4. McCormick - Fear, Technology, And the State

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Fear, Technology, and the State: Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, and the Revival of Hobbes inWeimar and National Socialist GermanyAuthor(s): John P. McCormickReviewed work(s):Source: Political Theory, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Nov., 1994), pp. 619-652Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192042.

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FEAR, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE STATECarl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, and the Revival ofHobbes in Weimar and National Socialist Germany

JOHN P.McCORMICKUniversityof Chicago

It is striking hatone of the mostconsequential epresentatives f [the]abstract cientificorientationof the seventeenthcentury[ThomasHobbes]becameso personalistic.Thisis becauseas ajurstic thinkerhe wantedto grasptherealityof societallifejust as muchas he, as a philosopherand a naturalscientist, wanted to grasp the reality of na-ture. [J]unsticthoughtIn those days had not yet become so overpoweredby thenatural ciences thathe, in theintensityof his scientificapproach, houldunsuspectinglyhave overlooked thespecific realityof legal life.CarlSchmitt,PoliticalTheology(1922)

Inthe lightof Hobbes'snatural cience, man and his worksbecomea merephantasma-goria. ThroughHobbes's naturalscience, "the nativehue" of his political science "issicklied o'er with thepale cast" of somethingwhich is remlmscentof death but utterlylacks themajestyof death--of somethingwhichforeshadows hepositivismof ourday.Itseems then that f we want to dojustice to the life which vibrates n Hobbes'spoliticalteaching,we must understandhatteaching by itself, and not in the lightof his naturalscience. Can this be done?2

Leo Strauss,"On theBasis ofHobbes'sPolitical Philosophy"(1959)

In thepassagescitedabove,a masteranda studentassertthe existenceofa dissociation,if not a divorce,between that which is natural-scientific ndthatwhichis "personalistic," human," specificallyreal,""alive"withintheAUTHOR'SNOTE: For their comments and criticisms,I thankRichardBernstein,StephenHolmes,BernardManin,RobertPippin,MoishePostone,TracyStrong,andGeorgeSchwab,aswell as membersof thefollowingorganizationsat the Universityof Chicago:theInterdisciplin-ary Social TheoryForum,the ModernEuropeanHistory Workshop, nd the Political TheorySundayNight Group.POLITICALTHEORY,Vol.22 No. 4, November 1994 619-652? 1994 Sage Publications, nc.

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620 POLITICALTHEORY November1994

philosophyof ThomasHobbes.Butthequestionwithwhichthe secondquoteconcludesmight lead the readerto assumethateven afterthe lapse of thealmostforty yearsthatseparates hestatements,he master'spropositionhadyet to be fully demonstrated,nd moreover, hat the studentrecognizestheproblematic ature f such anassertion, espitehisobvioussympathieswith it.CarlSchmitt,in his Weimarwritingsas theypertain o Hobbes,particu-larly n TheConceptofthePolitical,felt the needtoemphasize hissupposeddistinctionor oppositionin work of the great seventeenth-centuryEnglishpoliticaltheorist.This projectwas subsequently akenup by Leo Strauss nThe Political Philosophyof Hobbes as a resultof his intellectualexchangewith Schmittover "theconceptof thepolitical."As Hobbesremarked,"ThePassion to be reckonedupon, is Fear"(I, 14, 99),3 and both interpretersrecognize something vital, substantive, and fundamentally human inHobbes'sgroundingof thestate n thefearof death-or as Straussrepeatedlyemphasizes,thefearof violentdeath.On the eve of Weimar'scollapse,theysoughtto retrievethis primalsourceof politicalorder and free it from theelementsthat Hobbeshimselfhadfoundnecessary o employto constructastate on this foundation-natural science and technology. Schmitt andStrauss saw in these latterelements the verycause of the breakdown-the"neutralization"-ofthatwhichtheywere intended o helpbuild,the modernstate.Theparticularociopoliticalsituationof Weimar-violence exercisedby privategroups,a widespreadperceptionof technologyas a "runaway"phenomenon,and so on-rendered it a criticalmoment to reintroduce heissueof fearandthe issueof science,andconsequently o reformulateHobbesand the intellectual oundationof the state.

But, I will suggest, the issues of fear,violence, technology,and the statecouldnot be so easily distinguishedwithinHobbes'sthought,andin lightofthe emergenceof NationalSocialism, both Schmittand Strauss felt com-pelled, in subsequentworkssuch as TheLeviathan n The State TheoryofThomasHobbes andNaturalRightandHistory,either oqualifysignificantlyorabandoncompletelythisapproacho Hobbes-in retrospect,anapproachwithominousimplications.4

SCHMITT'STHE CONCEPTOF THEPOLITICAL1932)In Der Begriffdes Politischen,5CarlSchmittsets forthhis most famousthesis on theessence of politics:"Thespecificpoliticaldistinctionto which

political actions and motives can be reducedis that between friend andenemy"(CP, 26). Yetdespitethe apparentnoveltyof this proposition,one


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McCormuckFEAR, TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 621

finds theshadow of ThomasHobbescastquite prominently verthisfamoustreatise.As Hobbeshimself hadmaintained,nhumanity'snatural ondition,in thestateof nature,"everymanto everyman,for wantof a commonpowerto keep them all in awe is an Enemy" (I, 15, 102).6 Indeed, Schmltt'sfriend/enemydistinction is intended to serve a theoretical-politicalroleanalogousto Hobbes's state of nature.If Hobbes predicatedthe modernstate on the state of nature,Schmittdeclaresthat "theconceptof thestatepresupposes heconceptof the politi-cal."And any inquiriesmadeintothe "essence"of the state that do not firsttake this foundation nto considerationwould be prematureCP, 19). Ques-tions as to whetherthe state is "a machine or an organism,a personor aninstitution,a society or a community,anenterpriseora beehive"-questionsin which Schmittwill eventuallybecomequite interested,as we will see-must be provisionallyset aside (CP, 19).Schmitt thus conceives of his formulation of "the political" as an"Archimedeanpoint"not unlike that which Hobbessoughtto locate in thestate of nature:

Insofar as it is not derved from other critera, the antithesis of frend and enemycorresponds otherelatively ndependent riteraof otherantitheses:goodandevil inthemoralsphere,beautifuland ugly in the aestheticsphere,and so on. In any event it isindependent,notin the sense of a distinctnew domain,but in that t can neitherbe basedon anyone antithesisoranycombinationof otherantitheses,norcanitbe traced o these.(CP, 26)"Thepolitical" s irreducible o anyotherelement.Indeed,Schmittenvi-sions the friend/enemydistinctionas so fundamental ndelementary hat inthe courseof his argumenthe feels compelledatparticular ointsto remarkon theself-evidence of his thesis:"nothing anescapethislogicalconclusionof the political"(CP, 36). Schmitt even resortsto the most questionableofHobbes'sargumentso demonstrate he actualexistence of thestate of affairshe describes: ike thestate of nature, hepoliticalcanbe shown to exist basedon thebehaviorof statesInthe arenaof international ffairs(CP, 28).The heart of Schmitt'sneo-Hobbeslanprojectderives from their similarsociopolitical situations.7Schmitt observes thatHobbes formulatedhis po-litical theory"in the terrible imes of civil war"whereall legitimate and normative illusions with which men like to deceive themselvesregardingpoliticalrealitiesin perods of untroubled ecurityvansh. If withinthe statethere areorgamzedpartiescapableof according heirmembersmoreprotection hanthestate,thenthe latterbecomesatbest an annexof suchparties,and the individualcitizenknows whom he has to obey. (CP, 52)


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This also happensto be an excellent descriptionof WeimarGermanyduringits crisis years.8Schmitt sees in the context of Hobbes'sthoughtaparallelwith his own, andrelatedly,a parallel n theirprojects.InLeviathan,Hobbessought"toinstillin managain'themutualrelationbetweenProtec-tionand Obedience'"(CP,52) andso forestall hestrifeandchaos thatariseswhen armedautonomous roupsconfronteach other.This is notfarremovedfromSchmitt'sown intentions.Theexceptionalsituationof civil warrevealsnormallyconcealedpoliticalrealities such as humanbehavior n a stateofnature:"In it, states exist among themselves in a condition of continualdanger,and theiracting subjectsareevil for preciselythe same reasonsasanimals who arestirredby their drives(hunger,greediness,fear, ealousy)"(CP, 59). Therefore,arguesSchmitt,all "genuine"politicaltheones-thosethat have observedthenormallyconcealed"politicalrealities"-presuppose"man o be evil," meaning"dangerous nddynamic" CP, 61).Schmittthus shareswithHobbes notonly a similarhistoricalcontext,buta similaroutlookon humanityas well. Whatarethe ramificationsof this9This particular utlookon humanityoffers the way out of the problemsofthestate of nature, ivil war,orimpending ivil war.Regardinghe"genuine"political philosopherswho take theview thatthe humanbeingis essentiallydangerous,Schmittwrites,"theirrealism can frightenmen in need of secu-rity" CP, 65). Thisis preciselythepoint.Schmittrecognizes,as didHobbes,thatby frightening"men"one canbest "instill" n them thatprinclple-"thecogito ergosumof thestate"-protego ergo obligo (CP,52). Inotherwords,fear is the sourceof politicalorder.Humanbeingsonce confrontedwith theprospect of their own dangerousnesswill be terrifiedinto the arms ofauthority.Thus,as Schmittexplains,"ForHobbes,trulya powerfulandsystematicpoliticalthinker,hepessimisticconceptionof man is theelementarypresup-positionof a specific systemof politicalthought" CP, 65). But, systematicdoes not mean, for Schmitt,scientificor technical.Technologyhas helpedfoster the liberalconceptionof man, which assumesthat,with wealth andabundance,humanity'sdangerousness an be ameliorated, nd hence blindshumanityto the eternal reality of "the political" (CP, 61). Technology,accordingto Schmitt,has aided in the "neutralization"f the stateand theEuropeanorderof states, again concealing the natureof the "political."9Schmlttchides EduardSprangeror taking"tootechnical"a perspectiveonhumannature, orviewingItin lightof "thetacticalmanipulation f instinc-tive drives" (CP, 59). Hobbes's insight, on the contrary, s neither"theproductof a frightfulanddisquietingfantasynor of a philosophybasedonfree competition by a bourgeois society in its first stage but is thefundamentalpresuppositionof a specific political philosophy"(CP, 65).


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McCormick FEAR,TECHNOLOGY,AND THESTATE 623

Schmltt'staskthenis to elaborateon Hobbes's view of humanityandrevivethe fearthat is characteristic f man's natural ondition n threeways:(1) bydemonstrating he substantiveaffinitybetween his concept of the politicaland Hobbes'sstate of nature, 2) by makingclear theever-presentpossibilityof a return o thatsituation n the formof civil war,and(3) by convincingindividuals-partisans and nonpartisansalike-that only a state with amonopolyon decisionsregardingwhat s "political" anguaranteepeaceandsecurity.He mustdo all of thiswhileavoidingthe elements of natural cienceandtechnologyoftenassociatedwithHobbes,whichundermined hisprojectto beginwith.The radicalsubjectivitycharacteristic f thepoliticalheightens hedangerregardingSchmitt'sconceptof thepolitical,andconsequently ntensifiesthefear inspiredby it. "Only the actualparticipants an correctlyrecognize,understand,andjudge the concrete situationand settle the extremecase ofconflict. Each participant s in a position to judge whether the adversaryintendsto negatehis opponent'sway of life and thereforemust be repulsedor foughtto preserveone'sown form of existence"(CP, 27). Thefactthat nthe absence of a centralizedpower thereis no standardby which one canjudge anotheras anenemy,or be so judgedby them,clearlyimpliesthat onemustalways be readyto be attackedor,morereasonably, ompels one to bethe first to strike.This is obviously a revival of the Hobbesianscenarioof"theconditionof meerNature"where all "areudgesof thejustnesseof theirown fears"(I, 14, 96). In this light PasqualePasqulnoobserves that it isexactly "theabsence or eplstemologicalimpossibilityof definingan obJec-tive criterionof what constitutesa threat o the individual's elf preservationwhich transforms he naturalrightinto the originof the potentialwarof allagainstall."'?Schmittdropsthe natural ightandreemphasizes hepotentialwar. Hence this radicalsubjectivity s the sourceof the danger n Schmitt's"political,"andaccording o Pasquino,"theessentialreasonwhy theHobbe-slan stateof nature s one of totaluncertaintyand lack of freedom.""lThispotentialityfor warand the uncertaintywhich arisesfromthis radical sub-jectivlty intensify fear because they insure the constancyof the danger.Infact, the threatof dangeris always present,even when the actualdangerisnot.As Hobbesremarks, he essence of the warwhich is the state of nature"consistethnot in actuallfighting;but in the knowndispositionthereto" I,13,88-9). Accordingly,Schmittmaintains hat"totheenemyconceptbelongsthe everpresentpossibilityof combat" CP, 32, emphasisadded).The continuedexistenceof this kindof subjectivitywithinsociety impliesthepreservationof the state of war andthe fear that t engenders.As Hobbesmakesexplicit, it is a "diseased"commonwealth hat toleratesthedoctrine,"Thateveryprivateman is Judge of GoodandEvil actions"(I, 29, 223); and


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worse, one which allows persons to resort to violence to defend suchjudgments,"For hose men thatare so remisselygoverned, hat heydare akeup Armes, to defend, or introducean Opinion,are still in Warre" I, 18).Schmitt saw in thepluralist heories of theearlytwentiethcenturyajustifi-cation for just such behavior (CP, 52), and like Hobbes, evaluated theoutcomeas statevulnerabilitybothdomesticallyand with regard o foreignpowersas well:

The intensificationof internalantagonismshas the effect of weakemngthe commonIdentity is-a-visanother tate.Ifdomesticconflictsamongpoliticalpartieshavebecomethe sole political difference,the most extremedegree of internalpolitical tension istherebyreached; i.e., the domestic, not the foreign fnend-and-enemygroupingsaredecisive for armedconflict. The everpresentpossibilityof conflict mustalwaysbe keptin mind. If one wants to speak of politics in the context of the primacyof internalpolitics, then this conflict no longerrefers to war betweenorganizednationsbut to civilwar. CP,32)

Hobbesadamantlymaintains hatthe existenceof violentfactions,whetherconstitutedby familial ties, religious affiliation, or economic status, is"contraryo thepeaceandsafetyof thepeople,a takingof theSword out ofthe hand of the Sovereign"(II, 22, 164). And it is preciselythese kinds ofarmedantagonisms hat hadreemerged n late Weimar: radeunions versuscompanygoons,communistmobs versusfascistgangs,politicalpartyversuspolitical party,and so on.12Each had declared the rght to evaluate self-protection n one's own way, andto act accordingly.Eachhadclaimedtherighttojudge thepolitical(CP, 37).Schmittwantsdesperately o demonstrate hat this situation mplies thelikelihoodof combustion nto civil warandHobbes'sstateof nature.He mustrevivethefearthat ed to the termination f thestate of nature o prevent hereversionback to it. If groupsother than the state have power, particularlysuch as thatoverdeclaringwar,or worse if theydo notpossess such a powerthemselves but can preventthe state from exercisingthatpower,the statedisappears:

It would be an indication hatthese counterforceshad not reached he decisive pointinthe politicalif they turnedout to be not sufficientlypowerful o preventa warcontraryto their nterestsorpnnciples.Shouldthe counterforces e strongenoughto hindera wardesiredby the statethat was contrary o their nterestsor pnnciplesbut not sufficientlycapablethemselvesof decidingaboutwar,thena unifiedpoliticalentitywould no longerexist. (CP, 39)

Schmltt's mplicitreadingof Hobbes,therefore,s thata return o the stateofnature s an ever presentpossibilityfor a society.This readingis generally


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McCormick FEAR, TECHNOLOGY,AND THESTATE 625

countered by those who see Hobbes's state of natureas either a mererhetoricaldevice or ananthropological uppositionabouta verydistantpast.ButasPasqulnopersuasivelyargues, he stateof nature s notnearly o distantfrom presentrealityas all that. Hobbes viewed the stateof naturenot as afactuallyhistoricalpast,butrather s apoliticallypossible present;he viewedthe stateof natureas "ahypothetical rumblingof the state"andsociety "asif It weredissolved."'3Hobbes conceived of this condition as one of "terror,that is to say a conditionin whichno individual s certainof his/herbordersor even his physical identity, hat is his life";and he was "anxiousto showthat the state of natureactuallyexists."'4The state of natureas it exists inrelationship to the present is Hobbes's utmost concern, according toPasquino:"It can happenat any time and mustalways be avoided. It is theface of the threat hatpoliticalordermust wardoff."s5This buttressingof Schmitt'sreadingof Hobbes more clearly demon-strateshis own project.Schmitt seeks to make realthe terrorof what is andwhatmightbe so as to strengthenheexistingorder.Thecitizens of Weimarmust reaffirm he pact that delivers humanbeings out of the state of natureand into civil society by transferringheir llegitimatelyexercisedsubjectiv-ity regarding riend andenemy backto the sovereignstate. "Tothe state asanessentiallypoliticalentitybelongsthejus belli, i.e., the realpossibilityofdecidingin a concrete situationupontheenemy andtheabilityto fighthimwith thepoweremanating rom theentity" CP, 45). The state,and the statealone, decides on internalenemies (CP, 46), and externalones as well (CP,28-9). Regarding nternal nemies,Schmittseeks to reverse hepluralistviewof the stateas merely one interestgroup among manyothers in society oreven as a servant thereof(CP, 44). The state must stand abovesociety as aquasi-objectiveentity,rather hanhelpprecipitate ivil warbyexistingasonesubjectivity amongothers.Regardingexternalenemies,just as Hobbes hadCatholics in mind when he warned against allegiance to extra-nationalpowers, Schmittsurely thinks of the communists when he writes that oneshould not "love and supportthe enemies of one's own people"(CP, 29).Moscow should come before Berlinno more thanRome beforeLondon orPans. Onlyone's own statecan askone to surrender ne's life for it (CP, 46),and Schmittmocks liberal ndividualism or not beingable to command hisfrom citizens (CP, 71). But here he partscompanywithHobbes,who is themost famousexponentof thiskindof right-the rightnot to lay down one'slife in response to a political command. It is here that we should turn toStrauss'scritiqueand radicalization f Schmltt'sproject,becauseit is on thispointandthe issues surroundingtthatStrauss's ssay pivots.However,somepreliminaryssues needto be addressed irst.


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In his recentwork, RichardWolin identifies Schmitt as the archetypalWeimar xponentof "politicalexistentialism"' heobsession withthe"brutefacticlty,""bruteprimacy"of humanexistence and an accompanyingaes-thetizationof conflict, violence, and death as ends in themselves.'6Whatshouldbe clearfrommy presentationhus far is thatSchmittseeks to makethethreatof conflict-of war-felt andfearednot as an endinitself,asWolinand othercriticssuggest,butrather o as to makewar's outbreak ll the moreunlikelydomestically,and tsprosecutionmoreeasilyfacilitatedabroad.ThatSchmittaestheticlzedviolentconflict togenerate he fearnecessary opreventdisorder s not contestable-that he did so for its own sake is.17This servesas a more adequateexplanationof Schmltt'sintentionsrather han a merejustificationof them,becauseas we will see, Schmittmustbe held account-able for aestheticizingviolent conflict in the Weimarcontext,whateverhisintentions.In Political Romanticism,Schmitt declaredthatfor romantics,"the state is a work of art."'8A questionthatmust be asked is how muchSchmitthimselfaestheticlzedmattersof state.The issue of theaestheticization f violenceis, however, nherently elatedto a subjectonly implicit n TheConceptof thePolitical,but whichbecomesexplicitin Schmitt's aterwork on Hobbes: hequestionof myth.Inthewakeof the emergenceof NationalSocialism, several notableGermanscholarsattempted o understandhe returnorpersistenceof mythin what is suppos-edly theageof reason.Intheirrespectiveanalysesof myth,Max HorkheimerandT. W.Adorno,ErnstCasslrerand HansBlumenbergocus, in onewayoranother, nthe elementof fear.'9Myth s a human esponse othe fear nspiredby "theabsolutismof nature,"o use Blumenberg'sormulation.Rather hanconfrontthe amorphous,unpredictable, ndincomprehensibly ariableap-pearanceof natureas a whole,humanityprefers o fixateon specificentitieswithmoreclearlydiscernible raitsas surrogates,andsubsequentlyntualizethem ntomyths.Tothisextent,bothHobbes'sandSchmitt's heories unctionas myths.Accordingto the German heoristsof myth,humanityexchangesthe fearof the unordered ndchaotic for the fear of somethingmore certainand identifiable.Suchis thevery exchangethatHobbesoffers:subjectsgiveuptheirepistemologlcaluncertaintyegardinghetotalityof humannature-their earof everything ndeveryoneateverymoment-for the moretolerableknowledge hat tisonlythestate hat s tobefeared,and henonlyundercertainconditions.Indeed,Hobbesnameshis stateafter hemythicbiblicalmonster,theLeviathan.Theextentto whichSchmitt'srevival andreformulationf theHobbeslanexchange nTheConceptof the Political succumbs o theelementof myth andthe questionconcerningthe potentialramificationsof this aresubjectsthatwill be takenup in latersectionsof thisessay.


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McCorrmck FEAR, TECHNOLOGY,AND THESTATE 627

STRAUSS'S COMMENTARYN THECONCEPTOF THEPOLITICAL1932)

The young Leo StraussrecognizesSchmitt'sprojectas I have describedit and its relationship o thatof Hobbes;he confirmsthe necessityof such aprojectbased on "thepresentsituation"of Weimar;he criticizesthe projecton the basis of Schmitt's own assumptionsandalms;andfinally,he refash-ions, redirects,and radicalizestheproject tself.20Straussrealizes that Schmitt'sinquiry nto "theorder of humanthings,"into "thepolitical,"is necessarilyan examinationof the foundationof thestate(CCP, 81), forthe state wasfoundedwith "the undamental ndextremestatusof man" n mind(CCP, 88). Indeed,as Straussrecognizes explicitly,"the political, which Schmitt brings out as fundamental, s 'the state ofnature.' ... Schmitt restoresHobbes'sconceptionof the stateof nature o aplace of honor"(CCP, 87-8). Justas "inspiring ear" is a primarycharac-teristicof Hobbes'sstateof nature,he same canbesaidof Schmltt'spolitical,according o Strauss's nterpretationCCP, 95). As Straussobservedregard-ing Hobbesin a workpublishedonly a few yearsearlier n 1930:

Fear is not only alarmandflight,but also distrust, uspicion,caution,care lest one fear.Now it is not death n itself thatcanbe avoided,butonlydeathby violence, which is thegreatestof possible evils. For life itself can be of such miserythat deathcomes to berankedwith the good. In the final instance what is of prmary concern is ensunng thecontinuanceof life in the sense of ensunng defense againstother men. Concernwithself-protection s the fundamental onsideration, he one most fully in accord with thehumansituation. The fearof death,the fear of deathby violence, is [for Hobbes]thesource of all right,theprmarybasis of natural ight.21

Strauss thus acknowledgesas justified Schmitt's revivalof the image ofthe state of natureand thenotionof fearthatmustaccompany t. The"presentsituation" n "theage of neutralizations nddepoliticlzlng"calls for such arevival,according o Strauss,echoinganotherof Schmltt'sworks(CCP,82).The prevailing pluralistand liberaltheoriesof society and"culture,"whichview these entities as "autonomous"-that is, as legitimatelyseparate romthe state-have neutralized he political (CCP, 86). Because such theoriesview culture as somethingnatural n the sense that humanbeings develop itmoreor less spontaneously, heyoverlook thatthere s somethingthatexistsprior to culture. "This conception makes us forget that 'culture'alwayspresupposes somethingwhich is cultivated:cultureis always cultivation ofnature"CCP, 86). Straussmakesexplicitthatnaturenthis sensealso entailshumannatureand hence the stateof nature:


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Since we understand y "culture" bove all thecultureof humannature, hepresuppo-sition of culture s, aboveall,humannature, ndsinceman s bynature nanimalsociale,the humannatureunderlying ulture s the naturalliving togetherof men, i.e., the modein which man-pror to culture-behaves towardsothermen. The termfor the naturalliving togetherthus understood s the status naturalis. One may thereforesay, thefoundationof culture s thestatus naturalis.(CCP, 87)

The cultivation of the state of nature is, as we know according to Hobbes andSchmitt, the state, not society initially. The state, by establishing order,makespossible the existence of society. Therefore, Strauss more firmly grounds theSchmlttian thesis against the proponents of the theory of "autonomous"culture and society, namely, liberals and pluralists. The latter overlook thefact that the state of nature and the state itself exist priorto culture commonlyunderstood as It exists within society. Consequently, behavior that weakensthe state increases the risk of reviving the state of nature. The status naturalis,and human nature as it exists within it-the political-do not go away simplybecause, according to Schmitt, liberalism has ignored it or even "negated" it.As Strauss reiterates Schmitt, liberalism merely "conceals" the political:

Liberalismhas not killed the political,butmerelykilledunderstandingf thepolitical,andsincerityregardinghepolitical.To clearthe obfuscationof realitywhich liberalismhas caused, the politicalmust be broughtout and shown to be completelyundemable.Liberalism s responsiblefor havingcovered over the political,and the politicalmustonce againbe brought o light,if thequestionof the state s to be putin full serousness.(CCP, 82-3)22Strauss and Schmitt agree that liberalism has put the state into crisis by"obfuscating" the political, and that the specter of the state of nature must bemade apparent-with all the fear that accompanies it-and that "a differentsystem" must be made the basis of the state "that does not negate the political,but brings the political into full recognition" (CCP, 83). However it is on thequestion of how to found this "different system" that the student challengesthe master. The figure of Hobbes again proves central to the disagreement.On the issue of how one cultivates nature-how the state is founded orhow culture is developed-Strauss identifies two ways of proceeding. Thefirst "means culture develops the naturaldisposition; it is careful cultivationof nature-whether of the soil or of the human mind; in this it obeys theindications that nature itself gives" (CCP, 86). Strauss identifies the secondkind of cultivation with Bacon: "culture is not so much faithful cultivationof natureas a harsh and cunning fight against nature"(CCP, 87). This second,"specifically modern conception of nature," can also be located in Hobbesaccording to Strauss, a conception that associates culture with "adiscipliningof human will, as the opposite of the status naturalis" (CCP, 87). The


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McCormuckFEAR,TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 629

implication for politics is thatthe authoritarian uppression of nature-especially human nature-is easier, more "natural," nd ultimatelymorestablethanthediscipliningandeducatingentailedby popular elf-rule. Thelatter is actually the "harsh and cunning fight against nature,"and theformer-straightforward authoritarian ule-while ostensibly "harsh," sactuallymorein accord withnature.

Accordingto Strauss,Hobbesnotonlyheldthe "natural"essimisticviewof humanityas "dangerous" nd"dynamic,"hat Schmitt earlieridentifies,but simultaneouslyhe held the more problematicand unnaturalview ofhumanityas educable,prudent,andcapableof self-control for the sake ofrational elf-interest.This latterview fuels the"autonomy"heoryof society,andgives it thejustificationfordemandingsome degreeof the subjectivityaddressedin the previous section. Moreover,it provides society with thejustificationfor holdingleverageagainstthe state. Citizensmust be allowedto rule themselvesin some sense,andsocietymust be allowed to remain reeof the state to some degree. The firstview of cultivatinghumannatureputforthbyStrausswould,in line with theempiricalrealityof the stateof nature,deem humanityas "morally depraved"and simply and unequivocallyin"needof beingruled" CCP,97). Itwouldhence ruleoutany "autonomy" r"subjectivity"orindividuals,society,orculture,whichinsteadmustbekeptunder hetightcontrolof thestate.Strauss aultsSchmitt,followingHobbes,for notbeingtrulyandexclusively pessimistic,for not identifyingthis moreextremedangerousnessof humanity,and for not advocatingsingularlyandexplicitly a more directmode to govern it. And as Strausssubtlyasserts inmuchof his early writings,this severe modeof rule,contrary o conventionalwisdom, is actuallyless, rather hanmore,dependenton technology.In his bookon Spinoza,Straussexplainedhow the"disclpliningof humanwill,"the less pessimisticcultivationof humannatureprescribedbyHobbes,necessarily requiresthe dominationof nature n general: "Physics,"whichStrauss dentifiesexplicitly withtechnology,

is concerned with man's happiness,anthropology[which he identifies likewise with"politicalphilosophy"]with man'smisery.Thegreatestmisfortunes deathby violence;happinessconsists in the limitless increaseof powerover menand over things.Fearofviolent death, and the pursuitof domination over things-it is basically these twodetermnants of willing which Hobbesacceptsasjustified.2Insteadof adopting hefirstkindof cultivationpreviouslydescribedwhich"obeysthe indications hatnature tselfgives"(whichobserveshumanbeingsin thestateof nature,recognizesthemas incapableof rulingthemselves,andgoverns them accordingly),Hobbes opts for the other kind of cultivation,


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which eventually distracts human beings from their own nature by theconquest of outer nature-by providing for their potential happiness with thepromise of a commodious life. The direct domination of humanity, suggestedby "anthropology," is more natural than the direct domination of externalnature, for the latter,relying more explicitly on physics, is actually "the harshand cunning fight against nature" described above. According to Strauss,Hobbes chooses physics over anthropology, and hence ultimately technologyover political philosophy. Technology is employed by Hobbes to neutralizeprecisely those characteristics that make man dangerous, that create thelikelihood of violent death, and emphasizes that charactenstic that makesman capable of improvement, namely, reason:

Reason, the providentoutlook on the future,thusjustifies the strving after power,possessions,gain,wealth,since theseprovide he means to gratifytheunderlyingdesireforpleasuresof the senses. Reasondoes notjustify,but indeedrefutes,all strivingafterreputation,honor,fame:in a word and thatword used in the sense appliedby Hobbes,vanity. The legitimatestrivingafterpleasure s sublated nto strving afterpower.What is condemned is the strivingafterreputation.Philosophy(or more accuratelyphysics as distinctfromanthropology)s to be understoodas arsing fromthe strvingafterpowerscientiapropterpotentiam.Its aim is cultivation, he cultivationof nature.Whatnatureoffersto manwithout upplementaryctivityon thepartof man s sufficientfor no morethan a life of penury.So that life may become morecomfortable,humanexertionis required,andtheregulationof unregulated ature. The purposepursuedby science is conquestovernature.2

Reason, science, and technology tame man by reducing vanity, physicalneeds, and religion. Yet it is precisely the continued existence of this subJec-tive reason pursued toward private ends within civil society that will under-mine Hobbes's state. Strauss focuses on the contradiction within Schmitt thatwe observed at the close of the last section. Schmitt maintains that the natureof "the political" allows that the state, of which Hobbes is the founder, "may'demand . from those belonging to a nation readiness to die,' and thelegitimacy of this demand is at least qualified by Hobbes: the man in thebattle-ranks who deserts by reason of fear for his life acts 'only' dishonorably,but not unjustly" (CCP, 88). And it is precisely the reservation of such arlght-subjectively determined by an individual's reason-regarding howand when and in what capacity one's life can be employed, which becomesa powerful weapon against the state.The normative consequences of Hobbes's grant of subjectivity (howevernarrow) to individuals for the question of what is right retains no real force,according to Strauss. SubJective freedom is maintained "at the price of themeaning of human life, for when man abandons the task of raising thequestion regarding what is right, and when man abandons this question, he


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McCormck / FEAR,TECHNOLOGY,AND THESTATE 631

abandons his humanity" CP, 101). Schmitt,to the extent that he modelshimself on Hobbes, betrays the fact that he is "underthe spell" of theliberalismhe criticizes. He defines his politicalas beyond objectivenorma-tive standards-by defining it as if it were neutral(CP, 103). Schmltt'sdepiction of the political is hence reduced to a subjective Interpretationcharacteristicof "the individualistic-liberalociety" he wishes to replace(CP, 102). According to Strauss,Schmitt'sproject,as it stands, is hence"provisional" or it is "forced to make use of liberalelements"(CP, 83).Schmltt'scritique"isdetained on the planecreatedby liberalism. [H]iscritique of liberalism takes place within the horizon of liberalism"(CP,104-5).25Strauss is familiar with Schmitt's attemptto separatethe substantiveHobbes fromthemechanisticHobbes(CCP,97, 103).Strauss s in fullaccordwith this projectto the extent thatthe substantiveHobbesrecognizedwhatcharacterizesman's fundamentalcondition and the element with which tomanageit-fear. But one must furtherdistance this from the otherHobbeswho undermineshis own insight by setting in motion the forces that willneutralizehis system.Schmitt, nhis failure oemphasize he radicaldanger-ousness of man rather han whatamountsto mere "liberal"dangerousness,is susceptible to the subjectivityand the tendencytoward neutralityandtechnologythatcharacterize he latterHobbes. "A radicalcritiqueof liberal-ism," accordingto Strauss,"is thereforepossible only on the basis of anadequate understandingof Hobbes" (CCP, 105). This understanding scrucial if "the decisive battlebetween 'the spint of technology,'the 'massfaith of an antireligious,this-worldlyactivism' and the opposite spiritandfaith, which, it seems, does not yet have a name," s to be won (CCP, 104).Hobbes negated the political; Schmittaffirmsit (CCP, 90). AccordingtoStrauss, he opens the possibility of startingthe project over again. This"urgent ask"(CCP, 105), initiatedby Schmitt, s takenupby Strauss n hisownprojecton Hobbes.In theGermanyof 1933,Strauss xaltsthepossibilitythat" 'the orderof humanthings'mayarise afresh" CCP, 101).

STRAUSS'SUNDERTAKING F THEPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYOFHOBBES(1933)Based on the quality of Strauss'scommentaryon The Concept of thePolitical, as well as a draftof the beginningof his workon Hobbes,Schmittobtainedfor Strauss a RockefellerFoundationFellowship to continuethisendeavor nFranceandEngland n 1933.Apparently,whatwas writtenatthis


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point were the first five chaptersof what was eventually publishedas ThePolitical Philosophyof Hobbes in England n 1936.26 n these sections, wefind the mostexplicitand detailedattemptof the Weimarprojectof Schmittand StraussregardingHobbes.27Straussdeclares that "the particularobject of the presentstudy"is todemonstrate hat "the real basis of [Hobbes's]political philosophy is notmodernscience"(PPH, ix). Strausscites with approvalG. C. Robertson'sobservationhatHobbes'spolitical nsightsweremade ongbeforehe became"a mechanicalphilosopher" PPH, ix) and wishes to apprehendHobbes'sthoughtson"menandmanners" efore heywere "distorted"ytheinfluenceof modernscience (PPH, ix). ThroughStrauss'sproject,"weareenabled toperceivethat[Hobbes's]originalconceptionof human ife waspresent nhismind beforehe was acquaintedwith modernscience, andthus to establishthe fact thatthatconceptionis independentof modem science"(PPH, xi).Certainly,Hobbesdevelopedhis "method"n the fashionof Descartes andGalileo,butthesignificanceof histhoughtdoesnot lie in thissimilarity."Theuniversalimportanceof Hobbes's political philosophycannot but remainunrecognizedso long as, in accordancewith Hobbes'sown statements, hemethod is consideredto be the decisive feature of his politics. Now it isobvious that the methodis not its only andeven its most important harac-teristic"(PPH, 2). Reminiscent of his commentaryon Schmitt, Straussmaintains hatthe most important haracteristic f Hobbes's thoughtis itssubstance, ts insightintohumanity,he insightrelated o the fact that "manis bynature vil,""rapacious"PPH, 3).According oStrauss,Hobbesfoundshis theoryof the stateat the root,not on science andtechnology,but on thefeargeneratedby this insight."Hiscontention hat the Stateoriginatesonlyin mutual ear andcanonly so originatehasthusmoral,notmerelytechnicalsignificance" PPH,23). It is Spinozawhocompletely echnifiespolitics,notHobbes(PPH, 28). For Strauss(as for Schmitt),thereis somethingvital tobe graspedbeyondHobbes'smethod.In hiscommentaryon Schmltt'swork,Strausschastisedhis seniorfor notdistinguishingbetween that kind of pessimism that views humanityasprudentanimals,dangerousyet educable,on one hand,and thatkind thatviews it as dangerous,period,on the other,in need of nothingotherthan"beingruled."HereStrauss mphasizes hatman'sreason,ratherhanmakinghim educableand improvable,as even the formermore moderatekind ofpessimismargues,rather,makeshim even moredangerousand in even moredire needof beingruled:

Thespecificdifferencebetweenmanandall otheranimals s reason.Thusman is muchless atthemercyof momentaryense-impressions,he canenvisagethe futuremuchbetter


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thancananimals; or thisveryreasonhe is not like ammalshungryonly with thehungerof the moment,but also with futurehunger,and thus he is the mostpredatory,he mostcunning,the strongest,and the mostdangerousammal.(PPH, 9)

Straussnotes the tension in Hobbes between this "vitalistic"conceptionofhumanappetitesandthe "mechanistic" ne (PPH, 9), which Strausscharac-terizedin his commentaryon Schmittas the specificallyliberalconception.The latterpositshumanappetite"asa resultof the infinitenumberof externalimpressions"madefrom withoutthe body,and hence manageable,control-lable.Control he stimuliandyoucontrol he desires. Science andtechnologyare of course indispensablefor this kind of control. The formertheoryofappetites,on theotherhand,posits"thathumanappetite s infinite in itself,"andhence unquenchableand volatile (PPH, 9). "The mechanistic[techno-liberal]conceptionis based onthe mechanisticexplanationof perceptionandtherewithon the generaltheoryof motion;on the otherhand,theapparentlyvitalistic[trulypessimistic]conception s basednot on any generalscientifictheory,buton insightinto humannature"PPH, 9). Thelatter heory,whichStraussearlier dentifiedas anthropology, ecognizesthe differencebetweenanimal and man:"the animal desiresonly finite objectsas such, while manspontaneouslydesires infinitely" PPH, 9). Straussasserts,despitethe con-tradiction,"therecan be nodoubtthatonly thislatterview of humanappetitecorrespondsto the intentionof Hobbes'spolitical philosophy"(PPH, 9).Hence,"thewarof everyone againsteveryonearisesof necessityfrom man'svery nature"PPH, 12). Infiniteappetitesgenerate nfiniteconflicts.28It is precisely"the fear each man has of every othermanas his potentialmurderer"hat servesas "theoriginof law and the State" PPH, 17). Straussfocuses moredramaticallyon this fear of death thanany other author.29 eexplainstheprecisereason Hobbes chose to basehis theoryon thenegativeexpression"avoidingdeath"over thepositiveone"preservingife" "becausewe feel deathand not life; becausewe fear deathimmediatelyanddirectly,while we desire life only because rationalreflection tells us that it is theconditionof our happiness;because we fear deathinfinitelymore than wedesire life"(PPH, 16).Tomakethefear with which he is concernedmoreintense,Straussmakesthe source of that fear more extreme than it appears n Hobbes himself, oreven in Schmitt.It is notmerelyfearof deaththat s at thebaseof Hobbesianpolitics andhence the politicsof the modernstate,but fear of violentdeath.Because man, unlikethe animals,is not contentwith limitedsatisfactions,but desires limitless ones as well, such as recognition,he inflicts the worstdamage, the worst pain. It is well worth quoting Straussat length here:Because mancravesrecognition,he can be offended,slighted,


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and to be slightedis thegreatestanimimolestia,and from the feelingof being slightedanses the greatestwill to injure.The one slighted ongs forrevenge.Inorder o avengehimselfhe attacks heother, ndifferentwhetherhe loses his life inso doing.Unconcernedas to thepreservation f hisown life,hedesires,however,above all that heothershouldremainalive;for"revengeaimethnot at thedeath,but at thecaptivityandsubjectionofanenemy . revengeaimethattriumph,whichover the dead s not" The strugglewhichthus breaksout, in which,according o theopimonof bothopponents, heobjectis notkilling but the subjectionof the other,of necessity becomes serous, because it is astrugglebetween bodies, a real struggle.From the beginmngof the conflict the twoopponentshave,withoutrealizingandforeseeing t,completely eft theimaginaryworld.At some pointin the conflict,actual njury,or moreaccuratelyphysical pain,arouses afear for life. Fear moderatesanger, puts the sense of being slighted into the back-ground,andtransforms he desire for revenge into hatred.The aim of the hater s nolonger triumphover the enemy,but his death.The strugglefor pre-eminence,about"trifles",has becomea life-and-deathtruggle.Inthisway naturalmanhappensunfore-seenuponthedangerof death. .. Onlyforamomentcan hefreehimself fromthedangerof deathby killinghis enemy,for since every man is his enemy,after thekillingof hisfirstenemy he is "again n the like dangerof another",ndeed of all others. The killingof the enemy is thus the least far-sightedconsequenceof the withdrawal rom death.(PPH, 20-1)3

With his thoroughly existential reading of Hobbes's state of nature, Straussdemonstrates how the subjective desires of men lead to their struggle withother men with the deliberate aim of inflicting pain on them. However, in theheat of battle the opponents become focused no longer on the trigger, theexternal cause of the original altercation, but ratheron life and death. Schmittdescribed how realms such as economics and religion become so intense asto no longer concern themselves with economic or religious issues as theybecome political but rather with the destruction of a decided enemy "thenegation of the other." The prospect of this negation, the fear it inspires, issufficient to compel man to abandon the subjective trifles that serve assources of conflict and potential harbingers of violence, pain, and death. Thereligious impulses, which Hobbes regarded in his day as nothing more thanexpressions of pride, the class identity that was seen in much the same wayby Schmitt, must no longer inspire feelings of "slight." According to Strauss,the fear of violent death serves as an antidote to the realm of pride as mostbroadly interpreted by Hobbes:

Prde, farfrombeing theongin of thejustattitude,s rather heonly orgin of theunjustattitude. Not prde, andstill less obedience,butfearof violentdeath, s according o[Hobbes] the orgin of the just intention.What man does from fear of death, in theconsciousnessof theweaknessof othermen,when he honestlyconfesses to himselfandto othershisweaknessandhis fearof death,unconcernedabouthis honour, his aloneisfundamentallyust. (PPH, 25)


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Fear of violentdeathdefeats the frivolous butdangerous ubjectiveattitudesthat characterizethe state of nature and the epoch of religious wars forHobbes, and potentially,the era of malignant pluralismfor Schmitt andStrauss.Ina passagereminiscentof Schmltt's hatdescribedhow in civil war"men" ecognizethat"all egitimateandnormativellusions"withwhichtheylike to "deceive themselves"in periodsof peace "vanish,"Straussassertshow thatwhichis theproductof civil war,death,dissolves suchillusions thatin the end can only be viewed as the productof vanity:"Because man bynature ives in thedreamof thehappinessof triumph, f glittering, mposing,apparent ood, he requiresa no less imposingpowerto awakenhimfrom hisdream: his imposingpoweris the imperiousmajestyof death... The idealconditionforself knowledgeis, therefore,unforeseenmortaldanger"PPH,19).31Thus, arguesStrauss,Hobbes'spolitics is based not on science, but onsubstance,fundamentalhumansubstance.Any relationshipbetweenthetwomustrecognizethesubstanceas theantecedentof thescience,notvice versa.Onlythefearof violent deathconquers hesubjectivevanitythat gnitesstrife,andonly it subduestheprejudice hat interfereswithscience:

Hobbes identifies conscience with the fearof death;only throughknowledgeof mortaldanger,knowledgewhich is at the same time a retreat rom deathcan man be radicallyliberated romnatural anity, romthe natural bsorptionn the worldof hls imagination.If this is the case, the fear of death,the fearof violentdeath,is the necessaryconditionnot only of society but also of science. Justas life in commonis hinderedby passion,science is hinderedby prejudice. PPH, 26)Fear, he stateof nature,and the state tself all exist prior o science,whichmustlie within therealmof cultureandsociety.Thereforea trulyHobbesiantheoryof the statecannot be based on science;science is possible only afterthe state has alreadybeen established.Science can even be more or lessdiscardedwhen one understands hesepriorities.BecauseHobbes'spoliticalphilosophyis basedon the fear of violentdeath,because it is basedonexperence of human ife, itcannever, nspiteof all thetemptationsof naturalscience, fall completely into the dangerof abstraction rom moral life andforget moraldifference. Hobbes'spoliticalphilosophyhas thus for thatvery reasonamoralbasis, because it is not derved from natural cience but is foundedon first-handexperence of human ife. (PPH, 29)

It can nevercompletelyfall intosuchdangerwhen it can be retrievedby thelikes of Schmitt and Strauss.Forthey,particularlyStrauss,havearticulatedwhatis priorto science in Hobbes'sthought.Strausshassuccessfullycared


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out Schmitt'sprojectand his own correctionof it by getting "beyondthehorizon of liberalism"by supposedly adequatelyunderstandingHobbes.Strauss solatesHobbes'sthought rom the forces of neutralizationhatwillunderminet. Once one adequatelyunderstandshe basis of politics as fearof violentdeath,a fear basednot on a somewhatdangerous,yet improvableand educablehumannature,but simply on an infinitely dangeroushumannature, ne nolongerhasanyneedforscience. Once onecorrects hemistakesof Hobbes's iberalsuccessors,who takeupthetaskof trying o have citizensrulethemselvesby providing hemwith theproducts f theconquestof natureandallay their fearsby showingthem the orderlinessof nature,one can setup a state moreIn accordwith the naturalconditionof humanity,more inaccord with "the political."The logical outcome of Strauss's turningofSchmitt'sview of man to one which views him simply in need of "beingruled," s a theoryof statethatconsistently nstills in citizens the fear of the"human ituation"byconstantlyreminding hemof itsproximity. f this is tobe achievedwithouttechnology,withouttheapparatus f physicaldomina-tion, somethingelse mustholdsway.Themythof the state-the Leviathan,the sea monsterafterwhich Hobbes namedhis greatestworkon the state-mustinvokeuniformlyandin a controlledmanner heterrorhateachcitizenfelt individuallyand overwhelminglyin the state of nature.Myth is theelementwhich canmaintain he state'sseparationromsocietywhile simul-taneouslykeeping t in check.Thus,forthestatetokeepfrom ntegratingooextensively within society and hence weakening itself, myth must holdsway.32

Despite the mythic title of Leviathan,Hobbes was to emphasizemythmoreheavilyinhislaterwritings.In hiscommentary nHobbes'sBehemoth,StephenHolmes describeshow Hobbes came to realize that"the ultimatesource of politicalauthoritys notcoercion of thebody,butcaptivationof themind."33t is to this issue in Hobbesthat Strauss'sworkpointsand to whichSchmitthimselfturns n his laterworkon Hobbes,although,as we will see,his attitudetowardthe projectas a whole has become significantly lesssanguine.34

SCHMITT'S HELEVIATHAN N THESTATETHEORYOF THOMASHOBBES.MEANINGAND FAILUREOFA POLITICAL YMBOL(1938)

Much happenedin both Schmltt's personal life and Germanpoliticsbetween 1933and 1938,thepublicationdateof Schmltt'sbookon Hobbes's


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McCormuckFEAR, TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 637

Leviathan.35chmitt,enticedby thepromiseof prestigiouspositions,joinedthe NationalSocialistPartynotlongafterItcame topower.Followingseveralyearsin whichSchmittheldjudicialpostsand wrotetreatises or theregime,his unorthodoxNational Socialism, his past connection with political Ca-tholicism,andhis previous publicdenunciationsof the partyeventuallyranhim afoulof the SS, and he retired ntoprivate ife after1936.36Schmitthad not takenup the Welmar-Hobbesianrojecthe shared withStrauss ince 1933.Perhapshethoughthe hadfounda solution in thepoliticalchoice he madeinMayof thatyear.But after he eventsof theensuing years,he returned o Hobbes andhis Leviathan,which Schmitt declared was the"earthly" nd "mortal" od that must time andtime againbringman out ofthe "chaos"of the "natural ondition" L, 22). This statementhighlightsthethemesof Schmitt's reatise hatarenewtotheproject:mythand tsmortality.In theLeviathanbook,we still find SchmittdefendingHobbesagainstthosewho would interprethim "superficially" s strictlya "rationalist,mechanist,sensualist, individualist" L, 22). Schmittis more forthright n admitting,however, hat heseelements,particularlyhemechanistic,arepresent L,30),but thattheydo not constitute Hobbes'stheoryas a whole. Schmittempha-sizes that for Hobbes there are three Leviathans: he mythicalmonster, herepresentativeperson, and the machine (L, 30). Schmitt's thesis is thatLeviathanas mythicalmonster,or even as representativeperson-imagesthat can sufficientlykeep men in awe-hlstoncally become supersededbyLeviathan he machine-which is viewedas a meretool to beusedbyvariousgroupsof citizens (L, 54). In otherwords,Schmitt admits that the Weimarattemptto divorce the "mechanistic" rom the "vital" n Hobbes has beenhistorically mpossible.Whataccountsfor thischangeof mind?37The neutralization of Hobbes's state-its transformation into meremachine-beglns, with good reason,as a responseto the wars of religion,but led inevitablyto "the neutralizationof every truth" L, 64). Not onlyreligious,butmetaphysical, uristic,andpoliticalconsiderationseventuallycome to mean nothing to the "clean" and "exact"workings of the statemechanisms(L, 62-3). Liberalsandcommunists bothagreethat the stateisa machine,an apparatuswhich the most "vared politicalconstellationscanutilize as a technically neutral instrument"L, 62-3). In hindsight,writesSchmitt,reversinghis argumentn TheConceptof thePolitical, the statecanbe viewed as "the firstproductof theage of technology" L, 53).The fault does not lie fully with Hobbes, accordingto Schmitt, for heexpected his state to continue to inspireawe as a myth that stood abovesociety,maintainingpeace through hefear it engendered,andexpectedIt tofunction as smoothly as a finely tuned machine.Schmitt elaborateson aninsightbyStraussnotedearlier, hatSpinozaperpetratesheradical echniclz-


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ing of Hobbeslanpolitics. Resortingto an anti-Semitismnot present n hisWeimarwrtings, Schmitthereblames"theJew"Spinozaforacceleratingheneutralizingprocessof turning he Leviathan roma mythinto a machine.38Hobbes,thereligiousinsider nominallyChristianEnglishman), ormulatedthestate/civilsociety relationshipn thefollowingstable manner:

publicpeaceandsovereign powerInsuresindividual reedom.

Spinoza,the religiousoutsider a Jew), changestheprioritiesso as to maketherelationship undamentallyunstable:individual reedom

insuredbypublicpeaceandsovereignpower.

Thus the dangeroussubjectivitythat was the concern of Schmitt in hisreformulation of Hobbes in The Concept of the Political is historically givena place of prmacy over thestate,which was foundedpreciselyto keepit incheck. As ReinhartKoselleck,himselfa studentof Schmitt,explainsit, theslightesttraceof subjectivity hatHobbesgranted o his citizensas compen-sationfor giving upthe"NaturalRight"of the stateof nature, atertakesitsrevengeon the stateitself:

The Statecreateda new order,butthen-in genuinelyhistoric ashion-fell preyto thatorder.As evidentin Hobbes,the moral nnerspacethathadbeen excised from the Stateand reserved for man as a human being meant (even rudimentarily)a source ofunrest. The authorityof conscienceremainedan unconquered emnantof the stateof nature,protrudingntotheformallyperfectedState.39

As thesubjectivltiesproliferated ndgainedin power,theydemandedofthestateobjectivity-obJectivitytoward ts own existence-the logicalresultof which is thecompleteneutrality f the state.Accordingto Schmitt,Kantis guiltyof finallysappingthe stateof anysubstantive ontentof its own, ofdisentangling the "organism"from the "mechanism";simultaneously,Schelling and the Romanticsdisentangle"art" rom "mechanics,"but inHobbesthese elementswere all together,and hence the Leviathanstate, inthis awesome totality, was potentiallymythical (L, 61). After Kant, thereigning image for jurisprudence is no longer a personal judge pronouncingdecisions, but a mechanism dispensing rules: "The legislator humanusbecomesa machinalegislatoria"(L, 100).


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McCorrmck FEAR, TECHNOLOGY,AND THESTATE 639

Because the governmenthas no moral content, neither do the laws ittherebyproduces:"Forthe technicallyrepresentedneutrality t is decisivethatthelawsof the statebecomeindependentromeverysubstantive ontent,fromreligiousorlegaltruthandpropriety, ndshouldbevalidonlyasa resultof the positive determinationsof the state's decision in the form of com-mands"(L, 67).40A state that is purelymechanicalandhas no value contentwhatsoever otherthanefficiency has no boundary,not even the Hobbeslanone of the protectionof individuallife. "Such a state can be tolerantorintolerantbut neutralnonetheless.It has its truth,andjustice in its technicalperfection... The statemachineeitherfunctions or does not function" L,68-9). Ironically, t is the state'sgrantingbotha subjectiverealmandtherightto resist the state in the protectionof one's life that comes to endanger helives of citizens, accordingto Schmitt.Had the staterecognized,as Schmittand Strausswished,thatmansimplyneededto be ruledand thatto granthimany subjective determinationof self-preservationwas dangerousto order,peace, and life, it could have held for itself the moral content of protectingthe lives of its citizens. As thesubjectiveentitiesof civil society demandedmoreobjectivityfrom thestate,theydrained t of even thiscontent.If anyofthese subjectiveentities, "autonomous"L, 68) as they are from the state,should in theirguaranteed ubjectivefreedom of conscience choose not torecognizetheboundaryof the state in thesafetyof thepeople,and also seizethe neutralized,efficient, but weakenedstate, the results would be horrific.It would be the stateof naturewhereall arenot equal in theirabilityto killand be killed.Itwouldbeanentitywiththesubjectivityof the stateof nature,and theobjective efficiencyof thesovereignstate.As Schmittso masterfullydescribed hepredicament f lateWeimar nHobbesian erms nTheConceptof thePolitical, he has hereperhaps et forth ust such a Hobbesiandepictionof National Socialism.The aspectof myth in Hobbes'sLeviathancould have kepttheelementsof society frombecomingautonomousandfrommakingdemandsagainst hestate;accordingto Schmitt,it could have rulednot throughthe apparatusesof technicalefficiency,butratherby "captivatingminds."Now it is reducedto the failure thatSchmitt'stitle suggests. As Pasquinoobserves,Hobbes'sstatealwayswas in a ratherprecariouspositionvls-A-vls ts subjects:"Behindthe absolute characterof theHobbeslansovereignone beginsto discover itsfragility... its dependenceon those who dependuponit."41 hefrontispiecethat presentlyadornsSchmitt'sDer Leviathan bears this out: it features abeachedwhale,harpoonedandsubduedby the fishermenwho surround t. Itis a far cry from the frontlspieceof Hobbes'sEnglish edition of his work,whichfeatured hegiantsovereign,madeupof an infinite numberof people,


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arisingover thehorizon-presumablyfromthesea-with sword and staff inhand. The former is the fate of this greatLeviathan,accordingto Schmitt.How couldSchmittenvisionthestate to bedeadattheverymomenthe livedunder the most powerful state-the totalitarianstate par excellence-inhistory?In his Weimarwritings whichthe Nazis apparently id notconsultbeforesolicitinghis services),Schmittnotesthata statethat s integratedntoevery facet of society is hardlya state at all. For a state to be a state, forSchmitt, t muststandover and abovesociety,governing t-no doubt irmlyand vigilantly-as a separateentity.42And even in Hobbeslanterms, theNationalSocialist state s no sovereignstatebuta pervertedlypowerfulformof the state of nature,whereno one is sure if he is friendor enemy to hisfellow citizen orto theregime.However,Schmittis not simply the historically legitimatedprophetofdoomhe implicitlypresentshimself to be in Der Leviathan.Rather,he is alsoa contributoro the stateof affairshe crticizes underNationalSocialism.Inhis Weimarwritings,Schmitthad warnedagainst he takeoverof the statebynonneutral orceswho would "seize" heapparatus f "statewill-formation"for themselves, "withoutthemselves ceasing to be social and non-stateentities."43He even describedsuchan appropriationf the statein terms ofthedethroning f the Leviathan: When he 'mortalgod'falls fromhisthroneandthe realmof objectivereasonand civil society becomes 'a greatgangofthieves,' thenthe partiesslaughter he powerfulLeviathanandslice piecesfromtheflesh of his body."44chmitthadpromoted heReichsprasident sthe "neutral"orce to keepthe social elementsat bay-a neutral orceonlywith regard o the competingparties,but not neutral oward ts own power.Yet as Schmitt'sWeimar heoreticaladversaryHans Kelsen so prescientlyaskedatthe time:whatis toprevent hesupposedlyneutral ntityfrombeingaparticipantn the socialconflictSchmittdescribes?45chmitthadno answerin Weimarand he still has no answer underNational Socialism in DerLeviathan.

Thusthe stanceof HobbesianneutralityhatSchmittmaintainedhrough-out the 1920sand 1930sturnsout to be somewhatmisleading.An importantdifferencebetweenthe stateof natureandthefriend/enemydistinction s thatin the former,despitesome occasionalreferencesby Hobbesto families orprofessions,thereareno friends,andhenceno antagonisticgroupings.Theabstract ndividualismof Hobbes's "war of all against all" points up hisultimateagnosticismregardingherespectivecombatantsn theEnglishCivilWar:Leviathanwas written, orthe mostpart, nsupportof theking,butwaseasily convertedby Hobbesintoajustificationfor Cromwell.46 chmitthadmuchstrongerpreferencesregardinghe participantsn Weimar'snearcivilwar.It did matterto him, for instance,that the Social Democratsnot gain


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victory, etalone theCommunists.Groupswho wouldbethe enemiesof thesegroupswould necessarilybe, according o Schmltt's"conceptof the politi-cal,"better riends of the state. Should these friendsgaincontrol of thestate,it would be appropriateor them to suppress he enemiesof that state.Thisis in fact whatthe National Socialistsdid, albeitin a mannermore ruthlessthan Schmittcould have imagined.To this effect, Schmitt'stheoryencour-aged as much as it forewarnedagainstthe seizure of the Leviathanstatebyradicallysubjectivesocial forces.Moreover, hepotentially ethalresultsof sucha seizure arecompoundedby Schmitt'stheoreticaltamperingwith the Hobbeslanformula of protegoergoobligo. Had Hobbesoriginallyformulatedhe statein theway in whichSchmittand Strausswished in 1933-by not granting o the individualthesubjectiverght of self-protection,even for the sake of betterinsuringthatindividual's ife-the logic of the Leviathanwould have brokendown. It isonly the retentionof some of thatsubjectivity egarding elf-preservationhatrulescompletely in the state of nature hatencourages"Hobbesianman"tomakea compactandsubmit to the state. Schmittwas correct o recognizeinDer Leviathan hatthe statewas, in a way, ultimately heproductof the ageof technology; t was aninstrument, tool. It servedas a means tosomethingelse, namely securityandstability,preservation ndpeace.47The state itselfcould not, without most unfortunateesults,be what he and Strausswanted,namelythe embodimentof these things,and not the means thereto. Such aformulation s asdangerousas itis incoherent.The statecould not beexpectedto absorball of therightto self-preservationrom thestate of nature,and stillat thesametimeguaranteet. Theradicalsubjectivity, hedangerousrighttojudge, accruing o thestateas itdoes inSchmltt'sandStrauss's nterpretationof Hobbes, only increases that subjectivity's volatility exponentially.IfSchmitt,andparticularlyStrauss,hadonly deignedto consult that"liberal,"John Locke, as they engaged in their intellectualplaying-with-matchesn1933, theymighthavepausedto question,as did Locke:

I desire to know what kind of Government hatis, and how much betterit is than theStateof Nature,where one Mancommandinga multitude,hasLiberty o be Judge n hlsown Case, andmay do to all his Subjectswhateverhe pleases, withoutthe least libertyto anyonetoquestionor controlethosewho ExecutehisPleasure?Andinwhatsoeverhedoth,whether ed by Reason,Mistakeor Passion,must be submitted o? Muchbetter tis in the State of Nature wherein Men are not bound to submitto the unjustwill ofanother.4In Locke's reformulationof Hobbes, it is absoluterule, not the state ofnature,which is the actual state of "Warre." he stateof naturewhere eachindividualhas anequalchanceof remainingalive mustsurelybe better han


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a situationwhere one hascompletely given overone's rightto andcapacityforself-protection o an inordinatelytronger orce that offers no guarantee,no insuranceof protectingone's life. Schmitt surely must have come tounderstandhatWeimar,orallof his crticisms of it,wascertainlybetter hanNationalSocialism;there,whateverthe social disturbancesand economicfluctuations,Schmitt'sacademiccontroversiesdid notcausehim to fearforhis life.49

If, in Der Leviathan,Schmittperhaps mplicitly recognizes his earliermistake in attemptingto reformulate he Hobbesianprotection/obediencerelationshipn so dangerousa fashion,he apparently oes notrecognizethemistake n his earliercallingfor the rule of mythinsteadof theruleof technikin the art of statecraft.Like MartinHeldegger,but for differentreasons,Schmittmusthave originallyseen in NationalSocialism a myththat couldserve as an alternativeandantidoteto the age of technology.Schmittmusthaveviewedmythas anelementof the Hobbesianproject hathad fadedbutcouldberevivedto supplant hepresentlypredominantlement,technology,which threatened o bringdown the whole structure.And like Heldegger,Schmittmust have realizedsomewhatlate thatin modernity,mythcan berevivedonly verycarefully,particularlynrelationshipo technology.As wenow know,andas WalterBenJaminhadalreadyobserved n his masterpieceof 1936, 'The Artwork n the Age of ItsTechnologicalReproducibility,"nNationalSocialism,mythandtechnologywerefatefullybound:

The logical resultof Fascism is the introduction f aesthetics into political life. Theviolationof themasses,whom Fascism,withits Fiihrercult, forces to its knees, has itscounterpartn the violenceof anapparatuswuhch s pressed ntotheproduction f ritualvalues. All efforts to renderpoliticsaestheticculminate n one thing:war. "Fiatars-pereat mundus," ays Fascism,and expects

warto supplytheartisticgratifica-tion of a sense perception that has been changed by technology. Mankind['s]self-alienationhasreachedsuch a degreethat t canexperence its own destruction s anaestheticpleasureof the first order.

In 1933,how didStraussand Schmittexpecttorevivethatprimalsubstance,that link to myth, the fear of violent death?Did they not realize, as didBenjamin, hat"anapparatus" ouldbe needed ochange"senseperception"by "technology," nd"press ntoproduction"uch "ntualvalues"95'In one of the two quotes thatopenedthis study,Straussdisparagestheconceptof "phantasmagoria"o whichthe worldis reducedundera certaininterpretationf Hobbes.But if phantasmagoriaan be described,accordingto Susan Buck-Morss,as "an appearanceof reality thattricks the sensesthroughtechnicalmanipulation," s a "technoaesthetics"hat serves as "ameans of social control," his is preciselywhatHobbeshad in mindfor his


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Leviathan.52 he Leviathan s intendedas a phantasmagoria;he technologyandthe mythare for Hobbesintrinsically inked fromthestart.SchmlttandStraussmight have paid better attention o the opening lines of Hobbes'sIntroduction o Leviathan,where he describeshow humanscanmanufacturea politicalmachine,thestate,in theway thatGod createda naturalmachine,the human being.53And it is this technical constructionthat necessarilyunderlies he Leviathanpreferred y Schmittand Strauss: he"MortallGod,"which "hath he use of so muchPower andStrengthconferredon him, thatby terror hereof,he is enabledto conformethe wills of themall, to Peaceathome, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad" (II, 17, 120-1).54InHobbes,andconsequently n modernity,he result of thisentwinementof mythandtechnologyis thetragic act that heformercan serveto intensifyrather handiminish the threatposed by thelatter.Perhapsanattempt o exaltmythover science andtechnologybeyondHobbes'soriginalbalancebetweenthe two spheresparadoxically eads only to a greaterpredominanceof thelatterwithin the formeras a resultof their ntnnsic link.Thewaytodisengagethe mutual relationshipof myth and technology, or in the more familiarphrasingof HorkheimerandAdorno,mythandenlightenment,would per-hapsbe through he thresholdof reason andnot that of myth.55Thiswould,of course, necessitate the abandonment f fear as a contributing lement topolitics. As Benjaminpointsoutso well, thepotentialresult of theoppositestrategy,of subordinating ationalityomyth, s war.At what bettersite couldfear,pain,violence, aesthetics,andtechnologygather?56We observed that in The Concept of the Political, Schmitt found itnecessary to aestheticize-to elevate to mythic proportions-conflict togenerate the salutary fear that could restore order to society. But suchaestheticization,such myth making, on the contrary,contributedto thegenerationof far-from-salutaryearand heintensificationof disorder.Ratherthan, in Hobbes's words, insunng "Peace at home,"and simply fostenng"mutuallayd"againstexternalenemies,theaestheticlzationandelevation ofconflict to the status of mythinspireda war,ghastlyin mannerandscale,onGermany'sowncitizens,and inunprecedentedlobaltermson othernations.Schmitt'sstudent,FranzNeumann,in fact describes the NationalSocialiststate, not as the Leviathan,but rather as its opposite, the Behemoth: "anon-state,a situationof lawlessness,disorderandanarchy."57

Thus SchmittandStrauss'sWeimarattempto supplantiberalism hrougha reinterpretationf Hobbes is a catastrophicailure n two ways. First,theytamperwith one Hobbesian ormula-the protection-obedienceelationship-that had alreadybeen improved by the liberalism that succeeded Hobbes.Second, they experiment with another Hobbesian formula-the myth-technology relationship-to which post-Hobbesian iberalismcontinues to


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be oblivious. In both cases they renderthe reformulationmoredangerousthanthe original,supposedlyunstableproposition,andthe historicalrealitywithwhichit correspondswas undeniablydisastrous.In his commentaryon Schmitt's The Conceptof the Political, Straussexpressedtheneedto "disregardhequestionwhether t is possibleto speakof anyconceptionof culture andnature] xceptthemodernone"(CCP,87).He obviouslyfelt that the modernconceptionof theseentities,which led tothecrsis of thestaterequired modernsolution. Strauss aterremarkedhathis writingsin the dwindling days of Weimarwere "basedon the premise,sanctionedby powerfulprejudice, hat a return o pre-moder philosophyisimpossible."58hatchanged,however,with thepublicationof the full textofThePolitical Philosophy of Hobbesin 1936, and especiallyNaturalRightand History in 1953. Modernphilosophical-political xpressions,particu-larly as reflectedin Hobbes,are in these later workscast in a particularlyunfavorablecomparisonwith the classical tradition.In light of ensuingevents, perhapsStrausswas-to use a wordthathas figuredprominentlynthis study-frightened into this stance by the implicationsof the earlierprojecthe sharedwith CarlSchmitt.In his "secondsailing,"he would nolongerso explicitlyvoice modern olutionsto modernpoliticalproblems.Inthe United States, Strausskept his political inclinationshidden behind areligion in which he did not believe, an ostensible venerationof thingsancient,anda doctrineof esotericwriting.59WalterBenJamin,unlike Strauss,did not have sufficient influence toguaranteehisexit fromGermany ndthecontinent,andthusoneof Fascism'smost brilliantcritics becameone of its millionsof victims in 1940.60After the war,Carl Schmittattempted o justify his collaborationwithNationalSocialismby appealing otheHobbesian tandard f"obedienceforprotection"Hemerelyofferedallegiance o anewregime,whichheassumedwould in turnprotecthim.61t is almostfittingthenthatthisHobbeslanwhosoughtto theorize ntoobliviontheprotection omponentof the"protection-obedience" ormula,camerather lose severaltimesduring he ThirdReichtopayingwithhis life formaking hatunforgivablepoliticalchoice.62nsteadSchmitt ived well intohis nineties,claiminguntiltheend thathe wassimplymisconstrued.63

CONCLUSIONIn theirWeimarworkson Hobbes,Schmittand Straussattempt o pre-

serve, strengthen,andeven redefinethe stateby revivingthe sourceof its


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McCormick FEAR, TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 645

development,the fear of violent death. To not recreatethe conditions thatbroughtabout hecrisis of the statetobeginwith,Schmittand Straussattemptto refoundthe statesolely on this "vital,"andinevitably"mythic,"elementof fear,divorcingit from the"neutralizing"lementsof scienceandtechnol-ogy. By viewing man as an incomgibly dangerousbeing, Schmitt, andespeciallyStrauss,hopedtoeradicatehejustificationor asubjectiveautono-mousrealm cultivatedby science andtechnologyandgovernedby therightof self-protection,which might grow to rival the power of the state andthreaten o bringabout the chaos of the stateof nature.But therewas a flaw,a fatefulflaw, in this project.A revivalof themythsnecessaryto instill thisfearforthesake of creatingorstrengthening uthority ives norealguaranteeof actually allaying that fear: it does not abolish the state of nature,butperpetuatest. Itmaynot diminish the role of technologyin modempolitics,but rather serves to expand that role many times. This project was, as suchastute and learnedmen should haveknown,not the elimination,butrather,potentially, he veryinstitutionalization ndmanufacture f chaos.

NOTES1. Carl Schmitt,Political Theology:Four Chapterson The Concept of Sovereignty, rans.

GeorgeSchwab(Cambrdge:MITPress, 1986),34.2. Leo Strauss, "On the Basis of Hobbes's Political Philosophy," n What Is PoliticalPhilosophy?and OtherStudies(Glencoe:FreePress, 1959), 178-9.3. All referencesto Hobbes arefromLeviathan,ed. RichardTuck(Cambridge:CambrdgeUmversityPress, 1991).Book, chapter,andpagecitationsappearn parentheseswithin the text.4. This studydiffers from that of both Straussdisciple Heinnch Meier, Carl Schmitt,LeoStrauss und "DerBegriffdes Politischen"(Stuttgart: . B. MetzlerscheBuchhandlung,1988)and Strausscritic John Gunnell, "Straussbefore Straussiamsm:The WeimarConversation,"Reviewof Politics (Winter1990), in thatmy interest s primarilywith Schmittas participant ndwith Hobbesas subjectof this "conversation."5. TheConceptof thePolitical, trans.GeorgeSchwab(New Brunswick:RutgersUmversityPress, 1976). Referencesare to this edition, cited as CP within the text. Schmitt'sthesis wasoriginallyputforthm an articleof the same titlein 1927.6. The languageof frend and enemyis quite prevalent n Leviathan,for instance:"wheneither[a groupof people] have no commonenemy,or he thatby one part s held for anenemy,is by anotherpartheld for afrend, theymustneedsby the differenceof their nterestsdissolve,andfall againintoa waramongthemselves" II, 17, 119,emphasisadded).7. StephenHolmesobjectsto attemptsat softemnngchmitt'spoliticaltheorythatpresent tas Hobbesian rather han as reactionary.See "CarlSchmitt:The Debilityof Liberalism,"TheAnatomyofAntiliberalism Cambridge,MA. HarvardUmversityPress, 1993),41. Examplesofsuch scholarshipare, in German,HelmutRumpf'sCarl SchmittundThomasHobbes: IdeelleBeziehungen und aktuelle Bedeutungmit einer Abhandlung ber: Die FriihschriftenCarlSchmitts Berlin:Duncker & Humblot,1972), andin English,David J. Levy, "TheRelevance


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of CarlSchmitt,"TheWorld nd I (March1987).Although hisstrategy s indeedquestionable,there is little doubt that Hobbeshad a profoundeffect on Schmitt'sthought.Emphasizing hisinfluencedoes not make Schmitt'sthoughtany less extremebut,as thisessay will show, doeshighlightSchmitt'smajor heoretical-politicalbjectives.A reliableaccountof therelationshipcan be found n HerfnedMiinkler, CarlSchmittundThomasHobbes,"Neue PolitischeLiteratur29 (1984).8. See Detlev Peukert,The WeimarRepublic:The Crisis of Classical Modernity, rans.RichardDeveson (New York:Hill andWang,1992).9. This theme is developed more fully by Schmittin "TheAge of NeutralizationsandDepoliticizations"1929), trans.MatthiasKonzettand John P.McCormick,Telos96 (Summer1993). Ido not concernmyselfspecificallywiththisessayhere,because tdoes notdealdirectlywith thefigureof ThomasHobbes.However, t is importanto pointout that hisessay has beenmismterpreted s an endorsementof moderntechnology in many studies of Schmitt.BothRichardWolinandJerryZ. Mullermisread heessay in thisway,apparently nder heinfluenceof JeffreyHerf's faultyReactionaryModernism:Technology,Culture,and Politics in Weimarand the ThirdRetch(Cambrdge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1984). None of these authorsmake note of Schmitt'scriticismsof technology n his earlyworks such as TheodorDdublers"Nordlicht"DreiStudien iberdie Elemente,den Geist unddieAkualitdt es WerkesMumch:Muller,1916),orRomischerKatholizismusndpolitischeForm Hellerau: akobHegner,1923).For a criticismof Herf, see my "Introductiono Schmitt's 'The Age of NeutralizationsandDepoliticizations,'"Telos96 (Summer1993).As thepresent tudydemonstrates, critical tancetoward echnology s maintanedby Schmitt hroughout is Weimarwritingsand even beyond.See Wolin,"CarlSchmitt,PoliticalExistentialism nd the TotalState," n TheTerms f CulturalCriticism New York:ColumbiaUmversityPress, 1992),and "CarlSchmitt,The ConservativeRevolutionary:HabitusandTheAestheticsof Horror," oliticalTheory20, no. 3 (August1992);as well as Muller,"CarlSchmitt,HansFreyerandthe RadicalConservativeCritiqueof LiberalDemocracy n the WeimarRepublic,"Historyof PoliticalThought12, no. 4 (Winter1991). Amore accurateaccountof Schmitt'sattitude owardtechnologycan be found in G. L. Ulmen,Politische Mehrwert:Eine Studieiiber Max Weberund Carl Schmitt Weinheim:VCH ActaHumamora,1991).10. PasqualePasquino,"Hobbes:NaturalRight, Absolutism,and Political Obligation"(ApprochesCognitivesDu Social of theCentre-Nationale la RechercheScientifique,Pans,no.90158, September1990), 9.11. Ibid.

12. See Eve Rosenhaft,"Working-ClassLife and Working-ClassPolitics: Commumsts,Nazis, and the StateBattle forthe Streetsof Berlin1928-1932," n Social Changeand PoliticalDevelopment n WeimarGermany,eds. RichardBessel and E. J. Feuchtwanger New York:BarnesandNoble, 1981),207-40, for a compellingaccountof this state of affairs.13.PasqualePasquino,"Hobbesonthe NaturalConditionof Mankind"part1 of theEnglishmanuscript f "ThomasHobbes:la rationalit6de L'obeissancea la loi, La pensdepolitique,"Spnng 1994), 3. Settingaside the view thatthestateof nature s a mereintellectualenterprise,Pasquinoprefers o employ the term subtraction o describe t rather hanabstraction,becausethestateof nature s forHobbesastripping wayfrom heempmcalworldratherhan heproductof imagination.14. Ibid.There s of coursethe famouspassagewhereHobbesassertshowclose the"naturalcondition"reallyis to contemporary ealityby remindinghis readers hattheyarmthemselveswhentraveling,bolt theirdoorsatnight,and lock theirchestseven when at home (I, 13, 89).15. Ibid.,6.


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16. RichardWolin,The Termsof CulturalCriticism,87; "CarlSchmitt,The ConservativeRevolutionary," 43.17. George Schwabdeclares,"Nowhere n [Schmitt's]writingscan one detect a desireonhis part to perpetuatecrises as a means of escaping the tediousness of everyday bourgeoisexistence"(TheChallenge of TheException[New York:GreenwoodRepnnt,1989], 55).18. Political Romanticism,rans.Guy Oakes(Cambridge,MA: MITPress, 1985), 125.19. See Horkhelmer ndAdorno,Dialecticof Enlightenment1944), trans.JohnCummings(New York:Continuum,1989);Casslrer,TheMythof theState(New Haven,CT:YaleUmversityPress, 1946); Symbol, Mythand Culture:Essays and Lectures,1935-1945, ed. Donald PhilipVerene(New Haven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1979);andBlumenberg,WorkOnMyth,trans.RobertWallace(Cambridge,MA. MITPress,1989).See also, "Myth n ContemporaryLife,"aspecial issue of Social Research 52, no. 2 (Summer1985), particularly he contributionsofSheldonWolin,DavidApter,GianmVattimo,andUmbertoEco.20. Leo Strauss's"Anmerkungen u CarlSchmitt,Der Begriffdes Politischen"was ongi-nallypublished nArchivfiir SozialwissenschaftundSozialpolitik67, no. 6, 732-49. An Englishtranslation,"Comments n CarlSchmitt'sBegriffdes Politischen,"by E. M. Sinclairappears ntheEnglisheditionof TheConceptof the Political cited above.Iwill cite Strauss'sessay as CCPin thebody of the text.21. Strauss,Spinoza'sCritique of Religion, trans. E. M. Sinclair (New York:Schocken,1965), 92.22. Several years later, in 1939, WalterBenjaminobserved that one of the effects oftechnology-which Schmittand Strauss n these works associateexplicitlywithliberalism-isto rendera person"nolonger capableof tellinghis provenfnend from his mortalenemy"("OnSome Motifsin Baudelaire,"n Illuminations,d. HannahArendt New York:Schocken,1968],168).WhetherBenjamin,who was quitefamiliarwith Schmitt'swork, s hereexplicitlyalludingto thepoliticalis not clear.23. Strauss,Spinoza'sCritiqueof Religion,88.24. Ibid.,89-92.

25. Strauss'sassessment that Schmitt'sprojectremains"within hehorizonof liberalism" ssometimesexaggerated n an attempt o defendSchmitt'sWeimarworkfromchargesof latentNazism. Yet just because Schmitt's work is not latentlyNazi, does not mean that it is notauthoritarianr antiliberal.Strauss'scommentscanbe seen toemphasize hepointthatSchmitt'stheoretical hortcomings n his attackon liberalismare not for lack of trying; he intentand theattemptarequiteapparent.As ChantalMouffe morereasonably xplains,"it s incorrect oassert,as some do, that Schmitt'sthinkingwas imbuedwith Nazismbefore his turnabout f 1933 andhis espousalof Hitler'smovement.Thereis, however,no doubtthat t was his deep hostilitytoliberalismwhich madepossible, or which did not prevent,hisjoimng the Nazis"(Mouffe,TheReturnof the Political [London:Verso,1993], 121). Strauss s, of course,correct n observingthatSchmitt s caught n thethrallof theliberalismhe is criticizing.As RichardWolinpointsout,Schmitt'semphasison self-preservationn TheConceptof thePolitical leaves him susceptibleto some of the same chargesleveled againstliberalism tself:"InSchmitt'spoliticaltheorywetrade he 'good life' for 'mere life' "(TheTermsof CulturalCriticism,99).26. See Meier,CarlSchmitt,Leo Strauss und "DerBegriffdes Politischen," 134-5, 137-9.Despite the fact thatSchmitt oined theNationalSocialistParty n Mayof 1933, as late as Julyof thatyear,Strausswas still seekingacorrespondencewithSchmittabout heprospectof aidingin thecompilationof a critical edition of Hobbes's work(Meier,CarlSchmitt,Leo Strauss und"DerBegriffdes Politischen," 17,n. 11).See also Paul EdwardGottfned,Carl Schmitt:Politicsand Theory(New York:Greenwood,1990).


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27. Citationsare from the 1952, Universityof Chicago Press edition, titled in full, ThePolitical Philosophyof Hobbes:Its Basis and Genesis,abbreviated s PPH in thetext.28. Strauss's interpretations characteristicallyn oppositionto that of the "CambridgeSchool"of thehistoryof political hought.CambridgeHobbesscholarRichardTuckassertsthat"Men,on Hobbes'saccount,do not want to harmothermen for thesake of harrmnghem;theywish forpoweroverthem tis true,butpoweronlytosecure heirownpreservation.Thecommonidea that Hobbes was in some sense 'pessimistic'about humannature s wide of the mark, orhis naturalmen were in prnciple stand-offish owardsone anotherrather haninherentlybelligerent" Hobbes [Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1989], 55). Tuckignoresthe fact thatHobbes explicitly states thatsome persons"takepleasure" in exercising power over others"farther hantheirsecurityrequires"1, 13, 88). Witnesstheprecedent o this conflictbetweenthe"Straussian"nd"Cambridge"nterpretationsfapoliticaltheorist: ompareStrauss'soverlyslmster nterpretationf Machiavelli'spolitics n Thoughts n Machiavelli Chicago:Umversityof ChicagoPress, 1958) withQuentinSkinner'sunnecessarily epidone in TheFoundationsofModern PoliticalThought Cambridge:CambridgeUmversityPress, 1978, 2 vols.). Surelythetemperaments f thegreatest iguresof Westernpoliticalthoughtcanbe saidto fall somewherebetween the sadistic nihilismand the genteel detachment hat these two schools consistentlyattempt o imposeon themin theirrespective nterpretations.29. In 1958,whenReinhartKoselleckdiscussesthe roleof fear n Hobbes'spolitical hought,it is Strauss'sworkthat he cites. See Critiqueand Crisis:Enlightenmentnd the Pathogenesisof ModernSociety(Cambridge,MA. MITPress, 1988),24.30. JurgenHabermasobserveswith a certaindegree of accuracythat"above all it is theaestheticsof violencethat ascinates Schmitt]"TheNew Conservatism Cambridge,MA. MITPress, 1988], 137).As we cansee, anyfascinationon Schmitt'spartwithviolenceis rathermildin comparisonwith thatof theyoungStrausson Hobbes.31. StrausshereexemplifiesmorefullythanSchmitt he"political xistentialism" hatWolinidentifies as characteristicof Weimar ntellectuals:"the devaluationof all traditionalvaluesmeant hathumanexistence, n itsbrutefacticity,becamea valuein andof itself-the onlyvaluethatremained,as it were. By emphasizing he bruteprimacyof humanexistence,denudedof all supporting aluestructures,here eemsto beonlyonecertaintyeft in life: the nevitabilityof death. [the]existentialculminationof life itself' (TheTermsof CulturalCriticism,86-7).Obviouslyembarrassed y theserather xtremesentiments xpressed n hisyouthfulwritings-particularlyn lightof histoncalevents-Strauss latercriticized his fascinationwith the"abyss"thatdominatedWeimarntellectualdebates:"Thecontroversy aneasily degenerate nto a raceinwhichhe wins who offersthe smallestsecurityandthegreatest error. twould not be difficultto guess who would be the winner.Butjust as an assertiondoes not becometruebecauseit isshown to be comforting, so it does not become truebecause it is shown to be terrifying"(quoted in the so-called AutobiographicalPreface, which was added to the English editionof Spinoza'sCritiqueof Religion,11).Strauss s notso forthright, owever, n admitting hathehimself tookpart natheoretical roject hat ought ooffer"thesmallestsecurityandthegreatestterror."

32. It is interesting hatthetwo historiansof modemmythwho do deal withHobbesat all,CassirerandBlumenberg citedabove), focus solely on themythof the stateof natureandnotthatof the Leviathan.33. StephenHolmes,"Introduction,"nThomasHobbes,Behemoth Chicago:UmversityofChlcagoPress, 1991),xi.34. Of course,Schmittwas alreadyno strangero theissueof myth.In the lastchapterof his1923 bookonrepresentative overnment, fterhavingundressedheparagonof Western ational

politics,theEuropeanparliament,Schmitt peaksambiguouslyabout hepoliticsof "myth"see


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McCormick FEAR,TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 649

"Irrationalist heoriesof the Direct Use of Force" n The Crisisof ParliamentaryDemocracy,trans.EllenKennedy(Cambrdge,MA: MITPress,1988).35. Der Leviathanin der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes: Sinn and Fehlschlag elnespolitischenSymbols Hamburg:HanseatischeVerlagsaostalt, 938). I will cite the most recentedition (Koln: Klett-Cotta,1982) as L. The English renderngs are from the translationof theworkby GeorgeSchwabforthcoming romGreenwoodPress.36. For more detailed accounts of Schmitt's involvementwith National Socialism, seeSchwab,TheChallengeof TheException,andJosephBendersky,CarlSchmitt:Theorstfor theReich(Pnnceton:PnncetonUnversity Press, 1983).37. Strauss oo gave uptheattempt o divorce the"human" rom the "scientific"Hobbes inhis later treatmentof the philosopher n Natural Rightand History(Chicago:UmversityofChicagoPress,1953); nfact,Strausscomes toportrayHobbesas the bearerof the atter ormallyprofaneelement, "Theman who was

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4. McCormick - Fear, Technology, And the State