42 Years of Occupation

!e Civic Coalition for DefendingPalestinians’ Rights in Jerusalem

YEARS OF

O C C U P A T I O N

J e r u s a l e m F i l e

December 2009

!e Civic Coalition for Defending Palestinians Rights in Jerusalem!e Civic Coalition for Defending the Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem (!e Civic Coalition) is a non-governmental and non-pro"t coalition of institutions, societies, associations and individuals dedicated to the protection and promotion of Palestinian rights in Jerusalem.

Vision: To preserve the Palestinians presence in Jerusalem and ensure the Palestinian population is able to e#ectively realize and exercise their fundamental human rights.

Mission: Mobilize e#orts, capacities and resources to protect and promote the political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people in Jerusalem on the basis of international human rights and humanitarian law.

Objectives:Promote greater awareness amongst the Palestinian population of Jerusalem of their fundamental 1. human rights as enshrined under international human rights and humanitarian law.

Coordinate and facilitate advocacy e#orts on both individual and collective human rights 2. issues of the Palestinian people in Jerusalem.

Provide legal services to the Palestinians in Jerusalem. 3.

Strengthen the organizational capacity of the Civic Coalition and its members to enable the 4. realization of the Civic Coalitions’ vision and objectives.

Civic Coalition Programs:!e monitoring and documentation of violations of international human rights and 1. humanitarian law within Jerusalem.Awareness raising program.2. National and international legal advocacy. 3. Legal Aid clinic and legal services for Palestinian Jerusalemites 4. Capacity building workshops for human rights organizations in Jerusalem.5. Development and operation of a database on human rights violations and statistics in 6. Jerusalem.

Acknowledgments !e Civic Coalition for Defending Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem would like to thank the individual authors, researchers, and member organizations of the Coalition for making the present study possible. !e Coalition thanks Zakaria Odeh, Nathan Derejko, and Karen Sanchez for their tireless editing and insightful comments. !e views expressed here are attributed exclusively to the authors.

!e Civic Coalition would like to thank the Norwegian Representative O$ce for generously funding the development of this publication and the Norwegian People’s Aid for funding the design and printing.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .....................................................................................................................................................................................................5

Map of Jerusalem Municipality.......................................................................................................................................................8

Map of Occupied East Jerusalem ...................................................................................................................................................9

Map of the Annexation Wall in occupied East Jerusalem .....................................................................................10

Zoning Map of Occupied East Jerusalem ...........................................................................................................................11

CHAPTER ONELegal Status of the Population of East Jerusalem

since 1967 and the Implications of Israeli Annexation on their Civil and Social Rights ........13Advocate Usama Halabi (LL.M)

CHAPTER TWOLand Con"scation and Settlement Construction In Occupied East Jerusalem ................................41

Khalil Tufakji

CHAPTER THREEForced Displacement Israeli Violations of Palestinians’ Rights to

Residency in Jerusalem ........................................................................................................................................................................69

Dr. Nizar Ayyoub

CHAPTER FOUR“Legalizing demolition… Illegalizing construction”Israeli Occupation Authorities Campaign Against Palestinian Property in Jerusalem ..............95

Yaqoub Odeh

CHAPTER FIVEEducation in Jerusalem: Reality and Challenges ......................................................................................................109

Samir Jibril

CHAPTER SIX!e Minatory Chick Points and the Annexation Wall ........................................................................................121

Na’ila Jweiles and Azzam Abul-Su’ood

CHAPTER SEVEN!e Annexation Wall and International Law ...............................................................................................................139

Nasser Arayes

5INTRODUCTION

Introduction

!e Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem is now in its 42nd year, and counting. !is "gure represents more than double the amount of years that Israel, as a nation state, has existed without being an occupying force in the Palestinian territories. Since 1967, Israel has imposed a military and administrative occupation on the Palestinian people and has sought to annex, by military force, the area in and around East Jerusalem. In fact, the international community regards this annexation as unlawful and has refused to accept Israel’s attempt to unify Jerusalem as it contradict international law and various Security Council resolutions. In particular, resolution 478 speci"cally declares this annexation a violation of international law and calls on all member states to accept the council’s decision to not recognize actions by Israel that ‘seek to alter the character and status of Jerusalem’.

Despite its illegality, Israel has since 1967 imposed its own laws and urban planning policies in East Jerusalem, forcefully integrating and controlling East Jerusalem and its Palestinian inhabitants. However, given the demographic reality of a 35% Palestinian population in a city envisioned by Israel as a ‘united Jewish capital’, Israel has felt the need to follow a policies which aim to minimize and dominate the Palestinian population of Jerusalem, while at the same time annexing as much land as possible. In realization of this goal, Israel has adopted policies which grossly violate the Palestinians’ basic human rights and dignity as articulated by various international legal instruments of which Israel is party.

!e arduous 42 years of occupation have brought signi"cant hardship and adversity to the Palestinian people, as it has impacted every sector and tainted every aspect of day-to-day living. !is report aims to expose these policies and their impact on the community and draw attention to the injustice that continues everyday the occupation ensues. !is is done by providing a thorough analysis by experts on distinct but interrelated policies such as: land con"scation, the e#ects of the Annexation Wall, residency rights, forced displacement and home demolitions, and settlement building, just to name a few.

!e facts and "gures provided in this report involve recent statistics and data collected on the population of East Jerusalem. Every e#ort has been made to provide the most up-to-date and accurate information. However, it must be noted that data collection in East Jerusalem is di$cult, and sometimes impossible, given the realities of the Israeli occupation. !e Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics is impeded from collecting data on East Jerusalem, and the Israeli authorities do not reveal data they do collect for public use. While the Coalition stands behind the accuracy of the information, small (and infrequent) discrepancy in the data is often the result of the various di$culties organizations and academics face in collecting information.

It is the Civic Coalition’s hope that by making this information available and providing detailed analysis of these policies, governments, civil society, academics, and the international community will increase their awareness regarding the unlawful discrimination and treatment against the Palestinians, and take steps to enable the Palestinian people to put an end to the illegitimate occupation. In drafting these reports, attention has been paid to highlighting speci"cally where Israel’s policies and actions deviate from international law (often signi"cantly), and Israel’s commitments on the world stage to uphold the rule of law. Not only does the data reported indicate a marked departure from those international commitments but also demonstrates a clear disregard for customary international law, and international humanitarian law. As mentioned

6

above, despite the fact that the annexation of East Jerusalem is itself illegal under international law, Israel further compounds the illegitimacy of the annexation by undertaking actions on the ground which further violate the responsibilities and obligations of an occupying power as articulated by the Fourth Geneva Convention. Such actions include the demolition of Palestinian homes, the building of settlements for the sole use of the occupiers’ civilian population, and the building of the Annexation Wall well within the boundaries of East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Much of the report has been framed in legal and economic language in order that the audience may take notice of the violations and be ready to put pressure in the speci"c areas where it will be needed in order to bring about change and peace in this con%ict. While it is true that this language is a necessary and instrumental component in the realization of human rights, it is important to remember that at the forefront of the facts and "gures stands the human component and su#ering caused directly by the illegal occupation. Behind every action and policy deemed unlawful stands a fragmented family waiting to be reunited, or displaced from their home. Behind the numbers indicating economic decline due to the Annexation Wall stands a failed family business and along with it the hopes of a generation to provide a better life for their children. !e deprivation of human dignity of the Palestinian people is the core of the occupation itself and in e#ect every policy and state action works towards this deprivation.

!is report highlights these elements to remind the readers of their shared responsibility to ensure that people can indeed live in dignity, free from state imposed discrimination and harassment. !e recommendations included in the report serve as a call to anyone who truly has an interest in human rights and dignity of the person. Further, it hopes to encourage the international community to take up its obligation to hold states accountable for their actions, to take steps to foster peace, and start to make good on its promise that the world will ‘never again’ sit by as a people su#er gross human rights violations at the hands of a state.

In “!e Legal Status of the Population of East Jerusalem since 1967” Advocate Usama Halabi provides a comprehensive analysis of the consequences of both Israeli legislation and the judicial system on the legal status and the rights a#orded to the Palestinian residents of occupied East Jerusalem. Halabi explores the scope and application of the 1952 Citizenship law and the 1952 Entry into Israel Law by carefully explaining the accompanying rights and duties of “residency” versus “citizenship” in occupied East Jerusalem.

Khalil Tufakji provides a detailed historical and contemporary analysis of the Israeli occupation authorities settlement enterprise throughout occupied East Jerusalem in his essay “Land Con"scation and Settlement Construction”. With re"ned detail, Tufakji explains the process of land con"scation, initial settlement development and continued settlement expansion within occupied East Jerusalem. Tufakji also provides invaluable statistics on the number of dunums of land con"scated from Palestinian residents, as well as the number of settlements and constituent number of residential units within each settlement.

In Yaqoub Odeh’s “Legalizing demolition… Illegalizing construction” a detailed analysis of the Israeli occupation authorities policy of “judicial” and “administrative” house demolitions throughout occupied East Jerusalem is provided. Odeh’s elucidating analysis of the phenomenon of so-called “unlicensed construction” reveals the impetus driving the acute housing de"ciency currently facing the Palestinian residents of occupied East Jerusalem. Odeh also reveals disconcerting insight on the building permit application process that Palestinian residents of occupied East Jerusalem are subjected to in order to secure a building permit for licensed construction.

7INTRODUCTION

In “Forced Displacement and Ethnic Cleansing: Israel’s Violations of the Palestinians’ Rights to Residency in Jerusalem”, Dr. Nizar Ayyoub explores the legal mechanisms employed by the Israeli occupation authorities to deprive Palestinians of the right to residency in occupied East Jerusalem. !roughout the course of his analysis, Ayyoub provides invaluable insight on the ‘Nationality and Entry to Israel Law’ of 2003, the prohibition on family uni"cation, and the cancellation of residency rights. Ayyoub concludes with a legal analysis of the consequences of these policies to which he "nds amount to the forcible displacement and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian population of occupied East Jerusalem.

In “Education in Jerusalem: Current Situation and Future Challenges in the Absence of a Uni"ed Educational Authority” Samir Jibril, Director of Education Department for the Palestinian Authority in occupied East Jerusalem, explains the four distinct authorities that supervise and regulate education within occupied East Jerusalem. Jibril provides a detailed analysis of both the characteristics and shortcomings of the Islamic Waqf schools a$liated with the Palestinian Authority, the Municipal Schools operated by the Israeli Municipality, the Private Sector schools and the schools funded and operated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. Jibril provides a much needed analysis of the challenges stemming from the absence of a uni"ed authority for education in occupied East Jerusalem and proposes re"ned solutions to these current challenges.

In “!e E#ects of the Annexation Wall on the Economy in East Jerusalem” Na’ila Jweiles and Azzam Abul-Su’ood provide a detailed analysis on the various economic sectors within occupied East Jerusalem including commerce, retail/wholesale, industry, investment, employment and tourism. Jweiles and Abul-Su’ood explore the prospects of occupied East Jerusalem’s ability to cope with the current economic situation resulting from the construction of the Annexation Wall, and o#er possible solutions to the current economic reality of occupied East Jerusalem. !e Statistical analysis within this study provides grim insight to the economic future of occupied East Jerusalem.

In “!e Annexation Wall and International Law” Nasser Arayes pursues an in-depth legal analysis of Isarel’s Annexation Wall from within the framework of public international law, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law. Arayes begins with an examination of the legal framework applicable to the occupied Palestinian territory, and from there determines both the civil and criminal liability of Israel, as an Occupying Power. Arayes continues to provide a detailed analysis of the legal obligations of UN Member States, the High Contracting Parties to the Four Geneva Convention, and the UN Security Council and General Assembly as international bodies responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. In light of Israel’s continued non-compliance with the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, Arayes provides a series of legal recourses and recommendations to confront Israel’s disregard for International law.

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9INTRODUCTION

10

11INTRODUCTION

Legal Status of the Population of East Jerusalem since 1967 and the Implications

of Israeli Annexation on their Civil and Social Rights[1]

[1] !is paper is based mainly on Chapter Four of my book: !e Legal Status of Jerusalem City and Its Arab Population, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1997, (Arabic), and “Stage Five” of my study: Israeli Laws and Judicial System as Tools for Accomplishing Political Objectives, published by the Civic Coalition for Defending the Palestinians’ Rights in Jerusalem, July 2007, as well as on a speech delivered in a press conference held by the Civic Coalition at the Ambassador Hotel in Jerusalem on 20 March 2008. Other published relevant information not contained in the above three sources were also added.

CHAPTER ONE

13

15CHAPTER ONELegal status of the Population of East Jerusalem since 1967

Legal status of the Population of East Jerusalem since 1967 and the Implications of Israeli Annexation on their Civil and Social Rights[2]

Advocate Usama Halabi (LL.M)1

1. Introduction Israel occupied East Jerusalem by means of force in June 1967. Hence, the relation between Israel as the occupying Power and the residents of occupied Jerusalem is supposed to be governed by the rules and provisions of the international law relevant to military occupation, namely International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and its major component in this regard, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, as well as the Hague Regulations attached to the Hague Convention of 1907. Under the relevant IHL, there is no di#erence between the status of East Jerusalem and that of the West Bank and Gaza Strip: all have become occupied territories following the war of June 1967. Having rati"ed the Fourth Geneva Convention, as the Occupying Power, Israel has the duty to respect and ensure the rights of Jerusalem’s population as ”protected civilians”. International law allows for derogation from certain obligations only as far as is absolutely necessary to ensure the occupier’s ability to carry out its obligations towards the occupied Palestinian population on one side, and to preserve the safety of its troops and satisfy its security needs on the other. Moreover, Israel as the Occupying Power is obligated to respect the laws in force in the occupied territory as long as there is no “absolute deterrence” inhibiting this[3].

International humanitarian law unequivocally prohibits Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and the application of Israeli laws, administration and jurisdiction to the occupied city[4]. However, Israel has disregarded its obligations under IHL, since 1967 and has dealt with Jerusalem di#erently from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. From the outset of the occupation, Israel has attempted to annex East Jerusalem to create a “complete and united” Capital of Israel, thus imposing Israeli law in the occupied city and making it applicable to residents of occupied Jerusalem. !is paper addresses the repercussions of this decision on the legal status of the residents of Jerusalem and on their civil, political and social rights, and explains the di#erence between “citizenship” and “permanent residency” according to the Israeli law currently in force in Jerusalem. Further, the paper discusses

[2] !is paper is based mainly on Chapter Four of my book: !e Legal Status of Jerusalem City and Its Arab Population, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1997, (Arabic), and “Stage Five” of my study: Israeli Laws and Judicial System as Tools for Accomplishing Political Objectives, published by the Civic Coalition for Defending the Palestinians’ Rights in Jerusalem, July 2007, as well as on a speech delivered in a press conference held by the Civic Coalition at the Ambassador Hotel in Jerusalem on 20 March 2008. Other published relevant information not contained in the above three sources were also added.[3] Article 43 of the Hague Regulations attached to the Hague Convention of 1907.[4] Usama Halabi, !e Legal Status of Jerusalem and Its Arab Population, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1997, pp. 47-60 and references cited in. See also: John Quigley, “Old Jerusalem Whose to Govern”, Denver J.Int’t L& Policy, Vol. 20,No1, Fall 1990,p. 145, 160.

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di#erent continuous attempts by Israel to isolate the City of the West Bank and to weaken its Palestinian population on the one hand, and to strengthen the Jewish presence, on the other.

Diagram 1 : !e creation of the Israeli legal framework for annexation – June 1967

2. Permanent Residency vs. Citizenship:Despite the defacto annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel, the status of the population of East Jerusalem was not changed to allow them to become citizens of the State to which their city was annexed. !e Israeli government allowed the population to keep holding their Jordanian passports and decided, following a census, to grant them Israeli ID cards to indicate their status as ‘permanent residents’ in Israel. In order to explain the legal and practical di#erences between citizenship and residency in Israel and their factual outcomes and repercussions on the lives and rights of Palestinian Jerusalemites, we will elaborate on the relevant Israeli laws and regulations, as well as decisions made by the Israeli High Court.

a. !e 1952 Citizenship Law[5]

!is law de"nes the conditions in order to obtain and forfeit Israeli citizenship. One can obtain Israeli citizenship by any of the following means: First, based on the “right to return” (article 2); second, based on residency in Israel (articles 3 and 3a); third, based on birth in Israel (article 4); fourth, birth and residency in Israel (article 4a); "fth, naturalization (articles 5-8); and sixth, based on the grant of citizenship by the interior minister in speci"c cases (article 9).

[5] Published in the Compilation of Israel’s Laws, no.95, 1952, p. 146.


!e “right to return” is limited to Jews or members of their families (spouses, children, or children-in-law) only. When the law was enacted on 1 April 1952 a combination of the following conditions was required in order for residency in Israel to lead to citizenship:

!e concerned person have resided in Palestine prior to the establishment of the State of 1. Israel and holding a Palestinian passport or a certi"cate of Palestinian nationality.

S/he should be registered as of 1 May 1952 as a resident in the Israeli Population’s Registry.2.

S/he was living in Israel as of the date, when the law entered into force, i.e., on 14 July 1952.3.

S/he has been living in Israel, or in an area that has become part thereof after it was 4. established, or has entered Israel legally in the period between the establishment of the State of Israel (15 May 1948) and the date when the law entered into force (14 July 1952).

Since the above mentioned conditions, particularly the fourth one, have prevented a signi"cant portion of the Palestinian population in Israel from obtaining Israeli citizenship, the Law was amended in 1980 and Article 3(a) was added, stipulating that "ve conditions should be ful"lled in order for the concerned person to obtain Israeli citizenship based on hi/her residency in Israel:

S/he should not have obtained Israeli citizenship according to another article in the law.1.

S/he has been a national of Palestine – the Land of Israel prior to the establishment of the 2. State of Israel.

S/he was living in Israel and registered in the Population’s Registry on 14 July 1952 (date, 3. when the Citizenship Law entered into force).

S/he was living in Israel and registered in the Population Registry on the date when the 4. law was amended.

S/he is not a national of any of states identi"ed in Article 2(a) of the Prevention of 5. In"ltration Law (o#ences and jurisdiction) of 1954, which are: Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Yemen, and of “any part of the Land of Israel outside the boundaries of the State of Israel”, i.e., the West Bank and Gaza Strip[6].

!ese "ve conditions need to be present together in any Palestinian born prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in order to be eligible for Israeli citizenship. For those Palestinians born after its establishment; they should be an o#spring of a person that meets the "rst three conditions[7]. !ese conditions, however, prevent Palestinian residents of Jerusalem from obtaining Israeli citizenship on the basis of their ‘residency status’, since their ‘residency’ in Israel started on June 1967 following the occupation of Jerusalem and Israel’s decision to apply its laws, jurisdiction and administration to the City and to grant its residents, covered by the census, Israeli ID cards[8].

[6] Article 3A, Paragraph (a)(1)-(5) of the Citizenship Law.[7] Art. 3A(b) of the Citizenship Law.[8] See : Diagram 1. As shall be seen below, the Entry to Israel Law addresses the issue of entry to, and residency within Israel by non-citizens, which includes the issue of ‘permanent residency’

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Similar to ‘residency’, birth in Israel does not, per se, lead to obtaining Israeli citizenship, as an additional condition is required; at least one parent has to be an Israeli citizen. Birth and residency in Israel can be an adequate basis for obtaining Israeli citizenship for those born following the establishment of the State of Israel and who have never possessed another nationality and if such person applies to the Interior Ministry after reaching the age of 18 and before reaching the age of 21, provided that at the time of the application s/he has been living in Israel for "ve consecutive years[9]. However, even if these conditions are met by the concerned individual, the interior minister has the power to reject the application if this person has been convicted in a security case or has been sentenced to "ve years or more of imprisonment[10].

Apparently, ‘naturalization’ is theoretically the main and often the only, although not unconditional, possibility for Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem to obtain Israeli citizenship. Article 5 of the Citizenship Law which deals with obtaining citizenship through naturalization, requires the following six cumulative conditions in the concerned individual, unless exempted from some by the interior minister:

!e applicant should be present in Israel.1.

!e applicant should have been living in Israel for three years within the "ve years preceding 2. the application.

!e applicant has the right to permanent residency in Israel.3.

!e applicant has settled in Israel or intends to do so.4.

S/he is moderately acquainted with Hebrew language.5.

!e applicant should renounce his/her previous nationality or prove that s/he will not 6. remain a foreign national upon becoming an Israeli citizen.

Nevertheless, meeting the above six conditions does not mean an individual will automatically obtain Israeli citizenship as the Interior Minister still has the discretion to grant it or to reject the application, and if granted, the applicant must state the following: “I a$rm that I will be a loyal citizen of the State of Israel.”

Based on the above, if a resident of East Jerusalem wishes to obtain Israeli citizenship by means of naturalization, s/he should have a permanent residency in Jerusalem, moderately know Hebrew and has to, unless exempted, renounce their Jordanian citizenship. Furthermore, it should also be noted, that in practice when some Jerusalem residents applied for Israeli citizenship, they were obliged to give up their Jordanian passports. !ere is no reliable, let alone o$cial, "gure for the number of Palestinian Jerusalemites who obtained Israeli nationality and consequently an Israeli passport[11]. By the end of 2005, the Central Bureau of Statistics estimated that 93% of the Arab residents of Jerusalem have the status of “permanent residents” (including only 3% who obtained this status through “family uni"cation”), 5% of the Arab residents have the status of

[9] Art. 4A(a) of the Citizenship Law.[10] Art. 4A(b) of the Citizenship Law[11] Becoming an Israeli citizen and obtaining an Israeli passport, is conditioned upon declaring loyalty to the state of Israel, and this is conceived by the mass majority of Palestinian as betraying the Palestinian cause and deserting to the enemy side, and disclosing such a fact is very embarrassing for those who apply. !us, neither the applicants nor Israel are willing to disclose the exact "gure.


“citizen” (including 12%, who obtained Israeli citizenship through naturalization) and 2% with an unidenti"ed status.[12]

Once a person becomes an Israeli citizen, s/he will not forfeit the Israeli citizenship unless s/he renounces it in writing, with the approval of the Interior Minister, or it is cancelled as per few cases that are identi"ed by the Citizenship Law as amended on28 July 2008[13]. Such cases include; "rst, if the citizenship is obtained on the basis of falsi"ed information, the Minister of Interior is authorized within three years to cancel it.[14] Second, an administrative court may cancel the citizenship of an Israeli citizen if s/he betrays the State of Israel[15] e.g. commits an “act of terror” as de"ned in the Prevention of Funding of Terror, 2005 or is active in a terrorist group as de"ned in the same Law[16] , or if s/he commits an act that implies treason against the State of Israel[17], or if s/he obtains citizenship or permanent residency of any state or territory of those listed in the supplement to the Law which include: Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen and Gaza Strip.[18]

b. !e 1952 Entry to Israel Law[19]:While the Citizenship Law covers the rules and provisions related to citizenship in Israel, the Entry to Israel Law addresses the issue of entry to, and residency within Israel by non-citizens, which includes the issue of ‘permanent residency’. !e entry of non-citizens to Israel and their stay in the country is possible by obtaining an “oleh (a Jewish immigrant)” visa or an entry visa under this Law. !e Interior Minister has the power to issue entry visas and “stay permits” for periods ranging between "ve days and three years as follows:

A visa and a stay-transit permit up to "ve days1. A visa and a stay-visit permit up to three months2. A visa and a temporary residency permit up to three years3. A visa and a permanent residency permit4. [20]

!e law bestows upon the minister, the power to extend the visit permit from time to time, provided that the total extension periods do not exceed two years[21]. !e minister can also extend the temporary residency permit, provided that each extension does not exceed two years[22]. In regards to the permanent residency permit, there are no provisions in the Entry to Israel Law as to the conditions leading to obtaining such a permit, or when it would cease to be in e#ect. !e issue of granting a permit for permanent residency in Israel is actually left to the discretion of the

[12] A summary of statistics related to Jerusalem residents was published under the title «Jerusalem Fortieth Anniversary: Overwhelmed by Dreams» on the site: http://www.nfc.co.il/.[13] !e Citizenship Law (Amendment No.9), 2008, published in the Compilation of Laws of Israel, No.2176 (8/8/2008), p. 810.[14] Article 11 (a) of the Citizenship Law.[15] Article 11 (b) of the Citizenship Law[16] Article 11 (b) (2) (a) of the Citizenship Law[17] Article 11 (b) (2) (b) of the Citizenship Law[18] Article 11 (b) (2) (c) of the Citizenship Law[19] Published in the Israeli Compilation of Laws, 1952, No. 111, p. 354. [20] Article 2 of the Entry to Israel Law .[21] Article 3(2) of the Entry to Israel Law .[22] Article 3(3) of the Entry to Israel Law .

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Interior Minister, who does not grant such permits without obtaining a recommendation by the security apparatuses, usually the “Shabak”. Often, such applications are made by a spouse holding an Israel ID card for “family uni"cation” with the other spouse, who does not hold such ID. Until few years back, procedural guidelines adopted by the Interior Ministry in this regard have not been declared.[23] All that was declared to the public in this regard and stated by the Ministry is that the approval of ‘family uni"cation’ applications would require the following conditions: First, the couple is bound by an o$cial marriage contract. Second, the couple lives in Jerusalem and their address is in Jerusalem. !ird, there is no security or criminal deterrence in the person to be granted the residency status[24]. Yet, as we shall see below, the Entry to Israel Law, together with the Citizenship Law, have been amended several times since 2003, and more conditions and obstacles in the way of Palestinians seeking family uni"cation, have been added including that an application is not processed if the “non Israeli” spouse is under the age of 25 if female and under 35 if male[25].

Applicants of family uni"cation often complain about the long period starting from the date of application up until a decision is issued to reject or accept the application, which may last for several months. In the past, based on the experience of the present writer, this time period usually exceeded a year and has even reached two years. In addition to ‘family uni"cation’, permanent residency in Jerusalem can also be obtained on the basis of birth in Israel/Jerusalem provided that the child is born to a parent residing in Jerusalem[26]. In the latter case, child registration is usually not problematic if both parents, or at least the father has residency status in Jerusalem and is holding an Israeli ID card. However, if the mother is the holder of the Israeli ID card and wishes to register her child in her ID card and the Israeli residents’ registry, she has to prove that the child is living with her and that the center of her and her child’s life is in Jerusalem, and not in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. !is discrimination between men and women is attributed to the assumption adopted by the secondary legislator (i.e. the Interior Ministry) that fathers in Arab society are the heads of their households and that wives and children are dependent on the husband-father and live in the place he chooses to live in[27].

For not a clear reason, the Entry to Israel Law is silent as to the question when does permanent residency expire and the conditions de"ning when a permanent residency permit expires are set in a secondary legislation : the 1974 Entry to Israel Regulations.. Article 11(c) of these regulations provides that a permanent residency permit expires if a condition made by the Minster for maintaining the permit’s e#ect is not met, or if a change is made to the visa associated with the permit by an unauthorized person, or “if the permit holder leaves Israel and settles in another country.” Article 11A of Regulations de"nes “settling in another country,” as when a permanent resident either:

[23] Presently, the procedural guidelines related to applications for “family uni"cation” and child registration(detailing the di#erent steps and numerous documents to be submitted to the interior minister) can be found on the Ministry’s website at: http://www.moin.gov.il.[24] For years, these conditions were not o$cially published but known to the writer through his experience in representing clients applying for family uni"cation. Nowadays, the conditions to be ful"lled and document to present in this regard are published on the Ministry website.[25] See: section 4 of this paper.[26] Article12 of the Entry into Israel Regulation,1974.[27] !is “assumption” was clearly stated in a letter of 1986 signed by Mr.Ya’ari, the then legal advisor to the Ministry of Interior, sent to the Association of Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI).


stays outside Israel’s borders for at least 7 years,1. receives a permanent residency permit in another state, or2. becomes a national of another state by means of naturalization.3.

!e Israeli government considers the residents of East Jerusalem as ‘permanent residents’ of the State of Israel and thus are subjected to the aforementioned provisions. !e Israeli High Court has also endorsed this position in the High Court case 282/88 Mubarak Awad vs. Prime Minister and others[28], the court decided the following:

“In summary: the States jurisdiction and administration apply to East Jerusalem. Based on this applicability, the entry to Israel law also applies to East Jerusalem. !erefore, the stay of East Jerusalem residents, who have not been naturalized, is possible by a residency permit. Every person covered by the census conducted in 1967 is regarded as holding a permanent residency permit.”[29].

!e Court turned down the claim that the Entry to Israel Law does not apply to East Jerusalem residents because it addresses the issue of consensual entry to Israel, while the Jerusalemites occupied by Israel did not “enter” to Israel by their will, but rather Israel entered into their place and lives. As demonstrated above, the Court resorted to an assumption that Jerusalem residents covered by the census conducted in June 1967 are regarded as if they were granted permits of permanent residency in Israel. !e Court also rejected the claim raised by the lawyers of the appellant (Mr. Awad) that, by the application of the Israeli jurisdiction, authority and administration to East Jerusalem, its residents have gained an Israeli “quasi-citizenship” or “constitutional residency” in the city, and therefore, the Interior Ministry does not have the power to cancel such status and to deport the appellant from Israel on the pretext that he has settled in another state[30]. !e Court also rejected the claim that Article 11A of the Entry to Israel Regulations is unlawful and beyond the powers of the Interior Ministry because it de"nes conditions and circumstances when a permanent residency in Israel expires, despite the fact that the law under which they were issued does not contain any instructions in this regard[31]. !e Court decided that a permanent resident may forfeit his/her residency in any of the cases stated in aforementioned Article 11A and added that the permanent residency permit may expire, and cease to be in e#ect automatically and without the need for issuing an o$cial decision of cancellation if the speci"c conditions of the case reveal that permanent residency in Israel, on which the e#ect of the permit depends, is not available any more[32]. In each of these cases, the Interior Minister may issue an order to deport the concerned person under Article 13 of the Entry into Israel Law on the pretext of illegal stay in the country. In its decision, the Court explained that no importance is given to the feelings of the concerned person towards Jerusalem or to the fact that s/he keeps longing to return to Jerusalem while settling abroad. According to the Court, what matters is the fact that s/he has moved to settle outside the borders of Israel[33]. Based on the above, the court reached a decision the appellant Awad has forfeited his right to residency in Israel as he left Jerusalem to the United States, where he settled, got married and

[28] Israeli High Court Decisions, Vol. 42 (2), p. 424.[29] Ibid, p. 431.[30] Ibid, p. 428.[31] Ibid, p. 432.[32] Ibid, p.433.[33] Ibid.

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obtained the U.S. nationality and a U.S. passport. !erefore, the court endorsed the Interior Minister’s decision ordering to deport him from Israel[34].

In the High Court case No. 7023/94 Fathiya Shikaki vs. Interior Minister[35], the Court rea$rmed the position taken in Mubarak Awad regarding the status of Jerusalem residents as ‘permanent residents’ in Israel and the loss of residency rights by the virtue of settling outside Jerusalem (i.e. outside Israel). In his review of the details of the case, Justice Goldberg said, “!e appellant was covered by the census of 1967 as a resident of East Jerusalem and got an Israeli ID card, but she did not naturalize [request nationality]. !erefore, her situation is that of holding a permanent residency permit under the 1952 Entry to Israel Law[36].” When the court found that the appellant was married in 1985 to Fathi Shikaki, a resident of Gaza Strip and then leader of the Islamic Jihad, and that she moved to live with her husband upon his deportation in 1988, giving birth to their three children in Syria, and that she came back to Jerusalem only after six years as a visitor, the court decided that her permanent residency permit has expired automatically and that the appellant has forfeited her right to permanent residency in Israel[37]. !erefore, Ms. Shikaki was forced to leave Jerusalem. In its decision, the court explained that the three categories stated in Article 11A of the Entry to Israel law in regard to “settling in another country” is not an exhaustive list and the fact that the concerned person is settled in another country, and thus has forfeited his/her permanent residency in Israel, can be judged from facts and circumstances other than those stated in Article 11A[38].

!e above two decisions by the Israeli High Court have had serious implications for the residents of East Jerusalem, mainly enabling the Israeli Interior Ministry to revoke their residency in cases when their stay outside the borders of Israel has not exceeded seven years. Following the court decision in Shikaki, the Interior Ministry started to gradually con"scate the Israeli ID cards from Jerusalemite women married to Jordanians, then it started to revoke the ID cards of male and female residents of East Jerusalem claiming that “the center of their lives has moved to outside Israel,” although they have been leaving under the so-called policy of “open bridges” adopted by the Israeli government since 1967 and according to exit permits valid for three years and have been returning prior to the expiration of these permits[39]. In mid nineties, Interior ministry sta# in East Jerusalem o$ce con"scated a large number of ID cards from residents applying to renew their cards based on “instructions” from Israeli sta# at Allenby Bridge[40]. !is was part of a policy adopted by the Interior Ministry aiming at revoking the right of permanent residency of some thousands of Jerusalemites, using the pretext of their residence outside the city (“outside Israel”). Although complete data is not available, published "gures indicate that the residency right was revoked for at least 689 Jerusalemites in 1996, for 606 in 1997, for 788 in 1998 and for 394 in 1999. [41]As these steps, in our opinion, indicated a change in the policy adopted by the ministry towards this particular population group, the ministry was supposed to announce this change in

[34] Ibid.[35] Not yet (o$cially) published. !e decision can be found on the following website: www.pador.co.il.[36] Ibid. [37] Ibid.[38] Ibid.[39] Halabi, Usama, !e Legal Status of Jerusalem City and Its Arab Population, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1997.,p.96.,[40] Ibid. [41] Halabi, Usama, Israeli Laws and Judicial System as Tools for Accomplishing Political Objectives, published by the Civic Coalition for Defending the Palestinians’ Rights in Jerusalem, Jerusalem, July 2007, p.15.


the policy in public and to allow those who may be a#ected by this change a chance to adapt and/or take appropriate decisions in light of this change. However, backed by the authority of the High Court, in the case 7952/96 Fares Bustani vs. Interior Ministry[42], the Ministry continued to revoke ID cards. !is was the "rst case where the court approved the revocation of the residency status of a Jerusalemite on the basis of his work and residency in Jordan (whereas the appellant is a holder of a Jordanian passport similar to thousands of Jerusalemites, a fact the Israeli Interior Ministry was fully aware of ). !e appellant did not bene"t from the fact that his exit to Amman and entry to Jerusalem through Allenby Bridge were by a valid exit permit. !e court decided that the appellant has moved the center of his life from Jerusalem to Amman and that his summer visits, even if on an annual basis, did not change this fact[43].

Israeli considers residency in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as “residency in another country” or “residency outside Israel’s borders” and therefore, Jerusalemites who move to live in these areas are vulnerable to losing their right to residency status in Jerusalem. In the past, living outside the expanded municipal boundaries of Jerusalem has led Jerusalemites to lose their social security bene"ts, such as allowances for children born to the family after they have moved out of Jerusalem, but not to lose the residency status and the Israeli ID card. However, in 1995 the Israeli Interior Ministry started to revoke the Israeli ID cards of Jerusalemite women married to West Banker men and living with their husbands outside the Israeli de"ned Jerusalem municipal boundaries on the pretext that they have forfeited their right to permanent residency in Jerusalem[44]. As already mentioned, revocation of Jerusalemites’ ID cards continued at a higher pace in 1996 also on the basis of their residency in, and moving the center of their lives to “the territories” (i.e. the West Bank, including areas that have not been transferred to the control of the Palestinian Authority). !is Israeli position, aimed at reducing the number of Palestinians in Jerusalem has continued through to the present time and has become increasingly aggressive since the start of the third millennium, as will be explained later in this document[45].

Finally, It should be noted that the Israeli High Court, in a decision made on 20 September 2007, rea$rmed its decision in Shikaki and rea$rmed once again the validity of its decision in Mubarak Awad’s case[46]. In its decision in Administrative Appeal No. 5829/05 Saleh Dary and others vs. the Interior Ministry[47], the Court referred to Justice Barack’s opinion in Awad’s case and added, “the decision that East Jerusalem population are treated as if they have obtained a permanent residency permit under the Entry to Israel Law shall naturally imply that the cancellation of this status is made under the arrangement stipulated in this law and the regulations issued hereunder.”[48] !e Court later quoted Justice Barack stating that “the permanent residency is in essence a reality of life. When the permit [of permanent residency] is granted, it shall give a legal quality to this reality. If the reality is gone, the permit shall have no meaning and shall be revoked automatically.”[49]

[42] Not yet (o$cially) published. !e decision can be found on the following website: www.pador.co.il. !is case was handled by the present writer.[43] Ibid, paragraph 8 of the Court’s decision. [44] Halabi, Usama, !e Legal Status of Jerusalem City and Its Arab Population ,p.97.[45] See section 4 of this paper.[46] Supra, note 27.[47] Not yet (o$cially) published. !e decision can be found on the following website : www.pador.co.il.[48] Ibid, paragraph 7 of the decision.[49] Ibid.

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3. Rights and Duties Attached to Citizenship and Residency in Israel:After examining the di#erence between citizenship and residency in Israel in terms of the conditions for obtaining each and those leading to forfeiting each, we will elaborate on the rights and duties attached to both. Particular attention will be paid to implications of permanent residency in East Jerusalem on the rights and duties of the Arab population of the city in certain aspects.

a) Voting and Nomination Rights:!e right to vote for and be nominated to the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) is limited to Israeli citizens[50], whereas the law allows permanent residents to participate in the elections to the local authorities both as voters and candidates[51]. !erefore, the right of East Jerusalem’s population as “permanent residents in Israel” is limited to the participation in the elections to Jerusalem municipality. !e population of the occupied Jerusalem have participated in these elections in the past to varying degrees: In the years 1969, 1978 and 1983, the proportion of those participating in the elections ranged between 15-20%, which declined in 1989 to less than 3% and then increased again in 1993 elections to 7% of those with the right to vote[52]. !e low proportion of Jerusalemites participating in the municipal elections has not changed dramatically.

!e low proportion of those participating is an indicator that the majority of the Palestinian population is against the Israeli presence in the city, considering the participation in the elections of Jerusalem municipality a behavior that can be interpreted as giving legitimacy to Israel’s decision to absolve the Arab municipality of Jerusalem and annex East Jerusalem to Israel. !e participation in the elections to the “uni"ed” municipality has adverse implications for the Palestinian legal and political struggle over Jerusalem as it feeds into the o$cial Israeli position claiming that Jerusalem– is one city with one municipality and the capital of one state, Israel.

b) !e Right to Obtain an Israeli Passport:!e 1952 Passports Law[53] states that the right to obtain a passport is limited to Israeli citizens[54]. A citizen shall use his/her Israeli passport in exiting and entering Israel even if s/he has more than one nationality. Non-citizens residing in Israel or those with an unidenti"ed or questionable nationality shall obtain a travel document (Laissez Passer) that they can use in leaving and returning to Israel. While a passport is valid for ten years[55], a travel document is valid for only one year, and renewable only for another year. Since the population of East Jerusalem is considered as ‘permanent residents’ in Israel, rather than citizen, they do not have the right to obtain an Israeli passport, although are eligible for a travel document. Applications to obtain or extend the validity of a passport or travel documents can be made at the Interior Ministry o$ces inside Israel or in Israeli consulates and embassies abroad.

[50] Article 6 of Basic Law: the Knesset.[51] Article 7 of Local Authorities (Elections), 1965.[52] Halabi, Usama, Jerusalem Arab Municipality, PASSIA, Jerusalem, 1994, p. 35.(Arabic)[53] Published in the Compilation of Israeli Laws, 1952, p. 260.[54] Article 2(a) of the Passports Law.[55] Article 4(a) of the Passport Law.


c) Exit From and Entry to Israel:Every Israeli citizen staying abroad has the right to enter Israel. !is right however is NOT granted to non-citizens. For visitors and residents, including permanent residents, entry and stay in Israel requires obtaining an entry visa and a residency permit according to the Entry to Israel Law and regulations issued hereunder. Exit from Israel is the right of every one, but this right may be restricted in certain cases, such as when there is a basis to suspect that the exit of a certain person, whether a citizen or a resident, may interfere with the security of the state[56].

Entry to and exit from Israel takes place through border crossings identi"ed by law, including, inter alia, Ben Gurion Airport, Dov Airport (Tel-Aviv), Haifa port, Eilat port, Damia Bridge and Allenby (King Hussein) Bridge and Sheikh Hussein (Ma’oz) Bridge known also as the Jordanian River Crossing[57] . Residents of East Jerusalem usually leave through Ben Gurion Airport by using the travel document (Laissez Passer) or through Allenby or Damia Bridge by using their Jordanian passports and an “exit permit” valid for three years. In many cases, during the eighties and nineties, the Interior Ministry, in cooperation with the Bridges Authority a$liated to the Civil Administration and the Military Administration, have banned Jerusalem residents from traveling abroad for “security reasons” or allow their travel on a condition that they are of certain age and stay abroad for at least nine months. !e bridges remained under the Israeli control even in the period following the Declaration of Principles agreement. Although there is an agreed upon Palestinian presence in certain sites, the "nal decision of letting in and out remains an Israeli decision[58].

d) Employment in the State Service:Israeli citizenship is a prerequisite for employment in the state service in accordance with Article 16 of the State Service (appointments) Law of 1959[59] which states that only Israeli citizens shall be appointed in state service positions. Any individual renouncing his/her nationality shall be considered as resigning from his/her position. !ere are however, exceptions to this rule: Article 40 of the same law allows appointing a person in state service by a special contract if s/he meets other conditions de"ned by the law. Additionally, Article 23 of the Judicial and Administrative Settlements (combined text) Law of 1970 granted the Prime Minister the power to issue regulations to exempt a person living in a territory where Israeli law is applied from the condition of nationality in order to be appointed as a public servant. Apparently, these exceptions permit the Israeli government to appoint residents of East Jerusalem in governmental institutions and departments, such as the social security agency and population registration department of the Interior Ministry. !ose residents of East Jerusalem who obtained the Israeli citizenship and became Israeli citizens do not require the exceptions. Other than working in State service, Israeli law does not require Israeli citizenship for employment.

[56] Article 6 of the Emergency Regulations (Exit to Abroad), 1948. See also: H.C. 488/85 Daher vs. Minister of Interior, Compilation of High Court Decisions, Vol.40(2),p. 701.[57] See: Entry to Israel (Border Terminals) Order, 1987.[58] Since November 1994, and according to the Oslo Agreement (and its annexes), persons holding Israeli and foreign passports enter into Israel from Jordan through Shekh Hussein Bridge where there is no Palestinian presence. On the other bridges, however, there is a Palestinian presence, but, the "nal decision to allow entrance into Israel or into the Palestinian Authority Area is Israel’s. [59] Published in the Compilation of Israeli Laws,1959, p. 86

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e) Taxes:With regard to taxes, Israeli law does not di#erentiate between an Israeli citizen and a permanent resident. Income tax is due from any income generated in Israel whether by a citizen, permanent resident or even a foreigner. Israel has imposed income tax on the residents of East Jerusalem and opened a branch for the tax authority in the city. !e Value Added Tax (VAT) is also due from dealers, craftsmen and service providers such as lawyers, engineers, physicians, etc. working in East Jerusalem[60]. In addition, and in view of the application of Israeli law to Jerusalem, taxes levied on properties have also been imposed on the population of the City, such as the “environmental improvement tax”[61] and the “property tax”[62]. Similar to other municipal councils, Jerusalem municipality imposes a property tax known as ‘Arnona’ on houses and businesses. !is tax is levied from the population to enable the municipality to provide services to the city’s residents. However, as to Arnona on properties used for living, it is estimated at di#erent rates according to the area and where the structure is located. !e city is divided to residential areas A, residential areas B and then residential areas C. !e tax rate in each one of these areas is di#erent than the two others but the same rates are used for the population of East and West Jerusalem. !is means that residents of area A or B in West Jerusalem pay per sq. meter the same amount paid by residents of area A or B in East Jerusalem, although the services o#ered by the municipality in East Jerusalem is not at the same level as those o#ered to West Jerusalem and the development, recreation and social services enjoyed by Jewish neighborhoods is totally absent in most Arab neighborhoods[63]. Similarly, shops and hotels are required to pay the same rates of the ‘Arnona’ tax (which is much higher than that imposed on houses) in East and West Jerusalem although the resources and revenues of such businesses in East Jerusalem are much less than those in the West Jerusalem.

f) Zoning and Building:!e 1965 Zoning and Building Law[64] does not di#erentiate between citizens and residents. Conditions required for any person wishing to construct a building, including the requirement to issue a building license, apply to all people in the city. However, the discriminatory policy adopted by the Israeli Government and the Jerusalem municipality, in terms of zoning and building in Jerusalem has caused a complicated housing crisis in Arab neighborhoods, forcing a large number of East Jerusalem residents to meet their need for housing space in villages and suburbs around Jerusalem. !is policy has two main features. !e "rst is the intensive con"scation of Arab lands that took place between the years1968 -1970 and later in 1980, in 1982 and in 1992, for the establishment of Jewish settlements, leading to a shortage in lands available for Arab building and to the development of the Jewish community in East Jerusalem[65]. For example, by the end of

[60] Imposed in accordance with Value Added Tax Law, 1976, Published in Compilation of Israeli Laws, 1976, p.52.[61] Imposed in accordance with Land Improvement Tax Law, 1963, Published in Compilation of Israeli Laws, No. 405, 1963, p.156. [62] Imposed in accordance with Property Tax and Compensation Fund Law, 1961, Published in Compilation of Israeli Laws, No. 337, 1961, p.100.[63] For example, there are 67 parks in west Jerusalem and 3 in east Jerusalem, and in most places there are no pavements for pedestrians to use.[64] Published in the Compilation of Israeli Laws, No.467 (12-8-1965), 1965, p.307.[65] Between the years1968 and 1970, not less than 16,991 dunams were con"scated for “public use” and used in fact to built the following Jewish settlements: French Hill, Ramat Eshkol, Ramot, Gilo, Talpiot Mizrah,Neve Yaakov, Maalot Dafna and Atarot. In 1980 another 4400 dunams were con"scated and used to build Pisgat Ze’ev settlement. See: Halabi Usama, !e Legal Status of Jerusalem and its Arab Population, p. 21-22 and references cited in


1970, Israel had con"scated not less than 16, 991 dunams of Arab land in the de-facto annexed area for “public purposes” under the 1943 Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance, as demonstrated in diagram 2 below.

Diagram 2 Con"scation of land for “public purposes” 1968-1970

Moreover, as of May 1995, approximately 38,000 housing units were built for the Jewish population on the 23,378 dunams of Arab lands con"scated for “public purposes”[66]. !e second feature of the Israeli discriminatory policy is the neglect of the needs of the Arab population. Building and development plans have been focusing mainly on "nding solutions and meeting the needs for the Jewish community. With the exception of small housing projects, such as “Nusseibeh” housing project in Beit Hanina, which includes 400 housing units, and another project in Wadi Al-Joz with

[66] “A Policy of Discrimination: Land Con"scation and planning and Building in East Jerusalem”, a Report by B‘Tselem, Jerusalem, 1995, pp. 51-52 (Hebrew).

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24 housing units, Jerusalem Municipality and the Housing Ministry have not helped in establishing housing projects within the boundaries of East Jerusalem for the Arab population[67]. When Jerusalem Municipality developed a proposed zoning scheme for Shu’fat and Beit Hanina areas with 18,000 housing units (including the existing units), both the Housing Ministry and the Interior Ministry represented by the Jerusalem Governor (head of the district committee on zoning and construction) objected to the plan, which led to a reduction in the number of housing units to only 7500 units[68]. !e proportion of the “open green” land in this plan was 25% while the allotted ratio of the construction area to the land area in Arab neighborhoods ranges between 50% and 75%, compared to 125% in some Jewish neighborhoods, such as the project approved by the municipality in Ras Al-Amoud, owned by Yshevat Beit Aurot[69]. Moreover, while the zoning of Pisgat Zeev settlement (built on lands owned by residents of Shu’fat and Beit Hanina villages) took only three years, the zoning process for Beit Hanina took more than 13 years and several other Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem remain without a zoning scheme. In addition to the discrimination in the Israeli zoning and building policy against the Arab population, Israeli authorities have been banning the implementation of self-managed Arab housing projects, such as the teachers housing project in Atarot (Kalandia) area.

As a natural result of Israel’s zoning and building policy, the Arab population of Jerusalem has been forced to resort to unlicensed building in order to solve their housing problems. Jerusalem municipality has responded to this by issuing administrative orders of demolition whenever the building is detected before being erected and inhabited. !e municipality has also "led lawsuits before the Municipal A#airs Court against those who have already built and inhabited an unlicensed house and obtained court orders of demolition. It should be noted that right wing political groups in the Knesset often pressure the municipality to implement the demolition orders in East Jerusalem. For example, a number of Knesset members resorted to the High Court, claiming that the municipality has not implemented a large number of demolition orders issued against houses located in Arab neighborhoods[70]. Finally, it is estimated that 15,000-20,000 buildings in East Jerusalem have been built without permits; i.e 40% of the total number of buildings[71], and that Israeli authorities have demolished some 2000 houses since 1967[72]. In addition, some 3000 demolition orders are pending against Palestinian buildings[73]. Another estimation made by UN OCHA in its May 2009 report is that at least 28% of all Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem are at risk to be demolished for being built illegally[74].

g) “Social security” bene"ts:!e Social Security Agency pays di#erent bene"ts to eligible persons under the Social Security (Combined Text) Law of 1995[75], which replaced and introduced numerous amendments to the Social Security (combined text) Law of 1968. !e 1995 law came to ensure a certain level of social

[67] Halabi Usama, !e Legal Status of Jerusalem and its Arab Population, p. 107 and references cited in. [68] Ibid., p.108.[69] Ibid., pp.108-109.[70] H.C 1901/94 Uzi Landau and others vs. Jerusalem Municipality and others, published in compilation of High Court Decisions, Vol. 48(4), p. 403.[71] Margalit, Meir, No place like Home-House Demolition in East Jerusalem, ICAHD. Jerusalem. 2007.[72] JERUSALEM-Israeli Settlement Activities & Related Policies, PASSIA, Jerusalem, June 2009, p.22.[73] Ibid.[74] Ibid.[75] Published in the Compilation of Israeli Laws, No. 1522, 1995, p. 210.


welfare, particularly for vulnerable social groups. Bene"ts payable under the 1995 Law include: bene"ts for elderly people[76], for widows[77], work-related injuries[78], maternity bene"ts that include a hospital allowance, a birth allowance and a birth bene"t[79], child bene"ts[80], unemployment bene"ts[81], disability bene"ts[82], and bene"ts to ensure the rights of the workers in case the employer becomes bankrupt or the company is resolved[83]. Each of these bene"ts require special eligibility conditions that must be met by a person in order to receive that form of bene"ts from the social security agency. A common condition for paying bene"ts to elderly people, widows, unemployed workers and children is that the concerned person should be “ insured”, i.e. residing in Israel. As indicated in its relevant articles, the Law requires residency (not citizenship) as a main condition for being eligible to receive the above mentioned bene"ts. Since the population of East Jerusalem has become permanent residents in Israel following the annexation of their city, persons meeting the remaining conditions shall be eligible to receive the above bene"ts.

!e Social Security Agency opened a branch in East Jerusalem and started to o#er services to the population that were covered by the census in June 1967 and were given Israel ID cards. Initially, the agency did not require recipients to remain living within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem according to a decision made on 13 February 1973 by an inter-ministerial committee created by the Israeli Government. !is decision stated that “any person holding an Israeli ID card based on their residency status in Jerusalem and who maintain making their due payments to the social security incessantly shall keep enjoying the social security rights even if they move their place of residence to outside the boundaries of Jerusalem municipality.” Apparently the decision aimed at reassuring the rights of residents that have been forced to move their place of residence to Jerusalem suburbs for one reason or another. During this time, the Mayor of Jerusalem voiced his support of this decision, stressing that “the competent bodies have not revoked the ID card of anyone so far. !e municipality has reached an agreement with o$cials in the Interior Ministry and a governmental decision was made to ensure that no harm is made to Arab residents who are forced to search for a solution to their housing problem outside the boundaries of the City[84].” However, the o$cial policy in this regard has changed rapidly and the Jerusalemites who moved to live outside the municipal boundaries started to pay the price. For example, the Social Security Agency stopped paying child bene"ts to many families when it found that they are living in areas such as Al-Ram, Ezareyeh (Bethany), Abu Dis and Dahiat Al-Barid on the pretext that they are living outside Israel[85]. !e Social Security Agency interpreted the inter-ministerial decision made in 1973 as securing the rights of the population to bene"ts for children born in Jerusalem before the date their families moved to live in the aforementioned suburbs, while children born after that date shall not receive bene"ts. !e National Labour Court has con"rmed this position[86].

[76] Article 244 of the Social Security Law.[77] Article 252 of the Social Security Law.[78] Articles 75-157 of the Social Security Law.[79] Articles 39-64 of the Social Security Law.[80] Articles 65-73 of the Social Security Law.[81] Articles 158-179 of the Social Security Law.[82] Articles 195-222B of the Social Security Law.[83] Articles 180-192 of the Social Security Law.[84] Al-Anbaa Newspaper, 15/8/1980.[85] Usama Halabi, !e Legal Status of Jerusalem and its Arab Population, p. 114.[86] For example see: File No. MZ o-38 Ra"q Shweki and others vs. National Security Agency, Compilation of the National Labour Court Decisions, Vol. 19, p. 111.

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While a signi"cant number of the East Jerusalem population forfeited their right to the di#erent social security bene"ts (for living outside the municipal boundaries) and some have forfeited their right to residency in Jerusalem (when the Interior Ministry decides that they are living “outside Israel”), the Jewish settlers maintain their right to the di#erent social security bene"ts in spite of their residency in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israeli settlers have bene"ted from the 1987 Social Security Regulations (Applicability to Certain Categories of Covered Persons). Article 2 of these Regulations states that “the provisions of the [social security] law shall apply to every person living or working in the territory [the West Bank and Gaza Strip U.H] as if they are living or working in Israel, if they are Israeli citizens or have the right to return to Israel under the 1950 Law of Return[87].”

Following the signing of the Oslo accords and their endorsement by the Knesset, amendments were made to the Social Security Law a#ecting and even annulling rights that had been gained by Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem who had moved to the West Bank (“Judea and Samaria”) or Gaza Strip under the 1987 Regulations (Rights and Duties of !ose Not Residing in Israel) or the 1993 Regulations (Payments to Jerusalem Residents Who Moved !eir Place of Residence to Judea, Samaria and Gaza Strip). !e Palestinians were a#ected by amendments made to Article 192A of the 1968 Social Security (Combined Text) Law, which was amended later to become article 378 in the 1995 Social Security (Combined Text) Law[88], limiting the rights and bene"ts granted by the Law to “Israeli resident ’ in the territory”. Paragraph ‘a’ of the same article de"ned an “Israeli resident in the territory “ as one who works or lives in the West Bank and Gaza and is an Israeli citizen or has the right to enter to Israel according the Law of Return and who would have been listed as an Israeli resident if s/he happen to have his place of residence in Israel” (emphasis added).

!is amendment came into e#ect as of 21 December 1994 and is clearly limited to the Jewish population and excludes the Arab Palestinians holding Israeli ID cards. Accordingly, Palestinian Jerusalemites holders of Israeli ID cards, who live in the West Bank or Gaza have become ineligible to receive the security bene"ts other than bene"ts associated to injury in a work accident taking place in Israel. Under the aforementioned amendment, any accident taking place after the amendment came into e#ect shall not be considered a “work accident” if it takes place outside Israel, even if on the way to or from work in Israel. Another result stemming from the de"nition of “Israel resident in the territory” as stated in article 378 of the 1995 Social Law was that Jerusalemite mothers giving birth in Israeli hospitals lost their rights to have hospital expenses covered by the Social Security Agency, and to receive birth allowances and bene"ts if they happen to live with their husbands in Gaza or the West Bank, even if their husbands work in Israel[89].

h) Health insurance:!e right to obtaining medical treatment under the O$cial Health Insurance Law of 1994[90] is also conditional on the concerned person being a “resident” of Israel. !us, losing the right of residency in Jerusalem leads to losing the right to obtaining medical health. For the purposes of this law, a

[87] Published in the Compilation of Israeli Regulations, no. 5029, (10/5/1987), p. 913.[88] See infra note no. 74.[89] Article 40 of the Social Security Law of 1995.[90] Published in the Compilation of Israeli Laws, No.1469, 1994, p.156.


“resident” means the “resident” under the Social Security Law, which includes “Israeli resident in the territory” under article 378 of the Law, i.e. Jewish settler living in the West Bank[91].

4. !e start of the third millennium : more constraints on family uni"cation and increased risks of losing residency and social bene"ts :

!e period since the start of the third millennium has been characterized by continued implementation and intensi"cation of Israel’s discriminatory policy, which has sought, since the beginning of the occupation in 1967, to realize the idea of “the largest possible land with the smallest possible Arab population.”[92] During this period, Israeli policy has been implemented through numerous steps taken by the Israeli authorities, the most prominent of which, in terms of the achieved and expected outcomes, are twofold: the "rst was the enactment of the Citizenship and Entry to Israel Law (Temporary Order) of 2003[93] (referred to hereafter interchangeably as “the Citizenship and Entry to Israel Law” or “the Temporary Order”). !e second fold was the construction of “Jerusalem Incubator,” which is part of the “separation wall”, separating Jerusalem, with its expanded boundaries, from the rest of the West Bank.[94]

!ese two steps, however, were only taken after the Israeli Parliament had taken a step with symbolic and political dimensions regarding the status of Jerusalem and its boundaries as delineated by the Israeli government in June 1967. On 7 December 2000, shortly after the failure of the Camp David negotiations between the late Yaser Arafat, (then head of the Palestinian Authority) and Ehud Barak (then the Israeli prime minister), the Israeli Parliament amended the Basic Law: Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel and added three new articles[95]: Article 5 of the amended Law states that for the purposes of this law, the boundaries of Jerusalem “shall include, among others, the entire area described in the annex to the decree on expanding the jurisdiction of Jerusalem municipality of 28 June 1967, which was issued under the Municipalities’ Law.”[96] Article 6 bans the transfer of any power vested by the law in the Israeli Government or in Jerusalem municipality in relation to Jerusalem jurisdiction to “any political or authoritative foreign element or to any similar foreign element whether permanently or for a limited period.” And Article 7 of the Law provided that “the provisions of articles 5 and 6 cannot be amended except by a basic law enacted by the majority of Knesset members.”

a) Citizenship and Entry to Israel Law (Temporary order):!is law was enacted on 6/8/2003 to limit the possibility of family uni"cation for Palestinian Jerusalemites and their Palestinian spouses from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, even if this would lead (and it is in fact leading) to the break-up of such “mixed” families. !is “temporary law” which still prevented the Minister of the Interior from issuing a permanent or even a temporary residency visa to those considered as “residents of the territory,” i.e., residents of the West Bank or Gaza. !is de"nition includes those who are registered in the population registry of the “territory” or living in the “territory” even if not registered there. In addition, this law prevents the promotion of the

[91] Article 2 of the O$cial Health Insurance Law.[92] Meron Benvenisti, Jerusalem: !e Torn City, Jerusalem, Isratypest Ltd., 1976, pp. 113-115.[93] Published in the Compilation of Israeli Laws, 2003, No. 1901, p. 544.[94] !is paper does not address the Structural Plan of Jerusalem 2000 initiated by Jerusalem municipality.[95] Published in the Compilation of Israeli Laws, 2000, No. 1760, p.28.[96] See Diagram 1: “!e creation of the Israeli legal framework for annexation – June 1967”

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non-Jerusalemite spouse from his/her status to a higher status under the Entry to Israel Law.[97] For example, those whose applications for family uni"cation were approved and who obtained a visa for a stay in Israel (B visa) will not obtain – after the required 27 months – a permit for temporary residency (A / 5 visa), which in addition to the right to work in Israel, is accompanied by the right to receive bene"ts from the Social Security Agency or the right to receive health services. !e provision halting the promotion from one visa to another was applied retroactively. !is has resulted in large numbers of spouses from the West Bank holding the same visa for many years and not knowing when they will "nally achieve “family uni"cation” by obtaining a permanent residency[98].

!is Temporary Order came to replace the governmental decision No. 1813 issued on 12 May 2002, which provided for suspending all decisions regarding family uni"cation and closing all the doors for any new applications, including the registration of children born outside Jerusalem or in Jerusalem for a Jerusalemite mother and a West Bank or Gazan father. !e pretext used to justify this decision is that perpetrators of some suicide bombings inside the Green Line had received assistance and guidance in reaching the place of the bombing from persons carrying an Israeli ID obtained through family uni"cation[99]. Although this justi"cation was security-related (and used for the subsequent temporary law), the primary goal was to prevent large numbers of Palestinians from outside Jerusalem from entering the city and to other cities in Israel through marriage, followed by family uni"cation. In this context, it should be noted that Eli Shai, then the Minister of Interior from Shas party, published a booklet attempting to prove that Palestinians consider the family uni"cation process “a realization of the right to return through the back door.”[100] It is not coincidental, therefore, that the title of the aforementioned governmental decision was “policy of family uni"cation regarding the Palestinian Authority population and foreigners of a Palestinian origin”.

!e Citizenship and Entry to Israel Law (Temporary Order) was amended on 27 July 2005[101], where slight positive changes were made, opening the door for applications for family uni"cation of non-Jerusalemite husbands over the age of 35 years and of non-Jerusalemite wives over the age of 25[102]. Additionally, the interior minister was allowed to grant a permanent or temporary residency visa to children up to the age of 14. !e Military Commander of the West Bank was bestowed the power to grant a visa of stay in Israel for children over the age of 14. But the law bans granting a residency visa in Israel to those considered as “residents of the territory” if the Minister decides, based on a recommendation from the competent security bodies, that the concerned person or a member of his/her family may pose a threat to Israel’s security[103]. !e e#ect of the Temporary Order has been extended for periods of six months, most recently on 17 July 2006 ending on 16 January 2007, when the prime minister issued a decree under the Government’s power according to article 5 of the Temporary Order[104].

[97] Published in the Compilation of Israeli Laws, 1952, No. 111, p. 354.[98] !e Author has handled a larger number of cases of people su#ering from this problem.[99] In a brief submitted to the Israeli Supreme Court, setting as High Court of Justice (HCJ 7052/03, 7102/03, 7642/03, 7643/03, 8099/03 8263/03,1065/03 Adalah and others vs Ministry of Interior and others) the State Attorney, representing the Interior Ministry, claimed that the number of Palestinians holding Israeli Ids and involved in such incidents was 26. Whereas the total number of those obtained Israeli ID through family uni"cation was several thousands.[100] !e booklet was published on 12 May, 2002.[101] !e Amendment was published in the Compilation of Israeli Laws, 2005, No. 2018, p. 544.[102] !e explanation given to this amendment was that those involved in attacks inside Israel were within an age group below this age. See Article 3 of the Law.[103] See Article 3D of the Law.[104] !e decree was published in the Compilation of Israeli Regulations, 2006, p.657.


On 28 March 2007, the Knesset passed a second amendment to the Citizenship and Entry into Israel LAW (Temporary Order)[105]. !is amendment expanded the list of persons whose family uni"cation is subjected to the aforementioned restrictions to include, in addition to West Bank and Gaza residents, spouses from Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq[106]. Moreover, the second amendment added an article entitling the Interior Minister to grant a temporary residency permit or a permit of stay in Israel, for “humanitarian reasons,” to those who have a relative living legally in Israel”. However, this is conditional to the recommendation of a special committee established for this purpose. !e amendment explained that for the purposes of this article, the “relative” being the applicant’s spouse or the couple having children shall not be considered a “humanitarian reason.”[107] !e amending law extended the e#ect of the Citizenship and Entry to Israel Law to 31 July 2008[108]. Soon after this amendment, the e#ect of the Temporary Order was extended once again to 31 July, 2009 by a decree issued by the Prime Minister under the Government’s power according to article 5 of the Temporary Order which allow amendment to up of one year each time.[109] Indicating its strong well to continue with its discriminatory policy towards the Palestinians seeking family uni"cation, the Israeli Government approved on 19 July, 2009 the proposal by Eli Shai, Minister of Interior, to extend the e#ect of the Temporary Order once again until end of July 2010.[110]

It is worth noting here that the Israeli High Court of Justice, in High Court case 7052/03 Adalah and others vs. the Interior Minister and others, has approved the constitutionality of the Temporary Order of 2003 on 14 May 2006 with a majority of 6 judges out of 11[111]. !e majority of judges justi"ed their decision to allow causing damage to the right to family life by the pretext of security threats associated with the entry of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza to Israel and the inability of the Israeli security systems to examine all cases individually[112]. !e court rejected petitions "led by Arab and Israeli human rights organizations and Arab and Jewish Knesset members and kept the law intact. On the day following the hearing (14 February 2006), Hebrew newspapers published a statement by the vice-president of the High Court (currently retired) Mish’eil Hashin, who was among the majority approving the law, referring to couples who want to live together in Israel: “Nobody denied them the right to establish a family, but they can live in Jenin instead of Um Al-Fahm.”[113] However, Adalah did not give up, and "led another petition against the Citizenship and Entry to Israel Law (Temporary Order)(Amendment No. 2), 2007. !is petition which challenge the constitutionality of the Temporary Order in its current amended text, was heard on March 15, 2009 but still pending a "nal decision by the Israeli Supreme Court[114].

[105] Published in Compilation of Israeli Laws, 2007, No. 2092, p. 295.[106] !e relevant countries are listed in the Supplement to the Law.[107] Article 3A1(h)(1).[108] Article 5.[109] !e decree was published in the Compilation of Regulations, No. 6692, 2009, p. 1134.[110] Veiler-Polak, Dana, “!e Government Approves the Proposal by Minster of Interior to Extend the E#ect of the Temporary Order Concerning the Citizenship and Entry to Israel Law”, Haaretz Newspaper, 20 July, 2009. www.haaretz.com/hasite/spages/1101200.html .[111] HCJ 7052/03, 7102/03, 7642/03, 7643/03, 8099/03 8263/03,1065/03 Adalah and others vs Ministry of Interior and others (not yet published). !e decision can be found on the following website: www.pador.co.il.[112] Ibid.[113] Haaretz Newspaper, 15 February, 2006.[114] . HCJ 830/07 Adalah and others vs. Minister of Interior and others.

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Certainly, the failure to obtain family uni"cation keeps the concerned person in an unbearable situation. On one hand, s/he is forced to leave “Israel”, as his/her stay there is considered illegal. But on the other hand, s/he is linked and attached to a family: a spouse and children. If s/he does not abide by the law and leave, s/he will be arrested and taken to court, which may sentence him/her to imprisonment. If a decision is issued against the “violating” spouse, it will become later a “criminal deterrent” surely preventing the approval of his/her family uni"cation application. A worrying step in this regard was taken by the Israeli authorities on 19 July 2006, when the Knesset passed "rst reading (out of three) of a draft law called :”Entry to Israel Law (Amendment No. 19)”, which in summary stipulates that any person illegally staying in Israel for a period over 30 days, shall not be allowed to obtain any status unless s/he leaves Israel for one or more years, even if s/he is a spouse or a relative of an Israeli citizen[115]. Due to the fact that restrictions on residency are mainly imposed on Palestinian Jerusalemites and their spouses, persons mainly a#ected by this draft law in regard to “family uni"cation” will be Arabs, particularly families whose application for a family uni"cation in favor of a spouse was rejected and s/he did not leave the country. However, this draft law may also a#ect relatives of non-Jews who are married to Jews but who are not subject to the 1950 Law of Return[116].

Finally, it should be noted that the Israeli justice minister has recently proposed a draft law to amend the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom aiming at preventing the Israeli High Court from examining petitions on the constitutionality of decisions issued under the Return, Nationality and Entry to Israel laws. !e main purpose is to prevent the possibility of canceling the Nationality and Entry to Israel law (Temporary Order) in view of a new petition that has been "led and is to be examined claiming unconstitutionality of this law.[117] !e proposed draft amendment states that “the proposed amendment re%ects a belief prevailing among the Israeli public that the state of Israel has the right and duty to control entry, residency and naturalization of non-residents according to the values of the declaration of independence, Zionist perceptions and the state’s security, economic and social needs.”[118] It is not surprising, therefore, to know that the Israeli Government has intensi"ed its e#orts during the years 2006- 2008 to sharply increase the number of persons who their status of permanent residency was revoked. According to Haaretz, the Ministry of Interior has con"rmed that they have revoked permanent residency status of 1363 Jerusalemites during the year 2006 and of 4, 577 Jerusalemites in 2008 i.e more than 50% of the total number of persons that their status was revoked until then[119].

b) !e “Separation/Annexation Wall” surrounding Jerusalem:!e other important and critical step in this period, which re%ects Israel’s position of keeping the–“Greater Jerusalem” (including Ma’ale Adumim in the east, Giv’aat Zeev in the northwest and Efrat and Beitar settlements in Bethlehem Area in the south and south west) under its control, is

[115] Shahar Ellan, “A License for love”, Haaretz Newspaer, 27 July 2006, p.B6.[116] !e Law of Return, grants the right to Israeli citizenship to non-Jew married to a Jew (born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism), including a spouse of a Jewish grandchild. Yet, any person outside this protection curricle cannot obtain a status in Israel threw this Law (such as a mother of a non-Jewish spouse of a Jew or children of a non-Jewish spouse of a Jew from previous marriage). [117] Haaretz Newspaper, May, 2008, front page.[118] Ibid.[119] Hason, Neer, “A Sharp Increase in Number of Palestinians from East Jerusalem that Israel Has revoked their Residency”, Haaretz Newspaper, December 2009, front page and on page 2.


the decision to build a separation Wall in and around the city, with estimated length of 168 km[120], referred to by the Israelis as the “Jerusalem Envelope”[121], in order to isolate the city in its expanded boundaries from the West Bank.

!e decision to build the Wall in Jerusalem area was made by the inter-ministerial committee on national security on 11 September 2002 and was approved again on 20 August 2003.[122] By May 2006, 33 km of the Wall in the Jerusalem area were completed[123]. Another 24 km of this Wall were subject to objections [124] and 19 petitions against it were pending in the Israeli High Court of Justice[125]. According to the latest information published by the Israeli Ministry of Defence on August 14, 2007, 7 petitions against the Wall in the Jerusalem Area were pending before the Supreme Court[126]. By mid-2008, it was estimated that almost 50% of the construction was completed.[127] !e Wall in the Jerusalem area de facto annexes 228.2 km or 3.9% of the West Bank, and when completed, it will e#ectively separate over 230,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites from the rest of the West Bank[128]. It separates Jerusalem from Bethlehem in the south, from Ramallah and the surrounding villages and suburbs such as Dahiet Al-Barid, Al-Ram, Bir Nabala, Beit Hanina village, Biddo, Beit Iksa, and Beit Surik in the north and northwest, and from Abu Dis and Ezarreyeh (Bethany) in the east. !e Wall also separates parts of expanded Jerusalem itself, as is the case with Shu’fat refugee camp, which is located within the municipal boundaries as delineated by Israel in 1967 but has become completely beyond the Wall to the east.

According to a research by Yesrael Kamhi from Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies, the number of Jerusalemites holding Israeli IDs who will remain outside the route of the “Separation /Annexation Wall” is between 80,000 and 90,000[129]. !e same research indicates that Jerusalem will be turned from a central city to a border city and the Wall will invoke misery and rage among the a#ected Palestinians, which may increase their participation in “terrorist activities” against Israel in the future. !e research also warns that the construction of the Wall may increase the unlicensed building in Arab neighborhoods in an attempt to absorb Jerusalemites returning to live within the city boundaries due to the Wall and may increase the number of Arabs renting houses in Jewish neighborhoods for the same reason[130].

A joint survey conducted by BADIL Centre and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics between 15 May and 10 June 2006 and published on 4 July 2006 clearly illustrates the impact of the Wall on the lives of Palestinians living in its area. !e survey sample included 981 Palestinian

[120] http://he.wikipedia.org/wik; PASSIA, “JERUSALEM-Israeli Settlement Activities & Related Policies”, a newsletter, Jerusalem, June 2009, p. 20.(PASSIA)[121] !e Wall is surrounding “Greater Jerusalem”, and the term (Otef Yerushalayem in Hebrew) indicates a close protection of the City and other Palestinian areas that turned out to be in the “Israeli side” of the Wall. [122] !e website of Israel>s security wall (which Israel insist to call it fence): http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/Heb/matara.htm[123] Haaretz Newspaper, May 17, 2006.[124] Ibid.[125] http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/Heb/hadashot.htm. (Accessed on May 2006)[126] http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/Heb/hadashot.htm#news76. (Accessed on July 11, 2009)[127] PASSIA, p. 20.[128] Ibid. See also : Cnaan Liphshiz, UN: Separation fence will sever Jerusalem from West Bank, Haaretz Newspaper,May 23, 2009. [129] An overview of the study was published in Makor Rishon website: www.makorrishon.co.il.[130] Another overview of the main conclusions of the aforementioned research (which was submitted in a report to the Israeli government before it was later published in a book) were published in Haaretz Newspaper on October 6, 2005 (Nadav Shargai, “Wall Route in Jerusalem May Create Di$cult Social Problems”).

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households (composed of 5148 persons) living in Jerusalem district and found that 17.3% of the sample have changed their previous place of residence due to “the Wall and its consequences”, i.e., to “keep their IDs”[131]. In addition, it was found that 63.8% of individuals 16 years old and over are thinking of changing their current place of residence because of its location relative to the Wall or for other reasons related to the Wall[132]. !e survey also reveals the direct negative impact on people’s access to health services and education, as well as the separation from relatives.

It should also be noted in this regard that the Israeli Government does not hide the fact that there is a political dimension for the Wall’s route in Jerusalem area, additional to the claimed security dimension. In its response to petitions against the Wall’s route in the north of Jerusalem, the state prosecutor explained that the route within or on the municipal boundaries of the city has political meanings and implications as it passes through an area under the Israeli sovereignty. In the session held on 21 May 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court Chief in Justice, Ahron Barak, plainly stated that Israel has the right to build a security wall on the municipal boundaries within its sovereignty and, hence, the question whether the Wall is built there for security or political reasons is irrelevant[133]. He then questioned: What right do the residents of Al-Ram located in area B have to appeal against Israel’s right to build a Wall within its area of sovereignty? Consequently, the Court rejected the appeal in December 2006[134].

Hence it is not unreasonable to say that the Wall constructed around Jerusalem is a new delineation of the municipal boundaries with a wider geographic area (including Ma’aleh Adumim) and a fewer number of Palestinians (excluding Shu’afat refugee camp). And for sure, this Wall is serving the Israeli goal of securing the control over Palestinian land and people-the goal for which Israel has employed its legislative and judicial systems in addition to its governmental and administrative system. By creating an obvious physical barrier between what is “in” and what is “out”, the Wall will cause thousands of Palestinian Jerusalemites to lose their right of residency if they continue to live outside the wall and outside the municipal boundaries for seven years or more[135]

5. !e Judaization policy continues in Jerusalem and its surroundings:

In May 2007, it was published that the local committee for zoning and building in Jerusalem municipality decided to start the construction of 20,000 housing units in two areas beyond the Green Line and within the expanded municipal boundaries of 1967: Al-Walajeh in the south and the Airport area (Atarot) in the north. Elli Pollack, who served as the head of the committee and the deputy mayor, was quoted to say that the aim is to create continuity between Jerusalem and Ghosh Itzion (Bethlehem area) in the south and settlements in Beit Eil area in the north[136].

[131] A summary of the Survey was published in a press release on July 4, 2006.For more details, see: Forced Displacement as a result of the Construction of the Wall and its Associated Regime in Occupied East Jerusalem: A Pilot Study of Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights in cooperation with the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Bethlehem-Ramallah, 4 July, 2006.[132] Ibid.[133] !e Author was present in court when Chief Justice Barak expressed his opinion in response to an argument made by one of the petitioners’ lawyers, and thus con"rms that this information is correct. [134] HCJ 5488/04 A-Ram Municipal Council et-al v. Gov. of Israel, submitted on 10/6/04, ruling on 13-12-06 (not yet o$cially published). [135] !is one of the cases stipulated in Article 11A of Entry to Israel Regulations of 1974 and lead to losing the permanent residency.[136] Haaretz Newspaper, May 10, 2007.


On 11 March 2008, it was reported that the Government of Israel started to “register in the Land Registry Jewish properties located in the Jewish quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem”. !us, it is the "rst time that, from a legal formal point of view, Jewish ownership of properties in the Jewish quarter, which came under Israel’s control along with the Old City since 1967, is being documented[137].” !e newspaper added that, in preparation for property registration, buildings in the quarter were surveyed and a new numeration system was adopted not only for the buildings but for each single apartment/housing unit[138]. It was also reported that the registration of properties located in the Jewish quarter at the Land Registry O$ce is conducted by the Governmental Corporation for the Development of the Jewish Quarter, under the Corporations’ Unit in the Housing Ministry. !e news report also explains that a unique registration method was created due to problems associated to the speci"c characteristic of the site: when it was found that the buildings are interlinked either through their lower or upper parts and their boundaries go beyond individual lots, a decision was made not to su$ce by recoding the land portion, the lot and the building, but to record the number of the apartment or the housing unit. According to the news report, more than 120 properties out of 600 have been registered so far. Presently, the area of the quarter is 133 dunums, comprising 15% of the Old City, while its original area was only 5 dunums[139].

!e unprecedented fact is that this step provides a speci"c legal cover for the defacto Israeli control since 1967 under the provisions of the Israeli Land Registration Law by documenting and registering Jewish individuals’ ownership of properties they are occupying. Nevertheless, nothing in this step can alter the status of the Old City with its di#erent quarters under the international law as an occupied area, and nothing alters the duty of the occupiers to refrain from altering the realities on the ground. !is step also does not conform to the duty of entering negotiations with good will in order to reach a just solution for the issue of Jerusalem, for which a solution is still pending since the partition resolution and the declaration of the city as a special status area outside the boundaries of the Jewish and Arab states (corpus separatum)[140]. !is technical step should be viewed in its actual place and size within the bigger picture that re%ects the whole set of measures taken by the Israeli government in their attempt to strengthen the Jewish presence and weaken the Arab presence in the city and its surroundings.

In a press conference held by the then Israeli Prime Minister Ihud Olmert and the chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, on 17 March 2008, Mr. Olmert stated:

“!ere will be places, where construction processes or additions to existing buildings will go on because these places will remain in the hands of Israel in any future agreement. !is includes Jerusalem, "rst and foremost. We build in Jerusalem because everybody knows that the state of Israel will never give up neighborhoods such as Har Homa, which - as you know - is an integral part of Jerusalem[141].”

On 9 March 2008 it was published that the Minister of Building and Housing Zeev Boim is continually giving instructions to his o$ce sta# to go on with the construction in Agan Ha’ayalot in Givat Zeev (northeast of Beit Duqqo). !e Minister stated that “the renewal of the construction

[137] Haaretz Newspaper, May 11, 2008.[138] Ibid.[139] Ibid.[140] UN General Assembly decision No. 181, issued on November 29, 1947.[141] Haaretz Newspaper, March 17,2008.

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in Agan Ha’ayalot is an important indicator. !e addition of hundreds of housing units is part of a policy aimed at responding to the increasing demand and the need to balance and ensure a reasonable level of prices, while responding to the demographic needs in Jerusalem. I intend to proceed with the activation of this policy in order to strengthen and construct Jerusalem[142].”

In addition, Haaretz newspaper reported on 17 March 2008 under the heading “A plan is approved to build thousands of housing units in East Jerusalem”:

“Two weeks ago, the district committee on zoning and construction in Jerusalem approved a plan to construct 2200 housing units in the area Givat Hamatos in East Jerusalem. !is plan will include the construction of 4000 units, which, once completed, will isolate the residents of Beit Safafa neighborhoods, totaling 11,000, within a continuum of Jewish buildings

In this stage, the approval is made to open the plan for objections…

…. !e area of Givat Hamatos is located between Gilo neighborhood, Beit Safafa neighborhood and Hebron road. !is is one of the largest open areas in the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem. It was explained to the committee that constriction in this area is important for the future of the City. About 40% of the area of the plan is under the ownership of Israel Land Administration, 20% are owned by Jews and about 40% are owned by Palestinians.”[143]

Finally, it is worth mentioning here that the current Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu, has restated recently the known Israeli position in response to the American criticism to the Israeli position to allow construction of some 20 apartments for Jews in the Shepherd Hotel, in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood:

“United Jerusalem is the capital of the Jewish people in the State of Israel, and our sovereignty over the city is not subject to appeal,”[144]

To maintain this position and ensure its control over the Palestinian land and people in East Jerusalem, Israel has subjected them both to intensive use of its laws and policies as shown in diagram 3 below:

[142] www.moh.gov.il [143] “A plan is approved to build thousands of housing units in East Jerusalem”, Haaretz, 17 March 2008.[144] Akiva Eldar, “No di#erence to U.S. between outpost, East Jerusalem construction”, Haaretz Newspaper, July 20, 2009.


Diagram 3: Israeli laws used to ensure control over people and land

6. Conclusion and Closing Remarks:

Israel has adopted a policy aimed at assuring its control over East Jerusalem and other areas occupied in 1967, and at strengthening the Jewish presence in Jerusalem and its surroundings and ensuring a Jewish demographic prevalence at the expense of Arab presence. To achieve these goals, Israel has applied its administration to the area concerned ad has used its national laws as political tools.

However, East Jerusalem has been and remains an occupied area, governed by the laws of armed con%ict relating to occupation. Under these laws, the occupying power is prohibited from altering the city>s features and geography and from imposing constraints on its population with the aim of forcing them out. International law does not acknowledge annexation, nor does the act of occupation, no matter how long it lasts, grant the occupier sovereignty[145]. !e occupier may have

[145] See especially Part III, Section III of the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Available at www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/380?OpenDocument

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the authority and administration but sovereignty remains in the hands of the occupied people. i.e., the Palestinian people living in the city, and has the right to self-determination.[146]

It is worrying to see that many states deal with Jerusalem as a “regular” Israeli city, ignoring the realities of the occupation that began in 1967 and have yet to end[147]. Hopefully, the statements issued recently by the United States,[148] the European Union and the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, [149] demanding Israel not to build more apartments for Jews in East Jerusalem, indicate a real and more serious change in this regard. !e UN Secretary General reminded Israel of its obligation as an occupier and stated that “if Israel continues settlement activity, it will not only be acting contrary to international law but also to a strong international consensus”[150]

Certainly, the occupation of East Jerusalem and the forced application of Israeli laws and administration on its Palestinian population have altered their status from the Israeli point of view, making them attached in the di#erent aspects of their lives to the Israeli institution and a#ected by how it applies its laws and regulations, often against the interest of the Palestinian population. However, until an agreed upon solution on the future of Jerusalem is reached, ensuring equality and decent living for all its residents, the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem have no choice other than to remain attached to their city and be aware of obstacles and traps created by the Israeli laws and practices, in order to avoid them and prevent any grave consequences that may ensue, such as losing their right to residency in the city under Israeli law. !e continued presence of the Palestinian population in Jerusalem is testament to the people’s resilience and fortitude in their city, and constitutes a main factor in ensuring the success of any future solution seeking to make Jerusalem also “the Capital of the Palestinian State.”

Endnotes:1 *Usama Halabi has been a Law Researcher and Advocate in Jerusalem since 1987. He serves on the Board of ˜B’Tselem: !e Israeli Information for Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and was a founding member of the Arab Cultural Association in Nazareth, where he served on the Board until 2001. He also was a founding member of Mada al-Carmel, the Center for Applied Social Research in Haifa. Mr. Halabi received his Law degree from Hebrew University. He holds a MA in Law specializing in national discrimination in Israeli law and a second MA in International Legal Studies from American University in Washington, DC. His research focuses on constitutional and administrative law, planning law and land expropriation. His published work deals with the legal jurisdictional status of Jerusalem, Israeli practice in the West Bank and Gaza, and the status and rights of the Arab minority in Israel. In addition to seven published books, he is the author of numerous articles in professional journals and local and international newspapers. His most recent book is entitled, “Limits of a Place in Human Existence: Two Dimensions, Geography and Demography in Israel’s East Jerusalem Policy Between 1967 and 2000” (Ramallah, Jerusalem Association for Legal Aid and Human Rights, 2001).His recent article is entitled: ”!e Legal Status and Rights of the Palestinians Displaced as a Result of the June 1967 War”, !e Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 15No.4, 2009,p.54.

[146] !e right to self-determination of peoples is recognized in the Charter of the United Nations as well as international human rights law. See especially Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1967) and General Comment 12 of the Human Rights Committee, 13 March 1984. Both available at www.ohchr.org.[147] Reference is made to the Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the OPTs, by John Dugard, the then UN Special Rapporteur for the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Geneva, August 2005.[148] Infra note 138.[149] News Agencies, “Israel envoy: No crisis with U.S over settlements”, www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1102126.html (22/7/2009)[150] Ibid.

CHAPTER TWO

Land Con"scation and Settlement Construction In Occupied East Jerusalem

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43CHAPTER TWOLand Con"scation and Settlement Construction In Occupied East Jerusalem

Land Con"scation and Settlement Construction In Occupied East Jerusalem

Khalil Tufakji

Director of the Maps Department of the Arab Studies Society

IntroductionLegal, political, historic and geographic perspectives play a signi"cant role in determining political boundaries. While the legal perspective determines the boundaries of sovereignty and authority jurisdiction, the political perspective determines the ideological, economic, social and political systems. !ese elements played a signi"cant role in the demarcation of the Jerusalem Municipal boundaries.

!e importance of the geographic location of Jerusalem lies in the fact that it combines the two elements of openness and closeness at the same time. While closeness provides a certain degree of protection, openness on the other hand provides the potential to communicate with the neighboring areas and countries. !ese elements underline the religious, military, commercial and political importance of the city.

Due to Jerusalem’s location, with its characteristics of closeness and openness, it was chosen to be the point of emergence of Judaism and Christianity and to become the center of illumination for both religions. Afterwards, Islam linked Mecca with Jerusalem physically and spiritually giving Jerusalem a renewed importance and an increasing defensive ability.

!e "rst nucleus of the city of Jerusalem was established on ad-Duhur hill (Tel Ovel) that overlooks the village of Silwan in the south-eastern part of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. !is defensive position was chosen to provide protection and security to this emerging city. !e water of Ein Silwan (a spring that has the name after the village) provided the population with water. Valley Quadroon (the "re) surrounds it from the east and valley Rababa (Hnom) from the south-west and Jouret al- Innab from the west. !ese valleys form three natural defensive lines which make any attack on the Old City of Jerusalem di$cult except from both the north and north-west side.

To determine the geographic boundaries of the city, it was surrounded by walls that had a wider circle than that de"ned by the present walls, which were build afterwards by the Ottoman Sultan (Salman al Qanuni). !e initial walls reached northward up to the area known nowadays as the mosque of Sa’d and Said.

In the year 1863, the "rst municipality of Jerusalem was founded. In the mid-nineteenth century, Jewish neighborhoods began to appear and were then included in the boundaries of Jerusalem for the political purpose of achieving a Jewish majority in the city.[151] For ideological reasons, Yameen Moshe neighborhood was established in 1850 in the district of Joret al-Innab in order to establish the nucleus of Jewish neighborhoods outside the walls in the south-western, north-westerns and the

[151] !e demarcation of the municipal boundaries was established in such a way to include the Jewish neighborhoods and exclude neighborhoods with and Arab majority for the political purpose of creating a Jewish majority in Jerusalem.

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western direction. !en the neighborhood of Mi’a Sha‘arim was established in the Musrara area, and Makor Haim (Moscovia) in (1858). !e international Zionist movement, with the compliance of the British, was able to pressure the Ottomans to issue a number of decrees that allowed the Jews to establish a number of institutions in the city of Jerusalem. !e international Zionist Movement established the headquarters of the Executive Committee of the International Zionist Organization in Jerusalem, as well as the headquarters of the Jewish Agency, the Constituent Fund (Keren ha-Yesod), the National Jewish Fund (ha-Keren ha-Kayemet), the National Council of the Yeshuv and the Center for the Jewish National Committee which was the highest political administrative authority in Palestine in 1920. Jerusalem was assigned as the headquarters of the Hebrew University, which was established in 1925, and Hadassah Hospital which was founded in 1935.

As a result of the emergence of the suburban settlements in the western part of Jerusalem, and in accordance with the Zionist claims in the Israeli literature that Jerusalem has always had a Jewish majority and as part of the demographic con%ict over it, the British Mandate Government and the Zionist leaders set the demarcation of the municipality boundaries in relation to the Jewish presence. However it should be noted that the area of the Jewish quarter in the old city of Jerusalem did not exceed 5000 m&and its population was not more than ninety families.

!e boundaries were extended several kilometers to the West up to Giv’at Sha’ul, Shkhunat Mantifyori, Beit ha-Kerem, Shkhunat ha-Poalim and Beit Fajan, which was, located 7 kilometers away from the city walls, while the extension to the south and east was limited to few hundred meters, and stopped at the entrances of the neighboring Arab villages of the city. !e Arab villages were excluded from the boundaries of the city including those big ones, namely (at-Tur, Shu’fat, Lifta, Deir Yassin, Silwan, al-Isawiya, Ein Karem, al-Malha, Beit Safafa) despite the fact that those villages were connected to the city in a way that could almost be considered their suburbs.

!en the demarcation of the boundaries of the municipality was established in 1921 to include the Old City and a cross section of 400 meters along the eastern side of the wall of the Holy City in addition to the neighborhoods of Bab as-Sahira, Wadij-Joz, Sheikh Jarrah from the north. From the south, the line of the boundaries ended on the city wall, while from the west, with an area that exceeds the eastern part several times, the boundaries included the large concentrations of the Jewish communities in addition to some Arab ones (al-Qatamon, al-Bak’a al-Foqa and al-Bak’a al-Tahta, al-Talbeyia, al-Wa’reya, Sheikh Bader and Ma’man Allah).

!e second scheme of the municipality boundaries was done in 1946 to expand the services in the area. However, the expansion again focused on the western side in order to include and annex the new Jewish neighborhoods that remained outside the area of the general planning 1931. In the eastern part of the city, the village of Silwan was added from the south in addition to both ath-!awri and Wadij-Joz, with a total area of 20,199,000 m&. !e ownership of these lands was distributed as follows:

1 Muslim properties 40%

2 Jewish properties 26.12%

3 Christian properties 13.86%

4 Governmental and municipal properties 2.9%

5 Roads, Railways 17.12%

Total 100%

!e constructed area expanded from 4,130000 m& in 1918 to 7,230,000 m& in 1948. !e partition resolution (1947 -1949) once again recommended a separate status for Jerusalem under international


administration. !is resolution renewed the idea of partition of Palestine and internationalization of Jerusalem suggested by the Palestine Royal Commission (Peel Commission) to keep Jerusalem and Bethlehem, in addition to al-Old, al-Ramble and Je# outside the boundaries of the two states (the Jewish and the Arab) with free and safe crossings.

!e resolution stated that Jerusalem should be a separate region (corpus separatum) located between the two states (the Arab and the Jewish) and subject to a special international regime administered by the United Nations by a Trusteeship Council which will be formed for this purpose.

It determined the boundaries of Jerusalem subject to the proposed internationalization to include, in addition to the same city (Abu Dis from the east, Bethlehem from the south, Ein Karem, Mutsa, Kalonia from the west, and Shu’fat from the north).

But the war in 1948 and the escalation of the war battles that followed the partition resolution led to the division of the city into two parts. On November 30, 1948, the Israeli and Jordanian authorities signed a cease"re agreement, following the assigning of the division line of Jerusalem between the eastern and western parts of the city on July 22, 1948. !us, by the end of 1948, Jerusalem was divided into two parts and its borders were set as a result of the cease-"re line as follows:

1 Palestinian areas under the Jordanian control 2,220.000 m& 11.48%

2 occupied Palestinian areas (Western part) 16.261.000 m& 84.12%

3 No man zones and United Nations zones 850.000 m& 4.39%

Total 19.331.000 m# 100%

!us, after the armistice agreement between the Jordanian and Israeli on March 4, 1949, an agreement to share Jerusalem between them was con"rmed in accordance with their political position to oppose the internationalization of the city. On July 13, 1951, the "rst elections for the Arab Jerusalem municipality were held. !e municipality paid special attention to the determination and expansion of its municipal boundaries in order to accommodate the population growth and solve the worsening housing crisis. !e "rst scheme that shows the boundaries of Jerusalem Municipality (East Jerusalem) was rati"ed on 1 April 1952; the following areas were included within the areas under the municipality jurisdiction: the village of Silwan, Ras al-‘Amud, al-Suwaneh, Ard as-Samar, and the southern part of the village of Shu>fat. !e area under the municipality authority became 6.5 km& while the constructed area was only 3 km&.

On February 12, 1957, the Municipal Council decided to expand the boundaries of the municipality due to the limitations set by Kandil to prevent construction in the foothills of the Mount of Olives and the western and southern slopes of Mount Masharef (Mount Scopus). Many areas were monastery and church properties and others were still common properties (masha’) and had not passed the reparciliation process and thus could not be areas for building houses (Sheikh Jarrah, Shu’fat).

In one of the sessions of Jerusalem Municipality on June 22, 1958, the Council discussed the project of expanding the municipality boundaries northward to include an area of 500 meters wide from both sides of the main road leading to Ramallah and extends until Calandia airport. Discussions over the expansion of the municipal boundaries, and for a major urban scheme for the city continued without conclusion until 1959.

In September of 1959, the transformation of Jerusalem Municipality into the Jerusalem Secretariat was announced. !e change in the titles was not followed by a change in the size of budgets or aid.

46

In 1964, after the 1963 elections, there was a recommendation to expand the narrow boundaries of Jerusalem Municipality to become 135 km&, but the outbreak of the war in 1967 stopped the project, and the boundaries remained as it was in the "fties.

As for West Jerusalem, it has been expanded to the west and south-west to included new neighborhoods such as Kiryat Yovel, Kiryat Menachem, Eir Ganim, the villages of Ein Karem, Beit Safafa, Deir Yassin, Lifta, al-Malha to become with an area of 38 km&. !e West Jerusalem Municipality began to prepare an Urban Scheme for the city in 1964 which was re-sketched in 1968.

1967 War and the Expansion of the BoundariesIn June 1967 war broke out and subsequently, at the end of the war, Israel occupied East Jerusalem and began its procedures for the Judaization of the city. !e successive Israeli governments, of both “ha-Ma’rakh” and “ha-Likud”, agreed on this policy and developed strategic and tactical programs to achieve this goal. After announcing the expansion of the boundaries of Jerusalem Municipality and its reuni"cation on June 28, 1967, and in accordance with Israeli policy to control as much land as possible with the least possible number of Arab population, Rehba’m Ze’evi[152] drew the municipality boundaries to include the territories of 28 Arab villages and cities excluding their population centers. !e boundaries thus took a convoluted path, sometimes according to topographic lines, and another time with the roads. !us, another era of the municipality boundaries demarcation began to expand the area of Jerusalem Municipality from 6.5 km& to 70.5 km&. !e total area of both East and West Jerusalem became 108.5 km&. Later in 1990, the boundaries expanded to the west, and the area of Jerusalem became now 126 km& (See boundaries expansion table).

Since the early hours of occupation, the Israeli bulldozers and the Israeli policy started designing the features for the Judaization of Jerusalem in order to impose fait accompli and create geo-political conditions that would make it di$cult for a politician or a geographer to re-divide the city once again. !e Israeli authorities started to set the foundations for the construction of Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem in order to establish a series of colonies surrounding Jerusalem from all sides, and inhabit them by settlers to create a new geographic and demographic reality. !ese policies lead to a population disturbance in Arab East Jerusalem.

!e Palestinian residents constituted the majority in 1967, and in 2008 they became only 35%. !ey also used to control 100% of the land but now after the con"scations, the establishment of settlement projects, the building of roads, they control only 14% of the land.

Laws and regulations followed for the Judaization of JerusalemLand Con"scation1. : the Israeli authorities used con"scation laws for the public interest in order to establish the colonies. According to the Land Act of 1943 and through the Ministry of Finance and under the coverage of expropriation for the public interest, 24 km& of land was con"scated, equivalent to 35% of the area of East Jerusalem. 15 Israeli colonies were established and 60 thousand housing units were built. !e law of expropriation for

[152] Rehba’m Ze’evi was the military leader of Jerusalem district during the 1967 war , before his assassination at the beginning of the second Intifada, he occupied the position of the president of the right wing Moledet Party.


the public interest is one of the most prominent laws used by Israel to seize the Palestinian lands that were considered the vital space for their construction development.

!e Laws of Organization and Construction:2. the Israeli authorities used the laws of organization and construction to limit the physical growth and control this growth through organizing and planning. Since the early days of occupation, Israel started closing areas around the Old City announcing them as green areas and prevented any building on them. 40% of the total area of East Jerusalem became green areas and were considered strategic reserve for the construction of the settlements, as in Abu-Ghneim Mountain, and the area of ar-Ras in the village of Shu’fat. !ose areas were converted from green areas to settlement construction to become Har Homa in the case of Abu Ghneim and Ramat Shlomo in Shu’fat.

Construction and growth has therefore been severely restricted, with 13% of the annexed area zoned by Israeli Authorities for Palestinian construction, within which Palestinians may apply to obtain a building permit.[153]

Numerous obstacles were also placed within the process of obtaining building permits, including heavy costs that could reach up to thirty thousand dollars for every permit, in addition to extended delays for the issuance of a permit[154]. !is policy forced the inhabitants to build their houses without permits or simply immigrate towards the areas surrounding the municipality of Jerusalem boundaries where the land prices are reasonable and it is easier and less expensive to obtain a building permit.

Absentees’ Law3. : !e Absentees’ Property Law of 1950[155], which was enacted for land con"scation, is also used as a tool to Judaize Jerusalem. !is law states that a person who was outside the State of Israel during the census conducted by Israel in 1967, his properties are transferred to the custodian of the absentees properties.

!e custodian has the right to sell and lease the property. !is is also what happened to the real estate that had been seized for settlement construction in the Old City[156].

Judaization4. : as part of the Israeli project in Jerusalem, Israel worked on the Judaization of the Palestinian minority that remained in the city, whose percentage does not exceed 35% of the total population. Israel is working towards linking health, education, commerce, industry and services sectors in the eastern part of Jerusalem with its own institutions in West Jerusalem, adding to the annexation of the limited minority of the population of Jerusalem to the annexation of the lands of the city.

!e Municipality is raising the level of pupils’ assimilation in the Israeli governmental schools in order to cover the Arab public and private schools restricted abilities. !ere are 39189[157] Arab students studying in the Israeli schools in Jerusalem, i.e. 53%, while 30270 Arab students are studying in the Arab private and public schools.

[153] U.N. O$ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian A#airs Occupied Palestinian Territories. !e Planning Crisis in East Jerusalem: Understanding the Phenomenon of “Illegal Construction”.April 2009. [154] Ibid. [155] Absentees Property Law 5710. (1950) Israel Knesset. [156] See: Osama Halabi.[157] Sameer Jibril. References of the Education in Jerusalem/ the Reality and Challenges/Jerusalem, (2008).,

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In order to achieve all these goals, the municipality formed a committee of its senior sta# to set a vision that contributes to the upgrading of East Jerusalem and achieving full integration with West Jerusalem.[158]

Con"scation of Identity Cards5. : Israel views the Palestinians living in Jerusalem as Jordanian citizens living in the State of Israel, according to the laws imposed on the city of Jerusalem. Just after the occupation in 1967, Israel imposed a general curfew and conducted a census of the Palestinians on June 26,1967. !e census tables were considered the basis for issuing residence cards to the Palestinians in Jerusalem. Israel considered that all Palestinians residents in Jerusalem had illegally entered Israel, although permitted them to stay in Jerusalem as a humanitarian gesture from the State of Israel. !us, they are not citizens but foreigners who are permanent residents in Israel.

!is is the legal status that made every Jerusalemite living in any other place, whether outside the country, in the West Bank or Gaza Strip, for a relatively long period, lose his or her right of permanent residency in the City.

!e Law of Entry into Israel of 1952 in particular empowers the Minister of the Interior to cancel residency, temporarily or permanently.[159]

In addition, article 11(a)(2) of the Nationality Law 1952[160] states that the people will lose their permanent residency in case of residency in a foreign country for a period of seven years. !is article applies to Palestinians who live outside the Municipality boundaries of Jerusalem that were drawn by the Israeli authorities after the occupation.

Greater Jerusalem in the Israeli Concept!e increase of the Arab population has formed an essential point of departure in drawing the lines of Greater Jerusalem[161] In 1993, planning for the “Greater Jerusalem” began under the leadership of “Binyamin Ben-Eliezer”, the Minister of Housing at that time, and was supported by direct instructions from Yitzhak Rabin.

!e objectives of this scheme was to create a clear contiguity for the Jewish population, reduce the convergence and friction with the Arabs, strengthen the special status of Jerusalem as the ‘capital of Israel’, and link the settlements outside the municipality’s boundaries with those inside it by passages to achieve a Jewish majority of 88 % and an Arab minority of 12%.

!us, the "nal goal was to create a demographic change to bene"t Israel by implementing the vision of Ehud Olmert (the Mayor of Jerusalem at that time). Olmert’s vision was to annex the settlement blocs outside the municipality boundaries, exclude the Arab communities from the city, separate the Palestinian areas from one another dividing the West Bank into cantons, control large parts of the West Bank and prevent any Palestinian geographic jurisdiction or practice sovereignty on the ground, and "nally prevent the establishment of a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem.

[158] Ahmad Gneim. Jerusalem:TtheLast Call,.,(1999) p110.[159] Entry Into Israel Law 5712. August 26, 1952. Knesset. [160] Nationality Law 5712. April 1, 1952. Knesset.[161] Metropolitan of Jerusalem, Foundation Plan and Development Plan/Interior Ministry and Housing Ministry, the administration of Israel’s lands/ the municipality of Jerusalem 1994, the o$cial document.


(Map of Greater Jerusalem)

50

Sharon’s Project (!e Gates)Within the programmed policy of Judaization, and after surrounding the city with colonies, a new policy began in 1987 to establish settlement outposts in Arab neighborhoods. !e Israeli authorities began establishing such outposts in the Old City, especially in the Muslim Quarter using various methods and laws to seize Arab properties. Parallel settlement societies with multiple names were established, supported directly and indirectly by the Israeli government, to control Arab houses in order to achieve several objectives, including:

A controlled and secured passage between Bab al-‘Amood and al-Buraq Wall. 1.

Making it di$cult to divide the Old City in case of reaching a peaceful solution. 2.

!e expulsion of the Arab population out of the Muslim and Christian quarters, in order 3. to ensure population control, making the Arabs a minority who is easily monitored. !is is the Israeli plan for the year 2020.

Afterwards, this policy moved outside the city walls, when Sharon put forward a project to establish 26 settlements outposts outside the Old City within the Arab neighborhoods. !e project begins in Ras al-‘Amood, and Mountain of Olives, Sheikh Jarrah, al-Mukaber Mountain, and then moved to the area of Wadij-Joz. !ese outposts were points of friction between Arabs and Jews and began expanding in order to surround the Arab neighborhoods with settlement outposts, making the Arab population a minority surrounded by a Jewish majority. !rough this, the Arab neighborhoods are supposed to become dispersed points in a mosaic portrait of Jewish presence.

!e Settlement Project E1!is project was announced in 1994 on an area of 12.443.000 m& of the lands of the villages of at-Tur, Anata, al-Eizariya and Abu Dis. !e scheme that was designed and approved in 1997 by the Israeli Minister of Defense at that time Yitzhak Mordechai aims at:

!e establishment of an industrial zone on an area of 1 km&1. !e establishment of 4000 housing units. 2. !e establishment of 5 hotels.3.

!e E1 scheme is considered one of the most dangerous for the following reasons:

!e complete closure of the eastern parts of Jerusalem district and the surrounding of these 1. parts (Anata, at-Tur and Hizma), thus leaving no possibility of their future expansion to the East.

E#ectively prevent the establishment of East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine.2.

Linking all the settlements situated in the eastern areas and outside the municipality 3. boundaries of Jerusalem with the settlements within the municipality boundaries of Jerusalem. !us, making the Arab villages segregated areas surrounded by colonies.


!e establishment of the Greater Jerusalem in the Israeli concept with an area of 600 km&, 4. or the equivalent of 10% of the West Bank.

!e establishment of a set of belts of highways and subways that connect these settlements 5. with the settlements within the municipality boundaries and the Arab villages, such as the proposed Ring Road, Road No. 70 ( its construction is ongoing) or Tunnels Road No.16, which was inaugurated on Mount Scopus (al-Masharef ).

!e Large increase in the Jewish population within Jerusalem Municipality boundaries 6. to overcome the growth in the Arab population, which amounted to 35% of the total population. !e desired ratio of the Arabs as decided by the Israeli Ministerial Committee for Jerusalem in 1973 was 22%. However, it decided recently that this ratio should not exceed 12% of the total population of Jerusalem located within Jerusalem Municipality boundaries.

Linking this scheme with the project under planning, which is called the Eastern Gate.7.

Preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state with a geographic jurisdiction.8.

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(!e settlement project outside and within the boundaries of Jerusalem)


!e Eastern Gate !e Eastern Gate is located to the north east of Jerusalem and extends over the main eastern entrance of the city from the direction of the Jordan Valley. It has an area of about 2.700.000 m&. !e project aims at establishing commercial centers on an estimated area between 15 thousand and 20 thousand m&, the establishment of productive projects (Hi Tech), municipal institutions, bus parking and a train station.

In 1996, Jerusalem municipality decided to allocate half a million shekels for the planning of the Gate, and on 20 November 1996, the municipality set a plan to build 2200 housing units. !e Minister of Housing at that time Meir Porush announced his primary approval of the project and in the elections held in 2008, the elected Mayor (Nir Barakat) revived this project in his electoral campaign.

!e Complementary Building Plan for the Settlements of Neve Yacov and Adam Within the Urban scheme that the Ministry of Construction and Housing is working on, it planned to build about 1,600 housing units in the north-east of the city. !e construction will be beyond the city’s jurisdiction and will create contiguity between the Jewish settlement of Neve Yacov and Giv’at Binyamin (Adam).

!e proposed scheme aims at cutting o# the geographic contiguity between the villages of (Hizma, Jaba’ and ar-Ram) in order to put an end to their future expansion, as well as linking the colonies outside the municipality boundaries with those within the city boundaries.

!e Annexation Wall that has been completed in the region enforces this project; the lands which were excluded from the boundaries are preserved for future use in the bene"t of the proposed construction.

Paralyzing the Center of the Arab CityFollowing the encircling of Jerusalem from all sides with colonies, the establishment of thousands of Jewish housing units accompanied with Israeli settlers, and the con"scation of 34% of the area of Jerusalem[162], another phase of the process of Judaization has begun.

!is phase concentrates on directing a blow to the nerve of the Palestinian economy by declaring the new scheme for the city center with the aim of restricting the commercial activity by challenging and thus destroying the trade and industry in the Arab city.

Business has extended very little beyond the two rows of shops and o$ces that existed before 1967 in Salah-Din Street, which was considered a major commercial zone.

[162] Land Research Center. http://www.lrcj.org/index.htm. (2009)

54

In 1966, the Jordanian government planned to establish an industrial zone in the area of Qalandia because it is near the airport, which was planned to become international after performing the necessary expansions including the increase of the length of the runway and the establishment of a services area and designed special engineering plans for the region.

!e war of 1967, which disrupted these projects, was followed by a phase of land con"scation in 1970 to establish a special industrial zone for Israel. !ese con"scated lands would have become the space needed for the expansion of Palestinian trade and the establishment of Palestinian institutions that left the commercial area as a result of the Israeli policy of economic and regulatory constraints.

!e municipality is now conducting radical changes in the historic commercial area. Trucks, public vehicles parking, and peddlers on the streets will be removed to clean up the streets surrounding the walls of the Old City, and the making Salah-Din Street into a pedestrian passage, thus adopting radical changes in the tra$c movement. Another targeted area is al-Musrarah. It has been destroyed by establishing separating streets and making the whole area a general parking lot.

!us, the Israeli plan is to transfer economic activity from the center of the city of East Jerusalem to West Jerusalem. !ese changes will gradually weaken the economy of East Jerusalem and its traditional status as a commercial center.

A Final Israeli blow to East Jerusalem was the construction of the Annexation Wall that separates Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. As a result, a new phenomenon of transferring business and economic institutions from the city center began to appear with all of the related political and economic dimensions. Consequently, East Jerusalem becomes a ghost town after "ve p.m. further indicating the loss of East Jerusalem’s status as a city center.

Scheme 2020 Scheme 2020 emerged following the realization that the Arab population reached 35% of the total population in spite of the aforementioned policy. !e studies conducted by the Israeli research centers predicted a percentage of 40% for Arabs among the total population in the city in 2020, which alarmed Israeli planners.

!e Israeli government formed a steering team consisting of 40 planners in several "elds and included 31 representatives on behalf of Jerusalem Municipality, headed by the Mayor. !e team was supposed to design a structural map for the city of Jerusalem in order to develop the city and strengthen its centralism as the capital of the State of Israel and as a center for the Jewish people. It aims at strengthening its economic and social center, taking care of public buildings and buildings of national and international institutions. It also seeks to promote and increase the power of attraction of the city after years of population expulsion and create reserves of land for residential construction.

!is means that Israel’s attempts to control the city has taken a new dimension of demographic struggle, information for which can found in the book issued by the Municipality, including plans for maintenance of the Arab population growth.

!e data indicates the existence of 15 thousand illegal housing units as well as the failure of the expansion project to the west and the construction of 20 thousand housing units for Jews met resistance from the Jewish neighborhoods. !us, Safadi project "le was closed.


!us, the scheme 2020, with all its political and planning dimensions has one goal, to reduce the Palestinian presence in the city, especially during this crucial stage of transition for Jerusalem. !e surplus of the housing units and the areas of development are only allocated for Jews in order to attract new residents and prevent migration from East Jerusalem.

As for Palestinians, the scheme handles the increase in population by granting permits to add new %oors to the existing buildings only, without taking into account the infrastructure needed to absorb the new residents. According to the scheme, the areas that are rural in nature, where it is forbidden to build, are included in the Arab populations’ areas. In fact, allocating 2.500.000 m& to construct 26 thousand housing units for Arabs cannot be applied on the ground for several reasons, the most important of which are the land ownership, the common ownership and the lack of infrastructure. In addition, there is a lack of "nancial resources for construction, assuming that all the above-mentioned problems were resolved.

Noting that of the 9.500.000m&, which is the space allocated for the establishment of 47,000 Israeli housing units, construction will be done with certainty because the Israeli government and its construction companies have their own system in construction and selling the apartments. !is means that the absorptive capacity for designated Jewish areas in the scheme will be executed according to the set plan, while the planned Arab construction will remain uncertain.

!e E$ects of the Annexation Wall on the Situations in the Holy City!e Ex- General Attorney of Israel, (Meir Shamgar) admitted that the racial Annexation Wall, which is now constructed in the city of Jerusalem, allows the custodian of the absentees properties to seize the properties of Palestinians who live outside the Annexation Wall. !e Wall has created a situation whereby Palestinians have been dispossessed of their lands and property which were transferred to the custodian of the Absentees’ Properties[163]. !rough the dispossession of Palestinians Jerusalemites of their properties and the denial of their rights for movement by various pretexts, Israel is seeking to isolate Jerusalem with all its neighborhoods and surrounding villages from the West Bank[164].

For the "rst time, the State admits that the considerations in determining the track of the Annexation Wall were not only security purposes, but there are also other considerations involved. 250 thousand Arabs are living in the city of Jerusalem holding the blue Identity Card, 130 thousand live inside the wall, while 125 thousand live in the areas of Jerusalem located outside the Wall. Demographic considerations were taken into account when de"ning the future boundaries of Jerusalem Municipality. !e future vision of Jerusalem conducted by the former Mayor of Jerusalem, and Prime Minister Olmert, is based on the following key elements:

Excluding Palestinian communities from the municipality boundaries of Jerusalem.1.

Annexing the settlement blocs which fall outside the municipality boundaries, while 2. keeping the Old City and the surrounding areas with a Palestinian population no more than 12% of the total population.

[163] Dan Margalit. “A Scandal Made in Jerusalem”. Ma’ariv 25/1/2005.[164] Amira Hass. “!e Plan to Isolate Jerusalem” Ha’aretz 26/1/2005 .

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Continuation of the Settlements Policy After Anapolis Agreement (Real Estate Registration Project)According to the Israeli weekly “Yerushalaim” on 11 November 2005, and re-published in “Ha’aretz” newspaper on 10 March 2008, there is an unprecedented step which has been taken in the Jewish quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem. !e company for the development of the Jewish quarter is working on the registration of 1300 properties in the Old City in the lands registery (Tabo) that includes 585 housing apartments, 146 shops and more than 60 public institutions. It should be noted that before 1948, the so-called Jewish quarter had an area of no more than 5000 m& of which the majority was located in Haret ash-Sharaf. !ere were some Jewish properties in the Muslim Quarter, which were managed by the “Jordanian custodian of the enemy’s properties”, in accordance with the decision taken by the Minister of the Interior at that time, Was" Mirza, on September 16, 1950, and published in the O$cial Gazette No. 3035.

In 1968, the con"scation of 116000 m& of the lands of the Old City was announced according to a con"scation order for the public interest, No. 5 b/ a/ 108/322 and was published in the O$cial Gazette No.1443. In accordance with this order, 790 properties belonging to the followings were con"scated:

Islamic Wakf 15 real estate 1.9%Inherent Wakf 382 real estate 48.6%Private properties 257 real estate 32.5%Christian consecration 9 real estate 1.1%Jewish properties 121 real estate 15.3%Public facilities 6 (Municipality) 0.8%Total 790 100%

!e statistics show that the properties belonging to the Arabs equal 84% of the total land con"scated in 1968. !e claim that these properties did not have historic documentation in the Ottoman, English and Jordanian period is inaccurate because the British government had divided the Old City into 59 blocks, numerating each block, each house, and even the number of rooms in each house.

!e owner used to register and pay the taxes on his properties. Many among the population have registered their properties in the Turkish property registry during the Ottoman period. !e procedure continued in the Jordanian period, as evidenced by the existence of the records of taxes of the real estate assessment in the municipality and in the records of property registered in Israeli government departments, the records that were captured by the Israelis in 1967.!is unprecedented procedure is a legal cover for the continuous control Israel has adopted since 1967. !rough the registration of land ownership, Israel provides a legal cover that consolidates the Jewish individual property over the real estate they occupy.

!is step comes within the policy to strengthen the Jewish presence, weaken the Arab existence in the city and its surroundings, preceding the "nal negotiations in order to impose realities on the ground and bring about a change in the geography and the population.


Israeli Settlements Within the Expanded Boundaries of Jerusalem Municipality

1) !e Jewish Quarter: As previously mentioned, the Israeli policy of the Judaization of Jerusalem began immediately after the 1967 war with the demolition of Haret ash-Sharaf in the Old City, for the purpose of expanding and building the new Jewish quarter. In 1968, 116000 m& of land was con"scated according to an order issued by the Ministry of Finance attached with the map No 5b/ a/108/322 and published in the O$cial Gazette No. 1443.

On this con"scated area, 595 buildings which include 1048 shops and stores, in addition to "ve Mosques, 4 schools, and an Arab historic market (the Bashoura market) and a commercial street which was part of the Bab as-Silisla street along with a number of historic buildings constructed during the Mamluki, the Ayubi times and the Ottoman Empire. About 6 thousand Arabs were living in this area in three neighborhoods: the Moroccan (al-Maghraba)[165] neighborhood, which was completely destroyed after the war, and a part of as-Siriyan and ash-Sharaf neighborhoods.

In his autobiography, the late Secretary of Jerusalem, Rohi al-Khatib indicates that on 11 June 1967 the removal of the Moroccan Quarter had started. Hayel Sanduqa indicates in his research that evacuation of the neighborhood was executed in the evening of June 10, 1967, and therefore the dates of 11, 12, 13 of June 1967 had witnessed the "rst ethnic cleansing in the history of the city of Jerusalem, which continues until this day.

When the Palestinian residents refused to leave their homes, the houses were destroyed on the heads of their owners. Israeli sources have admitted, during an investigation published in “Yerushalaim” weekly in November 1999, that Eitan Ben-Moshe Ben Eitan, an o$cer in the Engineering Corps in the Israeli army at that time, that they demolished the neighborhood of al-Magharba and expelled its inhabitants, or demolished houses on top of the heads of their owners, then their bodies were buried within the remains under the current Wailing Wall square. !ree more bodies were transferred to Bikur Holim hospital in West Jerusalem. Uzi Benziman referred to the incident in his book “Jerusalem: A City Without Walls” saying “an elderly woman was taken out of the remains of the house destroyed by the Israeli bulldozers”. He further mentions the name of the old woman “Rasmiya Ali Tabeki”. !e same name was mentioned in another study as “Rasmia Abu Aquil Almughrabiah”, who died later as a result of this event.

In addition, the girls’ school, which was built during the Jordanian era and, real estate located outside al-Magharba Gate leading to al-Haram was also demolished in 14 June 1969. !e school was demolished after a period of time in which it was used as a Court of Appeal for issues of personal status and then for a short period as a Rabbi Court. As for Abu as-Suod neighborhood, which consisted of 21 houses and was adjacent to al-Haram from the outside, the Israeli government removed these houses in 1969.

!is area is about 15% of the total area of the Old City of Jerusalem (868.000 m&). !e authorities made extensive e#orts and huge "nancial investments in reconstructing the neighborhood. It mixes the traditional distinctive style of the buildings of the Old City and the modern character

[165] !e Judaization of Jerusalem 9th September 1971/ Rohi al-Khatib.

58

of these buildings, which make the quarter a tourist and cultural site of the city, in addition to its comfortable residency conditions. !e population of this neighborhood was 2,400 inhabitants in 2008.

Project No. 2185 was published, which aims to cover an area of 105.000 m&, and to establish 650 housing units that include 2100 rooms on an area of 80.000m&, while the planned units were 2122 units. Educational institutions, clubs, centers for mothers and children and health clinics[166] were established in this neighborhood.

2) Neve Yacov:!e con"scation of 1.835.000 m& between 1968 and 1980 was announced and published in the o$cial Gazette, in accordance with the Law of the Land (the acquisition for the public interest) for the year 1943. !e total number of the housing units is 3800 where 20250 inhabitants live in an area of 862.000 m&, according to the structural scheme No.1542. In addition to the existence of 46.000m& of green areas, that is considered a reserve for the future expansion of the colony[167].

3) Ramot: Within one of the largest con"scations in the city of Jerusalem (1970), 4.840.000 m& of land was seized by the Israeli government. !e announcement related to the con"scation was published in the o$cial Israeli Gazette (!e Hebrew Bulletin) No. 1656 with the pretext of using the lands “for public interest”. A map was attached carrying the number H f 121/ 322 with its borders, and so the establishment of this colony began in 1972. According to the structural map No. 1861, with an area of 2.875.000 m&, there are (8000) housing units inhabited by 38,992 inhabitants, and it has been expanded again carrying another name, Ramot neighborhood (06), which aims at constructing 200 new housing units[168]. !e colony was established on the territories of the villages of Beit Iksa, Beit Hanina and Lifta.[169]

4) Gilo:!e establishment of this colony started in 1971, after the con"scation of 2.700.000 m& in 1970, according to the structural map No. 1905 with an area of 2.743.000 m&, where 7,484 housing units were constructed and inhabited by 27,569 Jewish settlers.

Its borders were expanded more than once; the latest was by 300 housing units after the con"scation of more lands as ‘absentee properties’. !is colony is considered one of the largest colonies in the south-western part, where it controls the high lands that overlooks Beit Jala and Bethlehem, as well as the city of Jerusalem.

[166] !e structural scheme No 2185/ for the Jewish neighborhood/ the old city/ the department of local planning/ the municipality of Jerusalem 1969.[167] !e structural plan for Never Yahoo Housing- Ministry of Housing- Scheme No 1562, 30/3/1971.[168] Ramot (06) is a new quarter within the structural scheme No. 4192/BM- the municipality of Jerusalem 1993- the area of the scheme 203.000 m&. !e new quarter is a settlement expansion on new lands, but it took the same name with the addition of no.6 in order to avoid international pressure in announcing a new colony as happened with Mountain Abu-Ghneim.[169] Ibrahim Matar. “!e Quiet War: Land Expropriation in the Occupied Territories”. Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture. Vol.4 No.2 1997.


A broad street was built up between the city center and the colony (now Pat – Gilo st.), and therefore Beit Safafa was divided into two parts. !e general scheme of the settlement indicates 9000 housing units[170] will be established. !e colony was established on the lands of Beit Jala and Sharafat, and the con"scation order was published in the O$cial Gazette No. 1656.

5) Eastern Talpiot: A total area of 2.240.000 m& was con"scated by an order issued in 1970 with an annexed scheme No. H f/122/322. According to the structural map No. 1848, the area of this colony is 1.071.000 m&, and 4400 housing units were established to accommodate 12,591 inhabitants.

!is colony converges with the colony of Gilo, the south-eastern belt of those surrounding Jerusalem, and a large part of the colony is situated on ‘no mans land’ that separates Jordan and Israel and is supervised by the Truce Supervision forces. After the 1967 war, Israel signed an agreement with the United Nations in which Israel abandoned 2.084.000 m&, and kept about 716.000 m&. !e establishment of the colony started in 1973[171]. !e con"scated lands were from the village of Sur Baher.

6) Ma’alot Dafna: Ma’alot Dafna constructed on the land con"scated according to order No. H f/ 111/322 in 1968. !e owners of these lands were families from Jerusalem, and the structural scheme 1439A indicates that the area of this Colony is 389.000 m& with 1184 housing units that their construction began in 1973 in the ‘no man lands’ which separate East and West Jerusalem. Road No. 1 was constructed along it.

It is considered one of the belt colonies (the heart), which are colonies constructed inside Arab neighborhoods and apart from the “"ngers scheme” to isolate and fragment the Arab neighborhoods. In this area a large building was constructed to inhabit the Borders’ Guard police headquarters.

!e Government plans to construct more housing units in the places that have remained empty according to Sharon’s plan (26 gates around Jerusalem) and with a population of 3617 inhabitants[172].

7) !e area of the Hebrew University:!e buildings of the Hebrew University were established on the territories of the village of al-Isawiya in 1925, in addition to Hadasa Hospital in 1935. !e Hebrew University remained within the de-militarized zone under the supervision of the United Nations. After 1967 war and the con"scation of large areas of lands the villages of al-Isawiya and Lifta, its borders were expanded at the expense of Arab areas, and was connected with West Jerusalem through the colonies established nearby (!e French Hill, Giv’at ha-Miftar and Ramat Eshkol). !e area of the structural plan No. 3203 is 740.000 m&.

[170] !e local structural map 1905 – department of local planning- the municipality of Jerusalem 1976.[171] !e local structural map No. 1848 - department of local planning- the municipality of Jerusalem 1975.[172] !e structural scheme No 1439A/ the local committee/ the municipality of Jerusalem 1974.

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!e Hebrew University occupies a strategic location, both for security and political reasons, because it controls the north of Jerusalem, and overlooks a set of villages around it, in addition to the Jordan Valley and the western mountains of Jordan (and as-Salt Mountains). Its total population is about 2,500 inhabitants[173].

8) Rekhes Shu’fat (Giv’at ha-Shu’fat): !is colony is located on lands that were con"scated in 1970, in accordance with the law of con"scation for the public interest. !e total area of the colony according to the structural scheme 1973 is 1.198.000 m&.

In the beginning, this area was planted and turned into a natural reserve. In 1990, the establishment of the colony was announced, the trees were uprooted and the infrastructure for the establishment of 2,165 housing units for Canadian religious Jews was set.

Presently, connecting this colony with the other colonies situated in the north-east (Neve Yacov, Pisgat Ze’ev and Pisgat Omer) by Street No. 21 is ongoing. It joins street number 9 inside Israel proper to connect eastern and western colonies with one another and separate the Arab villages from each other, such as Beit Hanina and Shu’fat..

!is colony has been constructed on the territories of the village of Shu’fat with a population of 12,822 inhabitants.

9) Ramat Eshkol (Giv’at ha-Miftar): !is colony is considered one of the "rst colonial settlements constructed around the city, and acts as a link between the neighborhoods in West Jerusalem and East Jerusalem.

On September 1, 1968, an area of 3.345.000m& was con"scated in accordance with the order 1425. In this regard, the structural map of this settlement neighborhood indicates the area of the colony to be 397.000 m& and about 2200 housing units to accommodate 6,600 people.

!is colony converges with Giv’at ha-Miftar, the western part of the settlement neighborhoods that were set up to monitor the high way between Jerusalem and Ramallah, in addition to the encirclement of the city of Jerusalem[174].

!e con"scated lands were private property of the village of Lifta.

10) !e two colonies: Pisgat Ze’ev and Pisgat Omer: !ese two colonies were constructed on the lands of the villages of Beit Hanina and Hizma. 4.400.000 m& were con"scated for the construction of 12 thousand housing units to accommodate 100 thousand settlers.

According to the related structural schemes, this colony will be the largest settlement in the north-eastern part of the city of Jerusalem and the second settlement belt after the "rst belt that is surrounding the city.

[173] !e structural scheme No 3203- the local committee- the municipality of Jerusalem 1970.[174] !e colonies of Ramat Eshkol and Giv’at ha-Miftar are two attached colonies with the structural project No 1429A for the year 1969- the local planning department.


It has a population of 38,684 inhabitants. !us, by the end of the construction of these two colonies, in addition to the settlement of “Neve Yacov”, the north-eastern wall of the colonial project within the expanded boundaries of Jerusalem Municipality will be completed. !ere will remain only one other empty area to be "lled in order to connect all the colonies of the second belt with those of the "rst belt[175].

For this reason, 827 m& was con"scated within this project known as !e Eastern Gate. !e north-eastern part of the wall was closed and the Arab neighborhoods in this region were encircled. !e political dimension of this is to con"scate more Arab lands, achieve the displacement of the Arab population in indirect ways, ie. through their inability to build, and the establishment of the industrial centers to "nd work for the settlers.

11) Atarot (Industrial Zone): It was built on lands con"scated in 1970 with an area of 1.200.000 m&, where the industries of furniture and metal were founded. A lot of factories were transferred from Western Jerusalem to this area.

Due to its proximity to the airport, a new project aims at expanding the airport runway and facilities which plans to serve the industrial zone in transporting its goods internationally. Its structural area is 1.360.000 m&.[176]

12) Giv’at ha-Matos: Giv’at ha-Matos was constructed on lands belonging to the village of Beit Safafa and the city of Beit Jala. It has a total area of 170.000 m& and the establishment was initiated in 1991 by installing a few hundred caravans[177].

!e structural map shows that the total area is up to 980.000 m&, and that the temporary construction will be replaced by permanent constructions and 3600 housing units will be built. Along with Gilo, this colony is considered the south-western belt which is constructed around Jerusalem in order to prevent the Arab extension and to encircle the Arab villages that lie within Jerusalem Municipality boundaries and separate them from the cities of the West Bank.

13) !e Settlement of Abu Ghneim Mountain: In 1990, 1.850.000 m& was con"scated from the lands of the Arab villages of Sur Baher, Um Tuba and Beit Sahur, which is now a natural reserve. !e structural scheme No. 5053 with an area of 2.058.000 m& allocates the construction of 6,500 housing units in this colony. !us, with the establishment of this colony in the south-east, and after its connection with the colonies in the south-west, the south of Jerusalem will be closed, and puts the road linking Jerusalem with Bethlehem under Israeli control. It has a population of about 1125 inhabitants.

[175] !e structural project No. 3144- the local planning department- the municipality of Jerusalem 1985.[176] !e structural scheme- NO 1689- the local organization and building committee of Jerusalem 1977.[177] !e number of caravans is 256.

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14) French Hill: Considered one of the "rst settlements in East Jerusalem, this colony was constructed on the lands of the villages of Lifta and Shu’fat and is considered one of the largest settlements located in the "rst belt surrounding the city. According to the structural scheme number 1541A[178], its total area is about 822.000 m& with 5000 housing units. It has a population of about 6631 inhabitants.

15) Mamila Project (the village of David): It is located to the west of Ja#a Gate in the area of as-Shama’a neighborhood. In 1970, the acquisition of an area of 130.000 m& was announced according to scheme Hf/ 125/322. !is area which was a ‘No Man Zone’ is a part of a general scheme that aims at the integration of East with West Jerusalem, and the re-structuring of these two areas. !e con"scated lands are considered Arab property. !e construction in the new village follows a particular style and pattern to suit commercial and tourist purposes.

Conclusion It is evident that the occupation authorities have created a new political and demographic reality in the city of Jerusalem; the Israeli demography at the expense of the Palestinian geography through land con"scation, settlements construction, green areas, house demolition policy and the refusal to grant building permits.

All the aforementioned Israeli violations against the Palestinian land and people have created a demographic imbalance. !e construction of the Annexation Wall came to be used as a means to pressure Palestinians in the course of any further negotiations to achieve agreements that would serve Israeli interests.

!e Demolished Houses According to the Years:

!e Year !e Demolished Houses

2004 152

2005 120

2006 78

2007 94

2008 71

[178] !e structural Scheme No-1541A- the local organizing committee and construction of Jerusalem 1969.


!e Demographic Struggle in the Israeli Literature*[179]:

Year Muslim Christian Jewish Total

1800 4000 2750 2000 9750

1835 4500 3250 3000 10.750

1840 4650 3350 5000 13.000

1850 5350 3650 6000 15.000

1860 6000 4000 8000 18.000

1870 6500 4500 11.000 22.000

1880 8000 6000 17.000 31.000

1890 9000 8000 25.000 42.000

1900 10.000 10.000 35.000 55.000

1910 12.000 13.000 45.000 70.000

1920 13.505 14.700 34.400 62.000

In 1961, the population of Jerusalem was 60488, with 36801 inside the Old City and 23687 outside it.

!e Expansion of Jerusalem Municipality Boundaries:

!e Year !e area in 1000 m#

1952 33.5

1963 36

1964 38.1

1967 108

1985 108.5

1993 126.6

!e expansion of the city up until 1964 was in West Jerusalem. After 1967, the expansion was at the expense of the West Bank and the annexation of East Jerusalem. From 1993 onward, the expansion was towards the West. By annexing Ma’ale Adumim and establishing E1, the area will become 191.4 km&.

[179] !e Hebrew University, Dr Bin Arye- Jerusalem 1984.

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!e Number of Israelis in East Jerusalem During Selected Years*:

!e years !e number of settlers

1972 6900

1977 33000

1981 59000

1986 103.900

1991 137.400

1995 157.300

1999 170.400

2002 175.617

2006 182.000

2008 193.000

* !e Central Bureau of Statistics

Land Con"scation According to the Years Using the Law of Expropriation for Public Interest/ 1948:

Date of con"scation Area/ Neighborhood !e area in 1000 m#

8/1/68 !e French hill Mount Scopus (al-Masharef )Ramat Eshkol 3.345.000

Ma’aloot Dafna(Khalit Noah) 485.000

Total 3.830.000

14/4/68 Neve Yacov 765.000

!e old city, the Jewish neighborhood only 116.000

Total 881.000

30/8/70 Neve Yacov 470.000

Ramat Alon (the lands of Lifta, Beit Exa) Shu’fat 4.840.000

Talpeot East (Sur Baher) 2.240.000

Gilo (Beit Jala- Sharafat) 2.700.000

Atarot (Qalandia) 1.200.000

Ar-Rababa Valley 130.000

Yafa Street 100.000

Ramat Rahel Area 600.000

Total 12.280.000

20/3/80 Pisgat Ze’ev (Hizma - Beit Hanina) 4.400.000

1/7/82 Atarot (Qalandia) 137.000

16/5/91 Abu Ghneim Mountain 180.000+1.850.000

1/2/95 Beit Hanina+ Beit Safafa 535.000

Total1 24.200.000


Arab Communities within Jerusalem Municipality Boundaries:

Name of the village Area by 1000 sq.m# Number of inhabitants

Ath-!awri + Western as-Sawahra 1.078.000 + 658.000 13651

at-Tur + as-Suwana 851.000 + 1.745.000 20169

Beit Hanina + Airport 5.294.000 + 3.327.000 21909

Bab as-Sahira 427.000 4771

Beit Safafa 1.577.000 5981

Ras al-’Amood 1.262.000 12984

Wad Hilwa (Wadi Yassul) 506.000 4129

al-Isawiya 2.394.000 10703

al-Mukaber Mountain + as-Sawahra 2.342.000 + 2.949.000 14050

Kufr Akab 2.441.000 10781

Sharafat 978.000 8939

Sheikh Jarrah 711.000 2672

Shu’fat 4.277.000 31218

Silwan 537.000 9994

Sur Baher + Um Tuba 5.333.000 11757

Wadij-Joz 347.000 7179

!e Old City 1.000.000 24.000

Total 47.391.000208627 for the year 2002

280000 inhabitants according to the 2008 census

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Israeli Settlements within Jerusalem Municipality Boundaries, the Area and Number of Inhabitants:

Name of the colony Area in 1000 m# Number of inhabitants

Eastern Talpeot 1.195.000 12591

Gilo 2.859.000 27569

Abu Ghneim Mountain, Giv’at ha-Matos 2.523.000 + 310.000 1125

Giv’at ha-Miftar 588.000 2948

!e French hill 2.018.000 6631

Ma’lot Dafna 380.000 3617

Neve Yacov 1.759.000 20250

!e Jewish Neighborhood 122.000 2348

Pisgat Ze’ev 5.467.000 38684

Ramat Eshkol 397.000 3046

Ramot Sholomo 1.126.000 12822

Ramot 4.979.000 38992

Sanhadrea 378.000 4994

Total Area 24.754.000 (Equal to 35%)

175.617 number of settlers on 2002

193.000 number of settlers on 2008


References:Efrat Alishea: !e geography of settlement, translated by Dar Al-Galil 1990/ Amman.1.

Osama Halabi: !e Legal Status of the Population of East Jerusalem, 20082.

!e Municipality of Jerusalem: the rotocols attached to the structural maps with di#erent 3. dates.

Tufakji Khalil: Israeli settlements in the West Bank/ Arab Studies Association/ Palestinian 4. Geographic Center, July 1994.

Jerusalem, proposed project, Shoman Foundation 1995 / Amman 5.

Judaizing Jerusalem Facts and Figures/ Journal of Palestinian Studies 19.6.

Palestinian A#airs Magazine - Nablus -1996. 7.

Nizar Ayoub / Dr.: !e right of residency, March 2008 – Jerusalem8.

Palestinian Encyclopedia: Volume III / the issue of Jerusalem, issued by the Palestinian 9. Encyclopedia 1984 / Damascus P. 505

Mohammad Mahmoud El-Deeb: Palestinian Boundaries, Analytical Study of the 10. Palestinian Mandate Documents, Tunisia/ Arab Organization for Education, Culture and Science / Research Institute for Arabic Studies, 1976

Research Institute of Jerusalem. 11.

Jerusalem Institute for Israel studies 12.

Statistical Year Book for Jerusalem - 2000-200713.

Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories Volume 1814.

CHAPTER THREE

Forced Displacement Israeli Violations of Palestinians’ Rights to Residency in Jerusalem

69

71CHAPTER THREEForced Displacement Israeli Violations of Palestinians’ Rights to Residency in Jerusalem

Forced Displacement Israeli Violations of Palestinians’ Rights to Residency in Jerusalem

Dr. Nizar Ayyoub

Legal Researcher – Al-Haq

Introduction!e successive governments of Israel have consistently targeted the Palestinian presence throughout historical Palestine. In 1948, the Government of Israel, under Ben Gurion, conducted numerous large-scale expulsion operations displacing approximately 750,000 Palestinians (indigenous populations) from the areas where the State of Israel was established, including the western part of Jerusalem. !ese Palestinians were expelled and their houses and properties were either destroyed or appropriated and used to house Jewish newcomers from across the world in a large scale in an attempt to conceal any signs of Arab civilization inside the 1948 areas.[180] In addition, tens of thousands of Palestinians have been forcibly displaced from their homes and are now living as “internally displaced” in what is today known as the Palestine 1948 areas, where the state of Israel was created.

!e goal of this study is to examine the extent to which Israeli policies and measures aimed at increasing the Jewish presence in Jerusalem and minimizing the Palestinian can be classi"ed as forced displacement amounting to ethnic cleansing. To this end, the study will provide a background on the legal status of Jerusalem, and detail the policies and methods adopted in Jerusalem by Israeli authorities to expel Palestinians from the city, analyzing these within the context of relevant international law. !e study will also provide de"nitions of forced displacement and ethnic cleansing, analyzing the application of these terms within the context of Jerusalem and its Palestinian residents. A summary of the main points is followed by recommendations to the international community, Israeli and Palestinian authorities and international and local NGOs working in the occupied Palestinian territories.

1. Background: British Mandate over PalestineOn July 24, 1922, the League of Nations authorized the British government to have a mandate over Palestine. Composed of 28 articles, the British Mandate for Palestine included an obligation of the British government as the mandatory to secure the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, realizing the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1918. !e Mandate o$cially came into force on September 29, 1923[181].

[180] During the 1948 war between Arabs and Jews, the government of Ben Gurion attempted to clear the western part of Jerusalem from Palestinian citizens and appropriated houses and properties in their neighborhoods (Baqa>a, Qatamon, Talbiyeh, Lifta and others). Most of these houses and neighborhoods still exist today and are occupied by Jewish settlers. [181] PASSIA. Palestine Facts. www.passia.org.

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!e British mandate over Palestine sought to strengthen the authority of Britain in the region and create the conditions necessary for the ful"llment of the Balfour Declaration, establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine. !e British Mandate recognizes the Jewish agency as a public body for the purpose of “advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may a#ect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine.”[182] Despite the fact that Jews were a minority compared to the Palestinians at the time; the Mandate only addressed Palestinians civil and religious rights, ignoring their political rights, including their right to self-determination.[183]

!e British government abandoned its authority in Palestine and referred the Palestinian issue to the United Nations (UN) in April of 1947, once the demographic balance in Palestine was reversed in favor of Jewish immigrants. At this time, con%ict erupted between Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem, resulting in Jewish immigrants settling in the Western part of the city and Arabs retaining the population majority in the Eastern section, including the Old City.[184]

Following the discussions of two proposals, known as the ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ decisions, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 181 (D2) of 29 November 1947, endorsing the ‘majority decision’ which proposed the creation of two distinct States.

Part III of the Resolution provided for putting Jerusalem under a special international regime for 10 years, considering it a “corpus separatum” and expanding its boundaries to “include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, ‘Ein Karim; and the most northern Shu’fat.”[185] !e UN conferred the administration of the City with its new boundaries to an UN-a$liated trusteeship council, which was also commissioned with the task of developing a detailed statute for the City. !e statute aimed to protect and preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests of the three great monotheistic faiths; to foster cooperation among all the inhabitants of the city; and to promote the security and well-being of the residents.[186]

!e special international regime called for electing a Legislative Council of adult residents of the city on the basis of secret voting and proportional representation and for the establishment of an independent judiciary system. In economic terms, the City was to be included in the Economic Union of Palestine. It was to be neutral and demilitarized and no paramilitary formations, exercises or activities were to be permitted within its borders, with the exception of police forces to assist in the maintenance of internal law and order and the protection of the Holy Places within the city.[187]

[182] !e Palestine Mandate of the League of Nation from 1922 (British Mandate for Palestine), Article 4[183] According to Article 2 of the mandate instrument, the mandatory was responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as woul secure the establishment of the Jewish national home at the expense of the indigenous Arab population, while the instrument ignored the political rights of the Palestinians by only referring to the need to safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.[184] According to the investigative study by UNSCOP, the area of Jerusalem City housed an estimated number of 102,000 Jews and 150,000 Arabs in December 1946.[185] UN General Assembly Resolution No 181, Part III, Section B, “Boundaries of the City”. UN General Assembly 29 November 1947.[186] !e Palestine Mandate of the League of Nation from 1922, (British Mandate for Palestine) Article 11-18. [187] Under the provisions of the partitioning resolution, the Economic Board of Palestine should consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. !e Board’s task was to conduct measures and develop plans required to achieve economic unity of the proposed two states in Palestine.


Palestinians objected to the partition plan outlined in Resolution 181, and viewed it as prejudicial and contradictory to the principles of justice and democracy. !e Zionist movement accepted the resolution in order to establish and cement its presence in the region through the creation of an independent Jewish State.[188]

Palestine Partition Resolution and Israel’s Control over West Jerusalem:Following Resolution 181, acute disputes arose between the Arab population and the Zionist movement, leading to a large scale war in Palestine in 1948 and resulting in the partition of Palestine. As a result, the fate of Palestine, including Jerusalem, was decided by means of military power. !e war undermined the boundaries outlined in the partition plan as the Zionist forces occupied more than 22% of the territory assigned to the Arab state.[189] Furthermore, Jerusalem was divided into two parts, with the Zionist movement controlling the western part and displacing most of its Arab population and Jordan controlling the eastern part of the City.[190]

Members of the People’s Council and representatives of the Jewish community in Palestine declared the establishment of Israel on 14 May 1948, stating “by virtue of our natural and historic right and on the strength of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, [we] hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel.[191]”!e following day, Israel took advantage of the disorder resulting from the withdrawal of British troops from Palestine and seized all of the Arab neighborhoods in the western part of Jerusalem.[192] On the other side, Arab armies intervened to blockade the city and isolate it from Jewish settlements. !e battle over Jerusalem concluded with the Jordanian troops controlling the eastern part and the Israelis the western part.[193]

!e UN General Assembly passed Resolution 194 creating the Conciliation Commission, tasked with developing proposals for a permanent international regime for Jerusalem and facilitating the right of refugees to return to their homes[194]. Resolution 194 also requested the Security Council “to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem” and instructed the Conciliation Commission “to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals

[188] Henry Cattan. “Palestine in the light of Right and Justice”. Op. cit., p. 26. [189] http://zajel.org/article_view.asp?newsID=2767&cat=6, [190] In 1948, 38 villages and towns were destroyed in the Jerusalem area, displacing about 73,258 Palestinians. !is number does not include many neighborhoods within the western part of the City, mainly the neighborhoods of Musrarah, Baqa>a, Talbiyeh, Qatamon, the German Quarter, and the Greek Quarter, where the local residents were forced out and their houses were appropriated and occupied by Jewish settlers. !ese houses are still standing today. See Jerusalem 1948: !e Arab Neighborhoods and their Fate in the War. Editor: Salim Tamari. Published by Institute of Jerusalem Studies and BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights. (1999).[191] Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 14 May 1948, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Establishment+of+State+of+Israel.htm. [192] Nathan Krystall, “!e Fall of the New City” in See Jerusalem 1948: !e Arab Neighborhoods and their Fate in the War. Editor: Salim Tamari. Published by Institute of Jerusalem Studies and BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights. (1999) pp 93-100. [193] Musa Al-Qudsi Al-Dweik. Jerusalem and the InternationalLlaw. A Study on the Legal Status of the City and the Israeli Violations of Human Rights,.2002, p. 13. Nizar Ayyoub. !e Legal Status of Jerusalem City Between the Mandate and Political settlement. Published by Al-Haq, Ramallah, 2001. p. 35.[194] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III)11 December 1948.

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for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area.”[195]

!e Conciliation Commission established a special committee on Jerusalem to carry out consultations with representatives of Arab governments and the di#erent religious groups in Jerusalem. Arab agencies and delegations expressed a willingness to accept an international regime in Jerusalem, provided that the UN would present guarantees for the stability and durability of such a regime.[196] Unwilling to withdraw from the areas it occupied illegally, including the western part of Jerusalem, Israel refused to accept an international regime in the city as provided for in Resolutions 181 and 194, and accepted the international regime only in Holy Places.[197]

!e Jordanian authorities declared the annexation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, on 24 April 1950.[198] !e British government recognized the annexation and extended its mutual defense agreement with Jordan to include the West Bank and East Jerusalem. On 1 April 1950, the "rst parliamentary elections to include both sides of Jordan River were held and the Jordanian National Assembly consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the House of Senators adopted a resolution to unify the two sides of Jordan River – Palestine and Jordan – within the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. East Jerusalem remained under the Jordanian rule up to 7 June 1967.[199]

Subsequent UN e#orts spanning over two decades failed to apply the special international regime in Jerusalem, partly due to the unconditional Israeli rejection of the regime. At the same time, Israeli measures continuously undermined the e#orts of the Conciliation Commission by creating facts on the ground to ensure UN acceptance of Israeli control over the western part of the city.

Following the occupation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, in June 1967, the Commission explained the complex developments taking place in and around Jerusalem to the General Assembly and declared its inability to undertake any further e#orts in this regard.

Israel’s Occupation and Annexation of East Jerusalem:Immediately after ensuring control over the Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem, the occupying Israeli authorities implemented a series of policies that initiated the widespread con"scation of Palestinian land for the construction of illegal settlements and transfer of Jewish settlers into the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). East Jerusalem was particularly targeted by these measures, as the occupying authorities immediately started to implement policies aimed at undermining the city’s Arab character by expelling its Arab residents, isolating the city from the rest of the oPt, and "nally, by illegally annexing the City. !ese goals were revealed on 7 June

[195] UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (D3), 11 December 1948. !e Conciliation Commission consisting of France, Turkey and the USA was assigned the task to facilitate the return of refugees to their homes or the payment of compensation for those wishing not to return.[196] United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. Report: October 23, 1950. [197] http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/Jerusalem+and+the+Holy+Places+-+Introduction.htm[198] http://www.jcpa.org/art/knesset6.htm; http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1948to1967_jordan_annex.php[199] It should be noted that the annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem to Jordan was recognized by two states only: UK and Pakistan.


1967 by the Israeli Defense Minister at the time, Moshe Dayan, who explicitly described Israel’s policy to retain control of occupied Jerusalem by saying, “the Israeli Defense Forces have liberated Jerusalem. We have united Jerusalem, the capital of Israel. We have returned to the holiest of our Holy Places, never to part from it again.”[200]

To realize Dayan’s statement, the Israeli Government held a meeting on 11 June 1967, where they unanimously agreed to annex the city and assigned a special control committee to develop and implement the necessary steps in this direction. In this regard, the committee presented three draft laws to the Israeli Government: the Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law of 1967; the Municipalities (Amendment No. 8) Law of 1967; and the Protection of Holy Places Law of 1967.[201]

!e draft laws were presented to the Israeli Knesset and were approved on 25 June 1967. !e following day, the Israeli government issued the Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 1967, which established Israeli judicial and administrative jurisdiction on East Jerusalem. In his speech to the Knesset, the Israeli Minister of Justice stated that the Israeli army has liberated many areas from the rule of strangers and there is a need to take measures to establish sovereignty over them and apply Israeli jurisdiction on them.[202]

According to the Law and Administration Ordinance, Israel extended its judicial and administrative jurisdiction on areas of the Old City, Sur Baher, Sheikh Jarrah, Kalandia airport, Jabal Al-Mukabber, Shu’fat, Wadi Al-Joz, Eisawiyeh, and Beit Hanina.[203] In addition, the Israeli Interior Minister issued the “Jerusalem Declaration” providing for the expansion of powers of Jerusalem municipality to include East Jerusalem and adjacent villages and towns, including the Old City, and thus, e#ectively placing occupied Jerusalem under the authority of the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem.

!e United Nations objected to the three laws and associated decrees, which aimed at altering the situation of the City from the status quo prior to the occupation. !e UN adopted a number of resolutions calling upon Israel, the occupying power, to desist from taking any action that may alter the status of Jerusalem. Such resolutions include the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 2253 (ES-V), which called upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking action which would alter the status of Jerusalem, considering these measures invalid.[204] Additionally, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242, which emphasizes the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just a lasting peace”, which should include “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent con%ict”.[205]

[200] Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, Statement at the Western Wall, June 7, 1967.[201] Ossama Halabi. Space and People: Geographic and Demographic Dimensions in Israel’s Policy towards “East Jerusalem” in the period 1967-2000.Jerusalem Center for Legal Aid and Human Rights, and Ossama Halabi. Israeli Laws and Judicial System as Tools for Accomplishing Political Objectives,.CCDPRJ, 2006.[202] Meron Benvenisti, Jerusalem: !e torn city. Jerusalem 1976, p. 10.[203] Osama Halabi.Jerusalem - the E#ects of Israel’s Annexation of Jerusalem on the Rights and Position of its Arab Population. http://www.ccdprj.ps/en/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/israelilawsandjudicialsystem [204] In view of Israel>s failure to abide by this resolution, the UN and its agencies have taken dozens of other resolutions that have never been implemented, including the Resolution 2254 (D5). http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/repertoire/69-71/69-71_12.pdf[205] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 242, 22 November 1967.

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Opposition towards Israeli policies by the international community has been limited to formalities. In light of the new realities resulting from Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem, the international and Arab position calling for the application of a special international regime on Jerusalem City in line with the UN General Assembly resolution No. 181 began to fade, allowing various non-harmonized positions to appear. !e United States of America (USA) abandoned its support of establishing a special international regime and adopted a di#erent position, indicating that the status of Jerusalem should be decided through negotiations between the Jews and Arabs.[206]

Israel continued to ignore the international community and their accompanying resolutions and take steps towards Judaizing Jerusalem by building settlements and transferring Jewish settlers to these settlements, while simultaneously, employing numerous measures to minimize the Palestinian presence in the City. Following the development of the legal framework for the annexation of the City, the Israeli occupying authorities began implementing facts on the ground to reinforce their control over Jerusalem and the Jerusalemites by appropriating and con"scating lands, constructing Jewish settlements, isolating the City from the rest of the oPt, and restricting the livelihoods and living conditions of the Palestinians to force them out of the City. Examples of this include ID revocation, the policy of house demolition, and most recently, the construction of the Annexation Wall in and around East Jerusalem.

One of the most serious actions in this direction was the Knesset’s approval on 30 July 1980 of the Basic Law “Jerusalem the Capital of Israel,” which explicitly demonstrated the Israeli intentions aimed at annexing and Judaizing the City, and con"rmed international concerns regarding Israeli measures within occupied Jerusalem .!e law stated that “Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel” and provided for strengthening the presence of o$cial State institutions in Jerusalem, including the seat of the President of the State, the Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court. !e law also required the Israeli government to provide for the development of Jerusalem by allocating a special annual grant to the Municipality of Jerusalem[207].

!e Israeli decision to annex East Jerusalem was met with strong objection by the international community, including the UN and numerous international governmental and non-governmental organizations. !e UN Security Council issued resolution No. 478, expressing strong condemnation of Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem and its refusal to respect and comply with international resolutions concerning Jerusalem and the rest of the oPt. It considered the enactment of the “Basic Law” as a violation of international law, indicating that the Council does not recognize the “Basic Law” and such other actions by Israel that seek to alter the status of Jerusalem. It called upon all members of the UN to accept Resolution No. 478 as well as called upon those states that have established diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the City.[208] Consequently, all the 13 states that had diplomatic missions in Jerusalem withdrew them from the City.[209]

[206] Jerusalem and US Policy, Information Booklet, PASSIA, 1991, p. 32.[207] Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel. Passed by the Knesset on 30 July 1980. Accessed at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic10_eng.htm[208] Security Council Resolution 478, 1980, adopted with 14 members voting in favor and 1 (the United States of America) abstaining.[209] !ree Governments (Ecuador, Chile and Venezuela) withdrew their embassies prior to the adoption of the SC Resolution No. 478 (1980). !e remaining 10 governments (Salvador, Panama, Colombia, Bolivia, Holland, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, and Uruguay) withdrew their embassies in response to the SC resolution. However, Salvador and Costa Rica moved their embassies back to West Jerusalem later.


Israeli Measures Against Palestinian Citizens in Occupied Jerusalem!e application of Israeli law to East Jerusalem as a result of its annexation to Israel has led to the denial of Palestinians’ right to residency in Jerusalem and has caused the disintegration of Palestinian families, the obstruction of family uni"cation and severe restrictions related to the registration of newborns, access to education, delivery of health, social and other services, housing and construction.[210]

All Palestinians, and Jerusalemites in particular, have become extremely vulnerable to Israeli policies and measures, including legislation adopted to undermine the social fabric and economic structure of the city, disintegrate Palestinian Jerusalemite families and deprive them from essential requirements to ensure an adequate standard of living. As a result, Palestinian families in Jerusalem have been facing the daily struggle to defend their rights, primarily the right to live in Jerusalem in dignity, and the rights to housing, education and health.

1. Means Used to Deprive Palestinians of the Right to Residency in Jerusalem:Following the illegal annexation of Jerusalem, the occupying authorities initiated a register for its Palestinian residents, who were dealt with as ‘permanent residents’ in Israel; provided they could prove they were actually living in the City and were present during the registration. Conditions imposed by the occupying authorities to allow Palestinians to live in Jerusalem represented the initial steps towards the goal of reducing the proportion of Palestinians in the City. !e right to residency was restricted to those who were present in the City during the census, while those living outside the city at that time were automatically excluded, including those living outside the municipal borders as delineated by the Israeli interior ministry in June 1967. As a result, these families were denied the status of permanent residents and were not allowed to return back to their homes.

!e Israeli authorities granted the “right to permanent residency” only to those Palestinians that were present in Jerusalem in 1967 according to the provisions of the entry to Israel law of 1952. Palestinian Jerusalemites were and still are considered “residents in Israel” and not “citizens,” which means they are not entitled to the permanent rights ensured by the nationality laws, and thus they are forced to comply with conditions required for residency in Israel similar to foreign nationals coming from abroad under the aforementioned 1952 law.[211]

Since then, whenever Palestinians leave Jerusalem to live abroad or in the West Bank or Gaza Strip for a relatively long period of time, they risk losing their right to permanent residency in the City; this is particularly so considering the subsequent Entry to Israel law of 1974 entitles the Interior Minister to simply cancel residency, whether it is temporary or permanent.[212] In addition, article 11(a) of the provisions of the Entry to Israel law stipulates that permanent residency is forfeited when its holder lives in a foreign country for seven years, obtains permanent residency in a foreign country or becomes a national of a foreign country, which also includes Palestinians

[210] Musa Al-Qudsi Al-Dweik. Jerusalem and the international law. A Study on the Legal Status of the City and the Israeli Violations of Human Rights, 2002, p. 53.[211] Ibid, pp. 60-61.[212] Entry to Israel Law of 1974, articles 10-11.

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living outside the municipal borders of Jerusalem as delineated by the Israeli authorities following the occupation of the City.[213]

!is policy continued up to the year 1988, when the Israeli Supreme Court issued its ruling in Mubarak Awad’s case, employing a new criterion – domicile – as a condition for Palestinians to maintain their permanent residency status in Jerusalem. Based on this principle, the Israeli interior ministry acquired the authority to withdraw the Jerusalem ID cards from Palestinians who are proved to be living outside the city and their “domicile” proves to be outside the municipal borders even if for less than seven years.[214]

Starting from 1995, the Israeli authorities have employed these measures on a large scale, applying strict measures against Palestinians living outside the City and creating various obstacles to undermine their right to residency and prevent them from returning to Jerusalem. Such measures have a#ected tens of thousands of Palestinians who were forced by di$cult housing conditions in the City to live in adjacent neighborhoods. !e same problems were faced by Jerusalemites living outside Jerusalem with spouses who do not hold a Jerusalem ID and whose requests for family uni"cation and child registration have become almost impossible to get approval for. As a result, thousands of families have been fragmented, and thus an equal number of Palestinians have been subjected to forced migration from the City.[215]

In addition, the National Insurance Agency has since 1984 begun to impose strict measures against Jerusalemites, withholding the di#erent social security allowances for those Palestinians who moved to live outside the “municipal borders.” !ese measures have deprived children born in areas outside the municipal borders and in adjacent suburbs from all social bene"ts. !is step has been supported by the Israeli judiciary and the Israeli Supreme Court, which ruled in 1993 in favor of depriving Jerusalemites residing outside the “municipal borders” from bene"ts and services o#ered by the National Insurance Agency.[216]

To justify these measures, the Israeli authorities resort to false pretexts and distorted arguments that contravene international law and human rights standards, claiming that these children forfeit their rights because they were born or have long been living outside the occupied territories, that their domicile is not in Jerusalem or that they have been absent from the city for a period exceeding seven consecutive years. Such claims constitute a serious violation of the rights of these residents, especially the children, to maintain their family relations, and belonging to their City and identity. !is in turn is considered a breach of a child’s right to normal growth and development and their rights to education, health and social services.[217]

[213] http://www.e-xam.at/pdf/art11aIsl.pdf; http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=505[214] Mubarak Awad vs. Prime Minister and Interior Minister in Israel.. Israeli Supreme Court No. 282/88.. See, Ossama Halabi. Israeli Laws and Judicial System as Tools for Accomplishing Political Objectives, op. cit., pp. 10-11, and Space and People, op. cit. pp. 38-39.[215] According to the joint report published in October 2006 by B>Tselem and Center for the Defense of the Individual and HaMoked, the Israeli occupying authorities have been denying family uni"cation of Palestinians in the oPt with their spouses from outside the territories for over six years. Since the beginning of the second Intifada, over 120,000 applications for family uni"cations have been submitted to the Israeli authorities, who have consistently failed to consider and process them, except for very few cases that have been processed as «special humanitarian cases.» In this regard, see the above-mentioned report titled, «Perpetual Limbo: Israel>s Freeze on Uni"cation of Palestinian Families in the Occupied Territories.»[216] Ossama Halabi. Israeli Laws and Judicial System, op. cit, p. 11, Musa Al-Qudsi Al-Dweik, op. cit, pp. 48-49. Hanadi Al-Zghayar. Silent Displacement: Cancellation of Palestinian Residency in Jerusalem, Preliminary Report, Arab !ought Forum, May 2007. pp. 22-23.[217] Convention on the Rights of the Child, Preamble, article 5, 6, 8, 17, 18, ,


2. !e Impact of the Nationality and Entry to Israel Law of 2003 on Palestinians:In May 2002, the Israeli Government adopted resolution 1813 in regard to “addressing the issues of illegal residents in Israel and policy of uni"cation of families, who have a member of Palestinian origin or from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.”[218] !is resolution provided for the inapplicability of nationality or permanent residency to spouses of persons with Israeli nationality or permanent residency, when the spouses have Palestinian origins or are Palestinian residents of the occupied territories.[219]

!e resolution states, inter alia, that no applications for legal status shall be made for Palestinians from areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority (PA), or individuals from Palestinian origins, and that no applications currently on hold at the interior ministries shall be approved to grant legal status to spouses of Arabs in Israel, who are either residents of PA areas or from Palestinian origins.[220] In cases where such spouses have already obtained a permit for status, such status shall not be advanced to a higher level and shall be frozen, for example keeping “temporary resident” as temporary and not advancing the status to that of “permanent resident”.[221]

!e resolution is indisputably targeted at Palestinians wherever they happen to be (in Israel, the oPt, or abroad) as it applies exclusively to Palestinians and those of Palestinian origins, and allows non-Palestinians and those of non-Palestinian origins to proceed with their applications for obtaining Israeli nationality and/or permanent residency when they are married to Israeli spouses.[222]

!e Israeli government transformed this resolution into law on 31 July 2003 by enacting the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (temporary order) of 2003, which prevents Palestinians and persons of Palestinian origins married to Israeli citizens or holders of permanent residency in Israel from living with their spouses in Israel.[223] In view of the illegal annexation of Jerusalem and Israeli treatment of the City as “part of Israel”, this law basically a#ects Jerusalemites and their children born outside the City, denying them the right to register at the Israeli interior ministry. In practice, this law has meant a total freezing of family uni"cation measures.

!is law has been periodically extended since its implementation and is still in force today. Under an amendment made on 27 July 2005, a chance was allowed to apply for family uni"cation for non-Jerusalemite wives who are 25 years or older and non-Jerusalemite husbands who are 35 years or older. !e situation for those under this age remains the same. !e Israeli authorities justi"ed

[218] Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel. Ban of Family Uni"cation http://www.adalah.org/eng/famunif.php,http://www.adalah.org/features/famuni/2002H_1813government_decision.pdf. (2007).[219] !rough the annexation of East Jerusalem, the Israeli occupying authorities deal with the occupied City and its Palestinian residents holding permanent residency status as «part of Israel». !is move is unlawful and in breach of international law. !e Israeli authorities consider this resolution as applicable to Jerusalem and its residents, thus freezing all family uni"cation processes.[220] Supra, note 39. [221] Upon the promulgation of this resolution, Adalah - !e Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel appealed to the Supreme Court against the Israeli government>s resolution in regard to the uni"cation of 14 families. !e appeal contested the legality of the resolution on the basis of its clear discrimination against Palestinian citizens in Israel on an ethnic basis and violates their constitutional and human rights to build a family life with their spouses based on their own choices and/or with their young children on equal footing with all human beings.[222] Supra, note 39. [223] Supra, note 39.

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this by claiming that persons under these ages have carried out attacks inside Israel.[224] !is law has deprived thousands of Palestinian families in the oPt, including Jerusalem, and in Israel from their basic rights to family life. !is is especially in light of the fact that the family is considered the main unit in the social fabric and the natural environment for the growth and wellbeing of all its members, particularly children. Family should be o#ered all protection and support in order to be able to successfully undertake its responsibilities within the society.

!e Nationality Law speci"cally targets Palestinians and persons of Palestinian origins, freezing family uni"cation applications of Palestinians from both sides of the Green Line and in occupied Jerusalem, imposing very strict restrictions.[225] As a result, family uni"cation and child registration became almost impossible and Palestinian families became disintegrated, deprived of their right to live together in a safe and sound family environment. Furthermore, Palestinians became forced to migrate from areas where they are unwanted to areas behind the Wall or to leave the country altogether, which serves the discriminatory policies of the Israeli authorities aiming to reduce the proportion of Palestinians and increase the proportion of Jews.[226]

!e Nationality Law also denies children with one parent from Israel and the other from the occupied territories the right to have permanent legal status in Israel. Speci"cally, the law also only allows Palestinian children aged 14-18 years to obtain a temporary permit to stay in Israel for a maximum period of 6 months, without social bene"ts, even when the child lives with his or her parent that has Israeli nationality.[227] Children under the age of 14 can obtain a permit from the interior ministry for temporary residence in Jerusalem or inside Israel, valid for two years only and entitling the child to enjoy all bene"ts and rights equal to citizens (social security bene"ts, health insurance, etc). Such permits are only granted, provided that adequate proof is submitted that the child’s domicile is in Israel.[228]

It should be noted that the fate of these children when they reach the age of 18 is unclear. Will they be able then to obtain permits to stay with their parents? Will the authorities deny them such permits, forcing them to leave their houses in Israel or the occupied Jerusalem? Or will they continue to live in their houses and with their families under a consistent threat of being evicted to the occupied territories? Under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), “applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State for the purpose of family reuni"cation shall be dealt with by State Parties in a positive, human and expeditious manner”.[229]

[224] Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (Amendment ).Compilation of Israeli Laws, 2005 volume, No. 2018 (published on 10 August 2005).[225] Supra, note 39. [226] Report No.4, Local Outline Plan Jerusalem 2000, Proposed Plan and the Main Planning Polices, Planning Administration, City Engineer, City Planning Department, Jerusalem Municipality, 2000.[227] Supra, note 39.[228] 79 Supra, note 45.[229] United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child. GA Res 44/25. (1989). Art 10.


3. !e Supreme Court Support for the Policies of Residency Cancellation and Freezing of Family Uni"cation:Measures to isolate Jerusalem and reduce the proportion of Palestinians in the City have been continuously supported by the Israeli Supreme Court. For example, in Mubarak Awad vs. the Prime Minister[230], the judges corroborated the decision of the interior minister to withdraw the permanent residency of Mubarak Awad (withdrawal of the Israeli ID cards from Palestinian residents of Jerusalem) because he left Jerusalem to the United States to pursue his studies, married there and obtained American citizenship.[231]

Following the Knesset’s approval of the Nationality and Entry to Israel law, several Palestinian and Israeli human rights organizations appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court, contesting the legality of the law and calling for its revocation based on its violation of international human rights law, in particular, racial discrimination through its speci"c targeting of Palestinians. However, the Supreme Court rejected these appeals.[232]

Six out of the 11 judges agreed with the appellants’ claim that the provisions of the law violate the basic rights to family life and equality, however, they accepted the o$cial pretexts and justi"cations submitted by the authorities, claiming that the law is invoked by security needs[233]. A majority of six judges against "ve rejected the appeal submitted by the human rights organization Adalah, as well as six other associated appeals, including that of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel. !ey all appealed for the cancellation of the Nationality and Entry to Israel law (temporary order) 2003 based on its violation of the right of Israeli citizens to family uni"cation with their Palestinian spouses from the oPt.[234]

Justice Heshen, who was then the Deputy President of the Supreme Court, expressed the opinion of the majority, claiming that the citizens of the State of Israel have no constitutional right to request the court to revoke a law approved by the Knesset in regards to denying their “foreign spouses” a legal status in Israel.[235] Furthermore, Justice Heshen considered that the right to one’s dignity does not entail any legal duty on the part of the State to allow foreigners married to Israeli citizens to enter Israel; according to Justice Heshen, the “fact of war against the Palestinian Authority” was an adequate justi"cation to enact this law in order to prevent the entry of hostile elements to Israel[236]. Similarly Justice Levy recognized that the law is unconstitutional although held that appeals should be rejected in order to allow the Knesset a chance to amend the law.[237]

[230] Mubarak Awad vs. Prime Minister and Interior Minister. Israeli Supreme Court No. 282/88..[231] http://www.factsandlogic.org/ad_17.html[232] !ese appeals were submitted by Adalah - !e Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel and HaMoked – !e Center for the Defense of the Individual. !e appeal submitted by HaMoked stressed on the damage in%icted to Palestinians in East Jerusalem who are married to spouses living elsewhere in the oPt (outside the borders of Jerusalem as delineated by Jerusalem municipality following the annexation of the city). It should be noted that in issuing their ruling, the judges neglected the issue of threat caused by the law to the fate of children.[233] Mubarak Awad vs. Prime Minister and Interior Minister in Israel.Decision of Israeli Supreme Court No. 282/88.[234] !e Israeli politicians, o$cials and government members did not conceal the real aims of this law. !ey publicly stated that the purpose of this law is "rst and foremost demographic, i.e., to limit the proportion of Arab population in Israel and maintain the Jewish majority. !is proves the Supreme Court>s lack of independence by their giving legitimacy to the o$cial policies of consecutive Israeli governments, whether related to Palestinians in the oPt or inside the Green Line.[235] Supra, note 59.[236] Ibid.[237] Ibid.

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!e remaining judges within the majority acknowledged that the law violates the constitutional rights but thought it "t well with the desired outcome.[238]

!e President of the Supreme Court, Justice Aharon Barak, representing the minority position, considered that the issue at stake is related to the right of Israeli citizens to equality and practice of their family life under the provisions of the basic law on “human’s dignity and liberty,” which entitles Israeli citizens to practice their family life with their spouses in Israel. Justice Barak added, “here are their houses and their communities, here are their historic, cultural and social roots… this is targeted at Arab citizens in Israel. !e outcome of the law is the violation of the right of this group to equality. !e minority judges acknowledged that the law is not relative as it abolishes the possibility to examine each case on a one-by-one basis and violates the rights collectively and arbitrarily”.[239] Based on this, Justice Barak concluded that the law should be revoked based on its unconstitutionality.[240]

Cancellation of Residency Rights of Palestinian Jerusalemites and International Law:!e cancellation of Palestinians’ rights to residency in Jerusalem has serious consequences not only for Jerusalemites, but also for all Palestinians who have an inherent right to live in the City and access it freely. Jerusalem is an integral part of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967. All measures taken by the Israeli authorities to alter the legal status of the City and its Palestinian residents are invalid as they are in breach of international law, namely the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.

!ese measures cause su#ering to all Palestinians, a#ecting women and children in particular. Tens of thousands of families have been directly a#ected: couples cannot live under one roof, with one of them staying in occupied Jerusalem, in Israel or abroad and the other in Gaza or the West Bank. Children are being raised in the absence of one of their parents. Many people are afraid to travel abroad, including for medical treatment, fearing that they will not be allowed to return to their families. All of these conditions lead to grave violations of international human rights law and the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.

Everyone’s right to their country is inherent and basic. It is recognized and documented in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.” !e same applies to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states that “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.”

[238] Ibid.[239] Ibid. [240] Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel considers this case an illustration of the Court supporting the most racist law in the state of Israel, which prevents family uni"cation on an ethnic – Arab – Palestinian basis. By comparison, Adalah Center notes that «in 1980, in the peak of the Apartheid system, the Court in South Africa refused to endorse orders similar to the Israeli law because they violated family rights.» Advocate Hassan Jabarin, Chairman of Adalah Center stated, «In this way the Supreme Court has established three citizenship tracks on ethnic basis: a direct track for Jews under the right to return, an intermediate track for foreigners based on gradual procedures and the most di$cult track for Arab citizens».


By adopting these policies, Israel is in breach of its obligations under these international instruments and is violating the principle of non-discrimination – a binding rule under international law. Israeli policies on residency and family uni"cation entail evident discrimination against the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem in the "rst place and constitute a violation of the principle stating that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.

!ese policies entail a grave violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that provides for the protection of the family as the natural and fundamental group unit of society, and recognizes the right of the family to enjoy protection by society and the state and the right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and raise a family.[241] !e International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) also recognizes the importance of the family, to whom “the widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded”, particularly “while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children”.[242]

!e Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) con"rms “the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality, and, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents”. !e CRC also provides for the exclusion of any unlawful interference or reason that may a#ect the obligation of States Parties to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, nationality, name and family relations. !erefore, these policies are clearly in breach of the provisions of the CRC, which considers the family as “the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children” and recognizes that the child “should grow up in a family environment”. [243]

!e CRC also gives special attention to citizenship and the legal status of the child in the society and the state, where he or she can enjoy protection and social services and securities provided by the state to its citizens.

Being a State Party to the CRC, Israel is legally obliged to respect the Convention’s provisions and rules and to halt its ongoing violations of the Palestinian’s rights to reside in Jerusalem. Israel must also cancel the freeze on the uni"cation of separated Palestinian families and child registration, which constitutes a violation of its obligations under article 10 of the CRC, stating, “applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party for the purpose of family reuni"cation shall be dealt with by States Parties in a positive, humane and expeditious manner.(CITATION) States Parties shall further ensure that the submission of such a request shall entail no adverse consequences for the applicants and for the members of their family.” [244]

!e Israeli policies in regard to freezing the uni"cation of Palestinian families living across the Green Line entail grave violations of the rights of Palestinian children, contributing to the disintegration of Palestinian families. !ousands of children are forced to live away from one or both parents due to Israel’s rejection of family uni"cation applications and failure to process applications submitted prior to 2002 based on discriminatory ‘Nationality and Entry to Israel law,’ which creates an environment conducive for forced displacement and eviction.

[241] United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child. GA Res 44/25. (1989). Art 10. [242] International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. GA Res 2200A (1966). Article10.[243] Supra, note 62, Preamble.[244] Supra, note 62.

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It is evident that these policies cause harm to the best interests of the child, a basic principle enshrined in international and national laws[245], obligating States to give priority to the best interests of the child in all policies related to the children living within their jurisdiction and authority. !is principle requires allowing all children within the State’s jurisdiction to grow and live in a stable and supportive family environment and in an atmosphere of happiness, love and cooperation. By revoking the right to obtain permanent resident status in Israel, the Nationality law constitutes a serious violation of the rights of these children and their families to a family life. In addition, it a#ects the ability of parents to ful"ll their obligations towards their children.

!e Nationality Law also discriminates between children of Palestinian citizens or residents in Israel and children of non-Palestinian citizens and residents of Israel. Moreover, the application of the law to children, who do not constitute a threat to public safety, exposes the real purpose of this law, to minimize the Arab population within Jerusalem and Israel generally, and not for security reasons, as o$cial sources claim.

Policies and associated measures adopted by the Israeli occupying authorities deprive tens of thousands of Palestinian Jerusalemites from living in the city and deprive any Palestinian or any person of Palestinian origin from entering the occupied City and residing within it. Restrictions imposed on family uni"cation and on Palestinians’ residency in Jerusalem have deprived thousands of children from their IDs as they have to live with the parent who does not hold the Jerusalem ID and cannot stay and reside in the City with their whole family. When children remain outside Jerusalem with parents not holding Jerusalem IDs, they also become vulnerable to losing their right to residency in the City.

Ethnic Cleansing and Forced Displacement“I support forced transfer and see nothing unethical in it.”

David Ben-Gurion, addressing the Jewish Agency Executive Committee, June 1938.[246]

“Jewish villages were built in the place of Arab villages. You do not even know the names of these Arab villages, and I do not blame you because geography books no longer exist, not only do the books not exist, the Arab villages are not there either.”[247]

Moshe Dayan addressing the Technion (Israel Institute of Technology), Haifa (as quoted in Ha’aretz, 4 April 1969).

Many decision-makers, politicians, lawyers and researchers refuse to use the term “ethnic cleansing” to describe the ongoing policies and practices of Zionist and Israeli political and military leaders against Palestinians since 1948. Te policies have aimed to uproot the Palestinians from their lands and replace them with Jewish settlers. !ese individuals or groups hold that ethnic cleansing is a serious accusation that is di$cult to verify and prove, in particular because international law has not yet reached a legal de"nition of the concept “ethnic cleansing.”

[245] Including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child. GA Res 44/25. (1989), Article 3.[246] Central Zionist Archives, minutes of the meeting of Jewish Agency Executive, 12 June 1938. Quoted from: !e Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, by the Israeli historian Ilan Pappe, p.1.[247] Walid Khalidi ed..All !at Remains: !e Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948. Institute for Palestine Studies. 1992.


!is position however is held by those who are not willing to admit that Israel, as a “democratic state”, is committing acts of cleansing against the Palestinians. !is is despite the clear calls and orders issued by the Zionist leaders to Jewish militants in the 1948 war to cleanse the land of its Arab population in order to replace them with Jewish settlers. Since 1948, recurrent statements by various Israeli leaders warn of the demographic threats facing Israel that would a#ect the Jewish majority of the state. !e same leaders issue associated calls and approve actions to reduce the proportion of Arabs and increase that of Jews in Israel and occupied Jerusalem, including by means of transfer. !ese statements, calls, and actions clearly show the speci"c and stated aims of the leaders of Israel and the Zionist movement, to cleanse the country of Arabs just because they are Arabs. [248]

De"nition of ethnic cleansing:!e term “ethnic cleansing” "rst appeared at the end of World War II, when the Czechs and Polish started to publicly call for the need to cleanse their countries of Germans and Ukrainians. Prior to this, however, the Nazis used to call for making the German lands free of Jews in their health-related programs.[249] !e term started to appear more often and seriously in discussions in 1981 by the media in the former Yugoslavia for making the Kosovo region ethnically homogeneous.[250] Following the outbreak of the Bosnia and Herzegovina war in the former Yugoslavia, e#orts have been exerted to de"ne “ethnic cleansing” within the many reports published on this war and its associated acts and practices. As a result, ethnic cleansing became well-de"ned and was considered a punishable crime within this context, although there is still a complete absence of an international convention banning all forms of ethnic cleansing.

In Hutchinson encyclopedia, ethnic cleansing is de"ned as the forced expulsion of one ethnic group by another to create a homogeneous population in a multi-ethnic territory or region. !e aim of this expulsion is to transfer the largest possible number of people by using various means, including non-violent means, such as the case with Muslims in Croatia, who were expelled following the signing of Dayton agreement in 1995.[251]

Reports by the Special Rapporteur of the UN Committee on Human Rights on the former Yugoslavia between 1993 and 1994 included a number of acts and practices that were considered a form of ethnic cleansing. Such practices include various administrative measures such as bringing an elected authority down by force, dismissal from work, in particular from in%uential positions, restriction of access to humanitarian aid, resettlement of refugees from a certain ethnicity in the region being cleansed, enactment of legislations entailing discrimination and oppression, forcing people wishing to leave the region to take their families with them, and preventing women of a certain ethnicity from giving birth in hospitals.[252] Other acts and measures potentially constituting

[248] Israeli Committee Against Housing Demolitions (ICAHD). http://www.icahd.org/eng/articles.asp?menu=6&submenu=2&article=311. (2006).[249] Mark Kramer. ‘Introduction’, in Mark Kramer, ed., Rewarding Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, Boulder: Rowman & Little"eld, 2001, p. 1.[250] Drazen Petrovic, ‘Ethnic Cleansing-An Attempt to Methodology’, (1994) 5 Eur. J . Int’l L. 343.[251] Ilan Pappe. Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Beirut, 2007, p. 9.[252] Supra, note 80; Jacques Semelin. “Analysis of Mass Crime: Ethnic Cleansing in the Former Yugoslavia”. Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies. http://migs.concordia.ca/occpapers/semelin.html.(2000)

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ethnic cleansing entail intimidation of civilians by soldiers or armed civilians, including acts of looting, terrifying people in the streets, arbitrary arrest, abuse and transfer of people to prisons and detention centers, targeting of civilians by shooting at them or destroying their houses, and group transfer of speci"c populations.[253]

Ethnic cleansing may also take place during military operations, such as the deliberate killing or torturing of civilian leaders, including religious and political leaders, scientists, academics and businessmen, imposing siege on towns and villages, planned attacks to prevent access to humanitarian aid, targeting of residential areas and infrastructure by shelling, and retaliation from civilians and leaders.. All these acts constitute violations of human rights and the rules and provisions of international law and, depending on the speci"c case, can be considered a form of ethnic cleansing.[254]

!e Special Rapporteur of the UN Committee on Human Rights concluded that the main purpose of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to carry out ethnic cleansing in order to establish ethnic homogeneity in the region, and that the purpose of ethnic cleansing could be short term or long term. !e short term purpose of ethnic cleansing is to seize actual control of the region for military and strategic reasons, while the long term purpose is to create living conditions that make it impossible for the displaced groups to return home and thus e#ect a change in the ethnic composition of the population based on the region’s theories of unity and ethnic homogeneity.[255]

!erefore, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Committee on Human Rights stated in his report issued on 17 November 1992 that “the description of ethnic cleansing means the removal by an ethnic group controlling a region of other ethnic groups.” !e Rapporteur stated in his sixth report that “ethnic cleansing is the cleansing of civilians on an ethnic basis to force them to %ee the region where they live.”[256]

!ere are many other de"nitions of ethnic cleansing, the most prominent developed by the experts’ committee in its "rst interim report, where they concurred on the opinion that “taking into consideration the con%icts in the former Yugoslavia, ethnic cleansing means making the region ethnically homogeneous by using force and intimidation to displace people of a certain group from the region.”In a historical overview of ethnic cleansing, scholar Bell-Fialko# maintains that “…ethnic cleansing can be seen as expelling the unwanted population from a region for reasons related to discrimination on ethnic or religious basis and for political, strategic or ideological considerations or for all these elements together.”[257]

All of the aforementioned de"nitions entail certain elements that provide for a common opinion on ethnic cleansing, viewing it as aiming to create ethnic homogeneity in a multiethnic region through the expulsion of the unwanted ethnic group(s) using various means (administrative, military, intimidation and media), turning the unwanted ethnic group(s) into refugees and making it impossible for them to return based on the claimed need to restrict the population in the region to a speci"c main ethnicity.

[253] Bob Myers. “Against Ethnic Cleansing in the Former Yugoslavia”. http://%ag.blackened.net/revolt/inter/seattle/yugoslavia.html (2001) .[254] Supra, note 80. [255] Second Mazowiecki Report, at 2, Point 1. !ird Mazowiecki Report, at 3, Point 6. Drozen Patrovic, P. 9.[256] Supra, note 80, p. 10.[257] Bell-Fialko#. “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing, Foreign A#airs”. Vol. 72, No. 3 (1993) 110.


Ethnic Cleansing in Jerusalem:

cleansing of some ethnic groups from a territory to create ethnic homogeneity, the

description of ethnic cleansing applies to the policies employed by the Zionist leaders

in Palestine during the 1948 war as they were aimed at cleansing the majority of the

territories from Arabs in order to create an ethnic homogeneity restricted to Jews.

Following the declaration of the establishment of the Jewish state on the eve of 14 May 1948, the forces in the "eld were repeatedly using the Hebrew term “Tihour”, which means “cleansing.”[258] !e higher leadership of the Zionist movement selected this expression to charge and provoke the soldiers before they were sent to occupy the Palestinian urban and rural areas, cleanse them from Arabs, appropriate and loot their properties and/or destroy them altogether.

Jerusalem City and its surrounding villages and towns were in particular subjected to a large scale ethnic cleansing process. In this regard, the historian Salim Tamari stated that out of 40 villages in Jerusalem district that remained under Israeli control after the signing of the truce agreement in 1949, the population of 38 of the villages was displaced, which at the time amounted to approximately 73,258 people.[259] !is number does not include the residents of Arab neighborhoods in the western part of the City, which was also occupied and cleansed completely of the Arab population, and whose houses were appropriated and properties looted. According to some historians, the Arab neighborhoods in the western part of Jerusalem used to be among the richest and most prosperous neighborhoods in the Middle East prior to 1948.[260]

!e policy of ethnic cleansing and forced displacement of Palestinians continued after Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories during the 1967 war. !e resulting tragedy has mainly a#ected the population of the Old City of Jerusalem.[261] !e Israeli authorities also forced the eviction of the population of some Palestinian villages in the territories occupied in 1967 and then destroyed these villages.[262]

!e Israeli authorities are speci"cally targeting the Palestinian presence in occupied Jerusalem and consistently work towards altering the demographics prevailing in the City prior to its occupation through a policy of ethnic cleansing. !is policy aims at forcing the largest possible number of Palestinian residents of Jerusalem to move out of the City by means of freezing family uni"cation,

[258] Ilan Pappe. Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine..One World Publications, 2006. p. 143.[259] Salim Tamari, “!e City and its Rural Hinterland”, in Jerusalem 1948:!e Arab Neighbourhoods and their Fate in the War. Institute for Palestine Studies (1999). p. 75-86. According to UNRWA statistics of 1997, the number of refugees from these villages reached 246,342.[260] Nathan Krystall, “!e Fall of the New City 1947-1950”, in Jerusalem 1948:!e Arab Neighbourhoods and their Fate in the War. Salim Tamari ed. Institute for Palestine Studies (1999). p. 93.[261] By an order from the Israeli government, the occupying forces evicted the residents of Magharbeh neighborhood and several adjacent neighborhoods in the Old City and forcibly moved them to Shu>fat refugee camp. !en they demolished these neighborhoods and built new ones to accommodate Jewish settlers. Some of the settlers were accommodated in houses expropriated from Palestinians. Statistics indicate that the occupying authorities completely removed the Magharbeh neighborhood, demolishing 135 houses that hosted 650 Palestinians, in addition to demolishing two mosques. For more details, see: Musa Al-Qudsi Al-Dweik. Jerusalem and the International Law: A Study on the Legal Status of the City and the Israeli Violations of Human Rights.[262] During the 1967 war, the Israeli occupying troops forcibly evicted the population of the three villages in the Latroun (Imwas, Yalo and Beit Nouba), west of Jerusalem and demolished the villages by the virtue of a decision made by the Israeli government. According to the population of these villages, most of them are currently living in Amman, while some live in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

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appropriating land, building settlements ,severely restricting Palestinian construction in Jerusalem ,demolishing Palestinian houses, restricting the freedom of movement and choice of residence, and isolating the city from the rest of the oPt through the Annexation Wall which further annexes Palestinian land through its very construction.[263] !ese policies and measures prevent any Palestinian from exercising their right to live in Jerusalem and force many Palestinian residents out of the City, often by o$cially revoking their right to reside in Jerusalem.[264]

Among the most serious measures aimed at reducing the proportion of Palestinians and increasing the number of Jewish settlers in Jerusalem is the aforementioned Nationality and Entry into Israel law, which was initiated through the Israeli occupation authority’s Decision 1813 of 2002, providing for freezing the family uni"cation procedures for Palestinians. !e Israeli parliament (Knesset) approved the Decision and turned it into the National and Entry to Israel (temporary order) law of 2003, which was later renamed to the Nationality and Entry to Israel law. Under this law, a complete freeze was exercised on the uni"cation of Palestinian families and the processing of the related applications.

On 16 May 2007, Israel celebrated “Jerusalem Day”, which is in the Hebrew calendar equal to 28 June – the day when the eastern part of the City was o$cially annexed. On this occasion, the Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies issued a special report presenting the "ndings of an opinion poll implemented among the Jewish public on a number of issues and situations related to Jerusalem and its future.[265]

In the data gathered by its experts and presented in the report, the Institute warned that the demographic balance is likely to tip in favor of Arabs during the next two decades and that there is a risk of losing the Jewish majority in Jerusalem.[266] Researchers from the same institute warned in a 2007 conference on Jerusalem’s population that the “Jewish majority in the City is increasingly declining since several years” and indicated that the growth rate for the Arab population in Jerusalem is twice as much as the growth rate of Jews. !e data presented in the conference indicates that Jerusalem (both parts) has a total population of about 720,000, including 66% of Jews and 34% of Arabs. !is gap is predicted to decrease in the coming years to be 60% of Jews and 40% of Arabs by 2020.[267]

!e data clearly points to a certain drawback in the demographic situation as viewed by the Israeli authorities, in spite of the strict measures and restrictions imposed on the Palestinians in order to decrease their proportion in the City to below 30%. Hence, the authorities have been intensifying these measures, as re%ected in the Nationality and Entry to Israel law of 2003, which is considered a measure of ethnic cleansing.

[263] According to the Jerusalem Annual Statistical Book published by PCBS, 1635 families have been displaced from Jerusalem district in result of Wall construction.[264] According to data from the Israeli Interior Ministry, in 2006, the right to residency in Jerusalem was revoked for 1363 Palestinian residents of the City, which constitutes an about 500% increase compared to 2005..Data is based on an article published on the website of 1948 Arabs on 24 June 2007.[265] An Israeli institute specializing in developing studies, visions and strategic plans in regard to the status of Jerusalem.[266] Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. “!e Image of Jerusalem in the Eyes of the Jewish Public in Israel:” http://www.jiis.org.il/content.asp?pressMessageID=13 (2007).[267] Ibid.


De"nition of Forced Displacement:Internal displacement is a major issue a#ecting the Palestinians since the beginning of the con%ict with the Zionist movement, dating back to periods prior to 1948 – the year when Israel was declared as a state. However, the internal forced displacement of Palestinians within the territories where Israel was established (1948 areas) became evident following 1948, with tens of thousands of Palestinians being forcibly displaced inside their homeland. !e forced displacement of Palestinians continued following Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem in 1967, mainly targeting East Jerusalem and the surrounding areas. Local Palestinian residents were forced out and those wanting to move and live in Jerusalem were not permitted to do so.

!ere is no legal de"nition of internal displacement, other than the de"nition used in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of 1998, which de"nes internally displaced persons as “those persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to %ee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the e#ects of armed con%ict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border”.[268]

For persons or groups of persons to be included in the above de"nition of internally displaced, the displacement has to be a result of forced causes, and the displaced persons have to remain living within the internationally recognized borders of their state and not cross a border and settle in another state.[269]

To date there is no international convention or criteria to regulate the conditions of the internally displaced and provide them with protection and help as victims of human rights violations, armed con%icts or natural disasters. It should be noted however that internally displaced persons do not bene"t from the international protection available to refugees. To "ll this gap, the UN Guiding Principles should be adopted as guidance for the di#erent authorities, groups, governmental organizations and NGOs in dealing with cases of internal displacement, as these principles respond to the standards enshrined in international human rights law and in the rules and provisions of international humanitarian law.

Forced Displacement in the Occupied Palestinian TerritoriesUnder the de"nition of internal displacement as outlined in the Guiding Principles, Israeli policies can be considered as leading to the forced displacement of the Palestinian population of the territories occupied in 1967, and in particular the Palestinian Jerusalemites, who have been, and continue to be forced to leave their places of habitual residence due to the violation of their rights by the occupying power and have not crossed internationally recognized borders.

[268] Walter Kalin, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Annotations. ASIL Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, No: 32,.American society of International Law and the Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement, 2000, p. 1.[269] !e di#erence between the internally displaced and refugees should be emphasized as each category has a di#erent legal status. A refugee is one who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for race, religion, nationality, members of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 1A(2), amended through the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees). Refugees are not considered citizens of the host country but rather maintain a special legal status. On the other hand, the internally displaced, by the fact that they have remained within the borders of their country, should have all the rights and duties associated with their nationality.

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In this case, we "nd that the internally displaced Palestinians are those persons, or groups of persons, who have been forced to %ee as a result of the 1967 war and the continuous violation of their human rights by the Israeli authorities.[270]

Practices leading to the internal displacement in Jerusalem include the adoption of Israel – as the occupying power – of the policy of isolation of Jerusalem and preventing the Palestinians from accessing the City for purposes of residence or otherwise, the adoption of an discriminatory policy towards family uni"cation resulting in the recent freeze on this process, and the demolition of houses and deliberate damage to properties of Palestinians. Since the beginning of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the Israeli authorities have demolished thousands of buildings and houses on the pretext of security, to deter Palestinians from carrying out attacks against Israel, to retaliate for attacks, and due to the lack of building license. As a result, tens of thousands of Palestinians have been internally displaced.

No accurate statistics are available on the number of the internally displaced in the oPt. According to the estimates of BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, approximately 10,000 Palestinians were displaced during the 1967 war, with the vast majority from the villages and towns of Imwas, Yalo, Beit Nouba, Beit Awwa, Jiftlek, Qalqilia and the Old City of Jerusalem (Magharbeh neighborhood). According to BADIL estimates, about 50,000 Palestinians have been forcibly internally displaced due to the policy of house demolition in Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Jerusalem.[271] According to UNRWA estimates, the number of persons internally displaced due to house demolition in the period 2000-2004 was about 22,000 Palestinians, including about 3,800 persons who were displaced in Gaza Strip as a result of military operations and the accompanied large scale house demolition during May 2004.[272]

Regarding Jerusalem in particular, forced displacement has been consistently implemented in the city since 1967, when the occupying forces implemented the Israeli Government’s decision to evict the Palestinians from the Old City (Magharbeh neighborhood and other adjacent neighborhoods) to Shu’fat camp and completely destroy Magharbeh neighborhood[273]. In the remaining neighborhoods, the houses of the newly displaced Palestinians were expanded and used to accommodate Jewish settlers. New housing units were built to increase the capacity for adding even more settlers.

To summarize, Israeli measures targeted at Jerusalem and its Palestinian residents vary to include the isolation of the City from the rest of the oPt, denial of access for Palestinians, creation of obstacles for the uni"cation of Palestinian families in Jerusalem, prevention of any Palestinian not holding permanent residency status in Jerusalem (the blue Israeli ID card) from accessing and residing in the City, and most recently the freeze of the processing of any application for family uni"cation, which means prohibiting any possibility for a Palestinian or a person of Palestinian origin to have residence in Jerusalem. !ese measures come within a systematic and extensive plan to limit the proportion of Palestinians and increase the number of Jewish settlers in the City.

[270] !is includes Palestinians forced to move from Gaza Strip to the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and vice versa, as they have not crossed the borders of the oPt, but were displaced within these borders, which means they meet the criteria for the internally displaced.[271] Norwegian Refugee Council. “Pro"le of internal displacement: Palestinian Territories”., July 2004, p. 4.[272] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/98F0726BF7D6AA45C12574B30055BD32?OpenDocument (2009).[273] Supra, note 82.


Due to these grave violations of human rights, tens of thousands of Palestinian families have been forced to move out of the city and settle behind the Wall and outside of Jerusalem.

Overall, large numbers of Palestinians have been subjected to internal displacement due to the Israeli policies, mainly the freeze on the uni"cation of disintegrated Palestinian families and the large scale and deliberate practice of house demolition. !ese people are considered internally displaced because they have not crossed the borders of the territories occupied in 1967, contrary to refugees, who have been forced in 1948 to leave Palestine that was under the British mandate and seek shelter in neighboring countries as a result of Israeli policies or to avoid the adversities of the war.

Summary and Conclusions:!e purpose of this study has been to highlight the underlying reasons for the Israeli policies regarding residency and citizenship and their consequences on the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem in particular and in the occupied Palestinian territories. !ese policies are targeting the physical presence of Palestinians in their homeland and subjecting them to internal displacement in order to achieve the Israeli aims of reducing the number of Palestinians and increasing the proportion of Jewish settlers in the country – a practice that "ts within the scope and de"nition of ethnic cleansing.

!e study revealed that the de"nition of ethnic cleansing applies to the Israeli policies targeted at the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem, including the freeze on family uni"cation for Palestinians, house demolition, cancellation of Palestinians’ residency status in Jerusalem, land appropriation, restrictions imposed on building activities, and restriction of freedom of movement, including free access to and from Jerusalem. !ese policies and the associated measures lead to the forced displacement of Palestinians and constitute grave violations of their rights, including Palestinians’ right to residency in Jerusalem, the right to have a name and nationality, to choose the place of residence, to free movement, the right to live in liberty and dignity and in a sound family environment, the right to health care and education, and the right to grow and develop under parental care and within a calm and sound family environment. In addition, the policies of the Israeli authorities violate their obligations with regards to non-discrimination, enshrined in various international human rights instruments to which Israel is a party.

!e continuation of these policies re%ects the leniency of the international community towards Israel and its discriminatory policies, to the detriment of the Palestinian people. !ese policies have restricted family uni"cation for Palestinians since the beginning of the occupation, culminating with a total freeze since the start of the second Intifada. Despite the dozens of reports and studies published on the illegitimacy of these policies, there has been little impact on the public opinion. !e lobbying e#orts of human rights organizations towards ending these policies have had a minimal impact on the international community, who continues its reluctance to exert serious and e#ective pressure on the Israeli authorities to halt their discriminatory policies and ensure respect for human rights.

!e Civic Coalition has presented this brief study on the Israeli policies of ethnic cleansing and forced displacement targeting the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem in the hopes that human rights advocates globally will mobilize international opinion and together, use the information provided in this study to demand for the immediate cessation of these policies.

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Recommendations:

International community:Pressure Israel, the occupying power, to ensure protection for Palestinians in the oPt against the Israeli policies of ethnic cleansing and forced displacement and compel Israel to respect and implement their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law.

Pressure Israel, the occupying power, to revoke the Nationality and Entry to Israel law in view of its character as a tool of racial discrimination against the Palestinians in the oPt, Palestinian Jerusalemites and Palestinian citizens in Israel in particular, and to lift the restrictions on Palestinians’ mobility, including their free and safe access to and from Jerusalem, and allow all Palestinians to practice their inherent right to choose their place of residence, including in Jerusalem.

Demand that States Parties to the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Times of War compel Israel to ful"ll its obligations ensuing from the Convention and to halt its policies aimed at the forced transfer of Palestinians, especially Jerusalemites, which constitute a breach of the Convention’s rules and provisions.

Israeli authorities:Stop the policies of ethnic cleansing and forced displacement of Palestinians, including the immediate cancellation of the Nationality and Entry to Israel law, which entails racial discrimination speci"cally against Palestinians, and ensure Palestinians’ free access to and from Jerusalem and freedom to stay and live in the City.

Respect and implement the standards of the international human rights instruments to which Israel is a party, speci"cally with regard to the right to identity and nationality, the right to a family life and children’s right to know and be cared for by their parents. !is entails upholding obligations to protect the family as the natural and fundamental group unit of society and stop discrimination against Palestinians with regard to family reuni"cation and residency.

Apply the rules and provisions of international humanitarian law and international human rights law to the Palestinian population of the oPt; stop the current policies concerning the uni"cation of Palestinian families, including Jerusalemites; create, develop and activate mechanisms that can provide Palestinians with protection against violations of their basic rights and freedoms; and ensure their enjoyment of basic rights, primarily the right to freedom of movement and free access to and from the oPt, including Jerusalem.


Palestinian Authority:Monitor and document the consequences of the ethnic cleansing and forced displacement of Palestinians, the freeze on the uni"cation of disintegrated families, including Jerusalemite families, and evaluate the ensuing material and psychological damages.

Ensure the provision of the necessary support and aid to victims of these policies, including their rehabilitation and social integration, and generally support the wellbeing and integrity of Palestinian families.

International and local NGOs:Demand Israel, the occupying power, to end its occupation of the Palestinian territories and in the meantime to ensure the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the oPt and respect and apply its international human rights obligations with regard to the Palestinians; to restore the situation of Jerusalem as prior to its occupation; and refrain from isolating the City from its Palestinian surroundings.

Demand Israel, the occupying power, to cease the ethnic cleansing and forced displacement policies against Palestinians aimed at forcing them out of the City borders by di#erent means, including the freeze on family uni"cation, and to cancel the Nationality and Entry to Israel law, which entails racial discrimination against Palestinians.

Pressure the international community, the UN and States Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention to ful"ll their legal responsibilities and refrain from supporting the Israeli measures in the oPt, including the freeze on family uni"cation; and pressure Israel to stop its discriminatory measures and ful"ll its obligations under international law.

Monitor and document cases of ethnic cleansing and forced displacement in the oPt, including Israel’s policy ion family uni"cation, conduct studies in this regard and develop speci"c tangible projects in the area of protection and assistance to the victims of these policies.

Develop lobbying and advocacy campaigns targeting the international community, to pressure Israel to stop its violations of human rights in the oPt, speci"cally those a#ecting Palestinian families and preventing their uni"cation. !is can include threats of boycott and divestment and actual adoption of these measures in the case where Israel fails to respond.

CHAPTER FOUR

“Legalizing demolition… Illegalizing construction”

Israeli Occupation Authorities Campaign Against Palestinian Property in Jerusalem

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97CHAPTER FOUR“Legalizing demolition… Illegalizing construction”

“Legalizing demolition… Illegalizing construction”

Israeli Occupation Authorities Campaign Against Palestinian Property in Jerusalem

Yaqoub OdehField Researcher – Land Research Centre, Jerusalem

IntroductionPalestinian land has been at the center of the Arab-Israeli con%ict from the very beginning of the Palestinian cause and throughout its stages: prior to the creation of Israel in 1948, after Israel’s occupation of the remaining part of Palestine in 1967, and to date. !e Judaization and annexation of Jerusalem has been a primary aim of the Israeli occupation, which it seeks to achieve by imposing demographic changes on the ground. As a result, Palestinian land in Jerusalem is being appropriated and Jerusalemites are being prevented from using 88% of their land under various pretexts. In addition, 17 Jewish settlements and dozens of settler outposts have been established in and around the Old City of Jerusalem, accommodating over 9000 settlers. !e number of housing units in the settlements is over 70,000 housing approximately 200,000 settlers; a settler presence in occupied Jerusalem that is steadily increasing.

!e Israeli government policy against Palestinian construction activities in Jerusalem has been a means for implementing the Judaization plan, aimed at minimizing the non-Jewish population in the city. !e policy of demolishing existing houses, removing those under construction and banning the building of new ones has been implemented systematically by the Israeli authorities, with periods of intensi"cation and periods of easing as per the political context of the occupation and the region in general.

Home and old and new policy Immediately after the war of June 1967, on 11 June, Israeli bulldozers razed the As-Sharaf neighbourhood (Moroccan quarter inside the old city), destroying 135 houses, a school, and a mosque. Soon later, the three Latrun villages of Imwas, Yalo and Beit Naquba located northwest of

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Jerusalem were totally destroyed, including over 5,000 houses [274] Additionally, about 200 buildings and houses in the “no man’s land” areas in Jerusalem were, also destroyed. !e total number of houses alone demolished in Jerusalem to date (Sep. 2008 ) since June 1967 is estimated at around 9000 houses[275]. !is is in addition to the use of military tanks, warplanes, warships and military and civil bulldozers to demolish over 40,000 buildings and displace hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in other parts of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip since the outbreak of the second Intifada (uprising) in the year 2000.

Israeli government Violation of the Palestinians’ Rights to Land and Adequate Housing:Jerusalem su#ers from a complicated housing problem, which is increasing year by year due in large part to the Israeli occupation’s policies and practices:

Approximately 25 km& of land have been con"scated from the West Bank territory and annexed to Jerusalem since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967. !is illegally con"scated and annexed land was used to establish (to date) 17 settlements in Jerusalem for exclusive Jewish use under a systematically planned policy.[276] !e Israeli occupation has con"scated 34% of Jerusalem lands for settlement activities and classi"ed 54% of the lands as Green or Open areas, leaving less than 12% or only 10,048 dunums of land for Palestinian housing and other uses[277] According to the Jewish Professor Yohanan Peres, “Israel is banning construction in 70% of West Bank lands and 86% of Jerusalem lands

In addition, the Israeli occupation’s housing policy and practices completely ignore the needs of the local Arab population, particularly in regard to zoning and building. Similar to the situation in the apartheid regime in South Africa, the decision in this regard is political and not a structural or technical decision responding to the needs of urban development. !e essence of the Israeli occupation’s policy is to reduce the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem and its suburbs as much as possible so that it will account for less than 22% of the population of both parts of the City, as per the 1973 decision of the inter-ministerial committee (Gafni Committee) on ethnic balance.[278] !e Palestinian population in Jerusalem in the middle of 2007 was 258,000 [279], comprising about 35% of the total population of the city (east and west).

For 40 years since the inception of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, the Jerusalem Municipality had not approved a structural scheme in East Jerusalem for the bene"t of its Palestinian population. Only in 2007 did the Mayor of Jerusalem declared that 50 schemes would be put in place to bene"t the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem.[280] !e Israeli occupation

[274] See the documentary "lm titled «!e Cactus Memory», directed by Hana Misleh and produced by Al Haq human Rights Association, Ramallah.[275] LRC annual house demolition reports in Arabic, http://www.lrcj.org/Arabic/ViolationsMonitoring/Reports/2001_2008.htm. [276] Geographic Information System – GIS database, Land Research Center – LRC.[277] Ibid. [278] Discrimination in the heart of the city , Mr. Meir Margalit, 2006, and, Israel and the occupied territories, Amnesty International, p. 48, note 5.[279] Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Census "nal results in the West Bank - Summary (population & housing 2007), Ramallah - Palestine. [280] Coalition for Jerusalem. “40 Years under occupation - Jerusalem, Facts and Numbers”. June 2007.


has consistently prevented the implementation of building activities by, for example, allocating a low proportion of lands for building, or classifying lands as Green or Open Areas. For instance, lands classi"ed as Green comprise 60% of Sawahreh and 42% of Sur Baher. !e lands of these two villages are classi"ed as lands in need of reclassi"cation and zoning; compounding these con"scations are the Israeli bypass roads that occupy an additional 7% of Jerusalem lands. As a result, only a very limited area is available for building purposes.

!ese appropriations and con"scations have forced the Palestinians in Jerusalem to resort to unlicensed building – a choice that they have not taken willingly – in order to respond to the increasing need for over 200 houses per year and to avoid the heavy fees associated with the license. !ese license fees are particularly signi"cant in view of the low income level and high taxes faced by Palestinian residents in Jerusalem, who also su#er from crippling conditions resulting from complicated administrative procedures and prohibitive requirements that bar construction in practice. Such procedures include:

Possession of land ownership registration certi"cate, which is rarely available because two thirds of West Bank lands – including occupied Jerusalem – have not been registered in land registries. In addition, the Israeli authorities have since the late 1970s persisted in declaring unregistered and unused lands as “State Lands”, managed by the occupation’s Civil Administration.

Heavy fees for obtaining a building license, ranging between US $25,000-30,000. !e fees are impossible to meet under the severe economic hardship faced by Palestinians in Jerusalem. It should be noted that approximately 60% of Palestinians are living under the poverty line and approximately 35% of skilled workers in East Jerusalem are unemployed[281]. !e following table illustrates the cost of obtaining a building license from the Israeli occupation’s municipality:

Table 1

No Procedure Cost (in NIS)

1. Initial application 2000

2. Fees for building development (connection to water network) 14800

3. Fees for land development 18500

4. Taxes for sewage installation 15525

5. Fees for water network development 17606

6. Taxes for connecting to the sewage system 8236

7. Taxes for connecting to the water network 5025

8. Preparation of construction plan for registration purposes 15000

9. Improvement tax 12800

Total 109492

Source: A study on the Israeli structural plan for Jerusalem City 2000 – CCDPRJ

[281] Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Jerusalem Annual Statistical Report, No. 10 – June – 2008, Ramallah - Palestine

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Palestinian applicants for a building license have to wait for a period of 5-10 years and in some cases, even longer, to obtain a license. At best, the issued licenses account for only 5% of applications. A person obtaining a building license can only build two %ats and a parking garage of a 180 cm height as a maximum. As a result, more than 75% of the population lives in small and inadequate houses. People resorting to unlicensed building are often those with low or limited income who cannot a#ord to pay the fees for a license, but whom due to the inadequacy of their housing, cannot a#ord not to build.

When a Palestinian obtains a license to build, the allowed area for building is restricted, as the Israeli occupation’s municipality appropriates 40% of the land as the municipality’s share. In Al-Mukabber for example, the allowed area for Palestinians to build is only 37% of the land’s area, compared to 90% in the Jewish settlement Armon Hanatzif built on Al-Mukabber lands.[282] In Beit Hanina, the allowed area for building is 50% of the land’s area, compared to 90-120% in Pisgat Zeev settlement built on Beit Hanina lands.[283] In Sur Baher, the allowed area is 35-50% of the land’s area, compared to 90-120% in Har Homah settlement in the same area[284].

!ese crippling conditions leave Palestinians with only one choice – to build without obtaining a license. Eventually, this leads to penal procedures by the municipality, interior and defence ministries. !ese include monetary "nes, reaching, according to Meir Margalit, NIS 96 millions in 2006, con"scation of building equipment and tools and materials, imprisonment, and demolition of buildings. !ere has been a sharp decline in the number of buildings due to the Israeli occupation’s discriminatory policies against Palestinian building in Jerusalem. !e municipality declared to the media that the unlicensed building declined by 95% in 2005-2006, when in fact there has been 4.2% increase in the number of buildings in that period, re%ecting a 2.1% increase per year[285]. !e rate of increase has dropped compared to previous years, when from 1996-2004, the number of buildings increased by 129%, i.e. by 16% per year.

[282] Dr. Rasim Khamaysa, Struggle over Jerusalem. 2006. p. 89, table 28[283] Ibid.[284] Ibid. [285] Discrimination in the heart of the city , Mr. Meir Margalit, 2006, and, Israel and the occupied territories, Amnesty International, p. 48, note 5.


An Israeli bulldozer demolishing the walls of the ground #oor of a building owned by Majed Abu Eisheh in Beit Hanina

Abu Eisheh building after being demolished by explosives, along with furniture belonging to the seven families living there

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Two children from Al-Razem family, whose house in Beit Hanina was demolished by the Israeli occupation

!e Land Research Center of the Arab Studies Society has documented 837 cases of house demolition between the beginning of 2000 and the end of August 2008[286]. !e demolitions were carried out under the pretext of “illegal” unlicensed building. According to the Israeli Committee Against House Demolition (ICAHD), 65-71 houses were demolished in the period 1 January – 31 August 2008. Most neighbourhoods, suburbs and villages in Jerusalem district have been a#ected to varying degrees.

Table 2: Demolished houses in Jerusalem by year

Year Number of demolished houses

2000 11

2001 72

2002 69

2003 145

2004 183

2005 120

2006 78

2007 94

1/1 – 31/8/2008 65

Total 837

[286] LRC annual house demolition reports in Arabic, http://www.lrcj.org/Arabic/ViolationsMonitoring/Reports/2001_2008.htm


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Table 3: House demolition in Jerusalem from 2001 until the end of August 2008 by locality:

Locality Number of demolished houses

Kufr Aqab 9

Nabi Samuel 6

Al-Jib 13

Shu>fat 79

Old City 15

Z>ayem 4

Wad Al-Joz 11

Beit Hanina 191

Al-!ori 6

Eisawiyeh 57

Hizma 6

Bethany 14

Anata 100

Al-Tur 79

Al-Mukabber 32

Silwan 44

Um Tuba 3

Sur Baher 51

Al-Ram 7

Beit Iksa 5

Beit Safafa 4

Biddo 1

Al-Walajeh 26

Qatannah 4

Sheikh Jarrah 3

Sheikh Sa>ad 1

Beit Surik 2

Bir Nabala 10

Sawahreh Sharqieyh 6

Um Al-Lahem 2

Jaba> 2

Sharfat 1

Abu Dis 12

Mount of Olives 5

Qalandia 15

Total 826


!e average cost of construction of one square meter of a house made of brick, cement and stone in East Jerusalem is US $300. !is is a painful economic burden, particularly under the severe economic and living hardship experienced by the majority of Palestinians in the city. In addition to the "nancial loss, house demolitions have serious and long-lasting negative impacts on the physical and mental health and the social and cultural life of families and owners of demolished houses[287].

Challenges Facing the Housing Sector in Jerusalem:According to the Land Research Center’s data, the demolition orders and decisions served to Palestinians in the last four years totalled 88% of the total orders and decisions issued for Jerusalem during that period. !e remaining 12% in the Israeli side is only walls, TV towers and kiosks. !ere has been no demolition whatsoever of any housing units amongst this 12 %, according to Ex-municipality member, Sara Keminker, and, current member in the municipal council from Meretz party, Meir Margalit. !is is despite the fact the Palestinians only account for one third of the population of Jerusalem and their share of owned buildings in the City does not exceed 18.2%. !e cumulative amount of unlicensed building "nes in 2006 exceeded NIS 96 millions. !e “unlicensed” buildings, estimated at 20,000 houses[288] according to building control o$cer Zvi Schneider at the Israeli Interior Ministry are the only means for Palestinians’ fortitude in Jerusalem and for defending their lands and city, irrespective of the occupying authorities’ classi"cations. Continued building and restoration of Palestinian houses is a main factor in preventing the complete Judaization of Jerusalem and alteration of its holy and historical status. Victims of house demolitions are mostly people with low or average income. !eir fortitude in the city protects the Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem in the face of Israeli plans aimed to remove them from their houses and lands and replace them with Jewish settlers.

Major challenges for housing in Jerusalem include: Scarcity of lands, with only 12% or about 10,048 dunums of Jerusalem lands left for 1. building (half of the 12% is already occupied)[289]. Sections within the other half lack a land registration certi"cate, other sections are owned by multiple owners, and still others are considered by the Israeli Authority as absentee land and thus eligible for appropriation.

!e Israeli policies and laws illegalizing construction and legalizing demolition, which 2. represent a major threat for Palestinian Jerusalemites[290]

!e municipality’s classi"cation of houses as “illegal” includes 20,000 houses and 8 illegal 3. "les according to the Interior Ministry and Mair Margalit.. In addition to these numbers,

[287] Impacts of house demolition in Jerusalem, Amer Nur, 1995, Palestine Human Rights Information Center.[288] Discrimination in the heart of the city, Mr. Meir Margalit, 2006, P. 27, see also: http://www.kibush.co.il/downloads/meirbook-hw.pdf[289] Dr. Rasim Khamaysa. Planning and Organization in Jerusalem. 2008, p.79, and Je# Halper, “ Jerusalem on the Map” 2005, p.400.[290] See the planning and construction laws for 1965 and its Israeli amendments and procedures.

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an unknown number of unlicensed building "les are kept by the “Defence” Ministry, covering the remaining parts of the Jerusalem district[291]

High population density in the Old City, where the space is limited and services are 4. scarce, while the population is growing in inappropriate housing conditions and the majority of houses are in need for urgent restoration and rehabilitation. To solve the housing problem, it is estimated that Palestinians in Jerusalem currently need more than 42,000 housing units.

!e Annexation Wall that extends over more than 200 km to the east and west around 5. Jerusalem and occupies more than 40,000 dunums of the City’s lands. According to the plans, the Wall will annex 12 settlements with a population of more than 176,000 Jewish settlers to Jerusalem.

!e Israeli plan for Jerusalem 2000, which has allocated an insu$cient number 6. of housing units for Arab neighbourhoods, aims to allow the Israeli authorities to appropriate the remaining lands and force Palestinians out, using the pretext of overcrowding in the Old City.

Legal Consequences of Forced Eviction and House Demolition:!e demolition of buildings and houses in Jerusalem by the Israeli occupation represents the individual and collective punishment of the Palestinian people and, as such, constitutes a %agrant violation of customary and treaty based International Law. House demolitions by the Israeli occupation is part of its plan to force the Palestinians out of their homeland and establish Jewish settlements, where settlers would replace the Palestinian owners and residents, demonstrating the occupation’s political goals with regard to Jerusalem that go beyond the stated urban planning pretexts. Hence, it is necessary to mobilize e#orts to disclose the Israeli policies and practices at both, the local and international levels.

International Human Rights Law:!e right to choose residency is enshrined under Article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states that “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.” !e right to freedom of residence is also recognized and documented in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which states that “everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.” Israeli policies and practices of house demolitions constitute a violation of their legal obligations under the ICCPR, depriving hundreds of Palestinians of their right to choose their residence and actually forcing them from their chosen residence on their own land.

!e ICCPR also includes the right to respect of privacy, family, home and correspondence (Article 17). According to the Human Rights Committee, the monitoring body of the ICCPR,

[291] Bimkom ( Planners for Planning Rights), workshop on demolition in area 20, May, 2009


“this right is required to be guaranteed against all such interferences and attacks whether they emanate from State authorities or from natural or legal persons. !e obligations imposed by this article require the State to adopt legislative and other measures to give e#ect to the prohibition against such interferences and attacks as well as to the protection of this right” . By demolishing houses and rendering families homeless, Israel is openly and deliberately interfering with Palestinians’ homes and family life, and therefore is in clear violation of its obligations under Article 17of the ICCPR.

Under Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), everyone has the right to an adequate standard of living, which speci"cally includes “adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions”. Furthermore, as a State Party to the ICESCR, Israel is under obligation “to take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right”. Israel’s demolition of houses is a %agrant violation of its obligations under Article 11- instead of taking steps to ensure that Palestinians enjoy their right to adequate housing and continuous improvement of living conditions; it is directly and knowingly destroying the already inadequate housing available to the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem.

A necessary step in carrying out house demolitions is the practice of forced evictions. In order to demolish the house, the resident family is "rst be evicted against their will. In addition to the provisions set out in the text of the ICCPR and ICESCR, various UN bodies monitoring international law have expressly addressed forced evictions, which accompany the house demolitions. After the its General Comment 16, the Human Rights Committee in March 1993 unequivocally classi"ed the practice of forced eviction as “a gross violation of human rights, in particular the right to adequate housing”. !e Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has twice released general comments relating to forced evictions. According to the ICESCR on the right to adequate housing highlighted State Parties’ obligation to “give due priority to those social groups living in unfavorable conditions by giving them particular consideration” and speci"cally stated that “policies and legislation should correspondingly not be designed to bene"t already advantaged social groups at the expense of others” Israel’s policies regarding house demolitions and accompanying forced eviction (and subsequent development of land for exclusive use by the Jewish Israeli population) does in fact favor one already advantaged social group, Israelis, at the expense of another- the Palestinians. !e UN human right Committee in General Comment 4 concluded that the practice of forced evictions is “prima facie incompatible with the requirements of the Covenant and can only be justi"ed in the most exceptional circumstances and in accordance with the relevant principles of international law”.

To clarify the extent to which forced evictions may be permissible, the Committee subsequently released General Comment 7 in 1993, where it expressly states that “Forced eviction and house demolition as a punitive measure are also inconsistent with the norms of the Covenant. Likewise, the Committee takes note of the obligations enshrined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocols thereto of 1977 concerning prohibitions on the displacement of the civilian population and the destruction of private property as these relate to the practice of forced eviction.”

International Humanitarian Law:Article 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, rati"ed by Israel, prohibits the transferring of the Occupying powers’ own civilian population into the territory that it occupies. Also, according to article 53 of the same convention Israeli is prohibited from the destruction of “personal property”, therefore, Israel’s practices of house demolition are in direct violation of their obligations under

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the Fourth Geneva Convention, under which Israel is considered as the Occupying Power. Recent house demolitions ordered by the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem have garnered criticism by Switzerland, who regards such demolitions as violations of Israel’s obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel has stated that recent demolitions in Jerusalem (November 2008) were sanctioned by law as they were carried out under a court order; however the Swiss Foreign Ministry a$rmed that the demolition of houses is in fact a violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, of which Switzerland is the guardian. In a statement to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Switzerland stated that it noted “no military need to justify the destruction of these houses”, and as such regarded the demolitions as violations of international humanitarian law

Further, the Convention indicates that grave breaches of the Convention include “extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justi"ed by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”. Every High Contracting Party to the Convention is “under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts.” Under this provision, Israel is under obligation to investigate and prosecute those who have perpetrated or ordered grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention, including the extensive destruction and appropriation of property. We in occupied Jerusalem believe this provision should be applied to o$cials in the Israeli government who ordered and supervised such demolitions. As demolitions have been a continuous practice since June 1967, this provision within the Fourth Geneva Convention should a#ect senior governmental o$cials who have ordered or implemented the demolitions since 1967 up to the present day.

CHAPTER FIVE

Education in Jerusalem: Reality and Challenges

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111CHAPTER FIVEEducation in Jerusalem: Reality and Challenges

Education in Jerusalem: Reality and Challenges

Prepared by Samir Jibril Director of Education in Jerusalem

Education in Jerusalem

IntroductionFour di#erent authorities supervise education in Jerusalem: the Islamic Waqf a$liated with the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli Ministry of Education/Municipality, the private sector, and UNRWA. !is multitude of supervising bodies has a negative impact on the status, quality and development of education within the City. !e following table demonstrates the distribution of students by the supervising body according to 2007-2008 statistics:

Table 1:

Supervising body 2007-2008 Per cent

Students Classes % Students % Classes

Israeli Ministry of Education/Municipality 36770 1079 50.4 44.7

Islamic Waqf 12431 471 17.0 19.5

Private 17839 669 24.4 27.7

UNRWA 3572 106 4.9 4.4

Other bodies (*) 2419 88 3.3 3.6

Total 73031 2413 100 100

(*) A group of investors who open schools with "nancial support from the municipality. !e schools are known as Sakhnin schools, and to date total 8 in Jerusalem.

Sources:

Planning and Statistics Department at the Jerusalem Directorate of Education1. JerusalemMunicipality website: www.jerusalem.muni.il/jer_main/defaultnew.asp?lng=12. Sakhnin schools’ administration3.

Islamic Waqf schools (Palestinian Authority):Waqf schools (previously known as Husni Al-Ashhab schools) are considered the heir of the education department in the Jerusalem district since the period of Jordanian rule. !e schools were established post-1967 in response to measures taken by the Israeli occupation authorities to control Jerusalem schools and attempt to impose an Israeli curriculum. A majority of these schools occupy residential buildings that have not been adequately adapted to become schools, but have managed to accommodate the large demand resulting from the Jerusalem community’s refusal

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to accept the Israeli curriculum. !ese schools have been subjected to numerous harassments by the Israeli authorities[292]. Despite these adverse conditions, the Waqf schools continue to provide education to Jerusalemites free of charge without the Israeli curriculum or agenda, and hence they remain very popular.

Islamic Waqf Schools: Infrastructure and Facilities!e premises are originally residential buildings that are not adapted to accommodate a 1. large number of students. As a result, the schools have crowded classrooms and there is a lack of schoolyards and playgrounds for the children.

Most classrooms do not meet educational or health standards, with the average classroom 2. density at 0.9 sq. meters per student, compared to the international standard of at least 1.26 sq. meters. In some schools, the space per student is even less than 0.5 sq. meters.

Approximately half of the school buildings are rented. !eir annual rent amounts to over 3. USD 750,000, which is a high "nancial burden.

It is di$cult to obtain a building license due to the complicated procedures imposed by 4. the Israeli occupation’s municipality in Jerusalem. A building license requires long years of follow up in view of the incapacitating requirements and heavy fees levied, which may ultimately lead to achieving no result at all. In addition, the municipality imposes "nes on school buildings in amounts reaching tens of thousands of shekels (NIS).

Many schools lack libraries, science labs and computer labs. !is is either due to lack of 5. funds or limited space within the building hosting the school.

Islamic Waqf Schools: Sta$ Teachers receive low salaries, causing some of them to seek jobs in schools run by the Israeli municipality. !is also contributes to the low rate of applications for vacancies in teaching jobs at these schools. Heads of departments, school principals and school supervisors do not receive administrative bene"ts or allowances that match their workload: the bene"ts average less than $50 per month. Most holders of Jerusalem IDs do not show interest in the announced vacancies. In addition, the supervising body does not cover social security charges and taxes, which are imposed on them by the Israeli authorities.

!ese schools su#er from a severe shortage in teaching quali"cations in basic subject matters, such as Arabic language, English language, math, physics and Islamic education.

Boys schools su#er from the lack of adequate teaching sta# and competency of existing sta#, leading to a low quality education:

[292] Many organizations document the harassment children face both on their way to and from school as well as disruptions to their studies as a result of harassment from Israeli authorities, including military. For further information, please refer to the Monthly Bulletins of CCDPRJ available at www.ccdprj.ps, or the Weekly Protection of Civilians reports by OCHA, available at www.ocha-opt.org.


Male teachers holding Jerusalem IDs and working in Islamic Waqf schools do not -exceed 50. !eir colleagues holding West Bank IDs face di$culties getting to Jerusalem due to the Wall and checkpoints and often are unable to obtain permits required to enter Jerusalem.

Some teachers are in need of training in specialized and general education topics. -A large number of teachers are not quali"ed in the "eld of teaching (do not hold a diploma in education).

Some school principals are in need of training in management. -

Israeli Ministry of Education/Municipality Schools:Following the occupation of Jerusalem, the Israeli occupation authorities controlled the City’s schools from the period of Jordanian rule, including such schools as Rashidiyeh, Mamouniyeh, Khalil Sakakini, Abdullah Bin Al-Hussein, to name a few. !e Israeli occupation authorities also attempted to impose the Israeli curriculum in these schools. Strong objection from families, teachers and students, who were rightly concerned that the Israeli curriculum would inculcate an Israeli perspective on history, culture, religion, and thus further disconnect Palestinian Jerusalemites from West Bank Palestinians, failed this attempt and forced the Israeli occupation authorities to abandon the idea and proceed with the teaching according to an amended Jordanian curriculum.

General Characteristics: !e Israeli supervising bodies show little concern for education in Arab schools in Jerusalem, 1. evident in the wide di#erences in budgets from those allocated to Jewish schools. !e authorities also demonstrate no intention to address the causes of low quality education prevailing in the Arab community.

No educational supervision system is in place to monitor, evaluate and improve the 2. performance of these schools. Improvement is dependent on individual attempts by some principals to improve the performance of their schools.

!e Israeli Ministry of Education and the Municipality have in recent years established 3. new schools in di#erent neighborhoods in Jerusalem, such as Mount of Olives, Silwan, Shu’fat, Eisawiyeh, Beit Safafa, Mukabber, Beit Hanina and Sur Baher, and has added new classrooms to some old schools. !ese e#orts are inadequate in the face of the continued severe shortage in classrooms, forcing some parents to "le complaints within the courts in order to ensure a place for their children in a school.

!e new schools have adequate infrastructure, in terms of classrooms, schoolyards, 4. playgrounds, and halls.

Teachers’ salaries are much better compared to those of teachers in other schools of 5. Jerusalem. !at fact that even these salaries are inadequate for the high cost of living in Jerusalem serves to illustrate the unfavorable salary situation of the Waqf teachers.

School dropout rates are very high at over 10%. !e Israeli Ministry of Education has not 6. implemented procedures to follow up with the dropouts. !rough informal investigations

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and analysis, two scenarios emerge. First, dropout occurs primarily after a student reaches 16 years of age and thus receives an Jerusalem identi"cation and work permit for Israel. Second, extensive movement restrictions placed upon Palestinians force students temporarily postpone or terminate their studies.

Private Schools:Private schools in Jerusalem have had a positive national role in rejecting the Israeli curriculum in the post 1967 period. !ey have continued to teach the amended Jordanian curriculum and have absorbed thousands of students coming from schools run by the Israeli Ministry of Education and municipality, leading to an increased pressure on its capacity. An indicator of this fact is evident in the case of Rashidiyeh secondary school – one of the oldest and most popular schools in Palestine. In the pre 1967 period, the number of students in Rashidiyeh was about 780. !is number declined in the years during which the Israeli curriculum was imposed, reaching 210 students in the school year 1969/1970, 168 in the 1970/1971 academic year, and only 70 students in 1971/1972.[293]

!is year, the proportion of students receiving their education in private schools was 24% of total students in Jerusalem. Private schools are run by di#erent supervising bodies, including churches and monasteries, charitable societies, and individual owners.

General Characteristics Inability to attract adequately quali"ed teachers due to the Annexation Wall and restrictions 1. on movement in and around Jerusalem. Teachers holding Jerusalem IDs demand high salaries and often are not available in adequate numbers for private schools, as many prefer employment in schools run by the Israeli Municipality and the Israeli Ministry of Education for reasons associated with higher salaries and pension.

Some private schools face "nancial di$culties as the school fees are usually inadequate to 2. meet the basic needs of the school.

A large number of these schools have approached the Israeli municipality to demand 3. "nancial assistance. !e municipality is disbursing assistance at varying levels according to types of services available in each school.

Some schools su#er from extremely high rent fees that they have to pay for their 4. buildings.

[293] «Arab Education in Jerusalem: !e Realities and the Future.» Report published by the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education.


Private Schools: Quality of EducationPrivate schools are known to o#er high quality education for the following reasons:

!ey have to keep up with high standards in view of the competition among them.1.

Private schools adopt an employment system based on annual contracts and thus can 2. dispose of any teacher demonstrating lack of commitment.

!ey seek to recruit well performing students and reject those who do not meet the 3. required standards.

!e schools have the liberty to o#er exceptional programs, such as teaching other foreign 4. languages (French, German, Spanish, etc) or give increased focus to English language by increasing the number and quality of English lessons.

!ey o#er other educational activities, such as music and arts.5.

Some schools run by Islamic charitable societies focus on Islamic education and Qur’an 6. recital.

!ese schools tend to not expend resources on students with special needs and low 7. achievers.

Private Schools: Financial Support With the exception of a very limited number of schools, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education has not been concerned with supporting the private schools in "nancial terms. !is is despite the fact that the Palestine Liberation Organization used to o#er such support in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.

!erefore, we recommend that conditional support should be o#ered in order to avoid making private schools dependent on Israeli funding. Such support should take the following into consideration:

No school should receive funds from two sources (Palestinian and Israeli) at the same time.a.

Educational scholarships should be given to students with special needs, such as the poor, b. orphans, children of prisoners, etc.

Schools should refrain from increasing their tuition feesc.

UNRWA Schools:!ere are 7 UNRWA schools in Jerusalem, although their students account for only 5% of the total student population. In the early post 1967 years, UNRWA schools managed to accommodate more students and o#ered adequate educational services. More recently, however, they have been short of "nancial resources, particularly since the reductions in UNRWA budgets. UNRWA schools in Jerusalem also su#er from overcrowding and only teach up to the ninth basic grade, except for schools in Shu’fat refugee camp, where a tenth grade is also available. !is increases the burden on secondary schools run by other authorities in Jerusalem.

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Challenges Stemming from the Absence of a Uni"ed Authority for Education in Jerusalem:

Schools run by the Israeli Ministry of Education and municipality do not fully abide by the curriculum, either by skipping subject matters such as national education and civic education or by skipping certain chapters in the textbooks. !is impedes the achievement of the general goals of Palestinian education, most prominently attachment to and pride in the Palestinian identify.

Short-term and long-term planning is di$cult due to the lack of necessary data, either because such data needs to be gathered from multiple sources or because some sources intentionally deny access to their data.

!ere is an evident shortage in the number of schools and classrooms in certain neighborhoods in Jerusalem.

It is di$cult to monitor school dropout rates for Jerusalemite children.

Uncoordinated planning between the di#erent supervising bodies may lead to contrary and sometimes con%icting directions, for example the variation in the instructions regarding schooling days and hours and school holidays causes confusion to families, especially when a family has children attending schools run by di#erent authorities.

!e di#erent supervising bodies do not take responsibility for their students to take the general "nal secondary exams, whether in terms of inspection during the exams or reviewing and grading students’ papers. !is negatively a#ects the management of the exams and delays the publication of their results.

Jerusalem students lack the opportunity of actual participation in uni"ed activities of Palestinian nature, such as sports, cultural, artistic, folklore and voluntary events, which is believed to weaken the sense of national identity and attachment to Palestinian culture among Jerusalemites.

!ere is variation in the age of admission to grade one among the di#erent educational authorities, as re%ected in the following table:

Supervising body Admission age

Schools run by Palestinian Ministry of Education 7 February of the admission year (2003)

Private schools 14 April of the admission year (2003)

Israeli Ministry of Education/Municipality 25 December of the year preceding the admission year

UNRWA schools 31 January of the admission year (2003)

Communication between the di#erent schools as well as between the district o$ce and schools is limited.

Some schools do not abide by criteria for the passing or failing grade, as some seek to get rid of poor achievers by referring them to other schools. It could happen that some resort to issuing school certi"cates that do not re%ect the actual scores of the student.

!e di#erent supervising bodies adopt di#erent criteria for accepting students, especially when it comes to accepting students in the di#erent secondary education tracks.


Some schools seek to recruit the best quali"ed teachers by o#ering incentives in the form of high salaries. !is results in the lesser funded schools getting less quali"ed teachers, negatively impacting the education of the students.

Some schools do not abide by the requirement of endorsing the certi"cates and keeping record of students’ scores, which may jeopardize the education of students when they are transferred to new schools or when they take the "nal general secondary exams.

Sta# of Israeli run schools and some private schools do not actually participate in training courses related to the new Palestinian curriculum, which a#ects their ability to teach this curriculum and increases complaints regarding the contents of the curriculum by both teachers and students.

!e lack of a uni"ed authority has lead to lack of attention to vocational education.

Right to Education – International Legal Standards and Application!e right to education falls under of the ambit of social, economic, and cultural rights and its importance is widely proclaimed throughout many of the major international human rights instruments. !e relevant international framework pertaining to the right to education provides a well entrenched and legally binding position to advocate in favour of the development and protection of the right in and around Jerusalem.

International Human Rights Law!e Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) all contain explicit references to the right to education. !e relevant international standards premise this right on the basis that education, at least at the primary level, must be free and compulsory. Building from this platform, the major instruments seek to provide illumination through interpretations and speci"cations covering a range of issues several of which address concerns that have been identi"ed as obstacles to the unabridged enjoyment of education rights in Jerusalem.

!e most signi"cant and comprehensive proclamation under international law addressing the right to education appears in Article 13 of the ICESCR which attests that, “Primary education shall be compulsory and available free for all,” and that states, “undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents...to choose for their children schools, other than those established by the public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions…No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions”

In addition to the ICESR, Articles 28 and 29 the CRC provides a detailed requirement for the guarantee of the right to education for children, obliging states to “recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity.” !e Article continues to ensure that primary and initial education are free and compulsory, to encourage diverse forms of education, make higher education accessible on the basis of capacity, and take measures to encourage attendance and reduce drop-out rates. Article 29

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(2) states that all parties agree that, “No part of the present article or article 28 shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to the observance of the principle set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article and to the requirements that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be laid down by the State.”

From its basis in the major human rights instruments, the right to education has received a thorough interpretative endorsement from the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the UN body tasked with monitoring the implementation of the ICESCR. General Comment 13 remains the most authoritative statement on education and proceeds by pronouncing the fundamental essence that, “education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable means of realizing other human rights.” Paragraph 6 of the Comment provides a detailed interpretation of ICESCR Article 13(2), the right to receive an education. Availability, accessibility, acceptability, and adaptability are identi"ed as the essential components to the successful implementation of the right. Paragraph 6(b) continues to illuminate upon the accessibility requirement stating that, “education has to be within safe physical reach, either by attendance at some reasonably convenient geographical location or via modern technology.” Paragraph 43 discusses the immediate obligations of which States Parties are under, listing “the guarantee that the right [to education] will be exercised without discrimination of any kind.”

Physical impediments, which compromise reasonable access to educational facilities, appear contrary to the norms expressed through the aforementioned mechanisms. !e e#ects of the Annexation Wall have come under heavy criticism for imposing severe movement and access restrictions on signi"cant portions of the population. !e e#ects experienced are not lost on the education sector as both students and teachers may face numerous hindrances in accessing schools thus resulting in an overall decrease in the quality and pro"ciency of education in East Jerusalem. As seen through Paragraph 6, Comment 13 provides a general address endorsing accessibility as an essential component to the successful implementation of the right to education as well as a direct stipulation that educational facilities must be within a safe physical reach.

!e emergent theme of discriminatory practices in relation to the right to education is based on UNESCO’s 1960 Convention against Discrimination in Education. Rati"ed by Israel and legally binding, the Convention seeks to provide measures aimed at the promotion of equality of opportunity and treatment in the "eld of education as well as the elimination of all forms of discrimination. Article 4(b) seeks to, “ensure that the standards of education are equivalent in all public educational institutions of the same level, and that the conditions relating to the quality of the education are also equivalent.” Article 5(c) provides a protective recognition of the, “right of members of national minorities to carry on their own educational activities, including the maintenance of schools and, depending on the educational policy of each state, the use of the teaching of their own language.”

!e diverse and staggered composition of the East Jerusalem schooling system often lends itself to allegations that the discriminatory allotments of educational funding favours one group or fails to take into account the position of a socially or economically disadvantaged group. In such an instance the international framework maybe applied. Articles 4 and 5 of the UNESCO Convention as well as Paragraph 43 of General Comment 13 provide a strong basis under international human rights law through which discriminatory practices or policies within the "eld of education may be addressed. General Comment 13 is based on an interpretation of the ICESCR which along with the UNESCO Convention are legally binding instruments.


While the right to education is "rmly embedded in international human rights law, its importance and continuance during periods of armed con%ict and belligerent occupation is explicitly protected under international humanitarian law.

International Humanitarian Law

International Humanitarian Law directly addresses the issue of education under conditions of occupation thus providing a particularly relevant context for the application of the right. Article 50 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that, “the Occupying Power shall, with the cooperation of the national and local authorities, facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children.”

Further authoritative guidance is provided through the International Committee of the Red Cross’s commentary on the obligations entailed under Article 50 which states that, “the Occupying Powers must, with the co-operation of the national and local authorities, facilitate the proper working of children’s institutions. !at means that the occupying authorities are bound not only to avoid interfering with their activities, but also to support them actively and even encourage them if the responsible authorities of the country fail in their duty…!is provision assures continuity in the educational and charitable work of the establishments referred to and is of the "rst importance, since it takes e#ect at a point in children’s lives when the general disorganization consequent upon war might otherwise do irreparable harm to their physical and mental development.”

Conclusion International legal advocacy o#ers several avenues to advance e#orts aimed at the strengthening, promotion, and enforcement of the right to education. !e signi"cance of this right, as both a right in itself and as an indispensible means of realizing other human rights, cannot be understated. !e international legal framework, through both the mechanisms existing in human rights and humanitarian laws, includes numerous provisions well suited to address persistent challenges that have become commonplace in Jerusalem.

CHAPTER SIX

E$ects of the Israeli closure system, the Annexation Wall on the Economy in

East Jerusalem

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123CHAPTER SIXE#ects of the Israeli closure system, the Annexation Wall on the Economy in East Jerusalem

E$ects of the Israeli closure system, the Annexation Wall on the Economy in East Jerusalem

Prepared by: Na’ila Jweiles and Azzam Abul-Su’oodArab Chamber of Commerce and Industry – Jerusalem

Introduction!e Annexation Wall in the Jerusalem area is a major factor a#ecting the economy of Jerusalem. !is paper follows the stages of the construction of the Wall to outline the political, economic, social and security goals of Israel, who aims to isolate Jerusalem from its the rest of the occupied Palestinian territories, restricting access from the West Bank and facilitating access to and from Israel.

!e construction of the Wall is key to this aim, the "rst step of which was carried out after the 1967 war with Israel’s unilateral decision to annex East Jerusalem and thus ‘unify’ the two parts of the City. !is was followed by expanding the boundaries of the City and imposing taxes and other economic and social laws on Arabs living in Jerusalem. !ese were further accompanied by discriminatory policies adopted by Jerusalem Municipality with the aim of forcing Arab residents out of Jerusalem by increasing municipal taxes, reducing municipal services, severely restricting the issuance of building licenses, and failing to allocate a quali"ed industrial zone for Arab residents.

Over the forty two years of occupation, Jerusalem’s economy has witnessed %uctuations intrinsically linked to the political situation in the region. !e main phenomenon however, has been the gradual regression in the economy since the "rst Intifada in 1987 and the steep decline accompanying the “tunnel incidents” in 1997 and the second Intifada in late 2000 (despite strong economic improvement in the "rst nine months of 2000) . !e construction of the Annexation Wall adds to the steep decline in Jerusalem’s economy to a level that can be described as ‘catastrophic’.

!e decline in the di#erent economic sectors in Jerusalem is in large part a result of the various oppressive measures by the Israeli occupation since 1967 up to the present day. !e construction of the Wall has played a signi"cant role in the decline of Jerusalem’s economy, causing an imposed isolation of the City from its surroundings. As one cannot fully understand the e#ects of the Wall on the economic situation in Jerusalem without addressing the other factors that also impact the economy, all such factors had to be considered.

We relied on data available at the Chamber and statistics and data collected by the Chamber for the purpose of developing various studies in relation to Jerusalem, as well as statistics available from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). We tried to ensure accuracy in the data available to us as much as possible, knowing that the special status of Jerusalem makes collection of data a di$cult task.

!is research aims to presents an accurate picture of the economy in Jerusalem and calls for serious consideration to be given to the e#ects of the Wall on Jerusalem’s economy and subsequently consider the necessary steps to reverse these e#ects.

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E$ect of the Wall on the Economic Sectors!e majority of economic sectors in Jerusalem have been adversely a#ected by the construction of the Wall, which has reduced Jerusalem’s "nancial link to the Palestinian economy and increased its links to the economy of Israel. In this way, the Wall contributes to Israel’s policy of weakening the Arab presence in Jerusalem, including the Arab economy. Measures to implement this policy include:

Establishing military barriers and checkpoints at entrances to Jerusalem.1.

Denying access to Jerusalem for Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip unless 2. they have special permits.

Tightened security checks of goods imported by Arab merchants from abroad and hindering 3. their clearance at seaports and airports, resulting in increased transport and storage cost and consequently inability to compete with goods imported by Israeli agents.

!e Annexation Wall comes as one of the most serious measures thus far, severely a#ecting occupied Jerusalem by isolating it from its Palestinian surroundings. !is study examines the e#ects of the Wall on commerce, industry, tourism, services, employment, infrastructure and investment.

Commerce Sector:Commerce in occupied Jerusalem depends on consumers in the City, who are composed of the following groups:

Local residents1. Residents of villages around Jerusalem2. West Bank and Gaza Strip residents3. Jewish Israelis4. Arabs from inside Israel5. Tourists6.

Since 1994, the numbers of consumers from villages around Jerusalem and from the West Bank and Gaza Strip began gradually decreasing, until the Intifada when the number of consumers in Jerusalem decreased signi"cantly, reaching about 40% of the usual number of consumers in the City. !is is attributed to the following reasons:

Establishing of military checkpoints and hindering entry to Jerusalem for people from 1. villages around the City and from other Palestinian cities.

Increased cost of goods transport due to checkpoints and increased closure due to the 2. construction of the Wall.

Increased cost of goods clearance at ports due to security search. 3.

Imposing numerous taxes on Arab citizens without consideration given to their income 4. levels or living standards. Tax authorities also mistrust income statements of Arab dealers and producers and exaggerate estimations of their income.


Increased numbers of street vendors due to increasing unemployment rates, which 5. adversely a#ects the situation of o$cial taxpaying businesses.

Decreased average income per capita in the City and consequent decrease in income 6. available for shopping, with a large proportion of the population limiting their purchases to food and other essential items only.

Decline in the numbers of Jewish consumers in Arab Jerusalem since the "rst Intifada and 7. their almost complete absence in the years 2001-2004.

Almost complete absence of tourism activities in the years 2001-2004.8.

Preventing tourists from entering Al-Haram As-Shareef Compound and decreasing the 9. number of visiting hours.

With the construction of the Wall, over 120,000 citizens are forced to pass through 10. checkpoints in order to enter the City.

Employee layo#s in a number of commercial establishments in Jerusalem due to decreased 11. sales.

Strict denial of entry into Jerusalem markets for Palestinian products, especially food items 12. such as dairy products and eggs, which are cheaper than similar Israeli products.

Although statistics indicate that there are 5921 economic establishments in Jerusalem, including commercial and other types, only about one third of this "gure are members in the Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem. Figure 1 presents the number of economic establishments in Jerusalem (PCBS). Figure 2 presents the number of establishments registered at the Chamber of Commerce by sector, demonstrating the importance of the commercial sector in the City.

Figure 1: Number of economic establishments in Jerusalem district 2002-2007 (PCBS)

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Figure 2: Distribution of members in the Chamber of Commerce by sector, 2007 (Chamber of Commerce) 2007

Table 1 presents types of economic activity in Jerusalem City in terms of the number of establishments, number of workers and production size in 2007 according to data published by PCBS in June 2008.

Table 1: Number of establishments, workers and production size in the commercial sector, 2007 (PCBS 2007)

Economic activity No. of establishments No. of workers Production size ($1,000)

Automobile sale and maintenance, fuel sales 118 391 18,176.5

Wholesale trading 25 107 2,837.1Retail trading and repair of personal goods 1367 2560 37,622.9

Total 1510 3058 58,638.5

Retail Trade Inside the City:As demonstrated in Table 1, the retail trade has the largest production size and number of employees. !is large share of retail trade is due to the number of shoppers from outside the City, an increased commitment by local residents to shop in their City and the increased number of Arabs from Israel shopping in Jerusalem over the past "ve years. In addition, PCBS estimates that production size has increased by 50% compared to its level as of 2001.. Even constituting the largest economic commerce type, retail trade has actually declined to about 40% of its size in 2000 (Chamber of Commerce).


In summary, the adverse Israeli measures have resulted in the following e#ects:

Signi"cant decline in the number of people from outside the City shopping in the a. Jerusalem commercial market.

Approximately half of the local residents tend to shop outside Jerusalem. b.

Merchants holding West Bank IDs and owning shops in Jerusalem face di$culties in c. reaching their shops and need to obtain permits to do so.

Retail dealers from Jerusalem district who hold West Bank IDs need to obtain permits to d. access the City, however these are not easily obtained.

Wholesale Trade (distribution and agencies):Arab wholesale dealers, agents and suppliers face unfair competition with Israeli dealers, including expensive security checks at Israeli ports and high costs at military checkpoints. !is discrimination may cause the Arab dealers, agents and suppliers to lose their agencies or at least face some decline in the size of their sales. In summary, wholesale trade is a#ected in the following ways:

Decreased number of wholesale dealers.a.

Increased price of goods.b.

Isolation of areas that have been vital for Jerusalem economy, such as Bir Nabala – a c. major center for wholesale trade, storage and supply to Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank. !e same applies also to areas in the east, southeast, north, northwest and northeast to Jerusalem. !is isolation is directly caused by the construction of the Wall and its accompanying checkpoints.

Reciprocal Trade:Reciprocal trade refers to transport and exchange of goods, in this instance between di#erent Palestinian cities and districts. !e Chamber of Commerce issued a questionnaire on reciprocal trade in Jerusalem and the suburbs in order to assess its status in view of the constant closure and the construction of the Wall. Findings were as follows:

Dealers of food items in Jerusalem have almost stopped trading with the Gaza Strip. 1. About 20% of wholesales used to be directed at Gaza Strip in the past.

!e cost of transport associated with reciprocal trade has increased by 30-40% 2.

a. !e majority of Jerusalem wholesalers’ warehouses are located in West Bank areas. !e cost of transporting goods from these warehouses to shops in Jerusalem (Bethany to Jerusalem or Al-Ram to Jerusalem, for example) has increased by 30%.

b. !e Bir Nabala area has become a new problem in respect to transporting goods to Jerusalem, since dealers are forced to use lengthy routes and transport cost has increased by over 40%.

!e passage of goods through Israeli checkpoints (Z’ayem checkpoint for dealers from 3.

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Bethany area) are not subject to particular guidelines and, according to dealers, are subject to the mood of soldiers manning these crossings. Goods have be turned back or kept loaded on trucks until the soldier’s shift changes. Sometimes soldiers regard the goods as coming from Arab producers just because they carry labels of their contents in Arabic.

A considerable number of companies have been forced to register twice as an Arab company 4. in the West Bank and as a Jerusalem-based company with Israeli registration.

A considerable number of companies have been forced to rent warehouses in Israeli areas 5. and started to issue shipping vouchers from the company’s address in these warehouses. !is means that such businesses are being registered as trade between Israel and the West Bank or Israel and East Jerusalem.

Dealers su#er from inadequate provision of clearance vouchers from Palestinian tax 6. departments.

Fewer numbers of Jerusalemites living beyond the Wall are shopping in the City due to 7. di$culties in passing through the Wall and checkpoints. !ese include psychological, physical and "nancial di$culties (resulting from the signi"cant increase in transportation costs).

Industry Sector:Industry comprises about 14% of Jerusalem economy. !e largest single industry in Jerusalem is considered to be the Jerusalem Tobacco Company, with sales tax on cigarettes constituting a major source of local tax income for the Palestinian Authority (PA).

A number of factories in Jerusalem and its suburbs, including shoes, textile, leather garments and babies’ diaper industry, have been forced to reduce their production or totally shut down their business due to:

Decreased demand on local products (especially non-food products) to one third only. 1.

Weak competitive abilities of local products in view of the increased cost of delivery caused 2. by the closure.

Problems facing workers’ access to their work sites and decreased number of production 3. hours to around one third only.

Increased cost of raw materials due to the increased cost of transport from ports and 4. security searches.

Increased cost of transport and delivery of ready-made products.5.

Decreased potentials for export due to di$culties at Israeli ports and through border 6. crossings with Jordan and Egypt.

Increased percentage of losses in materials due to damages caused by security checks and 7. long hours of transport.

Many industrial producers turned their businesses into importers of the same goods they 8. used to produce due to the e#ects of globalization and inability to compete global prices and products.


Tourism Sector:!e tourism sector comprises about 40% of economy in East Jerusalem. !is sector has been among the most a#ected since the outburst of the Intifada due to the following:

Tourist %ow to Jerusalem severely dropped and all reservations were cancelled between 1. October 2000 and by the end of 2005.

Arab hotels in Jerusalem (43 hotels) started to shutdown and gradually lay o# their 2. workers and employees. In 2003, the occupancy rate was less than 8% across 37 hotels. In the 6 remaining hotels, occupancy rates ranged between 10-23% in the same year. !e following table illustrates the development of Arab hotels working in Jerusalem in the period 2000-2007:

Table 2: Number of hotels and rooms in Jerusalem district by year

Year # hotels # rooms

2000 43 1997

2001 29 836

2002 21 915

2003 20 907

2004 23 985

2005 18 869

2006 22 1209

2007 26 1249

Banks began requiring tourist transport companies (17 companies owning 220 tourist 3. buses in mid 2002) to pay the renewal fees for 90% of their buses in 2000. In view of companies’ inability to pay their dues, over 70% of the buses were sold, some in public auction and for very cheap prices as being impounded by banks. As a result, the number of tourist buses decreased to less than 60. Between 2005-2007, some tourist transport companies managed to purchase about 35 new buses. However, the available number of such buses in the City remains inadequate to meet the needs of the tourism sector.

Unemployment levels reached an unprecedented high at over 35%. 4.

A number of souvenir shops were forced to shut down in view of their inability to pay recurrent 5. expenses and taxes (up to 350 shops in late 2002 alone). !is number was subsequently reduced by almost one half as some shopkeepers managed to change their type of business.

Travel agencies were disrupted and some limited their activities to ticket sales only. In 6. addition, the 160 Arab tourist guides in occupied Jerusalem have been unemployed most of the time from 2000-2004. Business for tourist restaurants has also declined to its lowest levels during that period.

Although tourism in occupied Jerusalem has improved since the beginning of 2005 and 7. some hotels managed to resume functioning, competition has increased due to 3 new Israeli hotels adjacent to local tourist sites.

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Public service sector:With regard to the public service sector, this study can draw only a limited picture due to lack of information. !e information that is available suggests that this sector could be the most a#ected by the construction of the Wall.

Transport:Prior to 1987, 47 passenger transport companies used to work on "xed routes between Jerusalem and other Palestinian cities and villages. After 1987, licenses held by these companies were cancelled one after another until their number was reduced to 17 companies currently operating. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the transport sector in Jerusalem is the only sector that has managed to %ourish in the past "ve years for the following reasons:

Jerusalem-registered vehicles can have access to Israeli ports and can use the bypass roads, 1. while Palestinian vehicles are banned from using these roads. !erefore, Jerusalem-registered vehicles often replace other vehicles with Palestinian registration in o#ering services to Palestinian West Bank-based companies.

Passenger transport companies have been reorganized and their buses renewed, bringing 2. order back to the transport sector.

!e table below illustrates the number of establishments and workers in the transport sector, as well as their total production in US $1000:

Table 3: Number of establishments and workers and production size in the land transport sector in 2004

Economic activity # establishments # workers Production size in US $1000

Land transport 58 521 14,650.8Total 101 790 30,149.1

Contracting Services:Unlicensed construction is the only means available to Jerusalemites given the increasing demand on housing units and the Israeli policy of restricting the number of building licenses granted by Jerusalem municipality as well as the very high cost of obtaining a building licenses, which can be as high as US $100 per square meter.

!e construction of the Wall has been accompanied by a number of measures taken by the municipality in relation to unlicensed building. !ese include:

An evident increase in the demolition of unlicensed buildings.1.

Con"scation of machinery used by contractors working on an unlicensed building, in 2. addition to heavy "nes.


Exerting pressures on suppliers of building materials.3.

Denial of work permits to West Bank workers wishing to work in the construction sector 4. in Jerusalem, leading to increased cost of building as wages of workers from Jerusalem are usually higher than wages for those from the West Bank.

Raids and inspection in construction sites, whether licensed or unlicensed, to search for 5. West Bank workers who do not have work permits. !ese workers are arrested and "nes are imposed on them and/or on the contractor.

With the increased migration of people from areas beyond the Wall to areas inside the Wall, construction works have decreased in areas outside the Wall, such as Al-Ram, Bethany, Bir Nabala and others. However, this has not been matched with increased construction works inside the Wall, leading to a decline in the prices and rent fees of houses and lands outside the Wall and a very sharp increase in the prices and rent fees inside the Wall (40%). !e decline in the contracting sector is estimated to be more than 50% since the year 2000. In addition, the proportion of vacant apartments in some areas such as Al-Ram has reached about 30% of total apartments.

Electricity:Dues owed to the Electricity Company have been sharply increasing and in response, the company was forced to increase its sta# in order to run decentralized o$ces in the peripheral areas, leading to increased operational costs.

!e company started to address this issue by using modern economic methods, such as the introduction of prepaid chargers, rescheduling of consumers’ dues, the linkage line with Jordan, and a project for solar energy in the production of electricity. All these solutions have contributed to the prevention of collapse in the electricity sector.

Financial Sector:Banks1. : !e Jerusalem economy is almost wholly dependent on Israeli banks as Arab banks are banned from practicing within the City. Nevertheless, Arab banks o#er some services to Jerusalem traders through some branches located in the district outside the City. !ese services are inadequate, as in o#ering credit services, the banks do not accept real estate guarantees from traders and other citizens from Jerusalem City.

Arbitrary measures against money changers in the2. City: Money changing is one of the services that has a sizable impact on the Jerusalem economy. A major Israeli measure against this sector was a simultaneous raid by military forces on a number of money changing o$ces, where over US $1 million was con"scated from money changers who were noti"ed that they were practicing illegally and that they should register at the Israeli o$cial authorities and abide by the relevant Israeli systems and instructions. !is act comes in spite of the fact that some of these o$ces have been working in money changing for generations, including before the occupation. When the money changers sought to recover the con"scated money, the Israeli authorities refused to return it and considered these amounts as part of tax settlements. Many of these money changers were unable to go back in business after they had to fully abide by the relevant Israeli laws.

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Employment in Jerusalem:A rapid overview of the status of economic establishments in Jerusalem demonstrates that 45% of the establishments are located within the municipal borders, with tourist establishments composing about 28%, while 55% are located within the district but outside the municipal borders. !ere is no industrial zone in the City.

An analysis of the number of economic establishments shows that their number has been declining by an average of 100 per annum since 1999 and through 2002. Since 2002 however, the number has started to increase, partially in light of improvements in the tourism situation and partially because of some university graduates’ tendency to establish their own businesses due to their inability to "nd a job within their "eld of specialty. At the present time there are 6631 economic establishments in the City, but 97% of these are small-scale. !e decline in the numbers of economic establishments is a result of the prevailing economic situation, the deteriorated status of tourism, closure and checkpoints, and most recently the Wall, which is expected to cause a sharp decline and to a larger extent during the coming period.

Although a super"cial view on the matter may indicate that the situation of economic establishments in Jerusalem is better o# than that of similar establishments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the realities on the ground point to the opposite. !e Wall is in fact isolating Jerusalem from the West Bank, as an attempt to integrate the remaining numbers of Jerusalemites inside the Israeli delineated borders of Jerusalem and the Israeli economy and society. !e increasing number of establishments fails to convey an accurate picture.

In Jerusalem City, about 9,000 new workers enter the labor market on an annual basis, with university students comprising about 15% of the new work force. !e rest are school dropouts or students completing their secondary education. Usually, the Israeli labor market absorbs 35-40% of the total, while the rest turn to the Palestinian market in Jerusalem and PA areas for employment in the private and public sectors. At best, the public sector can absorb 10% only, leaving a large proportion of the responsibility to the private sector.

!ere is also a problem related to ex-prisoners, who have been detained by the Israeli authorities for security charges. After their release, ex-prisoners face problems in "nding employment at any Jerusalem-based establishment.

Unemployment rates in Jerusalem, peaked in 2002 at 23% for those holding blue (Israeli) IDs and 30% for those holding West Bank IDs (the district average was 27%). It is estimated that there are more than 20,000 unemployed workers in Jerusalem City and district, indicating how large scale the problem is.

Recent years have witnessed a decline in unemployment rates compared to 2002. However, as stated above, this was a sort of shift from full unemployment to hidden unemployment. !is decline re%ects the fact that many unemployed workers have given up registering as unemployed because they have lost hope of "nding a job through these o$ces.

Nevertheless, the unemployment rate remains high compared to international standards and even to the rate of 1999, which was 10% lower.


Figure 3: Unemployment rate in Jerusalem district, 2001-2007.

!e "gure above shows a gradual decline in unemployment since 2002, especially in 2005, when tourism in the City started to improve.

!e problem becomes more serious, however, when we look at the current capacity of Jerusalem’s economy to absorb the workforce. Investment in projects to provide employment for workers is di$cult due to the migration of capital from con%ict areas to safer and more stable areas. !is situation provides a pessimistic outlook for the problem of unemployment in Jerusalem.

In view of the Israeli plan to reduce reliance on the Arab work force and increase reliance on foreign workers, especially those coming from Southeast Asia, Arab Jerusalemites have been directly a#ected by this situation although they carry blue IDs as opposed to West Bank IDs. Many of them have lost their jobs and been registered at the Israeli labor o$ces as unemployed.

Any schemes to increase or improve social allowances for the unemployed – and this is what Israel is doing in spite of some reservations and complications when it comes to the Arab citizens of Jerusalem – will eventually lead to creating an idle army of passive recipients and will never contribute to reviving our society and economy.

Infrastructure and Facilities:Despite the responsibility of Jerusalem Municipality to provide facilities and maintain infrastructure throughout the City, there is an obvious lack of attention and severe neglect of the Arab parts of Jerusalem on the part of the municipality. !e most important indicators in this regard are Israeli statistics, which show that the expenditure of Jerusalem municipality on services in Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods does not exceed 5% of its total expenditure in all areas of the City, although the Arab population comprise 35% of the total population and pay 33% of the total municipal tax revenues.

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No industrial zone is established in East Jerusalem to serve Arab industrialists. As a result, many have been forced to rent or purchase lands or buildings for their establishments in the industrial zone of Qalandia (Atarot). Arab establishments in Atarot comprise almost 40% of the total establishments in the area.

!e housing shortage resulting from the reverse migration from outside the City to inside is a major problem for Jerusalemites. !e City has gone through a signi"cant decrease in income levels against a huge increase in expenditure levels, particularly in regard to the increased housing costs. !e Israeli policies of denying or restricting building licenses and demolishing houses built without a license result in the need for at least 1000 new housing units to be built annually. !is situation is further aggravated by the scarcity of lands due to land con"scation and construction of Jewish neighborhoods in the periphery of the municipal borders, as well as the fragmentation of land ownerships, the threats of the so-called guardian of absentees’ properties, and land stealing by forgers and mobsters. !e situation necessitates the adoption of the following steps:

Funding the development of structural schemes for small lots in order to make them suitable for building.

Solving the possible number of cases of fragmented ownerships, using the expertise of legal, engineering and urban planning o$ces.

Encouraging vertical construction of the existing buildings by increasing the number of %oors and "nding an engineering o$ce to develop the relevant schemes and follow up the licensing process.

Working to revoke the order to close the Palestinian Housing Council in Jerusalem and increasing the funding of this Council in order to expand the scope of loans to include the costs of licensing as well.

Providing additional funding to organizations working on the reconstruction of the Old City in order to expand their work and increase the number of restored houses while preserving the architectural heritage of Jerusalem. Recruiting a specialized o$ce to assess the restoration works carried out to date and to provide guidance to the existing reconstruction organizations.

Forming popular neighborhood committees that would assume resolution of con%icts and address social issues and land disputes.

Supporting legal defense organizations in Jerusalem to confront the silent expulsion of Jerusalemites, especially in cases related to the Wall , ID withdrawal and land con"scation.

Pressuring Arab banks to accept Jerusalem-based real estate guarantees in o#ering credit services to Jerusalem traders and citizens.

Investment in Jerusalem: To help generate investment in East Jerusalem, focus should be given to investments and search for investors, particularly encouraging long term investments that are developed in the course of several years. Donor support should be directed at establishing an industrial zone with a full range of services to encourage investment in long term projects. Although local and Arab investors exist, as well as surplus


funds to invest in, there is always reluctance to make investments and employ the surplus of local funds because of fears of instability in the region. In other words, East Jerusalem has been regarded a high risk area for investment, preventing potential investors from investing their funds in the City and prompting them to "nd investment opportunities outside the City for domestic product surplus.

!erefore, we should invest part of external support funds in alleviating investors’ fears. !e best way to do so is to create an investment guarantee fund that would ensure adequate revenues from investments and guarantee that the political and security situation will not a#ect investors’ projects. !e management of such fund should be protected from opportunistic intentions and political factionalism.

Attention should also be paid to training. !e German model of vocational training, led by the German Chambers of Vocations is perhaps the best model for us to adopt. !is model helped Germany to rebuild their shattered economy after World War II. Jerusalem su#ers the same lack of investment, and we can also succeed and excel as Germany did if we manage training well. !e vocational model can help us improve our small-scale establishments and turn some into medium-scale establishments that can absorb the new labor force entering the labor market, reducing unemployment rates.

!e successful experience of the Chamber of Commerce and the Union of Chambers of Commerce in the training and employment project for new graduates should be adopted and the number of bene"ciaries should be increased, as it will eventually provide people with expertise to help develop Jerusalem’s economy in general.

Jerusalem’s economy is mainly dependent on tourism, services and trade, with industry comprising a small proportion only and agriculture not factoring in. !e current unemployment rate stands at about 13.4%. !e newcomers to the labor market are estimated at 9000 new workers per year. !e private sector is the largest employer in the City, but second to the Israeli market, which is attempting to reduce absorption of Arab labor force. !e Palestinian market remains the largest employer for Arab university graduates, but they may start to face great di$culties in reaching their worksites upon the completion of Wall construction. During the period 2001-2004, tourism su#ered a complete recession, leading to disruption of the City’s tourist assets, selling of some tourist facilities and utilization of others for di#erent functions.

In this regard, the following is recommended:Link 20 hotels in Jerusalem with credit sources to help renew their infrastructure.1.

Ensure credit sources to fund the renewal of tourist buses in the City.2.

Create additional tourist attraction sites in Jerusalem other than religious sites to discourage 3. tourists from opting to stay in West Jerusalem.

Increase the number of international projects aimed at creating new job opportunities 4. in Jerusalem.

Revive handicraft business in Jerusalem, especially in streets with the highest level of closed 5. shops in the Old City.

Support the transport sector in order to replace the Israeli transport services operating in 6. Palestinian areas.

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Provide soft loans for housing purposes, including licensing costs, in order to encourage 7. development of licensed building projects that can absorb the largest possible number of workers.

Develop the capacity of training institutions in order to help train skilled laborers in 8. various "elds of specialty (vocational training).

Support legal consultation organizations which defend the rights of Jerusalemites in the 9. economic, social and services "elds.

Ability of Jerusalem’s Economy to Cope With the Present Situation!e Annexation Wall will strangulate East Jerusalem’s economy if it maintains its current form and composition. !e City has to adapt its economy in order to quickly manage and cope. In the absence of a national authority governing East Jerusalem, the private sector should take initiative and develop its ability to cope with the challenges of survival in the coming period. !e following steps are recommended for the private sector to follow:

Focus economic endeavors on tourism, which is the main potential for increased revenue 1. for Jerusalem.

Working to extend foreign tourists’ stay in East Jerusalem. Each additional hour will bring 2. the City an additional income of about US $25 million per year.

Direct potential investments in Jerusalem towards the tourist sector, which requires:3.

renovating the tourist infrastructure that was damaged between 2000-2005,4.

creating new and diversi"ed tourist attraction sites and keeping abreast with new 5. developments in the tourism industry,

increasing the promotion of Jerusalem as a stand-alone tourist site as well as within joint 6. tourist programs with neighboring countries,

developing the cultural and recreational life in Jerusalem to respond to and keep up with 7. tourist needs in a more attractive way, and encouraging the private sector to invest in this "eld,

increasing the number of Arab hotel rooms by establishing new hotels able to compete 8. with the Israeli hotels,

turning Saladin Street and Zahra Street to pedestrian areas,9.

reviving handicraft industry in Jerusalem by encouraging fathers to train the younger 10. generations or through training courses abroad (shop owners at Silsilah Gate may be encouraged to use that area for this purpose).

Reviving the Qattanin market in the Old City, as well as renovating Mamluki and Turkish 11. baths.

Encourage investment in housing and construction to ensure availability of adequate 12. houses for the largest possible number of East Jerusalemites.


Increase attention to renovating houses in the Old City, including houses outside Jerusalem 13. walls, in order to ensure a better life quality for residents and attractiveness of the Old City for tourists.

As part of its constant struggle for survival, Jerusalem City needs to adapt its situation to the new developments imposed by the Annexation Wall. Since there is no national authority to serve the Arab residents of Jerusalem and there is no o$cial political leadership in the City, the private sector remains the only sector that has relative freedom of movement and can lead the City in this struggle for survival in order to maintain the Arab character and culture of East Jerusalem.

Conclusion: In conclusion, this study indicates that a lot can be done to preserve Jerusalem City from being fully annexed to the Israeli economic system and to keep it economically self-reliant.

We estimate that Jerusalem City is in need of immediate investments in the range of US $150 million as a starting point for the coming three years. !ese investments should include the "elds of housing, tourism, renovation of the Old City and development of handicraft industry in the City.

In order to encourage local, Arab, Islamic and international investment in East Jerusalem and relieve investors’ fears of risks associated with investment in the City, the creation of a US $50 million fund to provide guarantees against investment risks is essential to attract capitals.

Investment in Jerusalem should not be viewed as solely an economic endeavor subject to the factors of win or lose, but rather a national and religious endeavor to preserve the Arab character of the Holy City.

In order to encourage external investors, we should "rst encourage local investment and demonstrate the ability to convince investors, starting from networking and integration of tourist, commercial, cultural, educational and service sectors to provide a solid platform against Israeli competition.

CHAPTER SEVEN

!e Annexation Wall and International Law

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141CHAPTER SEVEN!e Annexation Wall and International Law

!e Annexation Wall and International Law

Nasser ArayesLegal Researcher – Al- Haq

Introduction!is study holds that the Annexation Wall that Israel has been constructing inside the West Bank since mid 2002 is one of the most serious violations of international law perpetrated by Israel as an Occupying Power. !e Wall has negatively impacted various aspects of Palestinian life including education, employment, health and residency among others, and is a violation of Palestinians’ right to self-determination. !e Wall is being used by the Israeli authorities as a tool to annex Palestinian land and change the geographic and demographic realities in the Occupied Territories as well as in Israel. In so doing, the Wall is destroying Palestinian private property and means of survival through agriculture, as well as damaging the natural environment and denying Palestinians the protection a#orded them under international humanitarian law as protected persons under military occupation.

!e Annexation Wall has led to or directly caused the following damage in the Occupied Territories:

!e destruction of the Palestinian agricultural sector through the destruction of thousands 1. of dunums of arable land by Israeli authorities for the construction of the Wall. To date, the construction has led to the uprooting of 100,000 olive trees, the con"scation of 165,000 dunums of land, the razing of 230,000 dunums of land, and the isolation of 238,350 dunums of land. !e Wall has also separated farmers from their land in 71 di#erent villages, depriving thousands of Palestinians of their regular income. !e destruction of land is prohibited by the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.

Palestinian cities and populations have been su#ocated and besieged hindering the 2. development, growth and expansion of Palestinian demography. Israel has appropriated the most important sources of Palestinian water located in the occupied territories through land con"scation or declaration of certain land as military zones. !ese closures and con"scations have led to Israel’s control of the western aquifer which is one of the most important underground sources in the West Bank. Palestinians have also lost 40 water wells to the Israelis.

Hundreds of Palestinian families have been transferred and displaced from their homes to 3. other locations in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) as a result of the Wall, causing either a loss of income sources, or an increase in restriction on movement, monitored and implemented by the Israeli authorities.

In addition to direct and declared land con"scation for the construction of the Wall, Israeli 4. authorities are also using the Wall as a tool for the appropriation of land. Palestinians have been deprived thousands of dunums of land with the construction of the Wall. !eir access to their land is prevented or restricted by Israeli authorities for alleged security measures. !e appropriation of land by the occupying power is prohibited under international humanitarian law. Israeli appropriation of land within the territories it occupies contravenes

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its obligations under Geneva Convention IV. Article 47 of the Convention states that “Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the bene"ts of the present Convention by any annexation by the [Occupying Power] of the whole or part of the occupied territory.” Israel as the Occupying Power is prohibited from changing the laws or borders within the territory it is occupying.

!e Wall and its accompanying checkpoints have severely restricted the freedom of 5. movement of Palestinians. !ose with Israeli IDs cannot cross into many areas ‘outside’ the Wall, and the vast majority of Palestinians with West Bank ID cannot cross into occupied Jerusalem. !e right to liberty of movement is recognized under Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that “everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence”. Article 12(4) states that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country”.

!e Wall also a#ects Palestinians’ rights to work, health and education, all recognized by 6. the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under Articles 6, 12 and 13 respectively. For example, the Wall has negatively a#ected 170,000 students in 320 schools and has denied an estimated 220,000 residents in 30 locations their access to health centers and capacity to obtain medical services. Teachers in schools also have di$culty in getting to and from their schools, which also impacts the education on their students.

!e Wall has caused the dispersal and separation of many family members. !e Wall and 7. Israeli policies on residency in Jerusalem and on family reuni"cation have together led to the disintegration of many families, where children are denied their right to know and be cared for by their parents, enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child under Article 7. Further, the family is recognized as “the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state”[294].

!e Wall has caused extensive damage to the Palestinian environment, razing fertile land 8. and destroying the habitats of animals and plants, as well as contributing to the deterioration of water supplies. A recognized component of customary international humanitarian law is the protection and preservation of the natural environment[295].

Overview of the Annexation Wall under International Law !e successive Israeli governments have justi"ed Palestinian land con"scation and appropriation to construct the Annexation Wall by stating security requirements and urgent military needs in order to ensure the security and safety of its citizens against attacks perpetrated by residents of the occupied Palestinian territories (OPt). Regardless of this justi"cation, the Annexation Wall is considered illegal under international humanitarian law, and its e#ects on the population of the OPt constitute various violations of international human rights law.

[294] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Resolution 2200A , 1966. Article 23. Similar language is also used in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Resolution 2200A, 1966. Article 10, which provides for “the widest possible protection and assistance” to be given to the family.[295] See Rules 43 through 45 of J.-M. Henckaerts, “Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law”, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 87, Number 857, March 2005.


International Humanitarian Law:Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 explicitly prohibits the annexation of land. As a State Party to the Geneva Conventions, Israel is obligated to uphold and respect the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, including the Section III of Part III of the Fourth Geneva Convention, relating to occupied territories. Other agreements that Israel is bound by under treaty based international law relating to armed con%ict are the Second Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed con%ict.

In addition to treaty based humanitarian law, there are a recognized set of rules that fall under customary international law. !ese apply to all States during times of armed con%ict, including the occupation of territories. !ere are some provisions of international humanitarian law, therefore, that although Israel might not have signed on to under treaty based law, it is still obligated to uphold and respect to the extent they may also fall under customary law. !is is because of the extent to which the rules included in customary international law are recognized by States internationally as applicable in times of armed con%ict. !is includes for example, Article 75 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions and related to the protection of victims of armed con%icts of 1977 (Protocol 1), and other provisions set out by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In this regard, we can sum up the violations by the occupying power, Israel, of its obligations under international humanitarian law through its construction of the Annexation Wall as follows:

A clear violation of article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention resulting from the 1. unjusti"ed and large scale demolition and destruction of Palestinian private and public property to construct the Wall.

A violation of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention2. [296] resulting from forced collective or individual transfer of Palestinians from their places of residence that have been isolated by the Wall to other locations inside the occupied Palestinian territories, without provision of adequate accommodation for those displaced.[297]

A clear violation of article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits “any 3. change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory” that would in any way deprive protected persons in occupied territories their protection under the Convention.

!e protection and preservation of the natural environment during times of armed con%ict, 4. recognized by the ICRC as constituting customary international humanitarian law[298].

[296] Article 53 stipulates that “Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.»[297] Article 49 of the 4th Geneva Convention permits the “total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand”, however the occupying power has the duty to “ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that the removals are e#ected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that members of the same family are not separated.”[298] See Rules 43 through 45 of J.-M. Henckaerts, “Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law”, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 87, Number 857, March 2005.

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A clear violation of the text and content of article 23 of the Lahia agreement that banned 5. the destruction or seizure of the enemy’s properties except where such destruction or seizure is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations

A clear violation of the text and content of article 46 of the Lahia agreement that frankly 6. and absolutely banned the con"scation of private property.

Violation of the provision of article 47 of the Lahia agreement that frankly and 7. absolutely banned the stealing by the occupying power of properties, resources and project in the OT.

Violation of the provision of article 55 of the Lahia agreement resulting from transgression 8. of the occupying power to the code of bene"t in relation to public properties.

International Human Rights Law:!e Annexation Wall violates the right of Palestinians to self-determination, enshrined under Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Under Article 1, by virtue of the right to self-determination, all peoples “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” and may “for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources”. !e Article further states clearly and unconditionally that “in no case may a person be deprived of its own means of subsistence”[299]. Self-determination is also recognized within Chapter 1 on the purposes of the United Nations, which includes “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”[300].

In addition to self-determination, the destruction of Palestinian’s means of revenue (destroying their land used for agriculture) is a violation of the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to work[301], “which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts”.

!e Annexation Wall also restricts the right to liberty of movement of Palestinians, which is enshrined in Article 12 of the ICCPR, along with the right to freedom to choose residence[302]. !e destruction of land and property (including homes) as a result of the construction of the Wall constitute violations of the right to respect of privacy, family, home and correspondence and protection of honor and reputation[303]; and the right to an adequate standard of living, which includes adequate housing and the continuous improvement of living conditions[304].

[299] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Resolution 2200A , 1966. Article 1. See also Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Resolution 2200A, 1966. Both are rati"ed by Israel.[300] Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, Article 1(2). Signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, United States of America. Available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.htm [301] International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,1966. Article 6.[302] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Resolution 2200A , 1966. Article 12.[303] Ibid, Article 17. [304] Supra note 8, Article 11.


!e legal framework applicable to Israeli construction of the Annexation Wall:!e rules and regulations related to military occupation[305] obligate the occupying power to avoid actions related to the unjusti"ed con"scation, destruction and damage of private property, to avoid the transfer and displacement of the residents of the occupied territory outside the location of their residences, and prohibit the transfer of populations of the occupying power to occupied lands. Within the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 47 prohibits changes into the institutions or government of occupied territories or the annexation of land. Article 47 is not quali"ed and cannot be derogated from under any circumstances. In order words, no justi"cation on the part of Israel would validate any annexation of land or change within the government or institutions that would deprive Palestinians of their protection under Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Other provisions, such as the destruction of property, do provide for some derogation depending on the circumstance. Article 53 prohibits “any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property”, “except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”. In its Advisory Opinion on the Wall, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) outlined the requirements for derogation of Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. After considering the facts submitted to it, the ICJ was “not convinced that the destructions carried out contrary to the prohibition in Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention were rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”.[306]

Further, the Fourth Geneva Convention has speci"ed a number of acts and behavior that if perpetrated by the occupying power, can be deemed as grave breaches of the convention (and therefore international humanitarian law). Article 147 of the Convention stipulates that “ grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great su#ering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful con"nement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justi"ed by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly” (emphasis added). It has been shown that the International Court of Justice did not, in its Advisory Opinion on the Wall, believe the destruction or property for the construction of the Wall to be justi"ed by military necessity. !e destruction of public and private Palestinian property by Israel for the construction of the Wall thus constitutes a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as de"ned under Article 147 of the convention.

!e Court also addressed Israel’s right and duty “to respond in order to protect the life of its citizens”, however emphasized that the measures taken in this regard are bound to conform to

[305] !e principal norms of international humanitarian law dealing with occupation stem from Section III of Part III of the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949, and customary international law. !e latter has been compiled and documented in a study by the International Committee of the Red Cross, entitled Customary Internatonal Humanitarian Law, and edited by Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck. A summary can be found online at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/p0860?opendocument .[306] For more details, please refer to the ICJ Advisory Opinion of July 2004, in particular to paragraph 122. For the security alibis,, please refer to paragraphs 137 and 138. Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=5a&case=131&code=mwp&p3=4

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international law applicable to Israel[307].It should also be mentioned here that the member states have not referred to the 1st protocol of the Geneva Convention but held that article 85 was su$cient to describe the Israeli actions as grave violations.

As a matter of fact, Israeli measures associated with the wall construction which are not justi"ed by military necessity, fall within the category of war crimes which according to the principles and rules of international law require accountability and punishment of those who ordered the perpetration of these crimes, the perpetrators themselves, the inciters and the planners of these schemes.

Legal Mechanisms for Confronting the Wall!e ICJ advisory opinion issued on 9 July 2004 on the legal implications of the construction of a Wall by Israel, on occupied Palestinian lands[308] is a legal achievement in favor of Palestinians and their rights under international law. !e Advisory Opinion sets a precedent for the international judiciary with regards to the Palestinian cause and the rights of the Palestinian people living under occupation.

!e most important issues indicated in the Advisory Opinion can be summed up in the following legal principles:

A$rmation of the applicability of the term “occupation” to the Palestinian territories and 1. therefore the applicability and validity of international humanitarian law regulating the rights and obligations of the Occupying Power in addition to the rights of Palestinians as protected persons living under occupation.

A$rmation of the legitimate right of Palestinians to self determination 2.

A$rmation of the obligations of Israel related to the respect and application of the 3. international law of human rights (namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child) and a$rmation of the application of the international human rights law to the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

A$rmation of the prohibition on acquisition and annexation of land of others by force 4. and the necessity of the Occupying Power to respect this. Recognition of the risk of annexation posed by the Wall in its current and planned route within the occupied West Bank. Rejection of justi"cations provided by Israel for derogation of its obligations under international humanitarian law, speci"cally the destruction of property and related claims of military and security necessity.

A$rmation of the illegitimacy of the Wall for its contravention of the principles and rules 5. of international law.

[307] Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. ICJ Advisory Opinion, (2004) para 141.[308] the ruling was issued in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10 / 14 issued during the exception and urgent period and held on 8 Dec 2003


A$rmation of the occupying power’s liability as a result of its contravention with the 6. principles and rules of international law in its construction of the Wall.

A$rmation of the obligation of Israel as the occupying power “to return the land, orchards, 7. olive groves and other immovable property seized” or if impossible, to “compensate the persons in question for the damage su#ered”, as well as compensate “all natural or legal persons having su#ered any form of material damage as a result of the Wall’s construction”[309]

Israel’s accountability for its actions under international law is of paramount importance. !is includes both civil and criminal liability and a#ects Israeli authorities as well as Palestinians who have su#ered material damage due to the construction of the Wall.

!e Occupying Power’s Liability as a Result of the Construction of the Wall

!e Occupying Power’s violation of the rules and principles of international law evoke international liability of the occupying power for these breaches. According to rules of international law, this liability is double-faceted: it is both a civil and criminal liability[310]

A. Civil liability of the occupying power Israel’s violations of its international legal obligations have led to extensive damage to Palestinian residents a#ected by the construction of the Wall. According to the provisions of international humanitarian and human rights law, Israel is under obligation to return the property and land it has con"scated and/or to provide compensation to all individuals it has a#ected. !ese obligations should be discharged and implemented to mitigate the impact caused by these violations on the people a#ected[311]

With regards to the damages su#ered by Palestinians as a result of Israel’s construction of the Wall, Israel is required to implement the following steps:

Cease all construction of the Wall and implement the total cessation of the destructive and 1. damaging measures against Palestinian private and public property and land.

Return all public and private property including olive groves, orchards, agricultural 2. land and other immovable property to any person for the purpose of the Wall and its construction. Dismantling of those sections of the Wall that fall within the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. In addition, all measures taken towards the construction of the Wall must be repealed or rendered ine#ective (except for those acts which would provide compensation or other reparation to Palestinians a#ected by the Wall).

[309] Supra note 14, para 153.[310] Please refer to Dr. Mohammad Baha’ Adeen Bashan. Reciprocal Treatment in International Criminal Law, General commission for the Emirate Printing a#airs, Cairo, 1974, p 179, and Maryer Green, International law, McDonald and Evans, London, 1982, p 219. [311] On types of compensation, please refer to the following: Dr. Salah Abed Al Badee’ Shalabi, !e right to Rebate, 1st ed. Cairo (1983), p 209.

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Compensation where returning land or property is impossible due to for example 3. destruction or damage to land or property, including destruction or exploitation of natural resources. Compensation must include all direct and indirect damage in%icted on the residents of the occupied Palestinian territories and their public and private properties.

Israel’s implementation of the above requirements will mitigate the damage cause by its construction of the Wall only, and cannot in any way exempt Israel from its international liabilities resulting from other or previous actions and measures that violate the rights of Palestinians in the occupied territories.

B. Criminal liabilities Although the State itself cannot be held criminally liable, there are certain groups or individuals who can, under international humanitarian law, be held accountable for the grave breaches of international law associated with the construction of the Wall. Speci"cally, those who ordered and designed the plans for the construction of the Wall and those who implemented its construction must, under international law, be held accountable for their actions. !is is speci"cally articulated in article 146[312]of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which obligates High Contracting Parties to “undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide e#ective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention”. !e grave breaches set out in the Geneva Conventions are considered war crimes, which incur individual criminal liability. Under Article 146 of the Fourth Convention, the state is obligated to “search for the persons alleged to have committed or ordered to have committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts”.

!e same right has also been a$rmed and safeguarded in article 6 of the Nuremburg charter: “!e crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law: Crimes against peace:

Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of 1. international treaties, agreements or assurances;

Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts 2. mentioned under (i).”

Palestinians are therefore entitled to pursue the people who ordered the perpetration of the crime whether military personnel or politicians and state members in accordance with the provisions of the military occupation and the principles of armed con%icts. Even more so, this right also includes all people who participated in the implementation of the war crime in the oPt. It should be

[312] !e High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide e#ective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention de"ned in the following Article. Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case. Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches de"ned in the following Article. In all circumstances, the accused persons shall bene"t by safeguards of proper trial and defense, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949


mentioned here that the principle of non-retroactivity[313] and negative impact to the international community require the elimination of any action that would allow impunity for war criminals. Moreover, the invalidity of non-retroactivity on international crimes is one of the most important safeguards that ensures the oppressed and humiliated people the in%iction of punishment, when circumstances allow, on the people who have committed war crimes against them.

Despite the fact that the Charter of the International Criminal Court (ICC), rati"ed in Rome on 17 July 1998, stressed that international crimes are not subject to limitations, the same Charter has immunized war criminals and perpetrators of international crimes against punishment because they cannot be held accountable for crimes they had committed before the ICC charter became e#ective. Article 24 stipulates that “No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute”.

!is article, as it is understood, limits the criminal liability of scores ,even hundreds ,of individuals who have committed acts and practices which under the international law are viewed as war crimes when it entered into force. While this is unfortunate, the Charter will hopefully allow oppressed people to hold perpetrators accountable and to legally pursue any individual who commits a war crime against them in the future.

!e legal e$ects emanating from Israel’s international liability

Responsibility of Member States in Confronting Israel’s Violations of the Provisions of International Law !e absence of an e#ective international executive apparatus has impacted countries’ ability to set up tools and instruments that could have helped them to organize and consolidate peaceful international relations based on peace and security and mutual respect of commitments and the rights of the state members. As well, banning the use of force and ensuring legal equity among countries.

In light of the developments witnessed by the rules and principles of the provisions of the international law in the wake of the declaration of the UN Charter towards cordial relations among countries, there emerged an unshaken idea in the obligation of respecting international rules and principles. What’s more, this international interest also urges member states to look for creating tools and instruments that guarantee their safety, encourage respect and safeguard sovereignty.

!ese countries have taken upon themselves the burden of strengthening the law and protecting its sovereignty as an international interest. !ey have a duty to intervene in the event of undermining this law but, naturally, the commitment of these countries di#ered in degree and nature depending

[313] Article 88.-Mutual assistance in criminal matters:1. !e High Contracting Parties shall a#ord one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of grave breaches of the Conventions or of this Protocol. 2. Subject to the rights and obligations established in the Conventions and in Article 85, paragraph 1, of this Protocol, and when circumstances permit, the High Contracting Parties shall co-operate in the matter of extradition. !ey shall give due consideration to the request of the State in whose territory the alleged o#ence has occurred. 3. !e law of the High Contracting Party requested shall apply in all cases. !e provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall not, however, a#ect the obligations arising from the provisions of any other treaty of a bilateral or multilateral nature which governs or will govern the whole or part of the subject of mutual assistance in criminal matters.

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on the variety of the legal principle for which these commitments were placed for respect and commitment of the member states.

!ese commitments can be divided into two patterns: the "rst can be described as negative commitment which results in the refrain of these countries to recognize the actualities established by the occupying power, Israel, in the oPt, as a result of the construction of the wall and the commitment to cease and refrain from providing any assistance or support that can help the occupying power to sustain the violation of the principles and rules of the law.

!e second pattern is the positive commitment which goes beyond protest against the behavior of the country that acts in contravention of the international law into some kind of a positive and serious intervention to confront and bring to an end these violations of the rules and principles of international law.

Since this paper treats some of the above mentioned actions as war crimes and international crimes, we think we will clarify these patterns of commitments that emanate from Israel’s violations of international humanitarian law and due top Israel’s construction of the wall inside the oPt.

Responsibilities of UN Member States in confronting Israel’s violations of international law with regards to the WallSince its creation, the United Nations through its values of peace, democracy and respect for human rights has worked towards establishing and maintaining international peace. !is has in part been implemented through the creation and recognition of international legal frameworks including international humanitarian, human rights and criminal law. Part of this framework urges member States to create and implement tools and instruments that guarantee their safety, encourage respect and safeguard sovereignty. Another part of this framework gives member States the duty to intervene in the event of serious or repeated violations of international law that impact on the international community as a whole. An example of such is the United Nations Security Council, who routinely examines and passes resolutions on matters of import to the international community, such as the question of Palestine and the violations of the rights of Palestinian people.

!ese commitments of UN Member States can be divided into two categories: negative and positive. In the case of Israel’s construction of the Wall, negative commitments are for example the duty of States not to recognize the actualities established by the occupying power, Israel, in the oPt, as a result of the Wall and the duty to cease and refrain from providing any assistance or support that would help the occupying power to sustain its violations of the principles and rules of the law.

Positive commitments go beyond protesting against the behavior of the country contravening international law and consist of taking positive and serious measures to intervene and bring to an end the violations of international law.


A- Negative commitments of countries in regards to Israel’s violations of the rules and principles of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law !e negative commitment of member states to Israel’s violation of International Humanitarian Law is embodied in the refrain of these countries to recognize the actualities established by the occupying power, Israel, in the occupied Palestinian territories as a result of the construction of the Wall. Member States’ commitment to cease and refrain from providing any assistance or support that can help the occupying power to sustain the violation of the principles and rules of the law is also an example of negative commitment.

B-Positive commitments of countries in regards to Israel’s violations of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law !e rules and principles of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law oblige State Members’ positive intervention in confronting Israel’s violations of these rules. !ese obligations can be speci"ed as follows:

Intervention to bring an end to violations: Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates that “the High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances”. Article 146 states that “Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches” (de"ned in Article 147 as outlined previously).

Although the Convention does not mention speci"c means that should be followed by the Contracting Parties to impose respect of the Convention, by other Contracting Parties, it speci"es certain measures that should be taken against individuals who have been proved to have committed grave violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Article 146 gives Contract Parties the choice to either try the persons in their national courts or to extradite them to the party that issued the order of arrest to bring to their own national justice system.

Emphasis must be placed on the obligation of State Parties to investigate, prosecute and punish those persons responsible for war crimes (ie grave breaches of the applicable Geneva Conventions). !is obligation stands regardless of the demands made by others for this accountability.

!e countries party to the Fourth Geneva Convention are thus bound to enact any legislation necessary to provide e#ective penal sanction to any individuals proven to have committed (or ordered to be committed) grave breaches of the Fourth Convention, which includes any individuals or groups responsible for the mass destruction or appropriation of property within occupied lands. In the case of the Wall, these would include contractors, construction workers and those authorities who authorized the construction of the Wall (and therefore, the destruction of property within the occupied territory, including East Jerusalem). In its Advisory Opinion on the Wall, the ICJ held that all of the states party to the Fourth Geneva Convention “are under an obligation, while

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respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention”. !is poses a heavy burden on the Palestinian side to demand the signatories of the Geneva Convention and the carry out their obligations in this regard.

Appeals to support and assist the Palestinian people to confront these violations:In light of the obligations of states parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention and the duties of the UN member states in upholding the UN Charter, a number of agreements and declarations issued by the UN have urged member states to support and provide assistance to the Palestinian people in their struggle to claim their rights under international law.

One of the most important resolutions made in this regard is General Assembly Resolution 3236 issued on 22 Nov 1974, which “Appeals to all States and international organizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people in its struggle to restore its rights, in accordance with the Charter” and General Assembly Resolution 35/35 issued on 14 November 1980, which urges “all States, specialized agencies, competent organizations of the United Nations system and other international organizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people through its representative, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, in its struggle to restore its right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”.

Obligations of the UN in confronting Israeli violations Israel’s violations of international human rights and humanitarian law require a response from the UN system, and in particular, require the General Assembly and the Security Council to ful"ll their obligations and uphold the UN Charter[314] and intervene to ensure the respect of international law and confront the violations taking place throughout the oPt. !ese agencies have a legal obligation through their mandate to intervene against a country that violates its legal obligations and commits illegitimate actions that are expressly prohibited under the provisions of international law.

!e Security Council !e UN Charter has accorded the Security Council the mandate of preserving international peace and security. As a result, the UN charter in chapter 6 and 7 has listed a number of measures that allows the SC to undertake in order to achieve peace and security worldwide.

[314] UN Charter, Chapter I, Article 1 states the purposes of the United Nations as:To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take e#ective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends. Available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.htm.


!e intervention of the Security Council can be conducted in two manners in the event of grave breaches to international law. !e "rst is mediation and negotiations through diplomatic means and public clari"cation of the party’s obligations under international law and the rights of all persons a#ected, as well as stating the UN Security Council’s position on these breaches of international law, and courses of action to confront the party that has perpetrated activities deemed globally illegitimate. !ese courses of action range between economic sanctions and interruption of transport between the breaching party and the members states[315]. !e Security Council is also entitled to use aerial, land and marine forces to impose the embargo in these cases in order to bring the measures to success.[316] !e second option provides for the use of force. In practice, the Security Council, seeking to preserve international peace and security and confront the breaching party, has resorted to the use of force on several occasions including in the 1950 Korean con%ict, the Congo in 1960, and Iraq in 1990. With regards to non-military measures, the Security Council has issued a number of resolutions in this regard the most important of which is the South African example and the boycott of southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in 1966 and South Africa in 1977 and the air embargo on Libya and Sudan[317] and the embargo imposed on Iraq and the ban of the sale of weapons to Yugoslavia. In 1993, the Security Council issued Resolutions 808 and 827 to form an the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to try war criminals for crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1994, the Security Council issues Resolution 995, forming the International Criminal Court for Rwanda (ICTR) to try war criminals of the Rwandan con%ict[318]

!e Security Council must continue to ful"ll its obligations and confront Israel with regards to its repeated violations of international law, including grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention. As has been demonstrated, the construction of the Wall represents several violations of international law, including Israel’s obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention. In this regard, we wish to outline the measures that can be taken against Israel by the Security Council under the provisions of chapter VI and VII:

Issue unequivocal and absolute resolutions demanding Israel to bring the construction of 1. the Wall to an end, to dismantle those sections already constructed and to restore the lands and properties as they were to the rightful owners (or provide adequate compensate in the impossibility of restoring land and property as it was due to destruction resulting from the construction of the Wall).

[315] !is is stipulated in articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. Article 1 stipulates that «!e Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give e#ect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. !ese may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations».[316] Article 42 stipulates that «Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations». Please also refer to Bokradres, !e Principle on Non Intervention in Light of Modern International law , !e National Book Establishment, Algeria, 1990, p 292 – 298.[317] !e measures taken against Libya and Sudan raise reservations and questions on the legitimacy and safety of the UN Security Council resolutions. Giving these examples does not mean that we take the correctness of these resolutions for granted. As for Resolution 748 related to Libya for its involvement in the Lockerbie plane crash that killed 270 passengers, it should be said that the validity of the resolution extradited upon a deal between the international community and Libya in which the latter extradited the two suspects to be tried in Scottish courts. [318] On international criminal courts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, please refer to the special report on international criminal courts in ICRC magazine, issue 58 of Nov/ Dec, 1997.

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Use non-military measures against Israel in the event of its refusal to comply with 2. the UN Security Council resolutions and call all UN State Members to cease their economic dealings with Israel to bring it to compliance with international law, the UN Charter and the many resolutions issued by UN bodies relating to Israel’s violations of international law.

Use force if the previous measures fail in order to achieve the results and the objectives 3. that were set. It is known that the Security Council has refrained from using measures under Chapter VII due to US Veto power, which has often been used to thwart any attempt to propose such a resolution against Israel. !e Security Council has to date failed to issue a binding resolution in this regard that would e#ectively confront the violations of the Israeli occupation against the population of the Palestinian territories. !e success of the US attempts in blocking resolutions against Israel represents a genuine obstacle in the Security Council’s mission to maintain international peace and security, as well as the double standard and lack of neutrality in treating international issues and crises that require the intervention of the council[319].

!e General Assembly Israel’s continuous violations of international law also invoke the question of the General Assembly’s requirements to bring these practices to end in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. !e General Assembly initially brings attention to the breaches of international law while the Security Council undertakes to call for and implement measures in response to these breaches[320], however with regards to Israel’s breaches, the US veto power has thus far impeded the undertaking of these practices. As a result, the General Assembly has issued many resolutions condemning Israel’s continuous violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. In addition to these (non-binding) resolutions, the General Assembly is able to take the necessary measures to prevent further violations including the use of force to bring Israel to compliance and respect of its legal obligations (laid out under international humanitarian and human rights law and rea$rmed through the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice) . !e intervention of the General Assembly in this case draws legitimacy from the General Assembly Resolution 377 issued November 1950 (also known as Unite for Peace), which permits the General Assembly to examine issues and matters and international con%icts that threaten peace and security and recommend Member States to take the necessary collective measures including the use of armed force when necessary, in cases where “the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise

[319] Namibia is a striking similarity as an issue with the question of Palestine in terms of legal status. !e Security Council’s treatment of Namibia helps illustrate the lack of neutrality and use of double standards with regards to the question of Palestine. Namibia was under the mandate of South Africa but the Security Council has issued several binding resolutions on Namibia. Of these resolutions are resolutions # 245, 246, 248 of 1969, 276 of 1970, 301 of 1971 and 385 of 1976 which placed legal liability of the UN on Namibia and called on South Africa to publicly declare its commitments, the release of all prisoners, and the return of the displaced to their residences and the granting of independence to Namibia without any conditions. !e strong position adopted by the Security Council against South Africa "nally led to Namibia’s independence in February 1990 after over 105 years of su#ering and denial of the right to self-determination.[320] On ways on UN Security Council intervention with regards to the Palestinian question, please refer to Sami Hadawi, Ed., UN resolutions on Palestine, the Institute of Palestine Studies, Beirut 1967, p127 – 170. On the UN Security Council ‘s intervention in the wake of Israel’s war in 1967, please refer to Dr. Hasan Al Halabi, !e decision and the settlement – a legal and political study of settling the Arab / Israeli con%ict under the resolution 242 – Beirut 1978, P 22. Also refer to Mahmoud Riyad, Searching for peace and the ME con%ict, 1948 - 1978, Dar Al Mustaqbal al Arabi, Cairo, 2nd ed, p 142.


its primary for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”[321]

In light of the above, the General Assembly is able to maintain international peace and security and thus exercise its responsibilities under the UN Charter even when the Security Council is failing in its related responsibilities. !e Unite for Peace Resolution e#ectively allows the General Assembly to recommend to State Members to take collective action and intervene in order to stop threats or breaches of peace. As Israel’s construction of the Wall has as its e#ect the large scale destruction of property within the land it is occupying, which constitutes a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Conventions; the General Assembly could legitimately take action under its Resolution 377.

In addition to this Resolution, the General Assembly is also required to consider and address Israel’s breaches and violations in line with the UN Charter, to which Israel has the duty to respect and adhere to as a member state of the United Nations. It is commonly held that Israel’s membership to the UN is conditional on its respect of the requirements of the General Assembly, namely General Assembly Resolution 194 (addressing full access to Jerusalem and the right of return of refugees)[322].

!e General Assembly is required to call on Israel and urge it o$cially to comply with its duties towards the United Nations Charter and international human rights and humanitarian law. In the event of Israel’s refusal to do so, the General Assembly should consider dismissing Israel from the UN for refusal to respect the values and provisions of the UN Charter, in addition to its repeated failure to respect or implement the numerous General Assembly Resolutions issued with regards to Israel.

Intervention of the General Assembly can be conducted as follows:

Require Israel to comply with its commitments as a UN member state, with particular 1. regard to the General Assembly resolutions regarding Israel

Require Israel to respect the UN Charter and the provisions of international humanitarian 2. and human rights law by dismantling the Wall, immediately cease all construction works, and restore land and property as it was to its rightful owners. In the event of Israel’s further refusal to comply with the General Assembly’s resolutions, the General Assembly can undertake other appropriate measures to bring Israel to compliance and have it retreat from sustaining its practices, as outlined in the 1950 Unite For Peace Resolution.

In the event of failure of the General Assembly’s measures the General Assembly should 3. ask the UN Security Council to undertake military measures to confront Israel. If the UN Security Council fails to ensure international peace in this regard, the General Assembly can recommend the collective action of Member States, including the use of armed force in accordance with the United for Peace Resolution.

[321] For the full text of General Assembly Resolution 377, visit http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/561c6ee353d740fb8525607d00581829/55c2b84da9e0052b05256554005726c6!OpenDocument[322] Israel is the only country whose membership in the UN has been conditional to its commitment to previous agreements and conventions. For more information, please refer to: 1) G- Jans, “Israel and the US: a conditional membership”, Palestinian A#airs, issue 49, 1975, p 19. 2) William and Sally Melson. Analysis of UN resolutions on the Palestinian question from an international law perspective. United Nations Publications, New York 1979, p 29.

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ConclusionIsrael’s construction of the Wall has been shown to contravene international human rights and humanitarian law, has caused large scale damage to Palestinian lands and livelihoods, and has contributed to the denial of Palestinians’ basic right to self-determination. !is study has aimed to outline the main legal implications of Israel’s construction of the Wall, including the speci"c violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as the legal obligations of all parties resulting from the construction of the Wall and Israel’s breaches of international law. !e Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice has helped to clarify the duties of Israel as an occupying power towards the Palestinian people, with speci"c focus on the Wall and its e#ects on the Palestinians, as well as the obligations of Member States of the United Nations and the body of the United Nations itself that have arisen as a result of Israel’s violations of international law.

!e study has also examined the principal instrument of international humanitarian law relating to occupation, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and has outlined the obligations of all High Contracting Parties (including Israel) to ensure the full respect and implementation of the Convention.

!e study will conclude by listing a number of options available to the Palestinian people in light of the obligations of the international community and the illegitimacy of Israel’s construction of the Wall within the occupied territories:

Demand the High Contracting Parties of the Fourth Geneva Convention to assume 1. their responsibilities related to the pursuit and accountability of all people involved in the commission of grave breaches of the Convention. In this regard, the Civic Coalition recommends the launch of a Palestinian campaign urging the High Contracting Parties to hold an international conference to explore the legal obligations.

!e o$cial Palestinian UN representatives must also make a move to demand the UN 2. Security Council to intervene in accordance with its primary responsibility of ensuring international peace and security, and confront Israel’s violations of international law and refusal to adhere to General Assembly Resolutions or the ICJ Advisory Opinion.

Palestinian representatives must also be prepared for further steps in the event of slackness 3. by the UN Security Council and lobby for more pressure in the General Assembly and ask it to intervene to remove the Wall in accordance with the powers vested in the General Assembly pursuant to Resolution 337.

Formation of a team of Palestinian legal experts to explore the possibility of "ling a 4. complaint against the leaders of the Israeli occupation and other Israeli o$cials involved in the construction of the Wall, to be submitted to justice systems of interested or concerned UN member states. It is worthwhile mentioning here that a number of countries provide a jurisdiction for criminal liability for war crimes (Belgium, France, Britain, Spain and others).


Formation of a governmental and non-governmental committee under the supervision 5. of the Ministry of settlement activity a#airs and the Wall to explore the possibility of pushing international human rights organizations and other bodies in solidarity with the Palestinian people to exert pressure on their own countries to demand them to respect their obligations emanating from the Fourth Geneva Convention. !e committee could additionally urge the human rights organizations to "le cases before their own national courts in accordance with article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Nnote:Archive of Maps Department, Arab Studies Society- the O$cial Gazette.