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Journal of the Philosophy of History

JOURNAL of the PHILOSOPHY of HISTORY

Aims & Scope Philosophy of history is a rapidly expanding area. There is growing interest today in what constitutes knowledge of the past, the ontology of past events, the relationship of language to the past, and the nature of representations of the past. These interests are distinct fromalthough connected withcontemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and aesthetics. Hence we need a distinct venue in which philosophers can explore these issues. Journal of the Philosophy of History provides such a venue. Ever since neo-Kantianism, philosophy of history has been central to all of philosophy, whether or not particular philosophers recognized its potential signicance. No philosophic account of knowledge and truth can be considered worthwhile unless it addresses the issue of how we relate to our past. Journal of the Philosophy of History assumes that epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science are incomplete if they ignore history. Once we historicize the relationship of language and the world, however, we raise a number of philosophi-cal problems that call for deeper analysis and that are of the greatest signicance for an adequate understanding of how language and science are possible.

Journal of the Philosophy of History is a philosophical journal. It welcomes con-tributions from all the branches of philosophy that use history and historiography fruitfully, including epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, aesthetics, and value theory. It also welcomes the writing of history in so far as it elucidates and possibly solves philosophical problems.

Editor-in-Chief Frank Ankersmit (University of Groningen)

Editors Mark Bevir (University of California, Berkeley) Paul Roth (University of California, Santa Cruz)Alison Wylie (University of Washington) Book Review Editor Aviezer Tucker (Queens University, Belfast)

Editorial Board Arthur Danto (Columbia University) Jonathan Gorman (Queens University, Belfast) Nicholas Jardine (Cambridge University) Joseph Margolis (Temple University, Philadelphia) Murray Murphey (University of Pennsylvania) Giuseppina dOro (Keele University) Joe Rouse (Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn.) Quentin Skinner (Cambridge University) Karsten Stueber (College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Mass.) John H. Zammito (Rice University, Houston)

Journal of the Philosophy of History (print ISSN 1872-261X, online ISSN 1872-2636) is published 3 times a year by Brill, Plantijnstraat 2, 2321 JC Leiden, The Netherlands, tel +31 (0)71 5353500, fax +31 (0)71 5317532.

Journal ofthe Philosophy

of History

VOLUME 2 (2008)

LEIDEN BOSTON

BRILLLEIDEN BOSTON

2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands

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Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/187226308X268845

www.brill.nl/jph

Kants Biological Conception of History1

Alix A. CohenNewnham College, Cambridge, UK

[email protected]

Abstract Th e aim of this paper is to argue that Kants philosophy of biology has crucial impli-cations for our understanding of his philosophy of history, and that overlooking these implications leads to a fundamental misconstruction of his views. More precisely, I will show that Kants philosophy of history is modelled on his philosophy of biology due to the fact that the development of the human species shares a number of pecu-liar features with the functioning of organisms, these features entailing important methodological characteristics. From this main claim will follow three further claims: (1) Kants teleological view of history is not simply based on ethical considerations that have to do with the moral progress of the human species; rather, it stems from his conception of teleology as developed in his philosophy of biology. (2) Kants philosophy of history allows for the practice of scientic history. In this sense, Kants view of history is not merely teleological but involves a mechanical (and thus empir-ical) element. (3) Just as teleology is useful for furthering mechanical accounts of biological phenomena, teleological history is useful for scientic history.

Keywords Kant, history, anthropology, teleology, biology, human nature.

Introduction

A number of commentators have recently acknowledged a connection between the Critique of Judgment and Kants philosophy of history. For instance, Robert Louden remarks that Surprisingly, the best entre into

1) I would like to thank Nick Jardine, Marina Frasca-Spada, Frank Ankersmit and an anon-ymous referee of this journal for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (2008) 128

2 A. A. Cohen / Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (2008) 128

Kants philosophy of history is not the short essays on history themselves but rather part 2 of the Critique of Judgment.2 He also cites Ludwig Siep (the most detailed and for the mature Kant the decisive grounding of his philosophy of history is to be found in the Critique of Judgment) and Pauline Kleingeld (In the Critique of Judgment one nds the only text of some size in which Kant touches on the themes of history within a Cri-tique).3 Th e passages of the Critique of Judgment these commentators have in mind are essentially 63 on the distinction between extrinsic and intrin-sic purposiveness and 8384 on the distinction between the ultimate and the nal purpose of nature.4 Although these distinctions are indeed signicant for Kants philosophy of history, I want to suggest that by focusing almost exclusively on the passages that directly refer to history and culture, these commentators fail to draw out the full implications of the connection between Kants philosophy of history and the Critique of Judgment and more particularly between the former and Kants philosophy of biology.5

Th e aim of this paper is thus to argue that Kants philosophy of biology has crucial implications for our understanding of his philosophy of history, and that overlooking these implications leads to a fundamental misconstruc-tion of his views. More precisely, I show that Kants philosophy of history

2) R. Louden, Kants Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings (New York / Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 141. 3) L. Siep, Das Recht als Ziel der Geschichte: berlegungen um Anschlug an Kant und Hegel, in P. Knig, T. Petersen and C. Fricke (eds.), Das Recht der Vernunft: Kant und Hegel ber Denken, Erkennen und Handeln (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1995), 356, and P. Kleingeld, Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants (Wrzburg: Knighausen und Neumann, 1995), 36. For early formulations of this claim, see H. Van der Linden, Kantian Ethics and Socialism (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1988), 135142, M. Desp-land, Kant on History and Religion (Montreal: Mcgill Queens, 1973), 6876, W. Galston, Kant and the Problem of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 214224, and V. Delbos, La philosophie pratique de Kant (Paris: PUF, 1969), 296. 4) I. Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. W. S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987), 244247 [5:367369] and 317323 [5:429436] (hereafter cited as C.J.). In all reference to Kants texts, I have included a citation to the English translation followed by a citation to the German text of the Prussian Academy edition (volume and page reference) in brackets. 5) A commentator who has brought to light the connection between biology and history in Kants works is Allen Wood. He argues that Kants philosophy is naturalistic in that he treats history as a branch of biology. [ . . .] Kants philosophy of history is guided by a philo-sophical idea that understands the historical change as the development of the natural

A. A. Cohen / Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (2008) 128 3

is modelled on his philosophy of biology due to the fact that the develop-ment of the human species shares a number of peculiar features with the functioning of organisms, these features entailing important methodologi-cal characteristics.

In the rst section, I outline Kants biological conception of human nature in order to ground the legitimacy of the connection between biology and history in Kants philosophy. I then turn more specically to the issue of historical method and argue that Kants account of history takes the form of an antinomy that is structurally identical to the one put forward in his inves-tigation of organisms. Th is allows me to suggest that the antinomy of history should be understood in terms of the distinction between two types of his-torical method, empirical history and philosophical history. Th is distinction leads me to conclude that for Kant, teleological views of history are not only legitimate, but more importantly useful for the practice of historians.

1. Kants Biological Account of Human Nature

In the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant distinguishes between three predispositions of human nature:

1. Th e predisposition to the animality of the human being, as a living being; 2. To the humanity in him, as a living and at the same time rational being; 3. To his personality, as a rational and at the same time responsible being.6

Th e predisposition I want to focus on here is the predisposition to animal-ity, for I believe it is through its analysis that we can reach a better under-standing of Kants biological account of human nature. Kant denes the purpose of this predisposition as threefold:

predispositions of the human race as a living species (A. Wood, Kants Ethical Th ought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 208). Whilst I agree with the idea of a crucial connection between history and biology, I believe that Wood might be going a bit too far. For Kants philosophy of history is not strictly speaking naturalistic or at least not merely naturalistic insofar as it is partly based on moral considerations. Unfortunately, due to restrictions of space, I cannot discuss this claim here. 6) I. Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in Religion and Rational Th eology, trans. G. di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 74 [6:26] (hereafter cited as Religion).


rst, for self-preservation; second, for the propagation of the species, through the sexual drive, and for the preservation of the ospring thereby begotten through breeding; third, for community with other human beings, i.e. the social drive.7

Kant insists on the fact that these animal predispositions are still at work at the level of civil life: In the civil constitution of a state, which represents the highest degree of articial enhancement of the good characteristics in the human species toward [the] nal purpose of its destiny, animality still manifests itself earlier and basically stronger than pure humanity.8 And decisively, he remarks that what is presupposed for man in the predisposi-tion to animality is in fact identical to what is presupposed for other organ-isms: the biological determination at work is the same.9

Providence refers exactly to that same wisdom which we observe with amaze-ment at work in the preservation of a species of organised natural beings [the human species] that constantly busies itself with self-destruction, and still nds itself always protected. Nevertheless, we do not assume a higher prin-ciple in such providential care than we assume to be at work already in the maintenance of plants and animals.10

Kants account of Natures (or Providences) intentions for the human spe-cies has been the object of numerous debates which I cannot engage with here due to restrictions of space. As is well known, Kant sometimes under-

7) Kant, Religion, 75 [6:26]. For an account of the dierences between mans natural predis-positions in the Religion and the Anthropology, see H. Wilson, Kants Views on Human Animality, in V. Gerhardt, R.-P. Horstmann, and R. Schumacher (eds.), Proceedings of the Ninth International Kant Congress (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001). Kant dedicates a short pas-sage of the Anthropology to the predisposition to animality, in which he does not mention sociability but rather focuses on the sexual impulse to maintain the species. Th e reason could be that this point is developed a few pages later, when he focuses on the characteris-tics of the human species. Th ere, he restates the claim that man was not meant to belong to a herd like the domesticated animals, but rather, like the bee, to belong to a hive com-munity. It is necessary for him always to be a member of some civil society (I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. V. L. Dowdell (Carbondale & Edwaards-ville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996), 247 [7:330]; hereafter cited as Anthropology). 8) Kant, Anthropology, 244 [7:327]. 9) Note that Kants concept of biological determination, insofar as it includes domains such as nationality and personality, is notably broader than modern conceptions of the division between nature and culture. 10) Kant, Anthropology, 246 [7:328].


stands Nature as having providential aspects, and in particular, as designed to allow men to full their moral destiny.11 Th is conception of Nature should, I believe, be distinguished from his naturalistic account of Nature accord-ing to which it aims at the preservation of the human species.12 Th e scope of this paper is strictly limited to the latter its chief aim is to bring to light the biological dimension of Kants account of history, and in particu-lar the common methodological roots of biology and history. In this sense, for my present purposes, it is sucient to note that Kants conception of human nature characterises it as developing certain natural predispositions that aim at the preservation of the species: Nature has also stored into her economy such a rich treasure of arrangements for her particular purpose, which is nothing less than the maintenance of the species.13

In the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant analyses these natural predispositions according to four criteria: person, sex, nation and race. Relative to these criteria, Kant distinguishes between dierent types, as shown in the following chart.

Category Race Sex Person Nation Criterion Hereditary

transmitted features

Gender Temperament Civil whole united through common descent

Type White, Negro, Hindu, Hunnish-Mongolian-Kalmuck

Male and Female

Sanguine, Melancholic, Choleric, Phlegmatic

French, English, Spaniard, etc.

11) See for instance 84 of the Critique of Judgment where Kant writes that Nature strives to give us an education that makes us receptive to purposes higher than those that nature itself can provide. Th is purpose is man, the subject of morality, [ . . .] the nal purpose of creation to which all of nature is subordinated (Kant, C.J., 321323 [5:433436]). For analyses of the concept of nal purpose in relation to that of ultimate purpose, see Y. Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History (Princeton, Guildford, Princeton University Press, 1980), 175., van der Linden, Kantian Ethics and Socialism, 134., and Louden, Kants Impure Ethics, 141. 12) Th ese two conceptions of Nature (i.e. naturalistic and moral) are, of course, closely con-nected, and I would argue that both are present in texts such as the Idea for a Universal History and Perpetual Peace. Unfortunately, it falls outside the scope of this paper to discuss this claim. 13) Kant, Anthropology, 225 [7:310].


Each human type is the means to the realisation of a particular purpose that contributes to the realisation of Natures overall purpose for the species, as summarised in the following chart:

Criterion Type Natures purpose Gender Male, Female Reproduction and pres-

ervation of the human species

Race White, Negro, Hindu, Hunnish-Mongolian-Kalmuck

Diversity of biological character so as to be suited for all climates

Temperament Sanguine, Melancholic, Choleric, Phlegmatic

Diversity of human char-acter (leading to social antagonism) which secures civil peace

Nation French, English, German, Italian, etc.

Diversity of national char-acter (leading to external war) which secures inter-national peace

Although the behaviours prompted by these natural predispositions do emerge from biological determinism, they can be re-formed by man through culture. In this sense, by means of biological determinism, Nature identies the purposes to be fullled (for instance, survival through diet, rest and reproduction) whilst mans culture leaves room for the develop-ment of various means to achieve these purposes (dierent forms of foods, siesta, insemination and so on). And crucially on Kants account, Natures ultimate purpose for the human species is the existence of human beings as rational setters of ends:

this may therefore be regarded as natures ultimate purpose: It is a formal and subjective condition, namely, mans aptitude in general for setting him-self purposes, and for using nature (independently of [the element of ]


nature in mans determination of purposes) as a means [for achieving them] in conformity with the maxims of his free purposes generally.14

Th e natural purpose of man as an organism is to develop an ability to set his own purposes through the development of culture and civilisation: Nature strives to give us an education that makes us receptive to purposes higher than those that nature itself can provide.15 As a result, since Natures intention for the species is that man should set his own purposes, mans biological determinism, insofar as it leads to the species cultivation and civilisation, is the basis of his cultural open-endedness: within culture, man can re-form his nature.16

Th ere is no doubt that a lot more could be said about the relationship between nature, culture and freedom in Kants account. Unfortunately, this issue falls beyond the limits of this paper. What is crucial for my present purpose, however, is that these remarks on Kants biological account of human nature, albeit brief, are sucient to substantiate an investigation of the relationship between Kants biological and historical methods.17 In the

14) Kant, C.J., 319 [5:431]. 15) Kant, C.J., 321 [5:433]. Kant calls this ability the culture of discipline, which consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires, a despotism that rivets us to certain natural things and renders us unable to do our own selecting (Kant, C.J., 319 [5:432]). For discussions of this issue, see R. Makkreel, Kant and the Interpretation of Nature and His-tory, Philosophical Forum, 21 (1990), 169181, and A. Wood, Kants Historical Material-ism, in J. Kneller and S. Axinn (eds.), Autonomy and Community. Readings in Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy (New York: University of New York Press, 1998). 16) For instance, Kant writes about mans natural tendency to unsociable sociability that nature itself wanted to use the idea of such a competitiveness [ . . .] as only an incentive to culture (Kant, Religion, 75 [6:27]). As Makkreel writes in the context of the connection between ultimate and nal purposes of nature, Culture then is no longer simply a part of the history of nature, but makes room for a history of freedom (Makkreel, Kant and the Interpretation of Nature and History, 139). In other words, nature leads to culture which then leads to freedom which opens the door for morality. For details of this claim, see A. Cohen, Physiological vs. Pragmatic Anthropology: A Response to Schleiermachers Objec-tion to Kants Anthropology, Proceedings of the 10th International Kant Congress (Berlin: de Gruyter, forthcoming). 17) For a more detailed description of Kants biological account of human nature, see A. Cohen, Kant on Epigenesis, Monogenesis and Human Nature: Th e Biological Premises of Anthropology, Studies in History and Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 37.4 (2006), 675693.


following section, I launch this investigation by focusing on the connec-tion between the development of the human species and the functioning of organisms on the one hand, and the antinomy of reective judgment and what I will call the antinomy of history on the other.

2. Th e Part-Whole Relationship between Man and the Human Species and the Antinomy of History

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant holds that to describe something as an organism is to conceive its parts as combining into a whole in which they reciprocally produce each other: An organised product of nature is one in which everything is a purpose and reciprocally also a means.18 Th is distinc-tive feature, illustrated by the example of a tree, can be broken down into three categories which all have to do with the fact that organisms in some sense produce themselves: reproduction, generation and conservation.

(a) Generation refers to the fact that a trees leaves, for instance, pro-tect the branches that nourish them: this growth must be considered to be equivalent to generation [ . . .] the tree continues to develop itself by means of a material that in its composition is the trees own product [ . . .] these natural beings have a separating and forming ability of very great originality.19 In this sense, an organism pro-duces itself as an individual.

(b) Conservation indicates that a tree grows, regenerates and repairs itself: part of the tree also produces itself inasmuch as there is a mutual dependence between the preservation of one part and that of the others.20 Th us, an organism produces itself at the level of its parts.

(c) Reproduction points to the fact that a tree can produce other trees: a tree generates another tree according to a familiar natural law. But the tree it produces is of the same species. Hence with regard to its species the tree produces itself.21 In other words, organisms produce

18) Kant, C.J., 255 [5:376]. 19) Kant, C.J., 250 [5:371] .20) Kant, C.J., 250 [5:372] .21) Kant, C.J., 249 [5:371] .


ospring of the same kind and thus secure the survival of their spe-cies; that is, an organism produces itself at the level of the species.

Th ese characteristics call for two remarks. Firstly, the self-productive fea-ture of organisms operates at three levels: that of the species (reproduction), that of the individual (generation), and that of the parts of the organism (conservation). Th ese functions are not simply juxtaposed but intrinsically coordinated: it is because the parts of the organism work together towards the survival of the whole organism that it can then produce ospring and secure the survival of the species. Secondly, not only are the parts organ-ised, but the organisation of the whole aects the organisation of each part. It is the parts ability to adapt that demonstrates their superiority over a machine, in which the parts are not informed of and by the aim pursued by the whole they function externally and in some sense independently of each other. By contrast, an organism exhibits a reciprocity of the cause and the eect: it is both cause and eect of itself (although [of itself ] in two dierent senses).22 To have a better grasp of this reciprocity, I have for-malised the relation between an organic whole and its parts as follows:

Given x: a part of an organism, Given y: an organic whole,

(1) x is a part of y (2) x is the cause of y (3) y determines x.

Now, I want to argue that Kants account of the relationship between man and the human species exhibits the same peculiar character, namely a reci-procity of the cause and the eect. In other words, the part-whole relation-ship at work in human history is identical to the part-whole relationship in the functioning of organisms, as suggested by the following quote:

Th e analogy of these direct natural purposes [i.e. organisms] can serve to eluci-date a certain [kind of ] association [among people] [ . . .] into a state [ . . .]. For each member in such a whole should indeed be not merely a means, but also

22) Kant, C.J., 249 [5:370].


a purpose; and while each member contributes to making the whole possible, the idea of that whole should in turn determine the members position and function.23

Th is passage is fundamental and yet it calls for a number of remarks in order to be unpacked. Firstly, it should be noted that the analogy between organisms and the human species functions at dierent levels. In the case of biology, the part-whole relationship operates essentially at the level of individual organisms. Th is is due to the fact that organisms for Kant fully develop their capacities at the level of individuals. Mens natural capacities, however, are to be completely developed only in the species, not in the indi-vidual.24 Th us in the case of human history, the part-whole relationship operates at the level of the species the parts, men, are thought of in terms of their relationship with the whole they are part of, the human species. Th is entails that, rstly, the purposiveness at work in history is intrinsic to the human species as a whole, whilst the purposiveness at work in biology is intrinsic to particular individuals; and secondly, historical purposiveness is expressed in terms of the destination of the species, whilst the organisation of its parts, men, is thought of in terms of the means for the realisation of this destination.25

Keeping this qualication in mind, the part-whole relationship between men (the parts) and the human species (the whole) can be broken down into three categories which parallel that of organisms:

(a) Formation: Th e parts create the whole through an agreement: in order to survive, savage men are forced to give up their brutal freedom and to seek calm and security in a law-governed constitution.26

(b) Cultivation: Th e whole generates the progressive enlightenment of its parts, which amounts to a preservation of the parts by the

23) Kant, C.J., 254 [5:375]. 24) I. Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmological Intent, in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History and Morals, trans. T. Humphrey (Indianapolis / Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1983), 30 [8:18] (hereafter cited as Idea). 25) Th is is not to deny that a biological perspective on man considered as an individual organism is also available. Th e distinction drawn here is merely intended to contrast his-torical and biological methods insofar as they operate at dierent levels. 26) Kant, Idea, 35 [8:24].


whole: We [i.e. the parts] are, to a high degree, cultivated beyond bearing by all manner of social convention and property [i.e. the whole].27

(c) Perpetuation: It is the idea of the whole (i.e. civil society) that is at the origin of the features and the organisation of its parts (i.e. the antago-nism between mans freedoms): Man wills concord [i.e. the parts]; but nature better knows what is good for the species [i.e. the whole]: she wills discord.28 Th e parts are organised according to the idea of the whole in order to guarantee its survival.

Hence, Kants account of the emergence of civil society exhibits a part-whole relationship between men and the human species in which they reciprocally produce and determine each other. Th is relationship mirrors the part-whole relationship found in organisms as shown in the following chart:

Level Human species Organism Individual (the parts produce the whole)

Formation Generation

Parts (the whole preserves its parts)

Cultivation Conservation

Whole (the whole organises its parts)

Perpetuation Reproduction

Th is suggests that the human species can be thought of by analogy with an organism insofar as its development exhibits an analogous pattern:

Given x: a part of the human species, Given y: the human whole,

(1) x is a part of y (2) x is the cause of y (3) y determines x.

27) Kant, Idea, 36 [8:26]. 28) Kant, Idea, 32 [8:21].


Th e problem arising from this peculiar part-whole relationship is to under-stand (3) namely, what does Kant mean when he claims that the whole determine[s] the form and combination of all the parts?29

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant suggests that there are two ways in which the determination of the parts by the whole can be construed. Th ere is that of ecient causes (nexus eectivus) and that of nal causes (nexus nalis). And he adds Perhaps it would be more appropriate to call the former causal connection that of real causes, the latter that of ideal causes, since these terms would make it clear at the same time that there cannot be more than these two kinds of causality.30 In other words, the whole can be either the real or the ideal cause of its parts. When Kant writes that in organisms, the idea of the whole should conversely (reciprocally) determine the form and com-bination of all the parts, he seems to favour the latter alternative.31

[Teleological / Ideal Model of Explanation] Given R: a representation, Given a: the parts of an organic whole, Given b: an organic whole, R (b) a b.32

Yet insofar as this model conceives of organisms by analogy with inten-tional action, it requires a superior understanding as its cause, and is thus a decient account of organism. For, as Kant puts it, this analogy omits the fact that nature organises itself , that is to say it ignores the self-organis-ing feature of organisms by dening them merely as works of art.33

But on the other hand, if one considers the whole as the real cause of the possibility of its parts and their organisation, the following relation results:

[Mechanical / Real Model of Explanation] Given a: the parts of an organic whole, Given b: an organic whole, b a b.

29) Kant, C.J., 252 [5:373]. 30) Kant, C.J., 251252 [5:372373]. 31) Kant, C.J., 252 [5:373]. 32) Th ere would be a mechanical causality () between a and b, and a teleological causality () between R (b) and a. 33) Kant, C.J., 254 [5:374].


Th is structure is not analogous to intentional action, which is consistent with Kants claim that you overlook what is specic to organisms when you call them an analogue of art.34 Yet it raises a serious diculty. Even though we can formulate and formalise such a mechanical model of expla-nation, Kant believes we cannot conceive its possibility.

Let us suppose, then, that we try to present [ . . .] the possibility of the parts [ . . .] as dependant on the whole, so that we would be following the standard set by intuitive (archetypal) understanding. [ . . .] We cannot do it by having the whole contain the basis that makes the connection of the parts possible (since in the discursive kind of cognition this would be a contradiction).35

Th e mechanical / real model of explanation of organisms indicates the con-ception an intuitive understanding would have. But according to Kant, this conception is a contradiction for our discursive kind of cognition. Th e only way we can conceive the possibility of the parts as dependent on the whole is in the form of the teleological model of explanation (R (b) a b), that is to say by having the presentation of [the] whole contain the basis that makes possible the form of that whole as well as the connection of the parts required to [make] this [form possible].36 Yet it seems dicult to coordinate mechanism and teleology in a single theory insofar as they rely on distinct conceptions of the connection between a whole and its parts. It is this diculty that gives rise to the antinomy of reective judgment.

[Antinomy of reective judgment] Th e rst maxim of judgment is this thesis: All production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanical laws. Th e second maxim is this antithesis: Some products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanical laws. (Judging them requires a quite dierent causal law viz., that of nal causes.).37

Th e thesis expresses the necessity of judging things according to mechani-cal principles alone, where the antithesis argues for the restriction of the

34) Kant, C.J., 254 [5:374]. 35) Kant, C.J., 292 [5:407408]. 36) Kant, C.J., 292 [5:408]. 37) Kant, C.J., 267 [5:387].


thesis and the necessary resort to teleological principles in order to account for specic objects, namely organisms.38 Th erefore, the antinomy opposes distinct models of explanation: the thesis claims that the only possible model of understanding is mechanical, whilst the antithesis not only denies the possibility of its application to all objects, but also puts forward a quite dierent understanding, namely a teleological one.

On this basis, I want to suggest that insofar as human history exhibits a part-whole relationship that is analogous to that in organisms, it leads to the same diculty: how are we to understand the reciprocal determination between the parts (individual men) and the whole (the human species), and in particular the wholes determination of its parts? Th is diculty, I argue, is expressed by the fact that the part-whole relationship in human history can be formalised in two distinct fashions mechanically and tele-ologically the two perspectives coming across as equally necessary. To have a better grasp of this point, let us apply the two-fold model of expla-nation developed in Kants account of biology to his account of history, keeping in mind that we are concerned with the evolution of the whole.

Firstly, since human actions, like all other natural events, are certainly determined in conformity with universal natural laws, the reciprocity of the cause and the eect in the relationship between man and the human species can be accounted for mechanically as follows:39

[Mechanical / Real Model of Explanation] Given a: a part of the human species, Given b: the human whole, b a b.

Th e rst occurrence of b should be thought of as the human species in the state of nature, before the creation of civil society, its second occurrence being civil society as such. Th e mechanical model presents a picture of mankind that is structurally analogous to the denition of a natural pur-pose: the human whole is both cause and eect of itself (although [of itself ] in two dierent senses), these dierent senses being on the one hand the

38) For a detailed analysis of the antinomy of reective judgment, see A. Cohen, Kants Antinomy of Reective Judgment: A Re-evaluation, Teorema, 23.13 (2004), 183197. 39) Kant, Idea, 29 [8:17].


human species, on the other hand civil society.40 However, there is a diculty intrinsic to this model: it seems to presuppose that the will of all indi-vidual men be united into a will of all together in order to create the whole constituted by civil society (a b).41 And yet,

People in their schemes set out only from the parts and may well remain with them, and may be able to reach the whole, as something too great for them, in their ideas but not in their inuence, especially since, with their mutually adverse schemes, they would hardly unite for it by their own free resolution.42

We cannot reasonably presuppose that men consciously pursue a common goal through their actions insofar as man according to his own ways pur-sues his own end often at cross purposes with each other.43

Th e second, teleological, model is supposed to compensate for the insuciency of the mechanical model. It is intended to reveal certain pat-terns necessary to our understanding of the big picture a level not attain-able through mechanical explanations. If the latter do not seem to be able to make sense of the thoroughly confused play of human aairs, the former provide[s] an [ . . .] instructive outlook into a teleological order of things to which we would not be led if we used no such principles as this but considered them merely in physical terms.44 Th is thread, the idea of the destination of the human species, leads to a second model of historical explanation:

40) Kant, C.J., 249 [5:370]. Th is interpretation is also supported by the following quote: Th e small part of [history] through which mankind has until now passed allows one to determine the shape of its course and the relations of its parts to the whole (Kant, Idea, 36 [8:27]; my emphasis). 41) Th e will of all individual men (the distributive unity of the wills of all ) to live under a lawful constitution that accords with principles of freedom is not sucient to attain this goal; only the will of all together (the collective unity of combined wills) is. Th e solution to so dicult a task requires that civil society becomes a whole (I. Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History and Morals, trans. T. Humphrey (Indianapolis / Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1983), 127128 [8:371]; hereafter cited as P.P.). 42) I. Kant, On the Common Saying: Th at may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in prac-tice, in Practical Philosophy, trans. M. J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 307 [8:310]. 43) Kant, Idea, 29 [8:17]. 44) Kant, Idea, 39 [8:30] and C.J., 259 [5:379].


[Teleological / Ideal Model of Explanation] Given R: a representation, Given a: a part of the human species, Given b: the human whole, R (b) a b.45

In the following section, I will argue that the two models of historical expla-nation brought to light, which are formally identical to the two types of biological explanation put forward in the Critique of Judgment, show the path of two dierent understandings of history: one is empirical history, the other philosophical history. Th is will suggest that the study of history leads to an antinomy formally identical to the antinomy of reective judgment it exhibits the same conict between mechanical and teleological judgments, or put slightly dierently, between two conceptions of the part-whole rela-tionship between man and the human species.

3. Empirical History vs. Philosophical History: Teleology vs. Mechanism in Historical Explanation

Th e mechanical model of historical explanation, insofar as it focuses on individuals, amounts to the perspective of what I would like to call empir-ical history.46 Mechanical accounts of history are empirical in the sense that they are based on the perspective of mens reasons, and make sense of

45) Th ere is a teleological causality () between R (b) and a, and a mechanical causality () between a and b. 46) A number of commentators have cast doubts on the concept of empirical history. For instance, Paul Guyer argues that Kant does not say enough in the rst page and a half of his essay [the Idea] to prove that he is seriously concerned with the possibility of history as a scientic discipline. According to his reading, the beginning of the Idea is a page and a half of generalities in which Kant hardly suggests that he assumes that there is anything like a going practice of scientic history. [ . . .] even if Kant were attempting to ground a science of history, it seems as if his interest in such a history would itself be moral and political (P. Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 2000), 373). Larry Krasno goes in the same direction when he writes that Kant insists that any history should and even must be teleological (L. Krasno, Th e Fact of Politics: History and Teleology in Kant, European Journal of Philosophy, 2.1 (1994), 22). Contrary to these claims, I will argue that Kant clearly distinguishes between empirical and teleological history, and that he believes they both are legitimate enterprises.


mens actions in light of their own purposes and the context surrounding their actions.47 Th ey tell the story of empirical phenomena born of mens wills and actions. As Kant writes, history whose composition is wholly empirical , concerns itself with providing a narrative of these appearances [human actions]: it examine[s] the play of the human wills freedom in the large.48

Th is empirical form of history can be understood through Walshs con-cept of colligation, which he denes as historys distinctive methodological trait. It explains a historical event by tracking its primary connections to other events within their shared context.49 On the one hand, it posits the purposive actions of individuals as the links between events (each accord-ing to his own ways pursues his own end); on the other hand, the context (natural as well as social) is understood as limiting or circumscribing mens choices.50 In this sense, empirical history denes historical events as involv-ing agents self-ascriptions, goals and the context surrounding their actions (both past, present and future). Th e interplay between human purposes and contexts makes room for an account in which mens aspirations and attempts are constantly thwarted both by circumstances and by their fel-lows, and in which there is a continual struggle to make the best of unfa-vourable situations and achieve what one can in frustrating conditions.51

Empirical history thus dened encounters three types of diculty: episte-mological, structural and methodological. Th e epistemological diculty is that knowing a human act through its causes means knowing the intention at its origin. Yet these causes are deeply hidden since human motivation

47) It may seem odd to label an account based on mens reasons mechanical. However, as will become clear, it is the connection between mens reasons and their actions on the one hand, and the evolution of the species on the other hand, that is mechanical. 48) Kant, Idea, 39 [8:30] and 29 [8:17]. 49) Walsh denes it as the activity by which the historian groups dierent events together under appropriate concepts (W. H. Walsh, Colligatory Concepts in History, in P. Gar-diner (ed.), Th e Philosophy of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 133). It is interesting to mention that his concept of colligation is based on the Kantian-inspired thinking of William Whewell (see W. H. Walsh, An Introduction to the Philosophy of History (London / New York: Hutchinsons University Library, 1951), 23, 62). Th e main dierence between Walshs and Kants account is that colligation is, for Kant, specic to the empirical form of history. 50) Kant, Idea, 29 [8:17]. 51) Walsh, Colligatory Concepts in History, 130.


is, for Kant, ultimately opaque both to the agent and the spectator.52 Th is fact imposes strong limits on the perspective of empirical history under-stood as the narrative of agents behaviour and intentions by restricting it to an interpretative status.

Th e structural diculty faced by empirical history is based on the fact that, as already mentioned, men follow dierent goals, lead their lives accord-ing to dierent principles and thus do not proceed according to a con-certed plan: each according to his own ways pursues his own ends often at cross purposes with each other.53 Consequently, empirical history is made of a multiplicity of biographies which cannot be easily articulated within a global perspective and integrated into a single narrative: it appears that no systematic history of man is possible (as perhaps it might be with bees or beavers).54 Whilst bees and beavers exhibit regular patterns of behaviour that obey systematic natural laws so that individuals belonging to the same species follow similar behavioural steps, mens behaviour does not seem to exhibit any pattern. For on the one hand, with men, we are dealing with beings that act freely, to whom, it is true, what they ought to do may be dictated in advance, but of whom it may not be predicted what they will do.55 On the other hand, since man is a historical creature whose natural capacities are to be developed only in the species, not in the individual, contrary to non-human animals, his capacities cannot be exhibited entirely within the life-cycle of one individual.56

Finally, the methodological diculty is that empirical history seems to be limited to a chronological method which cannot provide a fully satisfactory

52) Kant, Idea, 29 [8:17]. According to Kant, the fact of the matter about mans interior is indeterminable from a scientic, third person perspective as well as from a rst person perspective, the agent having no privileged access to his maxims: man can never, even by the most strenuous self-examination, get entirely behind [his] covert incentives (I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, trans. M. J. Gregor (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 6162 [4:407]). Th is entails that agents as well as spectators can never know with certainty the motives, intentions and thoughts behind ones actions. Th e workings of the human mind are to remain hidden behind a veil of interpretative inferences. 53) Kant, Idea, 29 [8:17]. 54) Kant, Idea, 29 [8:17]. 55) I. Kant, Th e Conict of Faculties, in Religion and Rational Th eology, trans. M. J. Gregor and R. Anchor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 300 [4:83]. 56) Kant, Idea, 30 [8:18].


form of explanation. To understand this point, we can refer to the Blomberg Logic where Kant contrasts rational cognition with historical cognition in which the governing relation is one of coordination: In history, namely, I enumerate one thing after another, be it as to space or to time. But in rational cognitions and sciences we always derive one thing from another.57 Yet as Makkreel remarks, the relation of coordination that characterises historical cognition does not need to remain purely enumerative.58 For, if a discipline like history can be organised by the idea of the whole, then it can be considered a proper science.

In historical sciences one has two methods, the chronological and the geo-graphical. Th e two can be combined with each other. Th e last is better than the rst. In all cognitions that hang together one must rst take into consid-eration the whole rather than its parts, and of the parts the large ones rather than the small ones, the higher division rather than the lower.59

However, if history is to become rational, it cannot be in the form of empirical history; it will have to adopt another method, one which begins with the consideration of history as a whole. Th us, in order to compensate for the insuciencies intrinsic to empirical history, Kant advocates focus-ing on the question of the meaning of history as a whole through what he calls philosophical history.

If we cannot make sense of history as a whole by following mens con-scious intentions, we can attempt to make sense of it by presupposing that men unconsciously follow a plan set for them by Nature what Kant calls Natures intention.

Since the philosopher cannot assume that in the great human drama man-kind has a rational end of its own, his only point of departure is to try to dis-cover whether there is some natural objective in this senseless course of human

57) I. Kant, Lectures on Logic, trans. J. M. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 236 [24:291]. In this context, history should be understood in a broad, method-ological sense; it includes natural history, chronicle history, etc. 58) R. Makkreel, Th e Hermeneutical Relevance of Kants Critique of Judgment, in S. Martinot (ed.), Maps and Mirrors. Topologies of Arts and Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 186. 59) Kant, Lectures on Logic, 237 [24:292] .


aairs, from which it may be possible to produce a history of creatures who proceed without a plan of their own but in conformity with some denite plan of natures.60

Th is philosophical perspective on history aims at telling us something about the evolution of humanity by focusing on the whole of human actions. Methodologically, it entails that we stop focusing on particular men and focus instead on the level of the big picture the evolution of the human species: what strikes us as complicated and unpredictable in the single individual may in the history of the entire species be discovered to be the steady progress and slow development of its original capacities.61 Kant does not recommend that the teleological idea of human progress that gives rise to philosophical history replaces empirical history, but merely that it is a useful complement to strictly empirical perspectives.

It would be a misunderstanding of my point of view to [believe] that I want this idea of a world history that is to a certain extent led by an a priori guiding thread to take the place of history as such, whose composition is wholly empirical. Th is idea is only a reection of what a philosophical mind (which must above all be well versed in history) could attempt to do from another perspective.62

Numerous commentators have criticised Kants account of philosophical history on the basis that it contradicts or at least that it is of no use to what

60) Kant, Idea, 30 [8:18]. 61) Kant, Idea, 29 [8:17]. On a more historical note, the court preacher Schulz reported in the Gothaischen Gelehrten Zeitungen (February 11, 1784) that one of Kants favorites ideas was that a philosophical historian should undertake to write a history of humanity showing how far men in dierent ages had approached or deviated from their ultimate goal, namely the achievement of the most perfect state-constitution (S. Lestition, Kants Philosophical Anthropology: Texts and Historical Contexts, Continuity and Change, PhD Dis-sertation (Department of History, University of Chicago, 1985), 409410). As Kant him-self writes, No one has yet written a world history, which was at once a history of humanity, but only of the state of aairs and of the change in the kingdoms, which as a part is indeed major, but considered in the whole, is a trie. All histories of wars amount to the same thing, in that they contain nothing more than the descriptions of battles. But whether a battle has been more or less won makes no dierence in the whole. More attention should though be given thereby to humanity (I. Kant, Lectures on Anthropology (Friedlnder), trans. G. F. Munzel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), [25:472]). 62) Kant, Idea, 39 [8:30].


they believe to be the only legitimate form of historical inquiry, namely empirical history. As summed up by Wilkins, Th e fundamental problem posed by Kants essay is the relationship between natures purpose for man and the inquiries of historians. What exactly is the connection between the principle of teleology and the pursuits of ordinary historians? Is it possible to entertain such a principle without its aecting ones actual historical inqui-ries and interpretations?63 Kant himself acknowledges the strangeness of this approach whilst underlining its usefulness for our understanding of the historical world:

It is, indeed, a strange and for all appearances absurd scheme to want to write a history based on an idea of how the course of the world must go if it is to approach a certain rational goal; it seems that such an attitude can only result in a romance. If one may nonetheless assume that nature does not proceed without a plan and a nal objective, even in the play of human freedom, this idea can still be useful [ . . .] this idea may still serve as a guiding thread for presenting an otherwise planless aggregate of human actions as a system.64

Despite its apparent strangeness, the idea of Natures intentions is for Kant a heuristic device set up to organise historical data. To understand what Kant means by this heuristic use, it is crucial to refer back to his views of teleology in biology, for I believe that the function of teleology in history is in fact akin to its function in biology.65

63) B. T. Wilkins, Teleology in Kants Philosophy of History, History and Th eory, 5 (1966), 176. See also in his celebrated essay Idea for a Universal History Kant spoke of Nature or Providence as pursuing a hidden plan in history, and argued that the main object of a philosophical treatment of the subject was to uncover such a plan, thus making the writing of universal history possible. But if the proviso noted is correct, it must be agreed that no such plan could conceivably be of interest to historians (Walsh, Colligatory Concepts in History, 131) and the farsighted man must have perceived that there was a danger that a priori speculation would not consent to remain merely the servant of [ . . .] empirical his-tory, but might assert independence in which case the study of history would be more hindered than helped by it (R. Flint, Th e Philosophy of History in France and Germany, (Edinburgh / London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1874), 397). 64) Kant, Idea, 38 [8:29]. 65) Of course, there is no doubt that for Kant, the usefulness of teleological history is much broader than a mere usefuleness for empirical inquiries into historical events it impor-tantly involves the ethical destination of the human species and the issue of moral progress (see for instance S. Anderson-Gold, Unnecessary Evil. History and Moral Progress in the


Th e guiding principle at the basis of Kants biological method, which is based on the principle of teleology in order to maximise the intelligibility of the world, is that Everything in the world is good for something or other; nothing in it is gratuitous; and the example that nature oers us in its organic products justies us, indeed calls upon us, to expect nothing from it and its laws except what is purposive in [relation to] the whole.66 Teleology has thus a crucial role to play in biology: it supplies the principles and maxims with which we can investigate empirical phenomena.67 Yet insofar as it refers to the possibility of our judgments as opposed to the possibility of things themselves, teleology lacks objective explanatory power:

It does not pertain to [how] such things themselves are possible through this kind of production (not even if we consider them as phenomena), but per-tains only to the way our understanding is able to judge them.68

Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001), P. Kleingeld, Nature or Providence? On the Th eoretical and Moral Importance of Kants Philosophy of History, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 75.2 (2001), 201219, Makkreel, Kant and the Interpretation of Nature and History and Dierentiating Dog-matic, Regulative, and Reective Approaches to History in Kant, in H. Robinson (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), and Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History). Rather, my claim is that Kants teleological view of history should not be understood as being primarily based on moral considerations, but rather that it stems from theoretical considerations, considerations that are based on his conception of teleology and its relation to mechanism as found in his philosophy of biology. In other words, I do not deny that Kants account of history com-prises a signicant moral dimension; rather, I reveal another dimension, a biological dimen-sion, which has been overlooked and which has important implications for our understanding of the relationship between history and biology. 66) Kant, C.J., 259 [5:379]. 67) As Kant notes, these guiding principles are essential for dierentiating between mere groping and methodical observation: Nothing purposive would ever be found in nature by means of simple empirical groping about without a guiding principle that might direct ones search: for to observe means nothing less than to organise experience methodically. [. . .] If someone were to ask about something that he hadnt considered observing, he would typically answer: I certainly could have taken note of that had I known that some-one would ask me about it. (I. Kant, On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy, in R. Bernasconi (ed.), Race (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 38 [8:161]; hereafter cited as On the Use). 68) Kant, C.J., 292 [5:408].


Because of their reective nature, teleological judgments are hypothetical modes of explanation that cannot attain the level of objectivity required by the natural sciences.69 Th at is why Kant repeats endlessly that they are not informative: In such [teleological] descriptions reason [ . . .] gives us no information whatever about the origin and inner possibility of these forms, while that is exactly what theoretical science is concerned with.70 How-ever, doing away with teleology would lead to the loss of a precious heuris-tic principle, for the teleological principle [can] be used where theoretical sources of knowledge do not suce.71 Consequently, we should always think of organisms as being mechanically possible and go as far as possible in our mechanical explanation of them, but without excluding the use of teleological principles. Th us in the case of biology,

Once we have adopted such a guide [the concept of an intention] for study-ing nature and found that it works, we must at least try this maxim of judg-ment on the whole of nature too, since this maxim may well allow us to discover many further laws of nature that would otherwise remain hidden to us since our insights into the inner [nature] of its mechanism is so limited.72

On this basis, my claim is that similarly, teleology oers a methodological tool that allows historians to interpret data so that it leads to news expla-nations and further connections between events. In this sense, insofar as teleology is a heuristic tool (that is to say, reective rather than determi-nant), it is not intended to make any objective or scientic claim about reality and this is so whether it is used in biology or history. Rather, it consists in thinking as if history was following a plan, namely as if it was

69) Reective judgment, in this context, is dened as a judgment in which the particular alone is given and the universal has to be found. It is opposed to determinant judgments in which the universal is given and the particular is subsumed under it: If the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is determinative (even though [in its role] as transcendental judgment it states a priori the conditions that must be met for subsumption under that universal to be possible). But if only the particular is given and judgment has to nd the universal for it, then this power is merely reective (Kant, C.J., 1819 [5:179]). 70) Kant, C.J., 302 [5:417]. 71) Kant, On the Use, 38 [8:160]. 72) Kant, C.J., 280 [5:398].


teleologically oriented by an idea of the destination of the species: we think reectively of historical events as realising a purpose independent of mens particular purposes. And this importantly suggests that Kants use of tele-ology in history does not face traditional criticisms directed at Whig his-tory.73 For Kant does not claim that human history is directed towards a purpose, but rather that it looks as if history were directed towards a pur-pose, and that moreover, looking at history in this way is helpful for the historian.74

More precisely, teleology provides a guiding thread for our interpreta-tions of human behaviour: Individual men and even entire peoples give little thought to the fact that while each according to his own ways pursues his own end [ . . .] they unconsciously proceed toward an unknown natural end, as if following a guiding thread.75 Th is guiding thread allows us to put some order in the apparently disordered and meaningless succession of human behaviour by avoiding the confusion between the conscious moti-vations for human behaviour and their objective consequences for the soci-ety or the species. For it allows us to become aware of a certain machinelike progression of nature according to ends which are not theirs (the peoples) but natures own.76 For instance, as mentionned in the rst section, the diversity of nation-states (which are, for Kant, part of mans natural predis-positions) is Natures means to secure international peace through the regu-lation of external wars.

Th e mechanism of nature, in which self-seeking inclinations naturally coun-teract one another in their external relations, can be used by reason as a means to prepare the way for its own end, the rule of right, as well as to promote and

73) See for instance Herbert Buttereld who, in Th e Whig Interpretation of History, denes it as the tendency of many historians to write on the side of Protestants and Whigs, to praise revolutions provided they have been successful, to emphasize certain principles of progress in the past and to produce a story which is the ratication if not the glorication of the present (H. Buttereld, Th e Whig Interpretation of History (London: Bell, 1931), 5). 74) Note that the heuristic use of teleology in history discussed here is sucient to account for the fact that the explanatory model is specically biological rather than merely scientic (that is, with reference to the use of regulative ideas in science). For not only does it refer to an alternative between mechanical and teleological explanations, but it also stems from the biological conception of human nature spelt out in the rst section. 75) Idea, 29 [8:17]. 76) Kant, Religion, 81 [6:34fn].


secure the nations internal and external peace. Th is means that nature irre-sistibly wills that right should nally triumph.77

Th is process, namely the realisation of Natures purpose for the human species, takes place in spite of mens conscious intentions, and the teleo-logical outlook alone can spell it out.

In this sense, teleology claries seemingly irrational or counter-produc-tive events or behaviour by suggesting that they perform an unintentional function for the group, although this function might be quite remote from the conscious purpose of the behaviour. For instance, when the means cho-sen by man to realise his purpose seem counter-productive, or at least ill suited, we can turn to the social or natural purpose of the behaviour instead. Th is method is, indeed, encouraged by the fundamental principle of tel-eology as applied to history in the Idea:

All of a creatures natural capacities are destined to develop completely and in conformity with their end. [ . . .] In the teleological theory of nature, an organ that is not intended to be used, an organisation that does not achieve its end, is a contradiction.78

Insofar as the historian believes that the reasons oered by the participants for their behaviour do not suce to explain why they do what they do, from his perspective, the important question becomes what actually hap-pened? rather than how is it viewed by the participants?

For instance, Kants analysis of the phenomenon of war suggests that although the participants expressed purpose is the destruction or the inva-sion of an enemy nation and the empowerment of ones own nation, war is actually so destructive for all nations that it might seem to be rather counter-productive: it is a very articial undertaking, so uncertain for both sides in its outcome, but also a very dubious one, given the aftermath that the nation suers by way of an evergrowing burden of debt [ . . .]

77) Kant, P.P., 124 [8:36667]. Kant also writes that Nature uses two means to prevent peoples from intermingling and to separate them, dierences in language and religion, which do indeed dispose men to mutual hatred and to pretexts for war. But the growth of culture and mens gradual progress toward greater agreement regarding their principles lead to mutual understanding and peace (Kant, P.P., 125 [8:367]). 78) Kant, Idea, 30 [8:18].


whose repayment becomes inconceivable.79 Yet war can also be under-stood as an unintentional human endeavour (incited by our unbridled passions) which, for Kant, ultimately develop[s] to the utmost all the talents that serve culture.80 It can thus be accounted for by its actual consequences, namely mans historical progress towards peace: All wars are accordingly so many attempts (thought not as mans intention, but as natures objective) to bring about new relations among nations [i.e. peace-ful relations].81

Wilkins provides a further illustration of how teleological approaches can be of assistance to historical inquiry. He supposes we want to study the Napoleonic wars. If confronted with the question what were they for?, an empirical historian would probably say that Th ey were for nothing. All I know is that Napoleon, for example, wanted one day to conquer Spain, and that on another day he wanted to conquer Russia. I know that his desires and ambitions caused, or helped cause, a lot of wars, and that is all I know. As Wilkins notes, for Kantian purposes, this man is very dicult to reason with. However, another historian, a Kantian historian, could reply: But could we not say that the Napoleonic Wars, by exhausting and disgusting Europeans, paved the way for one of the longest periods of peace in European history and provided, for a time at least, for a greater cooperation of European states? And could not we also say that Napo-leon, inuenced as he was to some extent by ideals of the Revolution, may have made war to make peace, to impose a just, stable, and uniform civil authority upon all Europe? By focusing on the eects of the Napoleonic wars rather than on Napoleons intentions, the Kantian historian provides a new interpretation of Napoleons motives which can lead to further investigations of historical data.82 Hence, contrary to traditional readings, philosophical history is useful to historians insofar as it provides them with a guiding thread to analyse historical data and have a grasp of the big picture.

79) Kant, Idea, 37 [8:28]. 80) Kant, C.J., 320 [5:433]. 81) Kant, Idea, 35 [8:25]. Cf. also civil or foreign war in this species, as great an evil as it may be, is yet at the same time the mainspring for the transition from the crude state of nature to the civil state (Kant, Anthropology, 248 [7:330]). 82) Wilkins, Teleology in Kants Philosophy of History, 182183.


Conclusion

I have set out to show that Kants biological model of explanation could be used to uncover a distinction latent in Kants philosophy of history between two types of historical method. Empirical history on the one hand studies mens intentions, their actions and the consequences of their actions as the parts that form historical events and lead mechanically to the evolution of mankind. Philosophical history, on the other hand, studies men as parts of a greater whole that develops through generations, namely the human spe-cies. By focusing on the destination of the species, it accounts for the func-tion fullled by men through the elaboration of a historical narrative about the evolution of the human species. Just as in the case of biology, the two methods put forward by the antinomy of history are equally necessary and oer dierent approaches to history. Th e following diagram recapitulates the specic features of these approaches:

History

Mechanism Teleology

Empirical history Philosophical history

contextual purposesof individuals

destination ofthe species

evolution ofthe whole

behaviour ofindividuals

empiricalcolligation

(From bottom to top) (From top to bottom)

emplotednarrative


Unsurprisingly, rather than concentrating on detailed analyses of historical events, which is the task of historians, Kants works on history concentrate essentially on philosophical history. For:

Th e otherwise laudable detail with which men now record the history of their times naturally causes everyone concern as to how after several centuries our distant descendants will come to grips with the burden of history that we shall leave them. [ . . .] Th ey will treasure them only from the standpoint of what interests them, namely, what peoples and governments have done to contribute to or to impair the objective of cosmopolitanism.83

Of course, a lot remains to be said about the naturalistic teleological story I have just delineated, and in particular about its connection to its well-known ethical counterpart. However, the aim of this paper was to focus solely on the former in order to show that rstly, Kant does leave room for the practice of empirical history, secondly his teleological view of history stems from his conception of biology, and thirdly he does have the theo-retical resources to support a picture where teleological views of history are not only legitimate but, more importantly, useful for the practice of histo-rians. Th at he is able to do so, I argued, is grounded on the crucial connec-tions brought to light between his philosophy of biology and his philosophy of history.

83) Kant, Idea, 39 [8:31]. Kants concern is that a detailed record of historical events is of no use unless it is analysed from the general perspective of the evolution of human societies: gigantic erudition [ . . .] is often cyclopean, because it lacks one eye, the eye of true phi-losophy which puts the understanding to the purposeful use of this vast collection of his-torical knowledge equal to the load of a hundred camels (Kant, Anthropology, 126 [7:227]).

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