38. ABAKADA V PURISIMA GR 166715.doc

8/14/2019 38. ABAKADA V PURISIMA GR 166715.doc

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008]

ABAKADA GURO PART !"#T $%OR&ER! AA#'#( )O%%"CER#*&E&BER# #AON

#. A!CANTARA, ED +"NCENT #. A!BANO, RO&EO R. ROB"#O, RENE B. GORO#PE

AND ED"N R. #ANDO+A!, PET"T"ONER#, +#. -ON. CE#AR +. PUR"#"&A, "N -"#

CAPAC"T A# #ECRETAR O% %"NANCE, -ON. GU"!!ER&O !. PARANO, 'R., "N

-"# CAPAC"T A# CO&&"##"ONER O% T-E BUREAU O% "NTERNA! RE+ENUE, AND

-ON. A!BERTO D. !"NA, "N -"# CAPAC"T A# CO&&"##"ONER O% BUREAU O%

CU#TO, RE#PONDENT#.

D E C " # " O N

CORONA, '.

This petition for prohibition[1] seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing

Republic Act (RA) 933[!](Attrition Act of !"")#

RA 933 $as enacted to optimi%e the revenue&generation capabilit' and collection of the ureau of

nternal Revenue (R) and the ureau of *ustoms (+*)# The la$ intends to encourage R and

+* officials and emplo'ees to e,ceed their revenue targets b' providing a s'stem of re$ards and

sanctions through the creation of a Re$ards and ncentives -und (-und) and a Revenue .erformance

/valuation oard (oard)#[3]t covers all officials and emplo'ees of the R and the +* $ith at

least si, months of service0 regardless of emplo'ment status#[]

The -und is sourced from the collection of the R and the +* in e,cess of their revenue targets for

the 'ear0 as determined b' the 2evelopment udget and *oordinating *ommittee (2**)# An'

incentive or re$ard is taken from the fund and allocated to the R and the +* in proportion to their

contribution in the e,cess collection of the targeted amount of ta, revenue#[]

The oards in the R and the +* are composed of the ecretar' of the 2epartment of -inance(2+-) or his4her 5ndersecretar'0 the ecretar' of the 2epartment of udget and 6anagement (26)

or his4her 5ndersecretar'0 the 2irector 7eneral of the 8ational /conomic 2evelopment Authorit'

(8/2A) or his4her 2eput' 2irector 7eneral0 the *ommissioners of the R and the +* or their

2eput' *ommissioners0 t$o representatives from the rank&and&file emplo'ees and a representative

from the officials nominated b' their recogni%ed organi%ation#[]

/ach oard has the dut' to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation0 distribution and

release of the -und: (!) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and

emplo'ees $hose revenue collection falls short of the target: (3) terminate personnel in accordance$ith the criteria adopted b' the oard: () prescribe a s'stem for performance evaluation: () perform


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other functions0 including the issuance of rules and regulations and () submit an annual report to

*ongress#[;]

The 2+-0 260 8/2A0 R0 +* and the *ivil ervice *ommission (**) $ere tasked to

promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9330[transform[s] the officials and emplo'ees of the R and the +* into mercenaries and

bount' hunters> as the' $ill do their best onl' in consideration of such re$ards# Thus0 the s'stem of

re$ards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionall' mandated dut' of these

officials and emplo'ees to serve the people $ith utmost responsibilit'0 integrit'0 lo'alt' and

efficienc'#

.etitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the s'stem of re$ards and incentives onl' to officials

and emplo'ees of the R and the +* violates the constitutional guarantee of e?ual protection#

There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to $h' such a s'stem should not appl' to

officials and emplo'ees of all other government agencies#

n addition0 petitioners assert that the la$ undul' delegates the po$er to fi, revenue targets to the

.resident as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter# @hile ection ;(b) and (c) of RA 933

provides that R and +* officials ma' be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections

fall short of the target b' at least ;#0 the la$ does not0 ho$ever0 fi, the revenue targets to beachieved# nstead0 the fi,ing of revenue targets has been delegated to the .resident $ithout sufficient

standards# t $ill therefore be eas' for the .resident to fi, an unrealistic and unattainable target in

order to dismiss R or +* personnel#

-inall'0 petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it

violates the doctrine of separation of po$ers# @hile the legislative function is deemed accomplished

and completed upon the enactment and approval of the la$0 the creation of the congressional

oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the

la$#

n their comment0 respondents0 through the +ffice of the olicitor 7eneral0 ?uestion the petition for

being premature as there is no actual case or controvers' 'et# .etitioners have not asserted an' right or

claim that $ill necessitate the e,ercise of this *ourtBs Curisdiction# 8evertheless0 respondents

ackno$ledge that public polic' re?uires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this

case# The' assert that the allegation that the re$ard s'stem $ill breed mercenaries is mere speculation

and does not suffice to invalidate the la$# een in conCunction $ith the declared obCective of RA

9330 the la$ validl' classifies the R and the +* because the functions the' perform are distinct

from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities# 6oreover0 the la$ provides asufficient standard that $ill guide the e,ecutive in the implementation of its provisions# Dastl'0 the


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creation of the congressional oversight committee under the la$ enhances0 rather than violates0

separation of po$ers# t ensures the fulfillment of the legislative polic' and serves as a check to an'

over&accumulation of po$er on the part of the e,ecutive and the implementing agencies#

After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties0 the *ourt finds thatpetitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionalit' in favor of RA 9330 e,cept

as shall hereafter be discussed#

ACTUA! CA#E AND R"PENE##

An actual case or controvers' involves a conflict of legal rights0 an assertion of opposite legal claims

susceptible of Cudicial adCudication#[1"]A closel' related re?uirement is ripeness0 that is0 the ?uestion

must be ripe for adCudication# And a constitutional ?uestion is ripe for adCudication $hen the

governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it# [11]

Thus0 to be ripe for Cudicial adCudication0 the petitioner must sho$ a personal stake in the outcome of

the case or an inCur' to himself that can be redressed b' a favorable decision of the *ourt#[1!]

n this case0 aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a Cudicial controvers' b' the

mere enactment of the la$ even $ithout an' further overt act0 [13]petitioners fail either to assert an'

specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate an' direct adverse effect of the la$ on them# The'

are unable to sho$ a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an inCur' to themselves# +n this

account0 their petition is procedurall' infirm#

This not$ithstanding0 public interest re?uires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised b'petitioners# The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of

constitutionalit' in favor of the la$# And $here an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have

infringed the *onstitution0 it becomes not onl' the right but in fact the dut' of the Cudiciar' to settle

the dispute#[1]

ACCOUNTAB"!"T O% PUB!"C O%%"CER#

ection 10 Article 11 of the *onstitution statesE

ec# 1# .ublic office is a public trust# .ublic officers and emplo'ees must at all times be accountableto the people0 serve them $ith utmost responsibilit'0 integrit'0 lo'alt'0 and efficienc'0 act $ith

patriotism0 and Custice0 and lead modest lives#

.ublic office is a public trust# t must be discharged b' its holder not for his o$n personal gain but for

the benefit of the public for $hom he holds it in trust# ' demanding accountabilit' and service $ith

responsibilit'0 integrit'0 lo'alt'0 efficienc'0 patriotism and Custice0 all government officials and

emplo'ees have the dut' to be responsive to the needs of the people the' are called upon to serve#

.ublic officers enCo' the presumption of regularit' in the performance of their duties# This

presumption necessaril' obtains in favor of R and +* officials and emplo'ees# RA 933 operateson the basis thereof and reinforces it b' providing a s'stem of re$ards and sanctions for the purpose


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of encouraging the officials and emplo'ees of the R and the +* to e,ceed their revenue targets

and optimi%e their revenue&generation capabilit' and collection#[1]

The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrar' is re?uired to rebut it# t cannot be overturned

b' mere conCecture or denied in advance (as petitioners $ould have the *ourt do) speciall' in thiscase $here it is an underl'ing principle to advance a declared public polic'#

.etitionersB claim that the implementation of RA 933 $ill turn R and +* officials and emplo'ees

into >bount' hunters and mercenaries> is not onl' $ithout an' factual and legal basis: it is also purel'

speculative#

A la$ enacted b' *ongress enCo's the strong presumption of constitutionalit'# To Custif' its

nullification0 there must be a clear and une?uivocal breach of the *onstitution0 not a doubtful and

e?uivocal one#[1]To invalidate RA 933 based on petitionersB baseless supposition is an affront to

the $isdom not onl' of the legislature that passed it but also of the e,ecutive $hich approved it#

.ublic service is its o$n re$ard# 8evertheless0 public officers ma' b' la$ be re$arded for e,emplar'

and e,ceptional performance# A s'stem of incentives for e,ceeding the set e,pectations of a public

office is not anathema to the concept of public accountabilit'# n fact0 it recogni%es and reinforces

dedication to dut'0 industr'0 efficienc' and lo'alt' to public service of deserving government

personnel#

n United States v. Matthews0[1;]the 5## upreme *ourt validated a la$ $hich a$ards to officers of

the customs as $ell as other parties an amount not e,ceeding one&half of the net proceeds offorfeitures in violation of the la$s against smuggling# *iting Dorsheimer v. United States0[1bount' hunting or mercenar' activit'> or the product of the irregular

performance of official duties# +ne of these precautionar' measures is embodied in ection < of thela$E

/*#


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/?ualit' guaranteed under the e?ual protection clause is e?ualit' under the same conditions and

among persons similarl' situated: it is e?ualit' among e?uals0 not similarit' of treatment of persons

$ho are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the obCect to be accomplished# [19]

@hen things or persons are different in fact or circumstance0 the' ma' be treated in la$ differentl'# n

&ictoriano v. Eli'alde !ope (or)ers* Union0[!"]this *ourt declaredEThe guarant' of e?ual protection of the la$s is not a guarant' of e?ualit' in the application of the la$s

upon all citi%ens of the []tate# t is not0 therefore0 a re?uirement0 in order to avoid the constitutional

prohibition against ine?ualit'0 that ever' man0 $oman and child should be affected alike b' a statute#

/?ualit' of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merel' as such0

but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them# t guarantees e?ualit'0 not identit'

of rights# T Cost3tut3o os ot u3 tt t3gs 39 3::t 3 :9t ; tt 3

. T u< ?ot9t3o 93t3o s

to t3gs tt 3::t#"t os ot ?o3;3t


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The R performs the follo$ing functionsE

ec# 1


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,,, ,,, ,,, (emphasis supplied)

oth the R and the +* are bureaus under the 2+-# The' principall' perform the special function

of being the instrumentalities through $hich the tate e,ercises one of its great inherent functions &

ta,ation# ndubitabl'0 such substantial distinction is germane and intimatel' related to the purpose of

the la$# Fence0 the classification and treatment accorded to the R and the +* under RA 933full' satisf' the demands of e?ual protection#

UNDUE DE!EGAT"ON

T$o tests determine the validit' of delegation of legislative po$erE (1) the completeness test and (!)

the sufficient standard test# A la$ is complete $hen it sets forth therein the polic' to be e,ecuted0

carried out or implemented b' the delegate# [!]t la's do$n a sufficient standard $hen it provides

ade?uate guidelines or limitations in the la$ to map out the boundaries of the delegateBs authorit' and

prevent the delegation from running riot#[!;]To be sufficient0 the standard must specif' the limits of

the delegateBs authorit'0 announce the legislative polic' and identif' the conditions under $hich it is

to be implemented#[!3 ;= t Dt Bugt

Coo3t3g Co>>3tt $DBCC(0 in the follo$ing percentagesE

/,cess of *ollection of the/,cess the Revenue Targets

.ercent () of the /,cess*ollection to Accrue to the -und

3" or belo$ & 1

6ore than 3" & 1 of the first 3" plus !" of theremaining e,cess

The -und shall be deemed automaticall' appropriated the 'ear immediatel' follo$ing the 'ear $hen

the revenue collection target $as e,ceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal 'ear#


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Ru tgts st u 9o


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,,, ,,, ,,, (emphasis supplied)

*learl'0 RA 933 in no $a' violates the securit' of tenure of officials and emplo'ees of the R and

the +*# The guarantee of securit' of tenure onl' means that an emplo'ee cannot be dismissed from

the service for causes other than those provided b' la$ and onl' after due process is accorded the

emplo'ee#[31]n the case of RA 9330 it la's do$n a reasonable 'ardstick for removal ($hen therevenue collection falls short of the target b' at least ;#) $ith due consideration of all relevant

factors affecting the level of collection# This standard is analogous to inefficienc' and incompetence

in the performance of official duties0 a ground for disciplinar' action under civil service la$s# [3!]The

action for removal is also subCect to civil service la$s0 rules and regulations and compliance $ith

substantive and procedural due process#

At an' rate0 this *ourt has recogni%ed the follo$ing as sufficient standardsE >public interest0> >Custice

and e?uit'0> >public convenience and $elfare> and >simplicit'0 econom' and $elfare#> [33] n this

case0 the declared polic' of optimi%ation of the revenue&generation capabilit' and collection of the

R and the +* is infused $ith public interest#

#EPARAT"ON O% POER#

ection 1! of RA 933 providesE

/*# 1!# 1oint "on2ressional Oversi2ht "ommittee# GHI There is hereb' created a =oint

*ongressional +versight *ommittee composed of seven 6embers from the enate and seven

6embers from the Fouse of Representatives# The 6embers from the enate shall be appointed b' the

enate .resident0 $ith at least t$o senators representing the minorit'# The 6embers from the Fouse

of Representatives shall be appointed b' the peaker $ith at least t$o members representing theminorit'# After the +versight *ommittee $ill have approved the implementing rules and regulations

(RR) it shall thereafter becomefncts officioand therefore cease to e,ist#

The =oint *ongressional +versight *ommittee in RA 933 $as created for the purpose of approving

the implementing rules and regulations (RR) formulated b' the 2+-0 260 8/2A0 R0 +* and

**# +n 6a' !!0 !""0 it approved the said RR# -rom then on0 it became fncts officioand ceased

to e,ist# Fence0 the issue of its alleged encroachment on the e,ecutive function of implementing and

enforcing the la$ ma' be considered moot and academic#

This not$ithstanding0 this might be as good a time as an' for the *ourt to confront the issue of theconstitutionalit' of the =oint *ongressional +versight *ommittee created under RA 933 (or other

similar la$s for that matter)#

The scholarl' discourse of 6r# =ustice (no$ *hief =ustice) .uno on the concept of congressional

oversight inMacalintal v. "ommission on Elections[3]is illuminatingE

"oncept and bases of con2ressional oversi2ht

roadl' defined0 t ?o o: os3gt >;9s


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;uu9t39 9o>? o;@9t3s, $;( to t>3 t g93s

?o?33st, $9( to 3t 9ut3 st 3sost=, $( to ?t 9ut3

usu?t3o o: upervision> connotes a continuing and informed a$areness on the part of acongressional committee regarding exective operationsin a given administrative area# @hile both


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congressional scrutin' and investigation involve in?uir' into past exective branch actionsin order to

influence future e,ecutive branch performance0 con2ressional spervision allows "on2ress to

scrtini'e the exercise of dele2ated law/ma)in2 athority, and permits "on2ress to retain part of that

dele2ated athority#

"on2ress exercises spervision over the exective a2encies thro2h its veto power. t typically

tili'es veto provisions when 2rantin2 the -resident or an exective a2ency the power to proml2ate

re2lations with the force of law. +hese provisions re3ire the -resident or an a2ency to present the

proposed re2lations to "on2ress, which retains a 4ri2ht4 to approve or disapprove any re2lation

before it ta)es effect.uch legislative veto provisions usuall' provide that a proposed regulation $ill

become a la$ after the e,piration of a certain period of time0 onl' if *ongress does not affirmativel'

disapprove of the regulation in the meantime# Dess fre?uentl'0 the statute provides that a proposed

regulation $ill become la$ if *ongress affirmativel' approves it#

Spporters of le2islative vetostress that it is necessar' to maintain the balance of po$er bet$een the

legislative and the e,ecutive branches of government as it offers la$makers a $a' to delegate vast

po$er to the e,ecutive branch or to independent agencies $hile retaining the option to cancel

particular e,ercise of such po$er $ithout having to pass ne$ legislation or to repeal e,isting la$#

The' contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountabilit' as it provides legislative

check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies# +ne proponent thus e,plainsE

t is too late to debate the merits of this delegation polic'E the polic' is too deepl' embedded in our

la$ and practice# t suffices to sa' that the comple,ities of modern government have often led

*ongress&$hether b' actual or perceived necessit'& to legislate b' declaring broad polic' goals and

general statutor' standards0 leaving the choice of polic' options to the discretion of an e,ecutiveofficer# *ongress articulates legislative aims0 but leaves their implementation to the Cudgment of

parties $ho ma' or ma' not have participated in or agreed $ith the development of those aims#

*onse?uentl'0 absent safeguards0 in man' instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme could be

effectedE *ongress proposes0 the /,ecutive disposes# +ne safeguard0 of course0 is the legislative

po$er to enact ne$ legislation or to change e,isting la$# ut $ithout some means of overseeing post

enactment activities of the e,ecutive branch0 *ongress $ould be unable to determine $hether its

policies have been implemented in accordance $ith legislative intent and thus $hether legislative

intervention is appropriate#

ts opponents0 ho$ever0 critici'e the le2islative veto as uu 9o9>t u?o t 9ut3?ogt3s# The' urge that = ?ostF9t>t >sus ut ;= t


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permits *ongress to participate prospectivel' in the approval or disapproval of >sbordinate law> or

those enacted b' the e,ecutive branch pursuant to a delegation of authorit' b' *ongress# The' further

argue that legislative veto >is a necessar' response b' *ongress to the accretion of polic' control b'

forces outside its chambers#> n an era of delegated authorit'0 the' point out that legislative veto >is

the most efficient means *ongress has 'et devised to retain control over the evolution andimplementation of its polic' as declared b' statute#>

n mmi2ration and 5atrali'ation Service v. "hadha0 t U.#. #u?> Cout so


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inherent in a democratic s'stem of government# t ma' in fact even enhance the separation of po$ers

as it prevents the over&accumulation of po$er in the e,ecutive branch#

Fo$ever0 to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment >be'ond the legislative sphere0> the

*onstitution imposes t$o basic and related constraints on *ongress# [3;]t ma' not vest itself0 an' ofits committees or its members $ith either e,ecutive or Cudicial po$er#[3single0 finel' $rought and e,haustivel' considered0 procedures>

specified under the *onstitution0[39]including the procedure for enactment of la$s and presentment#

Thus0 an' post&enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutin' and

investigation# n particular0 congressional oversight must be confined to the follo$ingE

(1) scrutin' based primaril' on

*ongressB po$er of

appropriation and the budgethearings conducted in

connection $ith it0 its po$er

to ask heads of departmentsto appear before and be heard

b' either of its Fouses on an'

matter pertaining to theirdepartments and its po$er of

confirmation["]and

(!) investigation and

monitoring[1] of the

implementation of la$spursuant to the po$er of

*ongress to conduct in?uiries

in aid of legislation#[!]

An' action or step be'ond that $ill undermine the separation of po$ers guaranteed b' the

*onstitution# Degislative vetoes fall in this class#

Degislative veto is a statutor' provision re?uiring the .resident or an administrative agenc' to present

the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a la$ to *ongress $hich0 b' itself or through a

committee formed b' it0 retains a >right> or >po$er> to approve or disapprove such regulations before

the' take effect# As such0 a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in

the form of an in$ard&turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through

scrutin' and investigation) to an agenc' to $hich *ongress has b' la$ initiall' delegated broad

po$ers#[3]t radicall' changes the design or structure of the *onstitutionBs diagram of po$er as it

entrusts to *ongress a direct role in enforcing0 appl'ing or implementing its o$n la$s#[]


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*ongress has t$o options $hen enacting legislation to define national polic' $ithin the broad

hori%ons of its legislative competence#[]t can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the

e,ecutive branch the responsibilit' for making necessar' managerial decisions in conformit' $ith

those standards#[] n the latter case0 the la$ must be complete in all its essential terms and

conditions $hen it leaves the hands of the legislature#[;]Thus0 $hat is left for the e,ecutive branchor the concerned administrative agenc' $hen it formulates rules and regulations implementing the la$

is to fill up details (supplementar' rule&making) or ascertain facts necessar' to bring the la$ into

actual operation (contingent rule&making)#[


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b' $hich it shall like$ise be reconsidered0 and if approved b' t$o&thirds of all the 6embers of that

Fouse0 it shall become a la$# n all such cases0 the votes of each Fouse shall be determined b' yeasor

nays0 and the names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in its =ournal# The .resident

shall communicate his veto of an' bill to the Fouse $here it originated $ithin thirt' da's after the

date of receipt thereof: other$ise0 it shall become a la$ as if he had signed it# (emphasis supplied)/ver' bill passed b' *ongress must be presented to the .resident for approval or veto# n the absence

of presentment to the .resident0 no bill passed b' *ongress can become a la$# n this sense0 la$&

making under the *onstitution is a Coint act of the Degislature and of the /,ecutive# Assuming that

legislative veto is a valid legislative act $ith the force of la$0 it cannot take effect $ithout such

presentment even if approved b' both chambers of *ongress#

n sum0 t$o steps are re?uired before a bill becomes a la$# -irst0 it must be approved b' both Fouses

of *ongress#[]econd0 it must be presented to and approved b' the .resident# []As summari%ed

b' =ustice sagani *ru%[]and -r# =oa?uin 7# ernas0 #=#[;]0 the follo$ing is the procedure for the

approval of billsE

A bill is introduced b' an' member of the Fouse of Representatives or the enate e,cept for some

measures that must originate onl' in the former chamber#

The first reading involves onl' a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral b' the

enate .resident or the peaker to the proper committee for stud'#

The bill ma' be >killed> in the committee or it ma' be recommended for approval0 $ith or $ithout

amendments0 sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon# f there are other bills of the same

nature or purpose0 the' ma' all be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as acommittee bill#

+nce reported out0 the bill shall be calendared for second reading# t is at this stage that the bill is read

in its entiret'0 scrutini%ed0 debated upon and amended $hen desired# The second reading is the most

important stage in the passage of a bill#

The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are distributed at

least three da's before the third reading# +n the third reading0 the members merel' register their votes

and e,plain them if the' are allo$ed b' the rules# 8o further debate is allo$ed#

+nce the bill passes third reading0 it is sent to the other chamber0 $here it $ill also undergo the three

readings# f there are differences bet$een the versions approved b' the t$o chambers0 a conference

committee[


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+he -resident*s role in law/ma)in2#

The final step is submission to the .resident for approval# +nce approved0 it takes effect as la$ after

the re?uired publication#["]

@here *ongress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the la$ it has enacted pursuant tosufficient standards established in the said la$0 the la$ must be complete in all its essential terms and

conditions $hen it leaves the hands of the legislature# And it ma' be deemed to have left the hands of

the legislature $hen it becomes effective because it is onl' upon effectivit' of the statute that legal

rights and obligations become available to those entitled b' the language of the statute# ubCect to the

indispensable re?uisite of publication under the due process clause0[1]the determination as to $hen

a la$ takes effect is $holl' the prerogative of *ongress# [!]As such0 it is onl' upon its effectivit'

that a la$ ma' be e,ecuted and the e,ecutive branch ac?uires the duties and po$ers to e,ecute the

said la$# efore that point0 the role of the e,ecutive branch0 particularl' of the .resident0 is limited to

approving or vetoing the la$#[3]

-rom the moment the la$ becomes effective0 an' provision of la$ that empo$ers *ongress or an' of

its members to pla' an' role in the implementation or enforcement of the la$ violates the principle of

separation of po$ers and is thus unconstitutional# 5nder this principle0 a provision that re?uires

*ongress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a la$ after it has alread' taken effect

shall be unconstitutional0 as is a provision that allo$s *ongress or its members to overturn an'

directive or ruling made b' the members of the e,ecutive branch charged $ith the implementation of

the la$#

-ollo$ing this rationale0 ection 1! of RA 933 should be struck do$n as unconstitutional# @hilethere ma' be similar provisions of other la$s that ma' be invalidated for failure to pass this standard0

the *ourt refrains from invalidating them $holesale but $ill do so at the proper time $hen an

appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought before us#[]

The ne,t ?uestion to be resolved isE $hat is the effect of the unconstitutionalit' of ection 1! of RA

933 on the other provisions of the la$M @ill it render the entire la$ unconstitutionalM 8o#

ection 13 of RA 933 providesE

/*# 13# Separability "lase# & f an' provision of this Act is declared invalid b' a competent court0the remainder of this Act or an' provision not affected b' such declaration of invalidit' shall remain

in force and effect#

n +atad v. Secretary of the Department of Ener2y0[]the *ourt laid do$n the follo$ing rulesE

The2eneral rleis that $here part of a statute is void as repugnant to the *onstitution0 $hile another

part is valid0 the valid portion0 if separable from the invalid0 ma' stand and be enforced# The presence

of a separabilit' clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separabilit'0

rather than complete nullit' of the statute# To Custif' this result0 the valid portion must be so far

independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature $ould have enacted it

b' itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionall' enact the other# /nough must remain tomake a complete0 intelligible and valid statute0 $hich carries out the legislative intent# , , ,


17/35

The exception to the 2eneral rle is that $hen the parts of a statute are so mutuall' dependent and

connected0 as conditions0 considerations0 inducements0 or compensations for each other0 as to $arrant

a belief that the legislature intended them as a $hole0 the nullit' of one part $ill vitiate the rest# n

making the parts of the statute dependent0 conditional0 or connected $ith one another0 the legislatureintended the statute to be carried out as a $hole and $ould not have enacted it if one part is void0 in

$hich case if some parts are unconstitutional0 all the other provisions thus dependent0 conditional0 or

connected must fall $ith them#

The separabilit' clause of RA 933 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach an'

invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter ma' continue in force and effect# The

valid portions can stand independentl' of the invalid section# @ithout ection 1!0 the remaining

provisions still constitute a complete0 intelligible and valid la$ $hich carries out the legislative intent

to optimi%e the revenue&generation capabilit' and collection of the R and the +* b' providing for

a s'stem of re$ards and sanctions through the Re$ards and ncentives -und and a Revenue

.erformance /valuation oard#

To be effective0 administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to

enforce or implement e,isting la$ pursuant to a valid delegation# The RR of RA 933 $ere

published on 6a' 3"0 !"" in t$o ne$spapers of general circulation[]and became effective 1

da's thereafter#[;]5ntil and unless the contrar' is sho$n0 the RR are presumed valid and effective

even $ithout the approval of the =oint *ongressional +versight *ommittee#

-ERE%ORE0 the petition is hereb' PART"A!! GRANTED. ection 1! of RA 933 creating a

=oint *ongressional +versight *ommittee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of thela$ is declared UNCON#T"TUT"ONA! and therefore NU!!and +O"D. The constitutionalit' of

the remaining provisions of RA 933 is UP-E!D# .ursuant to ection 13 of RA 9330 the rest of the

provisions remain in force and effect#

#O ORDERED#

-no, ". 1., 6ismbin2, 7nares/Santia2o, 8stria/Martine', "arpio Morales, 8'cna, "hico/

5a'ario, &elasco, 1r., 5achra, !eyes, Leonardo/De "astro,andBrion, 11.0 concur#

"arpio, 1.0 ee separate concurring opinion#+in2a, 1.0 .lease see concurring opinion#


18/35

NAdvocates and Adherents of ocial =ustice for chool Teachers and Allied @orkers#

[1]5nder Rule of the Rules of *ourt#

[!]An Act to mprove Revenue *ollection .erformance of the ureau of nternal Revenue (R) and

the ureau of *ustoms (+*) Through the *reation of a Re$ards and ncentives -und and of aRevenue .erformance /valuation oard and for +ther .urposes#

[3]ection !0 RA 933#

[]ection 30 id#

[]ection 0 id#

[]ection 0 id#

[;]ection ;0 id#

[


19/35

[!!]8mbros v. "ommission on 8dit0 7#R# 8o# 19;""0 3" =une !""0 ! *RA ;!#

[!3]ection !0 RA 933#

[!]ection 1


20/35

[]d# at 11#

[]Metropolitan (ashin2ton 8irports 8thority v. "iti'ens for the 8batement of 8irport 5oise0spra#

[;]Ed v. Ericta0 1 .hil# 9 (19;")#

[

[1]eeEslao v. "ommission on 8dit0spra#

[!]t is also for these reasons that the 5nited tates upreme *ourt struck do$n legislative vetoes asunconstitutional inmmi2ration and 5atrali'ation Service v. "hadha(! 5## 919 [19


21/35

["]Spra note ;#

[1]ee ection 10 Article of the *onstitution# n +a9:ada v. +vera(!3" .hil# !the right of the people to information on matters of

public concern#>

[!]As much is recogni%ed in Article ! of the *ivil *ode $hich states that >Da$s shall take effectafter fifteen da's follo$ing the completion of their publication either in the +fficial 7a%ette0 or in ane$spaper of general circulation in the .hilippines0 unless it is other$ise provided#> +a9:adarecogni%ed that >unless it is other$ise provided> referred to the date of effectivit'# impl' put0 a la$$hich is silent as to its effectivit' date takes effect fifteen da's follo$ing publication0 though there isno impediment for *ongress to provide for a different effectivit' date#

[3]t has been suggested b' 6r# =ustice Antonio T# *arpio that ection 1! of RA 933 is like$iseunconstitutional because it violates the principle of separation of po$ers0 particularl' $ith respect tothe e,ecutive and the legislative branches# mplicit in this claim is the proposition that the abilit' of

the .resident to promulgate implementing rules to legislation is inherent in the e,ecutive branch#

There has long been a trend to$ards the delegation of po$ers0 especiall' of legislative po$ers0 even ifnot e,pressl' permitted b' the *onstitution# (# *ortes0 Administrative Da$0 at 1!&13#) 2elegation oflegislative po$ers is permissible unless the delegation amounts to a surrender or abdication of

po$ers# (d#) Recent instances of delegated legislative po$ers upheld b' the *ourt include the po$erof the 2epartments of =ustice and Fealth to promulgate rules and regulations on lethal inCection(Eche2aray v. Secretary of 1stice0 3< .hil# 1" [199fi, the details in the e,ecution and enforcement of a polic' set out in the la$> are called>supplementar' or detailed legislation># (d#0 at !;3#) +ther commentators such as -r# ernas (ernas0supra note


22/35

in the drafting of the implementing rules# This set&up does not offend the separation of po$ersbet$een the branches as it is sanctioned b' the delegation principle#

Apart from $hatever rule&making po$er that *ongress ma' delegate to the .resident0 the latter hasinherent ordinance po$ers covering the e,ecutive branch as part of the po$er of e,ecutive control

(>The .resident shall have control of all the e,ecutive departments0 bureaus and offices###> ection 1;0Article J0 *onstitution#)# ' its nature0 this ordinance po$er does not re?uire or entail delegationfrom *ongress# uch facult' must be distinguished from the authorit' to issue implementing rules tolegislation $hich does not inhere in the presidenc' but instead0 as e,plained earlier0 is delegated b'*ongress#

The marked distinction bet$een the .residentBs po$er to issue intrabranch orders and instructions orinternal rules for the e,ecutive branch0 on one hand0 and the .residentBs authorit' b' virtue oflegislative delegation to issue implementing rules to legislation0 on the other0 is embodied in the ruleson publication0 as e,plained in +a9:ada v. +vera (7#R# 8o# D&3910 !9 2ecember 19that is0 regulating onl' the personnel of the administrative agenc' and not the public0 need

not be published# 8either is publication re?uired of the so&called letters of instructions issued b'administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be follo$ed b' their subordinates in the

performance of their duties#> (d., at ) The dispensation $ith publication in such instances isrooted in the ver' nature of the issuances0 i.e.0 the' are not binding on the public# The' neither createrights nor impose obligations $hich are enforceable in court# ince the' are issued pursuant to the

po$er of e,ecutive control0 and are directed onl' at members of the e,ecutive branch0 there is noconstitutional need for their publication#

Fo$ever0 $hen the presidential issuance does create rights and obligations affecting the public atlarge0 as implementing rules certainl' do0 then publication is mandator'# n e,plaining $h' this is so0the *ourt $ent as far as to note that such rules and regulations are designed >to enforce or implement

e,isting la$ ?usut to


23/35

in the 3>?tt3o o 9ut3o o:


24/35

The controvers' rests on the so&called >legislative veto>0 defined b' Tribe as >measures allo$ing

[*ongress]0 or one of its Fouses or committees0 to revie$ and revoke the actions of federal agenciesand e,ecutive departments#>[1]+ur *onstitution specificall' neither prohibits nor allo$s legislative

vetoes0 unlike presidential vetoes0 $hich are formall' authori%ed under ection !;0 Article J# 5ntil

toda'0 *ourt has like$ise declined so far to pass Cudgment on the constitutionalit' of a legislative

veto#[!]

The *ourt is unanimous that a legislative veto0 such as that contained in ection 1! of Rep# Act 8o#

933 is unconstitutional# uch a ruling $ould be of momentous conse?uence0 not onl' because the

issue has never been settled before0 but also because man' of our statutes incorporate a similarl'

$orded provision that empo$ers members of *ongress to approve the mplementing Rules of various

particular la$s# 6oreover0 the invalidation of legislative vetoes $ill send a definite signal to *ongress

that its current understanding of the e,tent of legislative po$ers is a$r'#

*oncededl'0 our ruling $ill greatl' affect the $orkings of the legislative branch of government# t

$ould thus be intellectuall' honest to also consider the ?uestion from the perspective of that branch

$hich is the branch most affected b' that ruling# +f course0 the perspective of the e,ecutive should be

reckoned $ith as $ell since it has traditionall' inveighed against legislative vetoes# till0 if $e are to

consider the congressional perspective of the ?uestion0 there $ill emerge important nuances to the

?uestion that should dissuade against an' simplistic anal'sis of the issue#

.

have previousl' intimated that the .resident0 in chartering the e,tent of his plenar' po$ers0 ma' be

accorded a degree of fle,ibilit' for so long as he is not bound b' an' specific constitutional

proscription# That same degree of deference should be e,tended to *ongress as $ell# Thus0 $ish to

in?uire into $hether there is a constitutionall' Custifiable means to affirm legislative vetoes#

The emergence of the legislative veto in the 5nited tates coincided $ith the decline of the non&

delegation doctrine0 $hich barred *ongress from delegating its la$&making po$ers else$here#[3]6odern Curisprudence has authori%ed the delegation of la$making po$ers to administrative agencies0

and there are resulting concerns that there is no constitutional assurance that the agencies are

responsive to the peopleBs $ill#[]-rom that frame$ork0 the legislative veto can be seen as a means of

limiting agenc' rule&making authorit' b' lodging final control over the implementing rules to

*ongress# >ut instead of controlling agenc' polic' in advance b' la'ing out a roadmap in the statute

creating the agenc'0 *ongress no$ proposes to control polic' as it develops in notice&and&comment

rulemaking0 after the agenc'Bs e,pert staff and interested members of the public have had an

opportunit' to assist in its formation#>[]t is a negative check b' *ongress on policies proposed b'

the agencies0 and not a means for making polic' directl'#[]


25/35

-rom the perspective of *ongress0 the legislative veto affords ma,imum consideration to the plenar'

po$er of legislation0 as it bolsters assurances that the legislative polic' embodied in the statute $ill be

faithfull' e,ecuted upon its implementation# The faithful e,ecution of the la$s of the land is a

constitutional obligation imposed on the .resident[;]0 'et as a matter of practice0 there could be a

difference of opinion bet$een the e,ecutive and legislative branches as to the meaning of the la$# Theclash ma' be especiall' telling if the .resident and *ongress are politicall' hostile $ith each other0

and it bears notice that the legislative veto in the 5nited tates became especiall' popular beginning

in the earl' 19;"s0 $hen the ties bet$een the 2emocratic&controlled *ongress and the Republican

.resident Richard 8i,on $ere especiall' fra'ed#[# To take another e,ample0 ho$ are $e to

reconcile article Bs grant to *ongress of the po$er to appropriate mone' $ith article Bs grant to the

.resident of the po$er to supervise its e,penditureM 6ust the .resident spend all that *ongress

appropriatesM *ongress has addressed this conflict0 authori%ing the .resident to defer certain

e,penditures subCect to a legislative veto#[9]

There are practical demerits imputed as $ell to the legislative veto0 such as the dela' in theimplementation of the la$ that ma' ensue $ith re?uiring congressional approval of the implementing

rules#[1"]Oet the ?uestion must ultimatel' rest not on the convenience or $isdom of the legislative

veto device0 but on $hether it is constitutionall' permissible#

n 19


26/35

respect to the =oint *ongressional +versight *ommittee under Rep# Act 8o# 9330 composed as it is

b' seven 6embers from the enate and seven 6embers from the Fouse of Representatives#[13]

"hadha emphasi%ed that the bills passed b' the 5## *ongress must be presented for approval to the

.resident of the 5nited tates in order that the' ma' become la$#[1]ection !;(1)0 Article J of our*onstitution imposes a similar presentment re?uirement# "hadha also noted that a bill must be

concurred in b' a maCorit' of both Fouses of *ongress# 5nder our *onstitution0 *ongress consists of

a Fouse of Representatives and a enate0 and the underl'ing uncontroverted implication is that both

Fouses must concur to the bill before it can become la$# Assuming that the approval of the

mplementing Rules to Rep# Act 8o# 933 b' seven 6embers from each Fouse of *ongress is a

legislative act0 such act fails either the presentment or bicameralism re?uirement# uch approval is

neither presented to the .resident of the .hilippines for consent0 nor concurred in b' a maCorit' of

either Fouse of *ongress#

Oet $ith respect to the implications of "hadhaon the principle of separation of po$ers0 there are

critical informed comments against that decision# "hadhainvolved the statutor' authorit' of either

Fouse of *ongress to disapprove the decision of the e,ecutive branch to allo$ a deportable alien to

remain in the 5nited tates# The maCorit' had characteri%ed such disapproval as a legislative act0 since

it >had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights0 duties and relations of persons># [1]Oet that

emphasis >on the labels of legislative0 e,ecutive and Cudicial> $as critici%ed as >provid[ing] the

rhetorical ammunition for a variet' of cases seeking Cudicial reassessment of the constitutionalit' not

onl' of the great number of statutes that have incorporated some kind of legislative veto mechanism0

but of regulator' statutes in general that sought to delegate legislative0 e,ecutive and Cudicial po$er0

and various combinations thereof0 to the unelected officials that run the various federal agencies#>[1]

-isher presents a veritable laundr' list of criticisms of the "hadhareasoning0 replete $ith accusations

that the anal'sis emplo'ed on separation of po$ers detracted from the intent of the -ramers0 resulting

in giving the >e,ecutive branch a one&sided advantage in an accommodation that $as meant to be a

careful balancing of e,ecutive and legislative interests>#[1;]Fe further observedE

The *ourtBs misreading of histor' and congressional procedures has produced some strange results# ts

theor' of government is too much at odds $ith the practices developed over a period of decades b'

the political branches# 8either administrators nor congressmen $ant the static model proferred b' the

*ourt# The conditions that spa$ned the legislative veto a half centur' ago have not disappeared#/,ecutive officials still $ant substantial latitude in administering delegated authorit': legislators still

insist on maintaining control $ithout having to pass another la$# The e,ecutive and legislative

branches $ill0 therefore develop substitutes to serve as the functional e?uivalent of the legislative

veto# -orms $ill change but not po$er relationships and the need for 3id pro 3o#[1


27/35

could have been $rought onl' be legislation re?uiring his deportation# The difficult' $ith this

anal'sis is that the same observations appl' $ith e?ual validit' to nearl' all e,ercises of delegated

authorit'0 $hether b' a Fouse of *ongress or b' an e,ecutive department or an administrative

agenc'# oth through rule&making and through case&b'&case adCudication0 e,ercises of delegated

authorit' change legal rights and privileges no less than do full&fledged la$s#

There $as perhaps less need than the *ourt perceived to s?uee%e the legislative veto into one of the

three pigeonholes envisioned b' the -ramers# /ven if *ongressB action had been deemed >e,ecutive>

in nature0 it presumabl' $ould have been unconstitutional0 since *ongress ma' make0 but not e,ecute

the la$s# And if the legislative veto had been deemed >Cudicial0> it $ould still have violated the

separation of po$ers0 as =ustice .o$ell recogni%ed in his concurring opinion#[19]

The maCorit' in "hadhadid not address the realit' that the 5## *ongress had relied on the legislative

veto device for over five decades[!"]0 or for that matter0 the valid concerns over the e,ecutive

usurpation of legislative prerogatives that led to the invention of the veto as a countervailing measure#

=ustice 'ron @hite relied e,tensivel' on these concerns in his dissenting opinion in "hadha#

8onetheless0 the invalidation of the legislative veto in "hadhahas caused serious discussion as to

alternative constitutional means through $hich *ongress could still ensure that its legislative

intentions $ould not be countermanded b' the e,ecutive branch# +n one e,treme0 a Republican

congressman0 8ick mith of 6ichigan0 filed a bill re?uiring that significant ne$ regulations adopted

b' administrative agencies be approved b' a Coint resolution of *ongress before the' $ould become

effective#[!1]Dess constitutionall' controversial perhaps $ere the suggestions of =ustice re'er in

remarks he made after "hadha$as decided# Fe e,plained that >*ongress un?uestionabl' retains a

host of traditional $eapons in its legislative and political arsenal that can accomplish some of thevetoBs obCectives#>[!!]

These include the po$er to provide that legislation delegating authorit' to the e,ecutive e,pires ever'

so often# To continue to e,ercise that authorit'0 the e,ecutive $ould have to seek congressional

approval0 at $hich point past agenc' behavior that *ongress disliked $ould become the subCect of

serious debate# 6oreover0 *ongress might tailor its statutes more specificall'0 limiting e,ecutive

po$er# -urther0 *ongress can re?uire the .resident0 before taking action0 to consult $ith congressional

representatives $hose vie$s $ould carr' significant political $eight# Additionall'0 *ongress can

dela' implementation of an e,ecutive action (as it does $hen the upreme *ourt promulgates rules of

civil procedure) until *ongress has had time to consider it an to enact legislation preventing the actionfrom taking effect# -inall'0 each 'ear *ongress considers the agenc'Bs budget# f a significant group of

legislators strongl' opposes a particular agenc' decision0 it might $ell succeed in including a sentence

in the appropriations bill den'ing the agenc' funds to enforce that decision#[!3]

raise these points because even $ith the invalidation of the legislative veto0 *ongress need not

simpl' 'ield to the e,ecutive branch# The invalidation of the legislative veto can be mistakenl'

perceived as signal b' the e,ecutive branch that it can0 in the guise of rule&making po$er0 adopt

measures not authori%ed or even forbidden in the enabling legislation# f that happens0 undue $eight

$ill be shifted to the e,ecutive branch0 much like $hat had happened $hen former .resident 6arcos

e,ercised both e,ecutive and legislative po$ers# +ne might correctl' argue that the Cudicial branch


28/35

ma' still e,ercise corrective relief against such unauthori%ed e,ercise b' the e,ecutive [!]0 'et the

relief ma' not come for 'ears to come0 considering the inherentl' deliberative Cudicial process#

do believe that there is a constitutionall' sound mechanism through $hich *ongress ma' validl'

influence the approval of a la$Bs mplementing Rules# ection 1! of Rep# Act 8o# 933 ma' not besuch a means0 but maintain that it $ould be highl' useful for the *ourt to e,plain ho$ this can be

accomplished# n this light0 submit the follo$ing proposed frame$ork for invalidating the legislative

veto $hile recogni%ing the pre&eminent congressional prerogative in defining the manner ho$

legislation is to be implemented#

.

@e can consider that in the enactment and implementation of a la$0 there is a legislative phase and an

e,ecutive phase# The legislative phase encompasses the period from the initiation of a bill in *ongress

until it becomes effective as a la$# +n the other hand0 the e,ecutive phase begins the moment the la$

is effective and falls $ithin the capacit' of the e,ecutive branch to enforce#

8otabl'0 as such0 it is onl' upon the effectivit' of the statute that legal rights and obligations become

available to those entitled b' the language of the statute# 8o$0 subCect to the indispensable re?uisite of

publication under the due process clause0[!] the determination as to $hen a la$ takes effect is

$holl' the prerogative of *ongress#[!]As such0 it is onl' upon effectivit' that the la$ ma' be

e,ecuted0 and the e,ecutive branch ac?uires the duties and po$ers to e,ecute that la$# efore that

point0 the role of the e,ecutive branch0 particularl' the .resident0 is limited to signing or vetoing the

la$# All other po$ers of government that attach to the proposed la$ are e,ercised e,clusivel' b'*ongress and are hence0 legislative in character# n fact0 the 5nited tates upreme *ourt0 speaking

through =ustice lack0 has gone as far as to hold that the *onstitution >limits [the .residentBs]

functions in the la$making process to the recommending of la$s he thinks $ise and the vetoing of

la$s he thinks bad#>[!;]

t is viable to hold that an' provision of la$ that empo$ers *ongress or an' of its members to pla'

an' role in the implementation or enforcement of the la$ after the e,ecution phase has begun violates

the principle of separation of po$ers and is thus unconstitutional# 5nder this principle0 a provision

that re?uires *ongress or its members to approve the mplementing Rules after the la$ has alread'taken effect is unconstitutional0 as is a provision that allo$s *ongress or its members to overturn an'

directive or ruling made b' those members of the e,ecutive branch charged $ith the implementation

of the la$#

This time or phase demarcation not onl' affords a convenient 'ardstick b' $hich to assess the

constitutionalit' of a legislated role for *ongress vis&S &vis a la$0 it also he$s to the proper allocation

of governmental po$ers# Again0 the e,ercise of e,ecutive po$ers relative to a statute can onl'

emanate after the effectivit' of the la$0 since before that point0 said la$ cannot be e,ecuted or

enforced# 5ntil a la$ becomes effective0 there are no e,ecutive functions attached to the la$#


29/35

+f course0 follo$ing this rationale0 ection 1! of Rep# Act 8o# 933 $ill have to be invalidated# To

cite one outstanding e,ample of $hat else $ould be invalidated as a result is the =oint *ongressional

.o$er *ommission established in the /.RA (Rep# Act 8o# 913)0 $here the *ommission composed

of several members of *ongress e,ercises a continuing role in overseeing the implementation of the

/.RA#[!


30/35

n the .hilippines0 the po$er of e,ecutive officials to enact rules to regulate the internal management

of e,ecutive departments $as specificall' allocated to them b' a statute0 the Administrative *ode of

19#[3]ut b' and large0 an' problem left b' the absence of

clear and e,plicit statutor' language is avoided in turn b' the statutor' delegation of legislative po$er

to e,ecutive officials to vest them sufficient discretion to fill in the details# [3;]

@e thus cannot detract from the fundamental principle that rule&making po$er is legislative in

character and e,ercised b' e,ecutive officials onl' upon a statutor' delegation of legislative po$er#

As -isher summari%es the peculiar d'namicE

Ps3ts o;


31/35

$ith the disavo$al of that theor'0 greater consideration is accorded to legislative prerogatives $ithout

compromising the important functions of the presidenc'#

&.

Thusl'0 there is nothing inherentl' unconstitutional in congressional participation in the formulation

of implementing rules of legislation since that po$er is legislative in character# Oet there still are

multiple roadblocks impeding a constitutionall' valid e,ercise of that prerogative b' *ongress# The

matters of bicameralism and presentment0 as e,pounded in "hadha0 are hurdles $hich submit should

bind the .hilippine *ongress as it e,ercises its legislative functions# ection 1! of Rep# Act 8o# 933

can be struck do$n on that ground alone#[39] 6oreover0 imposing a rule barring a legislative role in

the implementation of a la$ after the statuteBs effectivit' $ill sufficientl' preserve the integrit' of our

s'stem of separation of po$ers#

At the same time0 the concerns of *ongress that ma' have animated the rise of the legislative veto

should not be disrespected b' simpl' raising formalistic barriers against them# n practice0 the

legislative veto is an effective check against abuses b' the e,ecutive branch# The end ma' not Custif'

unconstitutional means0 'et $e should leave ample room for *ongress to be able to address such

concerns $ithin broad constitutional parameters#

There are a m'riad of creative $a's b' $hich *ongress ma' influence the formulation of

mplementing Rules $ithout offending the *onstitution# f there are especiall' problematic areas in

the la$ itself $hich *ongress is not minded to leave an' room for interpretative discretion b'

e,ecutive officials0 then the provision involved can be crafted $ith such specificit' to precludealternative interpretations# At the same time0 commonl'0 legislators and their staffs ma' lack the

e,pertise to draft specific language#["]peaking from m' o$n legislative e,perience0 it is in the

drafting of the mplementing Rules0 rather than in the statute itself0 that the particular e,pertise of the

agenc' officials and e,perts tasked $ith the implementation of the la$ become especiall' vital#

Also0 *ongress can dictate $hich particular e,ecutive officials $ill draft the implementing rules0

prescribe legal or factual standards that must be taken into account b' such drafters0 or other$ise

impose re?uirements or limitations $hich such drafters are bound to compl' $ith# Again0 because the

po$er to draft implementing rules is delegated legislative po$er0 its e,ercise must be $ithin theconfines of the authorit' charted b' *ongress#

And because e,ecutive functions cannot commence until after the effectivit' of the la$0 *ongress

ma' ver' $ell adopt creative but constitutional measures that suspend the effectivit' of the la$ until

implementing rules to its liking are crafted# There is nothing unconstitutional $ith suspending the

effectivit' of la$s pending the occurrence of a stipulated condition# >[]t is not al$a's essential that a

legislative act should be a completed statute $hich must in an' event take effect as a la$0 at the time

it leaves the hands of the legislative department# A statute ma' be conditional0 and its taking effect

ma' be made to depend upon some subse?uent event#>[1]


32/35

The re?uirements of bicameralism and especiall' presentment ma' pose insurmountable hurdles to a

provision that plainl' suspends the effectivit' of a la$ pending approval b' *ongress or some of its

members of the implementing rules#[!]At the same time0 it should be recogni%ed that *ongress does

have the prerogative to participate in the drafting of the rules0 and if it finds a means to do so before

the e,ecution phase has begun0 $ithout offending bicameralism or presentment0 such means ma' beupheld#

[1]D# Tribe0 # American *onstitutional Da$ 1! (3rd ed#0 !"""#) 0 at 1!#

[!]ee0 e#g#0-


33/35

special pains to assure that these re?uirements could not be circumvented#> 5S v. "hadha0 supra note110 at 9&9;#

[1]d#0 at 9!#

[1]A# Aman @# 6a'ton0 Administrative Da$ (!nd ed#0 !""1)0 at 9#

[1;]D# -isher# *onstitutional *onflicts et$een *ongress and the .resident# (th ed#0 199;)0 at 13#

[1.o$er

*ommission>0 is hereb' constituted# The .o$er *ommission shall be composed of fourteen (1)

members $ith the chairmen of the *ommittee on /nerg' of the enate and the Fouse of

Representatives and si, () additional members from each Fouse0 to be designated b' the enate

.resident and the peaker of the Fouse of Representatives0 respectivel'# The minorit' shall be

entitled to pro rata representation but shall have at least one (1) representative in the .o$er

*ommission#


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The *ommission shall0 in aid of legislation0 perform the follo$ing functions0 among othersE

et the guidelines and overall frame$ork to monitor and ensure the proper implementation of this

Act:

/ndorse the initial privati%ation plan $ithin one (1) month from submission of such plan to the .o$er

*ommission b' .AD6 *orp# for approval b' the .resident of the .hilippines:To ensure transparenc'0 re?uire the submission of reports from government agencies concerned on the

conduct of public bidding procedures regarding privati%ation of 8.* generation and

transmission assets:

Revie$ and evaluate the performance of the industr' participants in relation to the obCectives and

timelines set forth in this Act:

Approve the budget for the programs of the .o$er *ommission and all disbursements therefrom0

including compensation of all personnel:

ubmit periodic reports to the .resident of the .hilippines and *ongress:

2etermine inherent $eaknesses in the la$ and recommend necessar' remedial legislation or e,ecutive

measures: and

.erform such other duties and functions as ma' be necessar' to attain its obCectives#

n furtherance hereof0 the .o$er *ommission is hereb' empo$ered to re?uire the 2+/0 /R*0 8/A0

TRA8*+0 generation companies0 distribution utilities0 suppliers and other electric po$er industr'

participants to submit reports and all pertinent data and information relating to the performance of

their respective functions in the industr'# An' person $ho $illfull' and deliberatel' refuses $ithout

Cust cause to e,tend the support and assistance re?uired b' the .o$er *ommission to effectivel' attain

its obCectives shall0 upon conviction0 be punished b' imprisonment of not less than one (1) 'ear but

not more than si, () 'ears or a fine of not less than -ift' thousand pesos (."0"""#"") but not more

than -ive hundred thousand pesos (.""0"""#"") or both at the discretion of the court#

The .o$er *ommission shall adopt its internal rules of procedures: conduct hearings and receive

testimonies0 reports and technical advice: invite or summon b' subpoena ad testificandum an' public

official0 private citi%en or an' other person to testif' before it0 or re?uire an' person b' subpoena

duces tecum to produce before it such records0 reports0 documents or other materials as it ma' re?uire:

and generall' re?uire all the po$ers necessar' to attain the purposes for $hich it is created# The

.o$er *ommission shall be assisted b' a secretariat to be composed of personnel $ho ma' be

seconded from the enate and the Fouse of Representatives and ma' retain consultants# The

secretariat shall be headed b' an e,ecutive director $ho has sufficient background and competence onthe policies and issues relating to electricit' industr' reforms as provided in this Act# To carr' out its

po$ers and functions0 the initial sum of t$ent'& five million pesos (.!0"""0"""#"") shall be charged

against the current appropriations of the enate# Thereafter0 such amount necessar' for its continued

operation shall be included in the annual 7eneral Appropriations Act#

The .o$er *ommission shall e,ist for period of ten (1") 'ears from the effectivit' of this Act and

ma' be e,tended b' a Coint concurrent resolution#

[!9]1!! .hil# 9 (19)#


35/35

[3"]P# ullivan 7# 7unther0 *onstitutional Da$ (1th ed#0 !""1)0 at 31#

[31]State ex .rel. (is. nspection Brea v. (hitman0 19 @is# !;0 !!" 8#@# 9!9 (19!The nature of government often re?uires *ongress to pass general legislation and leave to otherbranches the responsibilit' to fill in the details># -isher0 supra note 1;0 at 9"0 citing (ayman v.Sothard0 1" @heat# 10 (1

[3

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38. ABAKADA V PURISIMA GR 166715.doc