393

Motivating Government Managers forRetrenchment: Some Possible Lessonsfrom the Senior Executive ServicePatricia W. Ingraham, State University of New York at BinghamtonCharles Barrilieaux, State University of New York at Binghamton

In the past five years, two issues, civil service reformand cutback management, have emerged as major areasof interest in public administration. Although the issuesare clearly related, they are rarely discussed in tandem.'Cutback management has been analyzed most often inpolitical terms: What options are available to politicaldecision makers in a time of fiscal retrenchment? Whatkinds of political strains are placed upon the systemwhen the demands of some groups cannot be met? Civilservice reform has been discussed primarily in terms ofincreased governmental efficiency, productivity, andresponsiveness. Underlying the responsiveness theme isthe recurring notion that better control of the bureauc-racy leads to—or is synonymous with—better control ofthe budget.

In the analysis of both issues, civil servants generally,and government managers specifically, play dual roles:they are at once part of the problem and the means to itssolution. They are part of the problem because it isassumed that they will exhibit a certain measure oforganizational loyalty and program commitment, whichwill retard or subvert response to cutback activities.They are part of the solution because the process ofchange rests upon their management skills and upontheir commitment to the options chosen by their politi-cal superiors. For the managers, as well as for thoseadvocating retrenchment or reform, a clear tension iscreated. In major organizational change affectingpublic bureaucratic institutions, the support and assis-tance of careerists are critical to success. Career execu-tives are, in a very real sense, the change agents whobless reform and/or retrenchment with their coopera-tion and direction, or doom it by their disapproval andfailure to cooperate.

Yet, the "bureaucrat as solution to the problem"approach is one that has not been common. More fre-quently, the approach of both cutback advocates andcivil service reformers has been not only that bureau-crats are part of the problem, but that they helped tocreate it. This is in keeping with the view that publicbureaucracies are bloated, inefficient, and staffed byemployees eager to expand their empires through the

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting ofthe American Political Science Association, Denver, Colo.. Septem-ber 1982. The anthors wish to thank Professors Carolyn Ban, DavidGow, Patty Renfrow, and Irene Rubin for helpful comments.

• Survey daca related to the mouvation and incentive systems inthe Senior Executive Service are analyzed and the potential ap-plicability of the findings to cutback management is examined.Among the findings are that the managers consider both non-monetary and monetary rewards to be significant motivators forgood performance. Further, although attitudes concerning per-sonal self-esleem and individual commitment to their positionsand co-workers remain high over two waves of data collection,there appears to be a lower level of organizational trust which canbe viewed as a response to diminished opportunities for advance-ment and job security. Some suggestions for personnel policy inagencies involved in retrenchment activities are offered: First,managers should be treated as professionals who are viewed assolutions to rather than causes of ihe problems retrenchment isdesigned to address; second, managers should be allowed to workin an environment in which polilica! pressures are minimal; andthird, managers should be given financial awards (which are clear-ly limited during retrenchment) that are closely tied to perfor-mance.

budgetary process. Much of the political rhetoric sur-rounding both cutback management and civil servicereform appeals to this sentiment. James Sundquist haslabelled this resort to punitive rhetoric, "bashing thebureaucrat." Aside from being simplistic, such anapproach poses many problems and may well alienatethose career civil servants who feel they are doing agood job. Herbert Kaufman, for example, has pointedout that resisting organizational change is not neces-sarily a malevolent action on the part of many em-ployees. It can be attributed to a variety of organiza-tional, environmental, and political influences, many ofwhich are beyond the control of civil servants.^ Cutbackand reform are not synonomous. Significant differencesexist between them; yet, there are significant similaritiesas well. One similarity is the common demand forchange. The critical questions for both reform and

Patricia W. Ingraham is visiting assistant professor of political scienceat SUNY-Binghamton. She was the first director of the public admin-istration and the public policy program at the State University Collegeat Cor!land, N.Y. Prior to that time, she wa.s employed in various pro-grams at the state and local levels of government and at the U.S.Department of Housing and Urban Development. Washington, D.C.

Charles Barrilieaux is in ihe public policy program at SUNY-Bing-hamton. He received his B.A. and M.P.A. degrees from Lamar Uni-versity, Beaumont, Texas. This year, he is an intern with the NewYork State Department of Social Services, Albany.

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1983

Bi

rcheiichnieDi do not revolve around "badness" or•'goodness," but around receptivily or resistance lochange. Moie precisely, the questions are these; Wha!incentives are likely lo enhanee marsagerial cooperaiionin oece^sary organizationa! and fiscal changes? Whichrewards and incenlives are most iiuposianf to careerioarmgers? What do v.c know about (he moiivalionalprocess for pu!)]ic ;«anagers fha( wou]d enable us u)desigis a siratcgy for their full partieipatioo in eutbaekor reform activities? Do we know how \o use scareeresources k> [he best advantage in reiaioiiig aodmofivathig governoieot managers? Finally, gKen thepaueHy of data specifically rclaied iiy managing cut-back, and the abundance of data related to reforoi, is i:possible to extend tentatively the experiences ofniotivating managers in a leforni envirormient U) thoseol

)]"y eoucernet! with nunuui motivation in theworkplaee is abundant; to summarize that body of liter-ature is impossible iu a limited spaee. For the purpose--of this paper, it is necessary only K) identify severaloiajor themes which have been prominent io this eculury. The first iheme, identified wifh Frederiek "Favior,Futher Gulick, and others, asseits that the practice ofgovernment is viriuaHy identical to the practice ofbusiness. I'i'go, the same lessons and teehniques ought(o be applied in both places. F^roductivity can bemeasured—and improved—and employees ean be moti-vated and rewarded aecordingly. Though no! fullyelaborated in early vuitings, this school of thought im-plieitly advocated the use of "rewards" (promotions,pay increases, increased time off. aud others) as well asthe use of puninve measures when the oeea.sion

led. These punitive measures included the threat, decreased job seeurit>, reduction oi

of privileges, and otlscr similar actions, llus"carKit and stick'" approach to employee motivationhas been elassified as Theory X.'

The other major body of theory, whieh received someof iis earliest exposure through the writing of MaryParker F'oUett and later included Shepard, Argyris, anxlMeGregor among others, is generally referred to ar>Theor\ Y, Theory Y differs dramatically from TheoryX m thaf it emphasizes the soeial as well a'- the profes-sional involvement of the ensployee and relies on piimarily iutrinsie incentives such as increased involvementwith work group and in ileeision making, enhaneedrespeet among peers, and a feeling of personal effieaeyfor good job performanee. Theory Y advoeates, there-fore, suggest such incentives as inereased eommuniea-tion within the organization, shared decision making,and decentrali/alion of authority and responsibility toenhanee fhe participation and commitment of all mem-tiers of the organization.* Theory Y also emphasizes thequality of empioyee participation. Incentives in HieoryY arc less tangible (ban those advocated by Theory Xand appeal to a different group of human needs.

The role of various incentives is discussed in moredetail by theorists such as Maslow and Her/berg.Maslow'- ''hierarchy of needs" and Herzberg's descrip-tion of nK)tivaiors and dissatisfiers aie two examples olefforts [o dii'fcreniiate between the various rewardspresent in the workplaee.' In a theory often applied topublic employees, Flerzberg argues that motivation i<derived from intrinsic factors which lead lo job sausfaetion. Other factors, such as tlnaneia! rewards, really arenot motivators, but function as dissadsfiers wheupresent iu inadequate auiounts,*

Ou the other hand, Bozeman, citing l,awler andothers, notes th.al goveiumeiu reforms mai be uiosi uutarget when they toeus on pay issues a> significantmotivators. He urile"^. " ['here is a considerable amountof researeh pertinent to ihe issue of pay and motivationand the preponderance of research-hased wisdom tellsm that pay and monetary incentives generally can bepo\^'erful motivators. Most researchers conclude, how-ever, that pay is significantly related lo productivity auda sense of psyehologicai well being onh' if the workeiperceives ihat performanee and reward are eloselytied.'"

In rekuion to publie employees, especially those at theprofessional level being discussed m this paper, there isa third gronp of incentives, most of whieh are closelyrelated to 'Fheor> Y. Frevious studies and surveys haveindicated that career ci .ii tenants arc motivated by adesire to serve the publie interest or to participate in ihepublic policy process iu a meaningful way." Otherobservers, and -ome critics, argue ihat the remarkablesecurity and slabiliry historieahy afforded career-protected civil servauts is also an incentive.

The literature pr{nides, then, a wide varief\ of incen-tive opiions from which lo choose, Flie options pro-posed, however, generally assume environmental andorganizational resources that are plentiful and expand-ing. 'Fhough this is a corumoii charaelcristic of mueh ot[he literature related to Ameriean governmenf andpublie policy, it poses problems \ihen we alt,enipi fotranslate the principles involvc{l to a s>'sicni charac-terized bv resource scarciiv.

bxisimg analyses ot cutoaeK management nave nott'ocused directly ou the probieui of public employeemotivation. Fevine hu ^ identified the need for investiga-tion: "The need to rewaixl managers for direetingorganizational contraction and termination is a problembecause without growth, there arc few promotions andrewards available to moti\ate and letain succcssfui aiuiloyal employees particularly wheu compared to jobopportunities for talented managers outside the declin-ing organization.'*"

Robert Behn extends the diseussion: " l l ie iask oiattracting, kcepiug. and uiolsvating high quahty petsoii-uel is facilitated b> (1) resources with which lo rev^ardtalented individual'^. (2) a critical mass of per-^onnel and

MOTIVATING GOVERNMENT MANAGERS FOR RETRENCHMENT 395

support facilities to provide collegial interaction andnecessary assistance, and (3) the creation of new posi-tions into which valuable people can be promoted.Thus, in an era of retrenchment, when these are notavailable, il is particularly difficult to maintain a workforce that is productive. The most mobile and thus, bydefinition, the most talented employees are the first toleave, further decreasing morale, motivation, andwork.'""

Behn further specifies the tensions that retrenchmentposes for existing theory. Many of the intrinsic rewardsassociated with Theory Y management, for example,are available only in an organization characterized bydecentralized authority and decision making. He writes,"Retrenchment necessarily centralizes decision making.For a growing organization, decentrahzation may besatisfactory; the central responsibility for resourceallocation can be adequately discharged by simplylicensing requests for new endeavors, discriminatingbetween proposals only when necessary to maintainsome sense of equity between the growth of variouscomponents. For retrenchment, however, allocatingresources involves cuts and the various organizationalcomponents cannot be expected to volunteer them. Itwould be a very unusual organization indeed thatgenerated through a decentralized process enough pro-posals for self-imposed cutbacks to match a significantdechne in resources."^'

Essentially, cutback management poses problems forboth Theory X and Theory Y incentives. The traditionalrewards associated with carrot and stick methods—payincreases, larger staffs, increased budgets—are nolonger available or are available only in much morerestricted quantities. The organizational flexibility toinnovate, involve, and otherwise reward all criticalemployees is also diminished as most organizationa]energies are directing toward cutting back activities andprograms. In addition, the rewards that we haveassumed accrue from public service and doing publicgood also appear to be diminished. This has a two-pronged effect: First, to the extent that the public viewscareer bureaucrats as wasteful and inefficient, andpolitical decision makers consistently criticize bureau-cratic productivity, there are few ego rewards to begained from public service; second, there is a problem inrelation to the program and agency loyalty describedearlier—cutting back programs to which the managerhas a professional and personal commitment creates dif-ficulties for the manager. One government managersummed up the problem in the following way: "Formany (managers), loyalty is at the program level. Peoplecome to identify in a very close personal way with a pro-gram they have worked on for years, and they may alsoidentify closely with those served by the program. . . .Real pain comes from seeing programs that you reallyput yourself into, and that you thought were really im-portant, go down the tubes. One common frustrationamong those facing these difficult situations is that it isour perception that political appointees in many agen-cies have only the negative goal of cutting back.'"^ Thecutback manager is therefore confronted by a classic

dilemma: he or she must make very difficult manage-ment decisions with fewer resources and unclear per-sonal rewards. Further, this situation is not likely to betemporary, but is anticipated to continue for a longperiod of time. What do we know about motivating thepublic manager in such a context?

Earlier, it was suggested that some lessons fromreform could be generalized to cutback management.Clearly, the bureaucratic events and processes related toretrenchment are not identical to those related toreform. There are hazards in attempting to infer lessonsfor one from empirical data related to the other. On theother hand, important similarities were noted: the cen-trality of the cooperation of career managers, the needfor reexamination of motivation and incentive systems,the need for increased managerial and organizationalflexibility, the basic instability—and lack of predicta-bility—of the environment, and the need for enhancedunderstanding and trust between poiiticai leadershipand career managers are significant characteristics ofboth reform and retrenchment activities. Given thesesimilarities and the lack of specific information con-cerning motivating for cutback, it may be worthwhile touse relevant data about civil service reform, in general,and the Senior Executive Service, in particular, for pre-liminary exploration of common ground and for tenta-tive examination of common lessons.

Motivating Managers in theSenior Executive Service

Created by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, theSenior Executive Service is composed of the top echelonof career federal managers—the "cream of the crop."SESers have been subject to many changes since theyopted to join the Senior Executive Service, but, for ourpurposes, two are most important. First, the act of sign-ing the SES contract removed the managers from manyof the traditional securities of civil service protection.'^It replaced those securities with a new set of incentives,the most important of which were financial. Second,when the Senior Executive Service was little more thanone year old and still very much in transition stages,many SESers became cutback managers, presiding overthe budgetary and staff cutbacks initiated by the Reaganadministration.

Initially, SES was intended to increase the manage-ment skills, mobility opportunities, policy influence,and financial incentives of the highest ranking careerofficials. It was also intended to provide the presidentand his appointees with a more flexible and responsivemanagerial corps which would be more clearly account-able to presidential leadership and direction.

From the personnel management perspective, SESwas to improve the performance of federal executives bya combination of more flexible assignments, enhancedperformance management and evaluation, and resourcedevelopment reforms."* Among the changes intended tooccur under SES were greater mobility due to replace-ment of rank-in-position by rank-in-person, more mix-

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1983

ing of positious among eareer and non-career personnel,and elimination of some barriers lo inter-agency andintra-agency tr-ansfers. The strueture of finaneial ineentives was changed dramatiealK. Performanee awardbonuse.s and "Presideniial Rank" awards were added tosalary increases dependent on position and senioriiy.There was a new emphasis on ef feetive and effieient performanee appraisal .systems lo dislribnte ihese monie*^eqoitablv. Additional incentive.s included expandedit-aining opportunities and sabbatical leaves. In ,-ihort,creaiing Ihe Senior Execulive Service was an atlempl toalter the meenuve struelure for government exeeutive"-.

Tbe nature and preeise inlent of this set of incentivesha* been tiie subjeet of rather intense debate. AlanCampbell, the "father" of the reforn: in many ways,argued that the reforms were a ratiooali/allon of anexisling nonsystem and that the series of incentives provided for members of the Senior Fxeeutive Servicewould stimuiaie innovation and flexibility in govern-ment organizations.^-^ l-red Thayer, in a sihigiog dissent,argued tbat, as a paekage, Ihe Senior Exeeutive Servicecombined "Theory X with Catch 22'"*

The history of SES has been turbulent and its review^have been, at best, mixed. .Many have argued, for exam-ple, that the reform was never fully implemented?' Ha^

Hxeeoiive Serviee created a more flexibletop government managers, eapable of- - and

willing 10 engage in the new management demandedby the eeonomic and poiiticai environment? Has itdemonstrated ihe strength or weakness of the partieularineentives within its structure? In short, uha! has SEStaught us about motivation in unsiable times that ma>'be teptativelv inferred to cutback management?

The data analyzed here are drawn from three primarysour'ees. The Federal Employee Attitude Surveys,Phases I and I(. were administered by the U.S. Office ofPersonnel Management. Phase I was administered to asample of all federal employees in May 1979. Foi thisanalysis, we have e.xtraeled daia penaining only tomembers of the Senior Exeeutive Serviee. The total sam-ple size of Phase I was 20,092. I'he return rate was 73pereent. Tbe total sample size of Phase II was 13,000and Ihe return rate for that survey was 75 pereent. Iishould be noted that in Phase 11, niembers of the SESand Exeeutive level I-IV wc-rc eoded together, ll is thatdata that has been extracted aed analyzed here. **

Supplemental data from stirveys eondueted hy ih<:State University of Kc^^ York at Binghamton and theU.S. Merit Systems Proteetion Board are also included.Tbe SUNY-Binghamton survey was eondueted inJanuary and February 1981. This survey was a randomsample of members of the SES in four domestic agen-eies: HUD, HHS, Commerce, and Labor, Hie toialsample si/e was 300; tbe total number of cornpieiedsurveys was 178 for a response rale of 60 pereent. InNoveniber 1980. the Merit Systems Protecti(5n Boardsurveyed a random sample of 1,500 SESers and had areturn rate oi~ 7.' pereeni

Though ilie population surve>ed by each of tbese isnot identical, n h, important to note thai there is aremarkable similarity in ihe findings of various studiesof Ihe Senior Execulive Serviee. This i.i due, at least inpart. 10 the uniformity of SES membership along'ievei'al important dimensions, sueh a.s r'acc, gender, in-come, educaticHial level, and length of service.'*Samples drawn from such a liomogenous populationma> be eompared. even though there are differences insample sizes and sample mean.s. The different iiniefseriods in\olved, rather than bemg a problem, permi!preliminary traeking of altitudes and perceptionsamong seni<.)r niaiiagers whieh may be attributed, alleast partially, to the implememation ol' the reforms aswell as to die emircunnental iusiabihiv we wish io

centives or nwtivdents 10 consider,

s was presented for tliemly aiiehored in the moti

literature jusl reviewed, tbey provide one test of its rele-vanee. Respondents were asked, iu effect, "Are Theory.X or Theory V incenti\e'^ imporlani to you?" Does job-security matter'' Does pay matter? Table I presentsfinditigs for both 1979 and 1980.

As Table I inthcates, the executives snrve\ed .siateelearly thai they are motivated very strongly by incen-ii\es and rewards often assoeialed with Theory Y. Apersonal feeling of accomplishment and the respect ofco-workers are considered ^x'ry importanl by both setsof respondents. Indeed, nearly 100 pereent replied that afeeling of aeeouiplishment in relation to their work v\asvery imporlani to them. Similarly, nearly 100 pereeniresp<inded that aecomplishing something wx>rtlmhileiva^ very important. Friendliness of eo-\vorkers was alsoimporlant, Uiough tiot nearly so eritical, In both cases.

The findings in reiation lo material ineenlives are alsointeresting, however. Though nearly 90 pereent of therespondents felt thai job -eeurity and chanees tor priviiionon were very or soniewiiat important, the per-centage of [hose feeling that im opportunity for a per-formanee award was very important }jear]\ doubledfrom 1979 lo 1980, The 1980 survey also asked (o whatextent ihat employee would be motivated by a cashaward. Ninety-two percent resporKied tbat tbey v\x>u!dbe motivated to ai least some extent, aud of thaiiiumber. fully 45 pereent replied tbai a cash awardwould be a great < r very great ineetitive. It would appearfrom these findings, therefore, tbat although iuirinsicand social incentives are certainly important a.sntolivator^, financial ineenlives do pla\ a role, and noiprimarily as dissatisfiers, but as inotivators as well.FEAS If further explored tbe role of variou.s incentiveshy asking exeeuiis'e.'- to rate the imporianee of variousincentives rsot to themselves, but as a management tool.Table 2 tlisplav^ those fir^dhsgs.

hinTableabout

emonrina

ates, wiiatever senioicemives ui relation to

gersheir own

I ' l lOBhk

MOTIVATING GOVERNMENT MANAGERS TOR RETRENCHMENT 397

TABLE 1Importance of Selected Incentives to Government Managers

How important !s . . .

Chance for promotionJob securityPerformance awardFeeling of accomplishmentAccomplishing something worthwhile*'Friendliness of co-workersCo-worker's respect

How much would you be motivated by a cash award

% Very Important^

1979

42402999996792

1980

44395197986688

Great/Very GreatBxtent

45

% SomewhatImportant

1979 1980

47 4152 5255 39

1 21 1

31 338 Jl

Some Kxtent

47

'fr Not ImportantAt All

1979

107

15

1-

1980

14109

_.

1--

Not Al All

7

^Percentages are rounded to the nearest point.

''1979 wording is '^importanee of chance to accomplish something worthwhile."

Source: Federai Employee Attitude Survey: Phase 1 (1979) and Phase II (1980).

n FEAS I = 819n FEAS H = 2,463

performance, they clearly feel that they are an effectivemanagement tool. Fully 87 percent responded that asalary increase would serve as a great motivation fortheir employees and more than half felt that a cashaward would greatly motivate employees. Conversely,only 15 percent and 12 pereent respectively itW thattraining opportunities or more flexible work scheduleswould be likely to have a great impact.

What do these findings tell us about motivation andpublic employees? Tentatively, they suggest that execu-tives are strongly motivated by persona! and profes-sional feelings of accomplishment, but that financialawards and bonuses could play a role in motivatingthem as well. Executives place high priority and con-fidence in financial incentives as management tools.

Findings: Attitudes Toward Job Satisfaction,Motivation and Rewards

To permit more systematic consideration of man-agers' attitudes toward satisfaction with various com-ponents of organizational incentive systems, we used a

very simple classification scheme which considers fourgeneral categories of incentives. Extrinsic incentiveswere divided into material (salary) and purposive (serv-ing the public good). Intrinsic incentives were classifiedas positional (job is interesting and utilizes talents ap-propriately) and social (peer relationships are satisfac-tory)." In addition, incentives related to organizationalclimate and effectiveness are included. Table 3 displaysthe comparisons of FEAS Phase I and Phase II lorselected items which tap the extrinsic dimensions.

As Table 3 demonstrates, there has been an increasein dissatisfaction with at least two of the incentives thatwere included in the SES package. The most dramatic isthe increased dissatisfaction with pay. In 1979, 43 per-cent of the executives surveyed expressed satisfactionwith their pay, compared with only 23 percent in 1980.The reasons for this are fairly clear, since the long-standing pay cap on executive salaries was not lifted un-til after the survey had been administered. In addition,however, the action of Congress and the Office of Per-sonnel Management in limiting the numbers and size ofthe financial awards available under SES served to fur-

TABLE 2Importance of Incentives as Management Tools

My Employees Would Be Motivated By

Cash AwardsSalary IncreaseHonorary RecognitionAdditional Annual LeaveControl of Work ScheduleTraining Opportunities

Great/Very Great Kxtent

Source: TEAS, Phase \\, 1980.nFEAS II = 2,463

518739161512

Little/Some Extent

431855616372

Not At All

111

18161!

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1983

IVMSI IOS R

All in ::\\ \. Avu -ijusTieo « nh i!sv p;^}I jiii SUIHT'IC;! wilh ihc ansiisirs! o f ' o

,;;•;•! •nsplishii-'d sunr-ihin.: His-Dniiiilr

tlier exaeeibate ev\isting displeasure. In ils prehminaryreport on FEAS II, OPM noled, "The continuing capou exeeutive salaries is reflected iu the large amount ofexeeutive dissatisfaction with pay, a dissatisfactionwiiieh is growing over tinie."^^ in the SUNY survey, 76percent of executives expressed dissatisfaction with pa>.

Fift\ one percent of FEAS II respouden(s agreed withIhe statement, "Due to pay compression, I may leavegoverinTiei^t," and 17 pereent were undecided. Whenthis is contrasted with the generally high levels oforganizational commitment as seen in the second sci ofitems in Table 3, it ean be argued that a majority ofgovermneni managers may leave their jobs despite beingvery cooitnitted to them. Though lifsing the pay cap wasone step toward countering this problem, ihe scope ofexeeutive dissatisfaction may be so greai as to be a long-standing probleui,

Exeeulives surveyed also show a eonsiderable drop inthe degree lo whieh they are satisfied with the le el otreeognitioo reeeived for publie serviee. Fifty-eight per-cent expressed satisfaction with the recognition gainedTor public service in 1979; by 1980 Ihat had decreased to47 percent, a substaniial drop in ordy oue year. If weaeeept the assuuiption that doing something usehil andbeing rtx'ognj/ed for it is important to exeeulives, thisdecrease in satisfaction is significant.

!'i)i purposes of examining satisfaction with intrinsic:)y^tems. we compared FHAS Phase I and the SU^NYsurvey beeause many of the relevant items were notrepeated in I-EAS II. The findings for seleeted items arcdisplayed in I able 4.

As fable 4 indicates, satisfaction with selected miriu-S3C taetors is generally high. It appears that, whaleverhappens in relation lo other kinds of reeogniiion orrewai"d. ihe exeeutive's sense of personal effieaey re-iiiains sirou^. This raises the question o( the inevitable

strains created wheu efficacy LS high, whiie di^^satislac-tion with pay and finaacia] rewards is extreme and satisfaetion with pnblie service reeognition appear^ to bedeelining. These tensions are demonstrated, to some extent, by the responses in reiation lo organizational trusifrom 1979 to 1980. Both surveys leveal a pereeption thatemployees in generai have high levels of organizationaltrust. In 1980, however, fully 70 perceni of diemanagers agreed with She statement, "I feel / au: 7 tiustIhis organi^alioo." To e.xamine ihese apparent tensionsfurther, it is helpfui to examine the spccifie incentivesproposed by SES and the response to some of them afterimplementation.

The MSPB survey asked tiie tbilowing qnesdons;*"Whic!i of the following faetors. if any, did vou eonsider when deciding wisether to jc in SES and how ins-portant were they to your deeision to join?"' and, ''Howsausiled are yon with ihc ehanges SHS has broughtabout in the following areas as they apply K) yois pcr-souaily?" Table 5 displays die finding.s from tliesc twoquestions. W'hat Table 5 makes almost painfully clear i-that, even though many SESers joincci because thc}'thought there was no viable alternative, no structural in-

tive has lived up to expectations,he importance of fioaneial ineentives becouiesious: Dissalisfaeiion with their appearance and/orr Folc is apparent. Ml'ty-six percent of the MSFB

'ents indiealed that the oppartuint.> for a nuijorbonus 01' award xvas an important ineentive to join SHS.Fort>-eight perceni said tliat die opportunity for ahigher base salar\ was isnporiam. Sixty-ttuee p^ercemsaid tb.ey were not satisfied with die opportunity lor aniajO! bonus award and "'4 perceiu expressed ciissads-

MOTIVATING GOVERNMENT MANAGERS FOR RETRENCHMENT 399

TABLE 4Executive Attitudes Toward Intrinsic Incentives

Inirinsic-Positionat

My job makes good use of my abilitiesI have the authority I need to

accomplish my work objectives

FEASI

86

73

% Agree

SUNY

83

77

FEAS 11

73

FEAS

5

7

% Undecided

1 SUNY FEAS II

5

6 7

FEASI

9

20

% Disagree

SUNY

12

17

FEAS II

21

Intrinsic-Social

1 am satisfied with the respect I receivefrom the people I work with 92

In trimic-Organ iza tionalGenerally, I like working hereEmployees here fee! you can't trust

this organizationI feel I can't trust this organization

92

24

88 91

2170

4

21

6 4

1514

4

55

6 fi

6415

Source: FEAS I and II; State University of New York, Center for Social Analysis Survey of SES.n FEASI = 819nl'liAS 11 = 2,463nSUNY = 178

faction with the opportunity for a higher base salary.Together, these indicate high levels of dissatisfactionwith the performance of the financiai incentive structureavailable to members of the SES. The opportunity forpromotion to policy-making positions, or, in otherwords, to play a more significant role in relation topubhc service was important to 38 percent of therespondents. Seventy-seven percent said that it was toosoon to tell about that option. The other "incentives"specifically proposed by SES did not appeal to a largepercentage of the MSPB respondents.

Finally, a related problem should be noted. Most ofthe surveys of SESers to date indicate that performanceevaluation is not yet functioning as intended. Thecritical linkage that SES proposed to strengthen.

between performance and reward, appears to be onlyminimally improved. Though 60 percent of the respon-dents in FEAS I and 71 percent of the respondents inFEAS II felt that standards for performance evaluationwere fair and equitable, many did not see the results ofthose evaluations carried over to the awarding ofbonuses. Only 16 percent of the SES respondents forFEAS I felt that unusual performance would lead to acash award or unscheduled pay increase. Thirty percentof those respondents felt it was very likely that their jobsecurity would be improved. In FEAS II, a slightlylarger number, 19 percent, strongly agreed that a pro-motion or pay increase depended upon good perfor-mance. Another 55 percent of ali executives surveyedthought it would make a difference. However, when

TABLE 5Merit System Protection Board-Motivation to Join SES and Satisfaction With Incentives

No alternativeOpportunity for major bonus or awardOpportunity for higher base saiaryOpportunity for promotion to top policy

makinj! positionOpportunity for job mobility within agencyOpportunity for job mobility between agenciesOpportunity for sabbaticals

Motivation to Join

Extremely/ Somewhat/ %Quite Not Not

Important Important Aware of

128

15

17214

30

675648

38y 19icies 18

15

213636

45605855

Satisfaction with Incentives

Completely/ %(ienerally NeitherSatisfied Too Soon

188

8171121

Source: U.S. Merit System Protection Board. [Reported in/I Report on the Senior Executive Service, pp. 17-1S.]n= 1,125.

1918

77657061

Dissatisfied

6374

15181918

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1983

U'kcc! ttheihcr a cahli hojiiis or pay iiicjeasc dependedOSI good perlorniance. ^] pei-cenE of ihc executives in!''LAS II said no or «erc iJodecRled, Fiinher, 44 perceoifell ihat their job scciinly woidd noi be enhanced bygood performance. The fii^i figure is comparable lo ihenearly 50 percent of KFAS 1 resjiondents who repliedthai lisey did noi feel thai piofuoiion wa.s tieee.ssanlylinked lo i^ood [>erformanec. What seems lo be liappen •hig wilh peri 'ormancecvtduatioii. iherefore, may best bedescribed a^ '"nonprogres^/* Though rherc docs uoi ap-peai 10 be signifieani deterioraSifHi—at lea.-,: among thaigroup of federai eiiiplovee*- v\hose animdes are analyzedhc'i'e—neiliier is Ihcre improved aceepiaiiee of, nor con-fidence 111. Use new system, (jiven ihe crincai role Ihalperformance evaiiiaiion was inscnded lo p!av, iis fahureto liave iaken a Tiruier hold a! (Ins poini m;H be an in-dieation of addisfor'a

thai the career managers ' role as.vcbe reeogni/ed and acknov\ledge<cralie outeome the public and elect

>i! 10 l i t e j5K)b!ern

'hale\er bureau

OUI ariaivsis snggcsis Oiat ihe le^soii^ oi the SeniorLxeculive Service arc -^(Muewhai disheartenhig. Ihevare, howevei. iinp<irt;m( for retreiiehmcni and cutbackoiaiiagemenl Although managcis plaee importanceupon boih c.^innvic an{i intrinsic inceiUive.-, and feel Ihal(hey are useful managemeiii loob , ihey aKt^ feei thatneither set of ineentives is available in suffieienl quan-tities, eidier t\>r their own motivation or as a tool formotivating their empkn-ees. hxceunve'- surveyed are dis-satisfied with pa\ aiid promotion iiieentives, and,perhaps, more important, do not feel that ihcir posi-lions any longer provide the opporlunily to iiave a u,%e'ful effect on public policy. In addiiiou, a large oiajoriiyof respondeiHs lo ihe 1980 FE:AS II .suive\ reported lowlevels of trust iti the oigaiii/alion. Substaniial luimbersdo not feel ihey receive adequate reeognition for publieservice. The generai pietuje is c>ne (sf an ahenaied andfrustrated maiiagenierit cadre, one which is not likely lobe a fuil partner in achieving ehange.

Although Ihe daSa an;.dyzed are based on a specific setof reforms aod are only related to federal managers,iliere arc good reasons to eonsider them at least partiaii)'generali/able lo reirenchmeni. In addition to die generaisimilarities in ihc pioeesses of rct\)rm and retretiehmentooled earlier, ah of the poiitieal and ciivnoniTienud in-fluences on the ShS aie likely to be replicated inretrenchmenf situadon^. t'ven absein punitive polifsealintent, additional finaneial rev\ards aud ineentives locareer eivii servants would be prone \o Ihe budget a^e msuch enviionoienLs. Oiher, non-finaneial ineentives aremore difficult to create and implement ni an organl/atiiHi faeed with deelining resource.-,. And, iu a dme whenrapid bureauei'atic acniui Is viewed as imp(M'tant iobudgetar\ decrea.-,es and real savings, pubhc andpolitical dissalisfaelicn vMth llie normal pace ofbureaueraey will be heightened, lu this sen-,e, ihe c\-pcrienet; of the Sl'.S should uol. be \ii;wed as an aberra-ikni, but as a harbinger. If this ;s true, whal lessonsshould be drawn? l l iough we injeel a noie of cautiongiven the interential and ienkui\c nauiie ol onir conclu-sions, several ->um^esii{)ns mav be advanced.

ccur only witti the eooperation and assistance o^ iho^-cmanagers. Rom/ck and Hendrieks fonnd that (srgani/.atioual ecHumitmeut is negaii\ely associated with an in-dividual's being alTilialed with a program that is beingcut diastieally or abolished.'^ FEAS II and the 198^Sl;NY siirve)' found a sizeable number of manager^intending lo leave government service.*' lo this analy:,is.cxeeutives are iricreasingiy dissatisfied wids their po-^i-lions and wilh iheii pay. Significantly, many do nottiu*,! llie organization for 'Ahich they work. .Ahhough iiis reasonable to expeet ^(MHC oiorak: probleoi-, iti an>tHganization facing change or euibaeks, tlie puniiKeapproach that has been lat^eii iiiav be exaeerbaiing exist-mg pioblem.-,, rather than moving t<niard then solution.As career nlanager'^ anti employees are ahenaied, and a.-,the iiieendves for new' people to cnier piiblie .service arcdiminislied. the cadre of skilled civil servants uponwhich we rely for poliey implementation and day to d^iymanagement eould be decimated. Theeurrem approach.apf)ears to make blaming bureaucrais foi pybhc i^rob-lems a seif-!uilil!ing prophee\ .

One pos.siblu icchnique tor reducing stress and miun-taioiiig some level of organizational comuiitnieni andtrust i\ io jirovidc fov a high level of comnuuiicatioiiwithin the organization about the cuibaek paoeexs.Though there would be some loss of time in decisionmaking, the benefits that coukl be gained by mcieasedemployee cooperation should ouiweigh the costs of los-ing lime. Hven if it is clear that some euls mu.^t bv madeand that some jobs will be lost, by providing employee*;deiailed intbrmation about the reasons for the cuts, andabout their impaet upon agency mission, (he siu)rale ofthose whose jobs are left intaci (or greatly alleied)should not suffer so dramatically.

Another technique that the experience of Si:S sug-gests would enhance eareer eooperation in retrenchriientis the respeeifieaiion of program goals aod objectives a!

manager v;ho commented ou earlier drafts of ill isanalysis: ' i i seems to me ihat it would be ca--ici lotnanage cutbacks and gel youi hnvcr level -^taif :ocooperate in the proeess if you had a clear >;et oi'priorities (for ihe agenev) v.iiieh \ou couki ciMimn.;ni-catc to them, but this s precisely what is iacking."'^This perspective i"; echoed b,v Abiam^on. et ah, in ihen-

simihu conclusion ni liei study of pubtie employees ic.Kansas: "One way io avoid a decline in employee pei-ceptlou.^ oi' agenev effectiveness niay be to con^ideI aredefinition of the agency's mandate at the lime of cm

changes in its (sfhcial niission lo accompany tlic reduc-

Sec(md, and closely related lo me above, tlie eou-tuuiing tciidenev to ' 'bianie'^ eareer bureaucratN :orpiiblie problems ean be deir;mental lo efleeti^c cutback

MOTIVATING GOVERNMENT MANAGERS FOR RETRENCHMENT 401

more complex reasons for budgetary crisis and post-pones necessary and more appropriate action; and (b) itappears to be a serious disincentive to career managers.

The surveys analyzed in this paper all indicate that in-trinsic rewards have a major influence on career execu-tives. The belief that their job and their program is im-portant and that, in performing their job, they are doingsomething worthwhile is very important. To the extentthat bureaucrats are consistently characterized as in-efficient and overpaid, the effectiveness of that intrinsicmotivator will be eroded. This erosion is demonstratedin FEAS II by the decline in satisfaction with recogni-tion for public service, and by the belief expressed byrespondents in the SUNY survey that, "politicians cam-paign on the backs of the bureaucrats." The importantlesson to be learned is that retrenchment must be a jointendeavor of elected officials and career civil servants.Though managers play a key role in terms of implemen-tation, the responsibilities of political decision makersare also very important. David Dillman sums up thoseresponsibilities well: "To attract and hold quality publicservants requires more than just applying personneltechniques; rather it is a matter of creative politicalleadership and creating a consensus on the purpose ofadministration."" Further, political leaders must haveacommitment to good management of the programs thatremain after retrenchment has occurred.

Despite the current popularity of calling for govern-ment to be run more like a business, we see a personnelpolicy evolving that is difficult to imagine in the privatesector. By alienating and losing employees, governmentis weakening attempts to improve public management.A business faced with a cutback situation would bemore likeiy to utilize those employees who are doing agood job and would provide them with incentives tostay with the company. Federal personnel policyappears to be having the opposite effect.

Third, and finally, the significance of financialrewards and incentives as motivators in a cutback en-vironment should be recognized. They are important intwo ways: in terms of financial rewards to the managersthemselves, and in terms of achieving some minimalflexibility in allocating and actively managing cutbacks.

In relation to pay and individual financial rewards,the following points should be made: Although dissalis-

faeiion with current pay is high in all the surveys ana-lyzed in this paper, both the Merit Systems ProtectionBoard survey and FEAS II indicate that financialrewards also play a role as incentives to managers.FBAS II suggests that those executives view them asmotivators for their employees as well. Even thoughfinancial resources are scarce in retrenchment, thesefindings suggest that some of them should be directed tothe career managers charged with implementing cut-backs. A caveat is in order: The link between perfor-mance and reward must be clear. Employee dissatisfac-tion in retrenchment is inevitable. Random—or political—award of whatever resources are avaiiable will onlyexacerbate that dissatisfaction. Performance evalua-tion, therefore, assumes a very important role in cut-back management.

In relation to allowing some managerial flexibility incutback targets, financial incentives can also play a role.A common political response to fiscal stress has beenacross-the-board cuts. Though this does achieve sav-ings, it punishes good and bad performers alike.Rewards and/or incentives based on unit or office per-formance, which allowed managers to reward those theyknow to be performing well, would enhance themanager's sense of performing a worthwhile task. Itwould also provide that manager with a managementtool that FEAS II indicates they believe to be important.

The above suggestions are not panaceas, but theseverity of the problem at hand precludes easy solu-tions. Though it is clear that our knowledge of motiva-tion in the public sector is inadequate, particularly giventhe change in economic conditions, it is also clear fromour findings that the lessons of reform suggest a needfor continuing commitment and participation by careerexecutives. Absent that commitment, they may leavepublic service.

In relation to retrenchment, it must be noted that theexpertise and assistance of career government managersis one resource that need not decline precipitously, eventhough economic resources are decreased. It is aresource that is critical to effective cutback manage-ment. To allow—or worse, to encourage—the destruc-tion of that capacity is to decrease our ability to solveimportant problems.

Notes

t. An exception is Mark Abramson and Richard Schmidt, "Cul-back Management and Civil Service Reform: Are the Two Com-patible?," in Patricia Ingraham and Caroiyn Ban (eds.). Legis-laiing Bureaucratic Change: The Civil Service Reform Act of1978 (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, forth-coming).

2. See Herbert Kaufman, The Limits of Organizational Change(Birmingham, Ala.: The University of Alabama Press, 1971).

3. These cla.ssifications were devised by Douglas McGregor. SeeThe Theory of Human Enterprise (New York: McGraw Hill.I960).

4. For further elaboration, .see J. Hackman, et al., "A New

Strategy for Job Enrichment," California Management Review(1975), pp. 55-71,

5. See Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (NewYork: Van Nostrand, 1968).

6. See F. Herzberg, "One More Time: How Do You MotivateEmployees?," Harvard Business Review (January-February1968), pp. 53-62.

7. Barry Bozeman, "A Behavioral Sciences Interpretation of theCivil Serviee Reform Aei," Midwest Review of Public Admin-istration (September 1979), p. 188. For additional analysis see E.L. Dei!s, Intrinsic Motivation (New York: Putnam, 1975).

8. See the U.S. Civil Serviee Commission, Executive Personnel in

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1983

liivn'.w

nnnj:'hv Fedenii Sfrvici-' {W^^Hhnwitm. D t .• CjovtuiriiciOffice, .\oveniber, i977),

9. Charles Levine, •'(hgani/anonal Decline aad C ushack Managemeiii," Puhlic Admimsa-anan Rev/cv.. \'ol. 38 {Itjiy-Aupns^1978). p. 317.

iO- Robert D. BefiO, ' i cadcrship in m Era v'i RcUcnduncm./'Public Adiiunis!ranfni Review, Vol 40 ^N:>s.t!rshcr-i)eceniher1980). p. 603.

n . ibid., p. b\9

\2. Because we were .somewhai concerned aboQi ;ran>Sernoj' li!;.-[es. oiis ol S!"'S fo cusbaek nianagemeitf, we a^ked \i^-y eonimeni'.oii earlis r drafu hom i^Cinbct^ of \\i<: St.'nior hxecutivc Servicejifui oiher governmenl luanagtTS. ! iu; quoiaiions inciuded iii I'vn--anieie were gatiiereil in re.sponse ks ihai rcque-^!. !"he coiyoit'ii-tators wish to remain anunvmous.

\^, Bruee Buchanan. "'111:..' Senjor hAccyUve Service: Hott We ( anTell If h Works/ ' Fui'iii^ Adnnni'.fniliori Review, Voi. 41 (May-June 1981), pp. 349-.158.

14. I hid.15. Ahiii K, (".antpbeli, "(jvil ScrvLc Rei'onn: A New Commh

iiicni." Public Adsnini.'.iru!i<in Review. Vol. . 8 (MaretvApril(978). pp. W-iOI.

16 S-rederick C, I'hayer, "The PieMdeofs Managerries^l Rcfortiis:1 heory X Triumphant." Pubiie Administmlion Review , Vol. 3K(July-August, i978), p. 314.

17, For varying pcrspociivcs, see U S. Vk-ni Systems Fro^.\:HonBoard, ,-l Rcpon on she Senior Execu;i\e Service (Washingion,D.C: U.S-Cktvenmient PnnUiig Olfice, Sep^-mber, 1981): Tik'National Academy of Puhisc .' dmml.s1ralK>sl, '•Tia" SeniorExecuuve Service," .An IfUersm Repori t»l ihc Panel nJ !heSAPA on fhe Public Service {Washingtim, D . C . Ociohc^198U: and Mark Abramsisn. Riehard Schniidt, and Sandra B'd\-a-r, "Hvahiating !he Civil Serviee Reform Act of 1978: ^ View^rom One Depa!tiiient," in Pahieia Ingraham and Carolvn Ban

ReJorni Aci. oJ 197H. op, ca(8. Daia Tor FUAS. I'hases i aiul 11. were otsrasned Uwn fl PR. .Ann

Ai'boi, Miehisas*. ICVW is noi r<;spu!j].ibi'. foi the ar.ai-.sis p^^•.ciited here

Federal Hi'iiicc. op co.20, I'or a more oosiipleSc espLuuuioii ••ee Pelei Colb> and Palnesa

ingraham. "Civil Service Rei'ojm: [Eidividnal Mi,-li\aiK.ins •.\n(\instJlnsional Chanse'- i.inde; the Senior I.xeeunve Service."~Rev!cy> df Public P'er\ounel AdniinL-itraiiij*.', Synipo-jun; o'c:Civd Service Reform Vol. 2 (Spring. 1982). p]). H)f l!t^.

21 r . S . Offiee oi Personnel Managensent. federal Dnplov'ji' \io.-iiHiC.-^: IH/ate fl. Pielhninary RepoU (U a si singi on. DA 'rAugusL i98l).

22. Bart>ii!ii Rom/ek and .1. SleplK'n flejidrieks. "Oiginii/alioo:!'hnolveoien: and Represen;ahve Bureaueraey: ( an We Hni e hBcjfii Ways?." .American Poliiu ai Science / •(J,>u. \'oL ^6iMarcli, 1982). pp. 7^-82,

?.''• See Fairieia Itigraharr. and Veier C olhy. "Poluieai Reionn andCfOxernoKTj! Maiiagc!: The (.'a\e oi ihe Senior FxecuH^eService," Pollc: Sn<iJii"^ Journal, Vo! : I (December, i982), pp.304 } r

24 See Toutnok' 12.25, Mari^ Abranison.. Rieliaid Schnsidi. and Siindia BaKlcr, op. ci.26. l^arbaja Rom/.ek, "fimfiiovee Ai:ili[de'i l.ndes CoiKiition^- oi'

•ieetr»ene,ss," papei presenicd at tfie .Atninai Meeting ol ;he,-\nieriean Polilieal Seienee Ass(>eianon. Denver, Colorado.Sepiember. 1982.

2". David Dil I mini. I'lie Pohlies of i 'ml Serviee Rclcnni. 1 he M'Un. lipoi Re.-:pofriibU' A<Ituinisiranon ;« drea! Pit Ham anil llie (-no'edSiaii''-: impublisiied I ' l i .D. disseriaiion, l.niiversiry (JI'Ma.ssachu-

vest- al Anilierst. 1982, p. i.'.V

SIS Qi in iit.Ii

.,.f.h. >.•'/ •••\