33790992 Hartmann Philosophy of the Unconscious Vol I 1890

8/22/2019 33790992 Hartmann Philosophy of the Unconscious Vol I 1890

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THEENGLISH AND FOREIGN PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY is essentially the chief intellectual studyof our age. It is proposed to produce, under the title of " THEENGLISH AND FOREIGN PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY," a series ofworks of the highest class connected with that study.

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cloth, 1 2s. 6y assumiiig thisrelation between stimulus and sensation is " the differenceof sensation conditioned by diversity of stimuli independent of the excitability, and the difference of sensationconditioned by diversity of excitability independent of thestimulus," two conditions on which alone consciousness isin a position to keep asunder, and thereby to recognise, theeffects due to the stimuli and the excitability respectively.)If now /3 becomes smaller than b, i.e., the intensity lessthan the threshold-value of the stimulus, y becomes negative, and sinks "as much below 0, as ft sinks below b (with/S y is = oo ).

These negative y s now Fechner calls " unconscwussensations," with the full consciousness, however, of having only employed a license of speech, to signify that thesensation y is the more removed from reality the furthery sinks below 0, i.e., that an ever greater increment ofstimulation is required in order first to restore the zerovalue of y, and then to recall the latter to the limit ofreality. The negative sign before y accordingly signifieshere (as elsewhere often the imaginary) the insolubility


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INTRODUCTORY. 37of the problem, from the given quantity of a stimulus tocalculate a sensation.

The real meaning of the negative sign, Fechner veryproperly says, can only be disclosed by the comparison ofthe rational calculation with the explained facts. Accordingly he dismisses the common illustration of heat andcold as not to the point, and discountenances the algebraic summation of positive and negative J- 4 " " Pi

1 To ascertain the actual indcpcn- application, however, does not heredence of the co-operating conditions concern us, where we are only deal-in any given case may often be very ing with the establishment of thedifficult, and a main source of error, formal side of the purposive thought-This material difficulty in practical process.


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INTRODUCTORY. 49Hence the probability, that M has its sufficient cause

in n.n. = - - ; for M is the sum of the eventsJh Pz Ps PtPL Po, P3 , P4 ; consequently, if M is to be produced byn.n., loth Pl} and P p 2> p s> and p only need to beindividually a little greater than \X 2 = 1 189, consequently & , , and each a little less than 84,Pi P-2 PS Pifor pl p.2 p3 PI as product of the four factors to become

/Y\ fY\>y\

fY\ _m 1greater than 2, and ^3 -- : greater than ^. InPi P* Ps Piother words, if, for the several events Plf P2 , P3 , P4 , theprobability of a spiritual cause ( 1 - , &c. J is onlysmall

(< (H6), yet for their sum M its value risesas the number of distinct events which go to makeup M becomes larger. E.g., let the probability ofa spiritual cause be for each on the average only-p =

^ 1=1=1 = 1= 0-8, conse-Pl P2 PS Piquently - = 0-4096 and 1 - - - = 590-J,J Pi P* Ps Pi Pi Pi Ps Pi

3a very respectable probability of about -& . One easilyVOL. I. D


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50 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.sees that those parts of M, which undoubtedly result merelyfrom n.n., are self-eliminated from the calculation, sincetheir probability enters as 1 into the product of the rest,i.e., leaves it unchanged.

Let us consider an example of this case also. Ascause of vision (Z) a multitude (M) of conditions (Pj, P2 ,P3 , P4) have been observed, the most important of whichare the following: (i.) Special bundles of nerves issuefrom the brain, which are of such a nature that eachstimulus affecting them is perceived in the brain as asensation of light; (2.) They terminate in a peculiarlyformed very sensitive nervous tissue (retina) ; (3.) Before the latter is placed a camera-obscura ; (4.) The focaldistance of this camera is in general adapted to the indicesof refraction from air into the ocular humours (except inthe case of aquatic animals) ; (5.) By means of variouscontractions the focal distance is capable of being changedfor longsighted persons from a few inches to infinity ; (6.)The quantity of light to be admitted is regulated by thecontraction and dilatation of the iris, whereby an additional aid to clear vision is afforded by the cutting offof the peripheral rays ; (7.) The segments of the rodsor cones continuous with the nerve-endings form amosaic, so contrived, that each segment changes lightwaves of definite wave-lengths (colour) into stationarywaves, and thus produces in the appropriate primitivenerve-fibre the physiological colour-vibrations ; (8.) Binocular vision conditions the perception of solidity andreveals the third dimension of space ; (9.) The two eyesmay be simultaneously moved by means of special nerve-bundles and muscles, but only in the same direction,thus unsymmetrically in reference to the muscles ; ( I o.)The clearness of the visual pictures increasing fromperiphery to centre prevents the otherwise unavoidabledistraction of the attention ; ( 1 1 .) The reflex turning ofthe visual axis to the brightest point of the field of visionfacilitates education by the medium of sight and the for-


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INTRODUCTORY. 51mation of the ideas of space; (12.) The constant flow oftears keeps the surface of the cornea transparent and removes the dust ; (13.) The secluded position in the bonysocket, the lids which close reflectorially on the approachof danger, the eyelashes and eyebrows, protect the organfrom being rendered useless by external influences.

All these thirteen conditions are necessary for theexistence and maintenance of normal vision ; they are allthere at the birth of the child, although the occasion fortheir exercise has not yet been afforded ; the circumstances preceding and accompanying their origin (n.n.) areaccordingly to be sought in procreation and the life ofthe foetus. The physiologists, however, it may safely besaid, will never succeed, with the least show of probability,in exhibiting the sufficient cause for the origin of all theseconditions in the blastoderm of the fertilised ovum andthe material fluids which supply it : one cannot see whythe child should not develop even without optic nerve orwithout eye at all. Suppose now, however, that we fellback upon our ignorance, although that is a bad groundfor positive probabilities, and assumed a tolerably highprobability for the development of any of the thirteenconditions from the material conditions of embryonic life,say -j^y (a probability which but a small portion of ourmost certain knowledge possesses), still the probabilitythat all these conditions follow from the material relations of the embryonic life is only O913 O254. Theprobability, therefore, of a spiritual cause being required forthe sum of conditions 0746, i.e., almost Jk In truth,however, the several probabilities perhaps = O25, or at themost 5, and accordingly the probability of a spiritual causefor the whole = 9999985 or Q 99988, i.e., certainty.We have just seen, how from material events we mayconclude to the co-operation of spiritual causes, without thelatter being open to immediate inspection. From this tothe recognition of final causes there is but one step.A spiritual cause for material events can only consist of


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52 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.spiritual activity ; and, moreover, where the spirit has towork outwardly, Will must be present, and the idea ofwhat the Will wills cannot be wanting, as is more fullydiscussed in Chap, iv, A. The spiritual cause is thusWill in union with Idea, the idea namely of the materialevent which is to be brought about (M). We assumehere, for the sake of brevity, that M proceeds directlyfrom a spiritual cause, which is by no means necessary.Let us ask further, what can be the cause of M beingwilled ? Here the causal chain is at once broken, if wedo not adopt the simple natural hypothesis, the willingof Z. Now, it is obvious that Z cannot influence theevent as real existence, but only idealiter, i.e., as mentalobject, according to the axiom that the cause must beprior to the effect. That, however, willing-of-Z is a sufficient motive for willing-of-M is likewise a self-evidentproposition, for whoever wishes to produce the effect mustalso will to produce the cause. To be sure on this hypothesis we only obtain a genuine explanation, if the willing-of-Z is in itself more comprehensible to us than the willing-of-M. The sufficient motive of the willing-of-Z must thenlie either in the realisation of Z, or in a willing of Z 1; whichZx follows on Z as its effect ; a consideration admitting ofindefinite repetition. The more evident is the last motiveat which we stop, the more probable does it become thatthe willing-of-Z is cause of the willing-of-M. It is easyto see that this is, in point of fact, the course of ourspeculation with regard to natural ends. We have seen,for example, that the bird broods because it wills tobrood. We must either be satisfied with this barrenresult and forego all explanation, or we must ask whyis brooding willed ? Answer : because the developmentand hatching of the young bird is willed. We are stillin the same plight ; we therefore inquire further, why isthe development of the young bird willed ? Answer :because

propagation iswilled ; and this, because the con

tinued duration of the species, despite the shortness of


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INTRODUCTORY. 53the individual life, is willed ; and here we get a motivewhich may provisionally satisfy us. We are accordinglyentitled to assume, that the willing of the developmentof the young bird is the cause (no matter whether director indirect) of the willing of the brooding, i.e., that theformer is aimed at through the mean of brooding. (Thepoint is not, whether the bird is conscious of this aimor not, although the supposition would be absurd in thecase of a young bird bred in seclusion, for whencecould it have derived the conscious knowledge of theeffect of incubation ?) Certainly there always remainsthe possibility that an immaterial cause is at the bottomof the event M, without its being motived by the willto produce Z; consequently the probability that Z ispurposed will be a product of the probability that Mhas a spiritual cause (l - -), and of the probability

"Xt*

that this spiritual cause has the willing of Z for its cause-

; the product (1 ) must, however, of course beu \ x ysmaller than either of the factors, since every probability is less than 1. Here, too, the probabilitymay be considerably increased, if the several conditions(Pj, P2 , P3 , P4 ), of which M is usually compounded, betaken into account. The probability that Z is aimedat by means of Pa is, according to the foregoing,( 1 - -) , if is the probabilitythat the immaterial causePv ?i 1\has for its cause the willing of Z : accordingly the probability that P, has not Z in view = 1 - ( 1 - - )- Con-P\ ?!sequently the probability that neither P1T nor P2 , nor P3 ,nor P4 has Z for end, i.e., that Z is in nowise aimed atthrough M the product of the several probabilities

1 . . n


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54 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.Consequently the probability thatM in any part thereof hasZ for its end, i.e., the probability that Z is at all an end withrespect to M, is equal to the complement of this quantityin respect of 1, = 1 - J ( i _ (i _ 1/\1. 1,1, &c., arel..n PJ q, Pl p,genuine fractions, just as , & &c., consequently also

l-!,and(l-!)!,andl-(l- I)-1 ,Pi Pi 1i Pi & ! _ (i _ 1) 1.l..n ?,/ qiHence it follows, that this product becomes smaller thelarger the quantity n becomes ; for if n increases to 1 thenewly-introduced factor is

~ pn + I/ qn + 1This factor, like the product, is a genuine fraction, therefore the product of both must be a genuine fraction, whichis smaller than either of the two factors, q. e. d. From thecircumstance that n increasing ) ( becomes smaller, it1 . .71follows that n increasing 1 - ) ( becomes larger ; ac-1 . . ncordingly this probability also grows with the number ofconditions of which M is compounded. Let

Pibe on the average = ^, i.e., let the probability, that eachof the conditions of Z taken singly has this particularend in view, be on the average = ^, consequently veryimprobable. Then 1 - f 1 - J is on the average = % ;

01this raised merely to the fourth power gives ^^, consequently

. P. /. 1 \ 1 ~H 175 21 - 1 - 1 1 --- )- = _ = over - ;L p / q -l 2o6 3


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INTRODUCTORY. 55i.e., there results on the whole a very fair probability, forany one, who should bet 2 to I on the existence of Design,would still win. The application to the example of visionis obvious.We learn from the above, that those effects in particularcan safely be regarded as ends, which need for their production a considerable number of causes, each of which liasa certain probability of being means to the particular end.It is, therefore, no wonder that just the most general phenomena of Nature have always been most widely admitted tobe ends. For example, the existence and continuance oforganic nature as end of its own arrangements, as well asof those of inorganic nature. It is precisely here that aninfinite number of causes co-operate to secure one grandresult, the continuance of organisms. So far as thesecauses lie in the organisms themselves, they are divisibleinto those which conduce to the maintenance of the individual, and those which subserve the preservation of thespecies. Both of these points have seldom wanted recognition as natural ends. If we now call such an endcognised with the greatest possible certainty Z, we knowthat none of its many causes can be wanting, if it is tobe attained ; thus, e.g., not M. Now since I know thatboth Z and M were willed and imagined before their realexistence, and I see that among others the external causeM! is requisite for the occurrence of M, the assumption,that M!, too, was willed and imagined before its real existence, obtains a certain probability through this regressiveinference. Whether, namely, M be realised through theimmediate action of a spiritual cause, or indirectly in thatit follows from material causes, of which a few or severalare spiritually caused, in both cases M l may be willed andrepresented before its real existence as means to the endM. In the latter case this is perfectly clear, but also inthe former case the immediate interweaving of a spiritualcause in the realisation of M does not preclude the material causes of M, and therefore of M^ springing in larger


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56 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.or smaller part, from spiritual causes, which had M and Zfor their ends. In organic nature this is even the normalstate of the case. The result of this reasoning in anycase is a certain probability that Mx is also aimed at, andalthough it may not be in itself great, still it is always astrengthening of the directly obtained degree of probabilitywhich is not to be despised, since all later links in thechain have the benefit of this probability by its repetitionat every stage.From these considerations it is evident that the ways,in which ends are perceived in Nature, are multifariouslycombined. No claim is set up for the application ofsuch calculations in practice, but they serve to clear upthe principles which more or less unconsciously regulatethe logical procedure of every one who correctly reflectson this subject, and who does not dogmatise thereonfrom the lofty heights of some d priori system. Theexamples adduced in this chapter are not intended toserve as a proof of the truth of Teleology, but only forthe elucidation and illustration of the abstract expositions, which likewise will assuredly convert no opponentto the hypothesis of ends in Nature, for only examplesen masse can do that ; but perhaps they will lead some,who thought themselves to have outgrown the belief inPurpose as manifested in Nature, to weigh alleged instances thereof more carefully and impartially ; and noother than this, viz., as a preparation for Section A. ofour inquiry, was the design of the present chapter.


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A.

THE MANIFESTATION OF THE UNCONSCIOUSIN BODILY LIFE.

The Materialists endeavour to show that ail, even mental phenomena, are physical : and rigidly ; only they do not see that, on theother hand, everything physical is at the same time metaphysical."-SCHOPEXHAUER.


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( 59 )

I.

THE UNCONSCIOUS WILL IN THE INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONSOF THE SPINAL CORD AND GANGLIA.

THE time has gone by when the animals were contrasted with the free man as locomotive machines, assoulless automata. Deeper insight into the life of animals,strenuous effort to understand their language and themotives of their actions, has shown that with respect tomental capacity man differs from the brutes in degreeand not in kind, just as the brutes differ among themselves; that in virtue of this higher capacity he hascreated a more perfect form of speech, and thereby hasgained in the course of generations that perfectibilitywhich is wanting to the brutes, owing to their imperfectmeans of communication. We accordingly know now,that we cannot compare the educated man of to-daywith the animals, without being unjust to the latter, butonly the peoples which are but little removed from thestate in which they were fashioned by the hand of Nature ;for we know that even our own race, privileged as itnow is by higher aptitudes, was once what these stillare, and that our present higher qualities of brain andmind have been only gradually attained through the lawof hereditary transmission of acquired power. Thus theanimal kingdom is presented to us as a finished scale ofbeing, with pervading analogies. The fundamental spiritual faculties must be essentially the same in all, andwhat in the higher members appear to be new facultiesare only secondary powers, which have been developed


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Co PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.in certain directions by the higher culture of commonelementary capacities. In all beings these fundamentalor primitive activities of the rnind are willing and thinking ; for feeling (as I shall show in Chap. iii. B) may, withthe help of the Unconscious, be developed from thesetwo.We shall speak in this chapter only of the WilL Itis scarcely to be doubted, that what we regard as immediate cause of our action and call Will is to be found inthe consciousness of animals as causal moment of theiraction, and must also be called Will, if we cease to give ourselves airs of superiority by employing different names forthe very same things (as devouring, swilling, littering, foreating, drinking, child-bearing). The dog will not separatefrom its master ; it wills to save the child which has falleninto the water from the well-known death ; the bird willnot let its young be injured ; the cock will not share his henwith another, &c. I know there are many people who thinkthey elevate man, when they ascribe as much as possiblein the life of animals, especially the lower ones, to " reflexaction." If these persons have in their minds the ordinaryphysiological sense of the term reflex action, involuntaryreaction on an external stimulus, it may safely be saidthat either they have never observed animals, or thatthey have eyes but they see not. If however theyextend the meaning of reflex action beyond its usualphysiological acceptation, they are assuredly right, butthen they forget : firstly, that man, too, lives and movesin pure reflex actions that every act of will is a reflexaction ; and secondly, that every reflex action is an act ofwill, as we shall show in Chap. V.

Let us then retain provisionally the usual narroweracceptation of reflex action, and speak only of such actsof will as are not reflexes in this sense, i.e., are not involuntary reactions of the organism on external stimuli.There are two marks in particular whereby volition maybe distinguished from reflex actions : firstly, emotion, and


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THE UXCOXSCIOUS L\ BODILY LIFE. 61secondly, consistency in carrying out an intention. Reflexactions are mechanical and passionless; but one need notbe skilled in the art of physiognomies to clearly perceiyethe presence of an emotion eyen in the brutes. It iswell known that seyeral species of ants wage war with oneanother, one state subjugating and enslaving the citizensof another state, in order to obtain labourers for its operations. These wars are waged by a warrior caste, whosemembers are larger and stronger, and provided with morepowerful nippers. It is only necessary to have once witnessed this army knocking at the hostile edifice, to haveseen the workers withdraw and the warriors come out todo battle, with what bitterness the fight is carried on,and how, after an unsuccessful contest, the constructorsof the building surrender themselves captive, to have nolonger any doubt that this premeditated raid shows avery decided will, and is something altogether differentfrom reflex action. The like is the case with the swarmsof robber-bees.

Eeflex action disappears and reappears with the external stimulus, but it cannot form a purpose, which itpursues under changed external circumstances with appropriate change of means. E.g., when a decapitated frog,having remained quiet a long time after the operation,suddenly begins to make natatory movements or to hopaway, one might be inclined to look upon this as merephysiological reflex action, as result of the irritation ofthe terminations of the divided nerve by the air. Butwhen the frog in various experiments, the cutaneousirritation and the part affected being the same, overcomesdifferent obstacles in a different way, but equally suitedto the purpose ; when, having taken a fixed direction,and being turned therefrom, it tries with rare obstinacyconstantly to regain it ; when it creeps away under acupboard or into other odd corners, manifestly to seekprotection from its persecutors, there is unmistakableevidence of nou-reflectorial acts of will, regarding which


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62 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.even the physiologist Goltz justly concludes from hiscareful experiments, that there is no avoiding the assumption of an intelligence not confined to the cerebrum, butastricted to various central organs for the exercise ofdifferent functions (e.g., to the corpora quadrigemina forthe maintenance of equilibrium).From this example of the decapitated frog and the volition of all invertebrate animals (e.g., insects) it follows thatno brain at all is requisite for the exercise of will. Sincein the invertebrata the cesophageal ganglia take the placeof the brain, we must assume that these also suffice forthe act of will, and in the above-mentioned frog cerebellum and spinal cord must have supplied the place ofthe cerebrum. But we cannot confine the will of invertebrate animals to the cesophageal ganglia ; for when theanterior part of one bisected insect continues the actof devouring, and the posterior part of another the actof propagation, when praying crickets with their headscut off even seek their females for days, find them andcopulate, just as if they were unscathed, it is tolerablyclear that the will to devour has been an act of theoasophageal ring, but the will to propagate, in these casesat least, an act of other ganglia of the trunk. The likeindependence of the will in the different ganglia of oneand the same animal is observed, when the two halves ofa divided earwig, or of an Australian ant, turn againstone another, and, under the unmistakable influence of thepassion of anger and lust of fighting, contend furiouslywith their antennae till exhaustion or death ensues. Butwe must not limit the activity of the will even to ganglia ; for we find voluntary action even in animals of avery low type, where the microscope of the anatomisthas discovered no trace either of muscular fibrin or ofnerves, but only the fibroin of Mulder (now called protoplasm). Here probably the semifluid slimy substanceof the animal, as in the first stages of embryonic development, fulfils in an inferior manner those conditions


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THE UNCONSCIOUS IN BODILY LIFE. 63to which the nerve substance owes its irritability, andspecial fitness as an instrument of the will, viz., the easymobility and polarisability of the molecules. Let anyone take a glass of water containing a polype, andplace it in such a position that a part of the water isilluminated by the sun ; the polype will instantly propelitself out of the dark towards the illuminated part of thewater. If now a living infusorion be placed therein andit approaches within a few lines of the polype, the latterperceives it God only knows how and produces a whirlpool with its arms, in order to draw it within its grasp.On the other hand, should a dead infusorion, a smallvegetable organism, or a particle of dust, approach quiteas close, it does not trouble itself at all about it. Thepolype then perceives the animalcule to be living, drawstherefrom the inference that it is fit for food, and adoptsmeans to bring it within reach of its mouth. Not seldomalso one may see two polypes in bitter conflict over aprize. No one will venture to call a will guided by asense-perception so fine and so clearly manifested physiological reflection in the ordinary sense of the term,otherwise we should have to term it reflex action whenthe gardener bends the bough of a tree to reach its fruit.Accordingly, when we see acts of will in animals destituteof nerves, we can certainly not hesitate to recognise thesame in ganglia.

This result is also suggested by comparative anatomy,which teaches that the brain is an aggregation of gangliaconnected with nerve-fibres, and that the spinal cord inits central grey matter is likewise a* series of gangliawhich have coalesced. The Articulata are the first toshow a weak analogue of the brain in the form of twonodules connected by the cesophageal ring and also ofthe spinal cord in the so-called ventral cord, thelatter containing ganglia united by fibres, each ofwhich answers to a segment and pair of legs. Accordingly physiologists assume as many independent


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64 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.centres in the spinal cord as there are pairs of spinalnerves issuing therefrom. Among the Vertebrata there arefishes, whose brain and spinal cord consist of a numberof ganglia, which lie in a row behind one another. Thecomposition of a central organ from several ganglia ispositively confirmed by the metamorphosis of insects,when certain ganglia, which are separate in the larvastate, appear consolidated at a more advanced stage ofdevelopment. .

These facts may suffice to prove the essential resemblance of brain and ganglia, brain-will and ganglia-will.But now, if the ganglia of lower animals have their independent wills, if the spinal cord of a decapitated froghas its will, why should not the so much more highlyorganised ganglia and spinal cord of the higher animalsand of man also have their will ? If in insects thewill to devour lies in anterior, the will to procreate inposterior ganglia, why in man should not such a divisionof labour be likewise provided for his will? Or is itconceivable that the same natural phenomenon should inthe less perfect form exhibit effects which are entirelywanting in the more perfect form ? Or must we supposethat in man the conduction is so good, that every gan-glionic volition is immediately transmitted to the brainand appears in consciousness undistinguishable from thevolition generated in the brain ? This may, perhaps,be true to a certain extent for the upper parts of thespinal cord, certainly not for all the rest, since thechannels of sensation from the hypogastric plexus arealmost imperceptible. No other course is left open, then,but to ascribe independent wills to the human ganglia andspinal cord, the manifestations of which it only remainsempirically to prove. That in the case of higher animalsthe muscular movements which effect external actions aremore and more under the control of the cerebellum, andconsequently centralised, is well known. Facts, therefore, will not be forthcoming here to any great extent ;


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THE UNCONSCIOUS IN BODILY LIFE. 65and tins is doubtless the reason why hitherto the independence of the gangliouic system in higher animals hasbeen so little recognised by physiologists, although defended by the most recent investigators. Those voluntary acts, on the contrary, which are actually to beascribed to the ganglia, have been usually regarded asreflex actions, whose stimuli are said to exist in theorganism itself, which stimuli accordingly were arbitrarilyassumed when they were not assignable. In part theseassumptions may be justified; they then belong to thechapter on Eeflex Actions. It is not a large part, however, in any case, and, moreover, it cannot do any harm,to consider here even those which are reflex actionsproper from the point of view of the Will, since it willbe hereafter proved that every reflex action contains anunconscious Will.

The independent movements effected by the sympathetic nervous system, i.e., without the co-operation ofbrain and spinal cord, are : (I.) The beating of the heart ;(2.) the movements of the stomach and the intestines ; (3.)the tonic contractions of the lower part of the alimentarycanal and muscular coats of the arteries; (4.) an importantpart of the processes of organic life, so far as they dependon nervous action. The intermittent type of movementis shown in the beating of the heart, tone of the arteries,and movements of the intestines; and the persistent movements are illustrated by the other processes. The beating ofthe heart, as may be seen in an exposed frog s heart, beginswith the contraction of the venoe cavoe ; the contraction ofthe auricles follows, then that of the ventricles, and finallythat of the bulbus aortoe. In an excised frog s heartsprinkled with salt water the cardiac ganglia continue toperform their function of stimulating the heart to beatfor hours together. In the case of the intestines themovement begins at the lower part of the oesophagus, andprogresses vernacularly from above downwards, one wavehardly completing its course before the next begins. HaveVOL. i. E


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66 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.not these movements of the intestines the most surprisingresemblance to the creeping of a worm, with the simpledifference that the worm propels itself forward on its support, whilst here the worm is fastened, and the (inner)support, the masses of food and the faeces are pushedforward ? Should the one be called Will and not theother ? The " tone " is a slight muscular contraction,which is ceaselessly exhibited by all muscles during life,even in sleep or swoon. In the case of muscles subservient to volition (the cerebral will), it is maintained by thespinal cord, and there is only no movement of the limbs,because the actions of the opposing muscles (antagonists)neutralise one another. Where, therefore, there are noopposing muscles (as, e.g., in the circular sphincters), thecontraction is clearly manifested, and can only be overcome by strong pressure of the faeces. The tone of theintestines, arteries, and veins depends on the sympatheticsystem, and the latter is absolutely necessary for the circulation of the blood. Lastly, as concerns secretion andnutrition, these can be influenced by the nerves, partlyby means of dilatation and contraction of the capillaryvessels, partly by tension and relaxation of the membranesconcerned in osmosis, partly through the setting up ofchemical, electrical, and thermal currents. All thesefunctions are carried on exclusively by subordinate gangliathrough the agency of the sympathetic fibres found in allnerve-trunks, which are chiefly distinguishable from thesensory and motor fibres by the absence of a medullarysheath.

The surest proofs of the independence of the ganglionicsystem are derived from Bidder s experiments on frogs.The spinal cord having been completely destroyed, theanimals lived often six, sometimes ten weeks (with gradually slackening heart-beat). On destruction of thebrain and spinal cord, the medulla oblongata alone beingspared (for breathing), they lived six days ; when thisalso was destroyed, the beating of the heart and circulation


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THE UNCONSCIOUS IN BODILY LIFE. 67of the blood could be still observed even on the secondday. The frogs whose medulla oblongata had been preserved ate and digested their worms after six-and-twentydays, whilst micturition took place regularly.Besides the above-mentioned tone of the voluntarymuscles, the spinal cord (including the medulla oblongata)regulates all involuntary movements of the voluntarymuscles

(reflex movements, see Chap. V.) and the respiratory movements. The latter have their central organin the medulla oblongata; and not merely a large numberof the spinal nerves, but also the JV. phrenicus, accessorius,Willisii, vagus, and facialis, co-operate in the productionof these highly complicated movements. Although thecerebral will is able for a short time to strengthen or tosuppress the respiratory movements, it can never entirelyabolish them, since, after a little pause, the will of thespinal cord regains the upper hand.The independence of the spinal cord on the brain islikewise proved by many beautiful physiological experiments. A hen, from which Flourens had removed theentire cerebrum, sat indeed motionless as a rule ; but ongoing to sleep it tucked its head under its wings; onwaking, it shook itself and preened its feathers. Whenpushed, it ran forward in a straight line ; when throwninto the air, it flew. It did not eat spontaneously, butonly swallowed the food thrust into its bill. Voit repeated these experiments with pigeons. They first fellinto a deep sleep, from which they only awoke after afew weeks ; then, however, they flew and moved of theirown accord, and comported themselves in such a manneras to leave no doubt of the existence of their sensations ;only intelligence was lacking, and they did not spontaneously take food. Thus a pigeon, having thrust its beakagainst a suspended wooden pendulum, caused it to swingfor upwards of an hour till Voit s return, so that the pendent spool over and over again struck its beak. On theother hand, such a brainless pigeon endeavours to evade a


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68 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.hand trying to grasp it, to carefully avoid obstacles in itsflight, and can settle cleverly on narrow supports. Eabbitsand guinea-pigs, whose cerebrum has been removed, runfreely about after the operation ; the behaviour of a decapitated frog has been already mentioned. All thesemovements, as the preening of its feathers by the hen,the leaping of rabbits and frogs, take place withoutnoticeable external stimulus, and are so like the samemovements in uninjured animals that it is impossible toassume a difference in the underlying principle in the twocases : in the one case as in the other, there is a manifestation of will. Now we know that the higher animal consciousness is conditional on the integrity of the cerebrum(see Chap. ii. C.), and when this is destroyed, it is saidthese animals are without consciousness, and accordinglyact and will unconsciously. But the cerebral consciousness is by no means -the sole, but merely the highest consciousness of the animal, the only one which in higheranimals and in man attains to self-consciousness, to theego, therefore also the only one which I can call myconsciousness. That, however, the subordinate nerve-centres must also have a consciousness, if of a vaguerdescription, plainly follows from the continuity of theanimal series, and a comparison of the ganglionic consciousness of the Invertebrata with that of the independentganglia and central parts of the spinal cord of the higheranimals.

It is beyond a doubt that a mammal deprived of itsbrain is always capable of clearer feeling than an uninjuredinsect, because the consciousness of its spinal cord standsin any case higher than that of the ganglia of the insect.Accordingly this will, which gives evidence of itself inthe independent functions of the spinal cord and theganglia, is by no means to be at once declared to be initself unconscious ; we must rather provisionally assumethat for the nerve-centres from which it proceeds itcertainly may become more or less clearly conscious. On


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THE UNCONSCIOUS IN BODILY LIFE. 69the other hand, compared with the cerebral consciousnesswhich a man exclusively recognises as his consciousness,it is certainly unconscious, and it is accordingly shownthat there exists in us an unconscious will, since thesenerve-centres are all contained in our corporeal organism,therefore in us.

It seems requisite to add, in conclusion, a remark withrespect to the sense in which the word Will is here taken.We started with understanding by this word a consciousintention, which is the ordinary signification. We havefound, however, in the course of our investigation, that in asingle individual, but in different nerve-centres, there mayexist consciousnesses and wills more or less independent ofone another, each of which can at the most be conscious forthe nerve-centre through which it is expressed. In saying this, the usual limited meaning of Will is necessarilyabandoned ; for I must now recognise another will in methan that which has been exerted through my brain, andhas thereby become conscious to me. After these limitations of meaning have fallen away, we can no longer avoidunderstanding by Will the immanent cause of everymovement in animals, which is not produced reflectorially.This may also be taken as the sole characteristic and infallible mark of the will of which we are conscious, that itis a cause of preconceived action. It is now seen, thatit is somewhat accidental to the will, whether it passesthrough the cerebral consciousness or not; its essenceremains thereby unaffected. What then in the presentwork is denoted by the word " Will " is no other than thesame essential principle in both cases. If, however, it isparticularly desired to distinguish the two kinds of will, forconscious will language already offers a term exactly covering this conception Freewill whilst the word Will mustbe retained for the general principle. Will, we know, is theresultant of all contemporaneous desires ; if this struggleof desire is consciously waged, it appears as choice of theresult, or freewill, whilst the origin of the unconscious will


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70 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.is withdrawn from consciousness, consequently even thesemblance of choice among desires cannot here occur.One sees from the existence of this term Freewill, thatthe idea of a more general will with non-selected contentor aim, whose actions thus appear to consciousness notas free, but as inward compulsion, has long been in thepopular consciousness.

I do not merely rely upon the precedent of Schopenhauer and the wide-spread acceptance (even abroad) thatthis use of the word "Will has already found, but upon thefact, that no other word in general use in the Teutonic languages is more appropriate to designate the broad principlewhich is treated of in the present and following chapter."Desire" is volition still incomplete, in the making, asit were, one-sided as not having yet stood the test ofresisting other desires. It is only an unfinished productof the psychological laboratory of Volition, not the finalcollective expression of the activity of the whole individual (be it of higher or of lower order). It is only acomponent of the will, which, in consequence of beingparalysed by other opposite desires, may be condemned toremain velleity. If " desiring " cannot be substituted for"

willing," still less can "Impulse;" since it not only suffersfrom the same one-sidedness and limitation as desire, butdoes not even include the notion of actuality. It ratheronly represents the latent disposition to certain one-sidedtendencies to action, which, if they become actual inconsequence of some motive, are no longer called impulsebut desire. Every impulse thus denotes a definite aspect,not of volition, but of the character, i.e., the tendency of thelatter to react on certain classes of motives with desiresof a fixed direction (e.g., sexual impulse, migratory impulse,acquisitive impulse, &c ; cf. the phrenological " instincts "or " primitive faculties "). As specific predispositions theimpulses rightly stand for inner springs of action, justas motives represent the outer ones. Impulse then, assuch, has necessarily a definite concrete content, which is


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THE UNCONSCIOUS IN BODILY LIFE. 71conditioned by the physical predispositions of the generalbodily constitution and the molecular constitution of thecentral nervous system. Will, on the other hand, as universal formal principle of movement and change, standsaltogether behind the concrete dispositions, which, whenconceived as informed by the will, are called impulses,and is realised in the resulting volition, which receives itsparticular

content through the psychological mechanism ofmotives, impulses, and desires (cf. Chap. iv. B.) Althoughin the lower animals and in the subordinate central organsof man this mechanism is simple in comparison with thatof the human brain, it is none the less present, and easilyreveals itself in reflex movements. Even in the case ofthe independent functions of the spinal cord and gangliathe inherited innate material predisposition of the medullaoblongata to effect the respiratory movements may verywell be called a " respiratory impulse," if only it be notforgotten that behind this material arrangement standsthe principle of the will, without which it could as littlebe functional as, say, the innate cerebral disposition forcompassion, and that the exercise of the respiratory movements themselves is an actual willing, whose directionand content is conditioned by such predisposition.


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II.

UNCONSCIOUS IDEATION IN THE EXECUTION OFVOLUNTARY MOVEMENT.I WILL to lift my little finger, and the finger is lifted.Does, then, my will directly move my finger ? Xo ; forif the brachial nerve be divided the will cannot moveit. Experience teaches that for every movement there isonly one part, namely, the central ending of the nerve-fibres concerned, which is able to carry into effect thevolitional impulse for this particular movement of thisparticular member. Should this one part be injured, thewill would have just as little power over the member, asit would have if the nervous communication betweenthat place and the muscles were interrupted. The motorimpulse itself we cannot, intensity apart, imagine to bedifferent for different nerves ; for since the excitation inall motor nerves is to be looked upon as homogeneous, itcannot be otherwise with the excitation at the centre,whence the current issues ; consequently movements onlydiffer in this, that the central endings of different motornerves are affected by the volitional impulse, and therebydifferent muscles are constrained to contract. We may thuspicture to ourselves the central termination of motor fibresin the brain as a kind of keyboard. The touch is, intensity apart, always the same ; the touched keys alone aredifferent. If, then, I intend a specific movement, e.g., thelifting of the little finger, what is required is to compelthose muscles to contract which by their combinationproduce this movement, and for that purpose to strike


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THE UNCONSCIOUS IN BODILY LIFE. 73with the will that chord in the keyboard of the brain, thesingle keys of which set the related muscles in motion.If in framing the chord one or more false keys are struck,there occurs a movement which does not correspond withthe one intended ; e.g., in making a slip in speaking, mis-writing, tripping, in the awkward handling of children,&c. It is true the number of the central endings of fibresin the brain is considerably smaller

than that of the motorfibres in the nerves, provision being made through theintervention of a peculiar mechanism, to be further mentioned in Chap. V., for the simultaneous excitation of manyperipheral fibres by means of one central fibre. However,the number of different movements within the power ofthe conscious will, consequently dirigible by the brain, is,by means of a thousand little modifications of directionand combination, for each single limb sufficiently large forthe whole body, indeed, simply immeasurable ; so that theprobability would be infinitely small that the conscious ideaof the lifting of the little finger should, without causalconnection, coincide with the actual elevation. The meremental representation of the lifting of the little fingercannot act on the central nerve-endings, since they havenothing to do with one another ; the mere will, however,as motor impulse, would be absolutely blind, and therefore the striking of the right key would be left to purechance. If there were no causal connection at all, practice could avail nothing ; for nobody finds in his consciousness an idea or a feeling of this infinite number of centralendings. Thus, if accidentally once or twice the consciousidea of the lifting of the finger should coincide with theo oexecuted movement, experience would have nothing togo upon ; and on the third occasion when the man willedto raise his finger, the touch of the right key would be asmuch left to chance as in the former cases. It is, then,clear that practice can aid the linking of intention andexecution only if there be a causal nexus between thetwo, in which case certainly the passage from one to the


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74 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.other is facilitated by repetition of the process. The problem placed before us, then, is to find the causal nexus ;without it practice would be an empty word. It is, besides,in most cases not at all necessary, namely, in the case ofalmost all animals, which run and leap just as well at thefirst attempt as after long practice. From this it follows,in the second place, that all attempts at explanation areunsatisfactory, which intercalate such a causal link as canonly be perceived by the accidental association of idea andmovement. The conscious muscular feeling preceding theintended movement, for example, which can only be acquired and imprinted on the memory by repetition, mightperhaps suffice for explanation in the case of man, but notfor the far larger part of natural existences, the animals,since before any experience of muscular feeling they execute with marvellous accuracy the most extensive combinedmovements agreeably to the conscious idea of the end.For instance, an insect just born correctly alternates itssix legs, as if locomotion were nothing new to it, and ayoung brood of partridges, hatched by a domestic hen inthe stable, invariably, in spite of all precautions, immediately and correctly employ the motor muscles of theirlegs to reconquer freedom for their parents, and knowhow to use their beaks for picking up and crushing anyinsect they meet with, as if they had already performedthe operation a hundred times.

It might perhaps be thought that the cerebral vibrations answering to the conscious idea, " I will to lift thelittle

finger,"occur in that region of the brain wherethe nerves have their central terminations ; this is, how

ever, anatomically incorrect, since the conscious ideashave their seat in the cerebrum, but the motor nerve-endinjTS are found in the medulla oblongata or cere-o obellum. Just as little can a mechanical propagation ofthe vibrations of the conscious representation to the nerve-endings afford an explanation of the touching the rightkeys. "We should then be obliged to assume that the con-


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THE UNCONSCIOUS IN BODILY LIFE. 75scious idea, " I will to move my little finger," is localisedelsewhere in the cerebrum than the other conscious idea," I will to move my fore-finger," and that each of the placesin the cerebrum corresponding to a particular idea of anysort of movement to be executed stands, in virtue of aninherited mechanism, in intimate connection with thecentral ending of the motor nerves needed for realisingothese ideas, and with that alone. The consequences ofthis strange supposition would be stranger still ; e.g., theconscious idea, " I will to lift the five fingers of the righthand," would occur simultaneously in the five places ofthe cerebrum which are appropriated to the several ideasof the five liftings of the fingers ; whereas one would bemuch more inclined to assume, that the ideas of willing tolift this or the other finger are distinguished in the materialsubstratum of the brain rather by a small modificationof the form of vibration than by definite localisation.Further, were it only the propagation of the molecularvibrations to the central endings of the motor nervesresulting from such a conscious idea, which sufficed forthe performance of the movement, such a conscious ideaas " I will to lift the little finger," should always call forthmovement. With such a mechanism of fixed and isolatedchannels, not only would error be impossible, but also thatindescribable impulse of the will would be superfluous,which, as experience teaches, must first be added to thatconscious idea before an effect takes place. Lastly, whereno mistake was possible, no increase of accuracy or certainty, as result of any influence whatever, would beconceivable; practice also could have no influence onthe causal link between conscious idea and executedmovement. This consequence, however, contradicts experience as much as the impossibility of error, andtherefore discredits the hypothesis of a mechanical communication. Suppose, however, there really did exist sucha mechanism, Materialism would be obliged further toassume that it is transmitted by inheritance, and was


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76 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.gradually formed in our primitive ancestors by practiceand habit. In this genetic theory, where a part of thismechanism comes into existence from time to time, theproblem of a causal connection between conscious ideaand execution of movement would again arise in the formin which we now have it its possibility, to wit, withoutthe help of an already existing mechanism for the givencase. The theory of transmitting mechanisms wouldtherefore only push our problem farther back, not solveit, and the solution given below would even then, if thattheory were correct, be the only possible one.

Lastly, to return once more to the ascription of themuscular feeling of intended movement to the memoryof earlier cases of casual association, this explanation isshown to be one-sided and insufficient, not only becauseat the best it could only claim to explain the possibilityof exercise and perfection with an already existing causalconnection, not the connection itself, but also because, infact, it does not even explain that, but only pushes the problemone step farther back. Before it was not clear how thestriking of the right brain-keys by the volitional impulse isto be effected through the idea of the lifting of the finger ;now it is not clear, how this result is to be brought aboutby the idea of the muscular feeling in the finger and lowerarm, since the one has as little to do with the position ofthe motor nerve-endings in the brain as the other, yet itis these which have to be affected if the right event is totake place. Of what direct use is an idea referring to thefinger for the selection of the point to be excited in thebrain by the will ? That there exists an idea of the muscular feeling sometimes, but comparatively rarely, I do notat all deny ; that if present it may be an important linkin the chain terminating with movement, I just as littledeny ; but this I do deny, that for the comprehension ofthe sought-for union anything is gained by its intercalation, the problem is only carried a little farther back.For the rest, this intercalation has the less importance, as


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THE UNCONSCIOUS IN BODILY LIFE. 77in the majority of cases where this muscular feeling atall exists prior to movement it exists unconsciously.

Let us once more gather up what we know concerningthe problem, and the solution will press on us of itself. Awill is given whose content is the conscious idea of thelifting of a finger, indispensable as means for executinga voluntary impulse at the fixed point P in the brain ;required a method by which the voluntary impulse maystrike precisely the point P and no other. The mechanicalsolution of a transmission of vibrations appeared impossible ; practice before the problem was solved an empty,meaningless word; the interpolation of the muscularfeeling as conscious causal middle term one-sided andno explanation. From the impossibility of a mechanicalmaterial solution it follows that the intermediate linkmust be of a spiritual nature ; from the decided absenceof a sufficient conscious link it follows that the samemust be unconscious. From the necessity of a voluntaryimpulse at the point P it follows that the conscious willto lift the finger produces an unconscious will to excitethe point P, in order, by means of the excitation of P,to attain the object, lifting the finger ; and the contentof the will to excite P, again, presupposes the unconscious idea, of the point P (cf. Chap. iv. A.) The idea ofthe point P can, however, only consist in the idea of itsposition with reference to the other points of the brain,and herewith the problem is solved : " Every involuntarymovement presupposes the unconscious idea of the positionof the corresponding nerve-endings in the brain." Nowalso is it comprehensible how their dexterity is innate inthe animals, the knowledge just spoken of and the skill toapply it being born with them, whilst man, in consequenceof the immature and pulpy state of his brain at birth, onlygradually, by long practice, succeeds in turning to goodaccount his innate unconscious knowledge in accurate andpowerful muscular innervation. It is now also intelligiblehow muscular feeling can sometimes appear as the con-


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78 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.necting link. The excitation of this muscular feeling isrelated to the lifting of the finger as means to end, in sucha way, however, that it is one step nearer to the idea of theexcitation of the point P than the idea of the lifting of thelinger. It is thus, a medium which can be interpolated, butis better overleaped.We may then regard it as established that every, eventhe slightest movement, whether due to conscious orunconscious intention, presupposes the unconscious ideaof the appropriate central nerve-endings and the unconscious will to stimulate the same. We have accordinglymade a great advance beyond the results of the firstchapter. There (cf. pp. 68, 69) we only spoke of therelatively unconscious ; there the reader was only to beaccustomed to the thought that mental processes go onwithin him (as an indivisible spiritual-corporeal organism)of which his consciousness (i.e., his cerebral consciousness)does not dream; here, however, we have come acrossmental events which, if they do not attain to consciousness in the brain, cannot certainly be conscious for theother nerve-centres of the organism : we have thus foundsomething unconscious for the entire individual.


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( 79 )

III.

THE UNCONSCIOUS IN INSTINCT.

Instinct is purposive action without consciousness of thepurpose. No one would call Instinct purposive actionaccompanied by consciousness of the purpose, wheretherefore the action is a result of reflection ; just aslittle a purposeless blind action, such as the furiousoutbursts of rabid or irritated animals. I do not thinkthat the above definition can be objected to by thosewho assume the existence of instinct ; but whoever thinksit possible to refer all actions usually called instinctive toconscious reflection does, in fact, deny instinct altogether,and ought accordingly to strike the word "instinct" outof his vocabulary. But of this later on.

First of all, assuming the existence of instinctive actionsin the sense of the definition, they might be explained :(i.) As a mere consequence of corporeal organisation ; (2.)as a cerebral or mental mechanism contrived by Nature ;(3.) as a result of unconscious mental activity. In thefirst two cases the idea of purpose lies far back ; in thelast it immediately precedes action. In the first two anarrangement given once for all is used as means, andpurpose is only once concerned in constituting this arrangement ; in the latter, the end is imagined in every singlecase. Let us take the three cases in order.

Instinct is not the mere result of bodily organisation,for:

(a.)Instincts are quite different with similar bodily

structures. All spiders have the same spinning apparatus,but one kind constructs its web radially, another in an


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So PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.irregular manner ; a third does not construct a web at all,but lives in hollows, over the walls of which it spins,closing the entrance with a door. Almost all birds haveessentially the same organisation for building nests (beakand feet), and how infinitely diverse are their nests inform, architecture, mode of fastening (standing, clinging,hanging), locality (caves, holes, corners, forked branches,shrubs, the ground), and excellence, how different oftenin the species of the same genus, e.g., Pants (titmouse),Several birds do not build nests at all. Most birds withwebbed feet swim, but some not, e.g., upland geese, whichseldom or never enter the water, or the frigate-bird, whichis always hovering in the air, and which 110 one exceptAudubon has ever seen alight on the surface of the sea.Just as little do the different varieties of the song ofbirds depend on the difference in their vocal organs, orthe peculiar architecture of bees and ants on their bodilyorganisation; in all these cases the organisation only capacitates for singing or building in general, but has nothingto do with the mode of execution. Sexual selection,likewise, has nothing to do with organisation, since thedisposition of the sexual organs in any animal would beas well adapted for the members of numberless foreignspecies as for an individual of its own species. The nurture, protection, and training of the young can still less beconsidered dependent on the bodily structure. The samemay be said of the place where the insect lays its eggs, orthe selection of the spawn of their own kind on which themale fish discharge their seed. The rabbit burrows, but notthe hare with similar organs for digging, but it less needs asubterranean place of refuge on account of its greater speed.Some birds that fly remarkably well are stationary birds(e.g., kites and other birds of prey), and many moderateflyers (e.g., swallows) take the longest journeys.

(&.) Tlie same instincts appear with different organisations.Birds with and without climbing feet, monkeys with andwithout prehensile tails, squirrel, sloth, puma, &c., live


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THE UNCONSCIOUS IN BODILY LIFE. 8ron trees. The Mole-Cricket burrows with the prominentfossorial organs of its anterior extremities, the BuryingBeetle digs without any arrangement for the purpose.The Hamster carries in its winter stores with its cheek-pouches, 3 centim. long and i^ centim. broad, the field-mouse does the same without any special apparatus. Birdslive in the water just as well without as with web feet ; atany rate, Divers (Podiceps) and Waders (Fidico) are excellent aquatic birds, although their toes are only fringed bya web. Birds with elongated tarsus and long unconnectedtoes are for the most part marsh-birds, but with the samestructure of the feet the Moor-hen (Ortygometro) is almostas much an aquatic bird as the Water-hen, and the Crake(Crex) is almost as much a land-bird as the quail or thepartridge. The migratory impulse is manifested withequal intensity by animals of the most different orders, andirrespective of the outfit with which they undertake theirjourney by water, land, or air.

It must accordingly be admitted that Instinct is in ahigh degree independent of bodily organisation. Thata certain kind of bodily organisation is conditio sinequa non of its manifestation is a matter of course ; forwithout sexual parts no procreation, without certain appropriate organs no artificial construction, without spinneretsno spinning ; but in spite of this no one can say thatorganisation is the cause of instinct. The mere existenceof an organ does not furnish the slightest motive for theexercise of a corresponding activity; for that there mustbe at least a feeling of pleasure in the use of the organ ;this may then serve as motive to action. But even then,if the agr?eable feeling affords an incentive to action,only the that, not the how, of this activity is determinedby the organisation. The law of action, however, is precisely that which constitutes the problem to be solved.Nobody would call it instinct if the spider caused thesecretion to flow from its over-filled spinning-glands inorder to procure the satisfaction of the discharge, orVOL. I. 1(1


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82 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.if the fish for the same reason simply discharged itsseed into the water. The instinct and the marvel consistin this, that the spider spins threads and makes thethreads into a -web, and that the fish discharges its seedonly on the eggs of its own species. Lastly, the agreeable sensation in the use of the organs is an altogetherinsufficient motive for the activity itself ; for what is atonce grand and awe-inspiring in instinct is, that its behestsare obeyed with utter disregard of all personal well-being,even at the cost of life itself. Were merely the pleasantfeeling of the emptying of the spinning glands the motivewhy the caterpillar spins, it would only continue to spintill its glandular sac was emptied, but it would not perpetually repair a continually destroyed web till it diedof exhaustion. It is just the same with all other instincts,the causes of which are apparently personal pleasure.As soon as the circumstances are altered, so that iiiplace of individual weal individual sacrifice occurs, theirhigher origin is unmistakably shown. Thus, e.g., it mightbe said that birds tread for the sake of sexual enjoyment,but why then do they no longer repeat the treading whenthe proper number of eggs is laid? The sexual impulseindeed still exists, for, if an egg be taken from the nest,they recommence treading and the hen lays another e^ ",/ */ oor, if they belong to the cleverer birds, they quit thenest and rear a fresh brood. A hen of Igncx torquilla(Wryneck), whose deposited egg was continually removedfrom the nest, kept on laying, each egg being smallerthan the preceding, until at the twenty-ninth egg the birdwas found dead in the nest. If an instinct does not standthe test of a sacrifice imposed at the cost of individualwell-being, if it really merely proceeds from the endeavourafter bodily pleasure, it is not true instinct, and can onlybe so deemed by mistake.

Instinct is not a cerebral or mental mechanism implantedIjy Nature, so that the instinctive action could be executedwithout individual (if also unconscious) mental activity,


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THE UNCONSCIOUS IN BODILY LIFE. 83and without an idea of the purpose of the action, after themanner of a machine, the end beincr conceived once foroall by Nature or a Providence, which had so contrivedthe psychical organisation that only a mechanical use ofthe means remained to the individual. The suggestionnow is, that a psychical, not a physical, organisation isthe cause of instinct. This explanation would be at onceacceptable, if any instinct appertaining to an animal werefunctional without intermission. This is not true, however,of any instinct, for each waits upon a motive ; which,according to our view, signifies the occurrence of appropriate external circumstances making possible the attainment of the end by those means which instinct wills ;not till then is instinct functional as actual will, withaction at its heels ; before the motive is present, instinctremains latent, as it were, and is not functional. Themotive appears in the mind in the form of sensuous presentation, and the connection is constant between theactive instinct and all sense-perceptions, which indicatethat the opportunity has arrived for the attainment of thepurpose of the instinct. The psychical mechanism wouldaccordingly have to be sought in this constant connection.We should again have to imagine a sort of keyboard ; thestruck keys would be the motives, and the resoundingnotes the functional instincts. This might be satisfactoryin spite of the remarkable fact that keys altogetherdifferent give out the same sound, if only instinct werereally comparable to definite tones, i.e., if one and thesame instinct really always reacted in one and the sameway on the appropriate motives. This, however, is notthe case, but the only constant element is the unconscious purpose of the instinct ; the instinct itself, however,like the willing of the means, varies just as much as themeans to be appropriately applied vary according to theexternal circumstances. An hypothesis which rejects theunconscious idea of the end in each single case is accordingly condemned ; for if it were desired to retain in


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84 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.addition the idea of this mental mechanism, for everyvariation and modification of the instinct a special constant arrangement according to external circumstances,a new key with a tone of another timbre would have tobe inserted, whereby the mechanism would be infinitelycomplicated. That, however, with every variation in themeans selected by instinct the end is constant shouldbe a sufficiently clear indication, that such an endlessmental complexity is not needed, but in lieu thereof theunconscious representation of an end is all that need beassumed.Thus, e.g., for the bird which has laid its eggs, the constant

end is to hatch the chickens ; accordingly, if the externaltemperature is insufficient, it sits upon them, a proceedingomitted only in very warm countries, because the animalsees the goal of its instinct attained without its assistance.In warm countries many birds only brood by night. Withus, too, if by chance small birds have made their nests inhot forcing-houses, they sit but little or not at all. Howrepugnant is the supposition of a mechanism which constrains the bird to brood as soon as the temperature fallsbelow a certain degree ; how simple and clear the assumption of an unconscious purpose which compels the willingof the appropriate means, but of which process only thefinal term, as a will immediately preceding action, comesinto consciousness ! In South Africa the sparrow begirdsits nest with thorns as a protection against snakes andapes. The eggs laid by the cuckoo always resemble insize, colour, and marking the eggs of the nest wherein theyare laid ; e.g., in that of Sylvia rufa, they are white withviolet spots ; of Sylvia hippolais, rose-coloured with blackspots ; of Regulus ignicapellus, dark red ; arid the resemblance is so perfect that the eggs are scarcely to be distinguished save by the structure of the shell. And yetBrehm enumerates some fifty species of birds in whosenests cuckoos eggs were found (Illustrirtes Thierleben, vol.iv. p. 197). Only through an oversight, when the cuckoo is


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THE UNCONSCIOUS IN BODILY LIFE. 85surprised, is an egg ever deposited in a wrong nest, as wellas occasionally left to perish on the ground, if the motherwas unable to find a suitable nest at the right time.Huber by special contrivances prevented bees from carrying on their instinctive mode of building from above downwards, whereupon they built from below upwards, andeven horizontally. "Where the outermost cells are attachedto the roof of the hive or lean against the wall, the prisms,which are agglutinated together by their base alone, arenot hexagonal but pentagonal, for more durable fastening.In autumn bees lengthen the existing honey cells, if thereare not enough of them; in spring they shorten themagain in order to obtain broader passages between thecombs. If the honeycombs have become too heavy, theyreplace the waxen walls of the highest (supporting) cellsby thicker ones, formed of wax and propolis. If working-bees are introduced into the cells destined for drones, theworkers apply the corresponding flat rooflets instead ofthe round ones belonging to the drones. In the autumnthey regularly kill the drones, but allow them to live ifthe queen is lost, that they may impregnate the youngqueen which is to be reared from the larvae of femaleworkers. Huber observed that they barred the entranceof their hive against raids of hawk-moths with artificialconstructions of wax and propolis ; they only carry inpropolis when they want to make any improvements orfor special purposes. Spiders and caterpillars also showa remarkable skill in repairing their ruined web, whichis quite a different kind of work from the first manufacture of a web.

The examples cited, which might be indefinitely addedto, sufficiently prove that instincts are not actions mechanically performed in accordance with fixed rules, but thatthey are rather very closely adapted to circumstances, andare capable of such great modifications and variations, thatthey sometimes seem to be converted into their opposites.Many will be inclined to ascribe this modification to con-


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86 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.scions reflection on the part of the animals ; and certainlyin animals more highly endowed in most cases a combination of instinctive activity and conscious reflection is notto be denied. However, I believe that the examplesadduced satisfactorily prove that there are also many caseswhere, without any intervention of conscious reflection,the ordinary and extraordinary actions arise from thesame source ; that they are either both true instinct orboth results of conscious reflection. Or is it really adifferent power which causes the bee to build in themiddle hexagonal, at the edge pentagonal prisms ; whichleads the bird to brood over its eggs in the one set ofcircumstances, and not to brood in the other set; whichcauses the bees now pitilessly to murder their brethren,now to

givethem their life ; which teaches birds the

architecture of their species and their special measuresof precaution; which leads the spider to spin its web,and mend it when injured ? If it be granted that themodifications of instinct, together with its most usualfundamental form, which is often quite indeterminable,spring from a single source, then the allegation of conscious reflection is self-refuted later on, where the sameobjection is brought against instinct in general. It may,perhaps, not be improper to anticipate here the conclusion of a subsequent chapter, namely, that instinct andorganic formative activity contain one and the same principle, only manifested under different circumstances, andthat they shade into one another without any definiteboundaries. Admit this, and it is evident that instinctcannot depend on the organisation of the body or of thebrain, since it would be much more correct to say thatorganisation arises through a manifestation of instinct.This, however, only by the way.On the other hand, we have now to direct our attention again more closely to the notion of a psychicalmechanism, when it will appear that, apart from the factthat it explains very little, it is so obscure that it hardly


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THE UNCONSCIOUS IN BODILY LIFE. 87conveys any idea at all. The motive appears in the mindin the form of a conscious sensuous presentation. This isthe first term of the process ; the last term appears asconscious will to some particular action. Both, however,are quite heterogeneous, and have nothing in common withordinary motivation, which consists exclusively in thisthat the idea of pleasure or displeasure begets the desireto attain the former and avoid the latter. In instinct,pleasure, for the most part, appears as a concomitantphenomenon, although, as we have already seen, it is notat all necessary; but the full power and grandeur of instinctis only shown in the sacrifice of the individual. But thereal problem is here a far deeper one, for every idea of apleasure presupposes that this pleasure has been alreadyexperienced. It follows again from this that in the formercase a will was present, in the satisfaction of whichpleasure consisted, and whence the will comes before thepleasure is known, and without a bodily pain, as in thecase of hunger, urgently demanding relief, is the very question, since one may see in the case of any solitary animalthat the instinctive impulses appear before it can havegot to know the pleasure of their satisfaction. In instinctthere must, therefore, be a causal connection between thesensuous presentation which serves as motive and thewill to act instinctively, with which the pleasure of thesatisfaction that follows has nothing to do. This causalconnection, as we know from our human instincts, doesnot enter experientially into consciousness ; consequently,if it is to be styled a mechanism, it can only be eithera (non-conscious) mechanical conduction and conversionof the vibrations of the presented motive into the vibrations of the willed action in the brain, or an unconsciousmental mechanism. In the first case, it would be verywonderful that this transaction should remain unconscious,since the process is so powerful that

the will resultingfrom it overcomes all other considerations, every otherwill, and such cerebral vibrations always become conscious.


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88 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.It is also difficult to form an idea of the way in which thisconversion could take place, so that the end set up once forall should be attained by the resulting will with the varyingcircumstances. If the other case, an unconscious mentalmechanism, be assumed, the process cannot well be conceived under any other form than that which holds good ofmind in general, thinking and willing. Between the conscious motive and the will to the instinctive action a causalconnection has to be imagined by means of unconsciousideation and volition, and I know not how this connectioncan be more simply conceived than by represented andwilled purpose. We have now reached the mechanismpeculiar to mind, and immanent of Logic, and have foundthe unconscious idea of purpose to be the indispensablelink in the case of each single instinctive action. Accordingly, the notion of a dead, external, preordained mentalmechanism is abolished of itself, and changed into theimmanent mental life of Logic ; and we have reachedthe only remaining mode of conceiving a real instinct :Instinct is conscious willing of the means to an unconsciouslywilled end. This conception explains in an unforced andsimple way the whole problem offered by instinct, or, morecorrectly, in thus declaring the true nature of instincteverything problematical vanishes. In a separate essay onInstinct, the notion of unconscious mental activity, as yetunfamiliar to our educated public, would perhaps arouseopposition ; but here, where in each chapter new facts areadduced, proving the existence of this unconscious mentalactivity and its striking significance, any scruple due tothe novelty of this thought will be evanescent.

Although compelled decidedly to reject the notion thatinstinct is merely the action of a pre-arranged mechanism,I did not at all intend to exclude the supposition of constitutional tendencies of the brain, of the ganglia, andof the body as a whole, determining the nervous currentmore easily and more conveniently into one channel ratherthan into another. This predisposition is then either a


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THE UNCONSCIOUS IN BODILY LIFE. 89result of habit, graving its lines deeper and deeper, andat last leaving indelible traces behind it, either in thespecial individual or by inheritance in a series of generations, or it is expressly called forth by the unconsciousformative impulse, in order to facilitate action in aparticular direction. The latter case will have moreapplication to the external organisation e.g., the weaponsand working implements of animals the former more tothe molecular constitution of brain and ganglia, especiallyin respect to the ever-recurring fundamental powerof instinct e.g., the hexagonal form of the cell of thebee. We shall see later on (B. Chap, iv.) that the sumof individual modes of reaction on all possible kinds ofmotives is called the individual character, and (C. Chap,xi. 2) that this character is essentially dependent on aconstitution of brain and body in lesser degree acquiredby the individual by habit, in greater part inherited.Since, now, in the case of instinct, we have to do with amode of reaction on certain motives, we may speak heretoo of character, although we are not so much concerned with the character of the individual as of therace. Accordingly, in the case of character in respect ofinstinct, the question is not how one individual is distinguished from another, but how one animal class isdistinguished from another.

If such a predisposition of brain and body for certainactive tendencies be called a mecha

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33790992 Hartmann Philosophy of the Unconscious Vol I 1890