyfortifiedzones.ThencametheshockoftheFallofFrance.TheWehrmachtdefeatedtheFrench

Armyinameresixweeks.Sovietanalysisofevents,basedonincompleteinformation,concludedthatFrenchmilitarycollapsedduetoarelianceonlineardefenceandalackofarmoredreserves.TheSovietsdecidednottorepeatthesemistakes.Insteadofdigging-inforlineardefense,theinfantrydivisionswouldhenceforthconcentrateinlargeformations.Mosttankswouldalsobeconcentratedinto29mechanizedcorps,eachwithover1,031ofthem.ShouldtheGermansattack,theirarmoredspearheadswouldbecutoffandwipedoutbythemechanizedcorps.ThesewouldthencooperatewiththeinfantryarmiestodrivebacktheGermaninfantry,vulnerableinitsapproachmarch.TheSovietleftwing,inUkraine,wastobeenormouslyreinforcedtobeabletoexecuteastrategicenvelopment:afterdestroyingGermanArmyGroupSouth,itwouldswingnorththroughPolandinthebackofArmyGroupsCenterandNorth.WiththecompleteannihilationoftheencircledGermanArmythusmadeinevitable,aRedArmyoffensiveintotherestofEuropewouldfollow.

TheSovietoffensiveplanstheoryImmediatelyaftertheGermaninvasionoftheUSSR,AdolfHitlerputforwardathesisthattheRedArmymadeextensivepreparationsforanoffensivewarinEurope,thusjustifyingtheGermaninvasionasapre-emptivestrike.AfterthewarsomeWehrmachtleaders,likeWilhelmKeitel,promotedthisview.Thisthesiswasreiteratedinthe1980sbasedontheanalysisofcircumstantialevidence.ThusithasbeenfoundthatZhukovdrewupaproposal(signedbyAleksandrVasilevskyandNikolaiFyodorovichVatutin)suggestingsecretmobilizationanddeployingRedArmytroopsonthewesternborder,underthecoveroftraining.ThisproposedoperationaimedtocutGermanyofffromitsallies,especiallyfromRomaniaanditsoilfieldsthatGermanyneededtoconductthewar.AccordingtoViktorSuvorov,StalinplannedtouseGermanyasaproxy(the“icebreaker”)againsttheWest.StalinaimedtofuelHitler’saggressiveplansagainstEurope,andonlyafterthecountrieshadfoughteachother—andexhaustedthemselvestosomeextent—wouldtheUSSRmaketheirmove.ForthisreasonStalinprovidedsignificantmaterialandpoliticalsupporttoAdolfHitler,whileatthesametimepreparingtheRedArmyto“liberate”thewholeofEuropefromNazioccupation.SuvorovsawBarbarossaasaGermanpre-emptivestrikethatcapitalizedontheSoviettroopconcentrationsimmediatelyonthe1941borders.SomeotherswhosupporttheideathatStalinpreparedtoattack,likeMikhailMeltyukhov,rejectthispartofSuvorov’stheory,arguingthatbothsidespreparedforanattackontheirown,notinresponsetotheotherside’spreparations.Althoughthisthesishasdrawntheattentionofthegeneralpublicinsomecountries(Germany,RussiaandIsrael),andhasbeensupportedbysomehistorians(examplesincludeVladimirNevezhin,BorisSokolov,ValeriDanilov,JoachimHoffmann,andMarkSolonin),theideathatStalinwaspreparinganattackin1941hasnotbeenacceptedbymanywesternhistorians.

Orderofbattle

CompositionoftheAxisforcesFranzHalderastheChiefofGeneralStaffOKH,concentratedthefollowingWehrmachtandLuftwaffeforcesfortheoperation:ArmyGroupNorth(HeeresgruppeNord)(WilhelmRittervonLeeb)

stagedinEastPrussiawith(29divisions):

16thArmy(16.Armee)(ErnstBusch)4thPanzerGroup(Panzergruppe4)(ErichHoepner)18thArmy(18.Armee)(GeorgvonKüchler)AirFleet1(Luftflotteeins)(AlfredKeller)ArmyGroupCenter(HeeresgruppeMitte)(FedorvonBock)stagedinEasternPolandwith(50divisions):4thArmy(4.Armee)(GünthervonKluge)2ndPanzerGroup(Panzergruppe2)(HeinzGuderian)3rdPanzerGroup(Panzergruppe3)(HermannHoth)9thArmy(9.Armee)(AdolfStrauß)AirFleet2(Luftflottezwei)(AlbertKesselring)ArmyGroupSouth(HeeresgruppeSüd)(GerdvonRundstedt)wasstagedinSouthernPolandandRomaniawith(57divisions):17thArmy(17.Armee)(Carl-HeinrichvonStülpnagel)SlovakExpeditionaryForce(FerdinandČatloš)RoyalHungarianArmy“FastMovingArmyCorps”(BélaMiklós)–Initiallypartofalarger“CarpathianGroup”(KarpatGruppe)1stPanzerGroup(Panzergruppe1)(EwaldvonKleist)11thArmy(11.Armee)(EugenRittervonSchobert)ItalianExpeditionaryCorpsinRussia(CorpodiSpedizioneItalianoinRussia,CSIR)(GiovanniMesse)6thArmy(6.Armee)(WalthervonReichenau)Romanian3rdArmy(PetreDumitrescu)

Romanian4thArmy(TancredConstantinescu)AirFleet4(Luftflottevier)(AlexanderLöhr)

FromOccupiedNorwayasmallergroupofforcesconsistedof:ArmyHighCommandNorway(Armee-OberkommandoNorwegen)(NikolausvonFalkenhorst)withtwoCorpsAirFleet5(Luftflottefünf)(Hans-JürgenStumpff)(5divisions)

FromFinland(engagedinitsContinuationWar)(16divisions):TheFinnishArmyofsevencorps(CarlGustafEmilMannerheim)NumeroussmallerunitsfromalloverNazi-occupiedEurope,likethe“LegionofFrenchVolunteersAgainstBolshevism”(LégiondesVolontairesFrançaiscontreleBolchévisme),supportedtheGermanwareffort.

CompositionoftheSovietForces

AtthebeginningoftheGermanReich’sinvasionoftheSovietUnionon22June1941theRedArmyareasofresponsibilityintheEuropeanUSSRweredividedintofouractiveFronts.MoreFrontswouldbeformedwithintheoverallresponsibilityofthethreeStrategicDirectionscommandswhichcorrespondedapproximatelytoaGermanArmy(WehrmachtHeer)ArmyGroup(Heeresgruppen)intermsofgeographicareaofoperations.InaccordancewithpeacetimedirectivestheNorthernFrontwasformedfromtheLeningradMilitaryDistrict,theNorth-WesternFrontfromtheBalticSpecialMilitaryDistrict,theWesternFrontwasformedfromtheWesternSpecialMilitaryDistrict,andtheSovietSouthwesternFrontwasformedfromtheKievSpecialMilitaryDistrict.TheSouthernFrontwascreatedon25June1941fromtheOdessaMilitaryDistrict.ThefirstDirectionswereestablishedon10July1941,withKlimentVoroshilovcommandingtheNorth-WesternStrategicDirection,TimoshenkocommandingtheWesternStrategicDirection,andBudyonnycommandingtheSouth-WesternStrategicDirection.TheforcesoftheNorth-WesternDirectionwere:

TheNorthernFront(ColonelGeneralMarkianPopov)borderedFinlandandincludedthe14thArmy,7thArmy,23rdArmyandsmallerunitssubordinatetotheFrontcommander.TheNorth-WesternFront(ColonelGeneralFeodorIsodorovichKuznetsov)defendedtheBalticregionandconsistedofthe8thArmy,11thArmy,andthe27thArmyandotherfronttroops(34divisions).TheNorthernandBalticFleets

TheforcesoftheWesternDirectionwere:TheWesternFront(GeneralDmitryGrigoryevitchPavlov)hadthe3rdArmy,4thArmy,10thArmyandtheArmyHeadquartersofthe13thArmywhichcoordinatedindependentFrontformations(45divisions).

TheforcesoftheSouth-WesternDirectionwere:TheSouth-WesternFront(ColonelGeneralMikhailKirponos)wasformedfromthe5thArmy,6thArmy,12thArmyandthe26thArmyaswellasagroupofunitsunderStrategicDirectioncommand(45divisions).TheSouthernFront(GeneralIvanTyulenev)wascreatedon25June1941withthe9thIndependentArmy,the18thArmy,the2ndand18thMechanizedCorps(26divisions).TheBlackSeaFleet

BesidetheArmiesintheFronts,therewereafurthersixarmiesintheWesternregionof

theUSSR:the16th,19th,20th,21st,22ndandthe24thArmiesthatformed,togetherwithindependentunits,theStavka21ReserveGroupofArmies,laterrenamedtheReserveFront–nominallyunderStalin’sdirectcommand.

Theinvasion

At3:15a.m.onSunday,22June1941,theAxisbombedmajorcitiesinSoviet-occupiedPoland,twohoursafterthestartcodeword“Wotan”wasissued.Itishardtopinpointtheopposingsides’strengthinthisinitialphase,asmostGermanfiguresincludereservesallocatedtotheEastbutnotyetcommitted,aswellasseveralothercomparabilityissuesbetweentheGermanandUSSR’sfigures.RoughlythreemillionWehrmachttroopswentintoactionon22June,andtheyfacedslightlyfewerSoviettroopsintheborderMilitaryDistricts.ThecontributionoftheGermanallieswouldgenerallynotmakeitselffeltuntillater.Thesurprisewascomplete:thoughtheStavka,alarmedbyreportsthatWehrmachtunitswereapproachingtheborder,had,at00:30,orderedthatthebordertroopsbewarnedthatwarwasimminent,onlyasmallnumberofunitswerealertedintime.Ataroundnoon22June1941,thenewsoftheinvasionwasbroadcasttothepopulationbyMolotov,asfollows:CitizensandCitizenessesoftheSovietUnion!Today,atfouro’clockinthemorning,withoutaddressinganygrievancestotheSovietUnion,withoutdeclarationofwar,Germanforcesfellonourcountry,attackedourfrontiersinmanyplacesandbombedourcities…anactoftreacheryunprecedentedinthehistoryofcivilizednations…TheRedArmyandthewholenationwillwageavictoriousPatrioticWarforourbelovedcountry,forhonour,forliberty…Ourcauseisjust.Theenemywillbebeaten.Victorywillbeours.

MapThefrontierbattles(22June–3July1941)

Bycallinguponthepopulation’sdevotiontotheirnationratherthantheParty,Molotovstruckapatrioticchordwhileallowingastunnedpeopletoabsorbtheshatteringnews.TheinvasiondidnotcomeasasurprisetoStalinbuthewascompletelyastounded.Itwasnotuntil3JulybeforeStalinaddressedthenationforthefirsttimesincethestartoftheGermaninvasion,andjustlikeMolotov’sannouncementofthewaron22June,hecalledfora“patrioticwar…oftheentireSovietpeople”.InGermany,onthemorningof22June,JosephGoebbelsannouncedtheinvasiontothewakingnationinaradiobroadcast:Atthismomentamarchistakingplacethat,foritsextent,compareswiththegreatesttheworldhaseverseen.IhavedecidedtodaytoplacethefateandfutureoftheReichandourpeopleinthehandsofoursoldiers.MayGodaidus,especiallyinthisfight.Laterthesamemorning,Hitlerproclaimedtocolleagues,“beforethreemonthshavepassed,weshallwitnessacollapseofRussia,thelikeofwhichhasneverbeenseeninhistory”.Asidefromtheroughly3.2millionGermangroundtroopsengagedin,orearmarkedfor,theEasternCampaign,about500,000Romanian,Hungarian,Slovakian,Croatian,andItaliantroopsaccompaniedtheGermanforces,whiletheArmyofFinlandmadeamajorcontributioninthenorth.The250thSpanish“Blue”InfantryDivision,wasaformationofvolunteeredSpanishFalangistsandNazisympathisers.Luftwaffereconnaissanceunitsworkedfranticallytoplottroopconcentration,supply

dumps,andairfields,andmarkthemfordestruction.TheLuftwaffe’staskwastoneutralizetheSovietAirForce.Thiswasnotachievedinthefirstdaysofoperations,despitetheSovietshavingconcentratedaircraftinhugegroupsonthepermanentairfieldsratherthandispersingthemonfieldlandingstrips,makingthemidealtargets.TheLuftwaffeclaimedtohavedestroyed1,489aircraftonthefirstdayofoperations.HermannGöring—ChiefoftheLuftwaffe—distrustedthereportsandorderedthefigurechecked.PickingthroughthewreckagesofSovietairfields,theLuftwaffe’sfiguresprovedconservative,asover2,000destroyedSovietaircraftwerefound.TheLuftwaffelost35aircraftonthefirstdayofcombat.TheGermansclaimedtohavedestroyedonly3,100Sovietaircraftinthefirstthreedays.InfactSovietlosseswerefarhigher;accordingtoRussianhistorianViktorKulikov,some3,922Sovietaircrafthadbeenlost.TheLuftwaffehadachievedairsuperiorityoverallthreesectorsofthefront,andwouldmaintainituntilthecloseoftheyear.TheLuftwaffecouldnowdevotelargenumbersofitsGeschwadertosupportthegroundforces.

ArmyGroupSouth

OppositeArmyGroupSouthwerethreeSovietarmies,the5th,6thand26th.SovietcommandersreactedquickerandtheGermansfaceddeterminedresistancefromthestart.TheGermaninfantryarmiesstruckatthejunctionsofthesearmieswhilethe1stPanzerGroupdroveitsarmoredspearheadof600tanksrightthroughtheSoviet6thArmy,aimingtotakeBrody.On26June,fiveSovietmechanizedcorpswithover4,000tanksmountedamassivecounterattackonthe1stPanzerGroup.Thebattlewasamongthefiercestofthe1941campaignandoneofthelargesttankbattlesinhistory,lastingoverfourdays.IntheendthepoorSovietlogisticsandcoordination,combinedwithGermantacticalskillandairsuperiorityenabledtheGermanstoprevail,althoughtheSovietsinflictedheavylossesonthe1stPanzerGroup.WiththeSovietcounteroffensives’failure,thelastsubstantialSoviettankforcesinWesternUkrainehadbeendecimated,andtheRedArmyassumedadefensiveposture,focusingonstrategicwithdrawalunderseverepressure.TheSovietairarm,theVVS,lost1,561aircraftoverUkraine,withonetenthofitsentirestrengthdestroyedonthegroundonthefirstdayofthewar.Withtheirarmoredreservesallbutdestroyed,theRedArmyinUkrainecouldnotconductanymobileoperationsandwereforcedontothedefensivefortherestoftheyear.However,RedArmycommanderssuchasMikhailKirponos,KonstantinRokossovskyandAndreyVlasovwereamongsomeofthebestgeneralsintheSovietUnion(thoughVlasovwouldeventuallydefecttoGermany).Theirtacticalskill,aswellasquickreactiontotheinvasionmeantthattheSovietforcesinUkraineavoidedtherapiddestructionthatbefellotherarmygroupsinBelarusandtheBalticStates.Howeverwithoutanyarmoredsupport,andtheLuftwaffedominatingthesky,alltheRedArmycoulddowasbuytime.Eventually,theGerman6thArmybrokethroughtheStalinLineand1stPanzerGroupfinallyreachedopencountry.vonKleist’sPanzerslinkedupwithvonReichenau’sforces,trappingtheremainsoftheSoviet5thand6tharmies.ThedoortoKievwasnowopen.

Summaryofthefirstphase

Bytheendofthefirstweek,allthreeGermanArmyGroupshadachievedmajorcampaignobjectives.However,inthevastpocketaroundMinskandBiałystok,theSovietswerestill

fighting;reducingthepocketwascausinghighGermancasualtiesandmanyRedArmytroopswereescaping.TheestimatedcasualtiesoftheRedArmyamountto600,000killed,wounded,missingorcaptured.FranzHaldersummarizedtheachievementsmadeintheopeningphaseoftheoperationinhisdiaryasfollow:“TheobjectivetoshatterthebulkoftheRussianArmythis[western]sideoftheDvinaandDnieperhasbeenaccomplished…ItisthusprobablynooverstatementtosaythattheRussianCampaignhasbeenwoninthespaceoftwoweeks.”However,crackswerealreadybeginningtoforminHitler’splan.ItbecameapparenttoeveryonethattheOKHhadgrosslyunderestimatedthesizeofSovietreserves.Furthermore,theWehrmacht’sofficercoreconsistedoftheoldGermanaristocracy,primarilyPrussianJunkers.Theseofficerswereschooledinthe19thcenturystyleofClausewitziantheory.AccordingtoClausewitz,warswerewonbyconcentratingyourarmiesattheenemy’sfocalpoint,theirtacticalSchwerpunkt.Atthetacticallevel,thismeantthatyourarmieswouldwinabattlebyconcentratingeffortatunexpectedlocations,thenhavingthemconvergeupontheenemiesfocalpoint,leadingtoaKesselschlacht,acauldronbattle.Nowsurrounded,theenemywouldbeforcedtofightaVernichtungsschlacht,abattleofannihilationwheretheywouldbedestroyed.TheBiałystok–Minskoperationisaperfectexampleofthisstyleofthinking.Atthestrategiclevel,thismeantthatyourarmiesafterwinningtheirdecisivebattleswouldeventuallyconvergeontheenemiesoverallfocalpoint.InthecaseofOperationBarbarossa,thiswasMoscow.ThusnearlyeveryGermancommandertreatedMoscowastheultimateprize.HoweverHitlerhadamoremodern,andaccordingtoDavidGlantz,correctviewofmodernwarfare.Warswerenotwonbyaristocratsdrinkingwineandsmokingcigarsoverthenegotiatingtable,dictatingtermstotheirdefeatedgentlemanrivalsafterwinningsomedecisiveengagement.Warswerewonbymakingresistanceimpossiblebystarvingthemofindustrialproduction,anddenyingthemtherawmaterialsneededtofight.Inthisthinking,LeningradwasofvitalimportancetokeeptheBalticFleetfrominterferingwithdeliveriesofironorefromSweden.Furthermore,CrimeamustbecapturedtopreventairraidsonRomanianoilfields.Kharkovalsomustbecapturedtodenytheenemyitsdepositsofcoalandiron,aswellasitsheavyindustry.Finally,Rostov-on-DonmustbecapturedinordertodenyaccesstotheBlackSeaaswellasusingitaseventuallaunchingpadforaninvasionoftheCaucasus,richinoilandminerals.Tothisend,Hitlerordered3rdPanzerGroupnorthinordertoassistArmyGroupNorthinthecaptureofLeningrad.The11thArmywasorderedsouthtocaptureCrimea.The6thArmywasorderedtoseizeKharkovandthe1stPanzerGroupwasorderedtoseizeRostov-on-Donwiththe17thArmyactingasthelinkbetweentheothertwo.Thismeantthatinsteadofthearmiesconvergingonsomedecisiveobjective,theywereinsteadspreadingthemselvesoutleadingtothinlydefendedsectorsanddangerousgaps,areasripeforcounterattacks.TotheGermanofficercorps,Hitler’sdecisionswerestrategicmadness.

MapBattleofSmolensk(3July–5August1941)On3July,Hitlerfinallygavethego-aheadforthePanzerstoresumetheir

driveeastaftertheinfantrydivisionshadcaughtup.However,arainstormtypicalofRussiansummersslowedtheirprogressandRussiandefensesstiffened.ThedelaysgavetheSovietstimetoorganizeamassivecounterattackagainstArmyGroupCenter.ItsultimateobjectivewasSmolensk,whichcommandedtheroadtoMoscow.FacingtheGermanswasanoldSovietdefensivelineheldbysixarmies.On6July,theSovietsattackedthe3rdPanzerArmywith700tanks.TheGermansdefeatedthiscounterattackwithoverwhelmingairsuperiority.The2ndPanzerArmycrossedtheRiverDnieperandclosedonSmolenskfromthesouthwhilethe3rdPanzerArmy,afterdefeatingtheSovietcounterattack,closedonSmolenskfromthenorth.TrappedbetweentheirpincerswerethreeSovietarmies.On18July,thePanzerGroupscametowithinsixteenkilometresofclosingthegapbutthetrapwouldnotsnapshutuntil26July.WhenthePanzerGroupsfinallyclosedthegap,300,000RedArmysoldierswerecaptured;butliquidatingthepockettookanothertendaysinwhichtime100,000RedArmysoldiersescapedtostandbetweentheGermansandMoscow.Fourweeksintothecampaign,theGermansrealizedtheyhadgrosslyunderestimatedSovietstrength.TheGermantroopshadusedtheirinitialsupplieswithoutattainingtheexpectedstrategicfreedomofmovement.Operationswerenowsloweddowntoallowforresupply;thedelaywastobeusedtoadaptstrategytothenewsituation.HitlerhadlostfaithinencirclementaslargenumbersofSovietsoldiershadescapedthepincers.HitlernowbelievedhecoulddefeattheSovietsbyeconomicdamage,deprivingthemoftheindustrialcapacitytocontinuethewar.ThatmeantseizingtheindustrialcenterofKharkov,theDonetsBasinandtheoilfieldsoftheCaucasusinthesouthandthespeedycaptureofLeningrad,amajorcenterofmilitaryproduction,inthenorth.HealsowantedtolinkupwiththeFinnstothenorth.FedorvonBockandalmostalltheGermangeneralsinvolvedinOperationBarbarossa,vehementlyarguedinfavorofcontinuingtheall-outdrivetowardMoscow.Besidesthepsychologicalimportanceofcapturingtheenemy’scapital,thegeneralspointedoutthatMoscowwasamajorcenterofarmsproductionandthecenteroftheSovietcommunicationsandtransportationsystem.Moreimportantly,intelligencereportsindicatedthatthebulkoftheRedArmywasdeployednearMoscowunderSemyon

Timoshenkoforanall-outdefenseofthecapital.ButHitlerwasadamant,andissuedadirectordertoHeinzGuderian,bypassinghiscommandingofficervonBock,tosendArmyGroupCentre’stankstothenorthandsouth,temporarilyhaltingthedrivetoMoscow.Bymid-July,belowthePinskMarshes,theGermanshadcomewithinafewkilometersofKiev.The1stPanzerArmythenwentsouthwhiletheGerman17thArmystruckeastandtrappedthreeSovietarmiesnearUman.AstheGermanseliminatedthepocket,thetanksturnednorthandcrossedtheDnieper.Meanwhile,the2ndPanzerArmy,divertedfromArmyGroupCenter,hadcrossedtheRiverDesnawith2ndArmyonitsrightflank.ThetwoPanzerarmiesnowtrappedfourSovietarmiesandpartsoftwoothers.ForitsfinalattackonLeningrad,the4thPanzerArmywasreinforcedbytanksfromArmyGroupCenter.On8August,thePanzersbrokethroughtheSovietdefenses;theGerman16thArmyattackedtothenortheast,the18thArmyandtheEstonianguerillaForestBrothersclearedthecountryandadvancedtoLakePeipus.BytheendofAugust,4thPanzerArmyhadpenetratedtowithin30mi(48km)ofLeningrad.TheFinnshadpushedsoutheastonbothsidesofLakeLadoga,reachingtheoldFinnish-Sovietfrontier.Atthisstage,HitlerorderedthefinaldestructionofLeningradwithnoprisonerstaken,andon9September,ArmyGroupNorthbeganthefinalpushwhichwithintendaysbroughtitwithin7mi(11km)ofthecity.However,theadvanceoverthelast10km(6.2mi)provedveryslowandcasualtiesmounted.Atthisstage,HitlerlostpatienceandorderedthatLeningradshouldnotbestormedbutstarvedintosubmission.DeprivedofitsPanzerforces,ArmyGroupCenterhadremainedstaticandwassubjectedtonumerousSovietcounterattacksinparticulartheYelnyaOffensiveinwhichtheGermanssufferedtheirfirstmajortacticaldefeatsincetheirinvasionbegan.TheseattacksdrewHitler’sattentionbacktoArmyGroupCenteranditsdriveonMoscow.TheGermansorderedthe3rdand4thPanzerArmiestobreakofftheirsiegeofLeningradandsupportArmyGroupCenteronitsattackonMoscow.

MapBattleforMoscow(2October–5December1941)

Beforeitcouldbegin,operationsinKievneededtobefinished.HalfofArmyGroupCenterhadswungtothesouthinthebackoftheKievposition,whileArmyGroupSouth

movedtothenorthfromitsDnieprbridgehead.TheencirclementofSovietForcesinKievwasachievedon16September.AsavagebattleensuedinwhichtheSovietswerehammeredwithtanks,artillery,andaerialbombardment.Aftertendaysofviciousfighting,theGermansclaimedover600,000Sovietsoldierscaptured.Actuallosseswere452,720men,3,867artillerypiecesandmortarsfrom43Divisionsofthe5th,21st,26th,and37thSovietArmies.AfterKiev,theRedArmynolongeroutnumberedtheGermansandtherewerenomoredirectlyavailabletrainedreserves.TodefendMoscow,Stalincouldfield800,000menin83divisions,butnomorethan25divisionswerefullyeffective.OperationTyphoon,thedrivetoMoscow,beganon2October.InfrontofArmyGroupCenterwasaseriesofelaboratedefenselines,thefirstcenteredonVyazmaandthesecondonMozhaysk.ThefirstblowtooktheSovietscompletelybysurpriseasthe2ndPanzerArmy,returningfromthesouth,tookOryolwhichwas75mi(121km)southoftheSovietfirstmaindefenseline.Threedayslater,thePanzerspushedontoBryanskwhile2ndArmyattackedfromthewest.TheSoviet3rdand13thArmieswerenowencircled.Tothenorth,the3rdand4thPanzerArmiesattackedVyazma,trappingthe19th,20th,24thand32ndArmies.Moscow’sfirstlineofdefensehadbeenshattered.Thepocketeventuallyyielded673,000Sovietprisoners,bringingthetallysincethestartoftheinvasiontothreemillion.TheSovietshadonly90,000menand150tanksleftforthedefenseofMoscow.TheSovietshadalreadysurvivedbeyondthefewweeksthatmostexpertsexpectedaftertheGermansinvaded;WalterDurantywasperhapstheonlyobservertopredictthattheUSSRcouldsurviveformuchlonger.TheGermangovernmentnowpubliclypredictedtheimminentcaptureofMoscow,convincingforeigncorrespondentsofapendingSovietcollapse.On13October,the3rdPanzerArmypenetratedtowithin90mi(140km)ofthecapital.MartiallawwasdeclaredinMoscow.AlmostfromthebeginningofOperationTyphoon,however,theweatherhaddeteriorated.Temperaturesfellwhiletherewasacontinuedrainfall,turningtheunpavedroadnetworkintomudandsteadilyslowingtheGermanadvanceonMoscowtoaslittleas2mi(3.2km)aday.Thesupplysituationrapidlydeteriorated.On31October,theGermanArmyHighCommandorderedahalttoOperationTyphoonwhilethearmieswerereorganized.ThepausegavetheSoviets,whowereinafarbettersupplysituation,timetoconsolidatetheirpositionsandorganizeformationsofnewlyactivatedreservists.InlittleoveramonththeSovietsorganizedelevennewarmieswhichincluded30divisionsofSiberiantroops.ThesehadbeenfreedfromtheSovietfareastasSovietintelligencehadassuredStalintherewasnolongerathreatfromtheJapanese.WiththeSiberianforcescameover1,000tanksand1,000aircraft.TheGermanswerenearingexhaustion,whiletheyalsobegantorecallNapoleon’sinvasionofRussia.GeneralGüntherBlumentrittnotedinhisdiary:TheyrememberedwhathappenedtoNapoleon’sArmy.Mostofthembegantore-readCaulaincourt’sgrimaccountof1812.Thathadaweightyinfluenceatthiscriticaltimein1941.IcanstillseeVonKlugetrudgingthroughthemudfromhissleepingquarterstohisofficeandstandingbeforethemapwithCaulaincourt’sbookinhishand.On15November,withthegroundhardeningduetothecoldweather,theGermansonceagainbegantheattackonMoscow.Althoughthetroopsthemselveswerenowabletoadvanceagain,therehadbeennodelayallowedtoimprovethesupplysituation.FacingtheGermanswerethe5th,16th,30th,43rd,49th,and50thSovietarmies.TheGermansintendedtolet3rdand4thPanzer

ArmiescrosstheMoscowCanalandenvelopMoscowfromthenortheast.2ndPanzerArmywouldattackTulaandthencloseinonMoscowfromthesouth.AstheSovietsreactedtotheflanks,4thArmywouldattackthecenter.Intwoweeksofdesperatefighting,lackingsufficientfuelandammunition,theGermansslowlycrepttowardsMoscow.However,inthesouth,2ndPanzerArmywasbeingblocked.On22November,SovietSiberianunitsaugmentedwiththe49thand50thSovietArmiesattackedthe2ndPanzerArmyandinflictedashockingdefeatontheGermans.However,4thPanzerArmypushedtheSoviet16thArmybackandsucceededincrossingtheMoscowcanalandbegantheencirclement.On2December,partofthe258thInfantryDivisionadvancedtowithin15mi(24km)ofMoscow,andcouldseethespiresoftheKremlin,butbythenthefirstblizzardsofthewinterhadbegun.AReconnaissance-BattalionalsomanagedtoreachthetownofKhimki—onlyabout8km(5.0mi)awayfromtheSovietcapital—andcaptureditsbridgeovertheMoscowVolgaCanalaswellasitsrailwaystation,whichmarkedthefarthestadvanceofGermanforces.TheWehrmachtwasnotequippedforwinterwarfare.Thebittercoldalsocausedsevereproblemsfortheirgunsandequipment;weatherconditionsgroundedtheLuftwaffe.Newlybuilt-upSovietunitsnearMoscownownumberedover500,000men,andon5December,theylaunchedamassivecounterattackwhichpushedtheGermansbackover200mi(320km).ByDecember1941,theinvasionhadcosttheGermanArmyover210,000killedandmissingand620,000woundedin1941,athirdofwhombecamecasualtiesafter1October,andanunknownnumberofAxiscasualtiessuchasHungarians,Romanians,andWaffenSStroopsaswellasco-belligerentFinns.ThisphaseoftheoperationwascutshortbecauseoftheRussianwinterandresultedintheheaviestlossesofthewarontheGermanside.

ReasonsforinitialSovietdefeats

TheRedArmyandairforceweresobadlydefeatedin1941mainlybecausetheywereill-preparedfortheAxissurpriseattack.By1941theGermanswerethemostexperiencedandbest-trainedtroopsintheworldfortherapid,blitzkrieg-stylewarfarethatencompassedtheEasternFrontduringthesecondhalfof1941.TheAxishadadoctrineofmobility,annihilation,excellentcommunicationsandconfidencecausedbyrepeatedlow-costvictories.TheSovietarmedforces,bycontrast,lackedleadership,trainingandreadiness.TheofficercorpsoftheRedArmyhadbeendecimatedbyStalin’sGreatPurgeof1936–1938,andtheirreplacements,appointedbyStalinforpoliticalreasons,oftenlackedmilitarycompetence,whichwasshownbythedifficultythattheSovietUnionhadindefeatingFinlandintheRusso-FinnishWarof1939–1940.Ofthefivemarshalsappointedin1935,onlytwoemergedfromStalin’spurgewiththeirlives;50outofthe57corpscommanderswerekilled,154outofthe186divisionalcommandersand401outof456colonels;andmanyotherofficersweredismissed.Stalinfurtherunderscoredhiscontrolbyreassertingtheroleofpoliticalcommissarsatthedivisionallevelandbelowtooverseeandensurethepoliticalcorrectnessandloyaltyofthearmytotheregime.Thecommissarsheldapositionequaltothatofthecommanderbutwiththeauthoritytocountermandhisorders.Nonetheless,theimpactofthepurgesmustbeseenincontextofthemilitarystrengthofthearmedforcesin1937,whichwasfarfromactualizingthegoalssetbythemilitaryreformsthatbeganintheearly1930s.By1941about80percentoftheofficersdismissedduringthepurgehad

beenreinstated.Also,betweenJanuary1939andMay1941,161newdivisionswereactivated.Therefore,althoughabout75percentofalltheofficershadbeenintheirpositionforlessthanoneyearby1941,thatwasbecauseoftherapidincreaseincreationofmilitaryunits,andnotjustbecauseofthepurge.Hence,itwasthecombinedeffectofthepurgeandtherapidexpansionofthearmythatledtoitsdilution.IntheinterwaryearsfollowingtheendofWorldWarI,muchoftheeffortoftheRedArmywasputtowardsthedevelopmentofoffensiveforces,concepts,doctrines,andtechniques.Sovietbrainpowerandresourcesfocusedonthecreationofelementscriticaltoachievingstrategicoffensivesuccessthroughtheconductofdeepoperationsanddeepbattle.TheRedArmy’sfixationonoffensivecombatmeantlittleattentionwasgiventodefensivecombat.Forinstance,the1936FieldRegulationsdevotedonlyabout20pagesofthe300-pagedocumenttodefence,inwhichitwasdescribedasatemporaryphenomenondesignedtoeconomizeforce,gaintime,holdcriticalareas,ordisruptanadvancingenemy,pendingaresumptionoftheallimportantoffence.Thisgeneralneglectfortheneedofdefensivecombat,combinedwithotherproblems,causedthedisastersthatbefelltheRedArmyinthesummerandfallof1941.MuchSovietplanningassumedthatincaseofaGermaninvasion,themainforcesofeachsidewouldneeduptotwoweekstomeeteachotherandStalinforbadeanyideasofacampaigndeepinsideSovietterritory.ThustheAxisattackcamewhenneworganizationsandpromising,butuntested,weaponswerejustbeginningtotrickleintooperationalunitsMuchoftheSovietArmyinEuropewasconcentratedalongthenewwesternborderoftheSovietUnion,informerPolishterritorythatlackedsignificantdefenses,allowingmanySovietmilitaryunitstobeoverrunanddestroyedinthefirstweeksofwar.Initially,manySovietunitswerealsohamperedbySemyonTimoshenko’sandGeorgyZhukov’sprewarorders(demandedbyJosephStalin)nottoengageortorespondtoprovocations(followedbyasimilarlydamagingfirstreactionfromMoscow,anordertostandandfight,thencounterattack;thisleftthoseunitsvulnerabletoencirclement)byalackofexperiencedofficersandbybureaucraticinertia.Stalin’sordersnottoretreatorsurrenderledtostaticlinearpositionsthatGermantankseasilybreached,againquicklycuttingsupplylinesandsurroundingwholeSovietarmies.OnlylaterdidStalinallowhistroopstoretreatwhereverpossibleandregroup,tomountadefenseindepth,ortocounterattack.Morethan2.4millionSoviettroopshadbeencapturedbyDecember1941,bywhichtimeGermanandSovietforceswerefightingalmostinthesuburbsofMoscow.Untiltheendofthewar,morethanthreemillionSovietprisonersweretodiefromexposure,starvation,disease,orwillfulmistreatmentbytheNaziregime.Inhismemoirs,Zhukovsummarizedthepredicamentasfollows:twoorthreeyearswouldhavegiventheSovietpeopleabrilliantarmy,perhapsthebestintheworld…[but]historyallottedustoosmallaperiodofpeacetogeteverythingorganizedasitshouldhavebeen.Webeganmanythingscorrectlyandthereweremanythingswehadnotimetofinish.OurmiscalculationregardingthepossibletimeofthefascistGermany’sattacktoldgreatly.Soviettacticalerrorsinthefirstfewweeksoftheoffensiveprovedcatastrophic.Initially,theRedArmywasfooledbyoverestimationofitsowncapabilities.InsteadofinterceptingGermanarmor,SovietmechanisedcorpswereambushedanddestroyedafterLuftwaffedivebombersinflictedheavylosses.Soviettanks,poorlymaintainedandmannedbyinexperiencedcrews,sufferedanappallingrateofbreakdowns.Lackofsparepartsand

trucksensuredalogisticalcollapse.Thedecisionnottodigintheinfantrydivisionsproveddisastrous.Lackingtanksandsufficientmotorization,SoviettroopscouldnotwagemobilewarfareagainsttheAxis.

CausesofthefailureofOperationBarbarossaThegravityofthebeleagueredGermanarmy’ssituationtowardstheendof1941wasduetotheRedArmy’sincreasingstrengthandfactorsthatintheshortrunseverelyrestrictedtheGermanforces’effectiveness.Chiefamongtheseweretheiroverstretcheddeployment,aserioustransportcrisisandtheerodedstrengthofmostdivisions.Theinfantrydeficitthatappearedby1September1941,wasnevermadegood.FortherestofthewarintheSovietUnion,theWehrmachtwouldbeshortofinfantryandsupportservices.

UnderestimationofthecapacityofSovietmobilizationTheGermanHighCommandgrosslyunderestimatedthemobilizationpotentialoftheRedArmy.Fromtheonsetofthecampaigntilltheendof1941,theSovietUnionraised825division-equivalents,tappingintoitsmobilizationpoolofover10millionmen.BetweentheonsetofthewarandtheendofJunealone800,000menweremobilized,andanother600,000inJuly.TheplanforBarbarossaassumedthattheWehrmachtwouldemergevictoriousifitcoulddestroythebulkoftheRedArmywestoftheDvinaandDnieperrivers.By3July,ArmyGroupCenterhad,intheBattleofBiałystok–Minsk,destroyedthreeencircledSovietArmies(3rd,4thand10th)inthevicinityofMinsk.AsArmyGroupCenterarrivedattheriverbankson7July,however,theydiscoveredanotherfiveSovietArmies(16th,19th,20th,21st,and22nd).By10July,itbecameclearthattheassumptionsregardingtheresultofdestroyingtheRedArmyforceswestofthetworiversprovedincorrect.Nonetheless,threeoftheseSovietArmies(16th,19th,and20th)werequicklyencircledandeventuallydecimatedinthevicinityofSmolensk,whiletheothertwowereseverelyweakened.Injustthefirstsixweeksoftheinvasion,whichwasbetweenlateJuneandearlyAugust,theRedArmyhadlostasmanyas1.5millionsoldiers(killed,woundedorcaptured).By6AugustanotherrowoffiveSovietArmies(24th,28th,29th,30th,andGroupIartsevo)werefacingArmyGroupCenter,however,andunknowntoGermanintelligence,stillanotherrowofSovietArmieswereformingtotherear(31st,33rd,and43rd).Incomparison,accordingtoFranzHalderthechiefoftheOKHGeneralStaff,by2AugustArmyGroupCenterhadlost74,500men(killed,wounded,ormissing)andhadreceivedonly23,000replacements.BytheendofAugusttheRedArmylossesrosetonearlythreemillion(killed,woundedorcaptured),butthatdidnothinderitfromraisingmoremenforthedefenseofMoscow.TheSovietsalsoquicklyrelocatedtheirfactories.AccordingtooneaccountbyaGermansoldier,whenGermantroopsarrivedattheDnieperRivertheysawmanyintactindustrialplants;bythetimetheycrossedtheriver,however,theRussianshademptiedeverybuildingandtakentheircontentseast.BySeptemberitbecameclearthatthemobilizationcapacityoftheRedArmyhadbeenseverelyunderestimated.

FranzHalderwroteinhisdiaryin1941:ThewholesituationmakesitincreasinglyplainthatwehaveunderestimatedtheRussiancolossus…[Soviet]divisionsarenotarmedandequippedaccordingtoourstandards,andtheirtacticalleadershipisoftenpoor.Buttheretheyare,andaswesmashadozenofthemtheRussianssimplyputupanotherdozen.Thetimefactorfavoursthem,astheyareneartheirownresources,whilewearemovingfartherandfartherawayfromours.Andsoour

troops,sprawledovertheimmensefrontline,withoutdepth,aresubjecttotheincessantattacksoftheenemy.TheRedArmyproveditcouldreplacehugelossesquickly,andwasnotdestroyedasacoherentforce.Whendivisionsofconscriptstrainedbeforethewarweredestroyed,newformationsreplacedthem.Onaverage,abouthalfamillionmenweredraftedeachmonthforthedurationofthewar.TheSovietsalsoprovedveryskilledinraisingandtrainingmanynewarmiesfromthedifferentethnicpopulationsofthefarflungrepublics.Theabilitytomobilizevast(ifoftenpoorlytrainedandequipped)forcesrapidlyandcontinuallyallowedtheSovietUniontosurvivethecriticalfirstsixmonthsofthewar.

FaultsoflogisticalplanningAtthestartofthewarinthedrysummer,theGermanstooktheSovietsbysurpriseanddestroyedalargepartoftheRedArmyinthefirstweeks.WhengoodweathergavewaytotheharshautumnandwinterandtheRedArmyrecovered,theGermanoffensivebegantofalter.TheGermanarmycouldnotbesuppliedsufficientlyforprolongedcombat;indeed,therewasnotenoughfuelforthewholearmytoreachitsobjectives.ThiswaswellunderstoodbytheGermansupplyunitsevenbeforetheoperation,buttheirwarningswereignored.TheentireGermanplanassumedthatwithinsixtoeightweekstheywouldhaveattainedfullstrategicfreedomduetoacompletecollapseoftheRedArmy.Onlythencouldtheyhavedivertednecessarylogisticsupporttofuellingthefewmobileunitsneededtooccupythedefeatedstate.Germaninfantryandtanksstormed300mi(480km)aheadinthefirstweek,buttheirsupplylinesstruggledtokeepup.Sovietrailroadscouldatfirstnotbefullyusedduetoadifferenceintrackgauges(GermanyusedstandardgaugeswhileRussiausedfive-footRussiangauge),anddismantledrailroadfacilitiesinborderareas.Inaddition,roadsystemsthatlookedimpressiveonthemap,wereinrealityunder-developed.LackofsuppliessignificantlysloweddowntheformerlyhighlyeffectiveGermantacticofblitzkrieg.

Weather

ApaperpublishedbytheU.S.Army’sCombatStudiesInstitutein1981concludedthatHitler’splansmiscarriedbeforetheonsetofseverewinterweather.Hewasconfidentofaquickvictory,sohedidnotprepareproperlyforawinterwarintheSovietUnion.Moreover,hiseasternarmysufferedmorethan734,000casualties(about23percentofitsaveragestrengthof3,200,000soldiers)inthefirstfivemonthsoftheinvasion,andon27November1941,GeneralEduardWagner,QuartermasterGeneraloftheGermanArmy,reported“Weareattheendofourresourcesinbothpersonnelandmaterial.Weareabouttobeconfrontedwiththedangersofdeepwinter.”TheGermanforceswereunreadytodealwithharshweatherandthepoorroadnetworkoftheUSSR.InSeptember,terrainslowedtheWehrmacht’sprogress.Fewroadswerepaved.ThegroundintheUSSRwasveryloosesandinsummer,stickymuckinautumn,andheavysnowinwinter.Germantankshadnarrowtrackswithlittletractionandpoorflotationinmud.Incontrast,thenewgenerationofSoviettankssuchastheT-34andKVhadwidetracksandwerefarmoremobileintheseconditions.The600,000largewesternEuropeanhorsestheGermansusedforsupplyandartillerymovementdidnotcopewellwiththisweather.ThesmallerhorsestheRedArmyusedweremuchbetteradaptedtotheclimateandcouldevenscrapetheicygroundwiththeirhoovestodiguptheweeds

beneath.Germantroopsweremostlyunpreparedfortheharshweatherchangesintherainyautumnandearlywinterof1941.Equipmenthadbeenpreparedforsuchwinterconditions,buttheseverelyoverstrainedtransportnetworkcouldnotmoveittothefront.Consequently,thetroopslackedadequatecold-weathergear,andsomesoldiershadtopacknewspapersintotheirjacketsastemperaturesdroppedtobelow−40°C.Whileatleastsomecoldweatheruniformswereavailable,theyrarelyreachedtheEasternFrontbecauseHitlerorderedthatsupplylinesgivemoreprioritytoshipmentsofammunitionandfuel.Tooperatefurnacesandheaters,theGermansalsoburnedpreciousfuelthatwasinshortsupply.Sovietsoldiers,incontrast,oftenhadwarm,quilteduniforms,felt-linedboots,andfurhats.Germanweaponsmalfunctionedinthecold.Lubricatingoilswereunsuitableforthesetemperatures,leadingtoenginemalfunctionandmisfires.Toloadshellsintoatank’smaingun,frozengreasehadtobechippedoffwithaknife.Sovietunitsfacedlesssevereproblemsduetotheirexperiencewithcoldweather.Aircrafthadinsulatingblanketstokeeptheirengineswarmwhileparked.Lighter-weightoilwasused.Germantanksandarmoredvehiclescouldnotmoveduetoalackofantifreeze,causingfueltosolidify.Thecoldwassointensethatfireshadtobelitundervehicles’enginesbeforetheycouldbestarted.BecausefewRussianroadswerepaved,mostofthemainroadsturnedtomudwhentherainsandsnowcameinlateOctoberandearlyNovember.ThesequagmirescombinedwithlongersupplylinestocausetheGermanadvancetostallwithinsightofthespiresofMoscow.TheSovietcounteroffensiveofDecember1941wasledprimarilybySiberiantroops,whohadtrainedforharshwintercombat.TheyarrivedfromtheeastwithnumerousT-34tanks,whichhadbeenheldinreserve.TheseSiberiantroopsadvancedupto100mi(160km)insomesectors,provingthatmobilewarfarewasstillpossibleduringtheRussianwinter.Whentheseverewinterbegan,HitlerfearedarepetitionofNapoleon’sdisastrousretreatfromMoscow.HeorderedtheGermanforcestoholdtheirgrounddefiantlyinthefaceofSovietcounterattacks.Thisbecameknownasthe“standordie”order.SomehistorianshavearguedthatthisorderpreventedtheGermansfrombeingrouted;otherscontendthatthisorderrestrictedGermany’sabilitytoconductmobiledefensivewarfareandledtoheavycasualtiesduetobattleandthecold.Whateverthecase,theGermansweredrivenbackashortdistancebutultimately,theirdefensivepositionsstabilized;thisservedtoconvinceHitlerfurtherthathecouldignoretheadviceofhisgenerals,somethingthatproveddisastrousfortheWehrmacht.

BattleofUman

Dates:15July–8August1941WastheGermanandalliedencirclementofthe6th(GeneralLieutenantI.N.Muzyrchenko)and12th(GeneralMajorP.G.Ponedelin)SovietarmiessouthofthecityofUmanduringtheinitialoffensiveoperationsofGermanArmyGroupSouth,commandedbyGeneralfeldmarshallGerdvonRundstedt,aspartofOperationBarbarossaontheEasternFrontduringWorldWarII.

ThebattlesoccurredduringtheKievdefensiveoperationbetweentheelementsoftheRedArmy’sSouthwesternFrontdefendingtheSouthernBugbridgesandthestrategicrailroadbetweenOdessaandSmolensk,andelementsofPanzergruppe1inWesternUkraineduringthelatter’sadvancefromsouthernPolandtoCrimea.TheSovietforceswereunderoverallcommandoftheSouthwesternDirection,commandedbyMarshalSemyonBudyonny,whichincludedtheSouthwesternFrontcommandedbyColonelGeneralMikhailKirponos.Theheadquartersandmanysubunits

ofthe12thArmywereabletoevadetheencirclementduetotheinabilityoftheGermaninfantryformationstofullyclosethecauldron,howeverbotharmieswerelaterdisbanded,andescapingtroopswereincorporatedintootherunits.ThiswasamongthelargeAxisencirclementsthatwereexecutedagainsttheRedArmyintheFirstperiodofWorldWarII.IntheinitialweeksofOperationBarbarossa,ArmyGroupSouthhadrapidlyadvancedEast,capturingLviv,TernopilandVinnytsia,anddestroyingfourmechanizedcorpsthatKirponosusedinacounterattackattheBrody.By29June1941,theGermanadvancewastemporarilyhalted,buttheSovietforceswereexhaustedandstartedtoretreat.WiththefailureoftheSovietarmorcounter-offensiveagainsttheGerman1stPanzer-Armee,ArmyGroupSouthcontinuedtoadvanceEastandreachedtowithinafewkilometersofKievbymid-July.AnattemptwasthenmadebyBudyonnytocounter-attackfromnorthofUmaninthedirectionofBerdychivtopreventPanzergruppe1fromcuttingoffhislinesofcommunication.HoweverthiscounterstrokefailedtocontactsignificantGermanarmouredforceswhichpassedonlysome50km(31mi)totheeastoftheSovietconcentrationinitscontinuedoffensive.ThecounterstrokehoweverexhaustedtheabilityofSovietformationstocontinuewithdrawalmorerapidlythantheadvanceoftheGermanoffensive,andinmid-JulyGermantroopscuttherailroadatTalnoyeandotherbridgesovertheGorniyTikich,andsoonafterthebridgesoverSinucha.

Ordersofbattle

MostoftheSovietforceswereseverelydepletedhavingwithdrawnunderheavyassaultsfromtheLuftwaffefromthePolishborder,andthemechanisedunitswerevirtuallyreducedtoasingle“Corps”aftertheBrodycounter-offensive,itsmechanisedinfantrynowfightingasordinaryrifletroops.

TheAxisforcesweredividedintothoseofPanzergruppe1thathadsufferedsignificantlosesinmatériel,butretainedcombateffectiveness,andthelargeinfantryformationsoftheGermanandRomanianarmiesthatattemptedtoadvancefromtheWesttomeetthearmoredtroopsnorthofCrimea,theinitialstrategicobjectiveofArmyGroupSouth.

RedArmy

6thArmy6thRifleCorps(reduced)37thRifleCorps(reduced)4thMechanisedCorps(remnants)15thMechanisedCorps(remnants)5thCavalryCorps(remnants)4thFortifiedRegion(remnants)6thFortifiedRegion(remnants)

12thArmy13thRifleCorps(reduced)17thRifleCorps(reduced)16thMechanisedCorps(remnants)10thFortifiedRegion(remnants)11thFortifiedregion(remnants)12thFortifiedregion(remnants)

Elementsof18thArmyWehrmacht

6thFieldArmyPanzergruppe1(reduced)

17thFieldArmyHungarianMechanizedCorps3rdRomanianArmy11thFieldArmy

ThebattlesofencirclementOn10July1941,BudyonnywasgiventhegeneralcommandofthetroopsoperatingintheSouthwesterndirection,tocoordinatetheactionsofSouthwesternandSouthernFronts.Budyonnyhad1.5milliontroopsunderhiscommandintwostrategicsectorsofthefronttodefend:atKiev(37thand26tharmies),andVinnytsia-Uman.NosoonerhadhetakenuphiscommandthanhewasadvisedofthecontinuedArmyGroupSouththree-prongedoffensivesdeepintothebreachcreatedbetweentheKievsector’s26thArmyandthe6thArmytoitssouthasGeneralEwaldvonKleist’sPanzergruppe1droveawedgebetweenthetwoSovietsectorsofthefrontsouthofKievandnorthofVinnytsia,capturingBerdychivon15JulyandKoziatynon16July.GeneralKarl-HeinrichvonStülpnagel’s17thFieldArmyadvancedtotheSouthofUmanandGeneralEugenRittervonSchobert’s11thFieldArmyadvancednorthwardfromtheRomanianborder.StavkaandtheSouthernFront’scommandstaffmistakenlyassumedthattheGermanswerestrivingtoreachthecrossingoftheDnieperbetweenKievandCherkasyforafurtheroffensivetowardDonbass,andunderestimatedthedangerofencirclementforthe6thand12tharmies.On28July,anorderwasgiventotheSouthwesternandSouthernFrontstostoptheGermansfromcrossingtheDnieperandtoretreatonlyintheEasterndirection.Asaresult,anopportunitytoavoidthedangerofencirclementbyretreatingintheSoutheasterndirectionwaslost.TheeffectoftheclosingAxisforceswastoslowlyforcetheconcentrationofthetwoSovietArmiesinaneverreducedarea,withthecombinedHQsofthearmieslocatedinthetownofPodvisokoye.On2August,theencirclementwasclosedbythemeetingofPanzerGroup1andadvanceguardelementsoftheGerman17thFieldArmy.ThisencirclementwasreinforcedthenextdaybyasecondjoiningformedwhentheGerman16thPanzerDivisionmetwiththeHungarianMechanizedCorps(Gyorshadtest).By8August,theSovietresistancehadgenerallystopped.Remnantsof20divisionsfromthe6thArmyandthe12thArmyweretrapped.Germansourcesafterthewarreportedabout103,000troopsweretakenprisoner.Includedamongofficerstakenprisonerwerecommandersofboththe6thand12tharmies,fourcorpscommanders,and11divisioncommanders.

Aftertheencirclement

Asthepocketwaseliminated,thetanksofPanzergruppe1turnednorth,andattackedtowardKievontheorderstoassistPanzergruppe2inclosinganotherencirclementaroundthatcity.TheCrimeanobjectivewasforatimelefttothefieldarmies;thefirstofmanytimeswhenHitlerwouldchangehismindaboutstrategicobjectivesoftheArmyGroups.TheStavkausedtherespiteofferedbytheGermanrefocusingofPanzergruppe1tore-establishitsfrontusingthe9thCoastalArmy(independent)andeitherreformingthedestroyedarmies,orbringingintolinereserve37thand56tharmiesfromtheinteriormilitarydistricts,withthe38thArmyeventuallylefttoholdanover-stretchedKharkovsectoroftheFront.

BattleofKievTheFirstBattleofKievwastheGermannamefortheoperationthatre

sultedinaverylargeencirclementofSoviettroopsinthevicinityofKievduringWorldWarII.Itisconsideredthelargestencirclementoftroopsinhistory.Theoperationranfrom7Augustto26September1941aspartofOperationBarbarossa,theAxisinvasionoftheSovietUnion.InSovietmilitaryhistory,itisreferredtoastheKievDefensiveOperationwithsomewhatdifferentdatingof7July–26September1941.NearlytheentireSouthwesternFrontoftheRedArmywasencircled,withtheGermansclaiming665,000captured.However,theKievencirclementwasnotcomplete,andsmallgroupsofRedArmytroopsmanagedtoescapethecauldrondaysaftertheGermanpincersmeteastofthecity,includingtheheadquartersofMarshalSemyonBudyonny,MarshalSemyonTimoshenkoandCommissarNikitaKhrushchev.ThecommanderoftheSouthwesternFront—MikhailKirponos—wastrappedbehindenemylinesandkilledwhiletryingtobreakthrough.TheKievdisasterwasanunprecedenteddefeatfortheRedArmy,exceedingeventheMinsktragedyofJune–July1941.On1September,theSouthwesternFrontnumbered752–760,000troops(850,000includingreservesandrearserviceorgans),3,923gunsandmortars,114tanksand167combataircraft.Theencirclementtrapped452,700soldiers,2,642gunsandmortarsand64tanks,ofwhichscarcely15,000escapedfromtheencirclementby2October.Overall,theSouthwesternFrontsuffered700,544casualties,including616,304killed,captured,ormissingduringthemonth-longBattleforKiev.Asaresult,fiveSovietfieldarmies(5th,37th,26th,21st,andthe38th),consistingof43divisions,virtuallyceasedtoexist.The40thArmywasbadlyaffectedaswell.LiketheWesternFrontbeforeit,theSouthwesternFronthadtoberecreatedalmostfromscratch.AftertherapidprogressofArmyGroupCenterthroughthecentralsectoroftheEasternfront,ahugesalientdevelopedarounditsjunctionwithArmyGroupSouthbylateJuly1941.AsubstantialSovietforce,nearlytheentireSouthwesternFront,positionedinandaroundKievwaslocatedinthesalient.WhilelackingmobilityandarmorduetohighlossesintanksattheBattleofUman,theynonethelessposedasignificantthreattotheGermanadvanceandwerethelargestsingleconcentrationofSoviettroopsontheEasternFrontatthattime.On3August,HitlertemporarilycancelledthedriveonMoscowinfavorofdrivingsouthandattackingKievinUkraine.Howeveron12August1941,SupplementtoDirectiveNo.34wasissued,anditrepresentedacompromisebetweenHitler,whowasconvincedthecorrectstrategywastoclearthesalientoccupiedbySovietforcesonrightflankofArmyGroupCenterinthevicinityofKievbeforeresumingthedrivetoMoscow,andHalder,BockandGuderian,whoadvocatedanadvanceonMoscowassoonaspossible.Thecompromiserequired2ndand3rdPanzerGroupsofArmyGroupCenter,whichwereredeployinginordertoaidArmyGroupNorthandArmyGroupSouthrespectively,bereturnedtoArmyGroupCenter,togetherwiththe4thPanzerGroupofArmyGroupNorth,oncetheirobjectiveswereachieved.ThenthethreePanzerGroups,underthecontrolofArmyGroupCenter,willleadtheadvanceonMoscow.Initially,Halder,chiefoftheOKHGeneralStaff,andBock,commanderofArmyGroupCenter,weresatisfiedbythecompromise,butsoontheiroptimismfadedastheoperationalrealitiesoftheplanprovedtoochallenging.On18August,OKHsubmittedastrategicsurvey(Denkschrift)toHitlerregardingthe

continuationofoperationsintheEast.ThepapermadethecaseforthedrivetoMoscow,arguingonceagainthatArmyGroupsNorthandSouthwerestrongenoughtoaccomplishtheirobjectiveswithoutanyassistancefromArmyGroupCenter.PointingoutthattherewasonlyenoughtimeleftbeforewintertoconductasingledecisiveoperationagainstMoscow.On20August,HitlerrejectedtheproposalbasedontheideathatthemostimportantobjectivewastodeprivetheSovietsoftheirindustrialareas.On21AugustJodlofOKWissuedadirective,whichsummarizedHitler’sinstructions,toBrauchitschcommanderoftheArmy.ThepaperreiteratedthatthecaptureofMoscowbeforetheonsetofwinterwasnotaprimaryobjective.Rather,thatthemostimportantmissionsbeforetheonsetofwinterweretoseizetheCrimea,andtheindustrialandcoalregionoftheDon;isolatetheoil-producingregionsoftheCaucasusfromtherestoftheSovietUnionandinthenorth,toencircleLeningradandlinkupwiththeFinns.Amongotherinstructions,italsoinstructedthatArmyGroupCenteristoallocatesufficientforcestoensurethedestructionofthe“Russian5thArmy”and,atthesametime,topreparetorepelenemycounterattacksinthecentralsectorofitsfront.HitlerreferredtotheSovietforcesinthesalientcollectivelyasthe“Russian5thArmy”.Halderwasdismayed,andlaterdescribedHitler’splanas“utopianandunacceptable”,concludingthattheorderswerecontradictoryandHitleralonemustbeartheresponsibilityforinconsistencyofhisordersandthattheOKHcannolongerassumeresponsibilityforwhatwasoccurring;however,Hitler’sinstructionsstillaccuratelyreflectedtheoriginalintentoftheBarbarossadirectiveofwhichtheOKHwasawareofallalong.Engelinhisdiaryfor21August1941,simplysummarizeditas,“itwasablackdayfortheArmy”.HalderofferedhisownresignationandadvisedBrauchitschtodothesame.However,Brauchitschdeclined,statingHitlerwouldnotacceptthegesture,andnothingwouldchangeanyhow.Halderwithdrewhisofferofresignation.

On23August,HalderconvenedwithBockandGuderianinBorisov(inBelorussia),andafterwardsflewwithGuderiantoHitler’sheadquartersinEastPrussia.22DuringameetingbetweenGuderianandHitler,withneitherHaldernorBrauchitschpresent,HitlerallowedGuderiantomakethecasefordrivingontoMoscow,andthenrejectedhisargument.HitlerclaimedhisdecisiontosecurethenorthernandsouthernsectorsofwesternSovietUnionwere“taskswhichstrippedtheMoscowproblemofmuchofitssignificance”andwas“notanewproposition,butafactIhaveclearlyandunequivocallystatedsincethebeginningoftheoperation.”HitleralsoarguedthatthesituationwasevenmorecriticalbecausetheopportunitytoencircletheSovietforcesinthesalientwas“anunexpectedopportunity,andareprievefrompastfailurestotraptheSovietarmiesinthesouth.”Hitleralsodeclared,“theobjectionsthattimewillbelostandtheoffensiveonMoscowmightbeundertakentoolate,orthatthearmouredunitsmightnolongerbetechnicallyabletofulfilltheirmission,arenotvalid.”HitlerreiteratedthatoncetheflanksofArmyGroupCenterwerecleared,especiallythesalientinthesouth,thenhewouldallowthearmytoresumeitsdriveonMoscow;anoffensive,heconcluded,which“mustnotfail.”.InpointoffactHitlerhadalreadyissuedtheordersfortheshiftofGuderian’spanzergrouptothesouth.GuderianreturnedtohispanzergroupandbeganthesouthernthrustinanefforttoencircletheSovietforcesinthesalient.Thebulkof2ndPanzerGroupandthe2ndArmyweredetachedfromArmyGroupCentreandsentsouth.ItsmissionwastoencircletheSouthwesternFront,commandedbyBudyonny,inconjunctionwith1stPanzerGroupofArmyGroupSouthunderKleist,whichwasdrivingupfromasoutheasternlydirection.

BattleThePanzerarmiesmaderapidprogress.On12September,Kleist’s1stPanzerGroup,23

whichhadbynowturnednorthandcrossedtheDnieperRiver,emergedfromitsbridgeheadsatCherkassyandKremenchug.Continuingnorth,itcutacrosstherearofBudyonny’sSouthwesternFront.On16September,itmadecontactwithGuderian’s2ndPanzerGroup24advancingsouth,atthetownofLokhvitsa,120milesbehindKiev.BudyonnywasnowtrappedandsoonrelievedbyStalin’sorderof13September.Nosuccessorwasnamed,leavingthetroopstotheirindividualcorpsanddivisioncommanders.Afterthat,thefateoftheencircledRussianarmieswassealed.Withnomobileforcesorsupremecommanderleft,therewasnopossibilitytoeffectabreakout.TheinfantryoftheGerman17thArmyand6thArmyofArmyGroupSouthsoonarrived,alongwith2ndArmy(alsoonloanfromArmyGroupCenterandmarchingbehindGuderian’stanks).TheysystematicallybegantoreducethepocketassistedbythetwoPanzerarmies.TheencircledSovietarmiesatKievdidnotgiveupeasily.AsavagebattleinwhichtheSovietswerebombardedbyartillery,tanksandaircrafthadtobefoughtbeforethepocketwasovercome.By19September,Kievhadfallen,buttheencirclementbattlecontinued.After10daysofheavyfighting,thelastremnantsoftroopseastofKievsurrenderedon26September.TheGermansclaimed600,000RedArmysoldierscaptured,althoughtheseclaimshaveincludedalargenumberofcivilianssuspectedofevadingcapture.

AftermathByvirtueofGuderian’ssouthwardturn,theWehrmachtdestroyedtheen

tireSouthwesternFronteastofKievduringSeptember,inflicting600,000lossesontheRedArmy,whileSovietforceswestofMoscowconductedafutileandcostlyoffensiveagainstGermanArmyGroupCenternearSmolensk.Theseoperations,suchastheYelnyaOffensive,wereconductedoververybadterrainagainstdefendersinfortifiedstrongpoints,andnearlyallofthesecounter-offensivesendedindisasterfortheRedArmy.Asaresultofthesefailedoffensives,RedarmyformationsdefendingMoscowwereseriouslyweakened.Withitssouthernflanksecured,ArmyGroupCenterlaunchedOperationTyphooninthedirectionofVyazmainOctober.OvertheobjectionsofGerdvonRundstedt,ArmyGroupSouthwasorderedtoresumetheoffensiveandoverrannearlyalloftheCrimeaandLeftBankUkrainebeforereachingtheedgesoftheDonbasindustrialregion.Howeverafterfourmonthsofcontinuousoperationshisforceswereatthebrinkofexhaustion,andsufferedamajordefeatintheBattleofRostov(1941).ArmyGroupSouth’sinfantryfaredlittlebetterandfailedtocapturethevitalcityofKharkovbeforenearlyallofitsfactories,skilledlaborersandequipmentwereevacuatedeastoftheUralMountains.

AssessmentImmediatelyafterWorldWarIIended,prominentGermancommandersarguedthathadoperationsatKievbeendelayedandhadOperationTyphoonbeenlaunchedinSeptemberratherthanOctober,theWehrmachtwouldhavereachedandcapturedMoscowbeforetheonsetofwinter.HeinzGuderianandFedorvonBockinparticularfiercelyarguedthatthe“diversion”toKievwouldhavedireconsequencesiftheoperationdraggedonfortoolong.Winterwascominginafewweeks,andifMoscowwasnottakenbeforethefirstsnow,theentireoperationwouldliterallybogdowninthemud.However,DavidGlantzarguedthathadOperationTyphoonbeenlaunchedinSeptember,itwouldhavemetgreaterresistanceduetoSovietforcesnothavingbeenweakenedby

theiroffensiveseastofSmolensk.Theoffensivewouldhavealsobeenlaunchedwithanextendedrightflank.GlantzalsoclaimsthatregardlessofthefinalpositionofGermanTroopswhenwintercame,theywouldhavestillfacedacounteroffensivebythe10reservearmiesraisedbytheSovietstowardtheendoftheyear.IfKievhadnotbeentakenbeforetheBattleofMoscow,theentireoperationwouldhaveendedinutterdisasterfortheGermans.

FirstBattleofKharkov

The1stBattleofKharkovsonamedbyWilhelmKeitelwasthe1941tacticalbattleforthecityofKharkov(nowKharkiv)(UkrainianSSR)duringthefinalphaseofOperationBarbarossabetweentheGerman6thArmyofArmyGroupSouthandtheSovietSouthwesternFront.TheSoviet38thArmywasorderedtodefendthecitywhileitsfactoriesweredismantledforrelocationfarthereast.TheGerman6thArmyneededtotakethecityinordertoclosethewideninggapbetweenthe4thPanzerGroupandthe17thArmy.By20OctobertheGermanshadreachedthewesternedgeofthecity,itwastakenbythe57thInfantryDivisionby24October.Bythattime,however,mostofKharkov’sindustrialequipmenthadbeenevacuatedorrendereduselessbytheRedArmy.

Intheautumnof1941,KharkovwasconsideredoneoftheSoviets’mostimportantstrategicbasesforrailroadandairlineconnections.Itnotonlyconnectedtheeast-westandnorth-southpartsofUkraine,butalsoseveralcentralregionsoftheUSSRincludingtheCrimea,theCaucasus,theDnieperregion,andDonbas.MilitaryimportanceKharkovwasoneofthelargestindustrialcentersoftheSovietUnion.Oneofitsgreatest

contributionswastheSovietT-34tankthatwasbothdesignedanddevelopedattheKharkovTractorFactory.Itwasconsideredtobethemostpowerfultankplantinthecountry.OtherfactoriesthatwerelocatedinthecityincludedtheKharkovAircraftPlant,KharkovPlantoftheNKVD(FED),andtheKharkovTurbinePlant.MilitaryproductsthatwereinKharkovbeforethebattlestartedincluded:tanks,Su-2,artillerytractors,82mmmortars,sub-machineguns,ammunition,andothermilitaryequipment.ThemainobjectivefortheGermantroopswastocapturetherailroadandmilitaryplants,thustheydesperatelytriedtokeeptheindustrialareaofKharkovintact.AdolfHitlerhimselfstressedtheimportanceofthosemilitaryplantsstating:“…ThesecondinimportanceissouthofRussia,particularlytheDonetsBasin,rangingfromtheKharkovregion.Thereisthewholebasisof[the]Russianeconomy;iftheareaismasteredthenitwouldinevitablyleadtothecollapseoftheentireRussianeconomy…”

PopulationofKharkovKharkovwasoneofthemostpopulatedSovietcitiesduringWorldWarII.

Itwasratedat901,000peopleon1May1941.InSeptember1941thepopulationskyrocketedtoonemillion500thousandpeople,duetomultipleevacueesfromothercities.Aftermultipleattacksandmanydeaths,thepopulationofKharkovdecreasedto180–190thousand,whichwasthesizeaftertheliberationofthecityinAugust1943.

JewishpopulationKharkovwasoneofthemostimportantSovietcentersforthefleeingJewishpopulation.Accordingtorecords,Kharkovhad10,271peopleofJewishethnicitylivinginthecity,75%ofwhomwerewomen,children,andtheelderly.Afterthebattle,manyofthemwereeithertransferredtoconcentrationcampsorexecuted.

TheaftermathofKiev

AftertheBattleofKievArmyGroupCenterwasorderedtoredeployitsforcesfortheattackonMoscow,andsothe2ndPanzerGroupturnednorthtowardsBryanskandKursk.ArmyGroupSouth,andinparticularWalthervonReichenau’s6thArmyandCarl-HeinrichvonStülpnagel’s17thArmytooktheplaceofthePanzerDivisions.ThemainoffensiveformationofArmyGroupSouth,PaulLudwigEwaldvonKleist’s1stPanzerGroup,wasinthemeantimeorderedsouthforadrivetoRostov-on-DonandtheCaucasianoilfields,followingFührerDirectiveNo.35.TheburdenofprocessingKiev’s600.000PrisonersofWar(POWs)felluponthe6thand17thArmies,sowhilethe1stPanzerGroupsecuredtheGermanvictoryintheBattleofMelitopol,thesetwoarmiesspentthenextthreeweeksregrouping.25

Meanwhile,‘Stavka’,(theSovietHighCommand),neededtostabiliseitssouthernflankandpouredreinforcementsintotheareabetweenKurskandRostov,attheexpenseofitsforcesinfrontofMoscow.TheSouthwesternFront,whichhadbeencompletelydestroyedduringthebattleofKiev,wasre-establishedunderthecommandofMarshalSemyonTimoshenko,oneofthemorecapableRedArmycommanders.The6th,21st,38thand40thArmieswerereconstitutedalmostfromscratch.

ApproachingKharkovWiththeBattleofMoscowunderway,theGermanshadtoprotecttheirflanks,andon6OctobervonReichenauadvancedthroughSumyandOkhtyrkainthedirectionofBelgorodandKharkov.Onthesameday,the17thArmycommenceditsoffensivefromPoltavatowardsLozovaandIzyumtoprotectthelengtheningflankofthe1stPanzerArmy(therenamed1stPanzerGroup).TheSouthwesternFront’s6thArmy(commandedbyRodionMalinovsky)and38thArmy(commandedbyVladimirTsiganov)failedtoconductacoordinateddefenseandwerebeatenback.IntheleaduptotheBattleofMoscow,theRedArmysufferedacatastrophicdefeatatVyazmaandBryansk,suffering700,000casualties.ThefewreservesavailableweredesperatelyneededtodefendtheSovietcapitol,andthuswereunavailabletoTimoshenko’sreconstitutedSouthwesternFront.Withnoreservestoplugthebreach,theStavkawasforcedfallbacktoVoronezhinorderpreventatotalcollapseofthesouthernflank.AlthoughthemainobjectivesoftheGermanArmybeforewinterfellweretocaptureLeningrad,MoscowandtheapproachestotheCaucasianoilfields,Kharkovwasanimportantsecondaryobjective.Besidestheneedtoprotecttheflanksofitsmotorizedspearheads,theOKH,theGermanArmyhighcommand,(OberkommandodesHeeres),

alsosawtheimportanceofKharkovasanindustrialcenterandrailroadhub.CapturingthecitymeantthattheSouthwesternandSouthernFronthadtofallbackonVoronezhandStalingradastheirmajortransporthubs.When,inthesecondweekofOctober,thedirtyweatheroftheRasputitsa(the‘mud’season)andthepoorlogisticsintheareabetweentheDneprandthefront,(allthebridgeshadcollapsedduringcombatandicethreatenedthepontoons),causedtheoffensivetostall.Hitlerpersonallyallocatedresourcesfromthe17thArmytothe6thArmytoensurethecaptureofKharkov.This,however,weakenedthe17thArmy’sefforttoprotecttheflankofthe1stPanzerArmyandcontributedtotheGermandefeatattheBattleofRostov.After17October,nightfrostimprovedtheroads,butsnowstormsandthecoldstartedtohampertheGermans,whowereinsufficientlyequippedforwinteroperations(theGermanArmyhadplannedthatBarbarossawouldbeoverbeforewinterfell).

Courseofthebattle

PreparingtotakethecityThetaskofassaultingKharkovitselfwasgiventotheLV.Armeekorps

commandedbyGeneralderInfanterieErwinVierow.Thiscorpshadatitsdisposalthe101.Leichte-Division,commandedbyGeneralleutnantJosefBraunervonHaydringencominginfromthenorth,the57.Infanterie-Division,commandedbyGeneralmajorAntonDostlercominginfromthesouth,andthe100.Leichte-Division,whodidnottakepartinthebattle.Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung197,commandedbyHauptmannKurtvonBarisanihadtwoofitsthreebatteriesattachedtothe57.Infanterie-Divisiontoprovideclosefiresupportduringtheassault.ForthedefenseofKharkov,the216thRifleDivisionhadbeenreformedthereafteritsdestructionatKiev.Itreceivedlittletonosupportfromotherdivisionsorfromhighercommandformations,becausethe38thArmywasintheprocessofastrategicretreatandthedefenseofKharkovwasonlynecessaryaslongasitsfactoryequipmenthadnotbeencompletelyevacuated.

Battlesonthewesternedgeofthecity(20–23October)By21Octoberthe101stLightDivisionhadreachedalineaboutsixkilometerswestofKharkov.The228thLightRegimentspearheadedthedivision,its1stand3rdbattalionstakingupdefensivepositionsonthefront,withthe2ndbattalioninreserve.On22Octobertheregimentwasorderedtoconductreconnaissancetodeterminetheenemy’sstrength.ThatsamedayatnoontheregimentwasattackedbyaSovietinfantrybattalionsupportedbytanks.Theattackwasrepulsedandtwotanksweredisabled.ThatnightthereconinformationwastransmittedbyradiototheDivisionHQ.The216thRifleDivisionhadoccupiedthewesternedgeofthecity,withmachinegunnests,mortarpitsandminefieldsinplace.Fortheattack,the3rdbattalion(theregiment’srightflank),wasreinforcedwithtwogunsfromthedivision’sartillery,The85thArtilleryRegiment,acompanyofengineersandan88mmanti-aircraftgun.The2ndbattalionreceivedthesamereinforcements,butwithouttheAAgun.The1stbattalionactedastheregimentalreserve.Thefirstbattalionofthe229thLightRegimentwouldprotecttheleftflankofthe228th.Theattackhourwassetatnoon,inconjunctionwiththe57thInfantryDivision.At11:00hours,aliaisonwasestablishedbetweenthe85thArtilleryandthe228thLightRegiments.Theartillerywasnotreadyatthetimedesignated,sotheattackhadtobe

postponed.Inthemeantimetheanti-tankcompany,whohadbeenstuckinthemudattherear,finallyarrivedatthefrontandwasorderedtoassignone37mmAT-gunplatoontoeveryfrontlinebattalion.At14:25,theartillerywasreadyandtheattackhourwassetat15:00.

Assaultonthecity(23–24October)TheevacuationofindustrialenterprisesstartedbeforetheGermanshadachancetoattack.By20October1941itwasvirtuallycompleted.Threehundredandtwentytrainsweresentwiththeequipmentfrom70majorfactories.KharkovwastakenbyvonReichenau’s6thArmy,on24October1941.

OccupationofKharkovThecitywassubjecttoitsfirstoccupationduringthewar,whichlasteduntil16February1943.ThecityneverbecamepartofReichskommissariatUkrainebecauseofitsproximitytothefront.ThestaffoftheLV.Armeekorpsactedastheoccupationalauthority,using57.IDasanoccupationforce.GeneralmajorAntonDostlerwasStadtkommandantuntil13December,whenhewassucceededbyGeneralleutnantAlfredvonPuttkamer,andKharkovwastransferredtotheHeeresgebietofthe6.ArmeeandputunderthejointauthorityoftheStadtkommandantandFeldkommandantur757.GermantroopsactingundertheauthorityoftheReichenau-Befehlof10October(effectivelyanordertokillanybodyassociatedwithcommunism)terrorizedthepopulationthatwasleftafterthebattle.ManyoftheSovietcommanders’corpseswerehungoffbalconiestostrikefearintotheremainingpopulation.Manypeoplebegantoflee,causingchaos.Intheearlyhoursof14November,multiplebuildingsinthecitycenterwereblownupbytime-fusesleftbytheretreatingRedArmy.Casualtiesincludedthecommander(GeneralleutnantGeorgBraun)andstaffofthe68.Infanterie-Division.TheGermansarrestedsome200civilians(mostlyJews)andhangedthemfromthebalconiesoflargebuildings.Another1,000weretakenashostagesandinternedintheHotelInternationalonDzerzhinskySquare.AllofthesewarcrimeswerecommittedbyfrontlineHeercommanders,andnotbySStroops.On14December,theStadtkommandantorderedtheJewishpopulationtobeconcentratedinahutsettlementneartheKharkovTractorFactory.Intwodays,20,000Jewsweregatheredthere.Sonderkommando4a,commandedbySS-StandartenführerPaulBlobel,ofEinsatzgruppeCstartedshootingthefirstoftheminDecember,thencontinuingtokillthemthroughoutJanuaryinagasvan.Thiswasamodifiedtruckthatfitted50peopleinit;thevandrovearoundthecityandslowlykilledthepeoplethatweretrappedinitwithcarbonmonoxidethatwasemittedfromthevehicleitselfandchanneledintoanairtightcompartment.Thevictimsdiedbyacombinationofcarbonmonoxidepoisoningandsuffocation.TheGermanArmyconfiscatedlargequantitiesoffoodtobeusedbyitstroops,creatingacuteshortagesintheUkraine.ByJanuary1942aroundone-thirdofthecities300,000remaininginhabitantssufferedfromstarvation.Manywoulddieinthecoldwintermonths.AsaresultofthebattlesinKharkov,thecitywasleftinruins.Dozensofarchitecturalmonumentsweredestroyedandnumerousartistictreasurestaken.OneofRussia’sknownauthors–AlekseyNikolayevichTolstoy,wrote:“IsawKharkov.AsifitwereRomeinthe5thcentury.Ahugecemetery…”

BattleofRostov

TheBattleofRostov(1941)wasabattleoftheEasternFrontofWorldWarII,foughtaroundRostov-on-DonbetweentheGermanArmyGroupSouth,commandedbyGeneralGerdvonRundstedtandtheSovietSouthernFrontcommandedbyGeneralYakovTimofeyevichCherevichenko.Itcomprisedthreephases:theGermanArmyGroupSouthSeaofAzovOffensiveOperation(begunon12September1941),theSovietRostovDefensiveOperation(5November1941–16November1941)bytheSouthernFront,andtheRostovOffensiveOperation(27November1941–2December1941)executedbythesameSovietFront.AfterconcludingtheBattleofKievinSeptember1941,theGermanArmyGroupSouthadvancedfromtheDnieprtotheSeaofAzovcoast.WalthervonReichenau’s6thArmycapturedKharkov.Carl-HeinrichvonStülpnagel’s17thArmymarchedthroughPoltavatowardsVoroshilovgrad.ErichvonManstein’s11thArmymovedintotheCrimeaandhadtakencontrolofallofthepeninsulabyautumn(exceptSevastopol,whichheldoutuntil3July1942).EwaldvonKleist’s1stPanzerArmyadvancedfromKiev,andencircledSoviettroopsatMelitopolinOctober,thenattackedeastalongtheshoreoftheSeaofAzovtowardRostovatthemouthoftheDonriver,knownasthegatewaytotheCaucasus.

SeaofAzovoffensiveOperation

Rostovwasassignedastheobjectiveforthe11thArmynowcommandedbyGeneralvonSchobert,howeverhediedinacrashonthesamedayafterlandinghisliaisonFieselerStorchaircraftinaminefield.Toreplacehim,GeneralofInfantryvonMansteinwasorderedtotravelfromtheLeningradsectorofthefronttotheextremesouthernsector.Hewouldalsoreceivesupportfromthe4thLuftwaffeAirFleet.AtthistimetheLIVthArmyCorpsofthe11thArmywasstillengagedinCrimea,andbecausetheRomanianforceswerestillengagedintheSiegeofOdessa,theArmy’sresourcesfortheRostovobjectivewereseverelylimitedevenagainstretreatingRedArmytroops.ThereforeinitiallyvonMansteinreplacedtheLIVCorpswiththesmallerXXXthArmyCorpsandXLIXthMountainCorps,andorderedtheLIVCorpsintothefirstechelonintheadvancetoRostov.LateinSeptemberthe3rdRomanianArmyjoinedthe11thArmyinitsadvancetowardsRostov,butwasseverelydepletedbytheattacksoftheSoviet9thand18thArmieson26September.ThisforcedahalttotheArmy’sadvancetosafeguarditsflank,andforcedvonMansteintousehisonlymobilereserveunit,theLeibstandarteBrigadetoshoreupRomaniandefenses.

RostovDefensiveOperation

TheSovietcounter-attackdeliveredaspartofthegeneralDonbass-RostovStrategicDefensiveOperation(29September1941–16November1941)alsoforcedtheArmyGroupCommandertoorderhis1stPanzerArmytomanoeuvreinordertobebetterplacedtocounteranyfurtherSovietthrustsintheRomaniansectorofthefront,andalsotoattemptanencirclementofthetwoSovietArmies,whichwaspartlysuccessfulintheareaofChernigovkawherethecommanderofthe18thSovietArmyGeneral-LieutenantSmirnovwaskilledduringthebreakoutattemptbetween5and10October1941.ThiswasinterpretedbyHitlerassuchasuccessthathedeclared“ThebattleoftheSeaofAzovisover.”on11Octoberbeforethetroopshadevenreachedtheirobjective.Asa

commemorativegesture,HitlerissuedtheordertoredesignatetheLeibstandarteBrigadeas1stSSDivisionLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler.TheGerman11thArmywasorderedbacktoCrimeatoeffectthebreakthroughoftheIsthmusofPerekop.PerceivingthatthewaytoRostovandtheCaucasuswasopen,Hitlerissuedanordertransferringtheobjectivefromthe11thArmytothe1stPanzerArmyandattachingtoitillpreparedRomanian3rdArmy,theItalianAlpineCorps,andtheSlovakianMotorisedBrigade.DuringthesubsequentreorganisationofAxisforcesthe3rdPanzerCorpsand14thPanzerCorpstookthelead,supportedbytheXLIXMountainCorpsrecentlyarrivedfromCrimea.By17October1941theMiusriverwascrossedbythe14thPanzerDivisionandTaganrogwascapturedbyGermantroops,withthemountaintroopsenteringStalino,forcingthenewlyformed12thArmyintoarenewedwithdrawal.HowevertheRedArmywasatthisstagefortunateinthattheAutumnrainshadbegun,andtheinfamousRasputitsahadsetinslowingthe1stPanzerArmy’sadvanceto“meterbymeter”.ThismeantthattheleadingGermanunitsdidnotreachtheoutskirtsofRostovuntilmid-November,havinglostcontactwiththeRedArmyinthemeantime.TheassaultonRostovbeganon17November,andon21NovembertheGermanstookRostov.However,theGermanlineswereover-extended,andvonKleist’swarningsthathisleftflankwasvulnerableandthathistankswereineffectiveinthefreezingweatherwereignored.

RostovOffensiveOperationOn27NovembertheSoviet37thArmy,commandedbyLieutenant-GeneralAntonIvanovichLopatin,aspartoftheRostovStrategicOffensiveOperation(17November1941–2December1941),counter-attackedthe1stPanzerArmy’sspearheadfromthenorth,forcingthemtopulloutofthecity.AdolfHitlercountermandedtheretreat.WhenvonRundstedtrefusedtoobey,Hitlersackedhim,andreplacedhimwithvonReichenau.However,vonReichenausawatoncethatvonRundstedtwasrightandsucceededinpersuadingHitler,viaFranzHalder,toauthorisethewithdrawal.,andthe1stPanzerArmywasforcedbacktotheMiusRiveratTaganrog.ItwasthefirstsignificantGermanwithdrawalofthewar.

Hitler’sWarDirectives1939-1945DirectiveNo21

FührerandSupremeCommanderFührerHeadquarters,oftheArmedForces18thDecember1940.9copies

DirectiveNo,21‘CaseBarbarossa’TheGermanArmedForcesmustbeprepared,evenbeforetheconclusionofthewaragainstEngland,tocrushSovietRussiainarapidcampaign(‘CaseBarbarossa’).TheArmywillhavetoemployallavailableformationstothisend,withthereservationthatoccupiedterritoriesmustbeinsuredagainstsurpriseattacks.TheAirForcewillhavetomakeavailableforthisEasterncampaignsupportingforcesofsuchstrengththattheArmywillbeabletobringlandoperationstoaspeedyconclusionandthatEasternGermanywillbeaslittledamagedaspossiblebyenemyairattack.Thisbuild-upofafocalpointintheEastwillbelimitedonlybytheneedtoprotectfromair

attackthewholecombatandarsenalareawhichwecontrol,andtoensurethatattacksonEngland,andespeciallyuponherimports,arenotallowedtolapse.ThemaineffortsoftheNavywillcontinuetobedirectedagainstEnglandevenduringtheEasterncampaign.IncertaincircumstancesIshallissueordersforthedeploymentagainstSovietRussiaeightweeksbeforetheoperationistimedtobegin.Preparationswhichrequiremoretimethanthiswillbeputinhandnow,insofarasthishasnotalreadybeendone,andwillbeconcludedbyi5thMay1941.Itisofdecisiveimportancethatourintentiontoattackshouldnotbeknown.ThepreparationsoftheHighCommandswillbemadeonthefollowingbasis:I.GeneralIntentionThebulkoftheRussianArmystationedinWesternRussiawillbedestroyedbydaringoperationsledbydeeplypenetratingarmouredspearheads.RussianforcesstillcapableofgivingbattlewillbepreventedfromwithdrawingintothedepthsofRussia.TheenemywillthenbeenergeticallypursuedandalinewillbereachedfromwhichtheRussianAirForcecannolongerattackGermanterritory.ThefinalobjectiveoftheoperationistoerectabarrieragainstAsiaticRussiaonthegenerallineVolga—Archangel.ThelastsurvivingindustrialareaofRussiaintheUralscanthen,ifnecessary,beeliminatedbytheAirForce.InthecourseoftheseoperationstheRussianBalticFleetwillquicklyloseitsbasesandwillthennolongerbecapableofaction.TheeffectiveoperationoftheRussianAirForceistobepreventedfromthebeginningoftheattackbypowerfulblows.II.ProbableAlliesandtheirTasks1.OntheflanksofouroperationswecancountontheactivesupportofRumaniaandFinlandinthewaragainstSovietRussia.TheHighCommandoftheArmedForceswilldecideandlaydowninduetimethemannerinwhichtheforcesofthesetwocountrieswillbebroughtunderGermancommand.2.ItwillbethetaskofRumaniatosupporttheattackoftheGermansouthernflank,atleastattheoutset,withitsbesttroops;toholddowntheenemywhereGermanforcesarenotengaged;andtoprovideauxiliaryservicesintherearareas.3.FinlandwillcovertheadvanceoftheNorthernGroupofGermanforcesmovingfromNorway(detachmentsofGroupXXI)andwilloperateinconjunctionwiththem.FinlandwillalsoberesponsibleforeliminatingHango.4.ItispossiblethatSwedishrailwaysandroadsmaybeavailableforthemovementoftheGermanNorthernGroup,bythebeginningoftheoperationatthelatest.III.ConductofOperationsA.Army(inaccordancewithplanssubmittedtome):Inthetheatreofoperations,whichisdividedbythePripetMarshesintoaSouthernandaNorthernsector,themainweightofattackwillbedeliveredintheNorthernarea.TwoArmyGroupswillbeemployedhere.ThemoresoutherlyofthesetwoArmyGroups(inthecentreofthewholefront)willhavethetaskofadvancingwithpowerfularmouredandmotorizedformationsfromtheareaaboutandnorthofWarsaw,androutingtheenemyforcesinWhiteRussia.Thiswillmakeitpossibleforstrongmobileforcestoadvancenorthwardsand,inconjunctionwiththeNorthernArmyGroupoperatingoutofEast

PrussiainthegeneraldirectionofLeningrad,todestroytheenemyforcesoperatingintheBalticarea.Onlyafterthefulfilmentofthisfirstessentialtask,whichmustincludetheoccupationofLeningradandKronstadt,willtheattackbecontinuedwiththeintentionofoccupyingMoscow,animportantcentreofcommunicationsandofthearmamentsindustry.OnlyasurprisinglyrapidcollapseofRussianresistancecouldjustifythesimultaneouspursuitofbothobjectives.ThemostimportanttaskofGroupXXI,evenduringtheseEasternoperations,remainstheprotectionofNorway.AnyforcesavailableaftercarryingoutthistaskwillbeemployedintheNorth(MountainCorps),atfirsttoprotectthePet-samoareaanditsironoreminesandtheArctichighway,thentoadvancewithFinnishforcesagainsttheMurmanskrailwayandthuspreventthepassageofsuppliestoMurmanskbyland.ThequestionwhetheranoperationofthiskindcanbecarriedoutwithstrongerGermanforces(twoorthreedivisions)fromtheRovaniemiareaandsouthofitwilldependonthewillingnessofSwedentomakeitsrailwaysavailablefortrooptransport.ItwillbethedutyofthemainbodyoftheFinnishArmy,inconjunctionwiththeadvanceoftheGermanNorthflank,toholddownthestrongestpossibleRussianforcesbyanattacktotheWest,oronbothsidesofLakeLadoga,andtooccupyHango.TheArmyGroupoperatingSouthofthePripetMarsheswillalsoseek,inaconcentricoperationwithstrongforcesoneitherflank,todestroyallRussianforceswestoftheDnieperintheUkraine.ThemainattackwillbecarriedoutfromtheLublinareainthegeneraldirectionofKiev,whileforcesinRumaniawillcarryoutawideenclosingmovementacrossthelowerPruth.ItwillbethetaskoftheRumaniapArmytoholddownRussianforcesintheinterveningarea.WhenthebattlesnorthandsouthofthePripetMarshesareendedthepursuitoftheenemywillhavethefollowingaims:IntheSouththeearlycaptureoftheDonetsBasin,importantforwarindustry.IntheNorthaquickadvancetoMoscow.Thecaptureofthiscitywouldrepresentadecisivepoliticalandeconomicsuccessandwouldalsobringaboutthecaptureofthemostimportantrailwayjunctions.B.AirForceItwillbethedutyoftheAirForcetoparalyseandeliminatetheeffectivenessoftheRussianAirForceasfaraspossible.ItwillalsosupportthemainoperationsoftheArmy,i.e.thoseofthecentralArmyGroupandofthevitalflankoftheSouthernArmyGroup.Russianrailwayswilleitherbedestroyedor,inaccordancewithoperationalrequirements,capturedattheirmostimportantpoints(rivercrossings)bytheboldemploymentofparachuteandairbornetroops.InorderthatwemayconcentrateallourstrengthagainsttheenemyAirForceandfortheimmediatesupportoflandoperations,theRussianarmamentsindustrywillnotbeattackedduringthemainoperations.Suchattackswillbemadeonlyaftertheconclusionofmobilewarfare,andtheywillbeconcentratedfirstontheUralsarea.G.Navy.ItwillbethedutyoftheNavyduringtheattackonSovietRussiatoprotectourowncoastsandtopreventthebreakoutofenemynavalunitsfromtheBaltic.AstheRussianBalticfleetwill,withthecaptureofLeningrad,loseitslastbaseandwillthenbeinahopelessposition,majornavalactionwillbeavoideduntilthisoccurs.

AftertheeliminationoftheRussianfleetthedutyoftheNavywillbetoprotecttheentiremaritimetrafficintheBalticandthetransportofsuppliesbyseatotheNorthern,flank(clearingofminefields!).IV.AllstepstakenbyCommanders-in-ChiefonthebasisofthisdirectivemustbephrasedontheunambiguousassumptionthattheyareprecautionarymeasuresundertakenincaseRussiashouldalteritspresentattitudetowardsus.Thenumberofofficersemployedonpreliminarypreparationswillbekeptassmallaspossibleandfurtherstaffswillbedesignatedaslateaspossibleandonlytotheextentrequiredforthedutiesofeachindividual.Otherwisethereisadangerthatprematureknowledgeofourpreparations,whoseexecutioncannotyetbetimedwithanycertainty,mightentailthegravestpoliticalandmilitarydisadvantages.V.IawaitsubmissionoftheplansofCommanders-in-Chiefonthebasisofthisdirective.ThepreparationsmadebyallbranchesoftheArmedForces,togetherwithtime-tables,aretobereportedtomethroughtheHighCommandoftheArmedForces.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo32TheFührerandSupremeCommanderoftheArmedForces

FührerHeadquarters,11thJune1941.9draftcopies

DirectiveNo.32Preparationsfortheperiodafter‘Barbarossa’A.AfterthedestructionoftheSovietArmedForces,GermanyandItaly

willbemilitarymastersoftheEuropeanContinent-withthetemporaryexceptionoftheIberianPeninsula.26NoseriousthreattoEuropebylandwillthenremain.Thedefenceofthisarea,andforeseeablefutureoffensiveaction,willrequireconsiderablysmallermilitaryforcesthanhavebeenneededhitherto.ThemaineffortsofthearmamentsindustrycanbedivertedtotheNavyandAirForce.ClosercooperationbetweenGermanyandFranceshouldandwilltiedownadditionalEnglishforces,willeliminatethethreatfromtherearintheNorthAfricantheatreofwar,willfurtherrestrictthemovementsoftheBritishFleetintheWesternMediterraneanandwillprotectthesouthwesternflankoftheEuropeantheatre,includingtheAtlanticseaboardofNorthandWestAfrica,fromAnglo-Saxonattack.InthenearfutureSpainwillhavetofacethequestionwhethersheispreparedtocooperateindrivingtheBritishfromGibraltarornot.ThepossibilityofexertingstrongpressureonTurkeyandIranimprovestheprospectofmakingdirectorindirectuseofthesecountriesinthestruggleagainstEngland.B.Thissituation,whichwillbecreatedbythevictoriousconclusionofthecampaignintheEast,canconfronttheArmedForceswiththefollowingstrategictasksforthelateautumnof1941andthewinterof1941-2:1.ThenewlyconqueredterritoriesintheEastmustbeorganized,madesecureand,infullcooperationwiththeArmedForces,exploitedeconomically.ThestrengthofthesecurityforcesrequiredinRussiacanonlybeforecastwithcertaintyatalaterdate.Inallprobability,however,aboutsixtydivisionsandoneAirFleetwillbesufficient,withalliedandfriendlyforces,forourfurtherdutiesintheEast.2.ThestruggleagainsttheBritishpositionsintheMediterraneanandinWesternAsia

willbecontinuedbyconvergingattackslaunchedfromLibyathroughEgypt,fromBulgariathroughTurkey,andincertaincircumstancesalsofromTranscaucasiathroughIran.(a)InNorthAfricaitisimportantthatTobrukshouldbeeliminatedandconditionstherebyestablishedforthecontinuationoftheGerman-ItalianattackontheSuezCanal.ThisattackshouldbeplannedforaboutNovemberontheunderstandingthattheGermanAfricaCorpswillbebythenbroughttothehighestpossibleefficiencyinpersonnelandequipmentandwithadequatereservesofallkindsunderitsownhand(bytheconversionof5thLightDivisionintoafullarmoureddivision),sothatitisnotnecessarytomovefurtherlargeGermanformationstoNorthAfrica.Thepreparationsfortheattackrequirethatthetempooftransportbequickenedbyallmeansavailable,includingtheemploymentofportsinFrenchNorthAfricaand,whenpossible,thenewsearoutefromSouthernGreece.ItwillbethedutyoftheNavy,incooperationwiththeItalianNavy,toarrangeforthenecessarytonnagebycharteringFrenchandneutralshipping.ThepossibilityofmovingGermanmotortorpedoboatstotheMediterraneanwillbeexamined.TheItalianNavywillbeaffordedallsupportinimprovingunloadingfacilitiesinNorthAfricanports.Commander-in-ChiefAirForcewilltransfertotheAfricaCorpssufficientairunitstfhdanti-aircraftartilleryfortheoperation,asthesebecomesuperfluousintheEast.HewillalsoreinforceItalianprotectionofseaborneconvoysbytheuseofGermanairformations.Inordertocoordinatethehandlingoftransport,theSupplyandTransportOfficeoftheArmedForcesOverseas[HeimatstabUbersee]hasbeenestablished,whichwillworkonthelineslaiddownbytheHighCommandoftheArmedForces,incooperationwiththeGermanGeneralatItalianArmedForcesHeadquarters,andwithCommanderArmedForcesSoutheast.(b)InviewoftheexpectedBritishreinforcementoftheNearandMiddleEast,especiallyforthedefenceoftheSuezCanal,aGermanoperationfromBulgariathroughTurkeywillbeplanned,withtheaimofattackingtheBritishpositionontheSuezCanalfromtheEastalso.TothisendplansmustbemadetoassembleinBulgariaassoonaspossiblesufficientforcestorenderTurkeypoliticallyamenableortooverpowerherresistance.(c)IfthecollapseoftheSovietUnionhascreatedthenecessaryconditions,preparationswillbemadeforthedispatchofamotorizedexpeditionaryforcefromTranscaucasiaagainstIraq,inconjunctionwithoperationsmentionedinparagraph(b)above.(d)ExploitationoftheArabFreedomMovement.ThesituationoftheEnglishintheMiddleEastwillberenderedmoreprecarious,intheeventofmajorGermanoperations,ifmoreBritishforcesaretieddownattherightmomentbycivilcommotionorrevolt.Allmilitary,political,andpropagandameasurestothisendmustbecloselycoordinatedduringthepreparatoryperiod.AscentralagencyabroadInominateSpecialStaffF,whichistotakepartinallplansandactionsintheArabarea,whoseheadquartersaretobeintheareaoftheCommanderArmedForcesSoutheast.Themostcompetentavailableexpertsandagentswillbemadeavailabletoit.TheChiefoftheHighCommandoftheArmedForceswillspecifythedutiesofSpecialStaffF,inagreementwiththeForeignMinisterwherepoliticalquestionsareinvolved.27

3.ClosingoftheWesternEntrancetotheMediterraneanbytheeliminationofGibraltar:Preparationsfor‘UndertakingFelix’,alreadyplanned,willberesumedtothefullestextentevenduringthecourseofoperationsintheeast.ItmaybeassumedthatunoccupiedFrenchterritorymayalsobeused,ifnotforGermantroopmovements,thenatleastforthemovementofsupplies.ThecooperationofFrenchnavalandairforcesisalsowithintheboundsofpossibility.AfterthecaptureofGibraltaronlysuchforceswillbemovedtoSpanishMoroccoasarenecessarytoprotecttheStraits.ThedefenceoftheseaboardofNorthandWestAfrica,theeliminationofEnglishpossessionsinWestAfrica,andtherecoveryoftheareascontrolledbydeGaulle,willbethetasksoftheFrenchwhowillbegrantedsuchreinforcementsasthesituationrequires.TheuseofWestAfricanbasesbytheNavyandAirForce,andpossiblyalsotheoccupationoftheAtlanticIslands,willbefacilitatedbyourcontroloftheStraits.4.InadditiontothesecontemplatedoperationsagainsttheBritishpositionintheMediterranean,the‘SiegeofEngland’mustberesumedwiththeutmostintensitybytheNavyandAirForceaftertheconclusionofthecampaignintheEast.Allweaponsandequipmentrequiredforthispurposewillbegivenpriorityinthegeneralarmamentsprogramme.AtthesametimeGermanAirDefenceswillbestrengthenedtothemaximum.PreparationsfortheinvasionofEnglandwillservethedoublepurposeoftyingdownEnglishforcesathomeandofbringingaboutafinalEnglishcollapsethroughalandinginEngland.C.ThetimeatwhichtheoperationsplannedintheMediterraneanandtheNearEastcanbeundertakencannotyetbeforeseen.ThestrongestoperationaleffectwouldbeachievedbyasimultaneousattackonGibraltar,Egypt,andPalestine.Whetherthiswijl,infact,bepossibledependsuponanumberoffactorswhichcannot,atthemoment,beforeseen,butchieflyonthepoweroftheAirForcetoprovidetheforcesnecessaryforthesimultaneoussupportofthesethreeoperations.D.IrequestCommanders-in-ChieftobegintheplanningandorganizationoftheseoperationsasoutlinedaboveandtokeepmeinformedoftheresultssothatImayissuefinaldirectivesbeforethecampaignintheEastisover.signed:warlimont

DirectiveNo32aTheFührerandSupremeCommanderoftheArmedForcesFührerHeadquarters,14thJuly1941.13copiesOnthebasisofmyintentionsforthefutureprosecutionofthewar,asstatedinDirective33,Iissuethefollowinggeneralinstructionsconcerningpersonnelandequipment:1.General:

OurmilitarymasteryoftheEuropeancontinentaftertheoverthrowofRussiawillmakeitpossibleconsiderablytoreducethestrengthoftheArmy.WithinthelimitsofthisreducedArmy,therelativestrengthofthearmouredforceswillbegreatlyincreased.ThemanningandequipmentoftheNavywillbelimitedtowhatisessentialforthedirectprosecutionofthewaragainstEnglandand,shouldtheoccasionarise,againstAmerica.ThemaineffortofequipmentwillbedevotedtotheAirForce,whichwillbegreatlystrengthened.

2.Manpower:ThefuturestrengthoftheArmywillbelaiddownbyme,afterreceivingproposalsfromCommander-in-ChiefArmy.TheReplacementArmywillbereducedtoconformwiththediminishedstrengthoftheArmy.TheChiefoftheHighCommandoftheArmedForceswilldecide,inaccordancewithmydirectives,ontheemploymentofthemanpowerwhichwillbecomeavailablefortheArmedForcesasawholeandforthearmamentsindustry.TheClassof1932willbecalledupatthelatestpossibledate,andwillbedistributedbytheHighCommandoftheArmedForcesinaccordancewiththefuturetasksofthevariousbranchesoftheArmedForces.3.ArmsandEquipment:(a)TheArmedForcesasawhole.Thearmingandequipmentoftroopswillbereducedtotherequirementsofthesituationinthefield,withoutreferencetoexistingestablishmentscales.Allformationsnotintendedforactualcombat(security,guard,construction,andsimilarunits)willbearmedbasicallywithcapturedweaponsandsecondlineequipment.Allrequestsfor‘generalArmedForcesequipment”willbeimmediatelyreducedorrejectedinrelationtoavailablesupplies,need,andwearandtear.ContinuedmanufactureofsuchweaponsascanbeprovedtobenecessarywillbedecidedinagreementwiththeMinisterforArmamentsandMunitions.Plant(buildingsandmachinetools)alreadyinusewillnotbeexpandedunlessitcanbeshownthatexistingequipmentcannotbeputtofullusebytheintroductionofshiftworking.WorkonallsuchpermanentbuildingsforindustryandtheArmedForcesasareintendedforuseinpeacetimeratherthanfortheimmediateprosecutionofthewarandfortheproductionofarms,willbehalted.ConstructiondirectlynecessaryfortheconductofthewarandforarmamentswillremainsubjecttotheregulationsoftheGeneralPlenipotentiaryforBuilding.Buildingserectedbyciviliancontractorswillbelimitedbyhimtosuchasaremostessentialtothewareffort.Contractsofallkindswhichdonotcomplywiththeseprincipleswillbeimmediatelywithdrawn.Themanpower,rawmaterials,andplantreleasedbythesemeasureswillbemadeavailableforthemaintasksofequipmentandplaced,assoonaspossible,atthedisposaloftheMinisterofArmamentsandMunitionsforuseelsewhere.(b)Army:Theextensionofarmsandequipmentandtheproductionofnewweapons,munitions,andequipmentwillberelated,withimmediateeffect,tothesmallerforceswhicharecontemplatedforthefuture.Whereordershavebeenplacedformorethansixmonthsaheadallcontractsbeyondthatperiodwillbecancelled.Currentdeliverieswillonlycontinueiftheirimmediatecancellationwouldbeuneconomic.Thefollowingareexceptionstotheselimitations:Thetankprogrammeforthemotorizedforces(whicharetobeconsiderablyreinforced)includingtheprovisionofspecialweaponsandtanksoftheheaviesttype.Thenewprogrammeforheavyanti-tankguns,includingtheirtractorsandammunition.Theprogrammeforadditionalequipmentforexpeditionaryforces,whichwillincludefourfurtherarmoureddivisionsforemploymentinthetropics,drawnfromtheoverallstrength

ofthearmouredforces.Preparationsforthemanufactureofequipmentunrelatedtotheseprogrammeswillbehalted.TheArmy’sprogrammeforanti-aircraftgunsistobecoordinatedwiththatoftheAirForce,andrepresentsasingleunifiedschemefromthemanufacturingpointofview.AllavailableplantwillbefullyemployedinordertoachievethedeliverytargetswhichIhavelaiddown.(c)Navy:TheNavywillcontinueitssubmarineprogramme.Constructionwillbelimitedtowhatisdirectlyconnectedwiththisprogramme.Expansionofthearmamentsprogrammeoverandabovethisistobestopped.(d)AirForce:Theoverallarmamentsprogrammewillconcentrateoncarryingouttheexpanded‘AirArmamentsprogramme’whichIhaveapproved.Itsrealizationuptothespringof1942isofdecisiveimportanceforthewholewareffort.ForthispurposeallavailablemanpowerfromtheArmedForcesandindustrywillbeemployed.TheallocationofaluminiumtotheAirForcewillbeincreasedasfaraspossible.Thespeedoftheprogramme,andtheextenttowhichitcanbefulfilled,willbelinkedtotheincreasedproductionoflightmetalsandmineraloil.4.TheprogrammeforpowderandexplosiveswillconcentrateupontherequirementsoftheAirForce(bombsandanti-aircraftammunition)attheexpenseoftherequirementsoftheArmy.Buildingswillberestrictedtothebarestessentialsandconfinedtothesimplesttypeofconstruction.Productionofexplosiveswillbelimitedtotheexistingbasis.5.Itisparticularlyimportanttoensuresuppliesofrawmaterialsandmineraloil.Coalproductionandtheextensionofthelightmetal,artificialrubber,substitutematerials,andliquidfuelindustrieswillbesupportedbytheArmedForcesineveryway,particularlybythereleaseofminersandspecialistworkers.Theconstructionofthenecessaryplansfortheextendedairarmamentsindustrywillbedevelopedsimultaneously.6.Theallocationofmanpower,rawmaterials,andplantwillbemadeinaccordancewiththeseprinciples.7.TheChiefoftheHighCommandoftheArmedForceswillissuethenecessaryordersfortheArmedForces,andtheMinisterforArmamentsandMunitionsforhissector,inmutualagreement.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo33TheFührerandSupremeCommanderoftheArmedForcesFührerHeadquarters,July1941.13copies

DirectiveNo.33ContinuationofthewarintheEast1.ThesecondseriesofbattlesintheEasthasended,alongthewhole

front,withthebreachoftheStalinLinearidthedeepthrustofthearmouredforces.IntheareaofArmyGroupCentre,moppingupofthestrongenemyforceswhichstillremainbetweenthemotorizedformationswillstillrequireconsiderabletime.ThenorthernflankofArmyGroupSouthisrestrictedinitsfreedomofmovementandeffectivenessbythefortressofKievandtheRussian5thArmyinitsrear.2.TheaimofthenextoperationsmustbetopreventanyfurthersizeableenemyforcesfromwithdrawingintothedepthsofRussia,andtowipethemout.Planswillbemadeforthisasfollows:

(a)South-easternFront:Themostimportantobjectis,byconcentricattacks,todestroytheenemyi2thand6thArmieswhiletheyarestillwestoftheDnieper.ThemainRumanianforceswillsupporttheseoperationsinthesouth.Theenemy5thArmycanalsobequicklyanddecisivelydefeatedandannihilatedbycooperationbetweenforcesonthesouthflankofArmyGroupCentreandthenorthernflankofArmyGroupSouth.WhileinfantrydivisionsofArmyGroupCentremovesouthward,otherforces,chieflymotorized,aftercarryingoutthetasksassignedtothem,securingtheirlinesofcommunicationandprovidingcoverinthedirectionofMoscow,willadvancesouth-eastwardsinordertocutoffthewithdrawalofenemyforceswhichhavecrossedtothefurtherbankoftheDnieper,topreventtheirwithdrawaldeeperintoRussia,andtodestroythem.

(b)CentralPartoftheEasternFront:Afterthedestructionofthemanypocketsofenemytroopswhichhavebeensurroundedandtheestablishmentoflinesofcommunication,ArmyGroupCentre,whilecontinuingtoadvancetoMoscowwithinfantryformations,willusethesemotorizedunitswhicharenotemployedintherearoftheDnieperlinetocutcommunicationsbetweenMoscowandLeningrad,andsocovertherightflankoftheadvanceonLeningradbyArmyGroupNorth.(c)NorthernPartoftheEasternFront:TheadvanceonLeningradwillberesumedonlywhen18thArmyhasmadecontactwith4thArmouredGroupandtheextensiveflankintheeastisadequatelyprotectedbyi6thArmy.AtthesametimeArmyGroupNorthmustendeavourtopreventRussianforcesstillinactioninEstoniafromwithdrawingtoLeningrad.EarlycaptureoftheBalticIslands,whichmightbeusedasbasesbytheSovietNavy,isdesirable.(a)FinnishFront:ItremainsthetaskofthemainFinnishforces,reinforcedbymostofi6srdDivision,toattacktheenemyopposingthemwiththemainweightofattackeastofLakeLadogaand,later,inconjunctionwithArmyGroupNorth,todestroythem.TheobjectoftheattackunderthedirectionofXXXVICorpsandtheMountainCorpsremainsasalreadydirected,exceptthatstrongersupportfromtheaircannotbeexpectedforthemomentandoperationsmaythereforehavetobetemporarilydelayed.3.ThetaskoftheAirForceis,inparticular,asforcesbecomeavailablefromtheCentralfront,tosupportoperationsontheSouth-easternfrontattheirmostimportantpointbybringingairandanti-aircraftunitsintoaction,and,ifnecessary,byearlyreinforcementorregrouping.TheattackonMoscowbythebomberforcesof2ndAirFleet,temporarilyreinforcedbybomberforcesfromtheWest,willbecarriedoutassoonaspossibleas‘reprisalforRussianattacksonBucharestandHelsinki’.4.TheNavywillcontinuetoensurethefreepassageofsea-bornetraffic,especiallyofsuppliesforthelandforces,asfarasenemyactivityatseaandintheairallows.Further,withtheincreasingthreattoenemybases,appropriatestepsaretobetakentopreventtheescapeofenemyshipstoSwedishports,wheretheywouldbeinterned.AsnavalforcesintheBalticbecomefree,motortorpedoboatsandminesweepers-oneflotillaofeachtostartwith-willbetransferredtotheMediterranean.TosupportGermanoperationsinFinland,whichmightbehamperedbythearrivalof

enemyreinforcementsbysea,afewsubmarineswillbetransferredtotheArcticOcean.5.AllthreebranchesoftheArmedForcesintheWestandNorthwillbearinmindthepossibilityofBritishattacksontheChannelIslandsandtheNorwegiancoast.PlansmustbemadeforthequicktransferofairforcesfromtheWesttoallpartsofNorway.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo33a

TheChiefoftheHighCommandoftheArmedForcesFührerHeadquarters,23rdJuly1941.14copiesSupplementtoDirectiveNo.33AfterareportbyCommander-in-ChiefArmy,theFühreron22ndJulyissuedthefollowingorderstoamplifyandextendDirective33.1.SouthernPartoftheEasternFront:TheenemyforceswhicharestillwestoftheDniepermustbedecisivelydefeatedanddispersed.Assoonasthestateofoperationsandofsuppliesallows,1stand2ndArmouredGroupswillbeconcentratedundercommandof4thTankArmyand,withthesupportofinfantryandmounteddivisions,willoccupytheKharkovindustrialareaandthrustforwardacrosstheDontoCaucasia.ThebulkoftheinfantrydivisionswillthenoccupytheUkraine,theCrimea,andtheareaofCentralRussiauptotheDon.Thesecurityoftheareaimmediatelysouth-westoftheBugistobelefttotheRumanianArmy.2.CentralPartoftheEasternFront:Aftermopping-upoperationsaroundSmolenskandonthesouthernflank,ArmyGroupCentre,whoseinfantryformationsdrawnfrombothitsarmiesarestrongenoughforthepurpose,willdefeatsuchenemyforcesasremainbetweenSmolenskandMoscow,byanadvanceontheleftflankifpossible.ItwillthencaptureMoscow.3rdArmouredGroupwillcomeundertemporarycommandofArmyGroupNorthtosecureitsrightflankandtosurroundtheenemyintheLeningradarea.ForthefurthertaskofthrustingforwardtotheVolga,themobileforcesof3rdArmouredGroupwillprobablybeoncemoreavailable.3.NorthernPartoftheEasternFront:Thesubordinationtoitof3rdArmouredGroupwillenableArmyGroupNorthtoemploystrongforcesofinfantryforanattackinthedirectionofLeningrad,andtoavoidexpendingitsmobileforcesinfrontalattacksoverdifficultterrain.EnemyforcesstillinactioninEstoniawillbedestroyed.TheirembarkationandwithdrawalacrosstheNarvatowardsLeningradwillbeprevented.3rdArmouredGroupistobereturnedtoArmyGroupCentreonthecompletionofitstask.4.TheHighCommandoftheArmywillplanfurtheroperationssothatlargepartsofArmyGroupNorth,including4thArmouredGroupandsomeoftheinfantryformationsofArmyGroupSouth,maybemovedbacktoGermanyassoonasthesituationallows.3rdArmouredGroupwillberenderedfullyoperationalbydrawingupon4thArmouredGroupforequipmentandpersonnel,istandandArmouredGroupswill,ifnecessary,supplythemselvesbymergingunits.5.TheordersgivenforNavyandAirForceinDirective33remainvalid.InadditiontheyaretoeasethesituationoftheMountainCorps:theNavy,bythedeterminedemploymentofitsforcesintheArcticOcean(now

reinforced);theAirForce,bythetransferofseveraldive-bombergroupstotheFinnishtheatreoncethefightingaroundSmolenskisover.ThiswillalsoreducethetemptationforEnglandtointerveneinthefightingalongtheArcticcoast.6.ThetroopsavailableforsecuringtheconqueredEasternterritorieswill,inviewofthesizeofthisarea,besufficientfortheirdutiesonlyiftheoccupyingpowermeetsresistance,notbylegalpunishmentoftheguilty,butbystrikingsuchterrorintothepopulationthatitlosesallwilltoresist.TheCommandersconcernedaretobeheldresponsible,togetherwiththetroopsattheirdisposal,forquietconditionsintheirareas.Theywillcontrivetomaintainorder,notbyrequestingreinforcements,butbyemployingsuitablydraconianmethods.signed:keitel

DirectiveNo34TheFührerandSupreme‘CommanderoftheArmedForcesFührerHeadquarters,30thJuly1941.14copiesDirectiveNo.34Thedevelopmentofthesituationinthelastfewdays,theappearanceofstrongenemyforcesonthefrontandtotheflanksofArmyGroupCentre,thesupplyposition,andtheneedtogiveandand3rdArmouredGroupsabouttendaystorehabilitatetheirunits,makeitnecessarytopostponeforthemomentthefurthertasksandobjectiveslaiddowninDirective33of19thJulyandinthesupplementof23rdJuly.Ithereforeorderasfollows:I.i.IntheNorthernSectoroftheEasternfrontthemainattackwillcontinuebetweenLakeIlmenandNarvatowardsLeningrad,withtheaimofencirclingLeningradandmakingcontactwiththeFinnishArmy.NorthofLakeIlmenthisattackwillbecoveredintheVolkhovsector;SouthofLakeIlrnenitwillbecarriednortheastwardsonlysofarasisrequiredtoprotecttherightflankoftheattacknorthofthelake.ThesituationaroundVelikiyeLukiwillhavebeenpreviouslyclearedup.AllforcesnotrequiredfortheseoperationswillbetransferredtotakepartintheflankattackingnorthofLakeIlmen.Theintendedthrustby3rdArmouredGroupagainstthehighgroundaroundValdaiwillbepostponeduntilarmouredformationsarefullyreadyforaction.Instead,theleftflankofArmyGroupCentrewilladvancesufficientlyfarnorth-eastwardstoaffordprotectiontotherightflankofArmyGroupNorth.Estoniamustfirstofallbemoppedupbyalltheforcesof18thArmy;onlythenmaydivisionsadvancetowardsLeningrad.2.ArmyGroupCentrewillgoovertothedefensive,takingadvantageonsuitableterrain.Attackswithlimitedobjectivesmaystillbemountedinsofarastheyarenecessarytosecurefavourablespring-boardsforouroffensiveagainstSoviet21stArmy.2ndand3rdArmouredGroupswillbewithdrawnfromthefrontlineforquickrehabilitationassoonasthesituationallows.3.OperationsontheSouth-easternfrontwill,forthepresent,beconductedonlybyformationsofArmyGroupSouth.TheirobjectivemustbetodestroythestrongenemyforceswestoftheDnieperand,inaddition,bysecuringbridgeheadsneartothesouthofKiev,toestablishtheconditionsnecessaryforbringingistArmouredGrouplatertotheeasternbankoftheDnieper.The5thRedArmy,fightinginthemarshlandnorth-westofKiev,mustbebroughttobattlewestoftheDnieperandannihilated.Anydangerthatitmightbreakthroughtothenorth

acrossthePripetmustbecounteredingoodtime.4.FinnishFront:TheattackinthedirectionofKandalakshawillbehalted.ThethreattotheflankoftheMountainCorpsfromtheMotovskiBightistobeeliminated.OnlysomanyforcesaretobeleftwithXXXVICorpsasarenecessaryfordefenceandtogivetheimpressionoffurtheroffensivepreparations.IntheareaofIII(Finnish)CorpsanattemptwillbemadetocuttheMurmanskrailway,particularlytowardsLouhi.Allforces,suitableforthisattackwillbemovedtothisarea;otheravailableforceswillbetransferredtotheKarelianArmy.ShoulddifficultiesofterrainbringtheoffensivetoastandstillintheareaoftheIII(Finnish)Corpstoo,theGermanforceswillbewithdrawnandemployedwiththeKarelianArmy.Thisappliesparticularlytomobileunits,tanks,andheavyartillery.The6thMountainDivisionwilljointheMountainCorps,usingallavailabletransportroutes.TheForeignOfficewillsettlewhethertherailwaythroughSwedentoNarvikmayalsobeused.II.AirForce.1.North-easternFront:AirForcewillswitchthemainweightofairattacktotheNorth-easternfrontbyattachingthebulkofVIIIAirCorpstoistAirFleet.ThesereinforcementswillbemovedupintimetogointoactionatthebeginningoftheoffensivebyArmyGroupNorthandatitsvitalpoint(earlymorning6thAugust).2.Centre:

ThetaskofsuchunitsoftheAirForceasremainwithArmyGroupCentreistoaffordsuchfighter-coverasisabsolutelynecessaryontheandandgthArmyfrontsandtosupportpossiblelocalattacks.AttacksonMoscowwillcontinue.3.South-easternFront:Tasksasalreadylaiddown.ItisnotproposedtoreducethestrengthoftheairforceswithArmyGroupSouth.4.Finland:Themaintaskof5thAirFleetistosupporttheMountainCorps.TheoffensivebyIIIFinnishCorpswillalsobesupportedatfavourablepoints.PreparationsaretobemadefortheemploymentofforcesinsupportoftheKarelianArmyshouldthisbenecessary,signed:adolfhitler

Directive34aTheHighCommandoftheArmedForcesFührerHeadquarters,12thAugust1941.14copiesSupplementtoDirectiveNo.34TheFuhrerhasissuedthefollowingordersfortheprosecutionofoperations-intheEast,supplementarytoDirective34:1.South-easternFront:ThroughthebattleofannihilationatUman,ArmyGroupSouthhaswondefinitesuperiorityovertheenemyandfreedomtoundertakeextensiveoperationsonthefurthersideoftheDnieper.Assoonasithasgainedafirmfootholdeastoftheriver,andhasensuredthesafetyofitscommunicationsintherear,itwillpossessthenecessarystrength,withcorrespondingactionbyalliedforcesandthecooperationoftheRumanianArmy,to

achievewithitsownforcesthefar-reachingobjectiveswhichlieaheadofit.Itsnexttaskis:(a)TopreventtheestablishmentbytheenemyofaplanneddefensivefrontbehindtheDnieper.ForthispurposethelargestpossibleportionofenemyforcesstillwestoftheDniepermustbedestroyed,andbridgeheadsacrosstheDnieperwonassoonaspossible.(b)TooccupytheCrimeanpeninsula,whichisparticularlydangerousasanenemyairbaseagainsttheRumanianoilfields.(c)TooccupytheDonetsareaandtheindustrialareaofKharkov.ThebattlefortheCrimeanpeninsulamayrequiremountaintroops.Thepossibilityoftheiruselater,acrosstheKerchstraits,inthedirectionofBatum,willbeconsidered.TheattackonthecityofKievitselfwillbehalted.Itisproposedtodestroythecitybyincendiarybombsandgunfireassoonasthesupplypositionallows.ThisentailsalargenumberoftasksfortheAirForce.Thesecannotbecarriedoutsimultaneously,butmustbeaccomplishedoneafteranotherthroughthelargestpossibleconcentrationofforces.Suchconcentrationswillbeachievedbytheadditionofdive-bomberunits,firstinthebattlesbetweenKanevandBoguslav,andthenforthepurposeofsecuringabridgeheadovertheDnieper.2.CentralPartoftheEasternFront:Themostimportanttaskhereistoeliminatetheenemyflankingpositions,projectingdeeplytothewest,withwhichheisholdingdownlargeforcesofinfantryonbothflanksofArmyGroupCentre.Forthispurposeclosecooperationintiminganddirectiononthesouthernflank,betweentheadjoiningflanksofArmyGroupSouthandArmyGroupCentre,isparticularlyimportant.TheRussian5thArmymustbedeprivedofanyfurtherpowertooperatebycuttingtheroadstoOvruchandMozyrjbywhichitobtainssuppliesandreinforcements,andthenfinallyannihilated.OnthenorthernflanktheenemymustbedefeatedassoonaspossiblebytheemploymentofmobileforceswestofToropets.TheleftflankofArmyGroupCentrewillthenbemovedasfarnorthwardsasisnecessarytorelieveArmyGroupNorthofanxietyaboutitsrightflankandtoenableittotransferinfantrydivisionstotakepartintheattackonLeningrad.Apartfromthis,effortswillbemadebeforehandtomovesomeonedivision(iczndDivision)toArmyGroupNorthinreserve.Onlyafterthesethreatstoourrankshavebeenentirelyovercomeandarmouredformationshavebeenrehabilitatedwillitbepossibletocontinuetheoffensive,onawidefrontandwithecheloningofbothflanks,againstthestrongenemyforceswhichhavebeenconcentratedforthedefenceofMoscow.Theobjectofoperationsmustthenbetodeprivetheenemy,beforethecomingofwinter,ofhisgovernment,armament,andtrafficcentrearoundMoscow,andthuspreventtherebuildingofhisdefeatedforcesandtheorderlyworkingofgovernmentcontrol.BeforethebeginningofthisattackonMoscowoperationsagainstLeningradmustbeconcluded,andtheaircraftfrom2ndAirFleetwhichareatpresentattachedtoistAirFleetmustagainbeavailableto2ndAirFleet.3.North-easternFront:TheattackwhichisnowinprogressshouldresultintheencirclementofLeningradandajunctionwiththeFinnishforces.WithregardtocooperationbytheAirForce,itshouldbeaprinciple,asfarasthepositionofourownairfieldsallows,always,ifpossible,toconcentrateonasinglepoint,inorder

tosecuretheutmosteffect.Assoonasthesituationallows,enemyairandnavalbasesonDagoandOselwillbeeliminatedbyacombinedoperationbyArmy,Naval,andAirForces.ItisurgentlynecessarythatenemyairfieldsfromwhichattacksonBerlinareevidentlybeingmadeshouldbedestroyed.TheArmyisresponsibleforthecoordinatedplanningofoperations.TheChiefoftheHighCommandoftheArmedForces.signed:keitel

DirectiveNo35TheFührerandSupremeCommanderoftheArmedForcesDirectiveNo.35FührerHeadquarters,6thSeptember1941.10copiesCombinedwiththeprogressiveencirclementoftheLeningradarea,theinitialsuccessesagainsttheenemyforcesintheareabetweentheflanksofArmyGroupsSouthandCentrehaveprovidedfavourableconditionsforadecisiveoperationagainsttheTimoshenkoArmyGroupwhichisattackingontheCentralfront.28ThisArmyGroupmustbedefeatedandannihilatedinthelimitedtimewhichremainsbeforetheonsetofwinterweather.ForthispurposeitisnecessarytoconcentratealltheforcesoftheArmyandAirForcewhichcanbesparedontheflanksandwhichcanbebroughtupintime.OnthebasisofthereportofCommander-in-ChiefArmy,Iissuethefollowingorderslorthepreparationandexecutionoftheseoperations:i.OntheSouthernsectorofthefronttheaimistheannihilationof-theenemyforcesinthetriangleKremen-chug-Kiev-KonotopbytheforcesofArmyGroupSouthwhichareadvancingnorthwardacrosstheDnieper,actinginconjunctionwiththeattackbythesouthernflankofArmyGroupCentre.Assoonasthecompletionofthistaskallows,thoseformationsof2ndand6thArmies,andofandArmouredGroup,whichhavebecomefree,willbereformedforthenewoperation.BeginningaboutrothSeptemberatlatest,themotorizedforcesofArmyGroupSouth,reinforcedbyinfantrydivisions,andsupportedatthemainpointofattackby4thAirFleet,willmakeasurprisemovementfromthebridgeheadsecuredbyiythArmynorth-westwardsonandbeyondLubny.AtthesametimexythArmyistogaingroundinthedirectionofPoltavaandKharkov.TheoffensiveagainsttheCrimeafromthelowerDnieperwillcontinue,withsupportfrom4thAirFleet;sowill-sofarasavailableforcespermittheoffensivefromtheDniepropetrovskbridgehead.29AnadvancebymotorizedforcessouthofthelowerDniepertowardsMelitopolwouldbeofsubstantialadvantageforthemissionofnthArmy.2.OntheCentralfront,theoperationagainsttheTimoshenkoArmyGroupwillbeplannedsothattheattackcanbebegunattheearliestpossiblemoment(endofSeptember)withtheaimofdestroyingtheenemyforceslocatedintheareaeastofSmolenskbyapincermovementinthegeneraldirectionofVyazma,withstrongconcentrationsofarmourontheflanks.Forthispurposemobilefocalpointsaretobeestablishedwithmotorizedunitsasfollows:Onthesouthernflank(probablyintheareasouth-eastofRoslavl,thedirectionofthethrustbeingnorth-east),fromtheavailableforcesofArmyGroupCentreand5thand2ndArmouredDivisions,whichwillbereleasedforthepurpose.

IntheQthArmysector(thethrustbeingprobablytowardsBjeloj),bybringingthestrongestpossibleforcesfromtheareaofArmyGroupNorth.OnlywhenArmyGroupTimoshenkohasbeendefeatedinthesehighlycoordinatedandcloselyencirclingoperationsofannihilationwillourcentralArmybeabletobegintheadvanceonMoscowwithitsrightflankontheOkaanditsleftontheUpperVolga.TheAirForcewillsupporttheoffensivewiththe2ndAirFleet,whichwillbereinforcedattheappropriatetime,especiallyfromthenorth-eastarea.Itwillconcentrateontheflanksandwillemploythebulkofitsdive-bomberunits(VIIIAirCorps)insupportofthemotorizedforcesonbothflanks.3.OntheNorth-easternfront,inconjunctionwiththeFinnishCorpsattackingontheKarelianpeninsula,wemust(afterthecaptureofSchlusselburg)sosurroundtheenemyforcesfightingintheLeningradareathatbyI5thSeptemberatthelatestsubstantialunitsofthemotorizedforcesandofistAirFleet,especiallyVIIIAirCorps,willbeavailableforserviceontheCentralfront.Beforethis,effortswillbemadetoencircleLeningradmoreclosely,inparticularintheeast,and,shouldweatherpermit,alarge-scaleairattackonLeningradwillbecarriedout.Itisparticularlyimportantinthisconnexiontodestroythewatersupply.InordertoassisttheFinnishadvancebeyondthefortificationsalongtheoldRusso-Finnishfrontier,aswellastonarrowthebattleareaandeliminateenemyairbases,forcesofArmyGroupNorthwillmovenorthacrosstheNevasectorassoonaspossible.WithFinnishcdoperation,theBayofKronstadtwillbesocompletelyclosedbymine-layingandartillerythatenemyforceswillbeunabletoescapeintotheBaltictoHangoandtheBalticIslands.Assoonasthenecessaryforcescanbemadeavailable,thebattleareaaroundLeningradistobecoveredtotheeastwardandonthelowerVolkhov.Thelink-upwiththeKarelianArmyontheSvirwillonlytakeplacewhenthedestructionoftheenemyaroundLeningradisassured.4.AsregardsfurtheroperationsitisintendedthattheoffensivetowardsMoscowbyArmyGroupCentreshouldbecoveredbyaflankguardcomposedofavailablemotorizedforcesintheArmyGroupSouthsectorandadvancinginageneralnortheasterlydirection,andthatforcesfromArmyGroupNorthshouldbemovedforwardonbothsidesofLakeIlmentocoverthenorthernflankandtomaintaincontactwiththeFinnishKarelianArmy.5.Anysavingoftimeandconsequentadvanceofthetimetablewillbetotheadvantageofthewholeoperationanditspreparation.signed:adolfhitler


FührerHeadquarters,22ndSeptember1941.12copiesDirectiveNo.36I.Owingtounusualdifficultiesoftheterrain,defectivelinesofcommunications,andthecontinualarrivalofRussianreinforcementsinKareliaandLapland,theweakforcesofArmyHighCommandNorwayand5thAirFleethavenotsofarsucceeded,inspiteofimmenseeffortsandthebravestactions,inreachingtheMurmanskrailway.TheinterruptionbytheenemyofourseacommunicationsalongtheArcticcoasthasstillfurtherreducedthelikelihoodthattheMountainCorpswillreachMurmanskthisyear.We

have,however,succeededintyingdownstrongenemyforcesandindrawingthemawayfromthemainRussianfront,indrivingbacktheenemyacrosstheformerFinnishfrontieratallpoints,andineliminating,sofar,allthreatstoNorthFinland,andabovealltothenickelmines.II.TheultimateaimofouroperationsinNorthernandCentralFinlandremainsconstant.ItistodestroytheenemyforcesaroundMurmanskandalongtheMurmanskrailway.TheimportanceofthisarealiesinthenickelmineswhicharevitalfortheGermanwareffort.Theenemyrealizesthisimportance.ItislikelythattheEnglishwilldeploystrongairforcesaroundMurmanskandKandalakshaandmayperhapsevencommitCanadianorNorwegiantroopsthere,andthattheywillsendasmuchwarmaterialaspossibletoMurmansk.Wemustexpectairattacks,eveninwinter,againstthenickelminesandthehomesoftheminers.Ourowneffortsmustcorrespondwiththegreatnessofthisdanger.III.Ithereforeorderasfollows:1.ArmyHighCommandNorway.(a)TheattacksinthesectorofIII(Finnish)ArmyCorpswillbehaltedandtheforcesthusreleasedtransferredtoXXXVIArmyCorps.(b)AllpreparationsaretobemadebyXXXVIArmyCorpsforresumptionoftheattacktowardsKandalakshainthefirsthalfofOctoberwiththeaimofatleastcuttingMurmanskofffromitsrailcommunicationsbythetimewintersetsin.Moreover,thequestionwhetherthecontinuationofthisattackinthewinterwillhavegreaterprospectsofsuccessthanintheautumnistobeconsidered.TheFinnishHighCommandwillberequestedtotransfer163rdDivision,byrailviaRovaniemi,totheHighCommandoftheArmyatthepropertime.(c)TheoffensiveoftheMountainCorpstowardsMurmanskistobehaltedforthetimebeingandthenorthernflankwilladvanceonlysofarasisrequiredtoimprovethepositionandtomisleadtheenemy.Ontheotherhanditisnecessary,inthelightofthetasksassignedtotheNavy,atleasttooccupythewesternendoftheFisherman’sPeninsula30beforethebeginningofthewinterandtherebytopreventtheenemyfromhamperingaccesstotheportofLiinahamaribyartilleryandmotortorpedoboats.Thecollectionofintelligenceandplanningforthisattackwillbeginatonceandtheresultwillbereportedassoonaspossible.Specialweaponssuitableforuseagainsttargetsonlandandatsea,whicharestilllacking,willbeprovided.WhethertheplanofArmyHighCommandNorwayforthewintercanbecarriedoutcanonlybedecidedlater.ThisplanistoleavetworeinforcedmountaindivisionsinthePetsamoareaandtoallow2ndMountainDivisiontorestintheRovaniemiarea.Ifpossiblethiswillbedone.Itisalsoplannedtorelieve3rdMountainDivisionbysthMountainDivisionorbyanewlyraisedmountaindivision.(d)NumbersoflorrieswillbeboughtorhiredinSwedeninordertoshiftthesupplyrouteoftheMountainCorpstotheArcticHighway.Ifthistransportisnotsufficient,reinforcementswillbebroughtfromhome.(e)IhaveinstructedReichsministerDrTodttoconstructafieldrailwayfromRovaniemialongtheArcticHighwaytoPetsamobytheruthlessemploymentofRussianprisonersofwar.(f)FortheresumptionoftheattackonMurmansk,allmodernweaponssuitableforuseinthetundrawillbesupplied.2.Navy:ItisthetaskoftheNavytoattackenemysuppliesmovingtoMurmanskeveninwinter,

andparticularlyattimeswhenairoperationsaremoreorlesscrippled.Forthispurposeasuitablesubsidiarybaseforlightnavalforceswillbeestablished-preferablyinPetsamoBay-incasewesucceedincapturingthewesternpartoftheFisherman’sPeninsula.TheflowofsuppliesbyseatoKirkenesandPetsamo,evenshoulditbeinterruptedforatime,mustbeconstantlyattempted.CoastaldefencesinthebaysofPetsamoandKirkeneswillbestrengthenedsothattheyarecapableofmeetingattacksevenbyheavyenemyships.3.AirForce:Itisofdecisiveimportancethat5thAirFleetshouldremaininNorthNorwaywithstrongforcessuitableforactioninwinter.TheseforcesaretobelargeenoughtogiveeffectivesupporttotheattackonKandalakshaandthecaptureofthewesternpartoftheFisherman’sPeninsulauptothebeginningofthebadweather.Meanwhileitisnecessarytomakecontinuous‘attacksontheenemy’sshippingandrearcommunicationsaswellashissupplyandequipmentdepots.Theseattacksaretobecontinuedthroughouttheperiodofbadweatherwheneveropportunityoifersandtobeextendedparticularlytoshippingandbasesunderconstruction.AirForcegroundestablishmentsmustthereforeremain,asfaraspossible,inNorthernNorwayandFinlandandmustbeprotectedagainstthewinterbyallpossiblemeans.Protectionagainstenemyairattackofourowncarnpsandcommunicationsand,aboveall,ofthenickelminesandthenavalbasewhichistobeestablishedmustbeensured.Groundorganizationsandsupplieswillbeincreasedsothat,whenthetimecomes,theresumptionoftheattackonMurmanskcanbesupportedbyconsiderablystrongerairforcesthanhitherto.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo37TheFührerandSupremeCommanderoftheArmedForces.FührerHeadquarters,1othOctober1941.13copiesDirectiveNo.37ThesuddenfavourabledevelopmentsofthesituationintheEasterntheatre,togetherwithreportsfromArmyHighCommandNorwayonthestateoftheforcesthereandonthepossibilitiesoffurtheroperationsinFinland,haveledmetoissuethefollowingorders:i.AfterthedefeatordestructionofthemainRussianforcesintheprincipaltheatreofoperations,therewillbenocompellingreasontotiedownRussianforcesinFinlandbycontinuedattacks.ThestrengthandoffensivepoweroftheavailableGermanformationsareinadequate,inviewofthelatenessoftheseason,tocaptureMurmanskortheFisherman’sPeninsulaortocuttheMurmanskrailwayinCentralFinlandbeforetheonsetofwinter.Themostimportanttask,therefore,istoholdwhatwehavegained,toprotectthePetsamonickelfieldsfromattackbyland,air,orsea,andtomakeallpreparations-beginningwhileitisstillwinter-forthefinalcaptureofMurmansk,theFisherman’sPeninsula,andtheMurmanskrailwaynextyear.Thetime-tablewillbeasfollows:(a)Armyformationstogoovertothedefensiveinfavourable,easilydefendedpositions.Winteraccommodationtobeerectedandpreparationsmadeforwinterwarfare.(6)Reliefandreinforcementoftroops.(c)Inwinter,aconcentricattackagainsttheMurmanskrailway,asfollows:

WithFinnishforcesfromthesouthtowardsBielo-morsk—KemandifpossibletowardsLouhi.WithGermanforcesfromtheVermansectortowardsKandalaksha.(d)AtafavourablemomentthecaptureoftheFisherman’sPeninsula,ifpossibleinitsentirety,andanattackonMurmansk.Theseoperationsmustbesotimedthatitispossibletoconcentrateallattackingforcesatonepoint.2.ThenextdutyofArmyHighCommandNorwaywillbe,whileensuringthedefenceofallareaswhichdonotcallfortheemploymentoflargeforces,sotodistributeforcesthatthoseformationswhichhavebeenheavilyengagedforalongtimepastcanrestandbeequippedforwinterwarfare,or,wherenecessary,berelievedbyreinforcementsandwithdrawn.Inthisconnexion(a)2ndand3rdMountainDivisionsoftheMountainCorpswillberelievedbythereinforced6thMountainDivision.OnemountaindivisionwillremaininNorthern.Finland,thesecondwillbemovedtotheRovaniemiareaandsouthofit.Theirtransferhomeisplannedtocoincidewiththearrivalof5thMountainDivision(aboutJanuary1942).Afterthat,afurthermountaindivision,newlyraisedorreorganized,willrelievethedivisionwhichremainsinNorthernFinland.(b)i&3rdInfantryDivisionwillcomeundercommandofXXXVICorpsassoonasitisclearthatitisnotrequiredforaconcentricattackonthesouthshoreofLakeLadogabetweentheKarelianArmyandArmyGroupNorth.Personnelofi6gthandi63rdInfantryDivisionswillifpossibleberelievedinthecourseofthewinterbydivisionsfromNorwayorfromhome.3.Allreliefs,includingthoseofthemountaindivisions,willbecarriedthroughsoastoensurethatthebulkofheavyweapons,equipment,horses,anddraughtanimalsremainonthespot.Thatistosay,onlytroopsandtheirpersonalweaponswillbeexchanged.Thiswillsavetimeandshippingspace.4.SSFormations.ItisintendedtorelieveSS9thRegiment,atpresentundercommandofandMountainDivision,byanSSRegimentconsistingofNorwegiansandFinnsand,byreinforcingitwithoneAustrianSSRegiment,toconvertSSBattleGroupNorthintoamountainbrigade.TheexecutionofthisplanwillbecoordinatedbytheHighCommandoftheArmedForceswiththeotherplansforexchangesofstaffsandunits.5.AstheFinnishHighCommandintendstoundertakeacompletereorganizationoftheArmyontheconclusionofthepresentoperation,theGermanandFinnishforcesinIIIFinnishCorpswillbeexchangedforoneanother(6thFinnishDivisionagainstSSBattleGroupNorth).ItisthenproposedtobringthesectorheldbyHIFinnishCorpsunderthecommandofFieldMarshalMannerheim.FieldMarshalMannerheimwillberequestedtoplaceatleastafewsmallFinnishformationsundercommandoftheGermanForcesattackingKandalakshabeforethebeginningofthenewoperations.6.TheAirForcewillcarryoutthefollowingtasksintheFinnishtheatre,asfarasweatherallows:(a)ItwillkeepthecoastsofNorthernNorwayandFinlandunderobservationtoprotectourownseatraffic”andtoattackthatoftheenemy.(b)Itwillprovideairdefences,particularlyforthePetsamonickelarea,portsatwhichsuppliesareunloaded,andnaval

bases.(c)ItwillreconnoitretheareaoffutureoperationsandwillconstantlyattacktheenemysupplybaseatMurmanskandmovementstoitbyseaorrail.(d)Itwillmakepreparationsfortheemploymentofstrongerforcesinsupportofforthcomingoperations.7.ThetaskoftheNavywillbetoattackenemysuppliesgoingbyseatoMurmanskandtoprotectourowntrafficintheArcticOceanwithinthelimitsofitsforces.Tothisendlightnavalforcesaretobestrengthenedassoonaspossibleandmotortorpedoboatstobebroughtup.Kirkeneswillbedevelopedasasubsidiarybase.Inordertoprotectourowncoastaltrafficitisdesirabletobringupfurthercoastalbatteries.TheChiefoftheHighCommandoftheArmedForceswillissuethenecessaryorders.KirkenesandPetsamowillbereinforced,beyondtheestablishmentalreadylaiddown,byonebatteryeachof21cm.guns.One28cm.batterywillbeestablishedatVardo.AfterthecaptureoftheFisherman’sPeninsula,anextra-heavybatterywillbeestablishedthere.8.CooperationbetweenArmyHighCommandNorway,Navy,andAirForcemustbeparticularlycloseintheensuingmonthsinordertocounteractanypossibleoperationsagainstourfrontoragainstourseaflank.InordertosimplifythiscooperationtheNavywillappointaNavalCommanderNorthandtheAirForce,afterwithdrawingHeadquarters5thAirFleettoNorway,willappointanAirForceCommanderNorth.9.OperationOrderswillbeissuedbytheChiefoftheHighCommandoftheArmedForces.31Throughhimthereshouldbesubmittedtome:(a)ByArmyHighCommandNorway:Time-tableforregrouping.Plansforre-equipmentinorderthatalltroopsmaybecapableofoperatinginthetundraandintheforestsofEasternKarelia.Plansforoperationsandrequestsforarmytroopsasreinforcements.Proposalsfortheexchangeofstaffs.(b)BytheNavyandAirForce:Theirdetailedplans.10.WhereDirective36isalteredbytheseordersitbecomesinvalid.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo38TheFührerandSupremeCommanderoftheArmedForcesFührerHeadquarters,2ndDecember1941.17copiesDirectiveNo.38i.InordertosecureandextendourownpositionintheMediterranean,andtoestablishafocusofAxisstrengthinCentralMediterranean,Iorder,inagreementwiththeDuce,thatpartoftheGermanAirForcenolongerrequiredintheEastbetransferredtotheSouthItalianandNorthAfricanareas,inthestrengthofaboutoneAirCorpswiththenecessaryantiaircraftdefences.ApartfromtheimmediateeffectofthismovementonthewarintheMediterraneanandNorthAfrica,effortswillbemadetoensurethatithasaconsiderableeffectuponfurtherdevelopmentsintheMediterraneanareaasawhole.2.IappointFieldMarshalKesselringtocommandallforcesemployedintheseoperations.HeisalsoappointedCommander-in-ChiefSouth.Histasksare:TosecuremasteryoftheairandseaintheareabetweenSouthernItalyandNorthAfricainordertosecurecommunicationswithLibyaandCyrenaicaand,inparticular,tokeepMaltainsubjection.TocooperatewithGermanandalliedforcesengagedinNorthAfrica.Toparalyseenemy

trafficthroughtheMediterraneanandBritishsuppliestoTobrukandMalta,inclosecooperationwiththeGermanandItaliannavalforcesavailableforthistask.3.Commander-in-ChiefSouthwillbeundertheordersoftheDuce,whosegeneralinstructionshewillreceivethroughtheCommandoSupremo.InallAirForcemattersCommander-in-ChiefAirForcewilldealdirectwithCommander-in-ChiefSouth.InimportantmatterstheHighCommandoftheArmedForcesistobesimultaneouslyinformed.4.ThefollowingwillbesubordinatetoCommander-in-ChiefSouth:(a)AllunitsoftheGermanAirForcestationedintheMediterraneanandNorthAfricanareas;(b)theairandanti-aircraftunitsputathisdisposalfortheexecutionofhistasksbytheItalianArmedForces.5.GermannavalforcesintheCentralMediterraneanremainundercommandofCommander-in-ChiefNavy.Fortheexecutionofthetasksassignedtohim,Commander-in-ChiefSouthisauthorizedtoissuedirectivestotheGermanAdmiralwiththeItalianNavalHighCommandand,ifnecessary,toNavalGroupSouth(fortheEasternMediterranean).OperationorderswillbeissuedbytheNavalHeadquartersconcernedinagreementwithCommander-in-ChiefSouth.RequestsbyCommander-in-ChiefSouthforcombinedoperationsbyalliednavalforceswillbemadeexclusivelytotheGermanAdmiralwiththeItalianNavalHighCommand.6.ThedutiesofCommanderArmedForcesSouth-eastandoftheGermanGeneralattheheadquartersoftheItalianArmedForcesremainunchanged.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo39

TheFührerandSupremeCommanderoftheArmedForcesFührerHeadquarters,8thDecember1941.14copiesDirectiveNo.39TheseverewinterweatherwhichhascomesurprisinglyearlyintheEast,andtheconsequentdifficultiesinbringingupsupplies,compelustoabandonimmediatelyallmajoroffensiveoperationsandtogoovertothedefensive.Thewayinwhichthesedefensiveoperationsaretobecarriedoutwillbedecidedinaccordancewiththepurposewhichtheyareintendedtoserve,viz.:(a)Toholdareaswhichareofgreatoperationaloreconomicimportancetotheenemy.(b)ToenableforcesintheEasttorestandrecuperateasmuchaspossible.(c)Thustoestablishconditionssuitablefortheresumptionoflarge-scaleoffensiveoperationsin1942.Mydetailedordersareasfollows:I.Army:1.ThemainbodyoftheArmyintheEastwill,assoonaspossible,goovertothedefensivealongalightlytenablefronttobefixedbyCommander-inChiefArmy.Thereaftertherehabilitationoftroopsistobegin,armouredandmotorizeddivisionsbeingwithdrawnfirst.2.Wherethefronthasbeenwithdrawnwithoutbeingforcedbytheenemy,rearareaswillbeestablishedinadvancewhichoffertroopsbetterlivingconditionsanddefensivepossibilitiesthantheformerpositions.Toallowtheenemyaccesstoimportantlaterallinesofcommunicationcancreatedangerforothersectorsofthefrontnotyetfortified.Insuch

casesthetimingofwithdrawalinindividualsectorsmustcomplywiththegeneralsituation.3.Thefrontlinemustbechosenwithaneyetoeasyquarteringanddefenceandsimplificationofsupplyproblems,especiallyduringthethaw.Salientandrearpositionswillbedeterminedandbuiltasquicklyaspossible,usingallavailablemanpower.4.Withintheframeworkofthesegenerallydefensiveoperationsthefollowingspecialtasksmustbeachieved:(a)Sevastopolwillbecapturedassoonaspossible.ThefutureemploymentofthebulkofnthArmy(withtheexceptionofunitsrequiredforcoastaldefence)willbedecidedattheendofthefightingthere.(b)Inspiteofalldifficulties,ArmyGroupSouthmustendeavourtoestablishconditionswhich,infavourableweather,evenduringthewinter,wouldmakeitpossibletoattackandcapturethelowerDon-Donetsline.ThiswouldprovidefavourableconditionsforoperationsagainsttheCaucasusinthespring.(c)ArmyGroupNorthwillshortenitsEasternandSouth-easternfrontnorthofLakeIlmen,whilestilldenyingtheenemytheroadandrailwayfromTikhvintoVolkhovstroiandKolchanavo.Thiswillmakeitpossible,afterthearrivalofreinforcements,tocleanuptheareasouthofLakeLadoga.OnlythuscanLeningradbefinallyenclosedandalinkwiththeFinnishKarelianArmybeestablished.(d)ShoulditturnoutthattheenemyhaswithdrawnhismainforcesfromthecoastalareasouthoftheBayofKronstadt,andnolongerintendstodefendthisareaseriously,thatcoastwillbeoccupiedinordertoeconomizeourforces.II.AirForce:1.ThetaskoftheAirForceistopreventtherehabilitationoftheRussianforcesbyattacking,asfaraspossible,equipmentandtrainingcentres,particularlyLeningrad,Moscow,Rybinsk,Gorki,Voronezh,Rostov,Stalingrad,Krasnodar,etc.Itisparticularlyimportanttoharass,daybyday,thoseenemylinesofcommunicationwhichenablehimtoexistandbywhichhethreatensourownfront.BesidesengagingtheenemyAirForce,theGermanAirForcewillsupporttheArmybyallavailablemeansindefenceagainstenemyattacksonthegroundandintheair.2.IapproveoftheproposeddistributionofplanesbetweentheArmyGroupsandoftheproposedstrengthoftheairforceswhichwillremainintheEast.Ontheconclusionoflandoperations,individualairunitsmaybewithdrawnforrestandtrainingasthesituationallows.3.Inordertooffereffectivedefenceagainstpossibleattacksduringthewinterandinviewofourownforthcomingwinteroperations(seeI.4),agroundorganizationwillbemaintainedwhichallowsforaquickswitchofforcesandforreinforcementbyunitsintherear.TothisendrestareaswillbesetupasclosetotheEasternfrontaspossible.4.Continualwide-rangingprotectiveairreconnaissanceisparticularlyimportantinordertodetectandobserveenemyre-grouping.TheArmyandAirForcemustcoordinatetheirforcesandtheiroperationsforthispurpose.5.IreservetomyselftherighttoauthorizethewithdrawalfromtheMoscowfrontofthoseforcesstillallocatedforservicewithCommander-inChiefSouth.6.TheAirDefencewillberesponsiblefortheprotectionofourowntroopsintheirbilletingandsupplyareasandforthedefenceofimportantcommunicationsintherear.Planswillbemadeforthespeedyconcentrationofourownfighterforcesinspecialareas,inordertodealwithconcentratedenemyairattacks.

III.TheNavywillensurethatthesea-routetoHelsinki,renderedsaferbythecaptureofHangoandOsmussaar,canbefullyutilizedforcargotrafficandsuppliestoourtroopsinFinland.ThenumberofsmallsupplyshipsbeingbuiltinGermanyandoccupiedcountries(particularlyforuseacrosstheBlackSeaandintheAegean)mustbestillfurtherincreasedevenattheexpenseofallnotabsolutelyessentialclaimsandsecuritymeasures.IV.ThereplacementofpersonneloftheArmedForcesfor1942mustbeensuredevenintheeventofheavycasualties.AstheGlassof1922willnotbesufficientaloneforthispurpose,drasticstepsarenecessary.Ithereforeorder:1.AllArmedForcestroopswhichcanbereleasedfromGermanyorfromspecialemployment(e.g.MilitaryMissionRumania)willbemadeavailable,bywholesaleredeployment,tothefightingfront.Youngersoldierswhoareservingathomeorinrearareaswilltaketheplaceofolderfightingsoldiers.2.ThemovementofforcesbetweentheEasternandWesterntheatreswillbemadeonthefollowingprinciples:DivisionsofthesecondandthirdwaveandarmoureddivisionsintheWest,iffullyfitforaction,willrelievedivisionsintheEastwhichhavebeenexhaustedbyparticularlyheavyfighting.WearejustifiedinriskingapurelytemporaryweakeningofourforcesinFranceduringthewinter.Battle-triedofficers,non-commissionedofficers,andmenfromthedivisionsintheEastwhicharetoberelievedmaybepostedtothesedivisionsintheWest.BeyondthisIwilldecidewhetherdivisionsintheWestwhichcannotbeemployedintheEastasfullformationsshouldbedisbandedandemployedtoreinforceseasoneddivisionsontheEasternfront.ThisdecisionwillbereachedwhentheArmy’sgeneralplansforreorganizationandregroupingaresubmittedtome.AtalleventsthestrengthoftheArmyintheWestmustbemaintainedsothatitiscapableofcoastaldefenceandofcarryingout‘UndertakingAttila’.


FührerHeadquarters,23rdMarch1942.35copies

DirectiveNo.40Ref,CompetenceofCommandersincoastalareas.I.GeneralConsiderations:ThecoastlineofEuropewill,inthecomingmonths,beexposedtothedangerofanenemylandinginforce.Thetimeandplaceofthelandingoperationswillnotbedictatedtotheenemybyoperationalconsiderationsalone.Failureinothertheatresofwar,obligationstoallies,andpoliticalconsiderationsmaypersuadehimtotakedecisionswhichappearunlikelyfromapurelymilitarypointofview.Evenenemylandingswithlimitedobjectivescaninterfereseriouslywithourownplansiftheyresultintheenemygaininganykindoffootholdonthecoast.Theycaninterruptourcoastalseatraffic,andpindownstrongforcesofourArmyandAirForce,whichwillthereforehavetobewithdrawnfromareasofcrucialimportance.Itwouldbeparticularlydangerousshouldtheenemysucceedincapturingourairfieldsorinestablishinghisowninareaswhichhehasoccupied.Themanyimportantmilitaryandindustrialestablishmentsonthecoastorinits

neighbourhood,someofthemequippedwithparticularlyvaluableplant,maymoreovertempttheenemytoundertakesurpriseattacksofalocalnature.ParticularattentionmustbepaidtoEnglishpreparationforlandingsoniheopencoast,forwhichtheyhaveattheirdisposalmanyarmouredlandingcraft,builttocarryarmouredfightingvehiclesandheavyweapons.Thepossibilityofparachuteandairborneattacksonalargescalemustalsobeenvisaged.II.Generaloperationalinstructionsforcoastaldefence:1.CoastaldefenceisataskforallArmedForces,callingforparticularlycloseandcompletecooperationbyallunits.2.Theintelligenceservice,aswellastheday-to-dayreconnaissancebytheNavyandtheAirForce,muststrivetoobtainearlyinformationofenemyreadinessandapproachpreparationsforalandingoperation.Allsuitableseaandairforceswillthenconcentrateonenemypointsofembarkationandconvoys,withtheaimofdestroyingtheenemyasfarfromthecoastaspossible.Itishoweverpossiblethattheenemy,byskilfulcamouflageandbytakingadvantageofunpredictableweatherconditions,mayachieveacompletelysurpriseattack.Alltroopswhomaybeexposedtosuchsurpriseattacksmustbeinastateofpermanentreadiness.OneofthemostimportantdutiesofCommandingOfficerswillbetoovercomethelackofvigilanceamongthetroopswhich,asexperiencehasshown,increaseswiththepassageoftime.3.Indefendingthecoastandthisincludescoastalwaterswithinrangeofmediumcoastalartilleryresponsibilityfortheplanningandimplementationofdefensivemeasuresmust,asrecentbattleexperiencedictates,lieunequivocallyandunreservedlyinthehandsofasingleCommander.TheCommanderresponsiblemustmakeuseofallavailableforcesandweaponsofthebranchesoftheArmedForces,oforganizationsandunitsoutsidetheArmedForces,andofourcivilheadquartersinthearea,forthedestructionofenemytransportsandlandingforces.Hewillusethemsothattheattackcollapsesifpossiblebeforeitcanreachthecoast,atthelatestonthecoastitself.Enemyforceswhichhavelandedmustbedestroyedorthrownbackintotheseabyimmediatecounter-attack.Allpersonnelbearingarms-irrespectivetowhichbranchoftheArmedForcesortowhichnon-serviceorganizationtheymaybelong-willbeemployedforthis.Moreover,therequiredworkingcapacityofthenavalshoresupplyestablishmentsmustbeguaranteed,insofarastheyarenotinvolvedinthelandfightingthemselves.ThesameappliestothereadinessforactionoftheAirForcegroundstaffandtheanti-aircraftdefenceofairfields.Noheadquartersorformationistoinitiatewithdrawalinsuchcircumstances.AllGermantroopsstationedonornearthecoastmustbearmedandtrainedforbattle.Theenemymustbepreventedfromsecuringafootholdonallislandswhichcouldpresentathreattothemainlandorcoastalshipping.

4.Thedistributionofforcesandtheextensionofdefensiveworksmustbesocarriedoutthatourstrongestdefencepointsaresituatedinthosesectorsmostlikelytobechosenbytheenemyforlandings(fortifiedareas).Othercoastalsectorswhichmaybethreatenedbysmall-scalesurpriseattackswillbedefendedbyaseriesofstrong-points,supportedifpossiblebythecoastalbatteries.Allmilitaryandindustrialplantofimportancetothewareffortwillbeincludedwithinthesestrong-points.Thesameprincipleswillapplytooff-shoreislands.

Lessthreatenedsectorswillbekeptunderobservation.5.Thedivisionofthecoastintosectorswillbedecidedbythethreeservicesinmutualagreement,or,shouldthesituationdemandit,bytheresponsibleCommander(referredtohereinparagraphIII,i),whosedecisionwillbefinal.6.Thefortifiedareasandstrong-pointsmustbeable,byproperdistributionofforces,bycompletionofall-rounddefence,andbytheirsupplysituation,toholdoutforsometimeevenagainstsuperiorenemyforces.Fortifiedareasandstrong-pointswillbedefendedtothelastman.Theymustneverbeforcedtosurrenderfromlackofammunition,rations,orwater.7.TheresponsibleCommander(referredtohereinparagraphIII,i)willissueordersforkeepingthecoastunderconstantobservation,andensurethatreconnaissancereportsfromallservicesarequicklyevaluated,coordinated,andtransmittedtotheheadquartersandcivilianauthoritiesconcerned.Assoonasthereisanyevidencethatanoperationbytheenemyisimminent,theCommanderisauthorizedtoissuethenecessaryinstructionsforcoordinatedandcomplementaryreconnaissanceonseaandland.8.TherecanbenoquestionofpeacetimeprivilegesforanyheadquartersorformationoftheArmedForcesincoastalareas,orfornon-militaryorganizationsandunits.Theiraccommodation,securityprecautions,equipment,immediatereadinessforaction,andtheusetheymakeoftheterrain,willbeentirelydependentuponthenecessityofmeetinganyenemyattackasswiftlyandinasgreatstrengthaspossible.‘Wherethemilitarysituationrequiresit,thecivilianpopulationwillbeimmediatelyevacuated.III.CompetenceofCommanders.1.ThefollowingareresponsibleforthepreparationandexecutionofcoastaldefenceintheareasunderGermanCommand:(a)IntheEasternareaofoperations(excludingFinland):TheArmyCommandersappointedbyHighCommandoftheArmy.(b)InthecoastalareaofArmyHighCommandLapland:Commander-in-ChiefArmyHighCommandLapland.(c)InNorway:CommanderArmedForcesNorway.(d)InDenmark:TheCommanderofGermantroopsinDenmark.(e)IntheoccupiedWesternterritories(includingtheNetherlands):Commander-in-ChiefWest.ForcoastaldefencetheresponsibleCommandersin(d)and(e)willbedirectlysubordinatetotheHighCommandoftheArmedForces.(f)IntheBalkans(includingtheoccupiedislands):CommanderArmedForcesSouth-east.(g)IntheBalticterritoriesandtheUkraine:CommanderArmedForcesBalticTerritoriesandUkraine.(h)IntheHometheatreofwar:theCommandingAdmirals.2.TheCommandersnamedinparagraphIII,IwillhaveforthesetasksfullpowersofcommandoverthestaffscommandingallArmedForces,theGermancivilauthorities,andthenon-militaryunitsandorganizationsintheirarea.Inexercisingtheirauthoritytheywillissuethenecessarytactical,administrative,andsupplyinstructions,andwillensurethattheyarecompliedwith.Inallmattersrelatingto

landfighting,trainingofunitswillfollowtheirruling,andallnecessaryinformationwillbeputattheirdisposal.3.Amongtheorderstobegivenandmeasurestobetaken,thefollowingmustbegivenfirstplace.(a)Theinclusionwithinfortifiedareasorstrong-pointsofallimportantmilitaryandindustrialestablishmentsconnectedwithdefence,particularlythoseoftheNavy(submarinebases)andtheAirForce.(b)Thecoordinationofcoastalreconnaissance.(c)Thedefenceoffortifiedareasandstrong-pointsbyinfantry.(d)Thedefencebyinfantryofallisolatedpositionsoutsidethefortifiedareasandstrong-points—e.g.coastallook-outpointsandair-attackwarning-posts.(e)Artillerydefenceagainstlandtargets.(TheNavyhaspriorityintheinstallationofnewbatteries,ortheconversionofexistingbatteries.)(/)Thedefensivereadiness,development,andsupplyfacilitiesofinstallations,aswellasofisolatedpositionsawayfromtheseinstallations.(Thisincludesbeingequippedwithallweaponsneededfordefence:mines,hand-grenades,flame-throwers,barbed-wire,etc.)(g)Thesignalsnetwork.(h)Methodsforensuringthattroopsarealwaysonthealert,andthatinfantryandgunnerytrainingisbeingcarriedoutinaccordancewiththespecialdefencerequirements.4.Thesameauthorityisconferreduponlocalcommandersuptosectorcommanders,insofarastheyareresponsibleforthedefenceofapartofthecoast.TheCommandersdesignatedinparagraphIII,iwill,ingeneral,appointCommandersofArmyDivisionsemployedincoastaldefenceaslocalCommanderswithfullpowers.InCretethe‘FortressCommandantCrete’willappointthem.Asfarastheirotherdutiesallow,localCommandantsorCommandersoftheAirForceandNavywillbemaderesponsibleforthegeneraldefenceofindividualsectorsorsub-sectors,particularlyAirandNavalstrong-points.5.AllnavalandairunitsemployedinstrategicwarfarearesubordinatetotheNavyorAirForce.Intheeventofenemyattacksonthecoast,however,theyarerequiredtocomply,insofarastacticalconsiderationsallow,withtheordersoftheCommandersresponsiblefordefence.Theymustthereforebeincludedinthedistributionofsuchinformationastheyrequirefortheirduties,andcloseliaisonwillbemaintainedwiththeirheadquarters.IV.SpecialdutiesofthebranchesoftheArmedForcesinthefieldofcoastaldefence.1.Navy.(a)Organizationandprotectionofcoastaltraffic.(bjTrainingandemploymentofallcoastalartilleryagainsttargetsatsea.(c)Employmentofnavalforces.2.AirForce.(a)Airdefenceofcoastalareas.Theuseagainstenemylandingsofsuitableandavailableanti-aircraftguns,undertheordersofthecommanderresponsibleforlocaldefence,willnotbeaffected.(b)Thecompletionofgroundorganizationsandtheirprotectionagainstairattackandsurpriseattackbyland;thelatterincaseswhereairfieldsarenotincludedinthecoastaldefencesandarethereforeinsufficientlyprotected.(c)Operationalemploymentofairforces.Attentionwillbepaidtotheduplicationofcommandimpliedbythesespecialduties.V.OrdersandinstructionswhichruncontrarytothisdirectivearecancelledfromistApril

1942.Newoperationorders,whichwillbeissuedbyCommandersonthebasisofmydirective,aretobesubmittedtomethroughtheHighCommandoftheArmedForces.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo41TheFührerandSupremeCommanderoftheArmedForcesFührerHeadquarters,5thApril1942.14copiesDirectiveNo.41ThewinterbattleinRussiaisnearingitsend.Thankstotheunequalledcourageandself-sacrificingdevotionofoursoldierson.theEasternfront,Germanarmshaveachievedagreatdefensivesuccess.Theenemyhassufferedseverelossesinmenandmaterial.Inanefforttoexploitwhatappearedtohimtobeearlysuccesses,hehasexpendedduringthewinterthebulkofreservesintendedforlateroperations.Assoonastheweatherandthestateoftheterrainallows,wemustseizetheinitiativeagain,andthroughthesuperiorityofGermanleadershipandtheGermansoldierforceourwillupontheenemy.OuraimistowipeouttheentiredefencepotentialremainingtotheSoviets,andtocutthemoff,asfaraspossible,fromtheirmostimportantcentresofwarindustry.Allavailableforces,Germanandallied,willbeemployedinthistask.Atthesametime,thesecurityofoccupiedterritoriesinWesternandNorthernEurope,especiallyalongthecoast,willbeensuredinallcircumstances.I.GeneralPlanInpursuitoftheoriginalplanfortheEasterncampaign,thearmiesoftheCentralsectorwillstandfast,thoseintheNorthwillcaptureLeningradandlinkupwiththeFinns,whilethoseonthesouthernflankwillbreakthroughintotheCaucasus.Inviewofconditionsprevailingattheendofwinter,theavailabilityoftroopsandresources,andtransportproblems,theseaimscanbeachievedonlyoneatatime.First,therefore,allavailableforceswillbeconcentratedonthemainoperationsintheSouthernsector,withtheaimofdestroyingtheenemybeforetheDon,inordertosecuretheCaucasianoilfieldsandthepassesthroughtheCaucasusmountainsthemselves.ThefinalencirclementofLeningradandtheoccupationofIngermanlandmaybeundertakenassoonasconditionsinthatareapermit,orsufficientforcescanbemadeavailablefromothertheatres.II.ConductofoperationsA.ThefirsttaskoftheArmyandAirForce,whentheperiodofthawwithitsmuddygroundconditionsisover,willbetoestablishthepreliminaryconditionsforcarryingoutourmainoperation.Thiscallsformopping-upandconsolidationonthewholeEasternfrontandintherearareassothatthegreatestpossibleforcesmaybereleasedforthemainoperation.Theothersectorsofthefrontmustbeabletomeetanyattackwiththesmallestpossibleexpenditureofmanpower.Wherever,forthispurpose,offensiveoperationswithlimitedobjectivesaretobecarriedout,inaccordancewithmyorders,everyeffortwillbemadetoensurethatallavailableforcesoftheArmyandAirForcearereadytogointoactioninoverwhelmingstrength,inordertoachieverapidanddecisivesuccess.Onlythusshallwebeable,evenbeforethebeginningofthebigspringoffensive,tomakeourtroopsconfidentinthe

certaintyofvictory,andtoinstilintotheenemyasenseofhisownhopelessinferiority.B.Thenexttaskwillbeamopping-upoperationintheKerchpeninsulaontheCrimeaandthecaptureofSevastopol.TheAirForce,andlatertheNavy,willhavethetaskofpreparingtheseoperations,andhinderingenemysupplytrafficintheBlackSeaandtheKerchStraitsasenergeticallyaspossible.IntheSouthernarea,theenemyforceswhichhavebrokenthroughonbothsidesofIzyumwillbecutoffalongthecourseoftheDonetsriveranddestroyed.Finaldecisionconcerningthemopping-upstillnecessaryintheCentralandNorthernsectorsoftheEasternfrontmustawaitconclusionofthepresentfightingandofthemuddyseason.Thenecessaryforces,however,mustbeprovided,assoonasthesituationallows,bythinningoutfrontlinetroops.G.ThemainoperationontheEasternfront.Thepurposeis,asalreadystated,tooccupytheCaucasusfrontbydecisivelyattackinganddestroyingRussianforcesstationedintheVoronezhareatothesouth,west,ornorthoftheDon.Becauseofthemannerinwhichtheavailableformationsmustbebroughtup,thisoperationcanbecarriedoutinaseriesofconsecutive,butcoordinatedandcomplementary,attacks.Thereforetheseattacksmustbesosynchronizedfromnorthtosouththateachindividualoffensiveiscarriedoutbythelargestpossibleconcentrationofarmy,andparticularlyofair,forceswhichcanbeassuredatthedecisivepoints.ExperiencehassufficientlyshownthattheRussiansarenotveryvulnerabletooperationalencirclingmovements.Itisthereforeofdecisiveimportancethat,asinthedoublebattleofVyazma-Bryansk,individualbreachesofthefrontshouldtaketheformofclosepincermovements.Wemustavoidclosingthepincerstoolate,thusgivingtheenemythepossibilityofavoidingdestruction.Itmustnothappenthat,byadvancingtooquicklyandtoofar,armouredandmotorizedformationsloseconnexionwiththeinfantryfollowingthem;orthattheylosetheopportunityofsupportingthehard-pressed,forward-fightinginfantrybydirectattacksontherearoftheencircledRussianarmies.Therefore,apartfromthemainobjectoftheoperation,ineachindividualcase,wemustbeabsolutelysuretoannihilatetheenemybythemethodofattackandbythedirectionoftheforcesused.Thegeneraloperationwillbeginwithanoverallattackand,ifpossible,abreakthroughfromtheareasouthofOrelinthedirectionofVoronezh.Ofthetwoarmouredandmotorizedformationsformingthepincers,thenorthernwillbeingreaterstrengththanthesouthern.TheobjectofthisbreakthroughisthecaptureofVoronezhitself.WhilecertaininfantrydivisionswillimmediatelyestablishastrongdefensivefrontbetweentheOrelarea,fromwhichtheattackwillbelaunched,andVoronezh,armouredandmotorizedformationsaretocontinuetheattacksouthfromVoronezh,withtheirleftflankontheRiverDon,insupportofasecondbreakthroughtotakeplacetowardstheeast,fromthegeneralareaofKharkov.HeretootheprimaryobjectiveisnotsimplytobreaktheRussianfrontbut,incooperationwiththemotorizedforcesthrustingdowntheDon,todestroytheenemyarmies.ThethirdattackinthecourseoftheseoperationswillbesoconductedthatformationsthrustingdowntheDoncanlinkupintheStalingradareawithforcesadvancingfromtheTaganrog-ArtelnovskareabetweenthelowerwatersoftheDonandVoroshilovgradacross

theDonetstotheeast.TheseforcesshouldfinallyestablishcontactwiththearmouredforcesadvancingonStalingrad.Shouldopportunitiesariseduringtheseoperations,particularlybythecaptureofundemolishedbridges,toestablishbridgeheadstotheeastorsouthoftheDon,advantagewillbetakenofthem.Inanyevent,everyeffortwillbemadetoreachStalingraditself,oratleasttobringthecityunderfirefromheavyartillerysothatitmaynolongerbeofanyuseasanindustrialorcommunicationscentre.ItwouldbeparticularlydesirableifwecouldsecureeitherundamagedbridgesinRostovitselforotherbridgeheadssouthoftheDonforlateroperations.InordertopreventlargenumbersofRussianforcesnorthoftheDonfromescapingsouthwardsacrosstheriver,itisimportantthattherightflankofourforcesadvancingeastfromtheTaganrogareashouldbestrengthenedbyarmouredandmotorizedtroops.Thesewill,ifnecessary,beformedfromimprovisedunits.Accordingtotheprogressmadeintheseattacks,wemustnotonlyprovidestrongprotectionforthenorth-eastflankoftheoperation;wemustimmediatelysetaboutestablishingpositionsalongtheDon.Inthismatter,antitankdefencesareespeciallyimportant.Thesepositionswillfromthefirstbepreparedwithaviewtotheireventualoccupationinwinter,forwhichtheywillbefullyequipped.Inthefirstinstance,unitsofourallieswillbeusedtoholdtheDon.front,whichwillbecomelongerandlongerastheattackproceeds.GermanforceswillprovideastrongsupportingforcebetweenOrelandtheDon,andintheStalingradstrip.Fortherest,individualGermandivisionswillalsoremainavailableasreservesbehindtheDonfront.AlliedtroopswillbemainlydisposedsothattheHungariansarefarthestnorth,thentheItalians,andtheRumaniansfurthesttothesouth-east.D.TheswiftprogressofthemovementsacrosstheDontothesouth,inordertoattaintheoperationalobjectives,isessential,inconsiderationoftheseason.III.AirForce.ApartfromgivingdirectsupporttotheArmy,thetaskoftheAirForcewillbetocoverthedeploymentofforcesintheArmyGroupSouthareabystrengtheningairdefences.ThisappliesparticularlytorailwaybridgesacrosstheDnieper.Ifenemyforcesareseentobeconcentrating,theprincipalroadsandrailwaysservingtheconcentrationareawillbebroughtundercontinuousattackwellintheenemy’srear.AfirstprioritywillbethedestructionofrailwaybridgesacrosstheDon.Attheopeningofoperations,theenemyAirForceanditsgroundorganizationinthetheatreofoperationswillbeattackedanddestroyedbyaconcentratedeffortofallavailableforces.ThepossibilityofahastytransferofAirForceunitstotheCentralandNorthernfrontsmustbeborneinmind,andthenecessarygroundorganizationforthismaintainedasfaraspossible.IV.Navy.’IntheBlackSeaitistheprincipaldutyoftheNavy,insofarasourcombatandescortforcesandourtonnageallow,toassistinsupplyingtheArmyandAirForcebysea.BecausethebattlepotentialoftheRussianBlackSeafleetisstillunbrokenitisparticularlyimportantthatthelightnavalforcestobemovedtotheBlackSeashouldbereadyforactionthereassoonaspossible.TheBalticwillbeprotectedbyblockadingRussiannavalforcesintheinnerwatersoftheGulfofFinland.

V.Mybasicordertoensuresecrecy32isonceagaintobebroughttotheattentionofallstaffsconcernedinthesepreparations.Inthisconnexiontheattitudetobeadoptedtoourallieswillbelaiddowninspecialinstructions.VI.ThepreparationsplannedbythevariousbranchesoftheArmedForces,andtheirtime-tables,willbenotifiedtomethroughtheHighCommandoftheArmedForces.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo42TheFührer

FührerHeadquarters,29thMay1942.6copiesDirectiveNo.42InstructionsforoperationsagainstunoccupiedFranceandtheIberianPeninsula

(previouslyknownas‘Attila’and‘Isabella’)I.ThedevelopmentofthesituationinunoccupiedFrance,orintheFrenchpossessionsinNorthAfrica,mayrenderitnecessaryinfuturetooccupythewholeofFrenchterritory.LikewisewemustreckononpossibleenemyattemptstoseizetheIberianPeninsula,whichwillcallforimmediatecounter-measuresonourpart.II.BecauseofthecontinualshiftingofourforcesintheWest,andtheconsequentchangesinthereadinessforbattleofourformationsthere,onlygeneralprinciplescanbegivenforcarryingouttheseoperations.Similarly,thesituationwithregardtomanpowerandequipmentmakesitimpossibletokeepforcesandmaterialpermanentlyavailablefortheseoperations.Thereforethedirectivesalreadyissuedfor‘Attila’and‘Isabella’arecancelledwithimmediateeffect.Improvisedplansforbothoperationswill,however,bemadesothattheycanstillbecarriedoutatveryshortnotice.III.OccupationofunoccupiedFranceincooperationwithItalianForces(covername‘Anton’(mostsecret).Dayofcommencementofoperations,A-day).i.TheobjectoftheoperationistobreakthepowersofresistanceofunoccupiedFranceandtooccupythecountry.ItwillthereforebethetaskoftheGermanforces,withoutweakeningcoastaldefence,withquicklyformedandverymobileforces,toseizebysurprisesuchobjectivesasareimportantfordefence,andthustoeliminatethepossibilityofFrenchresistance.ItwillbeparticularlyimportanttoseizequicklythelargerFrenchgarrisontowns,railwayjunctions,dumpsofsupplies,munitionsandarms,airfields,andtheseatoftheGovernment,Vichy.ItwillbethetaskoftheItalianstooccupytheFrenchMediterraneancoast(andCorsica)and,byblockadingnavalbases,particularlyToulon,topreventtheFrenchHomeFleetandmerchantvesselsinMediterraneanportsfrompassingovertotheenemy.TheItalianswillbesupportedinthisbyGermannavalandairforcesintheMediterranean.TheItaliansmayalso,ifthesituationrequires,havetotakeactioninTunisia.Aforceforthispurposeisnowbeingformed.3.TheHighCommandoftheArmy(ArmyGroupD)willmakeallnecessarypreparationsinviewoftheforcesavailable.ThespecialforcesrequiredtosupporttheArmyinparticulartasks(e.g.theoccupationofAirForceestablishments,theeliminationofsignalscentres,andsabotage)aretobeformedbythebranchesoftheArmedForcesandbythedepartmentsoftheHighCommandoftheArmedForces,uponrequestof,andinagreementwith,theHighCommandoftheArmy.3.ItwillbethetaskoftheAirForcetogivedirectsupportto

groundoperationsinFranceand,incooperationwiththeItalians,toeliminatesuchFrenchairforcesasremaininFrance.IfythAirDivisionandthenecessarytransportareavailable,advantagewillbetakenofallpossibilitiesofairbornelandings.InorderthattheAirForcemaybeusedforthispurpose,thenecessarygroundorganizationistobesetupatonceinoccupiedFrance.IV.Firstcounter-measuresagainstanenemyassaultontheIberianPeninsula(covername‘Ilona’(mostsecret).Dayofcrossingthefrontier,Iday).1.Thefirstaimofourcounter-measureswillbetooccupythesouthernpassesofthePyreneesandthusestablishtheconditionsnecessaryforfutureoperations.AnythreattothestrategicallyimportantportsontheAtlanticCoastofFrancewillbemetbysecuringtheharboursonthenortherncoastofSpain.2.NegotiationsandpreliminarydiscussionswiththeSpanishandothernon-Germanauthoritiesconcerningtheseplansareforbidden.V.TheHighCommandsofthebranchesoftheArmedForceswillreportbylothJuneconcerningbothoperations,asfollows:(a)Proposedstrengthofforces.(b)Proposalsongenerallinesforcarryingoutoperations.(c)Timerequiredbeforeoperationscanbegin.(d)DemandsorrequeststotheItalians,andpossiblewaysofsupportingthem(seeIII,i,sub-section3).ThenecessarydiscussionswiththeItalianswillthenbeauthorizedbytheHighCommandoftheArmedForces.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo43TheFührerFührerHeadquarters,11thJuly1942.5copies

DirectiveNo.43ContinuationofoperationsfromtheCrimea1.AfterclearingtheKerchpeninsulaandcapturingSevastopol,thefirst

taskofnthArmywillbe,whileensuringthedefenceoftheCrimea,tomakeallpreparationsforthemainbodyofthearmytocrosstheKerchstraitbythemiddleofAugustatthelatest.33TheaimofthisoperationwillbetothrustforwardoneithersideofthewesternfoothillsoftheCaucasusinasouth-easterlyandeasterlydirection.Theoperationwillbeknownbythecover-name‘Blücher’(mostsecret),andthedayofthelandingwillbeknownas“B1-day”2.Theoperationwillbeexecutedonthefollowinglines:InaccordancewiththeproposalsofnthArmy,thecrossingistobeplannedsothatthestrongestpossibleforcesarelandedintherearofenemycoastdefences.ThehighgroundnorthofNovorossiyskwillthenbecaptured.TheportsofAnapaandNovorossiyskwillbeoccupied,therebyeliminatingbasesfortheenemyfleet.Afterthat,theoperationwillcontinuetothenorthoftheCaucasus,itsmainthrustinageneraleasterlydirection.InthisconnexionitisspeciallyimportantthattheMaykopareabequicklyoccupied.ThedecisionwhethersmallforcesshouldalsobelandedonthecoastroadalongtheBlackSeaintheTuapseareacanonlylaterbetaken.ForthisoperationnthArmyistokeepthebulkofthemediumandfieldartillery(flat

trajectoryandhowitzer)mortarbatteriesupto21cm.mortarsinclusive,andsomeoftheheavyprojectordetachments.3.TheNavywilltakeimmediatestepstosecurethenecessaryshippingforthecrossing,inaccordancewithdetailedArmyrequirements.Tomeetthisneed,suitableshipping,apartfromvesselsalreadyavailableintheBlackSeaandtheSeaofAzovandthosewhichmaybebroughtinfortheoperation,willbecharteredorboughtfromtheBulgariansandRumanians.Duringtheactualoperation,theNavywillsupportthelandingforcesduringthecrossing,andprotectthemwithallavailablemeansagainstactionbyenemyseaforces.NavalunitsdetailedtocoverthecrossingofthelandingforceswillcomeundercommandofnthArmyduringtheoperation.4.ThetaskoftheAirForceinpreparingtheoperationistheoveralleliminationofenemynavalforcesandharboursintheBlackSea.Duringtheoperationitstask,apartfromimmediatesupportofthelandingforces,willbetopreventenemynavalforcesfrominterferingwiththecrossing.PreparationsaretobemadesothattheArmyforceslandedontheTemryukpeninsulamaybesuppliedforseveraldaysbyair.Thepossibilityofusingparachuteandairbornetroopsistobeinvestigated.Ifpossible,7thAirborneDivisionwillnotbeinvolvedintheseoperations,oratleastonlyinsmallpart.Itmaybeadvantageoustoemployunitsof22ndInfantryDivisionasairbornetroops.5.TheenemyistobedeceivedintobelievingthatlargeforcesofnthArmyarebeingmovedfromtheCrimeatotheareanorthoftheSeaofAzov.Forthispurposealarge-scalemovementbyroadandrailwillbeundertakentowardsthenorth,whiletheactualconcentrationfor‘UndertakingBlucher’willbeconcealedbynightmarches.TheHighCommandoftheArmedForceswillsupportthisdeceptionbysuitablemeans.6.Thefollowingspecialoperations(AbwehrII34)havebeenprepared.ThesespecialoperationsaretobeexaminedbytheGeneralStaffoftheArmywithForeignIntelligence,SecurityII[AbwehrII],and,ifapproved,tobeincludedin‘OperationBlücher’.(a)ParachutedropofacommandodetachmentintheMaykopareatoprotectoilinstallations(‘UndertakingSchamil’).(b)SabotageoperationsagainstthetriangleofrailwaysKrasnodar-Kropotkin-Tikhoretsk,andagainstthebridgesovertheKubaninthatarea.(c)ParticipationofalightengineercompanyoftheBrandenburgTrainingRegiment,raisedforoperationsofthiskind,inattacksonenemyportsandcoastalinstallations.7.DetailsforthepreparationandconductoftheoperationwillbeworkedoutbytheArmyGeneralStaffinconjunctionwiththeNavyandAirForce.IamtobeinformeddailythroughHighCommandoftheArmedForces,OperationsStaff,onthestateofpreparations(provisionofshipping)andtheforcestobeused.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo44TheFührerFührerHeadquarters,21stJuly1942.8copiesDirectiveNo.44OperationsinNorthernFinland

1.TheunexpectedlyrapidandfavourabledevelopmentoftheoperationsagainsttheTimoshenkoArmyGroupentitleustoassumethatwemaysoonsucceedindepriving

SovietRussiaoftheCaucasus,withhermostimportantsourceofoil,andofavaluablelineofcommunicationforthedeliveryofEnglishandAmericansupplies.This,coupledwiththelossoftheentireDonetsindustrialarea,willstrikeablowattheSovietUnionwhichwouldhaveimmeasurableconsequences.2.WemustnowcutthenorthernsupplyroutewhichlinksSovietRussiawiththeAnglo-Saxonpowers.ThisisprincipallytheMurmanskrailway,alongwhichbyfarthelargestproportionofsuppliesfromAmericaandEnglandweredeliveredduringthewintermonths.Theimportanceofthissupplyroutewillincreasefurtherwhentheseasonandweatherconditionspreventsuccessfuloperationsagainstnorthernconvoys.3.2othMountainArmythereforeproposes,incooperationwith5thAirFleet,toprepareanoffensivethisautumntoseisetheMurmanskrailwaynearKandalaksha.Forthis,wecanassume(a)LeningradwillbecapturedinSeptemberatthelatest,andFinnishforcestherebyreleased.(b)5thMountainDivisionwillhavemovedtoFinlandbytheendofSeptember.Theundertakinghasbeenallottedthecover-nameof‘Lachsfang[SalmonTrap]’.Dayofattackwillbecalled‘L-day’.4.ItisdesirablethattheattackbyaothMountainArmyshouldbecoordinatedwithaFinnishadvanceonBelomorsk.LiaisonStaffNorthwillascertaintheintentionsoftheFinnishCommandforthisattack,inconjunctionwithaothMountainArmy.5.Themostimportanttaskof2OthMountainArmyremainsthecompleteprotectionoftheFinnishnickelproduction.Itmustonceagainbestressed,withthegreatestemphasis,thatwithoutdeliveriesofFinnishnickelGermanycouldprobablynolongermanufacturethehigh-gradesteelnecessaryabovea’llforaircraftandsubmarineengines.Thiscouldhavedecisiveeffectsupontheoutcomeofthewar.20thMountainArmymustthereforebeatalltimesreadytosendreinforcementstoMountainCorpsNorwayasrequiredforthefulfilmentofthesetasks.Similarly,theAirForce5thAirFleetwill,intheeventofanattackuponthenickelmines,renounceallotherdutiesandconcentrateonthedefenceofthearea.6.‘UndertakingMeadowland[Wiesengrund]’35willnot

takeplacethisyear.Preparationsforthisoperationwill,however,continueandbereinforced,sothatitcanbeexecutedinthespringof1943atshortnbtice(abouteightweeks).Particularattentionwillbepaidtothedevelopmentandstrengtheningofairandsupplybases,becausetheseareessentialbothforthesuccessof‘Meadowland’andformeetingamajorenemyoffensiveinthenorth.7.2othMountainArmyandCommander-in-ChiefAirForcewillinformmeoftheirintentionsassoonaspossible.LiaisonStaffsNorthwillreportonFinnishplansfortheattackonBelomorsk.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo45TheFührer

FührerHeadquarters,23rdJuly1942.6copies

DirectiveNo.45Continuationof‘OperationBrunswick[Braunschweig]’36I.Inacampaignwhichhaslastedlittlemorethanthreeweeks,thebroadobjectivesoutlinedbymeforthesouthernflankoftheEasternfronthavebeenlargelyachieved.OnlyweakenemyforcesfromtheTimoshenkoArmyGrouphavesucceededinavoidingencirclementandreachingthefurtherbankoftheDon.WemustexpectthemtobereinforcedfromtheCaucasus.AfurtherconcentrationofenemyforcesistakingplaceintheStalingradarea,whichtheenemywillprobablydefendtenaciously.II.Aimsoffutureoperations.A.Army.1.ThenexttaskofArmyGroupAistoencircleenemyforceswhichhaveescapedacrosstheDonintheareasouthandsouth-eastofRostov,andtodestroythem.Forthispurposestrongfast-movingforcesaretomovefromthebridgeheadswhichwillbeestablishedintheKonstantinovskaia-Tsymlyanskayaarea,inageneralsouthwesterlydirectiontowardsTikhoretsk.Infantry,lightinfantry,andmountaindivisionswillcrosstheDonintheRostovarea.Inaddition,thetaskofcuttingtheTikhoretsk-Stalingradrailwaylinewithadvancedspearheadsremainsunchanged.TwoarmouredformationsofArmyGroupA(including24thArmouredDivision)willcomeundercommandofArmyGroupBforfurtheroperationssouth-eastwards.Infantrydivision‘GreaterGermany[Grossdeutschland]’isnottoadvancebeyondtheManychsector.37Preparationswillbemadetomoveittothewest.

2.AfterthedestructionofenemyforcessouthoftheDon,themostimportanttaskofArmyGroupAwillbetooccupytheentireeasterncoastlineoftheBlackSea,therebyeliminatingtheBlackSeaportsandtheenemyBlackSeafleet.ForithispurposetheformationsofnthArmyalreadydesignated(RumanianMountainCorps)willbebroughtacrosstheKerchStraitsassoonastheadvanceofthemainbodyofArmyGroupAbecomeseffective,andwillthenpushsouth-eastalongtheBlackSeacoastalroad.AfurtherforcecomposedofallremainingmountainandlightinfantrydivisionswillforceapassageoftheKuban,andoccupythehighgroundaroundMaykopandArmavir.Inthefurtheradvanceofthisforce,reinforcedatasuitabletimebymountainunits,towardsandacrossthewesternpartoftheCaucasus,allpracticalpassesaretobeused,sothattheBlackSeacoastmaybeoccupiedinconjunctionwithiithArmy.3.Atthesametimeaforcecomposedchieflyoffast-movingformationswillgiveflankcoverintheeastandcapturetheGroznyyarea.DetachmentswillblockthemilitaryroadbetweenOsetiaandGroznyy,ifpossibleatthetopofthepasses.ThereaftertheBakuareawillbeoccupiedbyathrustalongtheCaspiancoast.TheArmyGroupmayexpectthesubsequentarrivaloftheItalianAlpineCorps.TheseoperationsbyArmyGroupAwillbeknownbythecovername‘Edelweiss’.Security:MostSecret.4.ThetaskofArmyGroupBis,aspreviouslylaiddown,todeveloptheDondefencesand,byathrustforwardtoStalingrad,tosmashtheenemyforcesconcentratedthere,tooccupythetown,andtoblockthelandcommunicationsbetweentheDonandtheVolgaaswellastheDonitself.Closelyconnectedwiththis,fast-movingforceswilladvancealong

theVolgawiththetaskofthrustingthroughtoAstrakhanandblockingthemaincourseoftheVolgainthesameway.TheseoperationsbyArmyGroupBwillbeknownbythecover-name‘Heron[Fischreiher]’.Security:MostSecret.B.AirForce.ThetaskoftheAirForceis,primarily,togivestrongsupporttothelandforcescrossingtheDon,andtotheadvanceoftheeasterngroupalongtherailwaytoTikhoretsk,andtoconcentrateitsforcesonthedestructionoftheTimoshenkoArmyGroup.Inaddition,theoperationsofArmyGroupBagainstStalingradandthewesternpartofAstrakhanwillbesupported.TheearlydestructionofthecityofStalingradisespeciallyimportant.Attackswillalsobemade,asopportunityaffords,onAstrakhan.ShippingontheLowerVolgashouldbeharassedbymine-laying.DuringfurtheroperationstheAirForceistoconcentrateoncooperatingwiththeforcesadvancingontheBlackSeaports,and,apartfromgivingdirectsupporttotheArmy,toassisttheNavyinpreventingenemynavalforcesfrominterfering.Secondly,sufficientforcesmustbeallocatedtocooperatewiththethrustonBakuviaGroznyy.InviewofthedecisiveimportanceoftheCaucasusoilfieldsforthefurtherprosecutionofthewar,airattacksagainsttheirrefineriesandstoragetanks,andagainstportsusedforoilshipmentsontheBlackSea,willonlybecarriedoutiftheoperationsoftheArmymakethemabsolutelyessential.ButinordertoblockenemysuppliesofoilfromtheCaucasusassoonaspossible,itisespeciallyimportanttocuttherailwaysandpipelinesstillbeingusedforthispurposeandtoharassshippingontheCaspianatanearlydate.C.Navy.ItwillbethetaskoftheNavy,besidesgivingdirectsupporttotheArmyinthecrossingoftheKerchStraits,toharassenemyseaactionagainstourcoastaloperationswithalltheforcesavailableintheBlackSea.TofacilitateArmySupply,somenavalferrieswillbebrought“throughtheKerchStraitstotheDon,assoonaspossible.Inaddition,Commander-in-ChiefNavywillmakepreparationfortransferringlightforcestotheCaspianSeatoharassenemyshipping(oiltankersandcommunicationswiththeAnglo-SaxonsinIran).III.ThelocaloperationsnowbeingpreparedintheCentralandNorthernArmyGroupareasshouldbecarriedoutasfaraspossibleinquicksuccession.Theirresultmustbethemaximumdisruptionanddisintegrationofenemycommandsandforces.ArmyGroupNorthispreparingtocaptureLeningradbythebeginningofSeptember.Cover-name:‘FireMagic’(Feuerzauber)38Forthis,theywillbereinforcedbyfivedivisionsfromnthArmy,byheavyandextra-heavyartilleryandbysuchotherArmytroopsasmaybenecessary.TwoGermanandtwoRumaniandivisionswillremainintheCrimeaforthepresent.22ndDivision,asalreadyordered,willreverttoCommanderArmedForcesSoutheast.IV.Inhandlingandre-transmittingthisDirectiveandordersarisingfromit,IdrawparticularattentiontomyorderonsecrecyofizthAugust.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo46TheFührerFührerHeadquarters,18thAugust1943.30copies

DirectiveNo.46InstructionsforintensifiedactionagainstbanditryintheEastA.GeneralConsiderations

I.InrecentmonthsbanditryintheEasthasassumedintolerableproportions,andthreatenstobecomeaseriousdangertosuppliesforthefrontandtotheeconomicexploitationofthecountry.Bythebeginningofwinterthesebanditgangsmustbesubstantiallyexterminated,sothatordermayberestoredbehindtheEasternfrontandseveredisadvantagestooxirwinteroperationsavoided.Thefollowingmeasuresarenecessary:1.Rapid,drastic,andactiveoperationsagainstthebanditsbythecoordinationofallavailableforcesoftheArmedForces,theSS,andPolicewhicharesuitableforthepurpose.2.Theconcentrationofallpropaganda,economic,andpoliticalmeasuresonthenecessityofcombatingbanditry.II.Thefollowinggeneralprincipleswillbeborneinmindbyallconcernedinformulatingmilitary,police,andeconomicmeasures:1.Thefightagainstbanditryisasmuchamatterofstrategyasthefightagainsttheenemyatthefront.Itwillthereforebeorganizedandcarriedoutbythesamestaffs.2.Thedestructionofthebanditscallsforactiveoperationsandthemostrigorousmeasuresagainstallmembersofgangsorthoseguiltyofsupportingthem.Operationordersforactionagainstbanditswillfollow.3.TheconfidenceofthelocalpopulationinGermanauthoritymustbegainedbyhandlingthemstrictlybutjustly.4.Anecessaryconditionforthedestructionofbanditgangsistheassurancetothelocalpopulationoftheminimumrequirements’oflife.Shouldthisfail,or-whatisparticularlyimportant-shouldavailablesuppliesnotbefairlydistributed,theresultwillbethatmorerecruitswilljointhebandits.5.Inthisstruggleagainstthebanditsthecooperationofthelocalpopulationisindispensable.Deservingpersonsshouldnotbeparsimoniouslytreated;rewardsshouldbereallyattractive.Ontheotherhand,reprisalsforactioninsupportofthebanditsmustbeallthemoresevere.6.Misplacedconfidenceinthenativepopulation,particularlyinthoseworkingfortheGermanauthorities,mustbestrictlyguardedagainst.Eventhoughthemajorityofthepopulationisopposedtothebandits,therearealwaysspiestobereckonedwith,whosetaskistoinformthebanditsofallactioncontemplatedagainstthem.B.Commandandresponsibilityi.TheReichsfilhrerSSandtheChiefoftheGermanPolice39TheReichsfiihrerSSandChiefoftheGermanPoliceisthecentralauthorityforthecollectionandevaluationofallinformationconcerningactionagainstbandits.Inaddition,theReichsfuhrerSShasthesoleresponsibilityforcombatingbanditryintheReichCommissioners’territories.CommandersoftheArmedForceswillsupporthiminhistasksarisingfromthisbycoordinatingtheirmeasures,andbytransferringsuch’staffs,commandcommunications,andsuppliesasareneeded.Insofarasisallowedbymilitarysecurityduties,whichwillbecarriedoutlocallyasactivelyaspossible,HigherSSandPoliceLeadersfwillifnecessaryassumetemporarycommandofforcesoftheArmedForcesforuseintheiroperations.TheclosestliaisonbetweenHigherSuyosinceramente

40andPoliceLeadersandCommandersoftheArmedForcesisanessentialconditionofsuccess.2.Army.TheChiefoftheArmyGeneralStaffissolelyresponsibleforactionagainstbanditsinoperationalareas.Incarryingoutthistask,policeunitsstationedintheareaofoperations,aswellastheArmyunitsengaged,willcomeundertheArmyCommandersconcerned.ThelatterwillentrustthecommandofindividualoperationstoArmyCommanders,ortoHigherSSandPoliceLeaders,accordingtothesituation,

theforcesengaged,andtheseniorityoftheofficersconcerned.G.AvailableForces1.ForcesoftheReichsfuhrerSS.ThePoliceandSSformationsavailableandallocatedforoperationsagainstbanditsareintendedprimarilyforactiveoperations.Theiremploymentinothersecuritydutiesistobeavoided.EffortswillbemadetoreinforcePoliceandSSformationsintheEast,andtotransfertothethreatenedareasaconsiderablenumberofestablishmentsoftheReichsfuhrerSSatpresentemployedelsewhere.Formationsstillatthefront,butindispensableforoperationsagainstbanditsintherearareas,willbewithdrawnfromtheArmyassoonaspossible,andplacedatthedisposaloftheReichsfuhrerSSfordutyintheirproperareas.2.ArmyForces,Inordertoreinforcethegarrisonsofthevasteasternterritoriesbehindthefightingfront,Iorderasfollows:(a)WhentheGeneralGovernment41becomesaHomeForcesarea,tworeservedivisionswillmovetotheGeneralGovernment.(b)AtotaloffivereservedivisionswillbemovedtothespheresofCommanderArmedForcesBalticTerritoriesandCommanderArmedForcesUkrainebyi5thOctober1943.(c)Allformations,units,staffs,establishments,andschoolsoftheFieldArmynotservingundertheCommanderoftheReplacementArmywillbewithdrawnbyistOctober1942fromtheGeneralGovernmentandtransferredtotheterritoriesoftheReichCommissionersortotheareaofoperations.AnynecessaryexceptionswillbeapprovedbytheChiefoftheHighCommandoftheArmedForces.(d)ThefinaltargetistotransferbytheendofOctoberareplacementforceof50,000menformedfromtheReserveArmy.(e)Thenecessaryoperationordersconcerningparagraphs(a)to(d)willbeissuedbytheChiefoftheHighCommandoftheArmedForces.3.AirForce.Commander-in-ChiefAirForcewillarrangeforthetransferofAirForceestablishmentstotheareasthreatenedbybandits,inordertoreinforcethegarrisonintheeasternterritories.4.Unitsformedfromthenativepopulation.Nativeunitsmadeupoflocalpeople“whohaveparticularlydistinguishedthemselvesinactionagainstthebanditsaretobemaintainedandextended,42providedtheyarecompletelyreliableandarevolunteers.Theywillnottakepartinfightingatthefront,norwillImigrhormembersoftheformerintelligentsiabeenrolledinthem.TheArmyGeneralStaffwillissuegeneraldirectionscoveringtheinternalorganizationoftheseunits,wherethishasnotalreadybeendone.Inmattersofrank,uniforms,andtraining,thesedirectionswillfollowthegenerallineslaiddownfortheTurkomanformations.43TheywillthenbeapprovedbytheChiefoftheHighCommandoftheArmed

Forces.ThewearingofGermanbadgesofrank,theHohetis-abzeichen[theEagleandSwastika],andGermanmilitaryshoulder-strapsisforbidden.Thedependentsofthesemenaretobeprovidedfor.Rationscalesforthemwillbelaiddowncorrespondingtothedutiestheyarerequiredtoperform.Thesepeoplewillreceivepreferentialtreatmentintheformofgrantsofland,whichshouldbeasliberalaspossiblewithinthelimitsoflocalcircumstances.5.Otherforces.ThearmingoftheReichLabourService,railwaymen,foresters,agriculturaloverseers,etc.,will,whererequired,beimproved.Theyshouldbeabletodefendthemselveswiththemosteffectiveweaponsavailable.TheremustbenoGermanintheareathreatenedbybanditswhoisnotengagedactivelyorpassively,inthefightagainstthem.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo47

TheFührerFührerHeadquarters,28thDecember1942.24copies

DirectiveNo.47CommandanddefencemeasuresintheSoutheast

I.ThesituationintheMediterraneanmakesitpossiblethatanattackmaybemade,intheforeseeablefuture,onCreteandonGermanandItalianbasesintheAegeanSeaandtheBalkanpeninsula.ItmustbeexpectedthatthisattackwillbesupportedbyrisingsintheWesternBalkancountries.TheincreasinginfluenceoftheAnglo-SaxonpowersontheattitudeofTurkeyalsocallsforfreshvigilance.II.AsaresultofthissituationandofdevelopmentsinNorthAfrica,1transferthedefenceoftheSouth-eastarea,includingoff-shoreislands,toCommanderArmedForcesSouth-eastwhowillbedirectlysubordinatetomeasCom-mander-in-ChiefSouth-east(ArmyGroupE).TheprincipleslaiddownforcoastaldefenceinDirectiveNo.40willapplyhere.Themilitaryforcesofourallieswill,asfarasisnecessary,comeunderdirecttacticalcommandofCommander-in-ChiefSouth-eastonlyintheeventofenemyattack.ThenavalandairforcesofourAllieswill,insuchanevent,comeundertacticalcommandoftheheadquartersofthecorrespondingGermanservices.Thiscommandorganizationwillbecomeeffectiveupontheissueofspecialorders.Inpreparingforadefensivebattleofthiskind,Comman-der-in-ChlefSouth-eastwillhavethefollowingtasks:1.PreparationofcoastaldefenceswithmainemphasisintheDodecanese,Crete,andthePeloponnese,whichwillbedevelopedasfortresses(withtheexceptionofMytileneandChios).2.Thefinalpacificationofthehinterlandandthedestructionofrebelsandbanditsofallkinds,inconjunctionwithItalian2ndArmy.3.ThepreparationofallnecessarymeasurestomeetanenemyattackontheBalkanswhichishelpedorcondonedbyTurkey.ThiswillbecarriedoutinagreementwiththeBulgarianHighCommand.Inaddition,Commander-in-ChiefSouth-eastwillcontrolintheGermansphereUnifiedseatransportanditsprotectionintheAegeanSea,includingCrete.

SuppliesbylandandseaforallGermanforcesstationedintheSouth-east,inaccordancewiththeirrequirementsandthetransportavailable.DecisionsonallquestionswhichmayariseinthethreeservicesconcerningthecoordinatedcontroloftransportandcommunicationsintheoccupiedareaoftheSouth-east.III.OrganizationofCommandA.IntheGermansphere:1.Commander-in-ChiefSouth-eastisthehighestrepresentativeoftheforcesintheSouth-east,andwillexercisefullpowersinallareasoccupiedbyGermantroops.HewillsupervisetheciviladministrationwhichhasbeensetupbythevariousCommandersandbytheCommandantofFortressCrete.CommanderArmedForcesSouth-eastwillceasetobesubordinatetoCommander-in-ChiefSouthfromistJanuary1943.2,ThefollowingaresubordinatetoCommander-in-ChiefSouth-east:

(a)IntheareaofCroatia,“TheGermanGeneralPlenipotentiaryinCroatia”(apartfromhisdutiesasMilitaryAttache),and“TheCommanderofGermanTroopsinCroatia”.(b)IntheareaofOldSerbia,the‘CommandingGeneralSerbia’.(c)IntheSalonikaarea,andintheislandsofLemnos,Mytilene,Chios,andStrati,aswellasfortheneutralzonenearTurkeyinThrace,the‘CommanderSalonika-Aegean’.(d)ForthePiraeusportarea,thebilletingareas,andtheareaoccupiedbyGermantroopsinAttica,aswellastheislandofMelos,the‘CommanderSouthernGreece”.(e)FortheCretearea,‘theCommandantofFortressCrete’.(/)‘TheAdmiralAegean’inallmattersconcerningcoastaldefence.(g)The‘MilitaryAttacheinSofia’,wheredutiesbeyondthoseofanAttacheareconcerned.FortheNavy,thepresentdistinctionbetweenNavalGroupSouthandtheGermanNavalHeadquartersinItalywillberetained.3.AirForce.(a)ConductofAirWarfare.(i)TheconductofairoperationsinthewholeMediterraneanarea,withtheexceptionoftheFrenchMediterraneancoast,remainstheresponsibilityofCommander-in-ChiefSouth.Hewillreceivedirectivesforoperationsasfollows:(1)IntheCentralMediterranean,fromtheItalianSupremeCommand.(ii)IntheEasternMediterraneanandBalkans,fromCommander-in-ChiefAirForce,inaccordancewithmyinstructions.Commander-in-ChiefAirForceandItalianSupremeCommandwillagreeuponbasicplansforairwarfare.(2)Inordertoensurecoordinatedoperations,particularlyincoastaldefence,andcoordinatecontrolintheEasternMediterraneanandBalkanareas,Commander-in-ChiefSouthwillappointastafftocooperatewithCommander-in-ChiefSouth-eastforairoperationsinthisarea.ItsdutieswillalsobetopreparegroundestablishmentsintheBalkansandcommonactionwithouralliesinthecaseofanenemyattack.(b)AirDefence.(1)AirDefenceintheCentralMediterraneanistheresponsibilityofCommander-in-ChiefSouthundertheItalianSupremeCommand.(2)IntheBalkanareaairdefenceistheresponsibilityofCommander-inChiefSouth-eastinaccordancewiththedirectivesofCommander-in-ChiefSouth,therebyassuringthatairoperationsintheEasternMediterraneanarealsounderunifiedcommand.44

B.Preparationsforactionandthepacificationoftheareawillbemadeinclosecooperationwithourallies.Liaisonofficerswillbeexchanged,wherethishasnotalreadybeendone.Thefollowinggeneralprinciplesapply:1.Italy:

(a)Army:RegulationsregardedasnecessaryfortheItaliantheatrewillbesubmittedtotheHighCommandoftheArmedForces,whowillobtaintheagreementoftheItalianSupremeCommand.ThelatterwillthenissuethenecessaryorderstotheItalianarmiesstationedintheSouth-east.(b)Navy:OrdersproposedbyCommander-in-ChiefNavyGroupSouthfortheItalianAdmiralintheDodecaneseconcerningpreparatorymeasureswillbeforwarded,intheformofdraftorders,byNavyGroupSouthtotheNavalStaff,whichwillobtaintheagreementoftheItalianNavalHighCommandfortheissueofcorrespondingorders.TheItalianNavalHighCommandwillthenissuesuchorders,afterobtainingtheapprovaloftheItalianSupremeCommand.(c)AirForce:RegulationsregardedasnecessaryfortheItalianAirForceintheSouth-eastareawillbesubmittedtoCommander-in-ChiefSouth,who,aftersecuringtheapprovaloftheItalianSupremeCommand,willagreeonthemwiththeHighCommandoftheItalianAirForce,andwillensuretheirpublicationinanorder.2.Bulgaria:EveryeffortwillbemadetosecureasimilarprocedurewiththeBulgarianforces.(TheoutcomeofconversationswiththeBulgariansisstillawaited.)3.Croatia:CooperationwithCroatiaandtheemploymentoftheCroatianforceswillcontinueashitherto.Commander-in-ChiefSouth-eastandtheGermannavalandairforcecommandshavethedutytoensureunifieddefencepreparationsforthewholeSouth-easternarea,andareentitledtoexamineallmeasuresdirectedtothisend.IV.Commander-in-ChiefSouth-easthasallthepowersofaterritorialcommanderoverthethreebranchesoftheArmedForcesand’theWaffenSSinthosepartsofCroatia,Serbia,andGreece(includingtheGreekIslands)occupiedbyGermantroops.AreasoccupiedexclusivelybyGermantroopsareoperationalareas.Commander-in-ChiefSouth-eastwillexercisefullpowersinthemthroughhissubordinatecommanders.ThosepartsofCroatiawhichareoccupiedbyGermantroops,orinwhichGermantroopsareoperating,willalsoberegardedasoperationalareas.InthosepartsoftheItalianoccupationareainwhichGermantroopsarestationed,Commander-in-ChiefSouth-eastwillexercisepowersofcommandoverallbranchesoftheArmedForcesinsofarasthemilitaryrequirementsoftheGermanforcesdemand.ForthedelimitationofpowersbetweenCommander-in-ChiefSouth-eastand‘thePlenipotentiaryoftheReichforGreece’seeAppendix.45V.DirectiveNo.31ofgthJune1941andOKW/WFSt/Op.No.551743/43g.K.Chefs,ofi3thOctober194246areherebycancelled.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo48TheFührerFiihrerHeadquarters,26thJuly,1943.17copies

DirectiveNo.48CommandanddefencemeasuresintheSoutheastI.Theenemy’smeasuresintheEasternMediterranean,inconjunctionwiththeattackonSicily,indicatethathewillshortlybeginlandingoperationsagainstourstronglineinthe

Aegean,Peloponnese-Crete-Rhodes,andagainstthewestcoastofGreecewithoffshoreIonianislands.Shouldtheoperationsofthe^enemyextendfromSicilytothemainlandofSouthernItaly,wemustalsoreckonwithanassaultontheeastcoastoftheAdriatic,northofthestraitsofOtranto.Theenemy’sconductofoperationsisalsobasedonthebanditmovement,whichisincreasinglyorganizedbyhimintheinterioroftheSouth-eastarea.Turkey’sneutralityisatpresentbeyondquestion,butneedscontinuouswatching.II.Inviewofthissituation,theCommandintheSoutheasternareawillberearrangedinagreementwithourItalianalliesonthefollowinggenerallines:A.Army1.Commander-in-ChiefSouth-eastwillassumecommandofiithItalianArmyfromoo.oohours27thJuly1943.2.Germanformationsatpresentposted,ortobeposted,inthisArmyareawillcomeundertacticalcommandofnthItalianArmyandoftheheadquartersdesignatedbyit,withtheprovisothatuniformcommandofallGermanandItaliantroopsinthePeloponnesewillbeassumedbyGermanLXVIIIArmyCorps,andthatItalianVIIIArmyCorpswillmovetotheareanorthoftheCorinthcanal.GermanunitsdirectlyemployedincoastaldefencewillcomeundercommandoftheresponsibleItaliandivisionsintheirsectors.3.Germanunitstemporarily,committedinAlbania,Montenegro,andthosecoastalareasofCroatiaunderItalianoccupationwillcomeunderthetacticalcommandofItalianArmyGroupEastorof2ndItalianArmy.B.NavyandAirForce.TheprinciplesalreadylaiddownforexertinginfluenceonouralliesthroughtheNavyandAirForceremaininoperation.InthisconnexionAdmiralAegeanwillensurethatallmeasuresforcoastaldefencetakenbytheNavyinthecoastalareasoccupiedbynthItalianArmycomplywithGermanrequirements.III.ThemostimportanttaskofCommander-in-ChiefSoutheastistomakedefensivepreparationsforthecoastofGreece,ontheislandsandonthemainland.AnessentialpreliminaryistodestroythebanditgangsinGreece,Serbia,andCroatiaandthusopenupthesupplylines,inparticularthemainrailwaylines,toensuretoourforcesthenecessaryfreedomofmovementinrearareas.Inmattersofcoastaldefence,onlyGermanplansformanninganddevelopmentaretobeapplied,evenwhereItalianformationsareconcerned.TostiffentheItaliansinthemostthreatenedcoastalsectors,GermanFortificationBattalionsand,wherethesedonotsuffice,unitsofGermandivisionsheldinreservewillbestationedonornearthecoast.WemustalsodemandthatimportantItaliancoastalbatteriesandotherkeypointsbereinforcedbyracialGermans.WhereGermanformationsarenotstrongenoughtoformaneffectiveoperationalreserve,ItalianunitswillbebroughtunderGermancommandandinterspersedwithGermanunits.AirfieldsnearthecoastwillbedefendedbyGermanforces.Inthesitingandconstructionofalldefensivepositions,andinthereconnaissanceformovementandconcentrationoftroops,thelikelihoodofenemyairsuperioritywillbeborneinmind.IntherearareasthemosturgenttaskofCommander-in-ChiefSouth-eastistodestroythebanditsinSerbiaandCroatia,withspecialemphasisonlinesofcommunicationtoGreece.ThroughclosecooperationwithItalianArmyGroupEastandthe2ndItalianArmy,andby

transferringGermanforceswherenecessary,wemustensurethatoperationsagainstthebanditsintheirareasarealsocarriedoutwiththeutmostintensity;and,inparticular,thatgangsofbanditsnearthecoast,whocouldbeexceptionallydangerousintheeventofanenemylanding,areannihilated.Moreover,theArmyGroupmustbeconstantlypreparedtointervene,withasstrongGermanforcesaspossible,inordertodefendthecoastintheItalianarea,shouldthesituationsodemand.IV.ThedispositionofforcesproposedbyCommander-in-ChiefSouth-eastinhismemoof26thJuly1943isapprovedinprinciple.Detailswillbethesubjectofspecialorders.OrdersconcerningArmyreinforcementswillfollow.Inaddition,itisintendedinthenextfewmonthstoconcentrateanoperationalarmyalongtheBelgrade-Larissarailwayline.Itwillconsistof:TwoArmouredorArmouredGrenadierDivisionsTwoMountainDivisionsTwoLightInfantryDivisionswhichwillbemovedfromtheEast.V.A.1.GreekterritoryoccupiedbyGermanforcesandbythe7thBulgarianDivision,includingtheislandsandtheneutralzoneinThrace,willbeanoperationalarea.Comman-der-in-ChiefSouth-eastwillexercisefullpowersinthisarea,andisauthorizedtodelegatehispowerstoMilitaryCommanderGreece.HispowerswillbedefinedbytheChiefoftheHighCommandoftheArmedForcesinaspecialinstruction,onthegeneralprinciplethat,asthemilitarysituationdemands,allnon-militaryGermanauthoritiesposted,ortobeposted,inGreecewillbesubordinatetoCommander-in-ChiefSoutheastandwillbeincorporatedintheStaffofMilitaryCommanderGreece.TheauthorityofseniorofficialsoftheMinistriesoftheReichforissuingtechnicalinstructionsisnotaffectedbythis:buttheseinstructionswillbetransmittedthroughtheMilitaryCommander.2.PendingafinalsettlementwiththeForeignOffice,thePlenipotentiaryoftheReichaccreditedtotheGreekgovernmentisexcludedfromthisarrangement,asisMinisterNeubacher,whosespecialdutiesandpowersremainforthepresentunchanged.InstructionstotheMilitaryCommanderwillensuretheclosestcooperationbetweenhimandtheseauthorities.3.Commander-in-ChiefSouth-eastshouldinfluencethemilitaryadministrationoftheItalian-occupiedareasonlyinsofarasthemilitarysituationrequires.IfagreementcannotbereachedwithlocalItalianauthorities,appropriateapplicationistobemadetotheHighCommandoftheArmedForces.B.1.IntheSerbianandCroatianareaofoperations,Com-mandet’-inChiefSouth-eastwilldelegatehisexecutivepowerstothe‘MilitaryCommanderSouth-east’,whoforthispurpose,inCroatia,willmakeuseoftheCommanderoftheGermantroopsinCroatia.2.TheoverwhelmingimportanceofSerbiafortheentireconductofthewarintheSouth-eastrequiresthatallGermanauthoritiesshouldbecoordinated.Non-militaryauthoritiesstationedinSerbiawillthereforebesubordinatetotheMilitaryCommanderSouth-eastandincorporatedinhisstaff.TheauthorityofseniorofficialsoftheMinistriesoftheReichforissuingtechnicalinstructionsisnotaffectedbythis,buttheseinstructionswillbetransmittedthroughtheMilitaryCommander.TheChiefoftheHighCommandoftheArmedForceswillissueordersondistributionofduties.3.TheCommanderofGermantroopsinCroatiaandtheGermanGeneralPlenipotentiaryinCroatiawillretaintheircommandcompetencesanddutiesasheretofore.

VI.TheChiefoftheHighCommandoftheArmedForceswillissue,onmybehalf,thenecessaryinstructionsfortheincorporationofstaffsandheadquarters,andfortheprovisionofsupplies.Regulationsnotconformingwiththisdirectivearecancelled.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo49

DirectiveNo50TheFührerFührerHeadquarters,28thSeptember1943.10copies

DirectiveNo.50Concerningthepreparationsforthewithdrawalof20thMountainArmytoNorthernFinlandandNorthernNorway1.ThesituationintheArmyGroupNorthsectoriscompletelystabilized,andthereisnoprospectofawithdrawalonthisfront.Themostdangerouslythreatenedsectoroperationally,aroundVelikiyeLuki,isbeingContinuallyreinforced.Nevertheless,asecondarypositionisnowbeingdevelopedbehindLakePeipusandtheNarva,incaseofunfavourabledevelopments,particularlyinFinlanditself.2.ItisourdutytobearinmindthepossibilitythatFinlandmaydropoutofthewarorcollapse.3.InthatcaseitwillbetheimmediatetaskofsothMountainArmytocontinuetoholdtheNorthernarea,whichisvitaltoourwarindustry,bymovingbackthefronttoalinerunningthroughKaresuando,Ivalo,andthesectoratpresentheldbyXIX(Mountain)Corps.23othandayothInfantryDivisionswillcomeunderitscommandinduecourse.ItwouldthenbeespeciallyimportanttodefendagainstgroundandairattacktheKolosjokinickelmines,whichwouldbeparticularlythreatened.Itisimpossibletosayatpresenthowlongthistaskmaybepractical.4.Theexceptionaldifficultyofmovingtroopsandmakingwarundertheseconditionsentailsearlypreparations,whicharelikelytobelengthy.Theywillcoverthefollowingpoints:(a)Constructionandmaintenanceofroadslikelytobeusedfortroopmovements.Establishmentofstaging-posts.(b)PreparationofsuppliesfortheArmyshoulditwithdraw.(c)Planstodestroyestablishmentsofvaluetotheenemyintheareastobeevacuated.(d)Storageofsupplies.(e)Preparationforbilletingtroopsaftertheyhavewithdrawntotheirfutureareaofoperations.(f)Preparationsforsignalstraffic.TheappropriatepreparationstobemadebyaothMountainArmyinimmediateconsultationwiththeCommanderArmedForcesNorwaymustapplytoallseasonsoftheyear.Theyshouldassumetheworst,i.e.thatitmaybeimpossibletomovethosetroopsnotrequiredforholdingtheNorthernareabyseafromFinnishports.5.Ifthemeasuresorderedcannotbecarriedoutinconspicuously,theyaretobeexplainedtoourowntroops,andtotheFinns,asconcernedexclusivelywiththedevelopmentofcommunicationsbetweenNorwayandFinland.ThesecommunicationswillenabledivisionstobemovedfromtheReserveofCommanderArmedForcesNorwaytoFinland,eveninwinterifnecessary.Thenumberofofficerstobeinformedofthefurtherreasonsforthesepreparationswillberestrictedtoaminimum.IfexchangeofcorrespondenceorverbalexchangeisnecessarybetweenCommanderArmedForcesNorwayand2oth

MountainArmy,itmustberoutedviaGermany,notviaSweden.6.aothMountainArmyistosubmittotheHighCommandoftheArmedForces(OperationsStaff)ashortmemorandumontheconductoftheproposedoperation,withspecialreferencetosupplies.Theprogressofpreparationsorderedinparagraph4willbereportedby2othMountainArmyandCommanderArmedForcesNorwaybyistDecember1943.signed:adolfhitler

DirectiveNo51

TheFührerFührerHeadquarters,3rdNovember1943.27copies.DirectiveNo.51ThehardandcostlystruggleagainstBolshevismduringthelasttwoandahalfyears,whichhasinvolvedthebulkofourmilitarystrengthintheEast,hasdemandedextremeexertions.Thegreatnessofthedangerandthegeneralsituationdemandedit.Butthesituationhassincechanged.ThedangerintheEastremains,butagreaterdangernowappearsintheWest:anAnglo-Saxonlanding!IntheEast,thevastextentoftheterritorymakesitpossibleforustoloseground,evenonalargescale,withoutafatalblowbeingdealttothenervoussystemofGermany.ItisverydifferentintheWest!Shouldtheenemysucceedinbreachingourdefencesonawidefronthere,theimmediateconsequenceswouldbeunpredictable.EverythingindicatesthattheenemywilllaunchanoffensiveagainsttheWesternfrontofEurope,atthelatestinthespring,perhapsevenearlier.IcanthereforenolongertakeresponsibilityforfurtherweakeningtheWest,infavourofothertheatresofwar.Ihavethereforedecidedtoreinforceitsdefences,particularlythoseplacesfromwhichthelong-rangebombardmentofEnglandwillbegin.Foritisherethattheenemymustandwillattack,anditishere,-unlessallindicationsaremisleading-thatthedecisivebattleagainstthelandingforceswillbefought.Holdinganddiversionaryattacksaretobeexpectedonotherfronts.Alarge-scaleattackonDenmarkisalsonotoutofthequestion.Fromanavalpointofviewsuchanattackwouldbemoredifficulttodeliver,norcoulditbeaseffectivelysupportedbyair,butifsuccessful,itspoliticalandoperationalrepercussionswouldbeverygreat.Atthebeginningofthebattlethewholeoffensivestrengthoftheenemyisboundtobethrownagainstourforcesholdingthecoast-line.Onlybyintensiveconstruction,whichmeansstrainingouravailablemanpowerandmaterialsathomeandintheoccupiedterritoriestothelimit,canwestrengthenourcoastaldefencesintheshorttimewhichprobablyremains.ThegroundweaponswhichwillshortlyreachDenmarkandtheoccupiedareasintheWest(heavyanti-tankguns,immobiletankstobesunkinemplacements,coastalartillery,artilleryagainstlandingtroops,mines,etc.)willbeconcentratedatstrong-pointsinthemostthreatenedareasonthecoast.Becauseofthis,wemustfacethefactthatthedefencesoflessthreatenedsectorscannotbeimprovedinthenearfuture.Shouldtheenemy,byassemblingallhisforces,succeedinlanding,hemustbemetwithacounter-attackdeliveredwithallourweight.Theproblemwillbebytherapidconcentrationofadequateforcesandmaterial,andbyintensivetraining,toformthelarge

unitsavailabletousintoanoffensivereserveofhighfightingquality,attackingpower,andmobility,whosecounter-attackwillpreventtheenemyfromexploitingthelanding,andthrowhimbackintothesea.Moreover,carefulanddetailedemergencyplansmustbedrawnupsothateverythingwehaveinGermany,andinthecoastalareaswhichhavenotbeenattacked,andwhichisinanywaycapableofaction,ishurledimmediatelyagainsttheinvadingenemy.TheAirForceandNavymustgointoactionagainsttheheavyattackswhichwemustexpectbyairandseawithalltheforcesattheirdisposal,regardlessofthelosses.Ithereforeorderasfollows:A.Army.i.TheChiefoftheArmyGeneralStaffandtheInspectorGeneralofArmouredForceswillsubmittomewithoutdelayaplanforthedistribution,withinthenextthreemonths,ofweapons,tanks,self-propelledguns,motorvehicles,andammunitionontheWesternfrontandinDenmark,inaccordancewiththerequirementsofthenewsituation.Theplanwillrestonthefollowingbasicprinciples:(a)AllarmouredandArmouredGrenadierdivisionsintheWestwillbeassuredofadequatemobility,andeachwillbeequippedwith93MarkIVtanksorself-propelledguns,andwithstronganti-tankweaponsbytheendofDecember1943.The2othAirForceFieldDivisionwillbeconvertedintoaneffectivemobileoffensiveformationbytheallocationofself-propelledartillerybeforetheendofSSArmouredGrenadierDivision‘HJ.’[HitlerYouth],2istArmouredDivision,andtheinfantryandreservedivisionsstationedinJutlandwillbebroughtuptofullarmedstrengthwithspeed.(b)TherewillbeafurtherreinforcementwithMkIVself-propelledgunsandheavyanti-tankgunsofarmoureddivisionsinreserveintheWestandinDenmark,andoftheselfpropelledartillerytrainingunitinDenmark.(c)Amonthlyallocationofahundredheavyanti-tankgunsMks40and43(ofwhichhalfwillbemobile),forthemonthsofNovemberandDecember,inadditiontotheheavyanti-tankguns,willbemadetothenewlyraisedformationsintheWest.(rf)Anincreasedallocationofweapons(includingabout1,000machineguns)willbemadetoimprovetheequipmentofgroundforcesengagedincoastaldefenceintheWestandinDenmark,andtocoordinatetheequipmentofunitswhicharetobewithdrawnfromsectorsnotunderattack.(e)Aliberalsupplyofshort-rangeanti-tankweaponswillbegrantedtoformationsstationedinthreatenedareas.(f)Thefire-powerinartilleryandanti-tankgunsofformationsstationedinDenmark,andonthecoastsofoccupiedterritoriesintheWest,willbeincreased,andArmyartillerywillbestrengthened.2.NounitsorformationsstationedintheWestandinDenmark,noranyofthenewlyraisedself-propelledarmouredartilleryoranti-tankunitsintheWest,willbewithdrawntootherfrontswithoutmyapproval.TheChiefoftheArmyGeneralStaffandtheInspectoi?GeneralofArmouredForceswillfeporttome,throughtheHighCommandoftheArmedForces(OperationsStaff),whentheequipmentofarmouredunits,selfpropelledartilleryunits,andlightanti-tankunitsandcompaniesiscomplete.3.Commander-in-ChiefWestwilldecidewhichadditionalformationsfromsectorsofthefrontthathavenotbeenunderattackcanbemovedupandmadecapableofanoffensiverole,byatime-tableofexercisesinthefieldandsimilartrainingmeasures.Inthisconnexion,Iinsistthatareasunlikelytobethreatenedshouldberuthlesslystrippedofall

exceptthesmallestforcesessentialforguardduties.Inareasfromwhichthesereservesaredrawn,unitswillbeformedfromsecurityandemergencyforcesfordutiesofsurveillanceandprotection.Ourlabourunitsemployedonconstructionwillopenthelinesofcommunicationwhichwillprobablybedestroyedbytheenemy,employingforthisthehelpofthelocalpopulationonanextensivescale.4.TheCommanderofGermantroopsinDenmarkwilladoptthemeasuresoutlinedinparagraph3fortheareaunderhiscommand.5.TheChiefofArmyEquipmentandCommanderoftheReplacementArmywillraisebattlegroupsofregimentalstrengthintheHomeDefenceareafromtrainingdepots,troopsunderinstruction,armyschools,trainingbattalionsandrecuperativeestablishments.Thesewillformsecurityandengineer-constructionbattalions,andwillbeready,onreceiptofspecialorders,tomovewithinforty-eighthoursofbeingcalledup.Inaddition,allfurtherpersonnelavailablewillbeincorporatedininfantryunitsandequippedwithsuchweaponsasareavailable,sothattheymayimmediatelyreplacetheheavycasualtiestobeexpected.B.AirForce.Inviewofthenewsituation,theoffensiveanddefensivepowerofformationsoftheAirForcestationedintheWestandinDenmarkwillbeincreased.PlanswillbedrawnuptoensurethatallforcesavailableandsuitablefordefensiveoperationswillbetakenfromflyingunitsandmobileantiaircraftartilleryunitsengagedinHomeDefence,fromschoolsandtrainingunitsintheHomeDefencearea,andwillbeemployedintheWest,andifnecessaryinDenmark.GroundestablishmentsinSouthernNorway,Denmark,North-westernGermany,andtheWestwillbeorganizedandsuppliedsothat,bythelargestpossibledegreeofdecentralization,ourownunitsarenotexposedtoenemybombingatthebeginningoflarge-scaleoperations,andtheweightoftheenemyattackwillbeeffectivelybrokenup.Thisappliesparticularlytoourfighterforces,whoseabilitytogointoactionmustbeincreasedbytheestablishmentofanumberofemergencyairfields.Particularattentionwillbepaidtogoodcamouflage.InthisconnexionalsoIexpectallpossibleforcestobemadeavailableforactionregardlessofthecircumstances,bystrippinglessthreatenedareasoftheirtroops.C.Navy.TheNavywilldrawupplansforbringingintoactionnavalforcescapableofattackingtheenemylandingfleetwithalltheirstrength.Coastaldefences47underconstructionwillbecompletedwithallpossiblespeed,andtheestablishmentofadditionalcoastalbatteriesandthelayingoffurtherobstaclesontheflankswillbeconsidered.Preparationswillbemadefortheemploymentofallrankscapableoffighting,fromschools,trainingestablishments,andotherlandestablishments,sothattheymaybedeployedwiththeleastpossibledelay,ifonlyonsecurityduties,inthebattleareawhereenemylandingshavetakenplace.InthenavalplansforstrengtheningdefencesintheWest,specialattentionwillbegiventodefenceagainstenemylandingsinNorwayorDenmark.Inthisconnexion,Iattachparticularimportancetoplansforusinglargenumbersofsubmarinesinthenorthernseaareas.AtemporarydiminutionofsubmarineforcesintheAtlanticmustbeaccepted.D.SS.TheReichsführerSSwilltestthepreparednessofunitsoftheWaffen-SSandPolicefor

operational,security,andguardduties.Preparationswillbemadetoraisebattle-trainedformationsforoperationalandsecuritydutiesfromtraining,reserve,andrecuperativeestablishments,andfromschoolsandotherunitsintheHomeDefenceArea.E.Commanders-in-ChiefofthebranchesoftheArmedForces,theReichsführerS.StheChiefoftheArmyGeneralStaff,Commander-in-ChiefWest,theChiefofArmyEquipmentandCommandingGeneralofReplacementArmy,theInspector-GeneralofArmouredForces,andtheCommanderofGermantroopsinDenmarkwillreporttomebythei5thNovemberthestepstaken,andthosewhichtheyproposetotake.Iexpectallstaffsconcernedtoexerteveryeffortduringthetimewhich,stillremainsinpreparationfortheexpecteddecisivebattleintheWest.Allthoseresponsiblewillensurethattimeandmanpowerarenotwastedindealingwithquestionsofjurisdiction,butthattheyareemployedinincreasingourpowersofdefenceandattack.signed;adolfhitler

NOTE:DirectiveNo51wasthelastHitler’snumbereddirectives

28thJanuary1944.From:HighCommandoftheArmedForces,OperationsStaff.To:Commander-in-ChiefSouth-west,FieldMarshalKesselring.Withinthenextfewdaysthe‘BattleforRome’willbegin.ItwillbedecisiveforthedefenceofCentralItalyandforthefateofrothArmy.Butthesignificanceofthisstrugglegoesevenbeyondthat,becausethelandingatNettunomarkedtheopeningoftheinvasionofEuropeplannedfor1944.ThepurposeoftheenemyistoholddownlargeGermanforcesasfarawayaspossiblefromthebasesinEnglandwherethemaininvasionforcesarestillstandingready,toweardowntheGermanforces,andtogainexperienceforfutureoperations.Ofthesignificanceofthebattlewhichi4thArmyisabouttogive,everyoneofitssoldiersmustbethoroughlyaware.Itisnotsufficienttogiveclearandtacticallycorrectorders.AllofficersandmenoftheArmy,theAirForce,andtheNavalforcesmustbepenetratedbyafanaticalwilltoendthisbattlevictoriously,andnevertorelaxuntilthelastenemysoldierhasbeendestroyedorthrownbackintothesea.ThebattlemustbefoughtinaspiritofholyhatredforanenemywhoisconductingapitilesswarofexterminationagainsttheGermanpeople,whoispreparedtoadoptanymeanstothisend,andwho,withoutanyhigherethicalpurpose,seeksonlytheannihilationofGermanyand,withher,ofEuropeanculture.Thefightmustbehardandmerciless,notonlyagainsttheenemy,butagainstallofficersandunitswhofailinthisdecisivehour.Theenemymustbeforcedtorecognize,ashedidinthefightinginSicily,ontheRapidoriver,andatOrtona,thatthefightingstrengthofGermanyisunbroken,andthatthegreatinvasionof1944isahazardousenterprisewhichwillbedrownedinthebloodofAnglo-Saxonsoldiers.signed:adolfhitler

FührerOrderNo11TheFührer.HighCommandoftheArmy.FührerHeadquarters,8thMarch,1944.

FuhrerOrderNo.11(CommandantsofFortifiedAreasandBattleCommandants)Inviewofvariousincidents,Iissuethefollowingorders:

i.Adistinctionwillbemadebetween‘FortifiedAreas’\jestePlatze],eachundera‘FortifiedAreaCommandant’sand‘LocalStrong-points’[Orisstiitzpunkte],eachundera‘BattleCommandant’.The‘FortifiedAreas’willfulfilthefunctionoffortressesinformerhistoricaltimes.Theywillensurethattheenemydoesnotoccupytheseareasofdecisiveoperationalimportance.Theywillallowthemselvestobesurrounded,therebyholdingdownthelargestpossiblenumberofenemyforces,andestablishingconditionsfavourableforsuccessfulcounterattacks.‘LocalStrong-points’arestrong-pointsdeepinthebattlearea,whichwillbetenaciouslydefendedintheeventofenemypenetration.Bybeingincludedinthemainlineofbattletheywillactasareserveofdefenceand,shouldtheenemybreakthrough,ashingesandcorner-stonesforthefront,formingpositionsfromwhichcounter-attackscanbelaunched.2.Each‘FortifiedAreaCommandant’shouldbeaspeciallyselected,hardenedsoldier,preferablyofGeneral’srank.HewillbeappointedbytheArmyGroupconcerned.FortifiedAreaCommandantswillbepersonallyresponsibletotheCommander-in-ChiefoftheArmyGroup.FortifiedAreaCommandantswillpledgetheirhonourassoldierstocarryouttheirdutiestothelast.OnlytheCommander-iri-ChiefofanArmyGroupinpersonmay,withmyapproval,relievetheFortifiedAreaCommandantofhisduties,andperhapsorderthesurrenderofthefortifiedarea.FortifiedAreaCommandantsaresubordinatetotheCommanderoftheArmyGroup,orArmy,inwhosesectorthefortifiedareaissituated.FurtherdelegationofcommandtoGeneralOfficerscommandingformationswillnottakeplace.Apartfromthegarrisonanditssecurityforces,allpersonswithinafortifiedarea,orwhohavebeencollectedthere,areundertheordersoftheCommandant,irrespectiveofwhethertheyaresoldiersorcivilians,andwithoutregardtotheirrankorappointment.TheFortifiedAreaCommandanthasthemilitaryrightsanddisciplinarypowersofaCommandingGeneral.Intheperformanceofhisdutieshewillhaveathisdisposalmobilecourtsmartialandciviliancourts.ThestaffofFortifiedAreaCommandantswillbeappointedbytheArmyGroupconcerned.TheChiefsofStaffwillbeappointedbyHighCommandoftheArmy,inaccordancewithsuggestionsmadebytheArmyGroup.3.Thegarrisonofafortifiedareacomprises:thesecuritygarrison,andthegeneralgarrison,Thesecuritygarrisonmustbeinsidethefortifiedareaatalltimes.ItsstrengthwillbelaiddownbyCommander-in-ChiefArmyGroup,andwillbedeterminedbythesizeoftheareaandthetaskstobefulfilled(preparationandcompletionofdefences,holdingthefortifiedareaagainstraidsorlocalattacksbytheenemy).ThegeneralgarrisonmustbemadeavailabletotheCommandantofthefortifiedareainsufficienttimeforthementohavetakenupdefensivepositionsandbeinstalledwhenafull-scaleenemyattackthreatens.ItsstrengthwillbelaiddownbyCommander~in-ChiefArmyGroup,inaccordancewiththesizeofthefortifiedareaandthetaskwhichistobeperformed(totaldefenceofthefortifiedarea).4.The‘BattleCommandant’comesundertheordersofthelocalforcescommander.HeMillbeappointedbyhim,willbesubordinatetohim,andwillreceiveoperationordersfromhim.Hisrankwilldependupontheimportanceofthepositioninthebattleareaand

thestrengthofthegarrison.Hisdutiescallforspeciallyenergeticofficerswhosequalitieshavebeenprovedincrisis.5.Thestrengthofthegarrisonsofa‘LocalStrong-point’willbedeterminedbytheimportanceofthepositionandtheforcesavailable.ItwillreceiveitsordersfromtheauthoritiestowhichtheBattleCommandantissubordinate.6.Thedutiesof‘FortifiedAreaCommanders’and‘BattleCommandants’aswellasalistoffortifiedareas,andofreportsonthemsubmittedbyArmyGroups,arecontainedintheappendices.7.AllpreviousordersconcerningBattleCommandantsareherebycancelled.signed:adolfhitler

OperationOrderNo7HighCommandoftheArmy.2ndApril1944.

OperationOrderNo.7DirectiveforfurtheroperationsbyArmyGroupA,ArmyGroupSouth,andArmyGroupCentre1.TheRussianoffensiveinthesouthoftheEasternfronthaspasseditsclimax.TheRussianshaveexhaustedanddividedtheirforces.ThetimehasnowcometobringtheRussianadvancetoafinalstandstill.ForthisreasonIhaveintroducedmeasuresofamostvariedkind.Itisnowimperative,whileholdingfirmtotheCrimea,toholdorwinbackthefollowingline:Dniestertonorth-eastofKishinev-Jassy-TargulNeamt-theEasternexitfromtheCarpathiansbetweenTargulNeamtandKolomyya-TernopolBrody-Kovel.2.Forthepresent,ArmyGroupAwillholdthelineTiligulski-LimanDniesteraroundDubosari,untilwecanassumethattheCrimeacanbesuppliedindependentlyofOdessa.NomorewillbedonethantopreparefortheretreattotheDniesterline.Afterclosingthegapbetween8thArmyandtheCarpathians,thestrongestpossibleforceswillbeswitchedquicklyfromtherightflanktotheleftflankoftheArmyGroup.Rumanianforcesmustbemademobileanddeployedforwardbyusineverywaypossible.Rumanianforceswillbedisposedinaccordancewiththeterrain,sothatchieflyGermantroopsoccupythesectorsindangerofenemytankattack.Itisparticularlyimportantthattheheavyanti-tankgunswhichIhaveplacedatthedisposaloftheRumaniansshouldreachthemasearlyaspossible,andbebroughtintopositioninthemostthreatenedareas.TheywillbemannedbyGermangun-crews.Thismaybeaquestionofhours.TheArmyGroupisfullyresponsibleforthis,andwillemployaspecialstafftodealwithit.3.ThechieftaskofArmyGroupSouthistofreethesurroundedistTankArmy,istTankArmymustcontinuetobreakthroughtothenorth-west.AnoffensiveforceofgreatstrikingpowerwillbeformedintheareasoutheastofLemberg48fromavailableandnewlyarrivingformations.Thisforcemustadvancesouthwestattheearliestpossiblemoment,instrongconcentration,inordertoannihilatetheenemyforceswhichhavebrokenthroughintheStanislavarea,andtore-establishconnexionwithistTankArmy.Ingeneral,IaminagreementwiththeplansofFieldMarshalvonManstein.AftercontacthasbeenestablishedwithistTankArmy,thelineoriginallylaiddownwillfinallybesecuredbylocalattacks;contactwillbemadewithArmyGroupCentre,southofKovel;andaunifiedfrontwillbeestablished.TheHungarianforceswhichhavebeenraisedinHungarywillcomeundercommandofArmyGroupSouth.Itisimportanthere,too,toputtheminthefrontlinealongwithGermanformationstostiffenthem.Rigorousordersare

necessaryhere.4.ForArmyGroupCentre,IaminfullagreementwiththeheavyconcentrationaroundBrest.49ThefirsttaskofArmyGroupCentreistofightitswayoutofKovelandestablishcontactwithArmyGroupSouth.signed:adolfhitler

OperationBarbarossa

InOperation‘Barbarossa’,ArmyGroupsNorth,CentreandSouthwithpowerfulLuftwaffesupportstrikeinthreedirections:Leningrad,MoscowandKiev-Rostov.EncirclementsoftheRedArmyareatriumphantfeatureoftheearlydays,butmilitaryoperationsfanningoutoveravastandoftentracklessinterioraresoonbroughttoa

standstill.Haltedbydifficultterrain,badweather,inadequatesuppliesandexhaustedbyanunyieldingdefence,thepanzerdivisionsaftercapturingKievaredriventounrewardingbattlesforLeningradandMoscow.Hoepner(FourthPz-Army)22JuneleadsArmyGroupNorth(vonLeeb)toLeningrad.GuderianandHoth(SecondandThirdPz-Armies)22JuneresponsibleforthemainGermaneffort,leadArmyGroupCentre(vonBock)intheMoscowdirection.VonKleist(FirstPzArmy)22JuneleadsArmyGroupSouth(vonRunstedt)toKievandRostov.TheoutstandingpanzersuccessoftheearlyweeksisanenvelopmentoffiveRussianarmieseastofKievresultingin600,000prisonersforwhichvonKleistandGuderianareresponsible.Inthecourseofasubsequentoperation,‘Typhoon’2October1941,convergentactionbyGuderian,ReinhardtandHoepnerencirclingBryanskandVyasmaprovesequallyrewarding.Seventeenpanzerdivisions,thirteenandahalfmotorizeddivisionslead‘Barbarossa’-butdespiteoptimisticpredictionsofathree-weekcampaign,operationsaredestinedtolastfouryears.Expandedandre-equipped,inlatercampaignsthepanzerforcewillneverthelessfailtomatchRussiannumbersorstrategy.Divisionsareswitchedbetweentheatres,fronts,andcontrollingcorps.FouryearslaterontheCentralFrontinJanuary1945,whentheRedArmypushesacrosstheVistula,onlyfourpanzerdivisionssupportingindifferentlyequippedinfantrydivisionsface163Russiandivisions.AttheconclusionofhostilitiesthepanzerforceistotallyburnedoutandonlyweakbattlegroupsremainattheArmy’sdisposal.Hoepner(4)PzGr4:XXXXIPzKReinhardt,LVIvonManstein:threePzDivs1st,6th,8th:threeMotDivs3rd,36thandSSTotenkopf(latertrappedwithSS‘Polizei’,‘Danemark’andothersatDemjansk).Hoth(3)PzGrS:XXXIXPzKSchmidt,LVIIPzKKuntzen:fourPzDivs7th,12th,19th,20th:threeMotDivs14th,18th,20th:NoSSformationsGuderian(2)PzGr2:XXIVPzKGeyr,XXXXVIPzKVietinghoffXXXXVIIPzKLemelsen,fivePzDivs3rd,4th,10th,17th,18th:31/2MotDivs10th,29th,SSDasReich(laterswitchedtoHoepnerforattackonMoscow)andRegiment‘GrossDeutschland’VonKleist(1)PzGr1:IIIPzKvonMackensen;XIVPzKvonWietersheim;XXXXVIIIPzKKempf;fivePzDivs9th,11th,13th,14th,16th;fourMotDivs16th,25th,SS‘Wiking’,SS(Brigade)‘Leibstandarte’AH,RegtGenGoering.OKHReserve2nd,5thPzDivs:60thMotDivGermanArmyvonBrauchitsch153divisions(seventeenPz,+tworeserve,134motdivs)3,417tanksLuftwaffeKeller,1stAirFleet;IAirCorps/AGrNorth;Kesselring2AirFleet,II,VIIIAirCorps/AGrCentre;Lohr4thAirFleet,IV,VAirCorps/AGrSouth;-3,800aircraftRedArmy/AirForce150-180divs,20,000tanks,butonly1,000T34sand500KVs,10,000aircraft(2,750modemtypes).

OperationBlau

Operation‘Blue’(‘Brunswick’).Failingwith‘Barbarossa’andTyphoon’toachieveanythingmorein1941thanastronomicalnumbersofprisoners-ofwarandjumping-offpointsfromwhichtocontinuethecampaignintheeast,HitlerassignsnewobjectivestotheArmyGroups.AshortageofarmourrestrictsoffensiveoperationstoArmyGroupSouth(laterdivided‘A’and‘B’)whosere-equippedpanzerforceinconsecutivestagesofOperation‘Blue’renamed‘Brunswick’30June,willbeexpectedtotraptheRedArmywestoftheRiverDon-seizeStalingradinOperation‘Siegfried’(ArmyGroup‘B’)-andinOperation‘Mouse’(ArmyGroup‘A’)advanceintotheCaucasustooccupyRussianoil-producingcentresatGrosny,TiflisandBaku.Noneoftheobjectivesisattained.Theinclusionofmorethanthirtynon-Germanformations-sixteenRoumanian,tenHungarian,nineItalianintheAugusttotalofonehundreddivisionscommittedto‘Blue’/

‘Brunswick’willfurtherundermineHitler’sflawedstrategyofwidelydivergingoffensives.DeployednorthandsouthofStalingrad,therelativeinabilityofsatellitedivisionstowithstandattackwillberuthlesslyexploitedbytheRedArmy.SeePart2,Satellitecontributionsforthepanzerforce.HothFourthPz-Army28June1942succeedsincapturingVoronezhon6JulyforArmyGroup‘B’,butdisasterfollowsinactionsupportingSixthArmyatStalingrad(map11).VonKleistFirstPz-Army9July1942joinsoperationsthatwilltakethePzArmyintotheCaucasus,butthestrenuouslyresistedoffensiveisabandonedaftersuppliesandairsupportarecurtailed.Ninepanzerandsevenmotorizeddivisionsleadtheoffensive.Hoth(1)FourthPzArmy:XXIVPzK;XXXXVIIIPzK;threePzDivs,9th,llth,24th;threemotdivs,3rd,16th,GrossDeutschland.VonWeichsSecondArmy;HungarianSecondArmyGeyr(2)XXXXPzK:3rd,23rdPzDivs,29thInfDivMot;PaulusSixthArmyVonKleist(3)FirstPzArmy:XIVPzK;14th,22ndPzDivs;60thInfDivMot,IIIPzK,LSSAH,16thPz;RoumanianThirdArmyKirchner(4)(vonWietersheim)LVIIPzK;13thPzDiv,SSWiking;Ruoff,SeventeenthArmy:PartItalianEighthArmyVonKleist(5)FirstPzArmy;ArmeegruppeRuoff,SeventeenthArmyandRoumanianThirdArmy;XXXX,III,LVIIPzCorps,23rd,3rd,13thPzDivs,16thMot,SSWiking,andCDuntilAugust1942ArmyGr‘B’(1)vonBock/vonWeichs27divsinc.threePz,threePzGr,tenHungarian,400tanks(2)nineteendivsinc.twoPz,onePzGrArmyGroup‘A’(3)List16divsinc.threePz,twomot,fourRoum.(4)eighteendivsinconePz,onePzGr,fourRoum.,sixIt.(5)twentydivsinc.threePz,threeMot,fourRoum.oneSlovak(Schnelle),400tanks(totalArmyGrps‘A’and‘B’1,500tanks)4thAirFleetVonRichthofen:I,FiebigVIIIAirCorps.2PflugbeilIVAirCorps(until26July,then5),3,4,5=1,500aircraftRedArmy,AirForce(1)(2)GolikovVoronezh/BryanskFr;fivearmies(onetank)1,000tanks.(3)(4)TimoshenkoSW/StalingradFrsevenarmies(twotankforming)by20July,38divs,oneairarmy400aircraft.(5)BudennyN.CaucasusFr;fourarmies,oneairarmy120tanks,130aircraft.

Lastcauldron:ArmyandSSinHungary,1945Followinganunsuccessfulconclusionto‘AutumnMist’(map17)Sixth55

PanzerArmy(Dietrich)isswitchedacrossEuropetoreinforceArmyCroupSouth(Wohter)defendingwesternHungary.Thereon26December1944Budapest,thecapitalcityof800,000inhabitantshousingnumerousmilitaryagenciesanddefendedbyupwardsof70,000menincluding13thPzDivisionandFeldhermhalleresponsibletoSSGeneralPfeffervonWildenbruck(IXSSMtnCorps),isencircledbytwoUkrainianfronts.Balck,Gille(1)(SixthSSPz-Army)13February1945.Operation‘Konrad’isthefirstofthreeattemptsbyArmeegruppeBalck(SixthArmy)torelieveBudapest.Startingon1JanuarywithIVSSPanzerCorps(Gille)transferredwithTotenkopfandWikingfromNinthArmy/ArmyGroupCentre,‘Konrad’isafailure;despiteheavyfightingbySSWikingtowithinfifteenmilesoftheperimeter.Budapestremainsbesieged.‘Konrad2’asecondattemptbyIIIPzK(Breith)9-12Januaryfaresnobetter.Priess(2)Panzerbattlesnext

developeastofKomornwhereanunexpectedlypowerfulOperation‘SouthWind’leadbyISSPzCorps-LSSAHand12SSHJ-reduces2ndUKRFront’sbridgeheadontheRiverGran.PzCorpsFeldherrnhallewithremnantsofunitsisolatedinBudapestprovidesmainlyinfantrysupport.Balck,Gille,Breith(3)MeanwhileSixthArmy’sthirdreliefattempt‘Konrad3’followson18January1945,fromanewdirection.ButthereinforcedSSPanzerCorps(Gille)attackingsoutharoundStuhlweissenburgwith1stand3rdPanzerDivisions,SSTotenkopfandSSWikingwhileflankprotectiontothenorthisprovidedbyBreith’sIIIPanzerCorps-6thand23rdPanzerDivisionsandsouthbyPzRecceBns1st,3rd,23rdagainfailstorelievethecity.Abreakoutattemptbythedefenderson11Februaryisequallyunsuccessful;Budapestsurrenderson13February1945.Hitler’sarbitrarydiversionofpanzerdivisionstothissecondaryfrontisneverthelesssettocontinue.

Dietrich,Balck,deAngelis(4)SixthSSPz-Army6March1945opensanewoffensive‘SpringAwakening’inwhichSixthArmy(Balck),SecondPanzerArmy(deAngelis)-fourinfantrydivisionsandaweak16thReichsfuhrerSSPanzerGrenadierDivision(Baum)-arealsoinvolvedinHitler’splantoencircletheRedArmywestoftheDanube,recaptureBudapestandretainoil-productioncentresatNagykanisczasouth-westofLakeBalaton.But‘SpringAwakening’faltersinwaterloggedterrainandwhencounter-attackedinstrengthby3rdUKrFrontfailstorecovermomentum.(5)ArenewalofRussianattacksaimingatViennaandtheDanubevalleythreateningGermancommunicationsprecipitatesageneralretreat,by20March,panzerrearguardsarefightingdesperatelytodefendpositionswestoftheiroriginalstart-line.6thArmeegruppeBalck;SixthArmy,HungThirdArmy,Gille,IVSSPzCorps;Breith

IIIPz-Corps,HarteneckICavCorps,SSWiking,SSTotenkopf,PzDivs1st,3rd,6th,23rd,threecavdivs,Hungariantanks,infantry,Armytroops.After14January,503,509TigerBns.By20January,274PzKpfwIV-VIs,JagPzandSPs.By6March,138mixedtanks.EighthArmyKreysing(northofDanube)8th,20thPzDivs,remnantbattlegroupsFeldherrnhalle,13thPz.SixthSSPz-ArmyDietrich;PriessISSPzCorps,BittrichIISSPzCorps,SSPz-Divs1st,2nd,9th,12th.Reinforced6March,23rdPzandtwocavdivs.By6March,540tanksandSPguns(320battle-fit).SecondPz-ArmydeAngelis;LanzXXIIMtnCorps,KonradLXVIIICorps,16thSSPzGrenDiv,fourInfdivs(twoMtn).4thAirFleetDessloch;Deichmann,IAirCorps,by6March850aircraft.RedArmy/AirForce1January1945,Malinovsky2ndUKrFront;Tolbuchin3rdUKFront;54Infdivs;fivemechcorps;threearmdcorps,twocavcorps.By6March,407tanks,965aircraft.

RanksinGermanArmy

FahnenjunkerAcadetisatrainee.Thetermisfrequentlyusedtoreferthosetrainingtobecomeanofficerinthemilitary,oftenapersonwhoisajuniortrainee.Itsmeaningmayvarybetweencountries.Thetermisalsousedinciviliancontextsandasageneralattributive,forexampleinitsoriginalsenseofabranchofarulinghousewhichisnotcurrentlyinthedirectlineofsuccession.

FähnrichFähnrichisanofficercandidaterankintheAustrianBundesheerandGermanBundeswehr.However,Fähnrichranksareoftenincorrectlycomparedwiththerankofensign,whichsharesasimilaretymologybutisafull-fledged(albeitjunior)commissionedofficerrank.ThewordFähnrichcomesfromanolderGermanmilitarytitle,Fahnenträger(flagbearer),andfirstbecameadistinctmilitaryrankinGermany1January1899.

LieutenantAlieutenant(abbreviatedLt.,LT.,Lieut.andLEUT.)isajuniorcommis

sionedofficerinmanynations’armedforces.

Themeaningoflieutenantdiffersindifferentmilitaryformations(seecomparativemilitaryranks),butisoftensubdividedintosenior(firstlieutenant)andjunior(secondlieutenant)ranks.Innaviesitisoftenequivalenttothearmyrankofcaptain;itmayalsoindicateaparticularpostratherthanarank.Therankisalsousedinfireservices,emergencymedicalservices,securityservicesandpoliceforces.Lieutenantmayalsoappearaspartofatitleusedinvariousotherorganizationswithacodifiedcommandstructure.Itoftendesignatessomeonewhois“second-in-command,”andassuch,mayprecedethenameoftherankdirectlyaboveit.Forexample,a“lieutenantmaster”islikelytobesecond-in-commandtothe“master”inanorganizationusingbothranks.Notableusesincludelieutenantgovernorinvariousgovernments,andQuebeclieutenantinCanadianpolitics.

OberleutnantOberleutnantisajuniorofficerrankinthemilitariesofGermany,CzechRepublic,

Slovakia,Slovenia,Croatia,SwitzerlandandAustria.IntheGermanArmy,itdatesfromtheearly19thcentury.Translatedas“seniorlieutenant”,therankistypicallybestoweduponcommissionedofficersafterfivetosixyearsofactivedutyservice.OberleutnantisusedbyboththeGermanArmyandtheGermanAirForce.IntheNATOmilitarycomparisonsystem,aGermanOberleutnantistheequivalentofafirstlieutenantintheArmy/AirForcesofAlliednations.OtherusesTheequivalentnavalrankisOberleutnantzurSee.InNaziGermany,withintheSS,SAandWaffen-SS,therankofObersturmführerwasconsideredtheequivalentofanOberleutnantintheGermanArmy.

HauptmannHauptmannisaGermanwordusuallytranslatedascaptainwhenitis

usedasanofficer’srankintheGerman,AustrianandSwissarmies.While“haupt”incontemporaryGermanmeans“main”,italsohasthedatedmeaningof“head”,i.e.Hauptmannliterallytranslatesto“headman”,whichisalsotheetymologicalrootof“captain”(fromLatincaputhead).ItequatestoCaptainintheBritishandUSArmies,andisratedOF-2inNATO.Moregenerally,itcanbeusedtodenotetheheadofanyhierarchicallystructuredgroupofpeople,oftenasacompoundword.Forexample,aFeuerwehrhauptmannisthecaptainofafirebrigade,whilethewordRäuberhauptmannreferstotheleaderofagangofrobbers.OfficialAustriantitlesincorporatingthewordincludeLandeshauptmann,Bezirkshauptmann,BurghauptmannandBerghauptmann.InSaxonyduringtheWeimarRepublic,thetitlesofKreishauptmannandAmtshauptmannwereheldbyseniorcivilservants.ItmightcognateswiththeSwedishwordHövitsmanthathavethesamerootmeaning“Headman”or“themanatthehead”andthatarecloselyrelatedtotheword“hövding”meaningChieftain.Bothtitlesaresincemedievaltimesusedfortitleswithintheadministrationofthestateratherthenwithinthemilitary.

MajorMajorisarankofcommissionedofficer,withcorrespondingranksexistinginmanymilitaryforces.Whenusedunhyphenated,inconjunctionwithnootherindicatorofrank,thetermreferstotherankjustseniortothatofanarmycaptainandjustbelowtherankoflieutenantcolonel.Itisconsideredthemostjuniorofthefieldranks.Insomemilitaries,notablyFranceandIreland,therankisreferredtoascommandant,whileinothersitisknownascaptain-major.Itisalsousedinsomepoliceforcesandotherparamilitaryrankstructures,suchastheNewYorkStatePolice,NewJerseyStatePoliceandseveralothers.Asapolicerank,MajorroughlycorrespondstotheUKrankofSuperintendent.Whenusedinhyphenatedorcombinedfashion,thetermcanalsoimplyseniorityatotherlevelsofrank,includinggeneral-majorormajorgeneral,denotingamid-levelgeneralofficer,andsergeantmajor,denotingthemostseniorNCOofamilitaryunit.Itcanalsobeusedwithahyphentodenotetheleaderofamilitarybandsuchasinpipe-majorordrum-major.

OberstleutnantOberstleutnantisaGermanArmyandGermanAirForcerankequaltoLieutenantColonel,aboveMajor,andbelowOberst.

TherearetwopaygradeassociatedtotherankofOberstleutnant.PaygradeA14isthestandardlevelpaygradewhereasA15isassignedtoseniorOberstleutnantpersonnel.OberstleutnantoftheGeneralStafforReservehavethewords“imGeneralstabsdienst”(i.G.),“derReserve”(d.R.)aftertheirrank—thus:“OTLi.G.”,“OTLd.R.”Oberstleutnantwhoaredefinitelyretiredaredescribedas“außerDienst”(a.D.)DuringWorldWarII,theSSmaintainedanequivalentrankknownasObersturmbannführer

OberstOberstisamilitaryrankinseveralGerman-speakingandScandinaviancountries,equivalenttoColonel.ItiscurrentlyusedbyboththegroundandairforcesofAustria,Germany,SwitzerlandDDenmarkaandNorway.TheSwedishranköversteisadirecttranslation,asaretheFinnishrankeverstiandtheIcelandicrankofursti.IntheNetherlandstherankoversteisusedasasynonymforalieutenantcolonel.

GeneralmajorTheGermanrankofgeneralmostlikelysawitsfirstusewithinthereligiousordersoftheHolyRomanEmpireoftheGermanNation,albeitinmodifiedformsandusagefromthecurrentunderstandingofgeneral.Bythe16thcentury,withtheriseofstandingarmies,theGermanstateshadbeguntoappointgeneralsfromthenobilitytoleadarmiesinbattle.AstandardranksystemwasdevelopedduringtheThirtyYearsWar,withthehighestrankofGeneralusuallyreservedfortherulingsovereign(e.g.theKaiserorElector)andtheactualfieldcommanderholdingtherankofGeneralleutnant.Feldmarschallwasalowerrankatthattime,aswasGeneralwachtmeister.Bythe17thand18thcenturies,therankofgeneralwaspresentinallthemilitariesoftheGermanstates,andsawitsgreatestusagebythemilitariesofBavariaandPrussia.Itwasthesetwomilitariesthatcreatedtheconceptofthe“generalstaff”,whichwasoftenmannedentirelybymembersofthenobility.TobeageneralimpliedmembershipinthenobleclassasacountorGraf,baronorFreiherr(thisalsoaccountsformostGermangeneralsofthiserahavingtheprefix“von”beforetheirnames)

Generalleutnant

LieutenantGeneralisamilitaryrankusedinmanycountries.TheranktracesitsoriginstotheMiddleAgeswherethetitleoflieutenantgeneralwasheldbythesecondincommandonthebattlefield,whowasnormallysubordinatetoacaptaingeneral.Inmodernarmies,lieutenantgeneralnormallyranksimmediatelybelowgeneralandabovemajorgeneral;itisequivalenttothenavyrankofviceadmiral,andinairforceswithaseparaterankstructure,itisequivalenttoairmarshal.Alieutenantgeneralcommandsanarmycorps,madeupoftypicallythreearmydivisions,andconsistingofaround60,000soldiers.Thetermmajorgeneralisashortenedversionoftheprevioustermsergeantmajorgeneral,whichwasalsosubordinatetolieutenantgeneral.Thisiswhyalieutenantgeneraloutranksamajorgeneral,whereasamajorisseniortoalieutenant.Inmanycountries,therankofcorpsgeneralhasreplacedtheearlierrankoflieutenantgeneral(e.g.France,Italy).(Theranksofcorpsgeneralandlieutenantcolonelgeneralareintendedtosolvetheapparentlieutenantgeneral/majorgeneralanomaly).However,forconvenience,thisisoftentranslatedintoEnglishaslieutenantgeneral.Inanumberofstates,therankoflieutenantgeneralisthehighestarmyrankinuse.In

LithuaniaandLatvia,thechiefofdefenceisalieutenantgeneral,andintheIrishDefenceForcesandIsraeliforcestheChiefofStaffholdsthisrank.

GeneralderArtilleryGeneraloftheartillerymaymean:1.arankofgeneralintheImperialArmy,ReichswehrorWehrmacht-the

second-highestregularrankbelowGeneraloberst.Cavalryofficersofequivalentrankwerecalledgeneralofthecavalry,andinfantryofficersofequivalentrankgeneraloftheinfantry.TheWehrmachtalsohadGeneralderPanzertruppen(tanktroops),GeneralderGebirgstruppen(mountaintroops),GeneralderPioniere(engineers),GeneralderFallschirmtruppen(parachutetroops),GeneralderNachrichtentruppen(communicationstroops).TodayintheBundeswehr,therankoflieutenantgeneralcorrespondstothetraditionalrankofgeneraloftheartillery.TherewasnoequivalentrankinthearmyofEastGermany,whereitwasmergedintothatofGeneraloberst.

2.intheBundeswehr,thepositionofanartilleryofficerresponsibleforcertainquestionsoftrooptrainingandequipment,usuallywiththerankofBrigadegenerals.Thepositionofgeneraloftheartilleryisconnectedwiththatofcommanderoftheartilleryschool.Correspondingservicepositionsalsoexistforotherbranchesofthearmy.Sinceinthisusageitreferstoapositionnotarank,anOberstissometimes“Generalof”hisrespectivetypeoftroops.TheformofaddressisusuallyHerrGeneraland/orHerrOberst;theformofaddressHerrGeneralderArtillerieisunorthodox,sinceitdoesnotrefertoarank.

Generaloberst

Asupremegeneralorseniorgeneral(Generaloberst,sometimesmistranslated“colonel-general”byanalogytoOberst,“colonel”)wasthesecondhighestgeneralofficerrank—belowfieldmarshal(Generalfeldmarschall)—inthePrussianarmyaswellasintheDeutschesHeerofImperialGermany(1871-1919),theReichswehrReichswehr1933),andtheWehrmacht(whichincludedtheLuftwaffe,establishedin1935)ofNaziGermany(1933-1945).TherankwascreatedoriginallyforEmperorWilliamI—thenPrinceofPrussia—becausetraditionallymembersoftheroyalfamilywerenotpromotedtotherankofafieldmarshal.SincetherankofGeneralfeldmarschallwasalsoreservedforwartimepromotions,theadditionalrankofa“supremegeneralinthecapacityofafieldmarshal”—theGeneraloberstimRangeeinesGeneralfeldmarschalls

—wascreatedforpromotionsduringpeace.Suchgeneralswereentitledtowearfourpipsontheirshoulderboards,comparedtothenormalthree.Theequivalentranksofacolonelgeneralwereinthe:

KriegsmarineGeneraladmiral(“generaladmiral”)Schutzstaffel(SS)SS-Oberst-GruppenführerSturmabteilung(SA)-noequivalentOrdnungspolizei(Orpo)GeneraloberstderPolizei(“colonelgeneralofpolice”)

Generalfelsmarschall

GeneralfeldmarschallinGerman(usuallytranslatedsimplyasGeneralFieldMarshal),

wasthehighestmilitaryrankinthearmiesofseveralGermanstatesincludingtheAustrianEmpireandKingdomoPPrussia(latertheGermanEmpire).OriginallyusedintheHolyRomanEmpire,therankofGeneralfeldmarschallbecamethehighestmilitaryrankintheHabsburgMonarchyequivalenttothatofMarshallinFranceorFieldMarshallinEngland.FollowingthefalloftheHolyRomanEmpire,itwaskeptinthearmiesoftheAustrianEmpire(1804-1867)thenintheseoftheAustro-HungarianEmpire(1867-1919).ThePrussianarmyalsouseditasthearmyequivalenttoanavyGrandAdmiral(German:Großadmiral)andwaslaterusedasarankontheWehrmachtandLuftwaffeofGermanyduringWWII.

InGermanyIntheGerman-PrussianArmyandlaterintheWehrmacht,therankhadseveralprivileges,suchaselevationtonobility,equalrankwithministersoftheroyalcabinet,rightofdirectreporttothemonarch,andaconstantescort/protection.In1854,therankofColonel-General(German:Generaloberst)wascreatedinordertopromotethenPrussianprinceWilliam(WilliamI,GermanEmperor)toseniorrankwithoutbreakingtherulethatonlywartimefieldcommanderscouldreceivetherankoffieldmarshalforavictoryinadecisivebattleorthecaptureofafortificationormajortown.In1870PrinceFriedrichKarlofPrussiaandCrownPrinceFriedrichWilhelm—whohadcommandedarmiesduringtheFranco-PrussianWar—becamethefirstPrussianprincesappointedfieldmarshals.

RanksinWaffenS.S

RankShoulderSleeveinsigniastrap(parka)collarbadgeRankoftheEquivalenttotheWaffen-SSWehrmacht(Heer)

SS-OberstgruppenführerundGeneraloberstderWaffen-SS(SS-SupremegroupleaderandcolonelgeneraloftheWaffen-SS)

SS-ObergruppenführerundGeneralderWaffen-SS(SS-SeniorgroupleaderandgeneraloftheWaffen-SS)

SS-GruppenführerundGeneralleutnantderWaffenSS(SS-GroupleaderandlieutenantgeneraloftheWaffen-SS)

SS-BrigadeführerundGeneralmajorderWaffen-SS(SS-BrigadeleaderandmajorgeneraloftheWaffen-SS)Generaloberst

(OF-9)

GeneralderInfanterie(etc.)(OF-8)

Generalleutnant(OF-7)

Generalmajor(OF-6)

SS-Oberführer(SS-SeniorleaderoftheWaffen-SS)

SS-Standartenführer(SS-Regiment

Noequivalent.

Oberst

(OF-5)

leader)

SS-Obersturmbannführer(SS-Seniorassaultunitleader)SS-Sturmbannführer(SS-Assaultunitleader)

SS-Haupt

sturmführer(SS-Chiefassaultleader)

SS-Obersturmführer(SS-Seniorassaultleader)

SS-Untersturmführer(SS-Juniorassaultleader)Oberstleutnant(OF-4)

Major(OF-3)

Hauptmann/Rittmeister(OF-2)

Oberleutnant(OF-1)

Leutnant(OF-1)

SS-Sturmscharführer,Germannickname“Spiess”isaspecificappointment,comparabletothe“companysergeantmajor”.Appointmentinsignia:so-called“doublepistonrings”onbothcuffs(ofsleeves)ontheuniformjacketandtheovercoat.ThepositioniscommittedtoexperiencedsenorNCOalreadypromotedtoSS-Hauptscharführers(OR-7orSSScharführer(OR-6),seldomSSScharführer(OR-5).SS-Sturmscharführer(SS-Assaultsquadleader)

SS-Stabsscharführer“Spiess”(senorNCO,e.g.HauptscharführerorOberscharführer,seldomScharführer)Stabsfeldwebel(OR8)

Hauptfeldwebel“Spiess”(seniorNCOe.g.,OberfeldwebelorFeldwebel,seldomUnterfeldwebel)

SS-Hauptscharführer(SS-Chiefsquadleader)

(SS-Standartenoberjunker/Offiziersanwärter)

SS-Oberscharführer(SS-Seniorsquadleader)Oberfeldwebel(OR7)(Oberfähnrich/Offiziersanwärter)

Feldwebel(OR-6)(Fähnrich/Offiziersanwärter)

(SS-Standartenjunker/Offiziersanwärter)

SS-Scharführer(SS-Squadleader)

(SS-Oberjunker/Offiziersanwärter)

SS-Unterscharführer(SS-Juniorsquadleader)

(SS-Junker/Offiziersanwärter)Unterfeldwebel(OR5)

Unteroffizier(OR-4)(Fahnenjunker/Offiziersanwärter)

Noequivalent Stabsgefreiter(OR-4)

SS-Rottenführer(SS-Sectionleader)Obergefreiter(OR-4)

SS-Sturmmann(SS-Stormtrooper)Gefreiter(OR-3)

SS-Oberschütze(SS-Seniorrifleman)Oberschütze(OR-2)

SS-Schütze(SS-Rifleman)

Soldat,Schütze,Grenadier(OR-1)

VolunteertotheserviceoftheWaffen-SSConscriptormilitary

volunteerwhoenlistsandmaybecomeanNCOorOfficeroftheWehrmacht

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IndexPreface………………………………………………………………………………………….7

15thApril1945……………………………………………………………………………….7LastProclamation:SoldiersOfTheGermanEasternFront!……………7GermanArmy………………………………………………………………………………..8Origins…………………………………………………………………………………….105thS.SPanzerDivisionWiking……………………………………………………….16DivisionalHistory………………………………………………………………………….19Battles…………………………………………………………………………………………22BattlesforKharkov-PanzergrenadierDivision……………………………22

March-December1943………………………………………………………….24GermanyinDefeat………………………………………………………………..26NewPanzerCorps…………………………………………………………………27ChangeofCommand…………………………………………………………….30Norelief………………………………………………………………………………37Glitteringpromises…………………………………………………………………..40Rapidbuild-up………………………………………………………………………….41Himmler’sobsession…………………………………………………………………42Conscriptionintroduced……………………………………………………………44Absolutepower…………………………………………………………………………45Newregiments…………………………………………………………………………46Sinisterdirective………………………………………………………………………47OrderofBattle……………………………………………………………………………..49Commanders……………………………………………………………………………….56ObergruppenfûhrerFelizSteiner………………………………………………..56ArmyGroupVistula………………………………………………………………….59Endofthewar-peacetime………………………………………………………..60Promotions………………………………………………………………………………60Awards…………………………………………………………………………………….60Commands……………………………………………………………………………….61HerbertOttoGille……………………………………………………………………..61Militarycareer…………………………………………………………………………..61Post-War…………………………………………………………………………………64Personallife……………………………………………………………………………..64Summaryofhiscareer………………………………………………………………64Datesofrank………………………………………………………………………..64Notabledecorations………………………………………………………………65OberfûhrerEdaurdDeisenhofer…………………………………………………65Earlywarcampaigns…………………………………………………………………66Trainingduties…………………………………………………………………………67Divisionalcommand-latewar…………………………………………………..68Datesofrank………………………………………………………………………..68Notabledecorations………………………………………………………………69ObergruppenfûhrerHerbetOttoGille…………………………………………69Datesofrank………………………………………………………………………..70Decorations…………………………………………………………………………..71StandartenfûhrerJohannes-RudolfMühlenkamp…………………………71WorldWarII………………………………………………………………………..72Promotions………………………………………………………………………………73DecorationsandAwards……………………………………………………………73OberfûhrerKarlUlrich……………………………………………………………..73WorldWarII……………………………………………………………………………74Awards…………………………………………………………………………………….

74Annexes………………………………………………………………………………………75OperationBarbarossaJune1941…………………………………………………….75Lastcauldron:ArmyandSSinHungary,1945………………………………….77GermanyinDefeat1945………………………………………………………………..79AllgemeineS.S………………………………………………………………………………81Formationandservice………………………………………………………………82Hierarchyandstructure…………………………………………………………….84FulltimeSSpersonnel………………………………………………………………84SSregionalunits………………………………………………………………………85Securityforces………………………………………………………………………….85Concentrationcamppersonnel…………………………………………………..86Otherunits………………………………………………………………………………86Ranks………………………………………………………………………………………86SS-JunkerschuleBadTölz……………………………………………………………..87Selection………………………………………………………………………………….88Curriculum………………………………………………………………………………89S.SVerfugungstruppe……………………………………………………………………90Earlyoperations………………………………………………………………………..91DevelopmentoftheWaffen-SS……………………………………………………91SS-Totenkopfverbände………………………………………………………………….92Formation………………………………………………………………………………..93Development……………………………………………………………………………94Camporganization……………………………………………………………………96Operations……………………………………………………………………………….97SSKZpersonnel.………………………………………………………………………99Combatformations…………………………………………………………………100WaffenS.S………………………………………………………………………………….101Origins(1929–1939)……………………………………………………………….102Obergruppenfûhrer…………………………………………………………………….103WaffenSS………………………………………………………………………………104PanzerDivisions………………………………………………………………………107GrenadierDivisions………………………………………………………………..109ArmyGroupSouthOperationBarbarossa………………………………………1101939–1940German-Sovietrelationship…………………………………110MapOperationBarbarosssa…………………………………………………………..111MapOperationBarbarossaArmyGroupsObjectives……………………….112Germanyplanstheinvasion………………………………………………….112MapOperationBarbarossaPlanA…………………………………………………113MapOperationBarbarossaPlanB…………………………………………………114MapOperationBarbarossaPlanC…………………………………………………116Germanpreparations……………………………………………………………….117

Sovietpreparations………………………………………………………………….118TheSovietoffensiveplanstheory…………………………………………..122Orderofbattle…………………………………………………………………………123CompositionoftheAxisforces………………………………………………123CompositionoftheSovietForces…………………………………………..124Theinvasion……………………………………………………………………………125MapThefrontierbattles(22June–3July1941)………………………….126ArmyGroupSouth……………………………………………………………….127Summaryofthefirstphase………………………………………………….128MapBattleofSmolensk(3July–5August1941)……………………………129MapBattleforMoscow(2October–5December1941)………………….131ReasonsforinitialSovietdefeats……………………………………………….133CausesofthefailureofOperationBarbarossa…………………………135UnderestimationofthecapacityofSovietmobilization……………135Faultsoflogisticalplanning………………………………………………….137Weather………………………………………………………………………………137BattleofUman…………………………………………………………………………….139Ordersofbattle……………………………………………………………………….141RedArmy……………………………………………………………………………141Wehrmacht…………………………………………………………………………142Thebattlesofencirclement……………………………………………………….142Aftertheencirclement……………………………………………………………..143BattleofKiev………………………………………………………………………………143Battle……………………………………………………………………………………..146Aftermath……………………………………………………………………………….146Assessment……………………………………………………………………………..147FirstBattleofKharkov…………………………………………………………………147Militaryimportance……………………………………………………………..149PopulationofKharkov………………………………………………………….149TheaftermathofKiev…………………………………………………………..149ApproachingKharkov………………………………………………………….150Courseofthebattle………………………………………………………………….151Preparingtotakethecity………………………………………………………151Battlesonthewesternedgeofthecity(20–23October)…………..151Assaultonthecity(23–24October)………………………………………152OccupationofKharkov…………………………………………………………….152BattleofRostov…………………………………………………………………………..153SeaofAzovoffensiveOperation………………………………………………..154RostovDefensiveOperation……………………………………………………..154RostovOffensiveOperation………………………………………………………155Hitler’sWarDirectives1939-1945…………………………………………………155DirectiveNo21……………………………………………………………………………

155DirectiveNo,21‘CaseBarbarossa’……………………………………………..155DirectiveNo32……………………………………………………………………………158DirectiveNo.32Preparationsfortheperiodafter‘Barbarossa’…….159DirectiveNo32a………………………………………………………………………….161DirectiveNo33……………………………………………………………………………164DirectiveNo.33ContinuationofthewarintheEast……………………164DirectiveNo33a………………………………………………………………………….166DirectiveNo34……………………………………………………………………………167Directive34a……………………………………………………………………………….169DirectiveNo35……………………………………………………………………………171DirectiveNo36……………………………………………………………………………173DirectiveNo37……………………………………………………………………………175DirectiveNo38……………………………………………………………………………177DirectiveNo39……………………………………………………………………………178DirectiveNo40……………………………………………………………………………181DirectiveNo.40Ref,CompetenceofCommandersincoastalareas.181DirectiveNo41……………………………………………………………………………185DirectiveNo42…………………………………………………………………………..189DirectiveNo.42InstructionsforoperationsagainstunoccupiedFranceandtheIberianPeninsula………………………………………………………..189DirectiveNo43……………………………………………………………………………191DirectiveNo.43ContinuationofoperationsfromtheCrimea………191DirectiveNo44……………………………………………………………………………192DirectiveNo.44OperationsinNorthernFinland……………………….193DirectiveNo45……………………………………………………………………………194DirectiveNo.45Continuationof‘OperationBrunswick[Braunschweig]’DirectiveNo46……………………………………………………………………….196DirectiveNo.46Instructionsforintensifiedactionagainstbanditryinthe

East…………………………………………………………………………………..196DirectiveNo47……………………………………………………………………………199DirectiveNo.47CommandanddefencemeasuresintheSouth-east199DirectiveNo48…………………………………………………………………………..203DirectiveNo.48CommandanddefencemeasuresintheSouth-east203DirectiveNo49…………………………………………………………………………..205DirectiveNo50…………………………………………………………………………..205DirectiveNo.50Concerningthepreparationsforthewithdrawalof20thMountainArmytoNorthernFinlandandNorthernNorway..206DirectiveNo51…………………………………………………………………………..20728thJanuary1944……………………………………………………………………….211FührerOrderNo11………………………………………………………………………211FuhrerOrderNo.11(CommandantsofFortifiedAreasandBattleCommandants)………………………………………………………………………………212OperationOrderNo7…………………………………………………………………..213OperationOrderNo.7DirectiveforfurtheroperationsbyArmyGroupA,ArmyGroupSouth,andArmyGroupCentre…………………………..213OperationBarbarossa…………………………………………………………………..215OperationBlau……………………………………………………………………………217Lastcauldron:ArmyandSSinHungary,1945……………………………….218RanksinGermanArmy………………………………………………………………..221Fahnenjunker………………………………………………………………………….221Fähnrich…………………………………………………………………………………221Lieutenant………………………………………………………………………………221Oberleutnant………………………………………………………………………….222Hauptmann……………………………………………………………………………222Major…………………………………………………………………………………….223Oberstleutnant……………………………………………………………………….223Oberst……………………………………………………………………………………223Generalmajor…………………………………………………………………………224Generalleutnant……………………………………………………………………..224GeneralderArtillery……………………………………………………………….225Generaloberst…………………………………………………………………………225Generalfelsmarschall………………………………………………………………226InGermany………………………………………………………………………..226RanksinWaffenS.S……………………………………………………………………226Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………230Index

…………………………………………………………………………………………235Notes………………………………………………………………………………………….241

Notes1ParadeforthethirdanniversaryoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitleronthebarracks’grounds.SeppDietrichisatthelectern.May1935.239/2432AnS.SoftheS.STotenkopfStandarteOberbayern3MembersoftheSS-Verfûgungstruppenin1938.4InsigniasoftheunitsWaffenSSfromoutsidetheReich.5MittlereSchûtzenpanzerwagenAusfD/PanzergrenadierRegimentGermania6LeichteSchûtzenpanzerwagen5.SSPanzerAufklârungsAbteilung7PanzerkampfwagenIIIAusfJ(SDKfz141)5.SSPanzerRegimentWiking/II.Abteilung8German5thSSPanzerDivisionWiking9ManoftheSS-FreiwilligenLegionNorwegen,wasthefirstNorwegianSSunittobeformed.10HerbertGille,whoreplacedFelixSteinerasthecommanderofSSPanzerDivisionWiking,seenafterhispromotiontoGruppenfûhrer(laterSS-Obergruppenfûhrer)undGeneralleutnantderWaffenSS11DeisenhoferasSS-Obersturmbannführerduringservicewith3.SS-DivisionTotenkopf,1942.12ReichsführerHeinrichHimmlerleadsanAllgemeine-SSceremonyontheanniversaryofthedeathofHeinrichIatQuedlinburg,July193813Cadetstakingpartinaclassroomexercisein1942/43.14SS-JunkerschuleBadTölzatBadTölz,Bavaria.15SS-TVofficersstandinginfrontofprisonersatKZGuseninOctober1941.16SovietPOWs,Mauthausenconcentrationcamp17AmassgraveinTreblinkaopenedinMarch1943;thebodieswereremovedforburning.Inthebackground,darkgreypilesofashfromcrematedbodiescanbeseen.18AnSS-TVScharführerfromKZMauthausen.HiscollarpatchshowstheTotenkopfinsigniaofaconcentrationcampguard.19FlagSchutzstaffel20Einsatzgruppen(Germanfor“taskforces”,“deploymentgroups”;singularEinsatzgruppe;officialfullnameEinsatzgruppenderSicherheitspolizeiunddesSD)wereSchutzstaffel(SS)paramilitarydeathsquadsofNaziGermanythatwereresponsibleformasskillings,primarilybyshooting,duringWorldWarII.TheEinsatzgruppenhadaleadingroleintheimplementationoftheFinalSolutionoftheJewishquestion(DieEndlösungderJudenfrage)interritoriesconqueredbyNaziGermany.Almostallofthepeopletheykilledwerecivilians,beginningwiththePolishintelligentsiaandswiftlyprogressingtoSovietpoliticalcommissars,Jews,andGypsiesthroughoutEasternEurope.UnderthedirectionofReichsführer-SSHeinrichHimmlerandthesupervisionofSSObergruppenführerReinhardHeydrich,theEinsatzgruppenoperatedinterritoriesoccupiedbytheGermanarmedforcesfollowingtheinvasionofPolandinSeptember1939andOperationBarbarossa(theinvasionoftheSovietUnion)inJune1941.The

Einsatzgruppencarriedoutoperationsrangingfromthemurderofafewpeopletooperationswhichlastedovertwoormoredays,suchasthemassacreatBabiYar(33,771killedintwodays)andtheRumbulamassacre(25,000killedintwodays).AsorderedbyNazileaderAdolfHitler,theWehrmachtcooperatedwiththeEinsatzgruppenandprovidedlogisticalsupportfortheiroperations.HistorianRaulHilbergestimatesthatbetween1941and1945theEinsatzgruppenandrelatedauxiliarytroopskilledmorethantwomillionpeople,including1.3millionJews.ThetotalnumberofJewsmurderedduringtheHolocaustisestimatedat5.5to6millionpeople.AfterthecloseofWorldWarII,24seniorleadersoftheEinsatzgruppenwereprosecutedintheEinsatzgruppenTrialin1947–48,chargedwithcrimesagainsthumanityandwarcrimes.Fourteendeathsentencesandtwolifesentenceswerehandedout.FouradditionalEinsatzgruppeleaderswerelatertriedandexecutedbyothernations.21Stavka(Russian:Ставка)isthetermusedtorefertothehighcommandofthearmedforcesintheRussianEmpireandtheSovietUnion.ItwasusedinImperialRussiatorefertotheadministrativestaff,andtotheGeneralHeadquartersinthelate19thCenturyImperialRussianarmedforcesandsubsequentlyintheSovietUnion.InwesternliteratureitissometimesincorrectlywritteninuppercaseSTAVKA,butthetermisnotanacronym.Thetermmaybeusedtorefertoitsmembers,aswellastotheheadquarterslocation(itsoriginalmeaningfromtheoldRussianwordставка—Tent).22GuderianataforwardcommandpostforoneofhispanzerregimentsnearKiev,194123InMay1941,PanzerGroupKleistbecamePanzerGroup1(Panzergruppe1),whichwasattachedtoFieldMarshalGerdvonRundstedt’sArmyGroupSouthatthebeginningofOperationBarbarossa.AtthestartofOperationBarbarossainJune1941,PanzerGroup1includedtheIII,XIVandXLVIIIArmyCorps(mot.)withfivepanzerdivisionsandfourmotorizeddivisions(twoofthemSS)equippedwith799tanks.PanzerGroup1servedonthesouthernsectoroftheEasternFrontagainsttheRedArmyandwasinvolvedtheBattleofBrodywhichinvolvedasmanyas1,000RedArmytanks.OnOctober6,1941,PanzerGroup1wasenlargedtothe1stPanzerArmyfollowingthefallofKiev,withvonKleiststillincommand.AfterthattheFirstPanzerArmybeganitsthrustonRostov.TogetherwiththeLeibstandarteAdolfHitlerledbyOberstgruppenführerSeppDietrich,vonKleistreluctantlymadetheattackonRostov.His1stPanzerArmysuccessfullycapturedthecityinNovember,buttheRedArmyrecapturediteightdayslater.24PanzerGroupGuderian(German:PanzergruppeGuderian)wasformedon5June1940andnamedafteritscommander,generalHeinzGuderian,creatoroftheGermanPanzerwaffe.InearlyJune1940,afterreachingtheEnglishChannelfollowingthebreakthroughintheArdennes,thePanzergruppeGuderianwasformedfromtheXIXArmeekorps,andthrustdeepintoFrance,cuttingofftheMaginotLine.Fromthenon,everyunitthatservedinthePanzergruppeGuderianworealarge‘G’oneverytank,truckormotorcycle.Itwasreformedlaterthesamemonth.InNovember1940,itwasupgradedintoPanzergruppe2.25GermantroopsenterKharkovfromthewest,crossingthemainrailroadrunningthroughthecityontheviaductofSverdlovStreet.26Aswillbeseen(paragraph3below),‘UndertakingFelix’wasstillbeingcontemplated.ButHitlerwasnotnowrelyingsolelyonthecooperationofGeneralFranco.OngthMay

1941,aspartoftheprogrammeofsecuringtheWestofEuropeduring‘UndertakingBarbarossa’,theHighCommandoftheArmedForceshadpreparedaplanfortheseizureoftheAtlanticcoastofSpainandPortugal.Thisoperationwasknownas‘Isabella’.Freshordersconcerning‘UndertakingIsabella’wereissuedonzothJune1941,twodaysbeforethelaunchingof‘UndertakingBarbarossa’.27ForSonderstabF,underAirForceGeneralFelmy,seeDirectiveNo.30above.OnthefailureofRashidAli’srevolt,FelmyhadreturnedtoGermany.His‘SpecialStaff’wasreconstitutedbyaseparateorderdated2istJune1941.28Alaterorder(igthSeptember1941)gavetothisintendedattackthecover-name‘Taifun(Typhoon)’.29On19thSeptember1941thepassage‘aswill…Dniepropetrovskbridgehead’wasdeletedbyateleprintermessagesignedbyWarlimont,onbehalfoftheChiefofthe_HighCommandoftheArmedForces.Themessageadded,‘TheFiihrerwishesallmotorizeddivisionstobeaddedtoistArmouredGroupfortheattackfromthebridgeheadofKremenchug,sinceforcesof4thAirFleetarenotavailabletosupportan,attackfromtheDniepropetrovskbridgehead.’30i.e.theRybacbiyPeninsula,whichjutsintotheArcticOceanontheRusso-Finnishborder,closetotheArcticportofPetsamo.31Twosuchoperationalorderswereissued,onthebasisofthisdirective,on7thand2istNovember1941.32ThiswasanorderissuedbyHitleron11thJanuary1940,aftertwoGermanAirForceofficershadallowedthesecretordersfortheWesternoffensivetofallintoAlliedhands.Itstrictlylimitedaccesstosecretmaterial.33Thiswaschangedbyteleprintertwodayslaterto‘bythebeginningofAugust’.34AbwehrII(infull,AmtAusland,Abwehr,AbteilingII)wasthesectionoftheArmedForcesForeignIntelligenceServicewhichspecializedinsabotageandsubversion.TheBrandenburgTrainingRegiment(LehrregimentBrandenburg)wasaunitunderitsorders.35Thiswastheprojecttocapturethe‘Fisherman’sPeninsula’.Seeabove,Directive37,paragraph1(d).36Thiswasthecover-namegiventotheCaucasusoffensive.37Thispassage,andtheprevioussentence,wereoriginallyslightlydifferent.Theyarehereprintedasamendedonthefollowingday.38On31stJuly1942thiscover-namewaschangedto‘Nordlicht(NorthernLight)’.39i.e.HeinrichHimmler.40HohereSS-undPolizeifuhrerwereHimmler’sdeputiesinoccupiedcountries.41i.e.German-occupiedPoland.42On23rdJune1943Hitlerorderedthattherebenofurtherextensionofsuchnativeunits,andthewords‘andextended’werestruckoutofthisparagraph.43German-controlledformationsraisedfromRussianTurkestanandtheCaucasus.44OnistJune1943,35theresultoftheconversionofXFlyingCorpstoAirForceCommandSouth,underthedirectcommandofCommander-in-ChiefAirForce,thiswholeparagraph(III.A.3)waschangedandtheairwarinthewholeeasternMediterraneanareawasplacedunderthecontrolofCommander-in-ChiefAirForce(insteadofunderCommander-in-ChiefSouth),cooperatingwiththeItalianSupreme

Command.45Thisappendixisnothereprinted.ThePlenipotentiaryforGreece,appointedon28thApril1941,representedthepolitical,economic,andculturalinterestsofGermanyinGreece.46ThiswasapreviousorderconcerningunifiedcommandintheMediterranean.47SuchareportwaspresentedonisthNovemberbytheCommander-in-ChiefNavy,AdmiralDoenitz,whohadreplacedAdmiralRaederinthiscapacityonjothJanuary1943.48i.e.LwowinSouthernPoland.49i.e.Brest-LitovskinEasternPoland.

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