50924776 Minucher v CA Digest

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  • 7/28/2019 50924776 Minucher v CA Digest

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  • 7/28/2019 50924776 Minucher v CA Digest

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    diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, thecomplaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereignfrom suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state isbelieved to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription isnot accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, inwhose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem, non habetimperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assertjurisdiction over one another.

    22The implication, in broad terms, is

    that if the judgment against an official would require the state itselfto perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as theappropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed

    against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the stateitself, although it has not been formally impleaded.

    (T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply andmay not be invoked where the public official is being sued in hisprivate and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak ofprotection afforded the officers and agents of the government isremoved the moment they are sued in their individual capacity.This situation usually arises where the public official acts withoutauthority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in hispersonal private capacity for whatever damage he may havecaused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond thescope of his authority and jurisdiction."

    Indeed, a foreign agent, operating within a territory, canbe cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can beestablished that he is acting within the directives of the sendingstate. The consent of the host state is an indispensablerequirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.

    While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreementbetween the governments of the Philippines and of the UnitedStates (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillanceand related activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines),the consent orimpr imaturof the Philippine government to theactivities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency,however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere

    mentioned. The official exchanges of communication betweenagencies of the government of the two countries,certifications from officials of both the Philippine Departmentof Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well asthe participation of members of the Philippine NarcoticsCommand in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at theresidence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may beinadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter butthey give enough indication that the Philippine governmenthas given its impr imatur, if not consent, to the activitieswithin Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United StatesDrug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo hastasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliersand, after having ascertained the target, to inform local lawenforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In

    conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as theposeur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming aprincipal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzohardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his officialfunction or duties.

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr_142396_2003.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr_142396_2003.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr_142396_2003.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr_142396_2003.html#fnt22