3_2 Spatial Planning Traditions in Europe

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International Planning Studies, Vol. 9, Nos 2–3,155–172, May–August 2004

Spatial Planning Traditions in Europe: Their Role in the

ESDP Process1

ANDREAS FALUDI

Radboud University Nijmegen, Oostplantsoen 114, NL-2611 WL Delft, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT Making and applying the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) is an

example of ‘Europeanization’. Europeanization is the outcome of the interaction between actorswith various motivations. In the case of the ESDP process, these motivations reflect the spatial

planning traditions and the institutional set-ups of the relevant actors. As a preliminary, the paper

describes the ESDP. It then analyses the motivations, reflecting as they do their spatial planning

traditions and institutional set-ups, of four key actors without whom the ESDP would not have

been what it is: France, the Netherlands, Germany and the European Commission. The paper ends

with a discussion of the prospects of European spatial planning after enlargement.

Making and applying the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP)(CEC, 1999) is part of the wider process of ‘Europeanization’ (Borzel, 2002).During the process various spatial planning traditions have been influencingeach other. ‘The EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and Policies’,consisting of a summary volume (CEC, 1997) and volumes on each memberstate, is the source on spatial planning traditions, or approaches. They cannot belooked at in isolation but reflect the institutional set-ups of member states, moreparticularly the balance of power between national planning on the one handand regional/local planning on the other, and between planning and otherpolicy sectors. To plot the trajectory of European spatial planning into the futurerequires insight in these various arenas.

First, the paper briefly describes the ESDP and its making. What follows is an

analysis of the motivations—reflecting as they do their spatial planning tradi-tions—of national planners in France, the Netherlands, Germany and theDirectorate-General of the European Commission responsible for regional pol-icy. The paper ends with a discussion of the prospects of European spatialplanning after enlargement.

The ESDP

In May 1999, in Potsdam, the ESDP received the blessing of the ministers of themember states of the EU responsible for spatial planning.

The document comprises two parts: a policy-oriented Part A and an analyticalPart B. Part A starts with an introduction, ‘The Spatial Approach at EuropeanLevel’, asserting territory to be a new dimension of European policy. Theopening sentence addresses a key concern as regards Europeanization, namely

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156 A. Faludi

that it leads to more uniformity: “Spatial development policies … must notstandardise local and regional identities … which help enrich the quality of lifeof its citizens” (CEC, 1999, p. 7). The spatial approach as such is about coordinat-ing policies with a spatial impact. What is important is a shared discourse. Of course, there is reference to sustainable development. Here, the notion of

balanced spatial development alluded to in the subtitle of the document:‘Towards Balanced and Sustainable Development of the Territory of the EU’comes in. Balanced development helps to reconcile social and economic claimson land with an area’s ecological and cultural functions. The medium throughwhich this is to be done is that of a balanced spatial structure. Here, thedocument relates the three main policy guidelines of the ESDP:

• development of a balanced and polycentric urban system and new urban–ru-ral relationship;

• securing parity of access to infrastructure and knowledge; and• sustainable development, prudent management and protection of nature and

cultural heritage (CEC, 1999, p. 11).

These guidelines must be reconciled with each other, and have due regard tolocal situations. However, the ESDP is no blueprint but rather “… a generalsource of reference for actions with a spatial impact … Beyond that, it should actas a positive signal for broad public participation in the political debate ondecisions at European level and their impact on cities and regions in the EU” (op.cit.). So the ESDP is a non-binding policy framework, and “… each country willtake it forward according to the extent it wishes to take account of Europeanspatial development aspects in its national policies” (op. cit.).

Chapter 2 is about EU policies with a spatial impact that the ESDP wants tocoordinate. The Single Market assumes space to be frictionless. This abstract ideais being imposed on a situation marked by long distances and physical barriersexacerbating cultural and linguistic diversity and different levels of develop-ment. The gains of integration are unevenly distributed (Heritier, 1999, p. 31).The Treaty of Rome recognizes this. The preamble refers to the need to“… reduce the differences between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions. In addition, some of the sectoral policies … assumeda regional character in their early phases” (Calussi, 1998, pp. 225–226). Someregulations were derogated to allow regions to catch up, but it took until 1975when the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was established for

any positive policy to emerge (Pierret, 1984; Husson, 2002).Regional policy is now the second-largest spender, after the Common Agricul-

tural Policy, and one of the most prominent examples of a Community policywith a spatial impact, and is also the cradle of European spatial planning.Originally a club of member states, through its regional policy the EU drawsothers levels of government within its orbit. The involvement of sub-nationalgovernments makes it a form of ‘multi-level governance’ (Hooghe & Marks,2001).

Environmental policy is another EU spatial policy. The decision to embark onenvironmental policy was taken at the Paris Summit of 1972. The environment

now has a prominent position in the European treaties. Most significant forspatial planning is the requirement of Environmental Impact Assessments and of setting aside areas for protecting birds and the habitats of endangered species,

but the EU is also seeking to inject environmental awareness into all its policies.



Spatial Planning Traditions in Europe 157

The Treaty of Rome already asked for a transport policy, but it took a rulingof the European Court of Justice to jolt the Council of Ministers into action(Heritier, 1999, p. 33). Lobbying by the European Round Table of leadingindustrialists added to the momentum (Richardson, 1997) that led to the creationof so-called Trans-European Networks. The reasoning was that national net-

works needed to be integrated and access to them improved so as to facilitatethe operation of the Single Market. Coordinating transport policy with spatialdevelopment policy and urban development measures would facilitate thedesired shift in the modal split towards more environmentally friendly modes of transport (CEC, 1999, p. 14), this being an example of where the ‘spatialapproach’ would come into its own.

The ESDP discusses other spatial policies as well, including competition policyand the policy of the European Investment Bank. Chapter 3 then presents 60policy options, which constitute a mixed bag. Option 1 is “Strengthening of several larger zones of global economic integration in the EU … through

transnational spatial development strategies.” Contrast this with option 59:“Protection of contemporary buildings with high architectural quality.” What isstriking is the absence of any sort of key diagram conceptualizing Europeanspace—something that Dutch planners have pushed for (Faludi & Waterhout,2002; Roeleveld, 2003) All that the ESDP gives is a verbal description of the coreof Europe as the ‘pentagon’ comprising London, Paris, Milan, Munich andHamburg, the only “outstanding larger geographical zone of global economicintegration” of Europe. Here, on 20% of the EU territory inhabited by 40% of itspopulation no less than 50% of the EU’s total GDP is being generated. The trendtowards more concentration needs to be broken: “The creation of severaldynamic zones of global integration, well distributed throughout the EU terri-tory and comprising a network of internationally accessible metropolitan regionsand their linked hinterland … will play a key role in improving spatial balancein Europe” (CEC, 1999, p. 20). The emphasis is on initiatives from below, whichdemonstrates the affinity of this concept with the notion of endogenous develop-ment and of building social capital (as one of the planks of EU regional policy).This is indeed a central proposition, but one that is hidden behind a plethora of other concerns for which the compromise character of the ESDP, creating a needto accommodate many concerns, is responsible.

Chapter 4, on the application of the ESDP, specifies the intended follow-ups,all of which are on a voluntary basis. There are recommendations concerning the

European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON). A whole paragraphis devoted to transnational cooperation, endorsing the so-called INTERREGCommunity initiative. A further paragraph stresses the need for the Eu-ropeanization of state, regional and urban planning.

Chapter 5 of the ESDP is a perfunctory exploration of the impact of enlarge-ment, then still way off but now, of course, a fact.

The ESDP has come about by way of protracted discussions between nationalplanners extending over the best part of 10 years. National establishmentsperceived opportunities to improve their positions; the process has been de-scribed elsewhere (Faludi & Zonneveld, 1997; Albrechts, 1998; Faludi &

Waterhout, 2002). The trigger had been the reform of the Structural Funds. TheDirectorate-General XVI responsible for such matters wanted to explore thespatial dimension of these vastly increased funds. To this end, Article 10 of thenew regulations governing the ERDF was invoked for a study aiming to identify



158 A. Faludi

the elements necessary to establish a prospective outline of the utilization of theCommunity territory. On this basis, Directorate-General XVI produced ‘Europe2000’ (CEC, 1991), followed later by ‘Europe 2000 ’ (CEC, 1994).

The end of the 1980s was also when ministers from the Member Statesgathered at Nantes in France for the first of what was to become a series of

meetings on the road to Potsdam 10 years later. Ministers listened to Com-mission President Jacques Delors’ views on cohesion policy. The Italiansorganized a follow-up. This suited the Dutch who, during their Presidency in1991, wanted to hold another meeting. They took a great leap forward byproposing setting up the Committee on Spatial Development (CSD) to preparefuture meetings. Normally, the Commission would chair such a committee, butthe proposal was for the rotating EU Presidency to hold the chair. Germanmisgivings about the whole undertaking (about which more below) had beenconveyed to other member states, which is why the Commission was held at adistance, but even so Directorate-General XVI provided the secretariat of the

CSD. It gave other support as well, thereby treating the CSD as one of the untoldnumber of Brussels committees.

At the fourth meeting in Lisbon various ministers asked for a spatial vision,and the next meeting at Liege agreed to the making of a Schema de developpementde l’espace communautaire (European Spatial Development Perspective) as theintergovernmental complement to ‘Europe 2000 ’. In fact, the Germans alreadyhad plans for such a document to be prepared during their upcoming term.

In this they succeeded to the extent of getting the so-called Leipzig Principles,a kind of constitutive ESDP document, adopted in 1994. After Leipzig theparticipants expected to proceed swiftly. However, during their Presidency the

French introduced various scenarios. The effort was inconclusive. Being next inline, Spain feared that the ESDP might imply reallocation of the StructuralFunds. The Spanish central authorities were not enamoured by local andregional empowerment either (Morata & Munoz, 1996; Farinos Dası et al., 2005).Such ambivalence continued during the Italian Presidency. Nevertheless, minis-ters resolved to bring the process to its conclusion under the Dutch Presidencyin 1997, which is when diagrammatic representations became an issue. Beingunfamiliar with maps as a way of articulating spatial policy, some delegationswere unhappy, and so the policy maps pushed for by the Dutch were relegatedto the appendix.

At Noordwijk in the Netherlands, ministers accepted the ‘First Official Draft’of the ESDP. Transnational seminars and consultations within the Commissionfollowed. In parallel, the British Presidency produced the ‘First Complete Draft’.Another German Presidency brought the process to a conclusion (but rescindedpolicy maps altogether). There was no fanfare, just a communique by theGerman Presidency announcing that the political debate had come to an end. InOctober 1999 the Finnish Presidency held a follow-up meeting at Tamperedevoted mainly to a 12-point Action Programme.

The member states and the Commission are now applying the ESDP (Faludi,2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a). An important arena is the INTERREG Community

Initiative providing co-financing for hundreds of transnational projects. There isalso ESPON ostensibly doing the groundwork for the next ESDP. We now turnto the motivations of the main players, which is where spatial planning tradi-tions come in.




Motivations of the Main Players

It is not to belittle the role of others to say that without France, the Netherlands,Germany and the European Commission, the ESDP would not have come into

being. Most other member states did not do much in the way of national spatialplanning and/or were latecomers. For instance, with the exception of Denmark,Nordic Member States did not have much input (Bohme, 2002, 2003). SouthernMember States were reluctant, viewing spatial planning as a north-west Eu-ropean concern (Rusca, 1998), but the ESDP may have a long-term effect (JaninRivolin & Faludi, 2005). So this is why we restrict this discussion to the keyplayers in the order in which they appeared on the scene, starting with France.

France

An interventionist state elite (Ross, 1995, p. 242) propelled an unstable post-war

France along a path of modernization, with the Commissariat General du Planunder Jean Monnet, later to become the pioneer of European integration, in thelead. The Commissariat practised indicative planning, and to this day indicativeplans remain a feature of the French planning tradition although, to be sure,local planning works with regulatory plans. Later, President Charles de Gaulleestablished the Delegation a l’amenagement du territoire et a l’action regionale(DATAR) to “… co-ordinate the actions of the different ministries in the domainof central territorial development” (Balme & Jouve, 1996, p. 225). This wascongenial to the Gaullist view of development being guided from the centre(Burnham, 1999).

Amenagement du territoire has no satisfactory English equivalent. “The expres-sions most commonly used are spatial planning and regional policy but those donot reflect the global ambition to reach a harmonious allocation of economicactivities” (Chicoye, 1992, p. 411). Note that it is neither regulatory nor con-cerned with balancing claims on land. The Compendium (CEC, 1997, p. 35)describes this as the regional economic planning approach. Accordingly,“… spatial planning has a very broad meaning relating to the pursuit of widesocial and economic objectives, especially in relation to disparities … betweendifferent regions … Where this approach … is dominant, central governmentinevitably plays an important role …”

Unlike regulatory planning, amenagement du territoire requires no extra powers

and in fact no plan, let alone a statutory one. Naturally, though, it assumes aview of the national territory, and schemes or scenarios can be helpful for this.French planners show particular acumen for working with spatial scenarios. In1995, a national planning scheme was foreseen by the new planning act, only to

be rescinded from the statute book in 1999 (Faludi & Peyrony, 2001), so Frenchplanners returned to working with indicative scenarios.

The key problem is the dominance of Paris, the slogan being that of Paris andthe ‘French desert’ (Gravier, 1947). Investments went to, for instance, theaerospace industry at Toulouse. It was also considered necessary to decentralizeadministration. Since 1982, this has been taken seriously. DATAR introduced

so-called Contrats du Plan E tat-Region (CPERs), putting amenagement du territoireon a new footing.

French attitudes towards Europe were mixed, but in the 1980s PresidentFrancois Mitterrand reckoned



160 A. Faludi

… that the French could profit from renewing European integration.The British were ambivalent about Europe altogether. The Germans,despite their economic power, could not lead because of their history.The French administration, good at producing quick results and over-coming opposition, was another asset, particularly in Brussels. (Ross,

1998, p. 2)

However, national ministries, already loosing out to the regions, were apprehen-sive about Europeanization (Drevet, 1995). DATAR itself was under threat(Guyomarch et al., 1998) but decided to put a positive spin on Europeanization.It got involved in the reform of the Structural Funds and in inducing Director-ate-General XVI to produce ‘Europe 2000’. Directorate-General XVI had a Frenchmake-up and “… the procedure for allocating structural funds following thestructural funds reform of 1988 reflects, in many respects, the structure and theaction principles of the French CPERs that were conceived while Jacques Delors

was a member of the French government” (Balme & Jouve, 1996, p. 231).This was the setting for what subsequently turned out to have been thekick-off meeting of the ESDP process. At Nantes, Francois Chereque, Minister of Home Affairs and as such responsible for planning, was in the chair. Thedecision to hold the Nantes meeting had been taken by his predecessor.

Chereque was not at liberty to convene a Council of Ministers. Such initiativeswere subject to inter-ministerial coordination. This, and not, as is being argued,

because the Community had no planning competence, was why the Nantesmeeting was an informal one. The type of planning discussed related to regionalpolicy, and for this there was a Community competence, but ministers of financeand economic affairs did not want to let planners come on board.

Shortly after the Nantes meeting a member of the Chereque cabinet, formerlya DATAR staff member, moved to Directorate-General XVI to work on Europeanplanning. (The outlook of Directorate-General XVI will be discussed below.) Thesecond occasion for the French to exert influence came during their 1995Presidency. By that time, the intergovernmental ESDP process initiated byGermany was in full swing. French attitudes had also changed. The ministerresponsible at that time, Charles Pasqua, was (and as a Member of the EuropeanParliament still is) a declared Eurosceptic, or, as the term goes in France‘souvereinist’, and was as much against a Community role in planning as theGermans. French input in 1995 was in the field of methods. In the early 1990s,

DATAR had been engaged in a ‘France 2015’ scenario exercise and prior to thatin one for the Paris Basin, where Pasqua had been running one of the departe-ments (Liepitz, 1995). Other member states were surprised by the emphasis onscenarios. The agreement had been to formulate policy options based on theLeipzig Principles adopted previously. However, the French persevered andCSD delegations were required to draw up national trend scenarios. However,

because of different spatial planning traditions the scenarios could not besynthesized, neither, as had been the intention, was it possible to formulate apolicy scenario (scenario voluntariste).

The complexity of the task apart, the reason was pressure of time. French

elections loomed, and there was little time to prepare the scenarios. Ministersmeeting at Strasbourg barely took notice of them. Nonetheless, some CSDdelegates saw the French initiative as having been to good purpose (Sinz, 1996).It had forced them to look at spatial development of their territory as a whole.




In the second half of 2000 France assumed the EU Presidency once again, bywhich time the ESDP was on the books. France was particularly interested inpolycentricity (INGEROP, 2000; Baudelle & Castagnede, 2002; Peyrony, 2002). Inyet another scenario exercise, ‘France 2020’, France is portrayed as being nestedin a European polycentric system (Guigou, 2002).

In 2000 the future of intergovernmental cooperation was also at stake. Theissue was to clarify the role of the Commission. Even though the document is‘intergovernmental’, the ESDP would not have materialized without the Com-mission. Formalizing the role of the Commission seemed to require treatychanges, but the Intergovernmental Conference leading to the Treaty of Nice hadother things to worry about.

By that time, Michel Barnier had become Commissioner responsible forregional policy and, coincidentally, also for the preparation of the Treaty of Niceand later for representing the Commission on the Presidium of the Conventionon the Future of Europe drawing up the draft Constitution of the EU. As French

Minister of European Affairs he had seen to it that the concept of ‘territorialcohesion’ was included in Article 16 (formerly Article 7D) of the Treaty of Amsterdam (Husson, 2002)—about which more below.

So DATAR and other French players have perceived opportunities for project-ing their ideas at the European level. French identity is increasingly rooted inEuropean identity (Schwok, 1999, pp. 64–65). At the same time, France’s Eu-ropean policy works on the “… assumption that EC affairs are an integral partof national policy and should therefore be a mirror-image of what goes on inParis …” (Middlemas, 1995, p. 293). In other words, the Commission’s approach,reflecting French thinking, fits into a broader pattern. Before discussing theCommission, the Netherlands and Germany will be discussed, the former for thesupport it gave to the Commission and the latter for stopping it in its tracks.

The Netherlands

The Dutch had been party to preliminary discussions leading to Nantes andtheir Presidencies of 1991 and 1997 took great leaps forward in the developmentof the ESDP. Thus, at The Hague the Dutch presented a document, ‘UrbanNetworks in Europe’ (Minister of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environ-ment, 1991), the effects of which are visible in the ESDP focus on polycentricity.Also, at the instigation of the Dutch, the CSD was set up as the cornerstone of

a—albeit weak—European institutional infrastructure. At Noordwijk in 1997 theDutch Presidency presented the ‘First Official Draft’ of the ESDP.

The key Dutch actor is the National Spatial Planning Agency, since thenrefashioned as a Directorate-General at the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Plan-ning and the Environment. As compared to other European outfits, itsestablishment at the time of close to 300 staff made it seem like a giant. With ahistory extending back more than 60 years, its track record is good. TheCompendium of European planning systems describes Dutch planning as one of the most outspoken examples of the ‘comprehensive integrated approach’. Thisis an approach “… conducted through a very systematic and formal hierarchy of

plans from national to local level, which co-ordinate public sector activity acrossdifferent sectors but focus more specifically on spatial co-ordination than econ-omic development” (CEC, 1997, pp. 36–37). Indeed, Dutch planning takes placeat all three levels of government. However, what is important is that Dutch



162 A. Faludi

national planning documents are not master plans but rather indicative policystatements.

Early Dutch planning, which was local, owed much to the German example.Local planning was, and still is, a form of zoning but with the addition of uniquely effective land policy instruments. With suburban sprawl raising its

head in the 20th century, Dutch planners put their faith in regional as well asnational spatial planning being able to stop it. The twists and turns of thedevelopment of Dutch planning are not at issue here. Suffice it to say thatplanning is entrenched. The system comprises detailed, legally binding localschemes and comprehensive but indicative plans at local and provincial andstrategic policy documents called National Spatial Planning Reports at nationallevel. There is an intricate system for linking these plans to each other.

Dutch planning conceives its task as the coordination of various ‘sectors’, theoperational agencies intervening in space. Conflicts between sectors makingclaims on land need to be ironed out and opportunities for synergies established

ex ante. In this, the Dutch spatial planning tradition is like the ‘spatial approach’advocated in the ESDP.

Naturally, there is conflict with the sectors. In this struggle, the ability of planners to conceptualize space and spatial development using images has beenan asset. Amongst others, the images conjure up the spectre of suburban sprawlcovering the countryside. Dutch planners also fancy themselves as locked in astruggle to keep the horseshoe-shaped pattern of towns and cities, called theRandstad, surrounding the Green Heart intact. The latter is perhaps the mostsuccessful Dutch planning concept. (For a critique see van Eeten & Roe, 2000.)Randstad and Green Heart have captured the imagination of politicians and the

public alike, forming the basis of the coalition with housing policy that isresponsible for the success of Dutch growth management (Faludi & van derValk, 1994; Dieleman et al., 1999; Needham & Faludi, 1999; Evers et al., 2000).Spatial imagery appears so effective that spending departments like Agriculture,Economic Affairs and Transport are now formulating their own spatial visions(Priemus, 1999).

Dutch planners also place their country in its wider north-west Europeancontext where it forms a gateway, with two ‘main ports’, the Port of Rotterdamand Amsterdam Airport, handling an extraordinary amount of traffic. When theDutch economy was in a crisis in the 1980s, and with the Single Market in the

offing, this position became one of the key concerns. The idea was that a countrywith good access to the hinterland, and with good ‘spatial quality’ (NationalSpatial Planning Agency, 2001) would provide opportunities for internationalinvestors. This was to be achieved, amongst others, by coordination with itsneighbours and throughout the European Community. Thus, the Fourth Na-tional Spatial Planning Report of the late-1980s and early 1990s argued for theEuropean Community to assume a planning role, a position that, albeit briefly,Dutch ministers were willing to defend at Brussels. In a report entitled ‘Perspec-tives in Europe’ (National Physical Planning Agency, 1991) the Dutchdemonstrated what their approach implied for Europe. The report had been

prepared in splendid isolation and presented at the margins of the 1991 meetingunder the Dutch Presidency where it was largely ignored. Although misman-aged in the way it was presented, the report nevertheless demonstrated anindicative European strategy.




Dutch planners remained staunch ESDP advocates, devoting one of the year books of the national agency wholly to European planning and translating itfrom cover to cover into English (National Spatial Planning Agency, 2000a;Martin, 2001). Also, the ESDP was invoked in the ‘Fifth National Policy Docu-ment on Spatial Planning 2000/2020’, an ill-fated document in the process of

being absorbed into a new ‘National Spatial Strategy’. The report identified sixnational urban networks, including the ‘Delta Metropolis’—a new name for thewell-known Randstad—and presented as one of the nodes of the Europeanpolycentric system of cities discussed in the ESDP. With an eye to improving theDutch competitive position, the government undertook to improve infrastruc-ture links with the Flemish cities and the Ruhr area. To this end, and to improvecoordination generally, contacts with its neighbours were intensified.

The Dutch, with their share in three transnational areas of cooperation,including one concerned with flood prevention in the Rhine and Meuse river

basins, also had an important stake in INTERREG IIC. The Dutch were lead

partners on several projects, including one formulating a spatial vision fornorth-west Europe (National Spatial Planning Agency, 2000b). Like elsewhere,Dutch planners now exploit opportunities offered by INTERREG IIIB. Addition-ally, the Dutch policy is one of strengthening the spatial dimension of Europeanregional policy. The goal is a European strategy for spatial investments. This iswith a view to the second half of 2004, when once again the Netherlands holdsthe EU Presidency. They see this as an opportunity to give European spatialplanning a new boost.

It will be evident that Dutch planners have something to contribute and that, by getting a handle on European planning, they also think it possible to createa more congenial context for Dutch planning. Member states that think highly of some of their policies commonly pursue a strategy of forward defence (Heritieret al., 1996). However, the Dutch rely on their professional reputation rather thanon political lobbying. They neglect building coalitions with others representingsimilar spatial planning tradition, like the Germans, whose role and motivationwe discuss next.

Germany

As mentioned above, it was under the German Presidency that ministersconsented to the ESDP. This is not to say that Germany ran the show. Germany

simply happened to hold the EU Presidency at two strategic junctures: at theend, and five years previously, in 1994 when the Leipzig Principles wereadopted.

The Germans had not been party to initial discussions leading to Nantes.When they woke up to what had happened there, they developed seriousmisgivings. Like with the predilections of other key actors, explaining thisnecessitates analysing the German spatial planning tradition and institutionalset-up.

Germans make a distinction between local planning and regional, nationaland, where relevant, international planning. The former is a matter for auton-

omous local authorities. Above the local level, planning is called Raumordnung(literally spatial ordering). Federal legislation sets broad guidelines within whichthe 16 Lander make their own laws and draw up their regulatory plans. There ismuch variation, therefore, but, like in the Netherlands, spatial planning always



164 A. Faludi

involves coordinating various sectors as they impact upon space. Germanplanning is thus another representative of the comprehensive-integrated ap-proach. However, unlike the Dutch, German planners have forged no allianceswith sectors. In not having financial instruments, German planning is moreregulatory than proactive. Initiatives come not from planners but from the

sectors and/or private developers. They must comply with statutory plans, butthis is where the role of planning often ends.

Because planning is regulatory, planners put their faith in binding plans andare ill at ease with French- and Dutch-style indicative strategies. It should beadded that, at the federal level, there has never been a spatial plan, and certainlynot a legally binding one, nor does the law foresee this as an option.

However, other than in the two other federal states of the EU, Austria andBelgium, the federal level does have a planning role. Defining substantiveplanning guidelines, the Federal Planning Act sets the general framework, anda federal minister (currently the Federal Minister of Transport, Building and

Urban Development) is responsible for federal policy. However, the Landeralways eye federal initiatives for what they may imply for their position, sofederal planning is a delicate affair. Much business is conducted jointly with theLander through a Conference of Planning Ministers (known by its Germanacronym as the MKRO— Ministerkonferenz fur Raumordnung) bringing togetherthe federal and the Lander ministers of planning.

After German unification, the MKRO took the unusual step of adopting twosuccessive documents relating to the development of the Federal Republic, theEnglish version of the first and more important of the two going under the titleof ‘Guidelines for Regional Planning’ (Federal Ministry for Regional Planning,Building and Urban Development, 1993). The Guidelines also dealt with theposition of Germany in the wider and changing European context. By securelyplacing this initiative within the MKRO, the challenge to the balance of power

between the federal level and that of the Lander was contained.European integration poses another ongoing challenge to this delicate balance.

Generally, the federal government conducts much business through the agenciesof the Lander. Foreign policy and defence are its only exclusive prerogatives.European integration started out as a matter of foreign policy, with the Ministryof Foreign Affairs taking a lead. However, European integration affects powersand responsibilities that within the Federal Republic are shared with, or evenreserved for, the Lander, this whilst their governments are kept out of European

decision making. True, meanwhile, the Lander are represented on the consulta-tive Committee of the Regions, but this has not become the strong platform forpresenting the point of view of the regions, one reason being because it alsorepresents local authorities (Borzel, 2002). So this is no real solution to theproblem as seen by the German Lander. In terms of population, 19 out of 25 EUmember states are smaller than the largest German Land—North Rhine–West-phalia—with its 18 million inhabitants (approximately 50 times the populationof the smallest member state, Malta). Still, North Rhine–Westphalia relies on thefederal government to defend its interests.

Unsurprisingly, there is weariness as regards European integration, also

because in relation to their regional economic policy the Lander have theEuropean Commission breathing down their necks. Regional economic policy isa task shared by the federal government and the governments of the Lander, butthe European Commission allows only such support for regional economic




development that fits into the agreed Community Support Framework. Thisprevents prosperous Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg (home to Mercedes Benz)from pursuing regional economic policies of their own.

The Commission’s entering spatial planning threatened to give it anotherstring to its bow and would have interfered with the planning prerogative of the

Lander. The Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs responsible for the federalinput into regional policy shared their misgivings. Taking the Lander premoni-tions on board, a new federal chief planner saw an opportunity for enhancingthe position of federal planning as the intermediary between the Lander and theEuropean Community, but then European planning had to remain under thecontrol of member states. His reasoning was that, since German federal plannershad no power to make plans for the Lander to fit into, it was inconceivable forGermany to grant such powers to the EU. It will be remembered that Germansview plans as binding legal documents. Nobody at the Commission, nor indeedthe French or Dutch advocates of European planning, had asked for the

Community to be given the power to make such plans. Neither France nor theNetherlands knows such plans at national level. Still, the spectre of Europeanregulatory planning provided a pretext for opposing Community planning.

The German position thus was that European spatial planning should be anintergovernmental responsibility. Germans were even trying, unsuccessfully itmust be said, to include provisions in the Treaty of Amsterdam for intergovern-mental planning, thus formalizing the situation around the ESDP (Akademie furRaumforschung und Landesplanung, 1996). Note that it is common practice inGermany for policies to be formulated from the bottom up, this being anexample of what Germans call the ‘counter-current principle’, so this proposalwas congenial to the way of thinking about policy making in a multilevelsystem.

An additional stimulus for a positive German attitude towards a, albeitintergovernmental, form of European planning came from the Guidelines men-tioned above, putting Germany in its European context. Germany assumed that,during its 1994 Presidency it could produce an ESDP based on the Guidelines.Oddly, one implication was not drawn. The Guidelines had been producedunder the umbrella of the MKRO, with the federal and the Lander ministers of planning on it. What was there against the Commission drawing up an indica-tive ESDP jointly with the member states? This would have been close to thehearts of the French and the Dutch, but the Germans could not bring themselves

to think about an ESDP sponsored by the Commission as anything other than athreat.

The Germans overplayed their hand in 1994. Notwithstanding this, as with theDutch after their ‘Perspectives in Europe’ proposal had been rejected, theGermans remained committed to the ESDP.

What happened since Potsdam in terms of applying the ESDP? Coming sixyears after the Guidelines, the ESDP is more elaborate and specific. Should they

be revised to take account of the ESDP? This evokes little enthusiasm. Germanplanning has already anticipated many ESDP principles, so there is no obvious

benefit to be gained from this. The alternative would be for the Lander to apply

it directly, without the Guidelines being revised (Selke, 1999, 90–92). However,even though each and every phase during its preparation has been discussed bythe MKRO, and even though Lander representatives have always been part of theGerman delegations during the ESDP process, the Lander keep their distance.



166 A. Faludi

Germany has tended to focus on relations with the accession states—thosecountries that became new members of the EU as from 1 May 2004. The countryhas a share in various INTERREG transnational cooperation areas, the emphasis

being on the Baltic Sea Area and on CADSES, shorthand for Central European,Adriatic, Danubian and South-East European Space. The federal government has

set priorities as to the types of projects it co-finances.There is little enthusiasm for taking the ESDP process forward to a revision

announced in the ESDP. Germans realize that, in the absence of continuedCommission support, the intergovernmental ESDP process has reached the endof the road. Independent German experts have had discussions with theirFrench colleagues and are beginning to get used to the idea of the EU engagingin a form of planning under the rubric of territorial cohesion (Faludi, 2004b), butthe Lander are far from being reconciled to the prospect. Nor are ministries otherthan the ministry responsible for planning. So it will be interesting to seewhether there will be opposition to the Commission pursuing EU territorial

cohesion policy, once the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe is ratified. Beforediscussing these prospects, the role of the Commission needs to be analysed.

The European Commission

The Commission is a college of eminent figures, often ex-ministers, nominated by member states. The European Parliament has to approve their appointment, but unlike national executives they are not elected, nor can the EuropeanParliament vote individual Commissioners out of office. Commissioners aresworn to promote European integration and the Commission has the exclusiveright of initiative. Indeed, neither the Council of Ministers nor the EuropeanParliament can make formal proposals (but it is not unknown for the EuropeanCouncil of heads of state and government to invite the Commission to takecertain initiatives). Subsequent to the Commission making a proposal, theCouncil of Ministers enacts the proposals into European law. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, under the so-called co-decision procedure the European Parliamenthas to give its approval, and there are conciliation procedures in place for whenthere is disagreement. So there is little comparison with national set-ups.

The Commission is mandated to innovate. Having observed Jacques Delorsand his political cabinet in operation, Ross (1995, p. 12) describes his Presiden-cies as having offered unique opportunities for fulfilling this role:

It was the Commission’s official job to find ways to use this space. TheCommission had the power and institutional right to pick and chooseamong possible courses of action, to set agendas. The right choices,those which made the most of the political opportunity structures,could set the Community in motion again. Bad political work by theCommission would have wasted the opportunity.

Ross adds that the setting was manipulated with “astounding success”. Thequest for European spatial planning was part of these high-spirited efforts.

Indeed, planning was an area that Delors was interested in as part of his

cohesion policy and the quest for preserving the ‘European model of society’.Spatial planning was not, however, an urgent matter at the Commissioners’weekly meetings. Rather, discussions were restricted to the bureaucracy, butalways within the broader context set by the Delors programme. This bureauc-




racy, often referred to as the ‘Eurocrats’, is organized in so-called Directorates-General.

The mover of things as regards European spatial planning was, and still is,Directorate-General XVI, but since Commission President Romano Prodi hasdone away with arcane Roman numerals it is now called Directorate-General

Regio. It was set up to administer the ERDF. Initially, it gave aid to memberstates to pursue their regional policies, with few strings attached. However,

building on experiences gained in the experimental ‘Integrated MediterraneanProgrammes’ (IMPs), Delors proposed a new approach. The various funds were,firstly, integrated around six (later three) objectives. Secondly, they were to beinvoked in consultation with public and private regional and local stakeholders.In this way the, what Delors described as the forces vives were to be mobilized.

For overall coordination and as a think tank building on expertise gained inthe IMPs, Delors set up a new Directorate-General XXII. However, Directorate-General XVI had operational experience in administering funds and set itself up

as being solely responsible for coordinating the new Structural Funds. Using theexpertise of national experts on secondment it also developed a capacity forconceptualizing policy. Eventually, Directorate-General XXII was dissolved andsome of its personnel were absorbed into Directorate-General XVI (Hooghe,1996). Its hands were strengthened further by the addition of a former Frenchmember of the Delors cabinet, responsible for developing cohesion policy, as oneof its directors, a position that he fulfils to the present day. Directorate-GeneralXVI as a whole had many French officials anyway. As will be remembered,Community regional policy was modelled on the French example.

This is the backdrop to the initiative, on the instigation of France, for aprospective study of the development of the European territory under Article 10of the ERDF regulations. Unsurprisingly, the spatial planning tradition that thisrepresented was French. In an interview, a French Commission official (the onewho had been appointed to the Commission staff after Nantes) professed to hissurprise when challenged for pursuing a European master plan. This wouldhave been against the spirit of amenagement du territoire, he explained. Ratherthan a master plan, what he and others at the Commission had in mind was aspatial perspective to form the basis for more effective use of Structural Funds.Drawing up such a perspective required no special legal mandate. The problemfor Directorate-General XVI was rather to gain political legitimacy for it. Direc-torate-General XVI wanted a Council of Ministers to deliberate the issues raised.

Today, the absence of planning powers in the treaties is being seen as anobstacle to European planning. At the time that was not the perception. ACouncil meeting could have been convened to discuss any matter relating toregional policy, including ‘Europe 2000’. The reasons why Nantes was aninformal meeting were the misgivings—reported above when discussing theFrench role—held by other ministries. As indicated, subsequently the operationran into opposition from member states, and so the opportunity for an EUplanning role slipped. Directorate-General XVI continued to support intergov-ernmental planning. It is not uncommon for the Commission to bide its timeuntil opportunities arise to cash in on investments.

There were, of course, teething problems before a balance could be found between the ostensibly supportive, but omnipresent, not to say overpoweringDirectorate-General XVI and the various Presidencies. Once they had beensorted out, the ESDP process ran smoothly. However, as soon as the ESDP had



168 A. Faludi

arrived, the Commission ended its support. At present, it seems to be re-toolingfor an altogether different approach, more closely linked to the delivery of theStructural Funds in the post-accession situation when the lion’s share will go tothe member states from Central and Eastern Europe. The remainder of the Fundswill be used to support the implementation in the existing Member States of the

Lisbon Strategy of turning the EU into the most competitive region globally andto build on the INTERREG, URBAN and LEADER Community Initiatives, allunder the label of territorial cohesion policy. Thus once again the Commissionhas allowed itself to be influenced by the French spatial planning traditionwhere thinking in terms of territorial cohesion comes from (Faludi, 2004b).

The second Cohesion Report (CEC, 2001a) already makes reference to thisrather French concept (Faludi, 2003a, 2004b). Article 3 of the Constitution refersto territorial cohesion as an aim of the Union, alongside economic and socialcohesion, listing it in Article 15 as a competence shared between the Union andthe member states (Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of theMember States, 2004). The third Cohesion Report (CEC, 2004) announces theintention of producing a ‘strategic document’ on cohesion policy, to be put

before the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Although theCohesion Report of February 2004 makes no explicit mention of this documentaddressing territorial cohesion, it is safe to assume that this is what theCommission intends (Faludi, 2004c).

Conclusions and Prospects

The French, the Dutch and the Commission were initially on the same wave-length. The Dutch planning tradition was more comprehensive but, like Frenchplanning, worked with indicative rather than binding planning schemes. Bothshared the Commission’s outlook that European planning cannot be aboutproducing a master plan. Had this triumvirate been allowed to get on with it, wewould have seen indicative European spatial planning, French style, combinedwith the Dutch concern for ‘spatial quality’. The outcome would have somewhatresembled the ill-fated Dutch ‘Perspectives in Europe’ exercise or the spatialvision for north-west Europe formulated under INTERREG IIC (National SpatialPlanning Agency, 2000b). The document would have been prepared under the

auspices of Directorate-General XVI but, as always, the Commission would havedrawn on national expertise. Obviously, the Dutch and the French could havecounted on getting a share of the action, but the Commission would haveensured that the work was distributed equitably. The document would have

been submitted to the Council of Ministers to give it political backing.This is alternative history. The Germans closed the window of opportunity for

European Community planning. Why did the process proceed, nevertheless?Why have successive EU Presidencies taken the ESDP further? The Germaninitiative to bring the process into an intergovernmental arena created a diffusecommitment sufficient to keep the ESDP process on track.

So far, one would be hard put to discern clearly defined national interests atwork in this process. Governments do not engage each other over planning. Itis national planners (often pleading with ministers to take up their cause) thathave a primary interest in the matter. Their hope is that Europeanization will




enhance their position vis-a-vis sectors and/or regions. This type of ‘bureau-cratic politics’ has been one of the forces propelling the ESDP process along. Forinstance, DATAR was keen on European planning to bolster its position. The

Dutch National Spatial Planning Agency made European planning its mainpolicy and gained government approval for this (but when Dutch-sector depart-ments discovered what was happening, they put a spanner in the works; see

Waterhout & Zonneveld, 2000). Similarly, German federal planning defined it asin its best interests to accept the Lander position of containing the Commission,

but it combined containment with forward defence: the pursuit of European

spatial planning as an intergovernmental affair.Initially, the Commission seemed to do the bidding of DATAR, and now once

again its outlook is French. However, as evidenced by the White Paper onEuropean Governance (CEC, 2001b), the Commission has accepted the Dutch

and German idea of coordinating sectors to achieve balanced development.

French amenagement du territoire, too, now embraces the sustainability agenda(Wachter, 2002), and so does, of course, the Commission, as evidenced by the

Lisbon and, in particular, the Goteborg strategy for a sustainable Europe (CEC,2001c) As indicated, the Commission expects that inclusion of territorial co-hesion amongst the goals of the Union in the Constitutional Treaty will provide

an umbrella for putting its own role in spatial planning on a more secure footing(Faludi, 2004b).

At the same time, this is taking spatial planning, or what comes in its place,

out of bureaucratic politics into the arena of high politics. To take account of theneeds of new members, the Commission is proposing to increase the EU budget

for 2007–13 above the current level of less than 1% of GDP (but still staying wellclear of the ceiling agreed at Maastricht). Six existing member states, includingGermany, France and the Netherlands, are arguing for current spending not to

be exceeded, and there is opposition to cohesion policy ‘pumping around

money’—budget contributions being ploughed back to member states, but underconditions set by the EU.

The outcome of all this remains unclear. Just to illustrate how uncertain

the outcome is, it is worth looking at the situation as it evolves in France.In the wake of the defeat of the Raffarin government in regional electionsin April 2004, Michel Barnier has become French Foreign Minister, thus

dashing any hopes of his serving another term as Commissioner for regionalpolicy. Now, it seems hard to conceive of a French government with him in thisposition going soft on territorial cohesion, but the fight for the 1% budget ceilingis now led by a potential opponent of President Chirac in the elections of

2007—Minister of Finance Nicolas Sarkozy. What the outcome of the strugglesahead will be, including amongst others concerning the Common AgriculturalPolicy, no one can say.

The other unknown is the Polish Commissioner Danuta Hubner. Will spatialplanning concerns, articulated as they now are under the flag of terri-

torial cohesion, recede into the background? Or are they sufficiently wellentrenched in Commission thinking to persist? European spatial planning isnot only ‘unfinished business’ (Faludi, 2003a) but is also an uncertainproposition.



170 A. Faludi

Note

1. An earlier version of this paper was published as: Las tradiciones de Planificacion Territorial enEuropa: su papel en el proceso de la Estrategia Territorial Europea, in: J. Romero & J. Farinos(Eds) Ordenacion del Territorio y Desarrollo Territorial. El gobierno del territorio en Europa: tradi-ciones, contextos, culturas y nuevas visiones, pp. 17–44 (Gijon: TREA).

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Documents

3_2 Spatial Planning Traditions in Europe