Salvador Abunado et al. V. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 159218, 30 March 2004, First Division, (Ynares-Santiago, J.)

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no hearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required fro the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted

Thus, under the law, a marriage even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab ignition, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Salvador Abunado married Zenaida Biñas on December 24, 1955. In 1966, Salvador separated from Zenaida. On September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceña. Several years later in 1988, Narcisa left the country to work in Japan. On January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with Zenaida. When Narcisa returned in 1992, she discovered that Salvador left their conjugal home and now has an extramarital affair with a certain Fe Corazon Palto. Narcisa also learned of Salvador’s marriage to Zenaida in 1989.

On January 19, 1995, Salvador filed an annulment case against Narcisa. That same year, on May 18, 1995, Narcisa filed a complaint for bigamy against Salvador and Zenaida. Salvador, however, claimed he cannot be liable for bigamy since Narcisa has consented to his marriage with Zenaida. Salvador moreover, argued that his petition for annulment was a prejudicial question hence, proceedings in the bigamy case should first be suspended to give way to the civil case for annulment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial to the case

HELD:

First Issue: Subsequent Judicial Declaration Of the Nullity Of the First Marriage Was Immaterial . Salvador cannot invoke the benefit of a prejudicial question nor the order of the trial court annulling his marriage with Narcisa since the offense had already been consummated even before

he instituted the civil case for annulment which preceded Narcisa’s complaint for bigamy.

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.

Morigo vs. People GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004

FACTS:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

HELD:

Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with

Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.

Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy 143 SCRA 449

FACTS:

Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latter’s former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contents that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage.

ISSUE: Whether Karl’s marriage with Lilia is void.

HELD:

It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are regarded void under the law.

Domingo vs. CA 226 SCRA 572

FACTS:

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the

separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.

HELD:

The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.

Valdes vs. RTC 260 SCRA 221

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

People vs. Aragon 100 Phil 1033

FACTS:

Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While his marriage with the latter subsist, he contracted a canonical marriage with Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu while Faicol is in Iloilo. He was a traveling salesman thus, he commuted between Iloilo and Cebu. When Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where the latter worked as teacher-nurse. She later on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment. While she was in Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage with Maglasang. CFI-Cebu found him guilty of bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.

HELD: The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife whose marriage with Rosima was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for contracting marriage cannot prosper.

Mercado vs. Tan 337 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.

ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former marriage.

HELD:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as “void.”

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.

Republic vs. Nolasco 220 SCRA 20

FACTS:

Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s whereabouts. He did so by securing another seaman’s contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract. More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.

Lukban vs Republic L-8492, February 29, 1956

FACTS:

Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of since then. She diligently looked for him asking the parents and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is already dead since he was absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to have her civil status put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law.

ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry.

HELD:

The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that “for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Armas vs. Calisterio GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000

FACTS:

Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second husband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.

Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.

ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of presumptive death.

HELD:

The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958 where the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrieta’s marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.

Anaya vs. Palaroan 36 SCRA 97

FACTS:

Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora’s counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

HELD:

The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last paragraph providing that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity” shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.

Buccat v Buccat de Mangonon GR No. 47101 April 25, 1941

GODOFREDO BUCCAT, plaintiff-appellant,vs.

LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT,

defendant-respondent. HORRILLENO, J.:

FACTS:1.It was established before the trial court:a. The Plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938b.After several interviews, both were committed on September 19 of that yearc.On November 26 the same year, the plaintiff married the defendant in aCatholic Cathedral in Baguiod.They, then, cohabited for about eighty-nine dayse.Defendant gave birth to a child of nine months on February 23, 1939f.Following this event, Plaintiff and Defendant separated.2.On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an action for annulment of marriage before theCFI of Baguio City. The plaintiff claimed that he consented to the marriage becausethe defendant assured him that she was virgin.3.The trial court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.BASICALLY: Godofredo Buccat (Plaintiff) and Luida Mangonon (Defendant) got married onNovember 26, 1938. Luida gave birth after 89 days and on March 20, 1939 Godofredo filedfor annulment of marriage before the CFI because he was led to believe by Luida that shewas a virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint, so Godofredo appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the consent of Plaintiff to the marriage?

DECISION: There is no fraud because: The Supreme Court states that: “We see no reason to overturn the ruling appealed.” It isunlikely that the plaintiff, Godofredo, had not suspected that the defendant, Luida, waspregnant. (As she gave birth less than 3 months after they got married, she must havelooked very pregnant even before they were married.) Since Godofredo must have knownthat she was not a virgin, the marriage cannot be annulled. The Sacred Marriage is an institution: it is the foundation on which

society rests. To cancel it,reliable evidence is necessary.*Consent freely given: ARTICLE 4 and 45 FC.

Aquino vs. Delizo 109 Phil 21

FACTS:

Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage.

HELD:

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was “naturally plump” or fat. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.

In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is set aside.

Menciano vs. Neri San Jose G.R. No. L-1967 May 28, 1951

Facts: Matilde Menciano, in her and her children s behalf, filed a motion for declaration of heirs, alleging that she is the widow of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, to whom she was married on September 28, 1944 before Rev. Father Isaias Edralin, S.J.; that they lived together before the said marriage, hence, Carlo Magno Neri was born on March 9, 1940, the child having enjoyed the status

of a recognized natural child; that their second child Faustino Neri, Jr., was born on April 25, 1945 and was legitimized by the subsequent matrimony of his parents, thus he is a legitimate child in lawful wedlock.

On the other hand, on an amended answer, Paz Neri San Jose (the executrix of the deceased) and Rodolfo Pelaez (designated universal heir in the will of the deceased dated December 19, 1940), denied the substantial allegations of Menciano s motion for declaration of heirs and further alleged that the deceased was suffering from senile dementia from 1943 which became worse a year later; that the marriage between Menciano and the deceased was in violation of the legal provisions and requisites because of the latter s age, sickness, and bombardment; that Menciano took advantage of the deceased s condition, forced the latter to marry her by means of deceit and threat; and that the deceased was congenitally sterile and impotent. Moreover, the defendants also filed a counterclaim for the sum of 286,000 in cash, for jewels and certain properties which, as presumed, were retained and illegally disposed of by Matilde Menciano.

Issue:

(1)Was the marriage between the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano valid?

(2)Are the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo Magno Neri the legitimate children of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano?

(3)Did Matilde Menciano have in her possession and illegally disposed of the cash, jewels, and certain properties aforementioned?

Decision:

(1)Yes. The marriage between the two is evidenced by: the 2 applications for a marriage license, dated September 28, 1944, the first one, signed by the deceased to marry

Menciano and the other one, signed by Menciano to marry the deceased; the certificate for immediate issuance of marriage license applied for, signed by the Acting Local Civil Registrar and the deceased and Menciano; the marriage contract signed by the deceased and Menciano as contracting parties, Rev. Isaias Edralin as solemnizing officer, and the witnesses L. B. Castaños and Samson Pañgan. The 4 documents are official and public; there validity can be successfully assailed only by strong, clear, and convincing oral testimony. In this case, the oral evidence presented by the defendants is not convincing so

as to declare the said marriage invalid. A mere glance at the signatures of the deceased in the aforesaid documents will convince anyone that they could not have been written by a man who is almost unconscious and physically and intellectually incapacitated, as the defendants witnesses represent him to have been. Also, the tests pertaining to testamentary capacity were applied to show the capacity to contract marriage of the deceased. Although the said doctrine relates to testamentary capacity, there is no reason why is should not be applied to the capacity to contract marriage, which requires the same mental condition. Thus, the court did not err in declaring valid the marriage of the deceased and Menciano.

(2)Yes. Faustino Neri, Jr. is a legitimate child of the deceased and Menciano. The requisite for potency being met, the necessary conclusion is that the child Faustino Neri, Jr., is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the deceased with Menciano in lawful wedlock.

No. The court declared that Carlo Magno Neri has not been acknowledged as a natural child and, consequently, cannot be legitimized by the subsequent marriage of his parents.

(3)No. After a careful and exhaustive review of evidence, the trial court correctly reached the conclusion that such allegation has not been substantiated. The testimonies of mother and son- Paz Neri San Jose and Rodolfo Pelaez regarding the sum of money are contradictory. Moreover, Clotilde Galarrita de Labitad s testimony is unbelievable. With regard to the jewels, no satisfactory evidence was presented to prove that Menciano misappropriated them.

Jimenez vs. Canizares L-12790, August 31, 1960

FACTS:

Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to physical examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 days. She was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack of interest on her

part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband.

HELD:

The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact that women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The case was remanded to trial court.

Sin vs. SinGR No. 137590, March 26, 2001

FACTS: Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the State in the proceedings.

HELD: Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence

that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

De Ocampo vs. Florenciano 107 Phil 35

FACTS: Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code.

HELD: Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.