3.4 - Ferrara, Alessandro - Concept. Objections to the Notion of Phronesis. Concluding Remarks (en)

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On Phronesis

On Phronesis

by Alessandro Ferrara

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PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 3+4 / 1987, pages: 247-267, on www.ceeol.com.
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ON PHRONESISAlessandro Ferrara

Following R. Bernstein, we can characterize the current intellectual climateas a confrontation between the objectivist attempt to identify an invariant basisfor all judgments of validity and a new relativism which takes the form of ananthropologically and sociologically informed contextualism. 1 On theobjectivist side, the remnants of the empiricist and neo-positivist philosophyof science that once carried the day find themselves in the company of theremnants of orthodox Marxism and perhaps of the adepts of the newquantitative fashion in the social sciences. On the relativist or skeptical sidewe find most of anthropology, the Weberian and phenomenological brands ofsociology, most students of the humanities attracted by late Wittgensteinianphilosophy, prophets of post-modernism (Lyotard), pragmatist radicals likeFeyerabend and radical pragmatists like Rorty as well as neoaristotelians suchas Mclntyre. Would-be mediators between the two warring factions includeGadamer, Habermas, and Arendt. I wish to argue that the notion ofphronesis,usually thought to belong in the skeptical camp, bears no necessary relationwith relativism, but constitutes on the one hand a useful corrective against theformalism inherent in Habermas' attempt to steer a procedural coursebetween objectivism and relativism, and, on the other hand, provides a goodbasis for addressing the unsolved problem which haunts a large part ofcontemporary thought, namely the issue of value-judgment.In the first part of this paper I will review some of the reasons for theincreasing attention that phronesis and related concepts (wisdom, prudence,judgment) have recently received. I have opted for the more technical termphronesis because of the fewer undesired connotations that it conveys, but thisterminological choice implies no allegiance to a specific Aristotelian doctrine.In the second part I will address some perplexities generated by the use of theconcept of phronesis. In the third part, I will offer a characterization ofphronesis partially based on a reading of Kant and Aristotle. Finally, in theconcluding remarks, I will briefly touch on the psychological conditions of thedevelopment of phronesis and on the question of validity in prudentialjudgment.

Four Roads That Lead to PhronesisThe concept of phronesis and some of its cognates, such as wisdom,prudence, judgment, and taste, have acquired a new relevance today, beyondthe historical and philological interest linked with the respective inventorsAristotle and Kant. During the last two or three decades the objectivistproject of devising a priori methods for the acceptance or rejection of scientific

Praxis International 7:3/4 Winter 1987/8 0260-8448 $2.00


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Praxis International 247theories has suffered severe blows. The work of Thomas Kuhn and the otherpost-empiricist philosophers of science has shown a) that serious theorytesting always occurs in the context of the competition between two or moreparadigms and that a theory can be immunized practically against any kind ofanomaly, b) that the comparison of competing theories always involves someeffort at translating incommensurable concepts and statements, and thatscientific translations, as all translations do, represent mere approximations ofthe original meanings, and c) the ineliminable presence of scientific values inall choices of paradigm.2 Consequently, a moment of phronesis which is notreducible to methodological rules, deductive inferences and the like can befound at least three junctures of scientific practice: when scientists have todecide if the number and quality of the anomalies of a theory justify itsabandonment, when they have to determine whether certain theoretical termscan be considered equivalent across competing and incommensurable theoriesand, finally, when they have to determine which scientific values (e.g.,accuracy or theoretical scope) deserve priority.Second, the contemporary proponents of cognitivist ethics (Habermas,Rawls, Apel) insist on separating norms or rules, about which universallybinding moral judgment can be passed, from broader value-orientations,about which they wish to retain a pluralist position. They have failed,however, to show convincingly that judgments about the rightness of normsor institutional arrangements can be really detached from notions of the goodlife.3 Furthermore, ethics that hinge on rightness (Habermas) or fairness(Rawls) seem unable to orient action and account for sound judgment in thesphere of private conduct.4 Phronesis then seems to enter moral judgment inat least four respects: a) in so far as one must determine how norms apply tothe situation, b) in so far as one must decide if an action fulfils a prescription,c) insofar as different interpretations of a norm are rooted in competing valueswhich call for choice and d) in so far as actions are interpretations of doings anddepending on the interpretation the same doing can have different ethicalimplications. 5Third, some of the difficulties inherent in critical theory have alsocontributed to draw a sympathetic attention to the concept of phronesis. ForHabermas the truth of propositions and the rightness ofnorms rest on rationalconsensus, and rational consensus is consensus generated in the ideal speechsituation. What goes under the name of ideal speech situation, however, is acollection of at least four requirements (unrestricted participation, equality ofstatus, equality of chances to continue or terminate discourse, equal degree oftruthfulness and cooperative motivations). The problem is that in the absenceof a hierarchical and a priori ranking of these requirements the ideal speechsituation cannot serve its purpose as a yardstick for evaluating the rationalquality of consensus. In fact, it remains unclear whether one should considermore rational the agreement emerging from a situation in which moreparticipants discussed for a shorter time or the agreement resulting from adiscussion among fewer people who were able to ponder the matter for alonger time. On the other hand, we could have two instances of consensusreached in the first case in a situation where the participants were motivated

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248 Praxis Internationalsolely by a cooperative search for truth though their relations were largelyasymmetrical, and in the second case in a context where the participants hadalmost equal chances to use the various kinds of speech acts, yet were morestrategically minded. Again, it would not be easy for Habermas to indicatewhich instance of consensus should be considered more rational. A sensiblesolution could be to call more rational the consensus generated in the concretesituation which best approximates the ideal speech situation. But thenHabermas would have to give the notion ofphronesis, understood as the abilityto recognize which combination of factors represents the best approximationof the ideal speech situation, a much more central place in his account ofvalidity than he has thus far been willing to do.Furthermore, Habermas' view of modern rationality as differentiated in acognitive, a moral and an aesthetic sphere, each governed by independentstandards of validity, raises the problem of determining the kind of rationalitystandard to be applied to a given dilemma. To be sure, we cannot fall back onthe current social definition of a scientific, ethical or aesthetic problemwithout thereby falling into relativism. Nor can Habermas envisage a rational"metadiscourse" within which to argue on how to assign dilemmas to spheresof rationality, without thereby contradicting the idea of a decenteredrationality. Again, some notion of prudence or judgment must be invoked. 6Fourth, the rise of a historicist consciousness and more recently of ananthropological consciousness has undermined the universalistic selfunderstanding of modern society. Through Descartes, Kant, Husserl andWeber modern culture understood itself in universalistic terms, but today wewonder in what sense modernity might constitute anything more than a local,Western way of life. In our century anthropology, rather than history, hascalled attention to the issue of the universalistic claim ofmodernity under thetitle of a critique of ethnocentrism. After the early studies on primitivesocieties which showed little awareness of the problem, in the 20s and 30s theissue began to emerge in a number of studies by Malinowsky, Evans-Pritchardand others. Yet, it is only in 1958 that Peter Winch raises the questionwhether it is possible to analyze another society on the basis of our, i.e.Western modern, categories. His answer is negative. 7 Winch follows thethesis, elaborated by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, thatevery language game is a self-contained form defined by its internal normativity. Just as we cannot assess the validity of a chess move in terms of therules of poker, so we cannot judge the Azande belief in witchcraft and inoracles in terms of technological efficacy, i.e. in terms of the presuppositionsofmodern science. It would be as absurd as judging poker unfavorably on theground that it does not allow one to checkmate an adversary. Wittgenstein'sthesis of the self-containedness of language games and life-forms, however,has extended its influence well beyond the scope of an anthropologicallyinformed critique of ethnocentrism. In one form or other, within oneterminology or other, in the guise of a theory ofparadigms in the philosophy ofscience, or of episteme in the early Foucault, or of symbolic universes in Bergerand Luckmann, this thesis continues to pervade and almost define ourcontemporary intellectual climate. It has given rise to a new kind of


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Praxis International 249relativism, no longer vulnerable to the paradoxical consequences of the oldskepticism in that it admits the cogency of normativity, albeit only within theboundaries of the relevant symbolic complexes. I cannot discuss the implications of this view now prevailing in the entire disciplines, such asanthropology, ethnology, the sociology of culture and of knowledge andperhaps on its way to become the professional ideology of the social sciences.8This view poses the challenge of finding new ways of describing the practice ofdeciding validity-issues which cut across different and competing conceptualschemes and, indirectly, sheds light on another limitation of Habermas'procedural brand of critical theory.In order to reconcile a universalist perspective with the pluralism oflife-forms Habermas distinguishes between the formal aspects of a symboliccomplex (be it a world-view, a moral culture, a personal identity, or a valuehorizon) and its cultural contents. He then argues that one could consistentlybelieve in the superiority of certain kinds of fonnal structures (e.g. in thesuperiority of a modern, decentered notion of the world over a mythical andunidifferentiated world-view, in the superiority of a post-conventional moralconscience over a conventional one) while accepting the pluralism, and thusequivalence, of the cultural contents. 9 This universalism is "formal" or"procedural" in that the yardstick for evaluating symbolic complexes is thedegree of their realizing the presuppositions of argumentation derivable froma transcendental-pragmatic analysis of speech, and no longer at odds with thepluralist sensibility of contemporary modernity. The limits of this perspectiveare apparent. Simply, Habermas' solution proves irrelevant whenever-andthis may well the norm in our post-industrial societies-the rival symboliccomplexes share the same level of formal differentiation, e.g. in the case oftwo post-conventional ethics, two scientific paradigms, two subcultures of thesame society. For then the criterion of the satisfaction of the presuppositionsof argumentation can no longer orient our choice between the competingsymbolic complexes. Again, concepts such as phronesis, prudence or judgment seem promising tools for carrying out more successfully the project ofgrounding a universalist position without falling back into a metaphysicalstandpoint.Objections to the Notion of Phronesis

Before introducing a modern version of the concept of phronesis anddiscussing its relation to Kant's notion of taste and Aristotle's own concept ofphronesis, I would like to respond to a number ofobjections raised by HerbertSchnadelbach. In his paper "Was ist Neoaristotelismus?", Schnadelbachcriticizes the conservative and skeptical implications of what he calls the"ideology of phronesis".IO Neoaristotelianism, portrayed by Schnadelbach asthe ideology of sophisticated neoconservatives for whom "to be enlightened asto the end of Enlightenment is the ultimate enlightenment", 11 can becharacterized with reference to three pairs of concepts: theory vs. praxis,praxis vs. poiesis, and ethics vs. ethos.As far as the opposition of theory and praxis is concerned, Schnadelbach


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250 Praxis Internationaldraws attention to the fact that the historically enlightened neo-aristoteliancannot but bid farewell to principles, "take distance from the Kantian ethic ofduty as from the Platonizing ethics of values, abandon the study of practicalprudence to the social sciences, and rid himself of all normative claims".12 Asregards the opposition of praxis and poiesis, Schnadelbach takes issue withthe neoaristotelian use of the concept of praxis for criticizing the modernimage of homo faber. Those who invoke praxis, attracted by its relation to"eupraxia" and the good life, argues Schnadelbach, are faced with thedifficulty of having to specify what the good life is, without contradicting themodern idea that legitimate normativity can only be self-imposed. Thisdifficulty heads the consistent neoaristotelian to deemphasize the normativeaspects of praxis and thereby to feed conservatism. Finally, with reference tothe ethics vs. ethos dichotomy, Schnadelbach argues that neoaristotelianismimplies a "systematic harnessing of ethics to the yoke of some kind of existingethos". More specifically, the neoaristotelian position entails a "critique ofutopia" and a "rejection of ultimate ethical foundations" .13 Such diffidencevis-a-vis ideal images of the Good or a priori principles of justice rests on theconviction "that the good is already in the world" and the problem is only torecognize it. Today, the sophisticated neoaristotelian replaces Aristotle's"static" notion of ethos with the task of identifying the presence of Reason inhistory. However, since we can no longer subscribe to the Hegelian idea of alogic of history, the neoaristotelian attempt to grasp the presence of Reason inhistory turns into a search for Reason in tradition. Finally, Schnadelbachaccuses the ethics of ethos of containing merely hypothetical imperatives, i.e."situation-bound rules of prudence, which Kant or Fichte would have nevercalled moral". 14Against the ideology of phronesis Schnadelbach raises two more generalobjections. First, the notion of phronesis can be relevant to our moderncontext only if we overlook the colonization of the life-world by purposiverationality and the prominent position that poiesis and techne have acquiredin the modern world. Instead of appealing, somewhat nostalgically, to the ideaof phronesis as the counterimage of techne, according to Schnadelbach onehad better take up the challenge of "overcoming the limits of techne by itsown means".15 How a merely technical attitude can be overcome from within,through technical means or a technical mentality, is left unexplained bySchnadelbach. Secondly, for Schnadelbach the ideology of phronesis islinked with the renunciation of all universalistic claim. For the ethic of ethosmoral universalism means no more than a concrete, historically situated or"merely pragmatic universalism". 16 The only way to rescue the notion ofphronesis, according to Schnadelbach, is by reconstructing the concept fromwithin the Kantian perspective as practical judgment. Only then would thepragmatic-universalist element of phronesis be linked with the "real", i.e.principled, universalism of Kant's practical reason.Overall, I cannot avoid the impression that Schnadelbach's argument isplausible mainly relative to the German context and to the meaning thatneoaristotelian themes have acquired in it. I can see no "inevitable" conservatism in the idea that the true, the good and the beautiful are constantly


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Praxis International 251being produced in the world though often go unrecognized, or in the idea thatvalidity is concrete and singular, as opposed to general and a priori, or in theemphasis on commonsense over expert knowledge. Furthermore, I do not seeany "inevitable" affinity of phronesis and relativism or, worse, traditionalism.After all, the Kuhnian scientist who revolutionizes a received paradigm, theWeberian politician who reconciles the claims of competing values andprinciples, or the Hegelian world-historical individual who recognizes what istimely and acts on his intuition, can all be seen as exercising judgment orprudence in the service of innovation. In the Galilei vs. Bellarmine or in theKerensky vs. Lenin controversy, doesn't prudence lie on the side ofinnovation? Above all, in dismissing all accounts of validity based on singularjudgment as relativist and therefore conservative, Schnadelbach seems toforget that it is the crisis of objectivistic and procedural modes of thoughtwhich is largely responsible for the present resurgence of an interest inAristotelian themes and not the other way around. Finally, I think that thenotion of phronesis must be rescued in quite different terms than the onessuggested by Schnadelbach. Granted that the affinity between Kant's theoryof judgement and Aristotle's account of phronesis is worth exploring, I do notthink that phronesis ought to be reconstructed as a kind of applied practicaljudgment. On the contrary, phronesis must be de-ethicized and conceived as ageneral competence which plays a crucial role in the solving of all transschematic, trans-paradigmatic and cross-cultural dilemmas, regardless of theirethical, cognitive, political or aesthetic nature. And, instead of endowingphronesis with a vicarious universalism at the cost of turning it into a mereapplicative appendix to some principle of generalization Ca solution advocatedalso by Habermas and Apel), it is perhaps more promising to investigate thespecific kind of universalism inherent in prudential judgment itself.What is Phronesis?

By the term phronesis I understand the competence to choose betweenconceptual schemes which embed incompatible or differently ranked values insituations where no a priori standard can be invoked. I7 From the vantagepoint of scientific practice, phronesis designates the competence to choosecorrectly between rival paradigms or research-programs which embed aroughly similar balance of anomalies and strong points. With respect topost-conventional moral judgment, phronesis designates the ability of themoral actor to choose between conflicting value-orientations often rooted indifferent life-forms. In relation to Habermas' communicative paradigm withincritical theory, I use the term phronesis to designate the ability of the actor toevaluate the rationality of consensus, i.e. to assess the extent to which thepresuppositions of argumentation embedded in the ideal speech situation arerealized in an actual context of discussion. Finally, from the perspective of theWittgensteinian theory of language games, phronesis designates the ability ofactors not simply to follow the rules of a given game, but to pass judgment onthe desirability or worth of a game as a whole, and to choose the game to beplayed in a given situation. These four perspectives-despite the diversity of


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252 Praxis Internationaltheir central concepts (paradigms, cultures, contexts of argumentation,language games, etc.)-place on the actor a common demand. Since paradigms, cultural horizons, life-worlds and language games embed hierarchically organized values, to choose between them requires that the actorassign priorities to values and then assess the worth of the competingconceptual schemes in the light of these priorities. These approaches,however, all fail to indicate how values can be correctly assessed and a choicebetween them made. Kuhn shies away from the issue of cross-paradigmaticvalidity; Apel cannot explain how value-choice is to be made; Rawls deniesthat one could rationally choose between "thick" or substantive theories of thegood; Habermas relegates evaluative questions within those second-orderarguments for which the term "discourse" is inappropriate, whereas Wittgenstein and his followers give up entirely on the question and embracevarious forms of relativism.

This predicament poses the challenge of reconstructing a competence whichall human beings more or less possess and use when faced with theoretical orethical dilemmas. Such competence, designated in ordinary language byexpressions such as judgment, good judgment, soundness of judgment,prudence, consideration, sound understanding, commonsense, wisdom,sensibleness, sagacity, discernment, insight, etc., is the capacity to rankcompeting values in the absence of general guidelines or criteria. Some aspectsof the capacity for choice in the absence of guidelines have been discussed inthe past by Aristotle and by Kant under the headings of phronesis and ofaesthetic judgment. Yet, unfortunately both have restricted this capacity to ascope narrower than necessary (ethical and aesthetic) and both haveunderstood it as a sort of "natural" faculty of man. Their reflections provide agood starting point, but we must go beyond them by recognizing theimportance of judgment or prudence in all human activities, includingscience, and by reconstructing the inner structure of phronesis from a psychological standpoint as well as the social conditions which favor its rise.As far as the inner structure of phronesis is concerned, it is possible to thinkof all choices between rival conceptual schemes as ultimately resting onvalue-choices and to link conceptually the question "Which value deservespriority in a given situation?" with the question "Which needs are morecrucial for a given identity?". The analogy between assigning priority tovalues and recognizing the salience of inner needs for an identity rests on thefact that in both cases it is a matter not so much of determining whether one"has" a need or if a single value is worthy in general, but rather of placing thevarious needs or values into what might be called (in a sense yet to be clarified)"the right order". If the conceptual bridge between values and needs can bebuilt then we can account for the validity of trans-paradigmatic, transschematic and cross-cultural judgments without falling back into metaphysical claims. In fact, questions about the primacy of needs cannot beanswered a priori and in general (pace Maslow), because which needs arecentral to an identity depends not on the general characteristics of theidentity-what one shares in common with all other human beings-but onwhat is unique to it, on the specific and unique equilibrium of its components.


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Praxis International 253Yet, at the same time, there is a realist sense in which some needs are morecrucial than others. Psychoanalytic practice offers an example of the competence, on the part of the analyst, to assess the cohesion of an identity and itsdependency on the satisfaction of a unique configuration of needs. Although itcannot be objectivated in a method, such competence can be taught andevaluated, as the practice of having prospective analysts undergo didacticanalysis suggests. If a value-horizon is conceived as the equivalent of aconfiguration of needs at the level of a collective identity, we could then decidebetween values and cultural aggregates of values, without resorting to anexternal yardstick which would contradict our pluralist intuitions and be quitedifficult to ground.Let me try to spell out the idea of establishing an order of needs withoutinvoking a priori criteria. The archetypal version of this operation is theunderstanding of the psychological needs of an individual's identity, as ittakes place in contexts of everyday life. From this basic ability which we allpossess to various degrees derive the more refined and specialized versions ofphronesis, including the balancing of values in the making of policy whenmatters of collective identity are at stake, the aesthetic evaluation of works ofart, the choice between rival paradigms on the basis of the scientific valuesthat they embed, the interpretation of the patient's neurotic patterns intherapeutic practice, and the balancing of conflicting motifs in the interpretation of a text or in the evaluation of a translation. More generally this abilityamounts to recognizing whether and how a symbolic element fits the whole ofwhich it is a part.

The possibility of translating the question "What do we do when we assignpriority to values?" into the question "How are judgments on the integrity ofan identity possible?" rests on the analogy between judgments regardingvalues and judgments regarding needs. Yet, prima facie needs and values seemto belong to the different realms of the Sein and the Sollen. Needs areassociated with necessity, values with the will. One "has" a need regardless ofone's intentions, desires, and awareness, whereas one cannot "have" certainvalues unless one so desires, though not all desires are conscious. On closerinspection things appear less neat. Needs are three-place predicates. Oneneeds something for something or in order to do something. Even primaryneeds are needs for survival. Thus every need-statement presupposes, at somelevel, the desirability of something valuable-a purpose, a state of affairs, afeeling-for the sake ofwhich we need what we need. To this extent needs arealso, however remotely, related to the will. On the other hand, when we valuethings-even abstract things such as liberty, justice or equality-we feelpressed to decide as we do, i.e. we feel that we are recognizing some kind ofnecessity and "can do no other". Perhaps needs and values at their upwardlimit converge in the notion of the good life. The dignity of the human being,a worthy existence, or some such notion is the shared resting point of everyinquiry into why we need what we need or value what we value.The relation of need and values can be clarified also with reference to atheory of identity which can only be roughly outlined here. Identities,individual and collective, are symbolic representations generated by the Ego


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254 Praxis Intemationalwhich include at least (1) some perception of continuity of the self or thecollective in question, (2) a configuration of various kinds of needs and urgesand (3) an ideal projection of a desired self. Any prospective action must bechecked not only against its instrumental efficacy and normative acceptability,but also against (1) its potential for enhancing or disrupting the sense ofcontinuity of the self, (2) its relation to the inner needs of the identity and (3)its contribution to the attainment of the ideal self. Individual and collectiveidentities differ with respect to all these three components. For individualidentities continuity takes the form of an unbroken and meaningfulbiography, a life-course which can be cast in the form of a coherent narrative.Collective identities experience continuity in the form of narrated history andcultural tradition. Continuity must be objectivated in cultural products whichplay the same role as personal memories for the individual.The core of an individual identity can be conceived as a structure of needslinked with the inner world of object-relations, with the quality and aims ofthe person's libido, with the regulation of self-esteem, and with the person's"character", i.e. a combination of defense mechanisms and interactive stylestypically used by the person. The equivalent component in the case ofcollective identities consists of processes of cultural reproduction, socialintegration and socialization which stabilize the content of the collectiveself-representation as well as produce as sense of historical continuity. Centralto these processes is the transmission, reproduction and maintenance ofvalues. 18 Collective action and policy decisions must continuously be checkedagainst this set of communal values which, like the needs embedded in anindividual's identity, cannot be violated or neglected for long withoutendangering the cohesion and even the existence of a collective identity.Finally, all individual identity includes an anticipation of the ideal selfthat theperson wishes to become. This ideal self is the product of early identificationswith significant figures and, later, of the internalization of social images. Itmust bear a realistic relation to the past selves and to the needs embedded inthe central component. It is part of a sound identity to posit an ideal which canbe attained by the real self. Collective identities also embed the image of acollective ideal self which can be more or less consonant with the actualpossibilities of a group. At this level we have a thematization of the centralvalues of a society and their assessment in relation to the past history and theperceived potential of the present.With respect to the feeling of continuity we can speak of coherent orfragmented identities. In relation to the person's degree of awareness of theinner constitution of his or her object world, libidinal investments, mechanisms of self-esteem and defense mechanism, we can speak of deep or shallowidentities. And in relation to the anticipation of an ideal self, individual orcollective, we can distinguish mature identities and grandiose or narcissisticones. Finally, when all three main components of an identity are jointly takeninto account, we can speak of a fulfilled or authentic, as opposed to inauthentic,identity.Insofar as clinical judgments on the integrity of identities are singular butcan claim a larger consensus, we can draw on Kant's account of the judgment


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Praxis Intemational 255of taste in order to describe their properties. In the Critique ofJudgment Kantcharacterizes pure aesthetic judgment, or judgment of taste, by opposition toempirical aesthetic judgment, or judgment of sense. Both these types ofjudgment belong in the larger category of aesthetic, as opposed to teleological,judgments, and in turn teleological and aesthetic judgments are instances ofreflective, as opposed to determinant, judgment. Judgment generally concerns,for Kant, the inclusion of a particular into a universal. In the case ofdeterminant judgment, the universal-be it a law of nature, a principle ofreason, such as the categorical imperative, or a principle of logicalinference-exists prior to and independent of the particular. Instead, in thecase of reflective judgement the universal must be found at the very same timewe attribute the particular to it. 19 Let us return to the distinction ofjudgments of taste and judgments of sense. They are both reflective andaesthetic but differ in that judgments of taste concern the beauty of artistic ornatural objects, whereas judgments of sense concern the agreeableness ordisagreeableness of objects.2o In paragraphs 32 and 33 Kant illustrates twopeculiarities of the judgment of taste. First, all judgments of taste raise animplicit claim to universal consensus. This is possible because the judgment oftaste does not attribute mere agreableness to the object, e.g. by virtue of itssmell or its colors in the case of a flower ,-which could be a matter ofarbitrarypreference-but rather attributes beauty to the object by virtue of itsspontaneous adapting to our cognitive faculty. Second, although it raises auniversalistic claim a judgment of taste cannot be proven valid. "The judgmentof others, where unfavorable to ours, may, no doubt, rightly make ussuspicious in respect of our own, but convince us that it is wrong it never can.Hence there is no empirical ground ofproof that can coerce anyone's judgmentof taste". 21 In fact, argues Kant, the judgment of taste "is invariably laiddown as a singular judgment upon the Object". 22 Yet, the possibility of ajudgment which on the one hand concerns the individual's feeling of pleasureand on the other claims that everyone ought to feel pleasure in taking notice ofa certain object is just what needs to be explained. That this claim is made apriori and with no reference to concepts compounds the problem. In thesubsequent paragraphs Kant discusses the issue at greater length. At onepoint he suggests that the pleasure which the judgment of taste claims to belinked with the mental representation of an object "must of necessity dependfor everyone upon the same conditions, seeing that they are the subjectiveconditions of the possibility of a cognition in general, and the proportion ofthese cognitive faculties which is requisite for taste is requisite also forordinary sound understanding, the presence of which we are entitled topresuppose in everyone".23 This reference to human nature I find problematic. On the one hand, it implies a cognitive naturalism which reduces theshared basis of human cognition, on which rests the possibility of intersubjective agreement, to a natural endowment ofman. On the other hand, Kant asksus to subscribe to the whole of his analysis of the categories of cognition in theCritique of Pure Reason in order to understand how pleasure arises from thecongruence of perceived objects with our cognitive apparatus in the absence ofinterest.


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256 Praxis InternationalPerhaps more can be gained from Kant's account of the universality of thejudgment of taste if we proceed from the assumption that every persondevelops her identity through interaction with others and if we try tounderstand the fulfilment of an identity in analogy to Kant's notion of an

aesthetic idea. In paragraph 49 Kant starts out by characterizing soulless worksof art as products in which "we find nothing to censure . . . as far as tastegoes" but which leaves us uninspired and unmoved. Lack of soul means herethe lack of a certain "animating principle of the mind (Geist)". An aestheticidea, instead, is capable of setting "the mental powers into a swing that isfinal, i.e. into a play which is self-maintaining and which strengthens thosepowers for such activity".24 Through their capacity for stimulating a neverending play of all our mental faculties, aesthetic ideas provide a tangibleinstance of the overwhelming of language by thought and of thought by being.In Kant's words, "the aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination,annexed to a given concept, with which, in the free employment of imagination, such a multiplicity of partial representations are bound up, that noexpression indicating a definite concept can be found for it".25This leads us to the concept of genius as the ability needed in order to createaesthetic ideas. For Kant genius is the ability "to find out ideas for a givenconcept, and, besides, to hit upon the expression for them" so that they can becommunicated.26 More specifically, genius is characterized through a) the factthat it is a talent for art, not for science, politics or morality; b) the fact that itpresupposes both understanding and "a relation of the imagination tounderstanding"; c) it "displays itself, not so much in the working out of theprojected end in the presentation of a definite concept, as rather in theportrayal, or expression of aesthetic ideas containing a wealth of material foreffecting that intention" and d) the fact that it presupposes an accord betwenthe imagination and the understanding "such as cannot be brought about byany observance of rules, whether of science or mechanical imitation, but canonly be produced by the nature of the individual".27Employing Kant's theory of judgment to account for how actors chooseamong competing conceptual schemes is not entirely free of difficulties. Someof these are internal to Kant's position. For example, it has been stressed byGadamer that while Kant assumes a primacy of taste over genius--theinventiveness of genius must be submitted to the discipline of taste and in caseof conflict it is taste that should prevail-in the domain of art taste is bestunderstood as being "only a limiting condition of the beautiful" which does notcontain the principle of beauty. As Gadamer suggests, it would be moreappropriate for Kant to ground his aesthetics on the notion of genius, which"fulfils much better than does the concept of taste the requirement of beingchangeless in the stream of time".28 Second, Kant tries to separate beauty andperfection. Paragraph 15 is devoted to showing that "beauty, as a formalsubjective faculty, involves no thought whatsoever of a perfection of theobject". According to Kant, the notion of perfection implies the representation of an end for which the object is deemed "perfect" and thus contradictsthe purely "formal subjective finality" of beauty. This distinction need not beso crucial as he suggests. On one hand, it is hard to imagine identities as


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Praxis International 257objects that are good for some purpose-perfection here seems entirelysynonimous with beauty-and, on the other hand, it is not clear why Kantwould need to deny all cognitive content to aesthetic judgments, provided thatthe cognitive aspect, amenable to determinant judgment, does not prevail.29Third, in paragraphs 22 and 40 Kant stresses the social nature of taste, whichrequires us "to think from the standpoint of everyone else". This has rightlybeen seen as a more promising approach to validity than the monological andsubjecktphilosophisch perspective of the other two Critiques. 30 The socialdimension of taste, however, is considered by Kant only from the standpointof the justification of the judgment of taste, not from the perspective of itsgenesis. Although it can be refined and cultivated, taste remains for Kant anatural faculty ofman, not a social competence. Furthermore, in keeping withhis view of practical reason primarily as a law-testing faculty, taste isconceived by Kant as a critical, rather than productive, faculty. 31 This leadsattentive critics such as R. Beiner to view Kant's position as relevant only to athird-person account of prudential judgment and in need for a complementaryfirst-person perspective, which he sees best represented by Aristotle's notionof phronesis. To be fair, Kant does have a first-person, productive moment ofjudgment, only one to be found not in taste but in genius. The problem, onceagain, is that genius is naturalized and examined merely under the derivativeaspect of artistic genius. On the one hand, Kant's restrictive use of the termgenius for artistic performance make sense only under the assumption that inactivities such as science, morality or politics, reflective judgment plays nosignificant role and can be replaced by methodology, rules, principles and thelike. On the other hand, there is no awareness in Kant that artisitc genius isbut a special case of the broader capacity to understand what best suits theinner balance of a symbolic whole.If we want to appropriate the most valuable aspects of Kant's theory ofjudgment, we have to translate his position into a perspective which takes thenotion of identity into account. We can tentatively equate aesthetic ideas withthe quality of a cohesive and well-balanced identity, and Kant's notion of asoulless work of art with a fragmented or shallow identity. Aesthetic ideas andbalanced identities share a quality of roundness and self-containedness. Theircomponents appear to be at the proper place with respect to the symboliccenter. The overall harmony resulting from the combination of elementsstimulates the imagination and elicits a sense of pleasure, self-enhancementand awe. On the other hand, soulless works and inauthentic identities share acertain appearance of rigidity and unnaturalness, the opposite of grace.Sometimes they exhibit an obvious disproportion between certain elements, atother times while there is no flamboyant disproportion the whole yet remainsunmoving and uninspiring, as though the combination of its elements wereobvious and uninformative. From the perspective that I am trying to develop,what Kant calls genius is phronesis. Just as genius is the ability to createaesthetic, as opposed to soulless, ideas, so phronesis is the ability to choosecourses of action and assign priority to values in a way that results in anauthentic, as opposed to shallow or fragmented, identity. Phronesis, likegenius for the work of art, requires a special relation to the imagination, in


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258 Praxis Internationalorder to create a well-balanced and cohesive identity. Drawing on Freud'simplicit view of a healthy and non neurotic psychic life, we can see thecapacity to let our mental representations circulate from one ambit of ourinner life to another, so that the insights gained in one area of experience canbe readily applied to another, as the key component of both phronesis andgenius. Conversely, the compartimentalization of mental life into rigidlyinsulated areas, typical of the neurotic person, is at the basis of uninspiringand soulless identities or works of art. Kants introduces the distinctionbetween taste and genius in order to account for the fact that the ability torecognize beauty in a work of art does not include the capacity to produce one.Similarly, the capacity to recognize which needs are crucial to the equilibriumof an identity cannot be equated with the capacity to pursue self-realizationeffectively, although it constitutes a condition of it. Thus phronesis stands outfrom mere good judgment, on which it nonetheless rests, in that it incorporates a special form of integrity on the part of the actor, which I have calledauthenticity.32 Judgment plus authenticity equals phronesis.A somewhat similar conceptual architectonics can be found in Aristotle'sNicomachean Ethics. Although for Aristotle phronesis is essentially an ethicalconcept,33 his position carries broader implications. What makes a course ofaction the right one, or rather-as we should say-a right one, is not its beingto the immediate advantage of the actor, nor its meeting the expectations ofthe community, nor its accordance with moral principles or rules, but ratherits being "conductive to the good life (eudaimonia) generally".34 Thus, tounderstand what phronesis in the Aristotelian sense is requires a) that weunderstand what can be meant by the expression the "good life" and b) thatwe see how phronesis relates in a particular way to the good life, which sets itapart from the other intellectual virtues.The term "eudaimonia", used by Aristotle in order to designate the goodlife, is frequently translated as happiness. Yet it refers to a very special kind ofhappiness. In using this term Aristotle had in mind three rival conceptions ofthe good life influential in Athens at the time. On the first of these views, agood life is tantamount to a life spent in the successful pursuit of pleasure, onthe second the good life is a life in which we achieve honor, on the third thegood life is a life spent in contemplation. Aristotle decidedly rejects the firsttwo and takes an ambiguous attitude toward the third view. The good lifecannot be reduced to the pursuit of pleasure or honor, because while wepursue honor and pleasure for the sake of our happiness, "we always choose it(happiness) for itself, and never for any other reason".35 Specifically, Aristotledenies that the good life can be equated with the pursuit of honor. We receivehonor because we are good, so goodness, in so far as it is that quality thepossession of which is rewarded by honor, has primacy over honor. Furthermore, because honor is conceded to us by others, if we sought honor wewould be dependent on those who recognize us as honorable. We are then leftwith the somewhat vague statement that the good life is a life spent in trying toachieve the good for man. But what is the good for man? In Book I Aristotledefines the good as the "activity of the soul in accordance with virtue,,36 but inBook X specifies that the activity in which "happiness" consists is mainly


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Praxis International 259contemplation. 37 The first thing to be noticed here is the idea that happiness isan activity (energeia) rather than a state. Activity is a term obviously related topraxis, which means not only to act but to act well. In this context, Aristotlemeans that happiness is not something that one possesses, like a quality of themind or a trait of character, but includes the active exercise of certain powersand dispositions. Secondly, soul is to be understood as character or personality38 or more simply to be animate. Thirdly, we must clarify the meaningof the expression "to act in accordance with virtue". Arete is the abstractnoun for agathos, good, which always means good at something. Arete is tqeproperty of being good at something, of excelling in some activity, but to beagathos means also that the something at which one is good is in some sense"typical" of the kind of being one is. Thus, an agathos archer is one that aimsand shoots precisely, an agathos vessel is one that fares well, an agathosplough is one that plows well, an agathos knife is a sharp-edged one which cancut well, etc. In the case ofman, then, to act in accordance with virtue meansto perform well, over a period of time, the task which is most typical ofman ingeneral. If there is a plurality of typically human tasks, as it seems to be thecase, then to act in accordance with virtue means to excel at the most perfectamong the typically human tasks. 39Then the question emerges, What is distinctively human among the manyactivities in which human beings engage themselves? Aristotle is thought towaver between a more comprehensive and narrower answer. According to thereductive version, the most distinctively human ability is contemplation,according to the more comprehensive one the good life has to do not just withintellectual contemplation, but the "the full range of human life and action, inaccordance with the broader excellences of moral virtue and practicalwisdom" .40 The latter version is the one more relevant for our purposes.Aristotle's ethics can regain a contemporary relevance only if Schnadelbach'sobjection regarding the difficulty of reformulating the concept of the good lifein modern, non-metaphysical terms can be met. 41 One way to do so is tointerpret eudaimonia in terms of a theory of identity. Then the good life canbe seen, with Aristotle, as the telos to which the best human conduct aims but,differently than Aristotle, as a telos not preordained to the individual butimmanent to the vicissitudes of one's psychic life. To act in accordance withvirtue for us moderns cannot mean to perform well the task most typical ofman in general, but to perform well the task of maintaining the cohesion ofone's identity in the plurality of situations one encounters and of expressingthe salient traits of one's identity in a unique biography. Although this taskconfronts every person, its content varies from individual to individual andcannot be known a priori. The good life is then a life-course in which one isable to enrich the main plot of one's life-narrative with the largest possibleamount of episodes and sub-plots compatible with the preservation of itsoverall unity. The ability to unify one's biography into a coherent narrative isa good which plays a similar role as eudaimonia for Aristotle. On the onehand, it is a good which we seek for the sake of no other good. Rather, allother goods are pursued in order to attain the realization of one's identity,even though we often make mistakes and pursue goods that are not conducive


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260 Praxis Internationalto this purpose. On the other hand, self-realization is also a good whose lackdiminishes the meaning of all the other goods that we may possess.From this vantage point we can make sense of the nature of the virtues andof the special place of phronesis among them. A virtue is a disposition or traitof character which can be expressed in action and is an ingredient of alife-style conducive to eudaimonia. Aristotle characterizes the virtues in termsof the unfortunate doctrine of the mean, i.e. as the right proportion of acertain quality which lies between two excesses. Thus, for instance, couragelies between rashness and cowardice, liberality between prodigality andmeanness. Laden with problems and possibly untenable as it is, thischaracterization nonetheless can help us to understand the special role ofphronesis among the virtues. As we said above, actions are always interpretations of doings relative to a context. The same act could count as an instanceof courage in one context and of cowardice in another and perhaps of rashnessin a third. Thus no virtue can be exercised unless one possesses the capacity toappraise how different situations confer different meanings on our acts. Thiscapacity, along with the capacity to place the various goods in the order that ismost conducive to the good life, constitutes phronesis. Being an indispensablerequisite for the acquisition and exercise of all other virtues, phronesis is thusthe fundamental virtue.42Finally, if we examine the relation of phronesis to the intellectual virtuesmentioned by Aristotle in the Book VI, we can notice a number of similaritieswith the qualities attributed by Kant to aesthetic judgment. In contrast withtechne, which remains external to the personality of the expert, phronesis, justas taste, can neither be learned through a method nor forgotten. Phronesis andtaste can only be cultivated through exposure to exemplary cases of goodjudgment or to someone already endowed with superior ability in this respect.Differently than with episteme, and again in analogy to taste, the conclusionssuggested by phronesis cannot be demonstrated but only shown and madeplausible. Contrary to sophia, 'which is concerned with universal truths,phronesis studies particular goods. In fact, phronesis has to do with deliberation and, argues Aristotle, no one deliberates about things that are universalor necessary. Finally, phronesis is different from intuition (nous) in thatintuition apprehends general definitions which cannot be logically demonstrated, whereas phronesis apprehends objects which also cannot be the objectof demonstrations, but are particular.The greatest divergence between Aristotle's notion of phronesis and Kant'snotion of taste concerns the place of this competence in the overall picture ofthe human faculties. While for Aristotle phronesis is the crucial human abilityin the realm of the practical, and political science represents its highestrealization, for Kant the relevance of taste is limited to the aesthetic realm.Although he acknowledges that politics and morality both require somedegree of prudence (Klugheit), he directs his efforts to the search forprinciples of choice (the categorical imperative, the principle ofpublicity) thatcan reduce to a minimum the importance of reflective judgment.43 Finally,Aristotle and Kant fail to see any relevance of prudence or taste in the sphereof cognition.


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Praxis International 261To sum up, though neither Aristotle nor Kant provide us with a theory ofphronesis or taste directly applicabe to the contemporary context, nonethelesstheir accounts offer a good starting point and some important insights. Forinstance, both operate with an implicit distinction, which will have to be part

also of a modern notion of phronesis, between a basic level of judgment, closeto commonsense (sunesis or understanding for Aristotle, taste for Kant) and asuperior type of judgment which includes motivation and the ability totranslate judgment into action (phronesis for Aristotle, genius for Kant). Kantoffers also a phenomenological account of this higher form of judgment, whenhe connects the performance ofgenius with the ability to set the play of all ourmental faculties in motion and with the falling short of our expressive powersvis-a-vis the meanings created by genius. Obviously, what is not to be foundin Kant or Aristotle, is the distinction between ordinary and exceptional,normal and abnormal contexts of choice, i.e. between problems that arisewithin a conceptual scheme, paradigm, life-world etc. and problems that cutacross conceptual schemes, paradigms or life-worlds. The latter problemscannot be solved, in principle, without recourse to phronesis whereas theformer are usually "tackled" successfully through the application of somealgorithm or standardized procedure. If we neglect this distinction wegenerate the misleading impression that dramatic acts of judgment are thenorm in social life and that phronesis is what keeps the wheels of socialinteraction turning.44 On the contrary, in everyday life we usually dosubstitute rules of thumb, received social expectations, or sheer habit forjudgment proper. This reality is at the basis of H. Arendt's insight into thebanality of evil as well as of the Cartesian illusion that all kinds of decisioncould be reduced to a matter of correctly applying the right rules andprinciples. Judgment of the kind investigated here, instead, occurs only atexceptional moments in personal and social life, when all the availableconceptual schemes somehow fall short of doing justice to various aspects ofsome complex dilemma.Concluding Remarks

No analysis of phronesis can be considered complete until the internalconstitution of this competence and the conditions of its genesis areadequately spelled out. Although such a reconstruction goes beyond the scopeof this paper, let me briefly present, by way of concluding my discussion ofphronesis, some tentative ideas which I hope to develop in a future inquiry.Let us go back to phronesis as the ability to establish priorities among needswith reference to a given identity. What do we exactly do when we correctlyevaluate the relative salience of two needs for the identities of two persons, orwhen we try to determine what the impact of a certain course of action on anidentity will be, or when we assess which alternative better fulfils theequilibrium of an identity?Obviously, we do not make empirical generalizations on concrete identitiesthrough statistical methods or appeal to general laws of behavior or of thepsyche. Nor do we follow the best argument in the ideal speech situation or in


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262 Praxis Internationala concrete dialogical exchange. For, in order to evaluate the cogency ofarguments in the ideal speech situation and come to a consensus regarding thebetter argument we must have already answered the above questions. Rather,we let the conflicting interpretations or prognostic assessments resonatealternatively within our mind until a kind of reflective equilibrium isgenerated. In order for an actor to reach an adequate conclusion characterizedby reflective equilibrium,45 the actor must at least possess:1. the ability to view the matter from the point of view of the concreteother; when dealing with abstract objects and identitites, this abilityamounts to the capacity to recognize the inner logic of the object;2. knowledge about one's own needs;3. a willingness to assign priority to some aspect of the selfover others andto accept the consequences;4. some prior experience of judgement in the area where the dilemma hasarIsen;5. the ability to let representations and other psychic contents circulatefreely from one experiential domain to another.It is easy to see that 1), 2) and 3) amount respectively to the requirement thatone's identity be coherent (otherwise projective mechanism and other distortions may prevent one from perceiving the inner autonomy of other peopleand symbolic objects), sufficiently deep (i.e., include sufficient knowledgeabout one's needs) and mature (otherwise the chosen direction of growthwill be unrealistic and in the end frustrating).

From the perspective of a psychoanalytic theory of identity, these requirements presuppose an ability to cathect objects in a non-narcissistic way which,in turn, originates in a certain type of optimal early development. For all thedifferences that separate them, several authors in the object-relation traditionof psychoanalytic theory seem to agree on some basic features of early humandevelopment which bear a direct relevance on the growth of the ability andqualities mentioned above. The names ofE. Jacobson, W.R.D. Fairbairn, D.Winnicott, E. Erikson and the theorists of narcissism O. Kernberg and H.Kohut come to mind.By contrast to the classical Freudian emphasis on the oedipal conflict as thekey variable in the psychic development of the person, for the object-relationtheorists the crucial element in the shaping of the personality is the ability ofthe maternal figure to respond empathically to the needs of the child beforethe onset of the oedipal stage. The way in which the oedipal situation ishandled by the child depends largely on what went on before. Underlying thisconception is a theory of "optimal frustrations" to which all these authorsmore or less explicitly subscribe. On this view, initially formulated by E.Jacobson, in their relation to the parental figures preoedipal children undergocontinuous experiences of disappointment, disillusionment and frustrationwhich give rise to acute feelings of ambivalence. In away, this is a highlypositive process. Because children tend to direct aggressiveness towards theobjects that cause frustration and libido towards the self, up to a certain pointfrustrating experiences and parental demands or prohibitions contribute tothe differentiation of self and objects and stimulate the child's self-reliance.


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Praxis International 263Past the "optimal" degree, however, frustration and overgratification aliketend to induce fantasies of merging with the love object and thus to block,rather than favor, the process of autonomization of the child. 46 Thesefantasies, which up to a point are part of normal development, originate in thetotal dependency of the infant on the mother for the satisfaction of its needs. Ifsuch dependency is protracted for longer than necessary, due to parentalnarcissistic, masochist or plainly hostile attitudes, then the child's objectrelations may remain fixated at that stage.Differently than the other object-relations theorists, Kohut postulates toeexistence of two distinct developmental lines: "one which leads fromautoerotism via narcissism to object love; another which leads fromautoerotism via narcissism to higher forms and transformations of narcissism".47 The main variable which causes the child to follow the first or thesecond path is, according to Kohut, the preponderance of object-instinctual ornarcissistic of libido in maternal love. This distinction does not refer to thetarget of the instinctual investment, be it one's own or someone else's self, butto "the psychological meaning" of the affective experience.48 Both in the caseof undercaring and overcaring, parents seem to love the baby not in its ownright but as the vehicle for something else (their own self-confidence, theirsocial image, their need to be loved or desire to project themselves onsomebody else), and at the same time their empathy for the child's needs islargely insufficient. Also, Kohut's distinction between an object-directed anda narcissistic type of libido separates the intensity and the internal constitutionof the feeling. A narcissistic libidinal investment may reach an intensity equalor even superior to object-love, thus giving rise to overprotecting andovercaring, but the point is that the parent who invests narcissistic libidosomehow falls short of recognizing the infant as a center of initiative andreadily shifts to aggressive modalities whenever the child musters any degreeof real emotional independence.In a nutshell, the teaching of object-relation theory is that only if we haveonce been the target of object libido and have had our own needs understoodand empathically attended to at the right time, can we in turn develop anundistorted understanding of others' needs as well as of our own. Also, only ifwe are able to invest object libido on others are we able to understand howneeds distribute over center and periphery in an identity. Finally, exposure toobject oriented, as opposed to narcissistic, libidinal investments favors the riseof phronesis in that the ability to make good value-choices requires one toassess the impact of prospective action on personal, collective or symbolicidentities in a way as free as humanly possible from distortions, projectionsand other uncontrolled psychic urges.It would be misleading, however, to derive from object-relations theory theidea that narcissistic libido only plays a negative role in human relations and injudgment. Among the theorists mentioned above, Kohut explicitly addresses

this point. In his opinion, if amalgamated with true object libido and,presumably, if it is not the dominant element in the mixture, "idealizingnarcissistic libido" can have a positive role in mature object relations and canprovide "the main source of libidinal fuel for some of the socioculturally


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264 Praxis Internationalimportant activities which are subsumed under the term creativity, and itforms a component of that highly esteemed human attitude to which we referas wisdom". 49 If its empirical basis is plausible, this observation providespsychoanalytic evidence for Kant's distinction of soulless works and aestheticideas and, indirectly, for transposing it in the realm of value judgment. Theinvestment of pure object libido with no narcissistic aspect generates theimpeccable yet uninspiring relations or products which Kant calls soulless.The aspect of genius is absent from them. On the other hand, the products ofgenius which violate the standard of taste also fall short of beauty. On thebasis of Kohut's work we can describe them as works or relations in whichnarcissistic libido prevails and breaks the balance of the whole. Finally, therelations or human products in which a good proportion of object-instinctualand narcissistic libido is invested can attain the characteristics of aestheticideas. This view does justice to our feeling that the enormous investmentsrequired by true works of art and by the great deeds which transcend orrevolutionize received schemes, paradigms, or hermeneutical horizons areusually rooted in special compensatory needs stemming from developmentalimbalances, while, on the other hand, no true work of art, scientific insight,moral intuition or political judgment can be produced without adhering to"the logic of the object", i.e. without recognizing and attending the autonomyand inner dynamic that every meaningful object, as a product of humanaction, enshrines. Thus, at a surface level, phronesis entails a combination ofadherence to and disregard of the conceptual schemes or needs configurationsat stake in a given dilemma, whereas at a deeper level it rests on the ability ofthe actor to invest both object oriented and narcissistic libido without lettingeither achieve a total predominance. Object-relations theory and Kohut'stheory of narcissism provide the basis, yet only the basis, for a psychoanalytictheory of phronesis. To be complete such a theory should also include anaccount of the psychodynamic processes (identifications, psychic structuresmobilized, flow and vicissitudes of the instincts, shifts between types oflibido, etc.) which underlie exemplary cases of prudential judgment.Although an object-relation approach to phronesis may be helpful forbreaking out of the objectivism versus relativism deadlock and for correctingthe formalistic bias of Habermasian critical theory, it cannot solve theproblem of trans-schematic validity. Whether a prudential judgment is valid,in fact, cannot be determind by describing psychodynamic processes, thoughit cannot be determined without reference to them either. Building on theideas presented above, we can say that a trans-schematic judgment is validwhen the chosen alternative brings the identities of those concerned closer tothe good life than the discarded alternative, where by the good life weunderstand the richest possible configuration of themes achievable for a givenidentity (concrete or abstract) with no loss of coherence. Expressed in anegative form, valid is a prudential judgment which favors the alternativecapable of disrupting less the chances for the identities of those concerned toattain the good life. More specifically, we can speak of a valid prudentialsolution to a trans-schematic dilemma when reflective equilibrium is reached,requirements 1) through 6) are fulfilled, the solution elicits a "aha!" experi-


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Praxis International 265ence in the present and meets consensus in the future. 50 Again, an analogy canbe drawn with psychoanalytic practice. One knows that a diagnostic interpretation is correct when a) no more opaque areas exist, but all the new materialcan be easily interpreted in terms of the diagnostic hypothesis and nothingsubstantially new emerges from the going back and forth from interpretationto surface actions and viceversa (reflective equilibrium), b) the formulation ofthe interpretation goes hand in hand with a sudden experience of recognitionon the part of the analysand and c) also in the long run the interpretationmeets the consensus of the analysand and of trained observers.There is, however, another aspect of the question of validity that still awaitsan answer. Many actions can further the good life, including contemplating,playing basketball, cooking beef with oyster sauce, having sex, watchingmovies, supporting political candidates etc. What is special about the way inwhich judging prudently contributes to the good life? Phronesis favors thegood life by way of enabling us to distinguish what is similar and what isdifferent. 51 But the capacity to identify and to discriminate rests, at adepth-psychological level, on the good differentiation of self and object and ofthe two modalities of emotional dependency and independency. These are thetrue building blocks of the more refined versions of the task of associating anddiscriminating. Solidarity and the assertion of diversity, opening up to theother and daring to reject, emphasizing closeness and merging or asserting theseparateness of the selfare the bases on which we build the capacity for joiningand severing abstract symbols, such as traditions, concepts, styles, genres,cultural motifs, in the service of the enhancement of larger identities which atthe limit coincide with humankind.

NOTES1. See R. Bernstein, BeyondObjectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, andPraxis (1983: Oxford,Blackwell).2. For a characterization of the essential features of paradigm choice, see T. Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions, (1974 (1962): Chicago, The University of Chicago Press), pp. 145-9 and T.

Kuhn, The Essential Tension (1977: Chicago, The University of Chicago Press), pp. 321-2 and 338.For Lakatos' view on the choice between research-programs see I. Lakatos, "Falsification and theMethodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in I. Lakatos/A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and theGrowth ofKnowledge (1970: Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), pp. 91-196.

3. See J. Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (1972: Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press), K.O. Apel,Towards a Transformation of Philosophy (1980: London, Routledge & Kegan Paul), J. Habermas,Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln (1983: Frankfurt, Suhrkamp).

4. See S. Benhabib, "The Methodological Illusions of Modern Political Theory: the Case of Rawls andHabermas," inNeue Heftefur Philosophie, 21, pp. 47-74, and Ch. 8 in her Critique, Norm, and Utopia(1986: New York, Columbia University Press). See also A. Ferrara, "A Critique of Habermas'Diskursethik," in Telos, 64, 1985, pp. 45-74.5. See S. Benhabib, "Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt's Thought," in PoliticalTheory, forthcoming.

6. See M. See!, Die Kunst der Entzweiung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986).7. See P. Winch, The Idea ofa Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (1958: New York, HumanitiesPress), and "Understanding a Primitive Society", in B.R. Wilson (ed.), Rationality (1970: Oxford).8. See Bernstein, ope cit., and S. Lukes, Essays in Social Theory (1977: New York, Columbia UniversityPress), pp. 154-74.


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266 Praxis International9. See J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981: Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, I), pp. 111-13.

10. See H. Schnadelbach, "Was ist Neoaristotelismus?," in W. Kuhlmann (ed.), Moralitiit undSittlichkeit (1986: Frankfurt, Suhrkamp), pp. 38-63; English translation in this issue of PraxisI ntemational.

11. Ibid., p. 41.12. Ibid., pp. 45-6.13. Ibid., p. 51.14. Ibid., p. 53.15. Ibid., p.55.16. Ibid., p. 56.17. I use the term conceptual scheme as an umbrella term to designate all the specific versions ofWittgenstein's "language games", e.g. paradigm, episteme, life-world, tradition, culture, symbolicuniverse, etc. See also D. Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Schema," (1974) in D.Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984: Oxford, Clarendon Press), pp. 183-98.18. The reproduction of a collective identity can be conceived as a process similar to the reproduction ofthe symbolic structures of the life-world. See J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns

(1981: Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, vo!' 2), pp. 208-17.19. See I. Kant, The Critique ofJudgment, trans!' by J.C. Meredith (1952: Oxford, Clarendon Press), par.18.20. See Kant, op. cit., p'U. 8 and 13.

21. Ibid., par. 33, pp. 139-40.22. Ibid., p. 140.23. Ibid., par. 39, p. 150.24. Ibid., par 49, p. 175.25. Ibid., par 49, p. 179.26. Ibid., par. 49, pp. 179-80.27. Ibid., par. 49, pp. 180-1.28. See H.G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975: New York, Continuum), p. 53. See also Gadamer's

discussion of taste and genius and of the 19th century's reversal of Kant's priorities, ibid. pp. 49-55.29. On this point see R. Beiner, PoliticalJudgment (1983: Chicago, The University of Chicago Press), pp.113-4.30. See Beiner, Political Judgment, op.cit., pp. 51-2, D. Howard, From Marx to Kant (1985: New York,SUNY Press), pp. 149-51.31. See Ibid., par. 48.32. See A. Ferrara, "A Critique of Habermas' Diskursethik", in Telos, no. 64 1985, pp. 72-3.33. More specifically it is one of the intellectual virtues, alongside techne (art or technical skill), episteme(scientific knowledge), sophia (wisdom) and nous (intelligence or intuition). See Aristotle, The

Nicomachean Ethics, trans!' by J.A.K. Thomson (1953: Harmondsworth, Penguin).34. Ibid., 1140a24-bI2; p. 209.35. Ibid., 1097aI5-b2; p. 73.36. Ibid., 1098a8-27; p. 76.37. Ibid., 1177a25-bI3; p. 329.38. See A. Mclntyre, A Short History of Ethics (1967: London, Routledge & Kegan Paul), p. 64.39. See Ibid., 1098a8-27; p. 76.40. See T. Nagel, "Aristotle on Eudaimonia", in A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (1980:Berkeley, University of California Press), p. 7. Nagel concludes that Aristotle identifies eudaimoniawith contemplation. J.L. Ackrill, on the other hand, tries to construe an alternative, inclusive view ofeudaimonia. See J.L. Ackrill, "Aristotle on Eudaimonia," in A.O. Rorty, op.cit., pp. 28-33. Thisview is supported also by Ch. Taylor in his paper "Die Motive einer Verfahrensethik," in W.Kuhlmann (ed.), Moralitiit und Sittlichkeit, op.cit., pp. 101-35. Mclntyre stresses the dominantposition, in his History of Ethics, op.cit., p. 82, but then in After Virtue, op.cit., p. 204, he offers a

reformulation of his own and defines the good life in a formal way, as "the life spent in seeking for thegood life for man".41. The possibility of integrating Aristotle's account with a psychological approach is mentioned by B.Williams, but he does not pursue this line of thought. See B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits ofPhilosophy (1985: London, Fontana and Collins), p. 52.


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Praxis International 26742. See A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981: Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press), p. 144.43. For a similar interpretation of Kant's political theory, see Beiner, Political Judgment, op.cit., pp.63-71. For an interesting attempt to reconstruct a Kantian politics based on judgment, see Howard,

From Marx to Kant, op.cit., pp. 247-70.44. For example, this is one of the problems with the otherwise excellent discussion of judgment byBeiner, Political Judgment, op.cit.45. On the notion of reflective equilibrium, see J. Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, op.cit., p. 20.

46. See E. Jacobson, The Self and the Object World (1964: New York, International Universities Press),Ch. 4. See Also W.R.D. Fairbairn, An Object-Relations Theory of the Personality (1954: New York,Basic Books), p 110, D.W. Winnicott, "Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena", in D.W.Winnicott, Collected Papers: Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis (1958: London, Tavistock Publications), E. Erikson, Childhood and Society, 2nd. ed., 1963 (New York: Norton & Co.), pp. 247-51,O. Kernberg, Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism (1975: New York, Jason Aronson),pp. 275-6, and H. Kohut, The Analysis of the Self(1971: New York, International Universities Press),p. 41 and 79.47. Kohut, The Analysis of the Self, op.cit., p. 220.48. Ibid., p. 39.49. Ibid., p. 40.50. On the "aha!" experience see K. Duncker, "On Problem-Solving", Psychological Monographs. Vo!.58, n. 5. Washington, American Psychological Association.51. On this point, see Beiner, PoliticalJudgment, op.cit., p. 155.

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3.4 - Ferrara, Alessandro - Concept. Objections to the Notion of Phronesis. Concluding Remarks (en)