5052863 Offshore Safety Case Trainingppt

Sreejith Offshore Training pack

One Day Offshore Safety Training

Pillai Sreejith


Introduction

Offshore Safety Case Training

[email protected]


•Major accidents do happen around the world, some of them recent, have caused us to ask if they can happen to us – and they certainly can!

•We need to ensure they do not happen to us by:

• Re-emphasising our safety management system;

• Updating our existing Field safety Case; and

• Ensuring you all know about it!!

Why this training?


What will we learn today?

• The difference between occupational/personal and process safety;

• What is a major accident;• What is and what is in an offshore Safety Case;• What are the safety barriers / controls/ systems/

Safety Critical Systems (SCE) that prevent major accidents;

• The part we all must play in preventing major accidents; and

• Test our understanding of what we have learned through Piper Alpha accident.


• Piper Alpha

• 1988 – Major fire and explosion

• 167 people died

• Caused by PTW failure, PFP flaws and layout issues

• Bombay High

• 2005 – MSV collision with platform and major fire

• 11 People died

• Caused by riser damage from MSV impact

• Texas City Refinery

• 2005 – petroleum distillate overflowed causing explosion & flash fire

• 14 People died

• Caused by maintenance & process start-up flaws

Major Accidents in Oil & Gas Industries


Recent Major Accidents in your offshore Field?

Please include details of major accidents (and near-misses) that occurred in your installation/s to tell the participants the need for them to be cautious. Include photographs if you have.


Major Modifications

• List down the major modifications (process / marine) that occurred in your offshore installation/s in the past 1 year to tell them that the risk profile has changed:– Examples:

• Flare system modifications• Addition of a hydrocarbon process equipment• Change in mooring system• Addition of gas compression facilities


What is a safety case?

• Operators of offshore installations want to be sure that their operations are safe and do not expose their people or their business to unacceptable levels of risk;

• Plant modifications, variations on operating conditions and new ownership mean that the risk picture is changing; and

• Regulators and other stakeholders ask you to justify the continuing operation of the installation through safety cases.


Corporate HSE Management System

Show your HSEMS through a flow chart or a diagram to explain how periodic risk assessment/s are done to update safety case, as part of global sustainability reporting / CSR.


Offshore Safety Case Update project

• Key steps involved:

• Offshore site visit (to assess the safety critical element / barrier performance);

• Risk Assessment (using realistic field inputs such as barrier performance to be used in QRA event gates in frequency analysis); and

• Safety Case update

http://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.thefinalsprint.com/images/2006/05/traffic%2520light.jpg&imgrefurl=http://vdillner-math.blogspot.com/&h=550&w=290&sz=73&hl=en&start=2&um=1&tbnid=RScOZ8Fukg0ZIM:&tbnh=133&tbnw=70&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dtraffic%2Blights%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DN


1 day Training Contents

• Difference between Occupational /personal and Process & Marine Safety;

• What is a major accident?; • Major Offshore accident case studies;

– Piper Alpha– Mumbai High Platform– BP Texas Refinery

• Potential Major accidents for offshore complex;• Offshore Safety Case;• Safety Barriers in the offshore complex / installation; and• Safety training assessment.


Breaks for the day

• 10.30 am: Tea / Coffee Break

• 12.30 to 1.30 pm: Lunch break

• 3.30 pm: Tea / Coffee Break

http://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://jkontherun.blogs.com/jkontherun/WindowsLiveWriter/coffee_man.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.jkontherun.com/coffee_break/&h=480&w=421&sz=5&hl=en&start=6&um=1&tbnid=giD4cD3Pf7g5JM:&tbnh=129&tbnw=113&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dcoffee%2Bbreak%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DN


Once the safety systems /barriers fail, there can be major

accidents!!!Only you can operate and

maintain safety systems without flaws.

Key Message

[email protected]


Session Break


Occupational /Personal, Marine and Process Hazards

[email protected]


Learning objectives•To understand major accidents;

•To understand the difference between occupational/personal, marine and process hazards;

• To understand the ‘Swiss Cheese’ accident causation model and ‘Bow Tie’ barrier concept;

• To learn the importance of barriers in controlling major accidents

and

• To appreciate the need to maintain the safety systems in order to control / mitigate major accidents.


Are these terms too obvious and more of a commonsense issue?

If so, why are we discussing this?

Discussion trigger: BP Texas findings by Mr. Baker panel.


Major Accident(UK HSE SC Regulations,2005 )

• A ‘Major Accident’ defined by UK HSE is:– A fire, explosion or the release of a dangerous substance

involving death or serious personal injury to persons on the installation or engaged in an activity or in connection with it;

– An event involving major damage to the structure of the installation or plant affixed thereto or any loss in the stability of the installation;

– The collision of a helicopter with the installation;– The failure of life support systems for diving operations in

connection with the installation; and– Any other event arising from a work activity involving death or

serious personal injury to five or more persons on the installation or engaged in an activity in connection with it.


Major AccidentsExamples

• Deadliest accident so far: 1988 Piper Alpha (167 fatalities);

• 2nd deadliest: 1980 Alexander L. Kielland Accommodation rig capsized during a storm (123 fatalities);

• 3rd deadliest: 1989 Seacrest drillship capsized during a typhoon (91 fatalities ); and

• 9th Deadliest: 2005 Mumbai High Platform fire (22 fatalities).


Potential Major Accidents in your Offshore Field

• Examples –please customize– Blowouts– Riser & Pipeline releases– Process Hydrocarbon Releases – Fire & Explosion– Ship Collision– Dropped Objects– Transportation Accidents– Helicopter crash– Projectile/Missile impact– Structural damage– Turret Failure– Cargo Tank explosion


Occupational Hazards

• Personal or Occupational Health and Safety Hazards– Can give rise to incidents or accidents that primarily affect

one individual worker for each occurrence

• Personnel injury from:– Slips, trips and falls;– Electrical shocks;– Adverse effects from high noise/heat/dust/fumes;– Minor cuts / bruises; and– Struck-by objects.

• Generally OH are avoided by wearing PPEs & following procedures


Occupational Accidents• Mainly those accidents that can be

controlled by the use of PPEs

Source courtesy: Internet

http://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.occupationalhealthsafety.ca/images/Occupational-Health-and-Safety-Act-bg.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.occupationalhealthsafety.ca/&h=282&w=425&sz=166&hl=en&start=19&um=1&tbnid=WhIGvJn2cxW3TM:&tbnh=84&tbnw=126&prev=/images%3Fq%3DOCCUPATIONAL%2BACCIDENTS%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DN

http://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.ccohs.ca/images/ppe021.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/safety_haz/landscaping/pesticides.html&h=378&w=319&sz=8&hl=en&start=7&um=1&tbnid=s4X_dbxa0lQj_M:&tbnh=122&tbnw=103&prev=/images%3Fq%3DPPE%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den

http://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.wildlandfire.com/pics/other/wear_ppe.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.wildlandfire.com/arc/2003b_feb.htm&h=414&w=300&sz=23&hl=en&start=6&um=1&tbnid=IwD5vH3fyJpu-M:&tbnh=125&tbnw=91&prev=/images%3Fq%3DPPE%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den


Process Safety & Marine Hazards

• Process and Marine Safety Hazards– Can give rise to major accidents that can have

catastrophic effects and can result in multiple injuries and fatalities, as well as substantial economic, property and environmental damage

• Examples of these are:– Fires / Explosions– Helicopter crash– Dropped objects damaging structure or FPSO hull– Un-ignited gas releases– Ship collisions– Riser / pipeline ruptures


Safety Performance OH & PSH

• Performance for occupational safety is measured through (eg.) lost time injuries (LTI); and

• Performance for process safety is measured process safety equipment performance, hydrocarbon releases, fires, etc.


Process Safety Accident

BP Texas City Refinery Fire and Explosion (15 killed, 180 injured)


Marine Accident

Ship collision in Japanese waters causing major damage(July 27, 2007)


Loss IcebergSource courtesy: Internet


Bow-tie Barrier ConceptEvents andEvents and

CircumstancesCircumstancesHarm to people and Harm to people and damage to assets damage to assets

or environmentor environment

HHAAZZAARRDD

CCOONNSSEEQQUUEENNCCEESS

BARRIERS

Major accidentMajor accident

Construction /Engineering activitiesMaintenance activitiesOperations activities



Barriers for Potential Major AccidentsTHREATS CONTROL &

PREVENTATIVE BARRIERSMITIGATIVE BARRIERS CONSEQUENCE

MAE

Instrumentation, i.e. TAHH / LALL /

LAHH / PALL / PAHH

Relief System (PSV)

Navigational Aids

Pedestal Cranes

Inert Gas System

Miscellaneous / Temporary Equipment

F & G System

F & G Detectors

ESD system

ESD Valves

Wellhead Isolation

Blowdown Valves

ESD Manual Pull Stations

HVAC

Manual Water Fire Fighting Equipment

Deluge System

Manual Foam Fire Fighting Equipment

Blowdown Valves


Firewalls

Firewater Pumps

Firewater Ring main

Gaseous Systems

Emergency Lighting

Emergency Power (UPS)

Internal Communications

& Alarms

External Communications

Helideck Crash Equipment

Miscellaneous Safety

Equipment

Safe Refuge (Muster Area)

Escape Routes

TEMPSC & Life rafts

Helicopter Facilities

Direct to Sea Equipment

Control

Detection

Mitigation

Emergency response

CMMS

PTW

PreventativeBlowout(Surface blowouts)

Riser Pipeline Releases

Process Hydrocarbon Releases

Ship Collision

Dropped Objects

Helicopter Crash

Projectile/missile Impacts

Structural Environmental events

Transportation Accidents

Major Potential Accidents

Turret failure

Cargo tank explosionsIgnition control

Audits

Inspections

Maintenance


Do you know where these safety barriers are in your installation/s?

• Fire walls (are they A or H or J type? What does these alphabets mean?; if there is A 60 fire wall, is this acceptable? Why?)

• Blast walls (are blast and fire walls same? How are their locations decided?)

• Flame / flash back arrestors

• ESD push buttons


Safety BarriersExplanation-Example 1

• Ignition Control– Hazardous Area Classification– Use of Ex type equipment (do you know how they are

designed? Why can’t they be designed as vapour / gas tight?)

– Flash back arrestors, spark arrestors– Static charge discharge control (bonding, when do

you install bonding? Why is this done?)– Lightning control (how do you control these hazards?)– Inert gas system for cargo tanks– Use of inert gas system to dilute hydrocarbon vapours

at vents


• What are the difference between Passive Fire Protection (PFP) & Active Fire Protection (AFP)?

• Examples of PFP?– Fire walls– In tumescent coatings (ESD valves?)– Heat shields on the escape routes?

• Examples of AFP?– Deluge– FM 200 Gaseous Fire Fighting system– Fire & Gas Detection system

Safety BarriersExplanation-Example 2


Fire walls, Blast walls, Heat Shields

Source courtesy: Internet sources

A 60 Firewall

J 45/ H60, 0.3 bar Blast wall

Blast wall in place Heat Shield




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Prevention barriers Mitigation barriers


Discuss

• For major accident control, which side of the bow tie should be strong? Left (prevention) or the right side (mitigation) ? Why?

Major Accident

Discussion trigger: Can a gas explosion be effectively mitigated prevented with water deluge?


Learning

• Major accidents;• Potential major accidents at your offshore

installation;• Difference between personal / occupational,

marine and process accidents;• Swiss Cheese & Bow Tie safety concepts; and• Importance of safety barriers in controlling major

accidents.

[email protected]


Session Break


Major Accidents in

your Offshore Field

[email protected]


Learning Objectives

• To learn about the major accidents that occurred in your offshore complex to understand ‘What went wrong?”; and

• To think about the potential barrier failures that might exist at offshore installations which could lead to potential major accidents.


Offshore Complex

• Show the field diagram

• Show the platforms / FPSOs and the interconnecting pipelines

• Include the major additions / modifications to highlight to the participants that the installation has changed over the years


Platform Accident Details

• Show the accident & near-miss trends (bar chart) and discuss cause breakdown (pie-chart)

• A graph that shows no particular trend (upward or downward) could mean:– The HSE is not under control;– The HSE performance / accident data collection /

analysis is not proper;– No one knows what will be the future HSE

performance is!


Major Accidents• Identify major accidents, hi-potential incidents, near-misses;

• Discuss each of the major cases from the detail reports to explain:– Causes– Consequences– Risk reduction recommendations– Implementation status– Any similar accidents occurred?

• If there are any photos of these accidents, show them.


CausesExamples

• Inadequate planning / organization;• Flaws in PTW procedures;• Written job procedure did not anticipate

contributing factors;• Failure to follow known job procedure (s);• Inadequate training;• Supervisor failure to identify unsafe condition;

and• Failure to communicate.


Learning

• If no concrete action is taken to rectify the cause of the incident permanently, it might lead to an accident next time round – History has proven this;

• Accidents could happen even with safety barriers in place;

• Personnel play an extremely important role in promoting safety – competency, experience and knowledge is important; and

• We need to ensure that the safety barriers are maintained so as to control / mitigate accidents.

[email protected]


Session Break


Potential Major Accident Events

at

Your Offshore Complex

[email protected]

In this presentation, the typical potential major accidents for FPSO / platform are included. This will require customisation in line with the field QRA results.


Learning Objectives

• To learn about the potential major accidents that can occur in offshore field and to understand the consequences;

• To be aware of the major risk contributors at offshore installations; and

• To be aware of the risk levels for various personnel at your offshore field.


Potential Major Accidents 1

Examples

1. Surface Blowout

2. Riser / Pipeline Releases

3. Process HC Releases –Fires / Explosions

4. Ship collisions

5. Dropped Objects

6. Transportation Accidents



Potential Major Accidents 2Examples

7. Helicopter crash

8. Projectile / Missile impact

9. Structural damage

10. Turret Failure

11. Cargo Tank Explosion



Risk Terminology

• Individual Risk (IR)

Individual Risk Per Annum is the frequency with which an individual may be expected to sustain fatal harm due to exposure to specific hazards in a year



ALARP Triangle



What does risk mean?



Essential data used in Quantitative Risk Assessment

(QRA)• Manning distribution

• Transportation details

• Heat & Material Balance diagram

• P&IDs

• PFDs

• General Arrangement / Layouts

• Design basis and safety philosophies


• Show the areas considered in the QRA

• Explain the manning distribution of various personnel categories in the areas

• Tell them the risks calculated is rather realistic since we have considered more facts

Offshore Installation Areas


Fires and Explosions

• Pool Fire

• Jet fire

• Vapour Cloud Explosion

• Flash Fire

Explain the causes and consequences of each type of fires including their impairment potential

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http://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.theage.com.au/ffximage/2007/08/31/GAS_narrowweb__300x374,0.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.theage.com.au/news/business/world-bank-calls-on-oil-producers-to-cut-50bn-gas-fire/2007/08/31/1188067369022.html&h=374&w=300&sz=18&hl=en&start=10&um=1&tbnid=QEBqKECag8DoMM:&tbnh=122&tbnw=98&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dgas%2Bfire%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den

http://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/pao/CEAInfo/Explosion%2520Photo.JPG&imgrefurl=http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/pao/CEAPhotos.aspx&h=1200&w=1600&sz=493&hl=en&start=7&um=1&tbnid=DXMUla_jaUDeRM:&tbnh=113&tbnw=150&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dexplosion%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den

http://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.nascoinc.com/standards/flash_fire/flash_fire.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.nascoinc.com/standards/flash_fire.htm&h=372&w=277&sz=64&hl=en&start=1&um=1&tbnid=jeybSYr3j5cSxM:&tbnh=122&tbnw=91&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dflash%2Bfire%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den


Impairment

• Discuss impingement and impairment from pool and jet fires

• Pool fire impingement on steel structures: – 10 minutes

• Jet fire impingement on steel structures: – 5 minutes

Courtesy: CMPT QRA Guidelines


Risk assessment Flow Chart

Sectionalisation: Review PFDs, UFDs & P&IDs to separate the process and utility system to various isolatable

sections.

HAZID: Identify potential hazards

Causal Analysis: Identify hazardous events associated with accidents

Risk reducing measures: Apply enhanced or additional control measures and mitigation

measures.

Frequency Analysis and Event Tree Analysis: Frequency of each accidental event (top

event) and branch probabilities are assigned to event tree and outcome event frequency are

estimated.

Consequence Modelling: Using the software. The physical effects and damages for each outcome

event are estimated

Impact Assessment: Analyse the fire and explosion impact to structures and

equipment.

•Risk AssessmentFatality Estimation: Determine the risk to personnel from each outcome event.•Risk Summation and Risk Ranking: Sum the risks to individual from each outcome events for hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon hazards and identify the dominant risk contributors.Risk Assessment: Compare the risk levels against Individual Risk Acceptability Criteria to determine whether additional measures are necessary to reduce risks to ALARP.


Potential Major Accidents

Offshore Field


Causes:

Failure of choke valve

Failure of X’Mas tree / DHSV / SCSSV

Presence of ignition sources

Consequences:

Jet Fire

Major asset damage

Multiple fatalities / injuries

MAE 1 Surface Blowout





Subsea blow out



Fire Contours

• Show the jet, pool fire contours superimposed on the offshore installation layout drawing to show them the potential effects.


Causes:

Failure of lifting equipment (overload / damaged lifting equipment)

Failure of crane equipment (overload, etc.)

Lifting without following procedures / controls

Consequences:

Asset damage (hull, equipment, platform, etc.)


MAE 5 Dropped Objects




Helicopter, boat, personnel transfers


ANOA FIELD


Risks from transportation


MAE 6 Transportation AccidentsCauses:

Mechanical failure of boats / helicopter/ flights

Extraneous weather conditions

Material defects of personal transfer baskets or associated lifting tackles

Consequences:

Asset damage (hull, equipment, platform, etc.)




•Protection from side & vertical impacts?

•Personnel falling from height due to giddiness, loss of grip, high wind, loss of balance, etc.

Personnel Basket Transfers

Is there an option?


MAE 7 Helicopter Crash

Causes:

Failure of helicopter (engine failure / extreme weather)

Failure of communication equipment

Fire / explosion in FPSO / Platform

Pilot error

Consequences:

Fire

Major asset / helicopter damage

Multiple fatalities / injuries There are hardly any known occurrences of Helicopter crashing into FPSO or platform





MAE 8 Projectiles / MissilesCauses:

Failure of equipment due to overpressure

Inadequate design

Missiles / projectiles from gas turbines and FPSO steam turbines

Consequences:

Asset damage (hull, equipment, etc.)






Causes:

Structural failures due to extreme weather

Corrosion

Inadequate design

Crane boom collision

Consequences:

Asset damage


MAE 9 Structural Events









MAE 10 Turret Failure



MAE 11 Cargo Tank Explosion

FPSO


Overall Risk for Offshore Complex

• Explain the Individual Risk (IR) for the various personnel categories;

• Explain the PLL (Potential Loss Of Life) values for the complex and various personnel categories;

• Discuss if the IR value is within the ALARP tolerable region;

• Explain the major risk contributors for the offshore complex;

• Explain what is base case IR, and ALARP IR cases (sensitivity cases); and

• Explain what is traffic light system and how is it used to determine Realistic Risk levels?

[email protected]


What is Traffic Light system?

Traffic Light system is used as an assessment tool by UK HSE, NOPSA, etc.



Traffic lights system and performance of safety systems

• Traffic light system was used to assess the performance of safety systems;

• The performance of safety systems were determined based on:– Critical maintenance test results;– Accidents / incidents;– Maintenance backlogs; and– Offshore audit findings.

How will the TL System used to calculate impairment / event frequencies in QRA?



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Safety Systems Performance

Traffic Light Interpretation

Tolerable


Earlier risk IR 1

Base case risk IR 2

Risk after Safety System performance Assessment IR 3

Potential residual risk after improvements IR 4


Learning

• Individual Risk for all offshore personnel are within the acceptable limits;

• Understanding potential major accidents for offshore installations (causes and consequences);

• Understanding the major risk contributors at offshore field; and

• Understanding the personnel risk levels for various categories.


Session Break


Offshore Safety Cases

[email protected]


Learning objectives

•To understand the objective of Safety Cases;

•To understand ‘The UK HSE Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005’;

•To understand the typical SC update triggers; and

•To know the Typical Safety Case contents.


Safety Case-Definition

“A documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a system is adequately safe for a given application in a given environment”

Safety Case exists for Nuclear, Offshore, Aviation, and Rail industries


Safety Case Origin(post 1988 Piper Alpha explosion)

“UK Offshore Operators, says Cullen, must adopt this new philosophy on safety, producing a ‘Safety Case'. This includes continuous hazard assessment over the plant's lifetime, fault tree analysis, which looks at all the ways an error could develop, and takes account of ways that 'human factors' contribute to disasters”


Safety Case Evolution Timeline

Forthwith: Immediate, at once

Lord Cullen recommended that the 4 (FEA, ESSA, EERA,SIGA) be carried out by the offshore operators immediately before the 1992 safety case regulation was released.


Why Offshore Safety Case?

• Operators of offshore installations want to be sure that their operations are safe and do not expose their people or their business to unacceptable levels of risk;

• Plant modifications, variations on operating conditions and new ownership mean that the risk picture is changing; and

• Regulators and other stakeholders ask you to justify the continuing operation of the installation through safety cases.

• Regulatory compliance is essential to your business


Safety Case

• First SC Regulations came into force in 1992;

• Cullen Forthwith studies:– A Fire Risk Analysis;– An assessment of the risk of ingress of smoke

or gas into the accommodation;– A review of the ability of emergency systems

to withstand severe accident conditions; and– An evacuation, escape and rescue analysis.


The UK HSE Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005

• Key changes introduced by the 2005 Regulations include:

-The requirement for duty holders to send an early design notification, instead of a design safety case, to HSE when establishing a new production installation; -Duty holders are required to carry out a thorough and fundamental review of their safety cases at least every five years, or as directed by HSE; -The present requirement to re-submit safety cases every three years has been removed (inspectors will be checking to see that safety cases are being kept up to date through inspection); -New duties require licensees to ensure anyone they appoint as an operator is capable of fulfilling their legal responsibilities for safety; -Combined operations safety cases have been replaced by notifications, which do not need HSE acceptance; and -The Offshore Installations (Safety Representatives and Safety Committees) Regulations have been amended to extend consultation with safety representatives to reviewing and revising a safety case, as well as preparing one.


Typical Contents of Safety Case

• Facility description

• HSE Management system

• Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) Summary

• Safety Critical elements and Performance Standards

• ALARP Demonstration

• Fitness to Operate


Safety Case Update TriggersExamples


Learning

• Origin and objectives of Safety Case;

• Piper Alpha Accident & Safety Case;

• ‘The UK HSE Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005;

• Typical SC contents; and

• Typical SC update triggers.


Session Break


Safety Barriers and their Role in Controlling Major accidents

[email protected]


Learning objectives

•To understand the critical role of safety barriers / safety systems in controlling major accidents using Bow-Tie diagram;•To understand safety barriers on offshore installations; •To appreciate the need to maintain the barriers through maintenance system, inspections, etc.; and•To identify and monitor performance of safety barriers through lead and lag indicators.


Bow Tie Diagram



Barriers for Potential Major AccidentsTHREATS CONTROL &


MAE


LAHH / PALL / PAHH

Relief System (PSV)

Navigational Aids

Pedestal Cranes

Inert Gas System


F & G System

F & G Detectors

ESD system

ESD Valves

Wellhead Isolation

Blowdown Valves


HVAC


Deluge System


Blowdown Valves


Firewalls

Firewater Pumps

Firewater Ring main

Gaseous Systems

Emergency Lighting



& Alarms




Equipment


Escape Routes

TEMPSC & Life rafts



Control

Detection

Mitigation

Emergency response

CMMS

PTW




Ship Collision

Dropped Objects

Helicopter Crash




Turret failures

Cargo tank explosions

Ignition control

Audits

Inspections


UK HSE KP 3 Inspection Results


Sreejith Offshore Training pack Source courtesy: Internet


What is wrong at present in oil & gas industry?

• Unacceptable level of process safety related dangerous occurrences especially in relation to loss of containment incidents;

• Major hazard industry measured safety performance using LTIs!!

• Critical systems deteriorate over time without warning until they fail catastrophically; and

• Audits tend to be too infrequent and workplace inspections focus on personal safety.


Process Safety Management System

An effective process safety management system measures performance

Key performance indicators must include appropriate indicators of process safety

performance



Permit-to-work

Inspection & Maintenance

Staff Competence

Operational Procedures

System defects

Lagging indicator

Leading indicator

Leading indicator

Lagging indicator

Lagging indicator

Lagging indicator

Leading indicator

Leading indicator

Accident Trajectory

Key Performance Indicators set to identify defects in safety systems



PR

OC

ES

S IN

STR

UM

EN

TA

TIO

N

IGN

ITIO

N C

ON

TR

OL

BLO

WD

OW

N &

RELI

EF

SYS

TEM

FIR

E &

GA

S D

ETEC

TIO

N

EM

ER

GEN

CY S

HU

TD

OW

N

AC

TIV

E F

IRE P

RO

TEC

TIO

N

PA

SS

IVE F

IRE P

RO

TEC

TIO

N

PROCESS HYDROCARBON RELEASES/FIRES/EXPLOSIONS Example

Hyd

ro C

arb

on

R

elea

ses

EX

PL

OS

ION

Main

ten

an

ce C

heck

s/te

stC

alib

rati

on

Loop

Ch

eck

sS

imu

lati

on

Au

dit

sM

OC

/EC

R

HA

CS

tati

c Ele

ctri

cA

ud

its

Loop

ch

eck

s fo

r B

DA

ud

its/

Insp

ect

ion

CFI

s on

Relie

f V

alv

es

Loop

Ch

eck

s

Dete

ctor

Calib

rati

on

s

Au

dit

sM

OC

/EC

R

CFT

on

ES

DV

Loop

Ch

eck

s

Au

dit

s/In

spect

ion

Fire

Dri

lls

Au

dit

s

CFT

on

Fir

e P

um

ps

& V

alv

es

Test

ing

of

foam

con

cen

trate

MO

C

Inte

gri

ty In

spect

ion

of

PFP

fire

walls

Au

dit

sM

OC

Pe

rfo

rma

nc

e I

nd

ica

tors

(Le

ad

ing

& l

ag

gin

g)


Dual Performance Assurance

Reactive Monitoring

Lagging Indicator:

Outcome Indicator

Active Monitoring

Leading Indicators:Process or

Input Indicators

Critical ProcessSafety

Risk ControlSystem

Dual Assurance - leading and lagging indicators measuring performance of each critical element of a Process Safety Management System



How effective are YOUR safety systems?

• Traffic light system was used to assess the performance of safety systems;

• Each of the safety systems were assessed based on:– Critical Maintenance Test (CMT) results;– Accidents / incidents;– Maintenance backlogs; and– Audit findings.


Acc

epta

ble

Partially degraded

N

ot

acce

pta

ble

Safety Systems Performance

Traffic Light Interpretation

Tolerable


Offshore Audit FindingsExamples

• H 60 fire walls penetrated to pass pipes and electrical conduits

• Fire water deluge not provided for critical hydrocarbon systems / valve clusters

• Flame Detectors obstructed with pipework

• Hazardous area Classification compromised

• Ex equipment maintenance flaws


Safety Barrier PerformanceTHREATS CONTROL &


MAE


LAHH / PALL / PAHH

Relief System (PSV)

Navigational Aids

Pedestal Cranes

Inert Gas System


F & G System

F & G Detectors

ESD system

ESD Valves

Wellhead Isolation

Blowdown Valves


HVAC


Deluge System


Blowdown Valves


Firewalls

Firewater Pumps

Firewater Ring main

Gaseous Systems

Emergency Lighting



& Alarms




Equipment


Escape Routes

TEMPSC & Life rafts



Control

Detection

Mitigation

Emergency response

CMMS

PTW




Ship Collision

Dropped Objects

Helicopter Crash




Turret failures

Cargo tank explosions

Ignition control

Audits

Inspections


Are The Barriers Being

Properly Maintained?

IDENTIFY Barriers;(SCEs)

Are They Suitable?

Maintenance Management

Major Hazard Analysis Performance

Indicators

Process Safety Management Major Hazard Analysis/Maintenance Loop



Learning

• Concept of Safety barriers in major accident control; and

• Role of offshore personnel in ensuring integrity of safety barriers by monitoring performance indicators; and

• Performance of safety systems to control major hazards cannot be monitored using LTIs which calls for a shift in focus.


Once the safety systems fail, there can be major accidents!!!

Only you can operate & maintain safety systems without flaws.

Key Message

[email protected]

Documents

5052863 Offshore Safety Case Trainingppt