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Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution by Martin KramerReview by: Fouad AjamiMiddle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1989), pp. 270-273Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283307 .

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270 MIDDLE ASTERNTUDIESShi'ism, Resistance and Revolution edited by MartinKramer.Boulder, CO:WestviewPress; London: Mansell PublishingLimited, 1987. Pp.324 + index.?27.50.Some fifteen years ago the Iranianpublicist Ali Shariati (d.1977) wrote ofShi'ism as a faith that had lost its earlyrebelliousspirit,thathad been strippedof that great act of negationthat lies at the root of its history. 'Red Shi'ism',the pamphleteerlamented, had changed to 'Black Shi'ism': the religion ofmartyrdom nd politicalrefusal had become the religionof mouming.It had allgone wrong,the pamphleteerwrote,with the Safavids who domesticatedShi'ismfrom the 'greatmosqueof the masses' to the 'Royal Mosque'.Of course it had not been that simple:Ali Shariatiwas not writinghistory:hewas a man with a politicalagenda,with a gift for the arrestingmetaphor.But theintervening earshave borneout the dramaof his imagery: he Shi'ism of politicalrestraintand political withdrawalhas throwncaution to the wind. In the land ofShariati'sbirth,and in otherMuslimrealms,we have beenwitnessing heaudacityandthe ordealof 'Red Shi'ism'. The rebellionhascome;Shariatis not hereto tellus what he thinks of the harvestof this politicallystridentShi'ism.PoliticalhistorianMartinKramerhas edited an excellentset of scholarlyessayson the phenomenonof radicalizedShi'ism. He has broughttogether 16 paperspresentedat a conferenceatTel Aviv University n Decemberof 1984.The essayscover Shi'ism's centerin Iran andrangeover Shia politics in Iraqandthe Gulf,Lebanon and Syria, and 'frontierShi'ism' in Afghanistan,Pakistanand India.The storyis carried orward rom Shi'ism's historicalbeginningsrightup to thepresent.And it is told by a groupof able and someverydistinguished uthorswhohavegivenus an admirable ccountof theplaceof the Shiain Islamicpoliticsandof Shi'ism's new sense of defiance.Cumulatively heessays assembledhere (and I will only pickandchooseamongthem in a briefreview) tell us of thepopularpassions,and the politicaltheoryatwork in the making of this newlyemancipatedShi'ism. But the millennium s notathand.Forthere s hereas well a recognitionof Shi'ism's limits,of the difficultywhich a minoritywithin the Muslimworldfaces in tryingto alter the politicalcourse of contemporary slam. Shia rebellions are not a new phenomenon nMuslimhistory; he Shiahave risenin rebellionbefore. But theirchallengesto theestablished order were crushed, historian BernardLewis reminds us in thevolume's opening essay, and ended in the 'suppressionof the rebellion, theextirpationof the terrorists,he deathor disappearance f the leader' (p.29). Orthe rebellionsknew a differentkind of fate, a differentsortof failure.ProfessorLewis writesthatthe rebelscameto powerandthen'carriedon withoutanygreatsignificantchangeson the pointswhichmattered'.It is this scriptwrittenby ProfessorLewis whichmay lie in storefor the mostrecentShia challenge.Out of the political stormof recentyears,this revoltmaytumout to have beenan affair of state in Iranand a hopelesspolitical oumey forotherShia in otherMuslimrealms.Indeed the burdenof Shi'ism's Iranianbasemay yet prove to be very heavy indeed. Iran gave this latest Shia outburstapolitical center - a jurist who served like some Pied Piper for the oppressed,politicalmoney, some courage to frightenedcommunitieson the fringeof powerin Sunni-ruledtates.ButIranmayhave 'Persianized' heShiaeverywhere: t mayhave loadedthemwith a strongassociationwith Iran n politicalorderswhere thecomununitieshatrule andbelong are so eagerto exclude andto discriminate.Shi'ismmaymergewithraisond'tat in Iran,be madeto buttresst;threeessayson domestic and foreign politics of Iranby Shaul Bakhash,the anthropologist

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BOOKREVIEWS 271MichaelFischer,and ShahramChubinwould appear o suggest that this kind ofmutation s alreadyin the works. The mujtahidcan become a rulingjurist, theulama can lay claim to the power and resourcesof a large state. But there isnothinglike this in the cardsfor other Shia communitieswhereShi'ism is eitherthe faith of a hounded minority (think of Saudi Arabia or of Pakistan andAfghanistan)or the heritageof a 'compact'and disadvantaged ommunity n aland of other faiths and sects (thinkof Lebanonand Iraq).Iranmay supplytheShia elsewhere with courage;but Irancan also leadthemastray.On the way to a politics of redemptionmen can gambleandlose: this was thefate of IraqiShi'ism,a tale of politicaldispossessionanddisappointmentarratedby ProfessorElie Kedourie.If Shi'ism was presumablyo have a centerthatcouldrivalIran,Iraqwas the sole candidate. raqhad thecentersof religiouslearning nKarbala,Najaf, Kazimayn,with their clerical class. Here the mujtahidswieldedpower, and developed an autonomousbase of political authority.All sorts ofcurrentsof both Persian and Ottomanpolitics of the late 1800s and early 1900smadetheirpresencefelt in the shrinecities of Iraq: he tobaccoprotestsof Persiaof the 1890s, the constitutional evolution n Persia n 1906, and theagitation hatfollowed the collapse of Ottomanauthorityn the First WorldWarand the Britishoccupationof Iraq.A quarter-centuryf political involvementhadgiven the Shiadivines a taste of politicalpower. And in the crucialyearsof 1918 through hecreationof the Kingdomof Iraqin 1921, the mujtahidswere in the forefrontofpoliticalactivism.The mujtahids in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karabala ook the lead inpushingfor independenceduringplebiscitesheld by the Britishin 1918-19. Thedivines were convincedthatthe force of Shianumberswouldprevailin the newindependentpolity. And in the summerof 1920, during he 'greatrevolt' againstthe British,the ulama gave the rebellion their sanction and approval.But fromthe perspectiveof the divines, the rebellion was a great failure. In ProfessorKedourie's summation: The rebellion was a throw of the dice that they [themujtahidsand the Shia leaders]lost, and the consequencesof thatfailed gamblehave dogged the Shiites of Iraqever since' (p.149). Undertfiemonarchyandtheofficer-led regimes that inheritedthe monarchy in 1958, Sunni notables andofficers wielded power in Iraq.And the questionsof the Shia in Iraqbecame apoliticaltaboo,just a questionof politicalsectarianism,a'ifiyya, hatthe politicalclass was determined o obliterate.Young Shi'is made their way to the political arena,particularlyn the yearsbetween 1945 and 1958, butthey did so, ProfessorKedourieobserves,as 'menofthe regime and of its political class'. The officer-led regimes visited greaterpolitical ruinuponthe Shiathandid the monarchy.The Shiareligiousinstitutionswere 'broughtundercentralcontrol, and suspecteddisaffectionwas put downwith a heavyhand'.Withthe warbetweenIranandIraq, he crueldilemmaof theIraqiShia was thereto see: The Shi'is of Iraq foundthemselvescitizens of a statelevyingwaron theirco-religionistsanddemandinghesacrificeof theirblood in itscause' (p.155). Khomeini summonedthem to the just rule of the jurist; andSaddamHusseintook themon a crusade n defense of orthodoxyand 'Arabism':is it any wonderthatearlierdivines once frownedon politics as compromiseandbetrayal? How muchbetterwouldhave beenSukut,'ProfessorKedourieswrites,'the silence earlierdivines traditionally ecommended o believers!'The choice between yesterday'ssukutand today's revolutionary emptationsconfrontsthe cautious communities in Bahrain,Kuwait,and Saudi Arabia.AsJosephKostinerably demonstrates n a chapteron the Gulf, the Shia therehadbeen on the marginsof political life; they had theirresentments,but these had

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272 MIDDLE ASTERNTUDIESnever translated nto open rebellions. Men knew thatpoliticalpower lay in thehands of others,so they channelled heirenergiesinto safe endeavors: ommerceand trade,the expandingopportuntiesn the oil industry.Currentsborneby thewindtaught he Shia in the Gulf to refrain romplayingwith fire. Andthe rulingdynastiesmaintained ome kind of balance which shut out the Shia frompoliticalpowerwhile providingthem with a 'relativelystableandprotectedway of life'.This precarious alancewasblownaway- alongwithso muchelse - by thevastpoliticaland economicchangesof the 1970s. There was Iran's call to revolt;butthere were, too, things internal to the states of the Gulf. There were theresentments f those who werelosing out in theboom,and the arrogance f thosewho could now entertainall kinds of grandiose llusions about theirprerogatives.The spirit of asabiyyahad never been vanquished,and the new scrambleforwealth, as well as the fight between Araband Persianin the Gulf, broughttheasabiyya o the fore and lent it a new ferocity.The shia rebellion ntersectedwithand fed a 'sunni backlash', Dr Kostiner observes. Ayatollah Khomeini hadsummonedmen to an Islamic rebellion.But he hadto settleforsomethingentirelydifferent,a Shiafollowing at odds witha rekindled ense of Sunniresentment. nthe Gulf men took the new rebellion- its discourse,its passion, its grandioseclaims that it is a revoltof the disadvantaged andturned t into somethingveryold and familiar: he tribalfeud, the passionof the sect, the primacyof the clan.And this was a battle the Shia could not win.It was at some geographic emove fromIran, n Lebanon,wherethe Shia revoltfound some fertile soil. Though there, too, as three able and solid essays byJoseph Olmert, AugustusRichardNorton and Clinton Bailey demonstrate, heprospectsfor the Shia are not as brightas the true believersthoughtonly a fewyearsago. In the Lebanesesetting sketchedout by Olmert,Nortonand Bailey,the Shia of Jabal Amil and the Biaq Valley and GreaterBeirut have shakenoff the quiescenceof timespast. In partthe Shia world in Lebanonwas re-madeby urbanization.Then came Iran's example after a bitter decade of Israeli-Palestinianwarin the Southernpartof the country.The Shia were the country'slargestdemographicgroup; in the aftermathof Israel'sdestructionof the PLOsanctuary n Lebanon,they seemed readyto inheritLebanon'srubble.But thestorydid nothavesuch a happyending forthem:therewere deepsplitswithintheShia communityto begin with, splits betweenthose who clung to the Lebanesestate,wantedprideof place in Lebanon'spoliticalsystemandthose who ralliedtoIran'scause andwho saw themselvesandtheirwork as extensions of the Iranianrevolution. And there were other factors to contend with: the presence inLebanon'spolitics of both Syria and Israel, the will and the fears of the othercommunitiesof Lebanon,and the resurgenceof the Palestiniansposing as thepraetorian uardfor the Sunnicommunitiesof West Beirutand Sidon.The Shia of Lebanonhave discarded heir old quietism, but there is no Shiadominion n Lebanon'sfuture andno end in sight to the politics of banditryandhate. Whatis clear is thatthe Shia of Lebanon'scountrysidearenow present nforcein thepoliticsof Beirut: heyhavebrokenwith the insularity f theirvillagesandwalkedinto the politics of a contestedcity.In the neighboringSyrian state, as well, there has been anotherdramaticmigration rom the (heterodox)countryside o the city. The childrenof the Alawicountrysidehave come to Damascus and they are there as its militarymasters.MartinKramer's ssay 'Syria'sAlawis andShi'ism' is anilluminatingook at howthis came to pass, and an intriguinganalysis of the relationshipbetween theAlawis of SyriaandTwelverShi'ism.Like the TwelverShia in Lebanon,the Alawis were a communityshutout of

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BOOKREVIEWS 273political power, 'divided and unassimilated'.There emancipationwas, for themost part, the conquest of political power throughthe army. But there wasanotherpartto the Alawi rise to power:their search or religiouslegitimacy.Andthis is where Dr Kramer'snarrative s particularly ompelling.Stitchingtogethervariousmemoirsand fragmentarybits of evidence, Kramershows how Alawismaking heirway out of rurual nsularity oughtreligious egitimacyby embracing(at least in public)TwelverShiajurisprudence.t was a marriageof convenience,two communities of marginalitybrought together in their struggle with thehegemonyof orthodox Sunni)Islamin Biladal Sham.The Frenchhadgiven theAlawis a Twelver Shia cover, in the 1920s, by establishing ndependentAlawicourtsandclaimingthat these courtswould rule in accordwithTwelverShi'ism.Naturallythe Alawis kept to themselves, ruled in accord with Alawi custom.With independence, he Alawis soughtan accordwith the Sunni authoritiesofDamascusand hadto settle for afatwa attesting o theirbeingMuslimsfromHajjAminal-Husayni n Jerusalem.By the early 1970s, after the Alawi conquestof politicalpower and the Sunnirejection of Alawi dominion,the matter of Alawi recognitionwould become athornypolitical issue. This time, the Alawis would again,as in the 1920s, seek aShia cover. The solution was to be providedby the Shia political divine thenascendant n Lebanon,ImanMusaal Sadr: The regimeof Hafizal-Asedneededquick religious legitimacy; the Shi'is of Lebanon,Musa al Sadr had decided,needed a powerful patron. Interestsbusily converged from every direction'.(p.247). Several years later the Iranianrevolutionfound an ally of sorts in theSyrianregime. The star of Twelver Shi'ism had 'risen in Iran and Lebanon'.Meanwhile he Alawis continueto straddle he fence: they are,alternately, itherdefendersof orthodox Islam and the besieged 'Arab order' or, like the Shia,heterodoxrebels,themselvespersecutedstep-children f the Arabworld.The Jurisprudenceof Shi'ism, and more importantly, ts temperamentandpsyche weremoldedby persecutionandmarginality.Shi'ism was nurturedn theshadows of power. Save for that 'Shia century' (930s until 1050s) where Shiathemespermeatedhe elite cultureof Islam,Shi'ismhasbeenthefaithof men andcommunitieswho got along without exercising power, who developed a keensense of wherethey lived and of the groundon which they stood. Only in IranwouldShi'ism be the faithof a majority,andonly therewouldthe clericalestatefinallyput forth a notionthatclericshave a rightto rule.TodayIranproposesitstemperament ndits jurisprudence s a guidefor Shiain otherrealms.Inplace ofthe caution of these communities, the Iraniantribunes now urge unbridledactivism; where men once let ambiguitysoften the hard edges of social andpoliticallife, the truebelieversnow dismiss ambiguityas cowardiceor worse.Led by the custodiansof the Iranianstate, the Shia upstartsof Islam haveattacked he citadelsof orthodoxyand of the statusquo. The attackers peakthelanguageof redemptionanddeliverance.But at its core theirrebellion s madeofwrathandresentments, herageof the excluded,and,of course,an Iranianbid forprimacy. For their part the defendersspeak of order,of the stricturesof theSunna,of the 'wholeness' and 'purity' of things Arab. And at its core, theirdefense is about some very old and familiarthings:the defense of privilege,theinability o take in othersbeyondone's clan andsect, the hatredandsuspicionofmen who partakeof other customs and doctrine.Can anythingreally positiveemergeout of the feud andthe carnage?

FouAD AJAMI