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Factors Influencing the Emergence of Collective Action:

An empirical assessment of three coastal towns in Oman

H.S. Al-OufiSultan Qaboos University, Department of Marine

Science and Fisheries

Sultanate of Oman

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Collective action refers to activities that require the coordination of efforts by two or more individuals (Sandler, 2001).

Introduction

Collective action

The collective action consists of fishermen obeying the group rules and participating in collective effort to manage the coastal fish resources to further the well-being of the group.

Applications of collective action:

• provision of public goods

• correction of externalities

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Coastal fisheries form vital parts of the livelihoods of large sections of the population (20 %)

Characteristics:

Small scale

30,000 fishermen

12,000 vessels

Introduction

Management system:

State control CPR

Oman Fisheries

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Inshore resources of the Sultanate have witnessed the symptoms of overfishing

Introduction

Preventing over-exploitation of coastal fisheries is of great importance for development policy in Oman

Oman Fisheries

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Fisheries exploited by small-scale fishing communities are vulnerable to over-exploitation due to:

• poverty

• uncertainty of occupation

• open access nature of inshore fisheries

• high demands for fish (population growth)

• high demands for employment opportunities (population growth)

Introduction

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Hardin (1968) “the Tragedy of the Commons”

CPR users are individualistic and are unable to co-operate in their collective interest.

Introduction

Strategy Co-operate Defect

Co-operate

3, 3 -1, 4

Defect 4, -1 0, 0*

Fisherman 1

Fisherman 2

* Nash equilibrium

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Prisoner’s Dillemma Game

Fisherman 2

Fisherman 1

Strategy Co-operate

Defect

Co-operate

3, 3 -1, 4

Defect 4, -1 0, 0

Introduction

In natural field setting:

The game is played repeatedly by participants who communicate, negotiate, and care for their reputation allowing scope for collective action to avoid the tragedy of the commons

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Hardin (1968) suggested strong state control to provide measures to regulate resource user’s activities.

Introduction

30

years

State control to solve the problem of the commons failed (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Runge, 1986; Berkes, 1989 and Ostrom, 1990).

9

year

rec

ord

ed

la

nd

ing

s (

ton

s y

r-1)

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

85 90 95

• Peak-recorded catches in 1988 in excess of 27,000 MT• Landings declined to around 3,000 MT during 1990s & it is 2560 MT at present

landings of S. commerson in Oman (1985-1998)

Introduction

Landings of S.commerson in Oman

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Co-operative means to manage CPR have achieved successful results in many parts of the world, e.g.:

Senat Al-Bahar

Oman Al-Oufi, et al. (2000)

Alanya fishery Turkey Berkes (1986)

Loften fishery Norway Jentoft and Kristoffersen (1989)

Artificial reef of Kerala

India Kurien (1995)

Introduction

See also: Baland and Platteau, 1996; McCay and Acheson,1987; Dasgupta, 1996&2001; Ostrom, 1990

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Fisherman 2

Fisherman 1

Introduction

Collective action

Strategy Co-operate

Defect

Co-operate

6, 6 1, 5

Defect 5, 1 0, 0

IF:

•Individual benefit exceeds individual costs

•Summation technology applies

1 unit reduction in fishing effort contributed by each and every fisherman gives 5 units of benefits at a cost of 4 units

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Demands

Support

Individual choices to either cooperate or defect

Phase 1

Retain status quo

Change status quo

Internal world

Inputs Outputs

Phase 2

Phase 3

Conceptual framework: assessing the emergence of collective action

Introduction

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Individual choices to either cooperate or defect

Internal world

1. Economic factors

• Econ. dependence

• Perception of risk

2. Awareness of resources exploitation problems

3. Demographical factors

• Age

• Education

• Household size

4. Group size

5. Social Identity

6. Heterogeneity

Factors influencing the emergence of collective action

Introduction

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Data for this study was gathered from 194 vessel’s owners (skippers) in three coastal towns (Barka, Masn’a and Suwaiq)

Fishermen from 27 villages were face to face interviewed using a pre-tested questionnaire

Methodology

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Variables measured

• Economic dependence on fishing (%)• Perception of risk - dept/asset (ratio) - no. of fishing gear owned (1-5)• Awareness of resources status (1-3)• Age (yrs)• Education (yrs)• Household size• Group size (no. of fishers/village)• Social identity - family involvement (0-5) - no. of years fishing (yrs)• Group heterogeneity - income inequality (Gini coefficient) - part-time/full-time (ratio)Attitude towards cooperation (0-11)

Methodology

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Variables Barka Masn’

aSuwai

q All

sample

Economic dependence on fishing (%)Perception of risk - dept/asset (ratio) - no. of fishing gear owned (1-5)Awareness of resources status (1-3)Age (yrs)Education (yrs)Household sizeGroup size (no. of fishers/village)Social identity - family involvement (0-5) - no. of years fishing (yrs)Group heterogeneity - income inequality (Gini coefficient) - part-time/full-time (ratio)Attitude towards cooperation (0-11)

45.1

0.722.432.8243.41.3412.481.6

3.3326.6

0.340.747.47

56.2

0.552.472.7143.91.0811.932.7

3.4527.8

0.370.407.02

53.1

0.422.412.5345.70.9012.847.6

3.3328.9

0.400.287.10

51.6

0.552.432.6744.41.1012.453.7

3.3627.8

0.390.447.19

Mean values for the dependent and independent variables (N=194)

Results

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Variables Pearson’

sr t P-value

Economic dependence on fishing (%)Perception of risk - dept/asset (ratio) - no. of fishing gear owned (1-5)Awareness of resources status (1-3)Age (yrs)Education (yrs)Household sizeGroup size (no. of fishers/village)Social identity - family involvement (0-5) - fishing experience (yrs)Group heterogeneity - income inequality (Gini coefficient) - part-time/full-time

0.23*

-0.33*-0.30*0.32*0.13

-0.14*-0.03

0.080.17*

0.06

1.01

-2.85*

<0.05

<0.05<0.05<0.05>0.05<0.05>0.05>0.05

>0.05<0.05

>0.05<0.05

Factors influencing the emergence of collective action Results

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1. Economic dependence

• fishermen who are more economically dependent on fishing show more willingness to cooperate in solving their common problem.

2. Perception of risk

• the higher the D/A ratio (less risk averse), the lower the fishermen's willingness to cooperate.

• A fisherman with a high debt to asset ratio will not take the offer of a cooperating game, as there is no guarantee that others will not defect and make him a "sucker".

Results

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3. Social identity

• fishermen who consider themselves to have more social identity were significantly more likely to adopt a co-operative strategy

4. Awareness of resource exploitation problems

• fishermen who have high awareness of the likely factors that cause the resource to deplete show more willingness to cooperate to avoid further damage to their fishery.

Results

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5. Group size

• there is no significant difference between fishermen's willingness to cooperate according to their group size

• the study ruled out the direct effect of group size as the main predictor of the success or failure of collective action.

Results

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6. Heterogeneity

• Sources of heterogeneity (cultural division and difference in objectives and interests) are considered as causing a strong obstruction to collective action (higher mean scores for full-time fishermen)

• no statistically significant correlation between variation in income and fishermen cooperation

• optimal provision of a public good in a community of a given size is independent of income distribution

Results

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Modelling cooperation

The linear regression model chosen to test the relationship was:

Cooperation= constant + ß1X1+ ß2X2+ ß3X3+

ßnXn

Where: ß1 to ßn are the regression coefficients and X1 to Xn are the independent variables entered into the regression equation.

Results

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Predictors ß Beta* R2 F

Awareness of resources problems

0.243 0.281 0.09 19.77 P<0.05

Perception of Risk -0.731 -0.257

0.14 16.76 P<0.05

Economic dependence on fishing

0.014 0.181 0.21 16.92 P<0.05

Social identity 2.37 0.169 0.24 14.48 P<0.05

(Constant) 2.94 - -

* Standardised Beta coefficients

Stepwise multiple regression modeling fishermen’s cooperation (N=194)

Results

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Thank you