Archive:

Mr. Ferrante,

{In Archive} Report of CMA On ~site Mark McC!ur~ AOV·210, Western Area Operations Branch to: Anthony Ferrante Cc: Dianne Babble, Keith Lindsey

This message is being viewed in an archive.

Dianne requested l send you a brief update re the results from yesterday's CMA visit

06/14/2011 09:42AM

All interviews were completed as planned, and all conducted face to face. ! requested to conduct the interviews solo, just myself, the interviewee and the interviewee's representative (if requested). AJS, QCG and LA District voiced no objection to this.

Mr. Hiebert had no new information. He did ask if the AOV report regarding this investigation will be available under the Freedom of Information Act. I advised him I was not an expert in FOIA but generally believed that it was "FO!A-ble." I assured him that AOV is committed to providing all parties appropriate feedback.

Mr. Michael Marcotte, the Ground Controller, confirmed the loss of separation. He stated that: • when he looked up, the Cub was airborne at approximately 40 to 50 feet AGL and the Cessna was still

on the runway between taxiways Bravo and Charlie, • he believed all three of them. the Ground Controller, Local Controller and the CIC (FLM) became

aware of the situation simultaneously, • whenthe Local Controller attempted to cancel the Cub's take off clearance, both he and the CIC told

the Local Controller, "that's a bad idea" orwords to that effect, • the fear was that the Cub would actually re-land and, due to its speed, catch up and overtake the

taxing Cessna, • the Cub did not overfly the Cessna but actually made an early right turn out (to the North) prior to

reaching the Cessna's position, • and that he did not file an ATSAP report because he believed management was immediately aware of

the incident.

Mr. Nielsen, the Local Controller, requested the CMA NATCA Local Representative accompany him during the interview. Mr. Nielsen stated that:

• he could not recall any of the events of 7/25/20 i 0, • it was his voice on the audio recording, {which I played for him), • he could not remember why he issued the cancel take off clearance but speculated that perhaps it

was because the Cessna was still on the runway between taxiways Bravo and Charlie, • he had no explanation as to how the Cub subsequently became airborne after the cancel takeoff

clearance, • and that he has previously filed an AT SAP report (but did not offer to disclose what that ATSAP report

concerned.)

The NATCA Representative made no comments concerning the investigation before, during or after the interview.

Mr. Pruitt, the CIC (FLM), stated that: • he could not recall any of the events of 7/25/2010. • he did not disagree with the facility records which showed him at work, manning the CIC position, at

the time of the event, • he never leaves the operating quarters when he is signed on a position, • his current understanding of the AT SAP program, vis·a-vis his responsibilities uhder 7210.56, is the

same understanding he had in July, 2010 (to wit· an FLM must report via 7210.56 even if an employee advises he/she is filing an ATSAP report)

FAA- 2\53

• even though he can not recall the events of 7/25/2010, he is certain that an operational error did not occur because, if it had, he would have reported it.

• and that he has no explanation for Mr. Marcotte's statements (which I quoted to him.)

I provided a verbal outline of this information to the LA District Manager, Sherry Avery and to the AJS I QCG representatives, Douglas Ware and Emilio Chaviano, during the out-brief.

I Will complete and forward the draft Report of Investigation by the end of this week.

As a side note • I advised, and emphasized, to all four individuals that it was not required of them to have AOV credentials in their immediate possession but asked. if they did. All four were able to immediately produce their credentials and l was able to confirm their credentials matched the data in AOV's database.

Best regards, Mark

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Mark McClure, ATSI Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service, AOV-21 0 1601 Lind Ave., SW Renton, WA 98057 mark.mcclure@faa.gov (425)-917-6765

VAA- 215~

FAA-01371

IM.-. Bany J Cavl8IANMJFAA,,~ 12/03/200703:01 PM

HI Terl.

To Ter! BrlstollAWAIFAA

cc Monlque Franee/ANM/FAA@FAA

bce

Subject Discussion with Ham

On the items that I looked into.

__ R Is revIsing the letter to use Andy's suggestion for the charge to be "unauthorized absence ofmore than 5 days" • I told them how disappointing it was that we haven't gotten this right yet. I stated thatit was unacceptable and that our Service Unit expects better. 1told them that we wanted this final letterready to go out by the end of this week. LR will notify us by COB today, how the timeline looks this weekto getting the drafts out for comment.

Jeff Lewis: Andy said that he will need to check with Medical, put Jeff had until November 30, 2007 to gethis medical information In for review. This Information Is what Is provided by the psychologIst that he sawrecently. Andy wants to propose discipline for the previous conduct Issue that led to this, and to send himover to Santa Rosa ATCT. I told Andy that we may have an Issue with the timeliness .

•• Letters of ~ will be issued t~or precipItating the joke; to_or his outburst at~nd t~or an outburst In the cab. Model Work Environment briefings are planned totake place in the next couple of weeks. Zo 7

_ LFWYA was coordinated at the national level with NATCA. It Is not a formal discussIon, but merelya training session conducted by management. I spoke with Pam Burger, the Enroute LR POC, Ron wastied up in a meeting.

-'MASS and Incident that Is being reviewed: Andy spoke wlt~on thls~s thecontroller working the local position when the inlcldent occurred and according to Andy, recognizes that itwas not a good operation. There's been no decision by AOV yet as to whether or not this Is an OE.

Barry J. DavisSenior AdvisorTerminal Operations, Western Service AreaOffice Phone: 425-227-2155Fax: 425-227-2906Blackberry: 425-231-8991emall: barry.j.davls@faa.gov

"Courage Is grace under pressure"Quote by Ernest Hemingway

FII-6665WSRcvd 10/1/11

FAA-01372

Barry J DavlslANM/FM

12/031200703:01 Plv1

To

bee

Brislol/f'\liVAJF AA

Discussion with Ham

HI Teri,

On the ilems thai I looked into.

ready to go out by ttle end of !tiis week. LR wili10 gelling the drafts out for comment

I told them that we wanted this final letter

us by COB today, how Ihe timeline looks this week

Jeff Lewis: Andy said that he will need 10check with Medical. but Jeff had until November 30, 2007 to gelhis medical information in for review. This information is what IS provided b the ps chologist that he sawrecently.

BUR: LFWYA was coordinated at the national level with NATCA It is nOIa formal discussion, but merelya training session conducted management. I wilh Pam Burger. lhe Enroute LR pac. Ron wasHed up in a meeling. .

SFO AMASS and incident that is reviewed: wilh on this. _ was Ihe

COf1I~al when lhe inicident occurredand according La Andy, recognizes thai ilwas~ There's been no decision AOV yel as 10whether or not thiS is an OE.

Barry J. DavisSenior AdvisorTerminal Operations, Western Service AreaOffice Phone; 425-227-2155Fax 425-227-2906Blackberr}" 425-231-8991emell

"Courage is grace underOuote by Ernest

FAA-01373

FAA-01374

FAA-01375

view

PresidentObama's

s- sala l1~d.,Mulino, O~9>~~ ~~

~ ~tel. (971) 295-7669

11onday,1\ugust 19,2013

U.S. Department of TransportationDocket Operations, 11-301200 New Jersey 1\venue SE.West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140Washington DC 20590-0339

Dear Sir or 11adam:

Please accept these comments for docket number F1\1\-2013-0375, a proposed rule in the7/19/13 Federal Register, with the title: Technical Operations Safety Action Program (T­SAP) and Air Traffic Safety Action Prol:::ram (ATSAP).1\ paragraph near the top of thisFederal Register posting invited comments, and the comments that follow conform with yourinvitation.

I am strongly opposed to the proposed rule:, for all of the following reasons:

1. This regulatory proposal is contrary to the Open Government Initiative.!Effectively, F1\1\ 1\dministrator Huerta is proposing to formalize and legitimizeF1\1\'s ongoing and improper practice of denying disclosable, de-identified ATSAPrecords to FOI1\ requestors. 1\s suc:h, he is running counter to the President's clearlyarticulated goals aimed at maximizing transparency, open government, andaccountability. Furthermore, these laudable goals were not just an off-the-cuffcomment; the Administration has restated them many times since.

Here are the first three paragraphs of President Obama's FOIA Memorandum,2issued on 1/21/09, the day of his first Inauguration:

"A democracy requires accountability, and accountability requirestransparency. As Justice Louis Brandeis wrote, "sunlight is said to be the best ofdisinfectants. " In our democracy, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), whichencourages accountability through transparency, is the most prominent expressionof a profound national commitment to en'luring an open Government. At theheart of that commitment is the idea that accountability is in the interest of theGovernment and the citizenry alike.

I view online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/opelll2 view online at: http://aireform.com/wp-content/uploadsI20090121 ..-FOIA-Statement-by-President­Obama-2p.doc

Jeff Lewis' Statement opposing FAA's Rule Proposal, page 1

AttorneyGeneralHolder's

view

OMBDirectorOrszag's

view

"The Freedom of Information Act should be administered with aclear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails. The Governmentshould not keep information c()j~fidential merely because public officials might beembarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, orbecause of speculative or abstract fears. Nondisclosure should never be based onan effort to protect the personal interests of Government officials at the expense ofthose they are supposed to serve. In responding to requests under the FOIA,executive branch agencies (agencies) should act promptly and in a spiritof cooperation, recognizing that such agencies are servants of the public.

"All agencies should adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure, in order to renewtheir commitment to the principles embodied in FOIA, and to usher in a new era ofopen Government. The presumption of disclosure should be applied to alldecisions involving FOIA. "

And, here is the heart of what Attorney General Holder added to the record, in hismemo dated March 19,2009:3

"First, an agency should not withhold information simply because it may do solegally. I strongly encourage agencies to make discretionary disclosures ofinformation. An agency should not withhold records merely because it candemonstrate, as a technical matter, that the records fall within the scope of aFOIA exemption.

"Second, whenever an agency determines that it cannot make full disclosure of arequested record, it must consider whether it can make partial disclosure.Agencies should always be mindful that the FOIA requires them to take reasonablesteps to segregate and release nonexempt information. Even if some parts of arecord must be withheld, other parts either may not be covered by a statutoryexemption, or may be covered only in a technical sense unrelated to the actualimpact of disclosure.

"At the same time, the disclosure obligation under the }'OIA is not absolute. TheAct provides exemptions to protect, for example, national security, personalprivacy, privileged records, and law enforcement interests. But as the Presidentstated in his memorandum, "The Government should not keep informationconfidential merely becausepublic officials might be embarrassed by disclosure,because errors and failures might be revealed, or because of speculative orabstract fears. "

Here are the two opening paragraphs added to the record by OMB Director PeterOrszag, with his Open Government Directive memo, dated December 8, 2009:

"In the .Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, issued on January21,2009, the President instructed the Director of the Office of Management andBudget (OMB) to issue an Open Government Directive. Responding to thatinstruction, this memorandum is intended to direct executive departments and

3 view online at: http://aireform.com/wp-contentluploads/20090319 ..-Eric-Holder-FOIA-memo-3p.pdf

Jeff Lewis' Statement opposing FAA's Rule Proposal, page 2

agencies to take specific actions to implement the principles of transparency,participation, and collaboration set forth in the President's Memorandum. ThisDirective was informed by recommendations from the "Federal Chief TechnologyOfficer, who solicited public comment through the White House Open GovernmentInitiative.

"The three principles of transparency, participation, and collaboration form thecornerstone of an open government. Transparency promotes accountability byproviding the public with iriformation about what the Government is doing.Participation allows members of the public to contribute ideas and expertise sothat their government can make policies with the benefit of iriformation that iswidely dispersed in society. Collaboration improves the effectiveness ofGovernment by encouraging partnerships and cooperation within the FederalGovernment, across levels of government, and between the Government andprivate institutions. "

2. The true aim of this regulatory proposal is to bypass Congress' FOIA mandate.Congress crafted FOIA in the mid-1960's, responding to growing citizen concernabout arbitrary bureaucratic overreach. Congress made additional amendments toFOIA as nee:ded for cultural and technological shifts. Congress has mindfully definedand adjusted the rules, but FAA is choosing to work around those rules. Effectively,FAA Administrator Huerta is proposing to formalize and legitimize FAA's ongoingand improper practice of denying de-identified ATSAP records to FOIA requestors.Which raises the interesting legal question:

... since Mr. Huerta has;proposed a new rule to protect ATSAPreports from FOIA disclosure, and since that new rule has stillnot been effectuated, ,how does FAA justify these past fewyears where they havt.~been arbitrarily denying hundreds ofF01'A requestsfor the Icurrently disclosable de-identified ATSAPrecctrds?

3. This regulatory proposal is a pathetic re-tooling of ASRS, aimed at gutting thevirtues of that excellent NASA program. All citizens aware of recent aviationhistory know that, in recent years, there has been an explosion of new programssoliciting voluntarily reported safety data from various aviation employee groups. Thegranddaddy of all these safety-reporting systems is NASA's ASRS. It was initiated inthe mid-1970's, more than three decades before ATSAP. It has been hugelysuccessful, so much so that the one millionth ASRS safety incident report was filed inMarch 2012. For nearly thirty years, FAA encouraged all avi.ation employees to reportto ASRS; the enticement was an offer of disciplinary immunity to ASRS reporters.Additionally, FAA has enjoyed use of judiciously de-identified ASRS data (and dataproducts, like NASA's monthly safety newsletter, 'CALLBACK') to train and supportsafety persormel such as air traffic controllers. So, one has to ask: why is FAA nowencouraging its employees to voluntarily report to ATSAP instead ofASRS, and why would FAA want to bury their ATSAP data?

Jeff Le)\!is ' Statement opposing FAA's Rule Proposal, page 3

4. This regulatory proposal will diminish Public confidence. FAA routinely producesreports that go to great lengths to present FAA in a positive light. One example is theFY2011 Performance and Accountability Report.4 At page 40, FAA states: "Thelevel of public confidence in the safety of air travel has a huge impact on the economichealth of both the industry and the United States. "

Clearly, the level of public confidence will decline when serious incidents happen, andconfidence will further decline when the public learns of FAA scandals and sees FAAtrying to conceal information.

Serious incidents do happen at FAA; just look at the u.S. fatal accidents this year:

• ..for the first quarter at: Ihttp://aireform.coml?page id=2565[

• ..for the second quarter at: /hiitp:llaireform.coml?page id=52071

• ..and, for the present quarter of2013 at: Ihttp://aireform.coml?page id=78971

FAA scandals, and improper concealment of information, do happen, too. Considerthe following, just some of FAA's dismal news stories, all of which occurred duringthe past few years, while FAA and NATCA have been offering ATSAP as a protectionfrom disciplinary action, to those controllers who file ATSAP reports:

• 4/3/08: A Congressional Hearing exposed that FAA management wasscuttling efforts by subordinate Aviation Safety Inspectors and enablingSouthwest Airlines to excessively delay making safety repairs related tocracking fuselages and rapid cabin depressurization. In other words, theInspectors were doing their jobs, but Southwest and higher FAA managerswere agreeing to indefinite delays. One testifYing whistleblower even endureddeath threats.

• 11/13/08: The U.S. Office of Special Counsel sent a letter to President Obamasubstantiating whistleblower Anne Whiteman's charges, that FAAmanagement at DFW had coverup up controller errors with 62 identifiedevents mis-classified as pilot errors.

• 7/3/09: The U.S. Office of Special Counsel sent a letter to President Obamasubstantiating whistleblower Rand Foster's charges related to noncompliantand unsafe modifications on emergency response helicopters.

• 11/24/09: The U.S. Office of Special Counsel sent a letter to President Obamasubstantiating whistleblower Ray Adams charges of persistent safety hazardsat Newark International Airport. Mr. Adams had also been locked out fromwork in retaliation for his whistleblowing.

• 4/1/10: The U.S. Office of Special Counsel sent a letter to President Obamasubstantiating whistleblower Douglas Peters' charges that FAA management

4 view copy at: http://aireform.com/wp-content/uploads/FAAs-FY2011-Performance-AccountabiJity­Report.pdf

Jeff Lewis' Statement opposing FAA's Rule Proposal, page 4

had intervened on behalf of American airlines, permitting" ... the continuedoperation of aircraft that were not in compliance with an FAA safetydirective .... "

• 7/22/10: The U.S. Office of Special Counsel sent a letter to President Obamasubstantiating whistleblower Mark Lund's charges that " ...FAA/ailed toprovide effective oversight o/Northwest Airlines and to address Northwest'ssystemic non-compliance with FAA Airworthiness Directives (AD's) .... "

• 11/4/1 0: The U.S. Office of Special Counsel sent a letter to President Obamasubstantiating whistleblower Andrew Blosser's disclosure that FAA'sCertificate Management Office in Fort Worth was failing to effectivelyoversee the American Airlines Inspection and Maintenance program.

• Spring 2011: the public was repeatedly alarmed by a rash of stories whereincontrollers were asleep while working their overnight shifts. The worstexample came in Knoxville, where a controller used couch cushions to build abed, then dozed off for hours. What the Public was not told (but was detailedvia FOIA records) was the tower controller who panicked at the situation andprovided radar ATC services from the tower cab was NOT CERTIFIED towork radar traffic; he was simply winging it.

• 4/17/11: A controller at Cleveland Center was watching a DVD movie on hislaptop computer while working air traffic. He inadvertantly had the mic keyedfor three minutes, and the story made the news the next day. An FAA internalinvestigation is conducted. In one sworn statement by a veteran controller, heassured that management was aware of the movie-watching: " ... they walkthrough the building andfiJr 20 years no one has said anything. "

• 5/8/12: Catching up with FAA whistleblower disclosures that had beendelayed through the Scott Bloch debacle, the Office of Special Counsel issueda set of eight letters to the President, mostly substantiating an array of FAAemployee complaints. Perhaps the most egregious was the New YorkTRACON case, which exposed extraordinary safety failures in late 2010 andearly 2011. A labor-management relationship had evolved whereinmanagement was reluctant to address controller misconduct issues. Thecharges were substantiated,. and included sleeping and wathching movies (plusthe common use of other disallowed personal electronic devices).

• And, lastly, there is the matter of the concealed controller error at CamarilloTower. It happened on July 25,2010 and was witnessed by a veterancontroller and a supervisor. The ATC audio tapes and the sworn statement ofthe veteran controller make the error indisputable, yet the supervisor (whofailed to file papers) insists he has no memory and cannot explain the tapes.The worst part is FAA officials have looked at it repeatedly and keep actinglike they cannot see it. In another case, an EEO complaint at the same tower,FAA submitted an affidavit signed by Lisbeth Mack,5 FAA's ATSAP

5 see attached 4-page Affidavit. Alternatively, view online at: http://aireform.com/wp­content/uploads/2012(J1411 ..-Lisbeth-Mack-Affidavit-for-CMA-EEOC-4p.pdf

Jeff Lewis' Statement opposing FAA's Rule Proposal, page 5

Manager, insisting that the ATSAP report filed after the incident was notreleasable. Oddly, the FAA/ AOV investigator, Mark McClure, who flewdown from Seattle to conduct an investigation in June 2011, did NOTreference the ATSAP, nor did he request the filing controller to provide acopy. Had it been released, it might have aided the Supervisor's memory.6

5. This regulatory proposal disempowers the individual citizen. It strips the citizenryof their FOIA rights, blocking their individual access to records that show theeffectiveness - or failure - of FAA employees in the conduct of their duties. Citizenswithout information cannot hold their civil servants accountable; they become slavesto the arbitrary whim of an ascendant bureaucracy.

6. This regulatory proposal is a gross overreach by FAA. To see the properapplication of 49 U.S.C. § 40123, one needs to look closely at the legislation thatproduced this code section.? It is also helpful to look at the context which led to thatlegislation. Two major commercial air crashes in 1996 undermined the Publicconfidence: the Valujet crash in Florida, in May, and the TWA explosion near LongIsland, in July. Many felt that the investigations were mishandled and trust in FAA(and aviation in general) was severely damaged. Congress deliberated, and passedlegislation to help protect whistle blowers from retaliation. At that time, they wereprimarily focused on airline employees and others in the private sector; it is only in thepast ten years that citizens are becoming increasing concerned about an apparent FAAculture of corruption.

This proposal by Mr. Huerta seeks to apply a legislative objective aimed at privatesector employees onto federal (public sector) employees.

Furthermore, 49 U.S.C. § 40123 specifies that, to legally justifY protection of theserecords from FOIA disclosure, Administrator Huerta must convincingly prove that:

(l) the disclosure of the information would inhibit the voluntary provision of thattype of information and that the receipt of that type of information aids infu(filling the Administrator~s sa;jety and security responsibilities; and

(2) withholding such informationfrom disclosure would be consistent with theAdministrator's safety and security responsibilities.

As regards the first requirement, Mr. Huerta has not proven this, nor will he, as it isfalse. The present form of ATSAP is very successfully generating voluntary reports,thus is not suffering any inhibition to produce reports. The present form of ATSAP isalso legally required to produce the de-identified ATSAP reports responsive to FOIArequests. As regards the second requirement, Mr. Huerta has produced no compellingargument that FAA's safety or security responsibilities are served by the withholdingof any de-identified ATSAP report contents.

6 an article with links to the audio, a diagram, and details is at: Ihttp://aireform.com/?p=96SI7 view online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title49/html/USCODE-2011-title49­subtitle VII -partA -su bpa rti-cha p40 1-sec40 123.htm

Jeff Lewis' Statement opposing FAA's Rule Proposal, page 6

f;1 PDF copy of ASRS Program Briefing is viewable at:Ullttp:llasrs.arc.nasa.gov Idocsl ASRS ProgramBriefing2011.pdf

Lastly, consider the predecessor (and granddaddy) to ATSAP: NASA's ASRS. As ofMarch 2012, more than thirty years a:ft:erthe first ASRS volunteer submitted the firstASRS report, more than a million ASRS reports have now been filed. In accordancewith NASA's successful safety methodology, these reports were all de-identified, andthen all other content was injected into the publicly disclosable ASRS database. Evenmore, NASA has aggressively shared ASRS report contents within their monthlysafety newsletter, CALLBACK. Here is a description, of this newsletter, from page 37of NASA's ASRS Program Briefing:

"CALLBACK, the ASRSmonthly safety newsletter,has been published sinceJ 979 in a popular "lessons learned " format. CALLBACK presents ASRS reportexcerpts that are significant, educational, and timely. In addition, occasionalfeatures on ASRS program developments and research are presented. Over 385issues have been published and distributed throughout the Us. and to theinternational aviation community. All issues since December J 994 are available

for download at the ASRS website at:http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov /pu bliications/callback.html"

NASA is clearly proud of their good work, as they should be; for more than thirtyyears they have managed this data collection and used it quite effectively to educatethe public.

In contrast, FAA should be ashamed; they have taken the successful ASRS model andare trying to finish transforming it into a black hole for the consumption anddestruction of valuable safety data. And, to make matters worse, in the process Mr.Huerta's program is offering malfeasant FAA personnel a vacation from accountableperformance.

CONCLUSION: In the interest of public safety, governmental efficiency, and to ensure aneffective and sustainable Democratic process with informed and engaged citizens, FAA'sproposal needs to be abandoned. FAA should immediately drop Mr. Huerta's absurd proposal,which seeks principally to protect FAA's 45,000 employees (and the many thousands ofcontract employees, too) from accountability.

Thank you for the opportunity to be heard.

Sincerely,

Jeff Lewis

AITACHED: 4/11/12, Affidavit of Lisbeth Mack (4p)

Jeff Lewis' Statement opposing FAA's Rule Proposal, page 7

DECLARATION OF LISBETH MACK

Group Manager, Safety ProgramsOffice of Safety, Air Traffic Organization,

Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation

I, LISBETH MACK, hereby declare and state:

I. I am over the age of 18 years, and attest that I am competent to testify as to the

following:

2. I am the Group Manager, Safety Programs, Office of Safety, Air Traffic

Organization ("ATO"), Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation,

Washington, D.C. My responsibilities include overseeing the management of the ATO's

confidential Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs, which include the Air Traffic Safety

Action Program CATSAP") and the Technical Operations Safety Action Program ("T-

SAP") along with the Confidential Information Sharing Programs that the ATO maintains

with certain airlines' Aviation Safety Action Programs. I also oversee the activities

association with Safety Culture, Safety Promotions, Crew Resource Management and the

Partnership for Safety programs. Prior to my appointment as Group Manager, I had been'

the ATSAP Manager since April 2009.

3. This Declaration is in support of the Agency's Response to 2/14/12 Order and

Motion for Reconsideration To Produce ATSAP Report, regarding __ ,..

Department of Transportation, EEOC No. 480-201 1-00360X, Agency No. 2011-23458-

FAA-06.

4. I am aware that •••••• and his EEO representative, Don Hiebert, allege that

another controller from Camarillo Air Traffic Control Tower ("ATCT'), Camarillo,

California, was responsible for an operational error on July 25, 2010, and pursuant

thereto, they seek a copy of the actual ATSAP report filed as a result of that alleged

incident.

5. I am further aware that an ATSAP report was filed by a controller regarding a

July 25, 2010 incident at Camarillo ATeT.

6. The surrounding facts and alleged witnesses of this alleged July 25, 2010 incident

appear to be best described in the Air Traffic Oversight Office's August 2, 2011 Report

ofInvestigation produced in response to Mr. Hiebert's Administrator's Hotline complaint

and already in Mr. Hiebert's possession, and attached to the Agency's response as

Exhibit 3.

7. ATSAP is governed by FAA Order JO 7200.20. This Order proscribes the

processes and procedures for filing an ATSAP report and reviewing an ATSAP report.

Prior to the issuance of this Order on January 30, 2011, there was a revision toOrderJO

72 I0.56 in July 2009, which changed the Agency's previous policy of naming specific

individuals alleged to have committed Qr been involved in losses of separation such as

operational errors. That previous policy, which could result in disciplinary action, was

deemed less effective than encouraging self-reporting.

8. ATSAP encourages the voluntary submission of safety reports from covered

Agency employees involved in the delivery of air traffic services. In order to encourage

such submissions, the Agency agrees to maintain and protect the reporting individual's

2

confidentiality. Only the individual himself or herself may agree to waive that

confidentiality. The effectiveness of the ATSAP can only be maintained when the

confidentiality of the reporting employee and the contents of his or her report are

ensured.

9. A covered individual may tile an ATSAP report usmg the online reporting

system. An ATSAP report is delivered via this system, which is housed on a separate

server maintained by a third-party contractor. The Agency does not have access to this

server or the actual report filed with the contractor. Once the report is filed with the

contractor, the contractor de-identities all personally identifiable information of the

individual in order to maintain that individual's confidentiality. The contractor then

provides electronic access to a redacted ATSAP report to the individuals who' comprise

the ATSAP Event Review Committee ("ERe') for review and!an acceptance decision.

10. The ERC is a three-member panel made up of one employee representing ATO

management, one employee representing the National Air Traffic Controllers Association

("NATCA"), and one individual from the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Office ("AOV").

As Order JO 7200.20 describes, the ERC meets to discuss ATSAP reports. The ERC

may request an investigation based on safety issues identified in the technical data

transmitted by the contractor from the ATSAP report. but this is rare. However, the ERC

does not investigate events themselves, nor do they determine whether the event should

be categorized as an operational deviation, operational error, pilot deviation, proximity

event or any other classification. The reports are subjective and qualitative.

3

I I. Three ERCs in three separate ATO Service Areas review approximately 300 de­

identified ATSAP repolis per week using an online third-party database. Most of the

reports cover events or incidents of some type, but some are simply reports about an

identified safety issue, in which no event has occurred. Importantly, the ATSAP

information reviewed by the ERCs does not identify. the reporting individual. Typically,

most ATSAP reports do not warrant additional action or further investigation. Each

ATSAP report is reviewed and analyzed individually to determine what, if any,

recommended action is needed in response to that particular incident.

12. Pursuant to standard practice, my understanding is that the contractor de-

identified the subject ATSAP report regarding a July 25, 20 10 repmi.

13. Here, the ERC accepted the report about the July 25, 2010 event and no further

action was recommended or taken.

14. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

15. Dated this II th day of April 2012 in Washington, D.C.

Lisbeth Mack

4

---------------- --_._- -- ------------_._-----

Comment to FAA docket FAA‐2013‐0375  8/19/2013  

In this proposed rule, the Federal Aviation Administration seeks to limit public access to critical aviation 

safety information by exempting reports submitted through its internal Air Traffic Safety Action Program 

(ATSAP) and Technical Operations Safety Action Program (T‐SAP) from public availability through the 

Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC 552).   I believe that the grounds stated for doing so are wholly 

inadequate, and that such an exemption would be contrary to the public interest as well as established 

Administration policy on access to Government records. 

Freedom of Information 

Since the law was originally passed in 1966, FOIA has provided the public with access to vital and 

valuable government information.  Congressional discussion published on the passage of the “Electronic 

Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996” stated, “…the purpose of the FOIA is to require 

agencies of the Federal Government to make records available to the public through public inspection 

and upon the request of any person for any public or private use. The findings also cite the role of the 

FOIA in leading to the disclosure of information about Government operations and consumer health and 

safety.”  Access to safety‐related information was explicitly acknowledged by Congress as a core 

purpose of FOIA. 

Upon taking office in 2009, President Obama signed a memorandum directing the Attorney General and 

the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to issue guidelines regarding accountability and 

transparency based on public access to information.  The memorandum stated in part: 

“The Freedom of Information Act should be administered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, 

openness prevails. The Government should not keep information confidential merely because public 

officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or because 

of speculative or abstract fears…In responding to requests under the FOIA, executive branch agencies 

(agencies) should act promptly and in a spirit of cooperation, recognizing that such agencies are servants 

of the public. All agencies should adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure, in order to renew their 

commitment to the principles embodied in FOIA, and to usher in a new era of open Government. The 

presumption of disclosure should be applied to all decisions involving FOIA.” 

Pursuant to that memorandum, on March 19, 2009, Attorney General Holder issued Administration 

guidance to the heads of executive departments and agencies about the processing of FOIA requests, 

stating in part: 

As President Obama instructed in his January 21 FOIA Memorandum, "The Freedom of Information Act 

should be administered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails." This 

presumption has two important implications.  

First, an agency should not withhold information simply because it may do so legally. I strongly 

encourage agencies to make discretionary disclosures of information. An agency should not withhold 

records merely because it can demonstrate, as a technical matter, that the records fall within the scope 

of a FOIA exemption.  

Comment to FAA docket FAA‐2013‐0375  8/19/2013  

Second, whenever an agency determines that it cannot make full disclosure of a requested record, it 

must consider whether it can make partial disclosure. Agencies should always be mindful that the FOIA 

requires them to take reasonable steps to segregate and release nonexempt information. Even if some 

parts of a record must be withheld, other parts either may not be covered by a statutory exemption, or 

may be covered only in a technical sense unrelated to the actual impact of disclosure.  

At the same time, the disclosure obligation under the FOIA is not absolute. The Act provides exemptions 

to protect, for example, national security, personal privacy, privileged records, and law enforcement 

interests. But as the President stated in his memorandum, "The Government should not keep information 

confidential merely because public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and 

failures might be revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears." 

These policies set a very high standard for the FAA to meet before denying public access to government 

records.  In this proposed rule, the FAA provides no justification for a blanket exemption of T‐SAP and 

ATSAP reports from FOIA access, except to assert (with no support whatsoever) that, “…Individuals are 

unwilling to voluntarily provide detailed information about safety events and concerns, including those 

that might involve their own failures to follow Agency directives and policies, if such information could 

be released publicly. If information is publicly disclosed, there is a strong likelihood that the information 

could be misused for purposes other than to address and resolve the reported safety concern. Unless 

the FAA can provide assurance that safety‐related reports will be withheld from public disclosure, 

personnel will not participate in the programs.”  Absent as much as a shred of evidence that this 

assertion is true, the FAA’s contention that the information will be unavailable or misused if subjected to 

public disclosure directly conflicts with the Administration’s determination that the Government should 

not keep information confidential because of, “…speculative or abstract fears.”   

Over the past few years, the FAA has adopted a “safety culture” focused on non‐punitive responses to 

identification of safety concerns.  When the ATSAP and T‐SAP programs were implemented as part of 

the improved safety culture, the FAA and their labor representatives negotiated strong protections for 

those providing safety reports.  Both FAA orders and memoranda of understanding between the FAA 

and its unions have established that, except in very limited circumstances, submission of a safety report 

can have no negative consequences for the submitter.  Before those protections were established, it 

was possible or even likely that reports of human error or other safety failings could negatively reflect 

on those involved, thus discouraging disclosure of such events.  As those policies have been essentially 

eliminated, there is no reason to anticipate that submitters should fear repercussions from disclosure of 

reported safety concerns.   

Confidential reporting programs such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Aviation 

Safety Reporting System have demonstrated the opposite: pilots, air traffic controllers, cabin crew, 

dispatchers, maintenance technicians and others have submitted over 1,000,000 reports of safety issues 

that are available to the public through Web access and other means.  There is no reason to expect that 

similar public access to the content of ATSAP and T‐SAP reports would either discourage reporting or 

result in their misuse.   

Comment to FAA docket FAA‐2013‐0375  8/19/2013  

FAA Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs versus Airline Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs 

The FAA’s current ATSAP rulemaking appears to be modeled on the previous rulemaking efforts 

affecting the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) provided by many airline operators to their 

employees in cooperation with the FAA.  It is inappropriate for the FAA, as a government agency, to 

essentially try to treat itself in terms of information disclosure as a private aviation entity, i.e., a 

certificate holder. 

ASAP programs are based on statutory protection provided under 49 USC 40123 for voluntarily provided 

safety information, and the associated regulations created by the FAA as 14 CFR 193.  The statute and 

regulations allow the FAA to receive and protect from public disclosure information belonging to a non‐

governmental entity such as an airline and its employees that would otherwise not be provided to the 

FAA.  Private entities such as airlines are not subject to FOIA requirements, as FOIA only applies to 

information held by the government or contractors providing records management services on behalf of 

the government (much to the FAA’s chagrin, hence this rulemaking action.)  Therefore, it is reasonable 

to assume that without legal protection for private information disclosed to the government, airlines 

and others would not voluntarily provide data they view as company confidential to the FAA and 

thereby expose it to subsequent FOIA disclosure.  As private companies, they are largely entitled to keep 

their internal business private, so it was reasonable to accommodate their privacy concerns in statute 

and regulation in exchange for improved FAA access to otherwise company‐confidential safety 

information. 

The FAA, on the other hand, is not a private business, its employees are public servants, and it is long‐

established law and policy that its records are a matter of public interest available for public 

examination by default.    The FAA has issued directives to its employees establishing mandatory 

reporting requirements when certain events occur, and has allowed its employees to comply with those 

mandatory reporting requirements either through management channels or by submitting reports 

through the ATSAP program.  All ATSAP and T‐SAP records are originated by FAA employees, are records 

of FAA issues or actions, and directly reflect upon the safety of FAA operations as well as the safety of 

the flying public.  There is nothing inherently private about them, although there may be a legitimate 

argument for protecting the identities of those submitting reports.  For the FAA to unilaterally decide 

that its internally generated safety data should not be subject to public review is remarkable, and seems 

to be gratuitously dismissive of its legal obligations.  The entire justification presented in this rulemaking 

for exempting ATSAP and T‐SAP reports from FOIA disclosure could be paraphrased as, “Because we said 

so.”  Neither 49 USC 40123 or 14 CFR Part 193 were written with the intent of protecting the FAA from 

disclosing its own data, an agency responsibility long ago subjected to FOIA requirements, nor does the 

FAA need to invoke Part 193 regulations to address how it handles internally created safety information, 

a matter that is already completely addressed through law, FAA orders, directives, and labor 

agreements.  Public agencies such as the FAA are held to a higher information disclosure standard than 

private companies for good reason: the public has an indisputable right to know about the public’s 

business.  The FAA should discontinue any further attempts to evade FOIA requirements by misusing 49 

USC 40123 and 14 CFR 193, legal strictures created to protect data disclosed by private companies and 

others TO the FAA, as justification for withholding critical FAA safety information from the public. 

Comment to FAA docket FAA‐2013‐0375  8/19/2013  

Mandatory vs. Voluntary Reporting 

As noted earlier, the FAA has established reporting requirements for its employees when certain events 

occur.  Compliance with these requirements is not optional, but is part of each person’s duty as a federal 

employee without regard to FOIA applicability.  The current directive establishing mandatory reporting 

requirements is FAA order 7210.632, Air Traffic Organization Occurrence Reporting, and the list of 

events requiring mandatory (that is, non‐voluntary) reporting is listed in Appendix A.  The order 

specifically refers to use of the voluntary safety reporting program mechanisms established under FAA 

order 7200.20, Voluntary Safety Reporting Program, as acceptable means of compliance with mandatory 

reporting requirements.  In this rulemaking, the FAA seems to be accepting that ATSAP and T‐SAP 

reports which cover events subject to mandatory reporting are not to be covered by the proposed FOIA 

exclusion, stating that, “…mandatory information about occurrences that are required to be reported 

under FAA Orders, Notices or guidance is not protected under this designation, unless the same 

information has also been submitted or reported under other procedures prescribed by the Agency.”  

While it is gratifying that FAA evidently recognizes that reports of events subject to mandatory safety 

reporting should be available to the public via FOIA requests, given the protections in place for 

submitters there is really no reason to treat voluntarily submitted reports of safety issues not subject to 

mandatory reporting any differently.  Further, such a distinction would cause the FOIA eligibility of 

various reported events to change with the status of other FAA orders.  If, for example, the FAA were to 

allow FAA order 7210.632 to expire even temporarily, mandatory reporting criteria would cease to exist, 

all reports submitted would be considered voluntary, and their FOIA eligibility would terminate.  This is a 

nonsensical position.  The fundamental principle that needs to be recognized here is that the content of 

reports of safety issues in the ATC system are the public’s business and should not be withheld from 

disclosure, whether voluntarily submitted or not. 

Public Interest 

The safety of the ATC system is a matter of widespread public interest.  Hundreds of millions of 

passengers use air transportation each year, quite literally having “skin in the game.”  Under the 

circumstances, it is difficult to conceive of any sensible argument that safety problems are none of the 

public’s business, or that the public cannot be trusted with the FAA’s internal safety reports.  The FAA’s 

response to safety issues is subject to public review, as is the process used by the FAA to evaluate and 

mitigate safety issues.  Without transparency in the details of safety reports submitted and the FAA’s 

reaction to them, the public cannot hold the FAA accountable for its safety performance.  Under current 

ATSAP procedures, there is no detailed explanation of what has been reported, how the reports were 

handled, and what corrective actions, if any, resulted.  In other words, it is impossible for anyone 

outside the process to tell how well it is working in identifying and correcting safety issues. In addition, 

the ATSAP process renders other FAA safety statistics completely suspect.   For example, the FAA 

publishes statistics on losses of separation, but reports of separation losses submitted solely through 

ATSAP are not necessarily included in the overall count ‐‐ thereby providing a misleading picture to the 

public.  There are similar problems with runway incursions and other critical measures of system safety.  

If the FAA proposes to run a two‐track reporting system, credibility requires that both sides be visible 

and accountable to the public.  

Comment to FAA docket FAA‐2013‐0375  8/19/2013  

Summary 

Given the unambiguous support for disclosure of government information through FOIA expressed by 

the President and the Attorney General, as well as the clear public interest in aviation safety issues, I 

believe that a blanket FOIA exemption for these safety reports is not appropriate.  To protect the 

submitter of a report from unwanted attention, it would be reasonable to remove information likely to 

result in identification of a specific individual as the source.  Both ATSAP and the very successful ASRS 

already de‐identify reports to varying degrees.  However, the actual content of the reports and the 

nature of the conditions or events reported are of fundamental public interest.  Virtually everyone uses 

air transportation from time to time.  Exposure of safety issues affecting a government‐operated air 

traffic control system staffed and managed by government employees is well within the intent of FOIA, 

and the ability of the public to hold the FAA accountable for transparently and effectively addressing 

safety problems is critical to ensuring public confidence in the system.  To do so requires access to 

detailed information that the FAA evidently wishes to hide solely on the basis of unsupported (and likely 

unsupportable) assertions regarding non‐submission of reports and possible misuse of data.  The 

justification presented by the FAA was copied wholesale from a previous rulemaking intended to protect 

private corporate information made available to the FAA from disclosure through FOIA, a very different 

scenario, and totally failed to recognize that the FAA is a public agency with legal obligations to the 

public far beyond those of a private firm. 

Therefore, as supported by the President’s memorandum and the Attorney General’s guidance to 

Executive Branch agencies cited above, as well as the other issues discussed above, I believe that the 

FAA should drop its plan to apply a blanket exclusion from FOIA disclosure to all ATSAP and T‐SAP 

reports.  Instead, it should develop a process to protect from release the identities of submitters of 

reports, while making available to the public all remaining safety‐related information in each report to 

the maximum practicable extent.  To do otherwise is contrary to the letter and spirit of FOIA, contrary to 

explicit direction from the Administration, and is contrary to entirely legitimate public interest in 

monitoring and evaluating FAA safety performance.  The revised plan should be detailed in another 

notice clearly explaining what will and will not be released, accompanied by rational, fact‐based 

justifications for the proposed approach and the decisions made. 

San Jose Mercury News

San Jose Mercury News (CA)

January 24, 2000REPORT FAULTS CONTROLLER ERROR BLAMED FOR COLLISION OF PLANE,COPTER AT REID-HILLVIEW

Author: ED POPE, Mercury News Staff Writer Edition: Morning FinalSection: Local

Page: IB

Estimated printed pages: 5

Article Text:

A midair collision between a helicopter and a light plane at Reid-Hillview Airport in May was theresult of an air-traffic control error that permitted the two craft to cross paths as they were takingoff, according to the Federal Aviation Administration.

No one was injured in the collision, and both craft were able to land safely. Neither pilotwas cited. And the controller, now stationed at San Jose International Airport, also did notreceive a sanction, although he did undergo mandatory retraining after the mishap.

As a result of the incident, however, the supervisor of the tower and helicopter operators at theairport, situated in what is now a heavily developed area, have agreed on new safety measures forhandling fixed-wing airplanes and helicopters.

"The mix is very tough to work with," said tower supervisor Denise Sanchez. "We had to set upprocedures to keep these guys separated. They are currently in place, and there has not been onecomplaint."

In the May incident, the plane -- a Cessna 172 embarking on a sightseeing flight over SanJose -- had a half-inch of its propeller tips bent back when it hit the helicopter's rightlanding skid. "Given the fact two aircraft collided in flight while under Air Traffic Control .. . this incident involved an FAA Air Traffic Control operational error," the FAA reportdeclared.

The author of that report -- obtained by the Mercury News under a Freedom ofInformation Act request -- was not identified, and the FAA was unable to say who made thefindings. According to the report, the helicopter had been cleared by the tower to take off to thenorthwest from the north end of runway 31L (left) at about the same time that the Cessna wasgiven permission to depart from the south end of runway 31L. Under flight rules in effect at Reid­Hillview, both aircraft should have stayed parallel and maintained visual contact until they wereclear of the airport and able to turn safely. But the report said that from the front left seat of thehelicopter, "(1)t would be impossible for the flight instructor to see the Cessna" coming up frombehind and below. Further, "The Cessna pilot was not advised that a helicopter was ahead of himand off to his left side."

Other details

The report also noted that to proceed to San Jose, the Cessna would have had to take a slight leftturn (in the direction of the helicopter), but added, "It was unknown whether the Cessna pilotturned. What is known is the aircraft did collide in flight while under air traffic control."

For the pilots involved, it was a very narrow escape. "I don't know how you could get anycloser," said helicopter pilot Robert Dahlberg.

In his report of the incident, Dahlberg wrote, "We were climbing straight out, when at about 600feet (altitude) I felt something thump the helicopter. It felt like we had struck a bird." Dahlbergsaid he immediately took control of the helicopter from his student and "about two to threeseconds later I saw the aircraft appear in front of us moving left and descending."

At the instant of impact, Cessna pilot Scott Mackey saw the helicopter directly above himand put his plane into a dive. In his report, Mackey said he "should have visualized where thehelicopter was and where he was going to be. After takeoff, if! couldn't see the helicopter, Ishould have asked the tower to help me get a visual and make sure I had separation." Mackeycould not be reached for comment.

An FAA flight standards official with the regional office in Los Angeles emphasized that evenwhen there is a controller on duty, the primary responsibility for staying out of each other's waylies with the pilots. This is the so-called "see and avoid" principle that is used at smaller airports.

But the FAA report also noted that while the helicopter was advised of the Cessna taking offbehind him, "the pilot of the Cessna was not advised of the helicopter" by the air trafficcontroller who was handling the two aircraft at the time.

Controller's response

Controller Roberto Aranda said in his written statement that he didn't issue a warning tothe Cessna about the helicopter's position because the Cessna "was halfway down therunway, had just started to be airborne and would outrun the helicopter." Arandla said hecontinued to watch the departures "and was satisfJied their departure paths would notconflict." He then turned around to talk to other traffic in the pattern. Aranda d«~clinedfurther comment.

Dahlberg said Nice Air -- which owned the helicopter and the Cessna involved in the Mayincident -- and the tower have since moved the takeoff point for helicopters closer to the end ofthe runways where fixed-wing aircraft start their takeoffs. Because helicopters have blind spotsbelow and behind them, Dahlberg said, this will help pilots spot each other better. It also will lettower personnel see helicopters and planes for a longer period of time as they depart. The towerhas agreed to "stage" takeoffs differently, holding helicopters or planes, if necessary, to make surethey have each other in sight.

Reid-Hillview Airport -- built amid pastures, a golf course and an auto racing track as a privatefacility in 1939 -- is closely bordered now by shopping centers, schools and hundreds of houses.Because of its proximity to homes and schools, the airport -- now owned by Santa Clara County ­- has become a sore point with its neighbors. Over the years, dozens of aircraft have crashed at ornear the airport, but no one on the ground has ever been killed or injured.

One of the most serious accidents occurred in 1978 when a plane lost power on takeoff andcrashed into the parking lot of nearby Smith Elementary School and caught fire, killing threepassengers on board the plane. Some children were on the playground at the time and ranscreaming as the plane approached, but the pilot apparently nosed the plane into parked cars toavoid them.

In 1987, a light plane also lost power and crashed into a house in a nearby neighborhood, killingthree passengers and setting fire to the house.

In a 1972 mishap, a plane clipped the roof of Macy's department store in the Eastridge ShoppingCenter, and two or three others have crashed on the shopping center property. Close to runways

Eastridge, once the site of a golf course, was built in the 1970s only 1,300 feet from the airport'srunways.

The county has studied the feasibility of relocating the facility over the years, but an independentconsultant in 1994 said the airport has an accident rate half the national average for small fieldsand is less a risk to its neighbors than stores, factories and auto traffic.

Dahlberg, who has been a helicopter instructor with Nice Air since 1998, said there is one aspectof the flight patterns at Reid-Hillview that still concerns him. When aerobatic planes take off, hesaid, they often rise at such a steep angle that they are well above the airport by the time theyreach the middle of the runway. If a helicopter wants to turn to the east, he said, it crosses themiddle of the runways west to east from the takeoff point. Ordinarily, planes taking off andlanding are close to the ground at that point, and the helicopters pass high over them. But that'snot true of the aerobatics, he said, and he'd like to see them roll father down the runway beforethey make their steep climb.

But Dahlberg still considers Reid-Hillview an exemplary operation. "Given the number oftakeoffs and landings, that airport is the safest in the United States," he said.

Copyright (c) 2000 San Jose Mercury NewsRecord Number: 0001260082

NOTE: this is a copy of the news article as purchased from MercuryNews. Emphasis added byaiREFORM.