3.1 Final Report Enhancing safety and reliability in Dynamic Positioning

Report Enhancing Safety and reliability in DP

Geert Heinen 01/02/2016 1

Enhancing safety and reliability in Dynamic

Positioning: The role of Situational Awareness for Dynamic Positioning Operators

performance

Place: Soesterberg

Date: 29 January 2016

Institute: Rotterdam Mainport University of applied sciences

Made by: G.A. Heinen

Company: TNO

Principal: Dr. J.H. van den Broek

Manager: J.R. Griffioen, MSc

End date project: 31 January 2016

Version 3.1

(FSCL, 2015)



Preamble This report is my final thesis and is part of my education at the Rotterdam

Mainport University of applied sciences. This report is made for and with the co-

operation of TNO. It is about enhancing safety and reliability in DP, focused on

the role of a DPO’s SA. I have chosen for this project because I am interested the

inner workings of SA.

The objective is to come up with an idea or concept to improve the current way of

working on board vessels equipped with DP systems, in order to increase safety

and reduce the financial risks. Because of the complexity of DP operations a

number of key areas can be identified (information presentation, collaboration,

SA, etc.). The focus of this research is to address the role of DP operators (DPO)

SA. This is done by examining the available literature and by means of interviews

with DPO’s and their companies.

Special thanks go out to TNO, the principal, the manager, people interviewed,

several companies for their co-operation and all other parties involved.

Soesterberg, 29-01-16

G.A. Heinen



Table of Contents

1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 8 1.1 Problem description: ........................................................................................................... 8 1.2 Problem definition: .............................................................................................................. 8 1.3 Objective: .................................................................................................................................. 9

1.3.1 Research question: ....................................................................................................................... 9 1.3.2 Sub questions: ................................................................................................................................ 9

1.4 The research methods ......................................................................................................... 9

2. DP operations categorized ....................................................................................... 10 2.1 Categorisation method ......................................................................................................10

2.1.1 Different DP operations .......................................................................................................... 10 2.1.2 Criteria ........................................................................................................................................... 11 2.1.3 Criteria assessment ................................................................................................................... 12

2.2 Grouping .................................................................................................................................12 2.2.1 Category 1 ..................................................................................................................................... 13 2.2.2 Category 2 ..................................................................................................................................... 13 2.2.3 Category 3 ..................................................................................................................................... 13 2.2.4 Category 4 ..................................................................................................................................... 13

2.3 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................14

3. Situational Awareness ............................................................................................... 15 3.1 Definition ...............................................................................................................................15

3.1.1 SA Theories................................................................................................................................... 15 3.1.2 Endsley Level one ...................................................................................................................... 16 3.1.3 Endsley Level two ...................................................................................................................... 17 3.1.3 Endsley Level three ................................................................................................................... 17

3.2 Importance of Situational Awareness ..........................................................................17 3.3 Out of the loop ......................................................................................................................18 3.4 Team Situational Awareness ...........................................................................................20

3.4.1 Team Situational Awareness ................................................................................................. 20 3.4.2 Shared Situational Awareness .............................................................................................. 22 3.4.3 Distributed Situational Awareness ..................................................................................... 23

3.5 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................24

4. The main differences in categories in terms of Complexity, Failure consequences and SA...................................................................................................... 25

4.1 Category 1 ..............................................................................................................................25 4.1.1 Complexity and failure consequences ............................................................................... 25 4.1.2 SA ...................................................................................................................................................... 25




4.5 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................27

5. The mechanisms involved in achieving, maintaining and or improving a level of SA during a multi-vessel heavy lifting DP operation ........................... 28

5.1 A multi-vessel heavy lifting DP operation ..................................................................28



5.1.1 SIMOPS ........................................................................................................................................... 28 5.1.2 The operation .............................................................................................................................. 28

5.2 Acquiring Situational awareness ...................................................................................29 5.2.1 Acquiring process ...................................................................................................................... 29 5.2.2 Mode Awareness ........................................................................................................................ 31 5.2.3 Distributed attention ................................................................................................................ 32 5.2.4 Creatures of habit ...................................................................................................................... 33 5.2.5 Automation ................................................................................................................................... 33 5.2.6 Acquiring SA during Heavy lifting under DP .................................................................. 33

5.3 Maintaining Situational Awareness ..............................................................................34 5.3.1 SA demons .................................................................................................................................... 34 5.3.2 Corrupted SA ............................................................................................................................... 35 5.3.3 Maintaining during Heavy lifting under DP .................................................................... 36

5.4 Improving Situational awareness .................................................................................37 5.4.1 Designing for SA ......................................................................................................................... 37 5.4.2 Attentional resources problems .......................................................................................... 38 5.4.3 Training.......................................................................................................................................... 38 5.4.4 Individual Differences .............................................................................................................. 39 5.4.5 Improving SA during multi vessel heavy lift .................................................................. 40

5.5 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................41

6. Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 42 6.1 The DP operator maintaining a high level of SA during DP operations within a highly automated system .....................................................................................................42 6.2 DP operations categorized ...............................................................................................42 6.3 Situational Awareness .......................................................................................................43 6.4 The main differences in the categories in terms of Complexity, Failure consequences and SA ................................................................................................................43 6.5 The mechanism involved in achieving, maintaining and or improving a level of SA during a multi-vessel heavy lifting operation .......................................................44

7. Recommendations ...................................................................................................... 45 7.1 The DPO maintaining a high level of SA during DP operations within a highly automated system ......................................................................................................................45 7.2 DP operations categorized ...............................................................................................45 7.3 Situational Awareness .......................................................................................................45 7.4 The main differences in the categories in terms of Complexity, Failure consequences and SA ................................................................................................................45 7.5 The mechanism involved in achieving, maintaining and or improving a level of SA during a multi-vessel heavy lifting operation .......................................................45

References .......................................................................................................................... 46

Appendix I .......................................................................................................................... 49

Appendix II Categorisation........................................................................................... 50

Appendix III Interview A. Goedknegt ....................................................................... 51

Appendix IV Interview DPO Rock emplacement Vessel ..................................... 53

Appendix V interview DPO multiple vessels .......................................................... 62

Appendix VI Interview DPO Jumbo ........................................................................... 70

Appendix VII Interview DPO Royal Netherlands Navy ....................................... 78

Appendix VIII Interview DPO Heavy Lift ................................................................. 86



Appendix IX Categorization assessment ................................................................. 96 IX.1 Anchor handling ........................................................................................................................... 96 IX.2 Cable layer ...................................................................................................................................... 96 IX.3 Cruise ................................................................................................................................................ 97 IX.4 Diving support .............................................................................................................................. 97 IX.5 Dredging .......................................................................................................................................... 98 IX.6 Drilling .............................................................................................................................................. 98 IX.7 FPSO .................................................................................................................................................. 99 IX.8 Heavy Lift ........................................................................................................................................ 99 IX.9 Minehunter ................................................................................................................................... 100 IX.10Pipe layer ..................................................................................................................................... 100 IX.11 Rock emplacement ................................................................................................................. 101 IX.12 Semi-submersible ................................................................................................................... 101 IX.13 Shuttle tanker ........................................................................................................................... 102 IX.14 Supplier ....................................................................................................................................... 103 IX.15 Survey/ROV ............................................................................................................................... 103

Appendix X TNO Prezi .................................................................................................. 104



Glossary of abbreviations

AA Adaptive Automation

AI Artificial Intelligence

DGPS Differential Global Positioning Satellite system

DP Dynamic Positioning

DPO Dynamic Positioning Operator

DPS Dynamic positioning System

DSA Distributed Situation Awareness

ERP Early Research Program

FPSO Floating production and storage offloading vessel

GPS Global Positioning Satellite system

IMCA International Marine Contractors Association IOSS Intelligent Operator Support System

TSA Team Situational Awareness

MVSA Multi Vessel Situational Awareness

IMCA International Maritime Contractors Organisation

HF Human Factors

HE Human Error

HMI Human Machine Interface

LAN Local Area Network

LOP Loss of Position

LOA Level of Automation

SME Subject Matter Expert

SA Situational Awareness

SAOD Situational Awareness Orientated Design

SIMOPS Simultaneous Operations

SSA Shared Situational Awareness

OOL Out of the Loop

OOLPP Out of the Loop Performance Problem

POA Plan of Approach

ROV Remotely Operated Underwater Vehicle

UHF Ultra High Frequency



Summary A short overview of SA types: 1.SA “The perception of the elements in the

environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their

meaning and the projection of their status in the near future”. 2.TSA “The degree

to which every team member possesses the SA required for his or her

responsibilities”. 3.SSA “The degree to which team members have the same SA

on shared SA requirements”. 4.“DSA is considered to be activated knowledge for

a specific task within a system at a specific time by specific agents, that is, the

human and nonhuman actors in a system.” Any form of SA has to be acquired via

input from the environment, possible team members, the sort of (DP) operation

at hand and the knowledge and or experience available for the operator and or

team. Once it is acquired it must be maintained. This is done with the same

factors that are needed to acquire SA. When a team or person is able to maintain

SA it can be improved.

As less automation is a step backwards, the solution to the problems surrounding

DPO SA should be sought in other factors. There are two main problems, one

occurs in static DP operations and the other during dynamic DP operations.

During DP operations the following points need to be taken into account to

maintain a high level of SA: 1.Good communication and collaboration is essential.

2.With training SA can be acquired, maintained, improved, developed, prolonged,

and strengthened. 3.Each person is different therefore each individual varies in

the actual SA build up and the maximum potential SA that can be reached though

training. 4.The way information is presented to the DPO is important. 5.Be aware

of the SA Demons. 6.Don’t let habits cloud input and judgement.

The following groups of DP operations are devised: Group 1:Diving support,

Minehunter and Heavy Lift. Group 2:Cable layer, Drilling, Pipe layer, Rock

emplacement, Semi-submersible and Shuttle tanker. Group 3:Dredging, FPSO,

Supplier and Survey/ROV. Group 4:Anchor Handling and Cruise. Something worth

noting is that the categorisation does have approximately the same division as

the IMO DP classes. The complexity and failure consequences of the four

categories differ immensely from each other. From interviews it is found that SA

is required for all categories. It cannot be said that an operation requires more or

less SA, as SA is always needed, preferably with TSA, SSA, DSA and Endsley’ s

original SA theory. The complexity of the SA differs between categories. It was

found that the SA, TSA, SSA and DSA theories and aspects of SA are all

represented in the DP operations. The emphasis between single SA and TSA, SSA

and DSA shifts between the categories and operations but they do not exclude

each other. It seems that there is some sort of common basis between these

forms of SA.

The lack or ineffective SA across the vessel poses a threat to safe operations.

Accident analyses show that a fairly great part of the incidents is somehow

related to HE. In the process industry 50% of the common operations failure

modes where related to feeble SA. This may also be the case during DP

operations. The underlying problems to this feeble SA can be found in:

1.Insufficient HMI. 2.Lack of training and operator development. 3.Insufficient

communication and collaboration. Tackling these problems will improve the SA of

the DPO and possibly other crewmembers. Solutions should not be about

delivering more data to the operator (causing a data overload) but about

individual operator development and teambuilding to increase the skill of the

operator and team. The way that the data is presented to the operator should

also be improved if the maximum effect is to be reached although the

improvement here varies per DP system manufacturer.



1. Introduction My name is Geert Heinen, as a student at the Rotterdam Mainport University of

applied sciences, I am the responsible researcher for this project. The principal of

this project is H. van den Broek (TNO) and the manager of this project is J.

Griffioen (RMU). The stakeholders of this project are: TNO, The Rotterdam

Mainport University of applied sciences and myself. I am responsible for the

quality and finishing this thesis. This project is a new project for me and is not

based on one of my previous projects.

1.1 Problem description: The number of vessels with DP has grown in recent years. During DP operations

the ship is placed under a fully automated system that makes sure position and

heading are maintained. DP has been introduced as an automated aid taking over

the performance of tasks previously performed by people, with the intention of

increasing performance and safety. However this system is prone to failure, which

is why a DP operator needs to be present during DP operations to monitor the

system and take over control if necessary. This problem puts the safety of the

ship and crew at stake.

Automation has several negative performance and safety consequences

associated with it, stemming from the operator out-of-the-loop (OOL)

performance problem. The OOL performance problem prevents operators of

automated systems from taking over operations on time in the event of

automation failure. This problem has been attributed to a number of underlying

operator factors, including vigilance decrements, complacency, skill degradation

and loss of situation awareness (SA), as can be seen in the mind map that is

included in the appendix I.

Furthermore, in more complex offshore operations (with multiple vessels),

collaboration and information exchange is crucial for the overall performance and

safety of the ship as well for the efficiency of process. Different operations use

different safety standards, criteria and use different procedures. Accidents reports

gathered and published by International Marine Contractors Organisation (IMCA)

show that accidents and near accidents occur frequently. A large proportion of the

accidents are attributed to Human Error (HE). But can we truly blame the

operators? Or does the structural nature of failure is an indication of a more

fundamental design problem? In other words, in view of the system and

operational complexity, do operators have sufficient means, information and

insight to intervene in an effective way?

1.2 Problem definition: The problem is that due to insufficient DPO Situational Awareness, occurring

incidents cannot be handled in an adequate way to prevent accidents and near

misses during DP operations.



1.3 Objective: The objective is to come up with an idea or concept to improve the current way of

working on board a DP vessel in order to increase safety and reduce risks.

Because of the complexity of these operations a number of key areas can be

identified (information presentation, collaboration, SA, etc.). The focus of this

research proposal is to address the role of DP operators (DPO) SA. The following

steps will achieve this:

1. An overview of how DP is used in different maritime operations.

2. An overview and comparison of the demands necessary for the task at

hand, skills and challenges of the DP-operators concerning SA in the

categorized operations.

3. Focusing on a particular operation and describing the challenges

concerning SA, Team SA (TSA), Multi Vessel SA (MVSA) and other

important factors.

4. Describing a concept where SA, and or TSA/MVSA is improved and

maintained.

1.3.1 Research question:

How can a DP operator maintain a high level of SA during DP operations within a

highly automated system?

1.3.2 Sub questions:

1. Which categories of DP operations can be distinguished?

2. What is Situational Awareness?

3. What are the main differences in these categories in terms of Complexity,

Failure consequences and SA?

4. What mechanism is involved in achieving, maintaining and or improving a

level of SA during a multi-vessel heavy lifting operation?

1.4 The research methods

Sub

question

Methodology Qualitative or

Quantitative

Information source

1 Literature Qualitative Internet, TNO database

2 Literature/ Field

research

Qualitative Internet, TNO database,

Interview,

3 Literature/ Field

research

Qualitative Internet, Interview

4 Literature/ Field

research

Qualitative/

Quantitative

Internet, SME, Interview

The following subjects will NOT be researched in this project: Classification

society’s, DP system functionality, DP system internals, Financial overviews, Need

for DP systems, Sustainability, Technical aspects, Weather conditions. Everything

underlying the interface of the DP console is not interesting from a SA point of

view.



2. DP operations categorized In this chapter various aspects of DP operations will be described. In cooperation

with M. Berendsen (Berendsen, 2015) a division has been made into four

categories: 1,2,3 and 4 with 1 involving the highest risk and 4 the lowest. This

division is based on the complexity of the operations as well as the risks involved,

financially, environmentally and for human safety. The findings of this

categorisation are presented, in a matrix (excel sheet) that is included in

appendix II

2.1 Categorisation method The following paragraphs will explain how and why certain decisions were made.

The operations and criteria in the paragraphs 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 have been defined

with the use of literature ( (Bray, 2008), (IMCA, 2007)) and an interview with A.

Goedknegt, SME at STC. (The interview is included in appendix III.)

2.1.1 Different DP operations

Anchor handling

Cable layer

Cruise

Diving support

Dredging

Drilling

FPSO

Heavy lift

Mine sweeper

Pipe layer

Rock emplacement

Semi-submersible

Supplier

Survey/ROV

Shuttle tanker

With each of these operations, a DP system is used for different purposes. An

anchor-handling vessel uses its DP system to retrieve an anchor from an offshore

facility and transports it to the desired location where it will be deployed. Cable

laying vessels use the DP system to follow a pre dug cable trench with a specific

speed and maintain tension on the cable while placing it. A cruise vessel merely

uses its DP system as to stay in a specific position and heading when anchoring is

impossible, impractical or forbidden. Vessels providing diving support use their DP

system to maintain their position and heading while divers are performing

underwater operations, the thrusters capabilities are hampered due to safe zones

for divers. Dredging vessels, like the trail suction hopper dredger use their DP

system to follow a specific track to dredge in the required areas to maintain or

increase the depth of a waterway or to efficiently acquire sand. Drilling rigs or

drilling vessels typically maintain their position and heading above a well or a

drilling spot with the use of DP when anchoring is not possible or desired. A

floating production storage and offloading vessel (FPSO) uses its DP system to

pivot around the connection point with a well, by the influence of the winds and

currents, while maintaining position. In offshore heavy lifting operations a DP

system is used to maintain a position and heading with a minimal amount of set

point variation, this operation can include multiple DP vessels. Minesweeping

vessels conducting underwater operations use their DP system to maintain their

position and heading while divers and or ROVs are performing underwater

operations, the thrusters capabilities are hampered due to safe zones for the

divers and ROVs. Pipe laying vessels use the DP system to follow a specific path



with a specific speed to maintain tension on the pipe while placing it. Rock

emplacement vessels use their DP system to follow the specific path with a

specific speed to place the right amount of rocks in the proper location. Semi-

submersible vessels typically use their DP system to maintain their position and

heading while being semi submerged and cargo is being brought into position.

With the supplying of offshore facilities a supplier uses its DP system to approach

the platform and then maintain their position and heading once they have

reached the desired location. Survey and ROV supporting vessels need to inspect

predefined areas and use their DP system to follow the ROV or to allow precise

survey operations. Although, shuttle tankers are included into this categorisation

they have their own training program and certification. A shuttle tanker sails from

an FPSO to a location where the cargo is required. To obtain this cargo the

Shuttle tanker has to connect to the FPSO with the use of his DP system and

keep in place till the loading operation is completed.

2.1.2 Criteria

IMO Classification

Complexity

Allowable position error

Operation aborting possibilities

Error consequences (Lives)

Error consequences (Money)

Communication

Communication Frequency

SA requirement

Location

Surface or submerged operations

Number of DP vessels involved

Operation aborting consequences (Lives)

Operation aborting consequences (Money)

These criteria give a good overview of the differences between the DP operations.

The IMO has three different classification levels (IMCA, 2007), which indicate the

level of redundancy of the DP system on board a DP vessel. Level three is the

most redundant level. The complexity of an operation indicates the level of

difficulty of each operation, this includes the skills required by the DPO. Allowable

position error is the maximum distance a vessel is allowed to be of the set point

before the situation requires action and is out of the ordinary. Operation aborting

possibilities indicate the ease of which an operation can be aborted. Error

consequences are about the resources (lives or money) that could be lost when a

position error occurs. Communication states whether the communication is

conducted mostly within the ship or between ships. Communication frequency is

the number of times communication takes placed. SA requirement indicate the

complexity of SA during the DP operation by the DPO. Location defines if the

operation is conducted in a coastal or ocean setting. Surface or submerged

operations are as the name implies operations conducted at the surface of the

sea or underwater. The problem with submerged operation is that the DPO

cannot see what is happening underwater, this drastically increases the

complexity of an operation. Number of DP vessels involved is an indicator for the

complexity of the operation. Operation aborting consequences (Lives or money)

indicate the risks that are associated with the aborting of the DP operation in

lives or money involved.



2.1.3 Criteria assessment The assessment criteria that have been used for and in the matrix can be found

in appendix IX. They have been rated high, medium and low according to

information provided by literature ( (Det Norske Veritas, 2011), (IMCA, 2007))

and an interview with A. Goedknegt, SME at STC. (The interview is included in

appendix III.) Depending on the criterion of the operation the colours red, yellow

and blue have been assigned. The colour indicates the estimated risk of the

criterion for each operation. The colour red signifies a high risk, yellow medium

and blue low. This means that the criterion low can be red or blue depending on

the operation. The colours green indicate internal communication while blank cells

indicate external communication. Operations with cells that are mainly red are

considered high risk with the potential of major consequences while operations

with mainly blue cells are considered relatively safe. For all operations available

the IMO classification is subtracted from literature ( (Committee, 2012), (Bray,

2008)). These are the minimum recommended IMO classes for DP operations that

are provided by the Dynamic Positioning Committee. The rest of the information

is provided by interviews. In the end it is the client (for example Shell) who

decides the IMO class of the vessels that the contractor will use (Shell, 2011). For

each type of operation that has been categorized, an analysis is provided in

appendix IX.

2.2 Grouping With the information provided by the method used above, the different DP

operations have been categorized. These categories combine operations with

more or less the same criteria assessments, this means that the practical

workings of DP operations in the same category are not necessary similar,

because the categories are made by looking at the criteria mentioned above

which have been defined from the viewpoint of the DPO. Therefore the division

into categories will be different if other criteria are used or a different viewpoint is

taken, however the information above shows how the operations are assessed.

With this in mind the conclusion can be drawn that any categorisation will be

considered wrong or at least partially incorrect because there are so many

different ways to look at categorisation. With the information presented above

and the categorisation done from the viewpoint of the DPO the following groups

have been made.

1: Diving support, Minehunter and Heavy Lift;

2: Cable layer, Drilling, Pipe layer, Rock emplacement, Semi-submersible and

Shuttle tanker;

3: Dredging, FPSO, Supplier and Survey/ROV;

4: Anchor Handling and Cruise.



2.2.1 Category 1 The first category contains DP operations with a potential loss of lives when

things go wrong. This results in a high position accuracy that has to be

maintained and a highly complex operation. The fact that lives could be lost if

something where to go wrong also results in a large amount of people involved in

the operation and an increase in communication and SA requirements. It is

notable that all these operations are to be carried out using at least IMO DP class

two and preferably class three vessels, which means that the client considers

these operations dangerous enough to prescribe the high(est) redundancy level

of DP equipment.

2.2.2 Category 2 The second category contains vessels that have an associated risk with their kind

of work. They all have a low allowable position error and thus need a high

position accuracy. This is why the operations in this category usually are carried

out in IMO DP class two. The cable layer and pipe layer will not be able to simply

move around because they are connected to the sea floor by a cable or pipe,

which in turn means that operation aborting possibilities are low. Although the

rock emplacement vessel, drilling vessel and Semi-submersible are not connected

to the sea floor they all have another inherent risk. The rock emplacement vessel

in restricted in its manoeuvrability by draught because of the rock-emplacement

pipe, which is located close to the sea floor and cannot be raised quickly. A

drilling rig has a major problem if something goes wrong and an oil spill occurs,

because the error consequences in terms of money are extreme, this is also the

case for the shuttle tanker but the consequences are lower. Besides that the rig

has a low allowable position error and time consuming operation aborting

possibilities. Finally the Semi-submersible needs to stay accurately in position

during loading and unloading operations. The nature of the work contains certain

hazards such as collision with cargo, which is why it is placed in this category.

2.2.3 Category 3 This category is the second category containing vessels using IMO DP class two

equipment. The difference with category two is that the type of operation and

thus the risks involved are somewhat lower. The FPSO has a high allowable

position error, which means that the time to abort an operation is increased.

Besides that the operation aborting possibility is high. The reason this type of

operation is in this category is that if something where to go wrong the

consequences in respect to the environment and therefore money are very high.

The dredging operation needs less time to abort the operation and if something

were to go wrong the consequences would be low. The dredging operation is the

only IMO DP class one operation that is not in category four because of the

somewhat higher complexity. The survey and supplier vessels are both IMO DP

class two vessels that have a medium risk but usually do not have to deal with

serious consequences if something where to go wrong.

2.2.4 Category 4 This is the final category and contains the DP operations and vessels where DP is

used to increase efficiency or to reach places that could not be reached before.

This category includes the Anchor Handling vessel and Cruise ship. It stands out

because the effects of a position error are low and the operation aborting

possibilities are high. If an error would occur it is not expected that any lives will

be placed in danger and the effects on the companies treasury is expected to be

minimal. The client has prescribed that IMO DP class 1 vessels are sufficiently

redundant for these types of operations.



2.3 Conclusions In chapter 2 the DP operations have been categorized by weighing in multiple

assessment criteria from the DPO point of view. The importance of the criteria

has been rated high, medium or low depending on the activity and risk involved.

The categories derived consist of operations that are roughly similar when it

comes to the amount of risk involved. By taking all the factors of chapter two into

account it boils down to the following groups:

Group 1: Diving support, Minehunter and Heavy Lift;

Group 2: Cable layer, Drilling, Pipe layer, Rock emplacement, Semi-submersible

and Shuttle tanker;

Group 3: Dredging, FPSO, Supplier and Survey/ROV;

Group 4: Anchor Handling and Cruise.

These categories provide an overview of the amount of risk involved during DP

operations. It is concluded that the categorisation has approximately the same

division as the IMO DP classes, which indicate equipment redundancy, although

this was not intended when making the categorization. After analysis of the

groups the conclusion can be drawn with most criteria that the risk declines from

group 1 to 4, this includes the SA required. It is important to note that if a

different viewpoint is taken the categorisation will become different.



Figure 2: The Activity theory model of SA (Pantelia & Kirschen, 2015)

3. Situational Awareness In this chapter the basis of Situational Awareness (SA) will be explained. What is

SA? Also an introduction will be given on how to achieve and maintain SA. What

factors are involved and what are their effects? What levels are there in SA, what

are the differences and how does it help the DPO?

3.1 Definition

3.1.1 SA Theories The concept of Situational

Awareness or SA was first seen

in aviation. In the aviation

industry it is a priority to be

aware of the surroundings,

including other planes and the

weather, this also goes for the

shipping industry. It can be a

matter of life and death. Until

today a universally accepted

definition of SA that includes all

aspects of SA still does not exist, even

though it has been tried to define it

several times. (Pantelia & Kirschen,

2015) Three SA models exist: The 3 level model by Endsley (which will be

discussed in the following paragraphs), the perceptual cycle by Smith and

Hancock and the Activity Theory by Bedney and Meister. Fundamental differences

exist between these models in terms of environmental interactions and in

acquiring SA. While Endsley’ s model separates the product (SA) and the process

to achieve SA, the perceptual cycle does not. The other 2 models underline the

information exchange between the operator and the environment to achieve and

maintain SA, making these models less static than Endlsey’s.

In the perceptual cycle, as shown in figure 1, “Situational awareness is the

invariant in the agent-environment system that generates the momentary

knowledge and behaviour required to attain the goals specified by an arbiter of

performance in the environment” (Pantelia & Kirschen, 2015). In this model there

are an infinite number of interactions and modifications occurring with the

operator and the

environment.

In the Activity theory

as shown in figure 2,

“Situational

awareness is the

conscious dynamic

reflection on the

situation by an

individual. It

provides dynamic

orientation to the

situation, the

opportunity to

reflect, the past,

present and future,

but also

Figure 1: The perceptual cycle model of SA (Pantelia & Kirschen, 2015)



the potential features of the situation. The dynamic reflection contains logical-

conceptual, imaginative, conscious and unconscious components which enables

individuals to develop mental models of external events” (Pantelia & Kirschen,

2015). In this model three activity stages can be identified which differ from the

three level model from Endsley. These stages consist of an Orientation, Executive

and Evaluative stage. Furthermore the model consists of eight function blocks

that are interconnected to form loops for input and feedback.

The intuitive three level definition of SA by Endsley that is widely accepted and

mostly used by the research community is as follows: “The perception of the

elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the

comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near

future” (Endsley, Toward a theory of SA in dynamic systems, 1995). From this

definition three distinctive parts of SA can be derived, which can be categorized in

three different SA levels: 1 Perception, 2 Comprehension, 3 Projection. This

model is easily understood and can be used to determine the required level of SA

and measure this level for a specific task and or

situation. The three level model is shown in figure 3.

The details of each level of SA will be defined in the following paragraphs.

3.1.2 Endsley Level one The first level of SA i.e. Level 1 SA i.e. perception, is all about gathering

information from the environment the individual is working in (Endsley, Toward a

theory of SA in dynamic systems, 1995). With DP operators for example this

involves checking the position of the vessel, watching the wind speed meters,

monitoring the amount of power available for the propulsion and so on. But

gathering information is not only restricted to visual perception, also smelling,

hearing and feeling are essential to detect environmental clues. For instance the

shaking of the vessel might be an indication that the maximum engine

capabilities are being reached which could lead to a LOP (Loss of position).

Figure 3: Three level model of SA (Endsley, Toward a theory of SA in dynamic systems, 1995)



3.1.3 Endsley Level two SA is far more complex than just receiving information from the world around you

i.e. the environment. Understanding the value and relevance of each piece of

information offered to the individual is crucial for reaching the set goals for an

operation or activity. For example if the wind increases, the vessel will be unable

maintain its position. The individual must process and prioritize this information

flow in order to be able to complete the picture of the situation. This means that

the individual must be able to link the different inputs like wind and current for

example together in order to able to make a next level evaluation. When a DPO

has achieved a good level 2 SA he is able to react instantly when an

extraordinary situation for instance the failure of a reference system like Artemis

occurs. (Conners & Endsley, 2008)

3.1.3 Endsley Level three According to Endsley (Endsley, Toward a theory of SA in dynamic systems, 1995)

the highest levels of SA i.e. SA level 3, consists of projection of received

information into the future to be able to predict what will happen next if the

situation continues to develop in certain ways. This can be seen as a merger of

the individual knowledge of the environment with the model that is created in

their mind (of the system). By foretelling the possible paths a situation can

follow, it will be easier to understand what path will be taken if a part of the

system fails or something unexpected happens. The consequences can be seen

earlier and actions to minimize these consequences can be taken faster. For

example in the last 4 hours the wind has gradually increased. If the wind keeps

increasing at this rate it will reach critical values after 4 hours, making the

maintaining of the position impossible. This means minimizing the possible

damages. Higher levels of SA make DPO’s more resilient and effective with the

ever more complex tasks that have to be completed. (Conners & Endsley, 2008)

3.2 Importance of Situational Awareness Now that the term SA is explained in the previous paragraphs, the question

arises: Why is SA important? Most of the research done into SA was done in

context of aviation safety. But SA is a generic concept and not limited to one

domain, other domains SA theories can be applied include but are not limited to:

Education, Military and Shipping. For each domain the individual elements of SA

can be quite different from each other. SA can be used to measure the

performance of the personnel and or operator during various circumstances and

is a foundation for decision making, the higher the level of SA the better the

operator knows what is currently happening and how to cope with changes and

problems that occur i.e. making the right decision. (Conners & Endsley, 2008)

Figure 3 illustrates the process of achieving and maintaining SA.

Achieving a high level of SA is step one, the next step is maintaining a high level

of SA. This can be quite challenging for a DPO with all the varying parameters.

Developing a good HMI (Human Machine Interface) and using support systems

can help the DPO with acquiring and maintaining his SA. For example a report of

the IMCA states that roughly 20% of the LOP is caused by HE (Human Error)

(IMCA, DP Station Keeping Incidents Incidents , 2009). In aviation this number is

even higher, 50% of the air traffic control operators errors are attributed to no or

poor SA. (Conners & Endsley, 2008)



Loosing SA in a DP environment can

have serious consequences

depending on the type of operation.

With drilling rigs for instance a major

LOP can cause enormous

environmental pollution (see figure

4), this also invokes major financial

and brand image damage, while on a

diving support vessel the lives of the

divers are at stake. On the other

hand with anchor handling operations

the consequences do not have a

direct disadvantage other than time

loss.

3.3 Out of the loop Maintaining and improving the safety on board of vessels performing complex

(offshore) operations is the main task of the DP system. The DP system has

taken over various tasks previously performed by humans i.e. the system has

been (extremely) automated. When operator input decreases and automation

increases, it is often seen that the operator loses the insight on how the

automated process works. This consequence of automation is called the out-of-

the-loop performance problem (OOLPP). This problem hampers the capabilities of

the operators of automated systems to take over the controls of the system

manually in case of an extraordinary event i.e. and automation failure.

The OOLPP causes a loss of SA for the operator. This loss arises from the fact that

the operator loses his vigilance (it normally never goes wrong), self-satisfaction

(He did not have to do anything), lack or change in feedback and the shift from

an active operator to a passive monitoring role. Operators of automated systems

have a significantly lower capability to detect system errors than operators that

perform the same task manually. Operators of automated systems also lose their

skills to operate the system manually by lack of usage. The loss of this skill also

reduces the understanding of the DPO what the system is doing. This loss of skill

is a major problem that accompanies the automation of processes and operations

around the world, DP systems are no exception. Even worse is that the necessary

skills might never be developed at all if an operator never learns to operate the

system manually due to its automation. "If the operator has been trained

exclusively for outer-loop control and is suddenly required to close an inner loop

in an emergency when the automatic systems fail, this will be impossible" (Kiris &

Endsley, 1995). The skill to perform tasks manually gives the operator insights as

to where to look, when things go wrong and thus improve performance while

troubleshooting. Performing operations manually lets the operator create models

(in his head), which he can use in automatic mode as well. This shows the added

value of manual experience with the development of automation failure detection

and thus improving the SA of the operator.

Another aspect of the OOLPP is that the operator loses some of his process

indicators. For instance with manual steering the operator can feel with his hands

how much he must steer to maintain in position, while in an automated process

this is only visually shown. The change from physical interaction with the system

to a non-physical interaction removes a diagnostic tool the operator can use to

determine a situation even though they have more advanced displays than

(before) with manual input.

Figure 4: Rig Oil Spill (Martin, 2013)



Sometimes the system intentionally hides information from the operator; this is

because some system designers believe that this information is no longer useful

for the operator since the task it was previously needed for is automated.

However if this automated system fails the operator will still miss the required

info, that he now needs to solve the problem at hand as is illustrated by figure 5.

With the right feedback an operator can be kept informed without being

overloaded with (raw) data. This proves to be quite a challenge for designers of

automated systems to accomplish now and in the future.

Not all automation results in the out-of-the-loop performance problem, it would

be useless if it did. In tests people monitoring an automated flight system

performed better than the subjects that did the flight manually (Kiris & Endsley,

1995). This is because manual control uses a lot of the direct focus, which you

cannot use to detect failures of the system. The subjects monitoring the system

had more time to look for the tell tales signs of failures that might occur, hence

performing better. There are a lot of tasks that benefit from full or partial

automation, these include but

are not limited to repetitive and

or routine tasks i.e. writing

system logs, performing mental

calculations etc. This frees up

time that can be used to gather

the information needed to

acquire and maintain SA.

Intermediate automation

should be used with cognitive

tasks that are critical to the

decision making of the

operator. If these tasks are

fully automated the out-of-the-

loop performance problem will

occur as illustrated by figure 5

i.e. the operator must be kept

in the decision loop. The

research done by Endsley and

Kiris suggests that:

“implementing automation

while maintaining a high level

of control for the human

operator provides definite

benefits in minimizing the out-

of-the-loop performance

problem as compared to full

automation” (Kiris & Endsley,

1995)

Figure 5: Out of the loop performance problem Appendix X



3.4 Team Situational Awareness

3.4.1 Team Situational Awareness The basis of a good team is collaboration and communication, without a good

team there can’t be a good TSA. More information about team improvement can

be found in the report: Communication and teamwork during DP operations

(Berendsen, 2015). A team is a group of 2 or more people and or AI (artificial

intelligence) that work together to achieve a common goal. On board this is the

bridge team in combination with the available equipment such as the DP system,

GPS etc. Information may come from multiple sources and can be communicated

by the team members in any way deemed suitable. Not every team member

needs to know all the information as long as the team has the information and

can share it.

TSA (Team Situational Awareness) is fundamentally different from the normal SA.

Instead of one person that needs to acquire the data, process it and make a

prediction, TSA involves multiple (none) human actors (DPO and Dynamic

positioning system (DPS)). These so called actors or members have to acquire

the data, process it and make

a prediction only not every

individual needs to know

everything. For completing

the common goal only the

team needs to know all the

information but this can be

distributed across the actors

as illustrated by figure 6.

Every team member must

maintain his own level of SA,

there must be a sufficient

overlap of information

between the team members

in order to be able to

complete collaborative tasks

but the overlap may not be

too big as individual SA may

then perish. For example

the ROV pilot and DPO of a

stone emplacement vessel

need to be aware of each other’s operation continuously according to a DPO on a

Rock emplacement vessel (The interview is included in appendix IV) (Pantelia &

Kirschen, 2015).

TSA is defined in the context of the team, the team must have a common goal

and members must have specific roles i.e. DPO, ROV pilot, Navigation watch,

Survey etc. The roles must be independent but can have a certain amount of

overlap, as is the case with the DPO and ROV pilot. Each member maintains his

or her own SA. In this context TSA is defined as “the degree to which every team

member possesses situation awareness required for his or her responsibilities”

(Endsley & Kaber, The effects of LOA and AA on human performance, SA and

workload in a dynamic control task, 2003). Endsley then states: “For an

organization to accomplish high team situation awareness, the individuals’

situation must be high and the shared situation awareness between members

must also be high” (Bullemer, 2013)

Figure 6: TSA elements (Pantelia & Kirschen, 2015)



When working with multiple people on a DP vessel the complexity of the situation

and environment can be immense. To be able to achieve the common goal with

these operations excellent teamwork is needed. The HF community has pointed

their arrows more to TSA due to these complex operations. To be able to conform

to the high standard the maritime and offshore cluster has developed, it is of the

utmost importance that there is sufficient TSA and individual SA. This is to ensure

that data and information can be shared across the actors so that every actor can

work with the relevant data and information needed, to do his or her job the best

way possible. Low levels of SA within the team can lead to decimation of the TSA,

it can severely cripple the entire operation and lead to errors and or accidents.

(As can be read in the interview in appendix VIII)

TSA has 5 key building blocks that are shown in figure 7. All five of these building

blocks are essential for a good level of TSA. If one element were to be left out the

TSA would disintegrate. To be able to work in a team individual SA is required. It

is nearly impossible to add value to the team if you don’t know how things work

and what you are doing. What individual SA is and how it works is described in

the previous paragraphs. To be able to work well as a team it is imperative that

the common goals are set i.e. the operation planning. With the goals set roles can

be assigned to each team member so that the actors can work towards the goals

together. Without this actors could end up doing the same actions twice or not at

all. Even worse, without setting goals each team member could go a completely

other way in achieving the goal that they made themselves. Each role given to a

person needs to fit the capabilities of that person, capabilities may include:

knowledge, leadership and determination. There is no team without

communication and collaboration (Berendsen, 2015), therefore its essential for

TSA. Good communication and collaboration keeps every actor in the team on the

same page, which is why it is necessary to achieve TSA. Detecting Δ

SA(differences in SA) across the members of the team is desired to be able to

determine what a member could add to his own SA. In merchant shipping for

instance the helmsman has a low SA due to the fact that his sole purpose is to

keep the ships heading. An officer will therefore not ask a helmsman what is

behind the vessels because he simply does not know this. As previously described

each team member has a different role and goal, these roles and goals require

different levels of SA. Detecting and knowing the levels of the team increases

individual and team SA. With roles and goals assigned inter-team planning can

provide handles to raise SA across the team. By working out what has to happen,

when members don’t have time to find out in what stage of the process they are,

there is more time for other tasks including building up and maintaining SA

(Bullemer, 2013)

Figure 7: TSA Building blocks (Bullemer, 2013)



3.4.2 Shared Situational Awareness The focus of most of the researchers in the TSA field has been on understanding

TSA in a shared understanding of a particular situation. Endsley however says

that TSA and Shared SA are two different things. According to Endsley TSA is “the

degree to which every team member possesses the SA required for his or her

responsibilities” while Shared SA is “the degree to which team members have the

same SA on shared SA requirements” (Pantelia & Kirschen, 2015). This has

already been illustrated by figure 6 on the previous page.

Figure 8, shows the shared SA concept combined with the TSA concept of figure

6. Each letter in figure 8 (A, B, C, D) shows a different operation room, this can

be compared to trailer suction hopper dredger with a navigation, DP, dredging

and engine room team. All these teams have their own specific tasks and make

their own decisions with the equipment they have at hand. Operation rooms have

at least one operator

(for instance in the

engine room) but

multiple operators is

possible (for instance

with the DP system).

Information is shared

within the team, for

instance between D-1

and D-2. This is how

the team works

towards their objective.

Even though all these

teams are separate

they do communicate

with each other, the

lines with the combined

letters (C-D etc.)

illustrate this. They

work towards a

common objective; in

case of the trailer

suction hopper dredger

this is, dredging a specific area as safely and efficiently as possible. For this to

happen it is important that the engine room knows what the dredgers are doing,

in order to be able to provide enough power for all the equipment on board. On

the other hand the dredgers need to know if there is enough power available

before they switch on the dredging pump. This is only one example of the need of

inner-and inter-team communication on vessels in general. Any form of

appropriate communication can be used (telephone, computer, etc.). This

requires a shared understanding of each other’s situation i.e. Shared SA (Pantelia

& Kirschen, 2015)

Figure 8: Shared SA (Pantelia & Kirschen, 2015;

Sandhaland, Hyst, & Oltedal, 2015)



3.4.3 Distributed Situational Awareness TSA is by some (Neville a. Stanton, 2015) referred to as DSA (Distributed

Situation Awareness) the SA is still present but the actors themselves don’t have

access to all the information as is the case during Simultaneous Operations

(SIMOPS), see figure 9. DSA is in fact a different concept of how SA works in

systems. When working with DSA the subject is not the individual person or a

team as is with Endsley’ s theory

(Conners & Endsley, 2008) but it

is the system as a whole. This way

of thinking is increasingly being

accepted in the HF community,

some even say Endsley’ s model

(Endsley, Toward a theory of SA in

dynamic systems, 1995) has lost

its value in the complex

sociotechnical systems that exist

today with the focus on the

individual mind.

This new way of thinking suggests

that individuals with SA are not

nodes (like computers in a

network), but rather they are links

(like the LAN (local area network)

cables in a computer network).

This is the essence of DSA and

the foundation of many HF system theory approaches. The DSA theory

overcomes a fundamental problem that hampers Endsley’ s 3 level theory,

namely that it is impossible to know what is exactly going on in the minds of

others which is especially difficult during SIMOPS, due to the multiple teams that

are involved on different locations. In other words one should look at the whole

system and or operation rather than look at the processes in a subject’s mind that is part of the system.

The DP environment is very diverse and the operator i.e. agent in the system can

have very different tasks and focuses depending on the type of operation at

hand. This goes hand in hand with the operators understanding of the situation

(SA), even if he or she is presented with the same data while doing different

operations. The above shows the distributed nature of SA, so that is why it’s only

logical to call it DSA.

With the DSA theory the ‘total’ SA is distributed between various agents i.e.

humans and systems i.e. different vessels and ship teams. The system should be

viewed as one rather than individual agents. The levels of SA of the individual

agent are low when compared to the Endsley model (Endsley, Toward a theory of

SA in dynamic systems, 1995), but when the information of all the agents and

systems is combined the ‘team’ has a good level of SA. An individual has to

remember less specific and detailed information; if specific information is needed

he could just ask another agent for the required info for example via UHF

communication. The interactions between agents are different than with other

theories. The information is within the system i.e. the whole operation rather

than in each agent individually. And it does not have to be. DSA’s inner workings

are like a hive mind rather than multiple minds holding the same information.

Figure 9: SIMOPS appendix X



Because of the dynamic nature of DSA each variation of input changes the ‘total’

awareness. This can be induced by several factors: Environmental, for example

wind and or task changes, and interactions between agents, for example vessel

movements. “DSA is considered to be activated knowledge for a specific task

within a system at a specific time by specific agents, that is, the human and

nonhuman actors in a system.” (Stanton, Salmon, & Walker, 2015) This is a

provocative perspective when it is looked at with an observing psychology view,

while from a system perspective it is quite common.

To be able to understand the concept of a hive mind imagine the following; if a

task changes a node in a network it will activate and another node will deactivate

to correspond with the change, this can happen right away or over a period of

time. Changes can be triggered by the environment or interactions between the

agents (human or system). Information can be owned by any agent, human or

other. The point is that the information needed needs to be located and send to

the right agent at the appropriate time. The theory behind this is “transactional

memory” (Stanton, Salmon, & Walker, 2015). This is where agents rely on other

agents to remember certain information for them. It means that not every agent

has to possess all information available (which would be impossible for human

agents). As long as the system has all the information, the ‘team’ can perform

efficiently and effectively. In this way agents in a team can compensate for the

skills and lack of them from other agents, this ensures safe operations can be

maintained. DSA is an indicator for a team’s task performance i.e. a team with

good DSA performs well. (Stanton, Salmon, & Walker, 2015)

3.5 Conclusions As there are many different theories and models about SA (as seen in chapter 3),

some, (such as Endsley’s model, which is chosen as the main theory because it’s

the most accepted theory in the scientific field) are better and more applicable

than others in the maritime domain, it is important to be able to project these

theories and models on the DP environment. As a result of information provided

by interviews, (they show how SA is acquired on board), the conclusion can be

drawn that TSA, SSA, DSA and Endsley’ s original SA theory, are all present

during DP operations. For the exact definitions of these terms reference is made

to chapter 3.

Through literature study and interviews it is learned, verified and concluded that

any form of SA has to be acquired via input from the environment, possible team

members, human or not, the sort of DP operation at hand and the knowledge and

or experience available for the DPO and or team. This leads to the conclusion that

every individual and team has a different amount of SA due to personal

differences. Once SA is acquired it needs to be maintained. Interviews disclosed

the maintaining of SA is done with the same elements that are needed to acquire

SA in the first place. When a team or person is able to maintain his SA he can

work on how to improve his SA. How to obtain, maintain and improve SA during

heavy lifting operations is described in detail in chapter 5. A lot of these

improvements are also applicable on other DP operations.



4. The main differences in categories in terms

of Complexity, Failure consequences and SA This section of the report will continue with the categories of DP operations

mentioned in chapter two with aid of the matrix in appendix II and the interviews

in appendixes III to VIII. How do the defined categories differ from each other in

terms of complexity, failure consequences and SA?

It is impossible to say an operation requires all, no or a certain amount of SA, as

SA is always required in a DP operation. It can, however, stretch the importance

of SA in different operations and show which SA theories are applicable.

4.1 Category 1 This category consists of the following operations: Diving support, Minehunter

and Heavy Lift. In this group general risk is rated high. Therefore this category is

the first category.

4.1.1 Complexity and failure consequences With the possibility of rapidly changing environments above and below the

surface of the sea the average complexity of the operations is the highest of all

the categories. For instance on a DSV, planning in advance is really essential as

thought has to be given to how to maintain the reference systems, while doing a

vessel move. Law requires IMO class three when working with divers, and a

minimum of three independent reference systems according to a captain (The

interview is included in appendix VIII). If something goes wrong with these

operations DP wise the chances are that lives are lost. This can be due to

personal injury or major damage to the vessel. On top of that failures occur

easier due to the fact that the allowable position error tends to be very small.

4.1.2 SA Complex DP operations, especially with multiple vessels and or divers, require

different sorts of SA. Firstly (of course) the DPO needs his own SA via the Endsley

model (Endsley, Toward a theory of SA in dynamic systems, 1995). Then the DPO

needs TSA to be able to work within his bridge team and SSA to accommodate

his need for information and mutual understanding with the rest of the vessel and

possibly other vessels. The DPO also uses DSA, he is able to receive information

from the rest of the vessel and other vessels on demand. Good SA is without a

doubt essential for the completion of these complex operations, as is indicated by

interviewees. (The interviews are included in appendixes VI and VIII)

4.2 Category 2 This category or group consists of the following operations: Cable layer, Drilling,

Pipe layer, Rock emplacement and Semi-submersible. In this category general

risk is rated medium/high. Therefore this category is the second category.

4.2.1 Complexity and failure consequences Although these operations are less complex than those of category 1, they are

still far from easy. The operations can be and mostly are dynamic (except for

drilling) according to B. Plug (The interview is included in appendix V). In contrast

to category 1 where almost all assessment criteria are rated high, here a

significant number of criteria are rated high, with the rest of them being low or

medium. Loss of life is not a major issue here when things do go wrong. Money

on the other hand is major factor here (except for Rock emplacement according

to a DPO on a Rock emplacement vessel (The interview is included in appendix

IV)).



When recovering from failures a lot of money is lost due to delays and possible

follow-up damages. The operations have very small margins of error. These small

margins make that a mistake is made relatively easy after which problems can

occurs. The DPO therefore needs to be anticipating the oncoming situation a lot

more than in category 4, although anticipation is also needed in category 4 of

course.

4.2.2 SA Because these operations can be dynamic, the situation could change quickly.

Anticipation is an important factor for SA especially when the operation is

dynamic. Communication is indispensable for TSA and SSA, it is for instance

constant between the DPO and the ROV operator in this category according to a

DPO on a Rock emplacement vessel (The interview is included in appendix IV).

The DPO and ROV operator have a great amount of SSA, as do the senior and

junior DPO. They need to be constantly aware of the other’s movements and

actions to be able to conduct the operation. To be able to do this the SA of the

DPO and the ROV operator needs to be high. DSA plays a significant role in this

category as the amount of crew on board is notably larger then in category 3 and

4 and thus the information is scattered across a bigger network.

4.3 Category 3 This category consists of the following operations: Dredging, FPSO, Supplier and

Survey/ROV. In this group general risk is rated medium/low. Therefore this group

is the third group.

4.3.1 Complexity and failure consequences While being far more complex than category 4 operations, still they are relatively

rudimentary compared to operations in category 1 and 2, as most of these

operations are quite static for the DPO. In this category most of the criteria are

rated medium, in contrast to category 1 where almost all assessment criteria are

rated high. The failure consequences are all fairly low as it comes to lives. When

it comes to money only the FPSO really stands out because of possible

environmental damage. The operations are not very dynamic except during

extraordinary circumstances.

4.3.2 SA SA, TSA, SSA and DSA are applicable to all categories that are devised. The more

people and vessels there are involved with the operation at hand one way or

another, shifts the focus from DPO SA to TSA, SSA and DSA. Although not

generally recognised DSA is used a lot on board of vessels. If the information

needed by a DPO or any other crewmember is not directly available, it will be

requested in the network where this information usually is according to an

interviewee (The interview is included in appendix VIII). The more complex the

operation, the longer it will take for the information to arrive at its destination.

The difference between static (such as in this category) and dynamic operations

really come into play then, as the time available for the information to travel is

shorter in a dynamic than in a static environment. DSA is present but does not

play a major role in this category. The focus here is on DPO SA and TSA.



4.4 Category 4 This category consists of the following operations: Anchor Handling and Cruise. In

this group general risk is rated low. Therefore this group is the last group.

4.4.1 Complexity and failure consequences The complexity of these operations is very low, as are the failure consequences.

DP is more an extra in this category then a necessity. The operations could be

conducted without DP. The reasons for clients to choose for DP on these types of

vessels are convenience, efficiency and increased safety. If the DP system fails,

the DPO is normally able to salvage the situation by taking manual control. If this

happens the loss in time and money is minimal according to a Watch Officer (The

interview is included in appendix VII). The risks of injury or death are relatively

small compared to the other categories.

4.4.2 SA As with all the previous categories SA is an indispensable factor. As stated before

and found in multiple interviews (The interviews are included in appendix IV to

VIII) a DPO is unable to function without SA. That being said the SA required in

this category is significantly less, as the operations are far less complex then in

the previous categories. One operator mostly conducts the operations and this

makes TSA, SSA and DSA less complicated and useful. Information still needs to

be shared between different teams on the bridge and on board so it is not

obsolete, but there are a lot less teams and people involved then with the other

categories.

4.5 Conclusions The complexity and failure consequences of the four categories differ immensely

from each other (as seen in chapter 4 and appendix II). With category 1 being

very risky and category 4 having the least amount of risk. It can be concluded

that the complexity tends to decline from category 1 to category 4. This decline is

also evident with the failure consequences of these categories.

From interviews the conclusion is drawn that SA is required for all these

categories. It cannot be said that an operation requires more or less SA, as SA is

always needed, preferably with TSA, SSA, DSA and Endsley’ s original SA theory.

It can be concluded that the complexity of the SA differs between categories, in

category 1 achieving SA is harder due to the dynamic nature and increased

complexity of the operation then in category 4 which is relatively static and

straight forward. Through the use of interviews and literature it is concluded that

the SA, TSA, SSA and DSA theories and aspects of SA are all represented in DP

operations. The emphasis between single SA and TSA, SSA and DSA shifts

between the categories and operations but they do not exclude each other. It

seems that there is some sort of common basis between these forms of SA.



5. The mechanisms involved in achieving,

maintaining and or improving a level of SA

during a multi-vessel heavy lifting DP

operation Research done by IMCA shows that a lot of DP incidents are associated with HE.

In the process industry for instance 50% of the common operations failure modes

where accredited to poor SA. Developing a sufficient level of SA and maintaining

it on a DP vessel is hard enough as it is. Now imagine multiple vessels that need

to cooperate to lace a heavy load exactly on the right spot. There are many

variables that need to be considered. Shared SA between vessels and there

commanders i.e. MVSA (Multi vessels SA) and DSA is essential for the successful

completion of a lifting operation. Kongsberg (A DPS manufacturer) has developed

a Heavy lift module for their DP systems. Some Heavy lift companies use this DP

module.

5.1 A multi-vessel heavy lifting DP operation

5.1.1 SIMOPS Simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) are multiple (DP) operations within the same

working area at the same time and sometimes even on the same operation.

SIMOPS could lead to increased risk and unwanted circumstances, i.e. safety,

environment, damage, timetable, commercial, financial, etc. hazards. The

operations that are conducted usually include, but are not limited to:

The operating of a vessel within the 500-meter zone of an offshore

installation.

Subsea umbilical’s, risers and flow lines operations.

Offshore field improvement with multiple vessels and contractors.

Vessels that might be used are, but are not limited to: barges, diving support

vessels, heavy lift vessels, pipe layers and suppliers. Basically any vessel that has

a DP system on board and is using it can be used (IMCA, Guidance on

Simultaneous Operations, 2010). Kongsberg has developed a SIMOPS module

that aims at increasing the safety and efficiency for complex Marine Operations.

5.1.2 The operation It starts with the planning of the project. It is especially important to know if the

work takes place above or below the surface of the sea (The difference is that

during subsea activities the DPO has no visual reference to do his job). Then the

mobilisation trials are conducted, these are a test of the complete vessel, DP

wise, even before the operation is conducted. The engine room is preparing for

the DP operation as well, therefore the communication with the engine room and

electricians is essential. Then the vessel is brought into DP. Now the vessel is

ballasted to the required condition i.e. preparing the tanks and have the right

trim. Ballasting affects the DP system because the displacement increases and

thus the forces that are needed to keep the vessel in place are increased.

Draught changes can be entered automatically but it is entered manually because

the value of the sensor readings can change quickly during the lifting operation

and then provide unintended feedback to the DP system. Survey is preparing for

the measurement and location of the load. Permission from the surveyors and

clients needs to be obtained as well. Depending on the lift, the cargo usually

arrives by a barge, which is pulled by tugs. It starts out with securing the barge

to the vessel. During this, one DPO is on the master DP console (aft of the

bridge) and the other DPO is on the bridge wing behind the slave. Once the barge



is alongside, the DP console on the bridge wing is abandoned by the DPO and he

returns to the aft DP station. The additional forces that the barge creates on the

DP vessel can be entered into the DP system. If the go for an operation is given,

the lashings of the cargo can be removed. Once all the lashings are removed, the

hoisting gear is in place and connected to the cargo, the hoisting operation can

commence.

The maximum allowable position error is usually within one meter, sometimes

two. The heading is not allowed to vary more than 0.3 degrees. There is always

an officer on the back of the vessel who looks at the lift when it comes free from

the barge. The barge needs to be removed if the cargo is lifted. With a subsea

installation it is possible that multiple vessels are involved in the operation.

Communication with other ships in the area and the barge within the operation is

done via VHF. The on-board communication takes place via UHF.

The capability of the ballast system determines the lifting capability and the

speed of the operation. The list and trim are also factors that determine the

speed of the lifting operation. Sometimes with very heavy lifts the cargo is finally

set down with the use of the ballast system, i.e. taking in ballast to lower the load

on the spot. The touch down situation is dangerous because the centre of gravity

changes and the draught of the vessel changes as well, because the vessel is

effectively discharging. A smooth placement is required, because the DP system

needs time to compensate. Huge forces are created when the lift touches down,

especially if this is done quickly. These forces need to be predictable so the DPO

can anticipate on them. The distance between the structure and the vessel

changes when the cargo is placed in its position, because the cargo is no longer

suspended from the vessel. The placement of the load is the most critical part of

the operation. The surveyors need to check if the structure is placed correctly

when it is on the sea floor.

After the touchdown and the checks by the supervisors, the disconnection

happens as soon as possible. Sometimes the cargo needs to be welded to a

subsea structure that is already in place on the sea floor and the ship needs to

stay into position for weeks. This dramatically decreases the vessels capability to

move. If the ship is connected via gangway, the allowable position error is even

lower. The DP operation then shifts from dynamic to static. The SA may slip but

there are always three people on the bridge to check each other and keep the

(team) awareness in place. This information is obtained from interviews (The

interview are included in appendix VI and VIII).

5.2 Acquiring Situational awareness

5.2.1 Acquiring process SA needs to be acquired and created. It involves gathering information from the

environment, system and or team members. With the help of all these sources

the DPO can build a mental model, much like the model that exists within the DP

system, but much more elaborate. In this model all different factors that can

influence the DP progress are incorporated. This model varies for each different

DP operation. The challenging thing about acquiring good SA and maintaining it

can be assigned to two causes, one being the features of the operators

information processing system, second the complex domains that interact to form

‘SA Demons’ (SA Demons will be discussed in paragraph 5.2) (Bolte, Jones, &

Endsley, 2003).



SA, TSA, SSA and DSA all involve the same information, only the distribution of

the information is different. During DP operations an operator, an operator team

or the systems and or teams involved have the total SA. This does not mean that

the individual person cannot have (a certain level of) SA.

It all starts with Endsley’ s level 1 Perception (Endsley, Toward a theory of SA in

dynamic systems, 1995). To be able to acquire the most basic SA, information is

needed. This information can come from one or all of the senses (sight, smell,

hearing, taste and touch). The information that reaches the senses can come

from any source, internal and external. The operator can use his sight to receive

information from the environment by looking outside but he can also receive

information about the environment by looking at his equipment i.e. aids.

Once all information that is available to the operator is perceived he can continue

to level 2 (Endsley, Toward a theory of SA in dynamic systems, 1995),

comprehend the data and integrate it into his own mental model of the situation

i.e. his SA. Bear in mind that this is an ever-continuing process and it is in no

way static, the 3 levels or stages are continuously being updated by the

perception of the ever-changing data i.e. the mental model of the operator is

continuously tweaked. Sometimes data that reaches the operator contradicts with

each other, therefore the operator should carefully weigh the information to

determine what is right, wrong or unreliable information. The ability of this

sampling differs from one operator to the other. The training the operator has

had in the past and the experience he has acquired over the years have a major

influence on this process. But personality also plays a role according to Hopkin

(Hopkin, 1994), some operators are better at acquiring and maintaining SA by

nature than others. There is also a limit to how much information the operator

can process in a given timeframe, much like a computers working memory an

operator has his own working memory. If this limit is exceeded i.e. the working

memory is full, the operator may experience a data overload and might not be

able to perform at all.

When the internal

model of the

operator is

‘finished’ he can

run different

scenarios of his

model mentally.

This is when he

has arrived at level 3 of

Endsley’ s theory (Endsley, Toward a theory of SA in dynamic systems, 1995),

the highest level that can be acquired in this model. With the help of these

scenarios the operator can predict what consequences his actions will have and

what will happen in the future. This is sometimes referred to as future projection.

The outcomes of the scenarios that the operator has run are used to make a

knowledge-based decision of what steps to take or what actions to undergo in

order to perform the operation at hand as safely and efficiently as deemed

possible. The process described above is illustrated by figure 10.

The two methods to complete this SA loop are described now. In the top-down

decision making process the goals and plans of the operator are determining

what environmental elements are taken into account and which will be neglected

when acquiring SA. The environmental input has to be processed by the operator

so that the required steps can be taken to achieve the set goals and plans.

Opposite to the top-down decision making process is a bottom-up decision

making process. In this bottom-up method the environment is analysed and

Figure 10: Acquiring SA (Conners & Endsley, 2008)



patterns will be determined. These patterns show if the operator needs to adjust

his plans to be able to achieve his goals or that new goals have to be set. Acting

upon changes that occur in the environment allow for a dynamic decision making

process i.e. there is more flexibility in the process. The decisions that are made

are now not only towards the continuation of the goals and plans but they also

include the actions that shift the perceived state of the operator in line with his or

her desired state. (Gilson, 1994)

5.2.2 Mode Awareness The term mode awareness has its origins in relatively simple computers for

example in word processors. When the complexity of systems increased due to

automation and dynamic environments such as the commercial aviation industry,

pilots where becoming less aware of all the different modes their equipment and

systems where operating in. This has led to incidents where pilots thought that

the auto pilot was on when in fact it was off, sending the plane crashing down to

the earth and killing all its passengers (Sarter & Woods, 1994). The lack of mode

awareness has also caused several incidents in the past with DP vessels (IMCA,

DP Station Keeping Incidents Incidents , 2009). Although the consequences

where limited with these incidents they could have been tremendous (oil spill,

loss of life etc.).

On almost all of the equipment on board, including the DP system and its

console, different modes of operation can be selected (heading control, yaw

control, sway control or auto position and heading). Different modes can cause a

difference in what the operator thinks the system is going to do with what the

system is actually doing. Each available mode is a potential for mode errors i.e.

the failure of mode awareness. When a human interacts with a system or

computer a problem that can occur is mode error. The origin of this error is rule

changing in different modes. If rotating the wheel of the autopilot clockwise is

moving the rudder to starboard in one mode and port side in another (inverted

action which is common with a computer mouse for example), mode errors can

and will occur. An operator that is not aware of the change in modes will perform

the same action as he or she always does but the outcome is now opposite of

what it used to be. Mode error is mostly found in systems where humans and

machines work together. If the user loses his mode awareness i.e. doesn’t notice

change in modes from the machine or confuses one mode with another or mixes

up the command outcomes in different modes or a system is used where the

same actions can have different outcomes in different modes, this error can

occur. The design of the HMI can tell a lot about the potential of a system to

produce mode errors with the operator, there are multiple guidelines to reduce

the possibility for mode errors. (Sarter & Woods, 1994)

When systems are automated they provide a resource for the operator. The

system has a lot of different modes of operation to carry out different tasks in

different environments under different conditions. In a DP environment the

operator has a supervisory role in the control of automated resources that are

event driven. This differs quite a lot from the initial research on mode error. The

role of the operator is to determine what the best mode is for a certain task. To

be able to do this he or she needs a lot of knowledge about the system in order

to track the mode the system is in and what it is doing, i.e. the underlying

process, in order to not become OOTL (see chapter 3.4) The skills an automated

system asks from the operator can be especially challenging when it comes to

highly automated systems, which can switch modes autonomously based on

environmental inputs such as wind and other sensor input without the consent of

the operator. This could be the case if adapted automation is implemented into

DP systems with the use of IOSS (Intelligent Operator Support System). The

ability of automated systems to change modes drives the demand for mode



awareness i.e. the ability of the operator to track what the system is doing and

foretell upcoming changes (in modes). How to maintain mode awareness is

largely determined by the design of the HMI and the capabilities of the automated

system. (Sarter & Woods, 1994)

The ever-advancing technology allows a designer to create automated systems

that are complex and have an abundance of operator modes. The number of

modes available to the operator is increasing rapidly, providing numerous levels

of automation and even different modes for different functions. This results in a

scattered view of the mode indicators over multiple displays that only contain a

piece of the information of a (sub) system. These advanced automated systems

with all their options create a bigger delay between the input and output from the

system, which results in longer feedback loops and decreased failure detection

capabilities. The ability of the operator to maintain mode awareness in such a

system is severely hampered by the dynamic nature of it without properly

informing the operator. Earlier automated systems, and the current DP system

only change their mode as a result of operator input (this might happen

accidently without the knowledge of the operator). Future DP systems and

(current other) automated systems (aviation industry) in other domains do not

require operator input per se, they can react on situational changes and system

fluctuation to change modes. (Sarter & Woods, 1994)

Not only the system modes can be a problem but also display modes create mode

awareness problems. An example of a system that uses different display modes is

ECDIS, these display modes determine what system information i.e. warnings

environmental data etc. is shown to the operator. If for instance an ice zone box

is not checked it will not show any alarms and or notifications if such a zone is

entered. This might not look like a problem as the operator does this action him

self, but when the navigational watch is changed and during the changeover the

operator forgets to mention this change in display modes, the new operator may

place trust into a function that isn’t activated (Hecht, Berking, Jonas, &

Alexander, 2011).

Because multiple users operate the DP system (normally 2) it is difficult for each

operator to maintain awareness of the active mode and its configuration

especially if the communication between the operators is less then optimum.

Observing the status of the system and its behaviour becomes increasingly

difficult if the other operator is also capable of modifying the system without the

consent of the first operator. When two operators use different strategies to

utilize the system this problem can surface. The interaction history needs to be

kept updated by two operators so that they stay on the same mental page, in

order to avoid mistakes and to prevent loss of mode awareness.

The previously mentioned elements of the (highly) automated systems prove to

be challenging to the supervising operators and the system designers to be able

to tackle the problem of mode awareness. Various studies in different domains

have shown that mode awareness problems often are a the consequence of

technology-centred automation (Sarter & Woods, 1994)

5.2.3 Distributed attention To be able to obtain SA it is important that the operator can distribute his

attention across multiple components of the system and team. Operators that are

having difficulty with distributing attention might also be less effective in working

towards multiple goals (Gilson, 1994). This underlying factor can have mayor

consequences in complex (DP) systems where the ability to pursue multiple goals

based on input is required. If the operator is incapable to pursue these goals it

could have a serious negative impact on his perception of important data due to



the fact that he does not pursue the goal that specific piece of data is needed for,

which in turn could lead to serious accidents.

5.2.4 Creatures of habit Another big problem that affects the SA is related to the fact that people are

creatures of habit. When a DP operator gets input from the environment or the

system, a standard pattern will be activated to deal with this input i.e. the data

will be processed in a procedure like way. When the data does not require this

kind of approach errors can develop. For example: When a sailor wakes up and

gets ready for work his daily ‘Booting’ pattern is activated. If the sailor wishes to

take breakfast, because he is hungry, which he normally skips, he must change

his ‘boot’ pattern to first go to the mess room and then go to the bridge instead

of going directly to the bridge. The sailor will probably arrive at his post on the

bridge and then realise that he unintentionally skipped his breakfast. This term is

called a slip of action, and this can be related to SA. With normal operating

conditions, input from the environment (appetite) will be processed to achieve

the goal (to take breakfast). But when the ‘booting’ patterns is running the new

goal is suppressed because it is not in the normal pattern, the feeling of the

appetite does not lead to the desired goal of taking breakfast. When a pattern is

activated a human “either (a) is not receptive to the non-habitual cues, or (b)

does not generate the appropriate higher-level SA from the perception of the

cues because the appropriate schema are suppressed” (Gilson, 1994).

5.2.5 Automation Automation has changed SA acquiring, maintaining and improving, and will

continue to do so in the future. With the introduction of smarter systems and

maybe even A.I. coming on board, the DPO needs to adjust to these

developments. All new things and or aids that are introduced to any system

require learning, to be able to understand and to be able to operate with it.

(Garland & Hopkin, 1994) Automation affects an operator’s vigilance. "Vigilance

effects can be found in complex monitoring systems and that humans may

be poor passive monitors of an automated system, irrespective of the

complexity of events being monitored” (Kiris & Endsley, 1995).

5.2.6 Acquiring SA during Heavy lifting under DP The permit-to-work system is the tool to acquire SA about the vessel state. The

planning of the project provides a reference for what is going on at the moment.

For the DP part the following is done according to an interviewee: The first thing

that a captain does when he wakes up is look out of the window in his cabin,

check the weather forecast and then read his email. When this is done he go’s to

the bridge, takes a look outside, talks to the officer in charge of the watch, looks

at the DP desk and all other navigational equipment that is being used. Then he

has acquired his SA according to an interviewed captain (The interview is included

in appendix VIII)

A similar method is used by T. Hofman: It starts when the DPO wakes up and

looks out of the window, as a lot can change in 12 hours, for instance the vessel

could be moored, then when breakfast is taken in the mess room the DPO might

run into some one that tells him what has happened in the last couple of hours.

In the pre shift meeting the DPO will be informed of things to come in the shift.

Then finally the watch is taken over from the colleague and the first round on the

bridge, DP console and other equipment is done. The six-hour checklist that is

filled out by your predecessor also helps you to acquire SA (The interview is

included in appendix VI).



5.3 Maintaining Situational Awareness When SA is acquired the next step presents itself, how can the SA be maintained.

Maintaining SA is about continuously adjusting the model in the operator’s head.

This can be done with the steps described in 5.1.1 and can also be seen in figure

10. In a team good communication and teamwork is needed to be able to

maintain the SA and achieve the set goals of an operation. More about

communication and teamwork can be read in the report of M. Berendsen

(Berendsen, 2015).

5.3.1 SA demons SA demons are if you will death traps for SA. They are the pitfalls for operators.

Eight different of these ‘SA demons’ have been categorized based on 40 years of

research in the field (Conners & Endsley, 2008). The problem lies in the

interaction between the physical and mental limitations of the operator and the

design of the automated systems that they work with. These ‘SA demons’ are

especially important for system designers as they have the opportunity to

minimise consequences in the new system designs. Operators can be undermined

in their ability to acquire and maintain their SA during (DP) operations. These are

the eight ‘SA demons’ with their possible solutions:

1. Attentional narrowing, operators (humans in general) are easily caught by

attentional narrowing. This is the restriction of attention during a very stressful

situation to a couple of critical components. If important information does not fall

within these components, it will not be noticed by the operator i.e. safety and

affectivity will diminish (psychologydictionary, 2015). (DP) Systems need to be

able to support multitasking while not losing track of the goals to cope with this

problem.

2. Requisite memory trap, operators should not be required to hold system

information in their memory i.e. the system should not be to complicated to

operate (Administration, 2015). The short-term memory of an operator is limited

(paragraph 5.1.1) and it is also easily lost and or forgotten. Using a good HMI can

partially solve this problem.

3. Workload, fatigue and other stressors, humans are (obviously) not machines,

they have a maximum workload before they collapse, much like computers. Other

than computers humans suffer from fatigue, this can be compared to the draining

of a battery. When the battery is empty it needs to be recharged, with humans it

is the same (Starren, et al., 2008). When humans are put under stress or other

forms of pressure their performance can suffer. These problems can largely be

overcome in a DP environment by making sure there is enough personnel

available on board.

4. Data overload, this problem occurs when the amount of data presented to the

operator is more than he or she can handle in the time allotted for this task. This

problem can be tackled by showing only the most important data. The pitfall is

that this can undermine an operator’s ability to understand the system, which can

cause the OOTL performance problem.



5. Misplaced salience, the way feedback is provided to the operator can cause

misplaced salience i.e. the operator gives the information more credit then it

deserves because of flashy lights and bright colours. Operators can be

misdirected by this information or can become overwhelmed. It is up to the

operator to determine if the presented alarms are important or even relevant.

Misplaced salience can also be the lack of information. Operators in general are

inclined to think that no news (information i.e. lack of cues) is good news. When

designing a system special care should be taken to limit these visual incentives

(Administration, 2015).

6. Complexity creep, the complexity of systems on board (including DP) keeps

increasing. The operator’s rate of perception (level 1) slows down, his primary

understanding (level 2) is undermined and his projection (level 3) is corrupted.

The complexity creep can be overcome by limiting added complexity and by

proper design, training is a way to work around this problem but not to solve it

(Administration, 2015).

7. Errant mental models, to be able to monitor the DP system the operator

creates a mental model of the situation. An errant model i.e. wrong and or

incomplete model can result in failure to comprehend (level 2) the situation and

thus impair the projection (level 3) as well. Conflicting data can be neglected due

to the mismatch with the mental model of the operator. (Bolte, Jones, & Endsley,

2003)

8. OOTL performance problem, low SA occurs if the operator cannot see what the

system is thinking, this is thoroughly discussed in paragraph 3.3

(Conners & Endsley, 2008)

5.3.2 Corrupted SA How can the operator know when his sense of SA is off? The first sign is usually

data provided from the system or environment that does not match with the

mental model of the operator. Thus when something happens that the operator

did not expect due to his mismatching mental model he knows something is

wrong. According to Gilson (Gilson, 1994) there are three ways to deal with this

situation:

1. The operator can make a new internal model so that it complies with the

data provided by the system and environment.

2. The operator can change his internal model so that it complies with the

data provided by the system and environment.

3. The operator can change its goals and planning to deal with the new

situation.

Choosing the wrong option here could have far reaching consequences concerning

the acquiring and maintaining of SA, making it impossible to improve it for quite

some time. If the new input can be included easily into the existing model it can

indicate that the situation has changed and that the way these changes affect the

goals and plans are only minor. If the new input cannot be included easily into

the existing model, it has to be re-examined. Pitfalls in this re-examination are

that the model will be changed until all the previously non-corresponding data

corresponds, while there actually is a better (and different) model available. De

new data should be able to provide the operator with hints to flag the use of a

new model corresponding with the changed situation. If these hints don’t occur

the operator may become stuck in an error loop where the data is continuously

misinterpreted due to the fact that the wrong model is used. (Gilson, 1994)



Between SA and performance there is an apparent relation, this relation is not

always casual, nevertheless it can be predicted. Generally poor performance will

be expected in the following three situations:

1. When the SA of the operator is incomplete or inaccurate.

2. When a situation is diagnosed but the adequate action is not known or

cannot be calculated.

3. When the operator is hampered by the available time or other factors,

limiting the operators acting capability’s to perform the required action.

In a study done by Endsley (Endsley, Toward a theory of SA in dynamic systems,

1995) it was found that (as said before) SA is significantly linked to performance,

but only for operators that have the operational and technical skill to take

advantage of the information. In the same study also came forward that having a

poor SA, as an operator, doesn’t not have to lead to bad performance, but only if

the operator realizes his or her lack of SA and is able to change his or her way of

working to reduce potential poor performance. SA is therefore a good factor to

indicate the performance of an operator, but this is not a foregone conclusion

(Gilson, 1994). Some scientists like N Stanton (Stanton, Salmon, & Walker,

2015) on the other hand indicate that the current views of SA might be out-dated

and that a paradigm shift is on hand.

5.3.3 Maintaining during Heavy lifting under DP A common SA loop that is used on the bridge is: cycling the system every 30

minutes or one hour, make a round on the bridge, regularly check the weather

forecast, filling out the six-hour checklist and in a continuous loop over all the

systems for instance PMS (Power management system) and the view outside i.e.

monitoring for anything out of the ordinary according to T. Hofman (The interview

is included in appendix VI).

To be able to maintain SA during a heavy lift operation the same basis is needed

as with individual SA. But that being said, good communication is the most

important factor in TSA, the team is comprised of individuals that all need

information, and good communication ensures this. If one member of the team

doesn’t have any, or bad, SA, the average SA of the entire team may collapse. If

this happens it is easy to make mistakes. Thus faith and confidence in the

competence of the team is needed. The general operation needs to be understood

by everybody according to a captain (The interview is included in appendix VIII).

The SA of the crew never drops to zero, there is always some level of awareness.

This is especially important for the captain of any DP vessel, an interviewed

captain said the following: Usually I take my SA from the bridge to the meetings

that are taking place with vessel management. My SA is 24/7 available although

with ups and downs (as I am not always on the bridge) but I always have some

level of awareness. I am constantly working to maintain my SA. If I notice that

something goes wrong, I am on the bridge as soon as possible. Maintaining SA is

vital for everybody on board in order to work safely according to a captain (The

interview is included in appendix VIII).



5.4 Improving Situational awareness When SA is acquired and maintained the next step can be taken, how to improve

SA. By analysing the acquiring and maintaining process faults and less then

optimum performance can be detected and improved, for instance an operator

can be checked during his operation on SA demons that might occur. Training

could also prove useful to be able to avoid the pitfalls of SA and improve overall

understanding of the situation as well as the design of the HMI.

5.4.1 Designing for SA Design of the Human machine interface (HMI) as illustrated by figure 11(which is

an interaction design) can make a huge difference in the easiness to operate a

system and to acquire, maintain and improve SA.

A good HMI is easy to

understand and presents the

required information to be

able to form SA. As

mentioned before SA only

exists in the mind of the

operator or the ‘team’, this is

very important to take into

account when designing

complex systems. If the

operator is overloaded with

(raw) data it will cause a

malfunction and or a blackout

of the operator, but if this data can

be successfully transmitted to the

operator and he or she can interpret

this in time then SA can be acquired. However most automated system fail in

doing this and thus cause SA problems. (Conners & Endsley, 2008)

A system can be designed in different ways. The design is gradually shifting from:

The HMI is developed in such a way that all the data that is needed is shown, to:

The HMI provides the needed data to acquire, maintain and improve SA.

Operators of complex systems such as a DPS need their information to be

presented in such a way that it is structured and in line with their goals. The old

HMI’s presented their data in bits and pieces that must be interpreted and then

integrated before they could be used at all. A good HMI provides SA while at the

same time it is able to handle multiple operator goals while minimising the

workload of the operator (Butler & Kwon, 2013). With the limitations of the

human body as a basis, factors like attention loss, loss in sampling rate and

stressors have to be observed. Guidelines for a good SA compatible HMI have

been developed, but still a lot of research is required to optimize the design of

HMI’s in different domains. While developing a HMI that is SA compatible, caution

must be taken that this does not go at the expense of other features. Additionally

the human limitations need to be taken into account. For the highest levels of SA

some sort of projection or trail function needs to be available, a lot of extra

research is needed to achieve this. In the future A.I.’s can provide projection

support, this is often called a decision assistance support, but this needs to be

investigated as well (Gilson, 1994). SA oriented Design (SAOD) is a guideline for

developing systems that support operator SA. SAOD is thoroughly tested and

scientifically proven. The guideline consists of three phases to develop a good

HMI. The focus of these phases is optimizing the SA of the operator.

Figure 11 Interaction design appendix X



By developing a system that increases the operator’s awareness, the decision-

making progress and overall performance are improved significantly. (Conners &

Endsley, 2008)

There is one root cause that is related to operator interface design, which leads to

SA loss or reduction. This cause makes up for 9% of the total root causes that

lead to SA loss or reduction. This cause is: inadequate HMI design. It was found

that the displays could be improved. Information was presented in a poor and

vague way, alarms are not always clear and the displays could be bigger

according to T Hofman (The interview is included in appendix VI). These factors

lead to poor SA building. The interface should provide a complete and workable

set of tools for the DPO, while supporting TSA and extraordinary situation

management. The following four elements can be used to deal with the root

cause of SA loss or reduction due to operator interface design:

Improved alarm management

Introducing alarm trends

Integrated information access

Intuitive display design

In a research conducted by the ASM Consortium it was found that a functional

layout with qualitative process indicators performed far superior over a schematic

layout with raw data process indicators. Operators noticed more fluctuations and

process abnormal situations in the process while using the functional layout then

when using the schematic layout. This shows that operator awareness is in fact

influenced by the design of the HMI. (Bullemer, 2013)

5.4.2 Attentional resources problems The total amount of attention an operator has is a key limitation on SA. Attention

is needed for perceiving the environment, processing this data and for the

development of a decision and or action. In dynamic environments, while working

with complex systems, the total amount of attention of an operator can quickly

run out, due to information overload and multiple tasks the operator has to

perform. As a way of coping with this problem, successive environment sampling

is often used. People, unlike computers usually don’t successfully sample all

samples within the sampling process, thus some information will inevitably be

missed or misinterpreted due to human physical limitations.

By stating that attention resources are limited it is not said that it can’t be

improved. Sharing your information i.e. passing it on to your co-workers can be

learned and moves some of the resource usage from you to your co-worker, thus

freeing up own resources. This is a skill that can be learned, although some

people are better at it then others. Another way of freeing up attention resources

is making parts of the job routine, the tasks take up a lot less resources this way

(Endsley, SA in human decision making, 1994).

5.4.3 Training SA training can be integrated into the training program of DPO’s and other

operators in multiple ways to improve their SA.

First of all training programs can be developed that are SA orientated. These

programs educate the operators in the importance of specific components of the

system, its dynamics, the way the system functions and the projection of future

actions. This type of SA training could provide a mayor improvement in many

domains that are technology orientated, including DP. Secondly (as mentioned

before) SA is not a passive but an active process. It is imperative the DPO’s

recognize this because they must achieve, maintain and improve SA through



effort. The skills that are required to do this need to be mapped, after this is done

they can be integrated in existing or new training programs. Finally feedback

should be provided to the operator, as this is an important part of the learning

process. This feedback should at least include the accuracy and the wholeness of

the operator. The operator now has an insight of where things went wrong which

in turn leads to better acquiring of the data provided by the environment and

interpretation of the environment. Also new sampling and integration techniques

can be taught to handle and process the provided information (Gilson, 1994).

There are two root causes that lead to SA loss or reduction which are related to

training and personal development. These causes make up 14% of the total root

causes that lead to SA loss or reduction. These causes are:

Meagre teamwork impairs the transfer of SA related information and thus

reduces it, crew teams therefore need to be improved (11%).

The complete lack of SA related training (9%) for DPO’s induces poor SA.

Current training programs for DPO’s focus on knowledge about the system and

skill improvement of the crew. These trainings also focus on extraordinary

situations and emergencies, but as mentioned before, SA is not included

specifically. The following two elements can be used to deal with the two root

causes of SA loss or reduction due to training and personal development

(Bullemer, 2013):

Team building should be done if team members are not properly working

together.

An SA training should be introduced for DPO’s

5.4.4 Individual Differences SA is a skill that can be learned though training as is described in the previous

paragraph. Each person is different, therefore each individual varies in the actual

SA he or she acquires and the maximum potential SA he or she can obtain

though training. This has consequences, which will be described below. These

consequences can be called hypothetical (Hopkin, 1994):

1. Each operator will, with the same information provided, have a different

SA. The consequence is that another operator working with the same

information could have included or excluded data for his or her SA, leading

to a mismatch in the SA’s of the two operators, which can cause problems.

2. SA can be learned and because of this it can be explained and to some

extend is predictable, as can be seen in chapter 3, this can be used in a

learning concept.

3. With training SA can be acquired, maintained, improved, developed,

prolonged, and strengthened.

4. With insufficient training and or experience it can and or will be, faulty,

incomplete, surreal, collapsing and subjected to error.

5. The ability of the operator to acquire SA will degenerate over time if SA is

not required, using and practicing SA is therefore very important.

6. SA can be improved by learning the right skills, by obtaining experience,

by increasing the knowledge base and by increasing the accessibility to

the knowledge base.

7. Habits that are formed by DP operators have an impact on their SA, they

may miss new crucial information that appears on the console or in the

environment that contradicts with the rest of the system of his mental

model. Their relevance filter may become corrupted due to biasing, and

their memories can give certain information a larger value than it should

have, based on previous events.



8. The by training obtained interpretation of specific and perceived values, is

an important part of the perception of the operator. This operator specific

‘model’ will be very resilient to the recognition and repairing of any faults

that are created by themselves.

9. SA is and will be severely influenced by training. What the operator is

taught, how it is taught and the relevance of what is learned in

comparison to what is needed at that specific moment.

10. Variations in attention will influence an operators SA.

11. To acquire SA not all information is used, only the data relevant to the

operator is incorporated into the mental model of the operator. Irrelevant

data to the operator is thus discarded and does not affect the operators

SA. The problem is that this information could be very important (

(Hopkin, 1994) (Garland & Hopkin, 1994)).

5.4.5 Improving SA during multi vessel heavy lift To be able to improve the SA of the operator during a multi vessel heavy lift DP

operation, the root causes of the loss or decrease of his or hers SA must be

addressed. In a study (Bullemer, 2013) an analysis is made where SA loss or

decreasing occurs. This study indicates that the focus must be placed with the

following 4 factors:

Communication and Collaboration

First line Leadership

Operator Interface design

Operator Development and training

These factors are related to the TSA building blocks in figure 7. Operator interface

design has been discussed in paragraph 5.3.1 and the training of the operator

and his or hers development has been discussed in paragraph 5.3.3 and 5.3.4.

5.4.5.1 Communication and Collaboration

There are three root causes that lead to SA loss or reduction which are related to

Communication and collaboration. These causes make up for 21% of the total

root causes that lead to SA loss or reduction. These causes are:

Lack of communication (12%) between the operator and the team and

between the different shifts on board.

Ineffective communication (5%), use of wrong communication medium or

wrong communication itself.

Insufficient planning and briefing on the upcoming operation (4%), i.e. the

absence or (usually) deficient briefing of the crew.

Good communication and collaboration are essential to achieve, maintain and

improve SA during normal operations, but especially during an emergency

according to a captain (The interview is included in appendix VIII). Good

communication ensures that the team members are able to perceive, assess and

adjust the information that is provided to them and make them capable to act

upon it while keeping the goals of the operation in the back of their minds. The

choice for the right medium to share the information between the team members

is important to guarantee the continuance of the operation and to keep the goals

in sight. More information about communication, collaboration and teamwork can

be found in M. Berendsens report (Berendsen, 2015).

The following three elements can be used to deal with the three root causes of SA

loss or reduction due to communication and collaboration problems: Firstly daily

communication needs to be structured. Secondly more interaction should take

place between operators and maintenance crew and this should be more



coordinated. Finally communication protocols should be written that are task

based. A structured change of the watch procedure can greatly benefit the

effective transfer of information related to SA. In a report by Bullemer (Bullemer,

2013) the minimum requirements for such a procedure are described. The

effectiveness of a structured watch change-over procedure was also tested. The

conclusion was a structured watch change-over procedure with the aid of a

checklist and logbook provided significantly better results in information transfer.

The quality of the logbooks increased by 18.6%, the operators of the new shift

had an increased SA of 9% and the operator had to make less use of his

colleagues for answering SA related questions which is an increase of 8%

(Bullemer, 2013).

5.4.5.2 First Line Leadership

There are three root causes that lead to SA loss or reduction which are related to

first line leadership. These causes make up for a staggering 26% of the total root

causes that lead to SA loss or reduction. These causes are:

Unsatisfactory teamwork (12%). The teamwork within the teams was

inadequate and impaired good (T)SA.

Lack of oversight (9%)

Disregard of existing procedures (5%). Not complying with procedures,

policies and standards that are designed to create expertise.

The first line leader i.e. the captain is for fulfilling a consultant role on board of a

heavy lifting vessel. Usually he is not present on the bridge and if he is to be

consulted he has to be contacted by phone or any other means. The captain has

to make sure that the behaviour of the crew is in compliance with the regulations

of the client, usually this is done via standing orders. The following three

elements can be used to deal with the three root causes of SA loss or reduction

due to communication and collaboration problems: Firstly leadership training

could be introduced. Secondly the first line leadership competency model could

be used. Finally the leadership skills could be verified. (Bullemer, 2013)

5.5 Conclusions As seen in chapter 5 the achieving, maintaining and improving of SA can be done

in varies ways. The conclusion can be drawn that a lot could be gained by

improving the achieving, maintaining and improving process of SA during DP

operations. This will lead to improved safety and efficiency. The mechanisms

involved in achieving, maintaining and improving SA have the same basis in all

DP operations although the amount of SA types varies, with DP heavy lift

operations for instance the focus lies more on DSA, SSA and TSA than on SA.

Furthermore it can be concluded that solutions to the problems and losses of SA

(that accompany automation) should not be about delivering more data to the

operator but about improving the following: The HMI, DP operation training, SA

training and training in communication and collaboration. Improving the HMI of

the (DP) systems on board will also improve the SA of the DPO. A problem is that

the equipment manufacturer can only develop HMI improvement. When DPO’s

are trained on DP operations their insight (in the operation and the system) and

experience will increase. This provides a way of improving the SA of the DPO’s

without modifying the systems on board. Another way of improving SA without

modifying the system is to provide communication and teamwork training.

Another conclusion drawn from multiple interviews is that if the system is

modified the DP control panel’s position and direction it faces are very important

factors to take in to consideration, as these are now far from optimum especially

on the older DP vessels.



6. Conclusions This chapter lists per question all the conclusions that have been drawn in the

previous chapters. The main question will be discussed in paragraph 6.1 and the

sub questions in the following paragraphs.

6.1 The DP operator maintaining a high level of SA during DP operations within a highly automated system As less automation is a step backwards, the solution to the problem that occurs

due to ever increasing automation should be sought in other HF related issues. It

can be concluded that SA is indispensable during all DP operations. The absence

of SA or incompleteness of SA from the crew is hazardous to the safe operation of

the vessel(s). The conclusion can be drawn that there are two main problems

during DP operations, one occurs in static DP operations and the other in dynamic

DP operations. It was found from interviews that during static operations a DPO

has to deal with a mental underload that affects the operators SA negatively. On

the other hand during the dynamic operations the DPO has to deal with an

adequate, or overload, that influences SA in a different way or negatively. It can

be concluded that during DP operations the following needs to be taken into

account in both situations to achieve, maintain and improve SA:

Good communication and collaboration are essential. (Chapter 5.4.5)

With training SA can be acquired, maintained, improved, developed,

prolonged, and strengthened. (Chapter 5.4.3)

The way information is presented to the DPO is important. (Chapter 5.4.1)

Be aware of the SA Demons. (Chapter 5.3.1)

Each person is different therefore each individual varies in the actual SA

he or she builds up and the maximum potential SA he or she can reach

though training. (Chapter 5.4.4)

Don’t let habits cloud input and judgement. (Chapter 5.2.4)

6.2 DP operations categorized In chapter 2 the DP operations have been categorized by weighing in multiple

assessment criteria from the DPO point of view. The importance of the criteria

has been rated high, medium or low depending on the activity and risk involved.

The categories derived consist of operations that are roughly similar when it

comes to the amount of risk involved. By taking all the factors of chapter two into

account it boils down to the following groups:

Group 1: Diving support, Minehunter and Heavy Lift;

Group 2: Cable layer, Drilling, Pipe layer, Rock emplacement, Semi-submersible

and Shuttle tanker;

Group 3: Dredging, FPSO, Supplier and Survey/ROV;

Group 4: Anchor Handling and Cruise.

These categories provide an overview of the amount of risk involved during DP

operations. It is concluded that the categorisation has approximately the same

division as the IMO DP classes, which indicate equipment redundancy, although

this was not intended when making the categorization. After analysis of the

groups the conclusion can be drawn with most criteria that the risk declines from

group 1 to 4, this includes the SA required. It is important to note that if a

different viewpoint is taken the categorisation will become different.



6.3 Situational Awareness As there are many different theories and models about SA (as seen in chapter 3),

some, (such as Endsley’s model, which is chosen as the main theory because it’s

the most accepted theory in the scientific field) are better and more applicable

than others in the maritime domain, it is important to be able to project these

theories and models on the DP environment. As a result of information provided

by interviews, (they show how SA is acquired on board), the conclusion can be

drawn that TSA, SSA, DSA and Endsley’ s original SA theory, are all present

during DP operations. For the exact definitions of these terms reference is made

to chapter 3.

Through literature study and interviews it is learned, verified and concluded that

any form of SA has to be acquired via input from the environment, possible team

members, human or not, the sort of DP operation at hand and the knowledge and

or experience available for the DPO and or team. This leads to the conclusion that

every individual and team has a different amount of SA due to personal

differences. Once SA is acquired it needs to be maintained. Interviews disclosed

the maintaining of SA is done with the same elements that are needed to acquire

SA in the first place. When a team or person is able to maintain his SA he can

work on how to improve his SA. How to obtain, maintain and improve SA during

heavy lifting operations is described in detail in chapter 5. A lot of these

improvements are also applicable on other DP operations.

6.4 The main differences in the categories in terms of Complexity, Failure consequences and SA The complexity and failure consequences of the four categories differ immensely

from each other (as seen in chapter 4 and appendix II). With category 1 being

very risky and category 4 having the least amount of risk. It can be concluded

that the complexity tends to decline from category 1 to category 4. This decline is

also evident with the failure consequences of these categories.

From interviews the conclusion is drawn that SA is required for all these

categories. It cannot be said that an operation requires more or less SA, as SA is

always needed, preferably with TSA, SSA, DSA and Endsley’ s original SA theory.

It can be concluded that the complexity of the SA differs between categories, in

category 1 achieving SA is harder due to the dynamic nature and increased

complexity of the operation then in category 4 which is relatively static and

straight forward. Through the use of interviews and literature it is concluded that

the SA, TSA, SSA and DSA theories and aspects of SA are all represented in DP

operations. The emphasis between single SA and TSA, SSA and DSA shifts

between the categories and operations but they do not exclude each other. It

seems that there is some sort of common basis between these forms of SA.



6.5 The mechanism involved in achieving, maintaining and or improving a level of SA during a multi-vessel heavy lifting operation As seen in chapter 5 the achieving, maintaining and improving of SA can be done

in varies ways. The conclusion can be drawn that a lot could be gained by

improving the achieving, maintaining and improving process of SA during DP

operations. This will lead to improved safety and efficiency. The mechanisms

involved in achieving, maintaining and improving SA have the same basis in all

DP operations although the amount of SA types varies, with DP heavy lift

operations for instance the focus lies more on DSA, SSA and TSA than on SA.

Furthermore it can be concluded that solutions to the problems and losses of SA

(that accompany automation) should not be about delivering more data to the

operator but about improving the following: The HMI, DP operation training, SA

training and training in communication and collaboration. Improving the HMI of

the (DP) systems on board will also improve the SA of the DPO. A problem is that

the equipment manufacturer can only develop HMI improvement. When DPO’s

are trained on DP operations their insight (in the operation and the system) and

experience will increase. This provides a way of improving the SA of the DPO’s

without modifying the systems on board. Another way of improving SA without

modifying the system is to provide communication and teamwork training.

Another conclusion drawn from multiple interviews is that if the system is

modified the DP control panel’s position and direction it faces are very important

factors to take in to consideration, as these are now far from optimum especially

on the older DP vessels.



7. Recommendations This final chapter holds the recommendations for maritime and offshore

companies, educational institutes and TNO. These recommendations provide a

guideline for future research and improvement of SA during DP operations.

7.1 The DPO maintaining a high level of SA during DP operations within a highly automated system A division should be made by TNO for the ERP, between two categories of DP

operations, one being the static operations where the DPO feels like a back-up for

the system, the other being dynamic operations where the DPO is actively

involved in the operation and is continuously controlling the system. This division

is needed because these two categories encounter different problems when it

comes to maintaining SA. Furthermore the subjects from the conclusions in

section 6.1 should be used to provide guidance for future research.

7.2 DP operations categorized The categorization should be used (by TNO) to give individuals a basic insight in

the differences between different DP operations. It aids in acquiring a knowledge

base for individuals that have to work with DP related researches. The

categorisation used in this report is comprised from factors that I deemed

important during DP operations. If this division is used for other purposes then

the original special care has to be taken to keep the information in context.

7.3 Situational Awareness SA experts should do more research into the upcoming paradigm shift around SA,

TSA, SSA and DSA. DSA shows promising results in grading a team’s

performance as where Endsley’ s model of SA is primarily applicable on a single

person. TSA and SSA have not proved to be the tool required to properly rate a

team’s performance, although such a tool can prove very useful in various

industries.

7.4 The main differences in the categories in terms of Complexity, Failure consequences and SA More research should be done by TNO and or the maritime and Offshore cluster

to map the need for specific forms of SA during specific operations (, as SA is a

key factor in all DP operations, with different forms of SA being more or less

present during each operation). This research has to be done to be able to

improve the way SA is acquired, maintained and improved per operation.

Information gathered with this research can then be used for TNO’s IOSS

concept.

7.5 The mechanism involved in achieving, maintaining and or improving a level of SA during a multi-vessel heavy lifting operation Since there is no SA training for DP operators, I recommend that such training is

developed and tested either by the maritime and Offshore industry or by nautical

institutes, the to see if this positively affects the overall SA of the DPO and

possibly the rest of the vessel and its crew. Furthermore a HMI specific study

should be conducted by DPS manufacturers of how to improve the HMI of the DP

system via SAOD for all manufacturers involved. Finally communication and

collaboration should be improved. This can be achieved by means of training (on

board or on shore) or by making and or following new and or existing protocols

on board. For instance, not all DP vessels use a structured watch-changing

procedure.



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Appendix I Mind map



Appendix II Categorisation DP operation categorisation.



Appendix III Interview A. Goedknegt Interviewee: A. Goedknegt

Company: STC

Place: Rotterdam

Date: 06-11-2015

1. How do you think DP operations should be categorised?

- IMO classification with an eye on redundancy;

- Complexity of the operation;

- Risks involved for the people, the environment and the financial costs.

I think DP operations should be categorized through risk analysis for each

single operation since the risks differ between ship types, companies,

ships and even per operation. That is why you should describe what

aspects were taken into account and how they where used.

2. What would your personal categorisation look like if you had to make one

for your self?

I would look for risks involved for the people, the environment and the

financial costs. This is paired with an IMO class. My division would

therefore be class 1,2 and 3 just as it is now. But this categorisation has

nothing to do with the nature of the operation itself, just with the risks

involved.

3. What do you think of our current categorisation with the following groups?

Critical operations, Wire tracking, Stationary, Tracking and Non-critical

operations. Do you have any remarks on this?

Wire tracking should be given another name as this advertises a wrong

image about the operation. Furthermore a description has to be made

about the purpose of the defined categories. If you describe why you put

an operation into a certain category then the categories devised are quite

correct. The risks involved are determined by multiple factors that must be

described, it’s about the combination of factors rather than just the

activity. Furthermore the names critical operations and non-critical

operations must be revised because they can be misleading i.e. put your

mind on the wrong track, for example group 1,2,3 and 4

4. What do you think about the factors that were used to categorize the

operations?

The essence is, what do you want to classify with this list? It all comes

down to a risk analysis in which different factors play a different role.

These factors need to be well described.

5. Do you agree with our choice to rate the factors with low medium and high

risk?

This is very debatable and should be well documented.



6. How can we justify our choice for low, medium and high with the help of

literature? Is there more literature besides the IMCA guidelines and the

operators handbook?

This can be done via a risk analysis or with the aid of interviews.

7. How would you feel about combining the groups Tracking and Wired

tracking, due to the fact that Tracking is less critical in multiple levels then

Wired tracking.

I would not do this because the risks are quite different.

8. Do you think that the most common DP operations are described or do

you miss a specific operation? If yes which one?

I still miss the shuttle tankers.

9. Does it matter for the complexity or the consequences of a mistake, if the

operation is conducted in a coastal or ocean region?

Environmental damage in sensitive coastal areas or Polar Regions can be

immense. The complexity of an operation is usually increased in coastal

areas due the currents and increased shipping activity. Each operation,

coastal or ocean, has different risks. Normally coastal operations are more

dangerous but this does not have to be the case, ocean operations can be

just as hazardous.

10. Does it matter for the complexity or the consequences of a mistake, if the

operation is conducted above or underwater?

Yes, the DPO needs to be informed about the underwater operations and

underwater infrastructure around the ship to be able to position it safely

and to be able to plan a safe escape route including subsea structures and

activities. This is sometimes forgotten because underwater operations

cannot be seen with the naked eye in contrast to surface operations



Appendix IV Interview DPO Rock

emplacement Vessel Interviewee: Anonymous

Company: Anonymous

Place: Rotterdam

Date: 03-11-2015

1. On which type of vessel do you have DP experience?

A Rock emplacement vessel.

2. Since when do you do this DP related work?

Since 6 years now.

3. Could you describe your work?

On a rock emplacement vessel the Second Officers are the DP operators.

The First Officers are head of watch, at times DPO’s have a large amount

of administration tasks to do. The Second Officers are either DPO or ROV

pilot and do some safety and some minor administration duties. This

means that during a DP operation there are two Second Officers on the

bridge and one First Officer. Thus in total there are two First Officers on

board and four Second Officers. It is therefore possible that one of the two

Second Officers does the communication and safety work besides being a

part of the DP operation team on the bridge. This is at times a necessity

because the DPO is in some operations too busy to deal with

communication and other tasks.

The survey department and the project department do another part of the

operation, they both do have their part to play on the bridge as well.

During a DP operation there is a surveyor and a project engineer on the

bridge present besides the officers, so in total we have about five to six

people on the bridge during a DP operation. The captain is not a part of

the day-to-day operations on board, he usually relieves a DPO or ROV

pilot temporarily so they can go get something to eat and he serves as a

source of knowledge if necessary. This means that the First Officers are

running the ship in practise.

4. Who is in charge during the DP operation?

The First Officer is in charge of the watch and the operation being

conducted.

5. With which criteria would you judge a situation during a DP operation?

With any DP operation the weather conditions are very important. With

rock emplacement the clearance between the rock placement pipe and the

sea Floor is a major factor. Besides that, the condition of the sea floor is

important as well. It is important to know if there are any subsea

mountains because these can damage the rock placement pipe. Another

factor to take into consideration is the traffic around you and also whether

the planning can be executed. Finally I would always like to know the

problems that have occurred in the previous watch.



6. If you would have to make a division between the different DP operations

how would you do it?

Basically the above-mentioned but also close structures and other traffic.

This is how I would differentiate our DP operations. It is worth noting that

the Collregs state that we are not restricted in our manoeuvrability as a

cable or pipe layer would be however we are constrained by draught

because we have a rock placement pipe under our ship.

7. Do you think the DP system is too complex?

No, we use Kongsberg DP systems and they are quite user friendly.

However there are other systems like L3 that are complex. Kongsberg is

developed for ships that use DP for their operations while L3 is designed

for FPSO and other stationary platforms.

8. How do you and your colleagues communicate on board?

The communication on the bridge is all-verbal and in Dutch. The

communication with the two cranes on deck, manned by people from the

Philippines, goes by UHF and in English. The DPO or the ROV pilot directs

them. The communication to the engine room goes via a hard-wired

phone; this communication is from First Engineer to First Officer and vice

versa. The DPO and the ROV pilot are seated next to each other on the

bridge and are in continues communication (not always about work). The

ROV pilot directs the DPO on where the ship needs to go because he can

see where the rocks need to be placed. So the ROV pilot determines the

movement of the ship and the DPO does what the ROV pilot says. This is a

continuous line of communication. The First Officer is not directly involved

in the operation but he can hear what is going on from behind his desk

elsewhere on the bridge. The project engineer is the link between the

survey and the ROV pilot however the project engineer does not have the

authority to direct the DPO. During a survey when the rock emplacement

operation is stopped the surveyor directs the DPO and the ROV pilot is

temporarily out of the game. Depending on the factors involved the

surveyor will determine the vessels speed and the length of the survey.

9. With whom do you communicate on board during DP operations?

See answer to question 10.

10. About what do you communicate during DP operations?

See answer to question 10.

11. Do you use closed loop communication and how do you execute this?

We do not give orders as is normal in the maritime industry, usually I just

ask if the ROV pilot or DPO can do something, which is in effect is an

order, and he responds. So we do not use the closed loop as set out in the

literature but we do get a response, so everybody knows the “order” is

understood. If something is not understood it is expected that more

information is asked so to avoid any misinterpretations.



12. Which communication barriers do you encounter during DP operations?

On the bridge we also work with Belgians, they are more sensitive for

raising your voice and interpret something’s differently. They are more

sensitive for the difference in rank and therefore can stop talking if they

feel they have done something wrong and are reprimanded for it. I think

all the five barriers are present at any time and it is up to us to deal with

it. For example the physical barrier is present in the case of

communication between the bridge and the cranes on deck. If they crane

driver says that an item of his crane has broken down then I still don’t

know how broken down it is, because I can’t see it. Another barrier arises

with the use of jargon, which is not always very definitive. So a problem

with a conveyor belt that is reported to the bridge does not always include

the location of the conveyor belt and the implication of that malfunction.

This barrier usually occurs when different cultures meet and have to report

a problem in a language that in not native to both sides. The perception of

the reality barrier does not necessarily occur on board as we all have our

own task, however a misinterpretation of the person in charge does occur

during the switch from normal work to a safety related move. During

normal work the project engineer is basically in charge as he is

responsible for the quality of the work that is delivered, however if the

ship needs to do something related to safety his opinion suddenly does not

matter anymore because the officers are than in charge.

13. Do you think there is enough, too much or too little communication during

a DP operation?

Between the ROV pilot and the DPO there is a continuous line of

communication and that works well, this is not too much and not too little.

A problem arises when the DPO, ROV pilot and the project engineer do not

agree on the next step or on the current situation. At that moment the

balance in communication is lost and it is the First Officer’s job to make

sure that the situation is resolved. So in my opinion there is not too much

or too little communication on the bridge. Communication with the other

participants on board outside of the bridge is another matter, for example

if something is broken in the engine room the engineers will not always

inform the bridge. That is because the engineers are usually very

protective of their work and image. This is more a work floor culture

problem than a communication problem but these things occur.

14. How does the communication with other ships occur which are a part of

the operation?

Usually the communication goes via VHF, just as normal traffic.

15. What do you think about the way the DP system informs the operator?

All information can be presented on screen or can be accessed otherwise.

The decision that needs to be made is which information is important to

you. We work with two screens that are divided in two halves so we have

four items on the displays. First is the posplot, left of that is the thruster

overview. On the other screen we have the reference system plot and left

of that we have the power management overview. These four items on

two screens give enough information and I would not want to add another

screen for more information.



16. Do you think the DP system informs you in time if something goes wrong?

Alarms given are usually not solvable by us. For example a GPS offset is

usually caused by satellite errors and is something I cannot fix. If the

error becomes too large we can deselect the GPS but that is usually it. So

the system informs us but we cannot always react to that. The most useful

thing about alarms is that I can see if a DPO is a good DPO or a bad DPO.

A good DPO presses the silence button and then takes his time to look at

the alarms given before acknowledging then and a bad DPO pushes the

acknowledge button as fast as possible to get rid of the alarms. Finally the

alarm name is sometimes unclear and cannot be found in the manual. This

means we have to make a screenshot send it to Kongsberg and wait for a

reply. This is something to be improved.

17. Are you always informed about the system’s actions or do you feel that

the system does not provide you all the information required, in other

words, do you feel you are in the loop or out of the loop?

I think all the information needed is provided. The system allows you to

see more or less information depending on the need of the DPO. A nice

feature is the trace line, this shows you what you have done before and is

very useful at times.

18. What do you think about the layout of the DP console?

HMI becomes more important for the efficiency of the DPO and therefore

the operation. The older ships were originally non-DP vessels, equipped

with DP later on, which allows for some unpleasant features. For example

on my ship the DP console faces the bow while the operation occurs on the

aft deck, this means the DPO cannot see the operation on deck. With a

new ship these kinds of problems can be solved. The DP console on the

new vessel is surrounded by other equipment so the DPO can sit in his

chair and have all the equipment he needs within his grasp. These are

class regulations, so new vessels will have to comply with these

regulations, which makes the DPO workstation a lot better. The Kongsberg

design is in my opinion very good, I do not like touch screen of L3 systems

because it needs calibration and is prone to a wrong touch. The only thing

I would change is the trackball incorporated in the design, we have had

some mayor problems with those things.

19. If you could add or remove buttons or other elements what would they

be?

Quick engine room alert could be removed in my opinion because we

would need to call them to explain the problem anyway. The thruster

emergency stop buttons are vital buttons in case things go wrong and

therefore I would want those buttons to stay. Other than that the console

is fine as it is.

20. What do you think about the information displayed on screen of the DP

console?

Kongsberg screens are fine by me.



21. Do you have any ideas to improve the screen division or use of symbols?

I like the adjustability of the screen, and the use of symbols is in my

opinion logical. Only one symbol is not well defined and that is the

retractable thruster symbol, you cannot see on the screen if a thruster is

retractable or not.

22. Which information do you use during a DP operation, what is displayed on

the screen and how often do you change the information items?

See question 17.

23. Would you like that when it is calm the DP system would increase the

tasks of the DPO and when it is busy the DP system would operate more

autonomously?

I think the DPO would miss information and the SA would decrease.

Having said that I think it would be nice if the system would be able to

solve problems on its own. In my business the workload of the DPO is

fairly well arranged, I do not think the DPO should do less and I do not

know how he would be able to do more, because he can’t keep position on

the joystick as well as the system can.

24. Do you think that adaptive automation provides the DPO with more insight

of the systems actions?

I think the SA of the DPO will deteriorate and an increase of insight in the

systems actions would not occur.

25. With how many people do you work directly during a DP operation?

About nine people. A DPO, a ROV pilot, a surveyor, a project engineer, two

AB’s, two engineers and a First Officer. This is one watch team.

26. Do you have regular team meetings and do you see those people or does

the meeting go by phone or other verbal communication?

One watch is comprised of three teams, one bridge team, one engine

room team and the two AB’s on deck. One day before the project starts

the entire ship’s crew is briefed about the project to be done. However

beforehand, usually while the ship is loading rocks, the client comes on

board to discuss safety and environmental matters.

27. Is there a clear team leader?

That is clearly the First Officer.

28. When is the captain called to the bridge and what is his task during a DP

operation?

The captain provides a relief for the DPO and ROV pilot so they can go get

something to eat. The standing orders provide a clear guideline for the

need for the captain to be on the bridge. If the ship gets within 500-meter

zones or gets close to other ships during DP operations the captain is

informed but is not always called to the bridge.



29. Do you think the DP system is a part of the team?

No, the bridge team sees the DP system as a large playstation. In the

future the HMI will probably change so much that the DP system will be

seen as a part of the team.

30. Do you see the DPO as a backup for the DP system?

No, the DPO controls the ship. The DP system does what the DPO says.

31. Do you think the teamwork on the bridge is one task done by multiple

individuals or one group of people doing one task?

In our company there is just one group doing one task, so there is no

collection of individual tasks.

32. Are you a member of one team or multiple teams, if so which ones?

In the Offshore industry safety is everybody’s task so we do not have a

safety team as such. The officers form the fire team, the AB’s are the

support team and the cooking staff is a part of the stretcher team. This is

besides the normal (job) teams everybody is part of.

33. Do you change your way of communication and behaviour according to the

situation, so do you communicate and behave differently on the bridge

than you do in the mess room?

Yes, I do notice this. The biggest change is that when I am on watch,

because than I am the First Officer and when I am off watch I am just me.

When I am on watch I notice that usually I do not have to pull rank with

the officers because they know me and they do not have to prove

anything to one another. The surveyor is also not a problem; however the

project engineer is a challenge, sometimes because I will have to explain

to him why I want to stop an operation or do something differently. This

professional conflict arises because it is his job to keep the operation going

while I have other, usually safety related, interests. This means that I

sometimes have to pull rank and adjust my way of communicating to

reach the desired effect. Something else is the way I communicate with

the Filipinos on board; if one of them has done something wrong you have

to talk to him in private or they will lose face and then you will have a

problem for the rest of their contract.

34. What do you think SA is?

SA is what a DPO does, he is always building and maintaining SA. It is

important to think two or more steps ahead.

35. How do you build up your SA during a DP operation?

The SA build-up starts with the TV in our cabins where you can see if

something is happening. Than, you usually run in to someone who reports

something that went wrong or caught his attention. On the bridge we

usually arrive 15 minutes before our watch begins so we can talk to each

other and have a look around. Finally we have the official watch transfer

that will finalise your SA build-up. The previous watch team will stay on

the bridge until 15 minutes after their watch, so if anything unclear comes

up we can ask them for help.



36. How do you maintain SA during a DP operation?

Listen, look outside and look at the screens. This is a continuous loop.

Looking outside is something the DPO does not do a lot. The radar is

running as well and can be looked at any time.

37. How long does it take for your SA to be insufficient when you are away

from your Workstation?

That differs a lot, on a calm North Sea you will lose your SA very quickly

because you were not physically and mentally challenged, it will only take

15 to 20 minutes to lose your SA. However when you are in Mexico, where

we also do a lot of projects, the environment is so challenging that the SA

will remain for up to one and a half hours.

38. Have you encountered a mode error, if so, how did it occur and how did

you find out?

No, I have not encountered this during DP operations. I did however

encounter this during the switching from non-DP to DP operation i.e. a

transfer from manual control to DP. It is possible that the navigator is still

under the impression that he is in full control while the DPO has started

taking over the thrusters.

39. Do you think SA is a vitally important part of a DPO’s task?

Yes, absolutely. If a DPO does not have a SA he cannot function.

40. What do you think team SA encompasses?

ROV pilot, DPO and First Officer are constantly aware of what the other

does and what the implication of each action is on the work. Generally

speaking the SSA of the seagoing personnel is good, they can anticipate

on each other’s moves. This is not the case between the officers, surveyor

and project engineer because the surveyor and project engineer do not

know what it is the officers are doing.

41. What is essential information for a team to build up and maintain team

SA?

Question 40 + power supply, cooling system and or engine room

problems.

42. Who is responsible during a Multi vessel operation and who takes the

lead?

The client determines this. The price for the different vessels will

determine the leader, however the type of operation is sometimes the

determining factor as well.

43. Do you have to deal with protocols during your work?

The managers at the office make the protocols. We are aware of their

existence but we do not have to deal with them directly, that is more the

task of the captain. We are sometimes briefed if there are any changes

made.



44. Which procedures do you deal with on a daily basis?

A company is free to make as many procedures as they want. Because we

usually do not work within the 500-meter safety zone those procedures

are normally not applicable. The project manager at the office makes the

procedures for every project and he produces the general work plan. Than

the superintendent on board makes a detailed work plan and a pre-project

survey is carried out. After the work is done and a final survey has been

conducted the client wants to have a report. The procedures for the length

of the project are too many to name, a few examples: before you switch

from manual to DP a DP checklist will need to be carried out and before

you start the work a mobilisation checklist needs to be carried out to

check if all the materials are on board. All the checklists have to be

provided to the client.

45. How do you transfer the watch and SA?

The watch is transferred at 12.00 and 24.00. First the First Officers do

their handover, which includes the things that have happened, and the

things that are going to happen besides other operation related matters.

Then the Second Officers will do their handover, which has to do with DP

operations, so again the things that have happened will be discussed

among other DP related information. This includes wind, weather and

problems that have occurred. These transfers are done in the company of

all officers involved in the previous watch and the upcoming watch. This is

to make sure that everybody gets all the information that is passed on to

the next watch and nothing is forgotten.

46. Do the procedures help to build up SA?

No, procedures are not intended for the build-up and maintenance of SA.

They provide guidance to achieving SA.

47. Which information do you share?

The ROV pilot tells the DPO where to go. The First Officer provides the

DPO with new weather forecasts and traffic information. The DPO can get

all the information he needs from the people around him.

48. How do you know the reference systems are working correctly?

The surveyor is responsible for a prediction of the amount of satellites or if

there is a blind spot. The DPO does only look at the position plot, which

shows the relative positions and position errors. This gives a picture of the

accuracy of the different reference systems. If the error radius becomes

larger it usually has to do with the FANBEAM system, which is deselected if

necessary. The Kalman filter monitors if the different reference systems

differ too much from each other.



49. How often do you train for your profession?

Our company has an annual e-learning assessment, which is comprised of

three parts. The first part is only for a junior DPO, the first and second

part for a normal DPO and all three parts for a First Officer and senior

DPO. If a DPO fails this and there are more DPO’s that fail on the same

point the company will send the DPO’s on a specific training. There are no

laws that says a DPO needs to do a training other than the one he needs

to do to become a DPO. When he is a licenced DPO he needs to do a

number of days every five years as DPO to keep his licence.

50. How does the coordination go before, during and after a DP operation?

The First Officer is always in charge, as all the operations are during a

First Officer’s watch. However the captain remains responsible.



Appendix V interview DPO multiple vessels Interviewee: Bart Plug

Company: Freelance

Place: Utrecht

Date: 16-11-2015

1. What is your name and profession?

Bart Plug, freelance maritime specialist

2. At which company do you work?

Freelance


Cable layer, Offshore construction vessel, Survey, DSV, Underwater

construction vessel, Trenching and Pipe layer.


About 28 years.


Cable layer: Cable laying was done via a plough that is pulled by the ship.

In the trench that was dug the cable was placed. A certain corridor of 10-

15 meters wide, agreed upon by the authorities, is the place to place the

cable. However you always try to aim for the centre of the corridor,

therefore very small deviations are allowed. If the operation needed to be

stopped we first had to lift the plough up and put slack on the cable. In

this situation the ship is still connected to the cable but has some

movement space. We always tried to keep the cable intact because

otherwise it needed to be welded together again which is considered a

loss, besides the delay would cost a lot of money.

The bridge team during almost all operations I have witnessed the bridge

team is comprised of: two DPOs, a surveyor (the person who determines

the position of the cable or pipe), a specialist (plough operator or another

type of operator). One DPO (junior DPO) is behind the DP desk and the

other DPO (Senior DPO) does the navigational watch, administration work

and other work on the bridge. A senior DPO is not always the higher-

ranking officer as seniority as a DPO is determined by the experience on a

particular operation.

The survey bridge team is comprised of: 1 DPO and 1 surveyor. During

survey the ship follows the ROV. This can be done via the follow target

mode or be done manually by following the ROV in steps.

On offshore construction vessels there might be another team of

specialists elsewhere on the ship. Then the communication will be between

the bridge, trench control room or ROV control and operation control. The

communication goes via hard-wired intercom systems to the control rooms

and via UHF with the people on deck.



Pipe laying operations are much the same as cable laying. There are two

DPOs, a surveyor and a tension operator on the bridge. The tension

operator operates the machines that keep the tension on the pipe both in

S-lay and in J-lay operations. Once again there is a corridor on the sea

floor (about 50 meters wide) and you try to stay in the middle of it. In

pipe laying the pieces of pipe are welded together on board and the ship

then moves the pipe length ahead. It is possible to keep a constant very

low speed if the pipe is placed in deep water.


The senior DPO is in charge. The captain is usually not involved but if he

comes on the bridge he clearly takes over command. The hierarchy is

always clear and is set in procedures. The superintendent is the boss of

the project and the captain of the ship. It is therefore good for the

operation if those two can get along.


My main criteria would be if the operation could be aborted quickly, so if

you are capable to quickly create a safe situation to sort out the cause of a

problem. The second thing I would look at are, the consequences of an

error, in lives or money. Another thing is the weather or your thrusters

capability or close structures.



See question 7.


I think the systems are complex, but they can be worked with if you are

used to them. Especially Kongsberg systems are good to work with.


The first way of communicating is with the PA this is ship wide; however

this is something that is not commonly used. The advantage of that is that

the effects can be seen instantly, so the persons on deck cannot respond

via the PA but the fact that they are startled is a confirmation for me that

the message is understood especially if they did something wrong.

Another way to communicate is the UHF to communicate for the people

spread around the ship. The different departments have their own

channel, if everybody needs to know something than the PA is used to let

everybody know that they need to switch to a specific channel to hear

something. Yet another system is the internal telephone system for two-

way communication in private. Hard line systems are between the bridge

and other stations such as: engine room, ROV control, other control rooms

and welding stations. Communication with other ships usually goes via

VHF or normal telephone depending on the sensitivity of the information

and who needs to know.




The DPO is in constant communication with the trench control, ROV

control and the welding stations. All communication is about the operation

itself, the specialist requests a move to somewhere and then the DPO

needs to check if that is possible, but also the other way around is possible

for example the DPO wants to adjust the heading and wants to check with

the tension control if that is possible. Another way to communicate is the

telephone, which is a big disturbing factor for the DPO. The telephone

connects the rest of the ship with the bridge and is used for all kinds of

problems unrelated to the operation. The navigation officer should handle

these things but this is not always the case. For the ship-to-ship

communication the VHF is used, this is information exchange because you

are working together on a project. Finally there is verbal communication

on the bridge between the DPO, surveyor and tension control or other

specialists. Closed loop communication is something that is used in all

normal communication and is something that is inherent to the maritime

industry.


See question 11.


See question 11.


Non-essential personnel is the cause of the most noise on the bridge,

which is fine but can be a disturbing factor if the situation demands full

attention of the DPO. In that case the other people are told to shut up,

more experienced personnel already knows when to shut up so the noise

level is already reduced. Language barriers are present as well because for

almost all people on board English is not the native language. Cultural

barriers are present as well, this is something to take into account.

Physical barriers are also present because for example the ROV control

cannot look outside so the DPO is the eyes of the ship. Perception of

reality is clearly visible when something goes wrong. For example when

someone does something that could be dangerous but does something

anyway because it solves a problem. The difference is also visible between

the people with the higher ranks that need to keep and overview but do

not know the ins and outs of the lower ranking crew’s jobs. The

crewmember may see a problem and decides to fix this in a way that

causes problems later on but he does not know that and the person that

needs to keep the overview does not know a certain solution has been

chosen.


a DP operation?

This is a personal thing. I cannot say if there is too little or too much

communication.

There are two 12-hour shifts, one from 12.00 to 00.00 and one from

06.00 till 18.00. This means that every six hours there is a change of

watch and therefore an information exchange. At that moment there



should be and information exchange about the things that have happened

and the things that are going to happen. So I think there is enough

communication.


the operation?

Communication goes via VHF or telephone depending on the sensitivity of

the information being shared. For example on a pipe layer that moves 12

meters and then stops again a system is designed to let the other ships

know that the movement is about to happen. This is simply a button that

is pushed by the DPO that switches a light or a buzzer on, on the other

ship.


The problem is that the DP system can only look backwards and analyse

its current situation. As DPO I would like the DP systems to think ahead

with me, but it cannot do that. A DPO can only choose the presentation of

data and work with that to do his work. Because the DP system works with

sensors to get an input of what subsystems do, so if the sensor

malfunctions the DP system will not see what is going on in reality.

Eventually the system will come up with an alarm because it notices that

things go wrong but then the problem has already occurred. An alarm is

usually informative but is not always something you can act upon.


See question 17.


the system does not in other words do you feel out of the loop?

No, it is possible to see if the process goes as expected but I am not

aware of the internal processes. I do not feel out of the loop.


The layout is fine. And it is possible to influence the design because we

worked with Kongsberg for the design. Naturally we need to find

arguments to back up why things should be different, if you have these

then Kongsberg is sometimes able to change things.

21. If you could add or remove buttons or other elements which would that

be?

See question 20.


console?

Kongsberg systems have the option to put the big overview screens in the

middle and the additional data around those.


They are fine as they are.




the screen and how much do you rotate views?

The screens we always use are thrusters and position plot. Other screens

that are used are for reference systems.

25. Would you like it that when it is calm the DP system would increase the


autonomously?

Yes, I think that is a good idea. Resetting Tautwires is something that the

system can do for you. Something that takes a lot of time is the logging of

the operation and other things, this is something I think is good to

automate. When it is calm I think it is a good idea that especially the

junior DPOs do some more work themselves to get a better feeling of the

system and the ship. This is also useful to get rid of the fear to touch

buttons.



See question 25.


It varies between 4 people to perhaps 30 people. Often the start and stop

of the operation involves to most people. The captain is on the bridge, the

superintendent, ROV supervisor and other supervisors are working

together with the DPO. During a normal pipe laying operation the DPO

works together with the welding stations supervisors because they need to

signal to the DPO that the ship can be moved because they have finished

their job. The other people the DPO works with are the surveyor and the

trenching operator.



There is no ship wide meeting because the amount of people on those

ships are too many. What is common practise is that the department

heads have regular meetings; the heads have safety meetings with their

departments. The DPO can see the workstations on the CCTV system.


Yes, the senior DPO is in charge. If the captain comes on the bridge he

needs to clearly take over command.


operation?

The captain is not visible during normal operations. It depends on the

captain if he sometimes walks around to see how things are going. The

captain has a large management task and is therefore not a part of the

day-to-day operation on the bridge.




Not at this moment, the developments of the DP systems are interesting.


I am always in charge of the DP system so I do not think that I am a back

up for the DP system.



I always believed that the team is comprised of everybody and that

everybody is responsible for the safe completion of the task. I strongly

believe that everybody on board is part of 1 team.


Yes, the DPO is always part of multiple teams. Usually the DPO is part of

the: fire team, bridge team and helicopter landing team.




I personally do not change my way of doing things. A small change is that

I, on the bridge, want to make sure the message has come across and

that is something that is elsewhere not of vital importance.


SA is essential. I think that SA is comprised of the knowledge of the things

happening around you, such as: helicopter operations, crane operations,

other traffic, other ships you are working with and sea floor.


An overview picture of the area is placed on the bridge with on it the

operation that you are a part of. A top down view is on the DP screen and

the survey screen also provides you with information. The watch transfer

is the moment in which the SA build-up is meant to happen. This takes

about 15 to 20 minutes and includes the things that have happened and

that are about to happen.


If there is a platform present you can look at, or can see via CCTV, that is

the most reliable and quick reference by which you can see if something is

happening.




from your Workstation or when you switched roles from DPO to navigator?

I never really completely lose my SA, I do not know the exact details of

what is happening at any time but I always know roughly what is suppose

to happen when.

40. Have you encountered a mode error, how did it occur and how did you find

out?

Yes, sometimes these things are discovered in one second but sometimes

it takes a little longer. If something is not working I usually find out during

the test phase.


See question 36.


Everybody needs to be aware of what is happening. The bridge team is

usually aware of what is happening because they listen to each other’s

hand over. The other teams on the ship are, I think, aware of what is

happening but not in detail.


SA?

Watch hand over. The planning and the deviations, weather, ships

movements and engine status.


lead?

Usually the meeting between ships are done via telephone at a fixed time.

The person responsible for the project is the project leader and the captain

of the biggest and most expensive vessel is usually responsible for the

coordination between ships.


Protocols are for everyone who is on board, for example ISM

(International Safety Management) and ISPS (International Ship and Port

facility Security Code). A part of the VMS (Vessel Management System) is

the DP manual, which states what the DPO and other people need to do

when something happens. The procedures are derived from this.


Everything is recorded in procedures. The DPO has to deal with many

checklists for example: the pre-field checklist (this is a check of the

complete system), the 12 hours checklist (check if the system works as it

is supposed to), pre 500 meter entry checklist and checklists for the input

from a new reference system.




The watch transfer goes simply verbally and is not always bound by a

checklist. There is not a prescribed way to check if all the information is

transferred. Normally during the watch a rough log is kept up to date and

is usually checked by the upcoming watch officer. Besides that the

upcoming DPO is always able to call the DPO of the previous watch to ask

if something is unclear.


No, not in my opinion. The 500-meter checklist for example covers only if

everybody is informed, so it may for a small factor contribute to the SA

but not significantly.


Mainly: the steps the DPO can take, maintenance in progress and logistics

(so if there is something coming in).


The checklists cover the checking of the reference systems. The reference

systems plot is the first indication if one reference system is

malfunctioning. The reference systems can be viewed from behind the DP

desk.


The only thing that happens is that the captains are sometimes sent to

seminars but there is no formal training.


During the start and stop of the operation there are a lot of people on the

bridge but the basic crew still needs to do the task. So if everything goes

the right way the other people on the bridge do not necessarily say

anything, so they just observe.



Appendix VI Interview DPO Jumbo Interviewee: Teun Hofman

Company: Jumbo

Place: Schiedam

Date: 17-11-2015

1. What is your name and profession?

Teun Hofman and I am an Off-shore Construction Manager (OCM) and ex

DPO


I work for Jumbo


I have worked on the Fairplayer and the Javelin


I did this job from 2006 till 2012


With the work we do at Jumbo two main operations can be described. One

is the building of Transition pieces in the windmill industry. On the

windmill project the DPO is very independent, he does the manoeuvring of

the ship and the movement to a new location for example to the mono

pillar where we will install our cargo on.

The other is the subsea installation work. The DPO is a lot less

independent and he has to take orders from shift supervisor who will tell

him where he has to position the vessel. The surveyor provides the shift

supervisor with information about the placement of the vessel in relation

to the underwater structures.

The DPO is not capable to keep the underwater awareness because of the

high complexity of the operation. This is why the shift supervisor is

coordinating the whole operation and is processing the information he

receives from all parties involved for example the surveyor, ROV pilot,

crane operator and hammer control.


The senior DPO is always (unless the captain takes over) in charge during

surface operations and is always a first mate. During subsea activities the

Surveyor is usually in charge.


I would make a division between surface and subsea operations because

everyone can see what is going on during surface operations but this is

not the case with subsea operations.





I would take extra special care if divers are involved as this has a major

impact on the whole operation as well as the required redundancy. I would

place pipe laying in his own category as continues tension needs to be

kept on the pipe or ells it would break or deform. These are the major

differences, in between these categories there are of course differences.

For instance suppliers are very manoeuvrable.


I do not find the Kongsberg system to complex. The controls are fine

I find SDP more user friendly than KPOS but this can be a personal

preference. I have no experience with Touch screen interfaces but I have

heard stories that these systems are far from optimum.


While doing surface operations the communication usually goes via UHF

(handhelds). Communication with the engine room will be done via ships

telephone. Clearcom is used for the communication during subsea

operations to communicate with the ROV operator’s, real drive operator

and hammer control. Clearcom is a two-way communication system just

like the modern day telephone. With the bridge team the communication

is verbal especially between the shift supervisor and the DPO. Between the

shift supervisor and the DPO there is none verbal communication as well.


See question 10


The position of the vessel in relation to an object i.e. distances, especially

for surface activities as this is visually perceptible. The DPO has to inform

the team about the reliability of the position and if special steps have to be

taken, for instance updating of the ships model or if he needs time to

create a stable situation. All the teams on board are on the same uhf

channel.


Yes but mainly on deck. On the bridge this happens less and is less

formal.




Yes that is the same reason why you are here and we are not speaking on

the phone, because it is easy to miss information if you are not in sight of

each other. Interference of other team members because a lot of people

are tuned to the same channel. Also the visual barrier is applicable on

board especially with the deck crew, the DP console on board of our

vessels is placed to the rear so you can see some of the work done on

deck and thus minimize this problem. The semantic barrier is not

applicable and jargon is understood. The culture barrier is also very

applicable as you work with people from a lot of different cultures, this

obviously also brings language problems.


a DP operation?

During critical parts of the operation there can be a lot of people on the

bridge, this creates interference and makes the communication less

effective. Especially when none essential personnel starts to discuss none

relevant subjects.


the operation?

Communication starts via VHF, later the deck crews will communicate via

UHF Handhelds or VHF handhelds if UHF is not available. The SIMOPS

interface from Kongsberg is not used.


The Kongsberg system provided good clear information but sometimes

there are alarms that are hard to place especially system specific alarms

but 95% of the alarms are evident. Some insignificant alarms are also

unclear and sometimes have to be send to Kongsberg for identification.


Errors are given timely but the direct cause of these errors is not always

evident. And thus it can be difficult to react in a timely and appropriate

manner. But this is a typical pc problem.



The DPO does not always know what the system is doing although he

should. But this is also greatly depended on the skill level of the operator.

For instance third or Second Officers don’t know how ships react to

thruster input because they have never learned this thus providing them

with less insight.


Kongsberg has a good DP console, although the trackballs tend to fail from

time to time and an operation screen could be bigger.

21. If you could add or remove buttons or other elements, which would that

be?

No need I am content with the layout.




console?

I would rather have a slightly larger screen to provide more overview.

Furthermore one top bar is sufficient as a double bar does not ad extra

information as this is a copy. But the screen layout is so customisable that

this can be made appropriate for almost any body.


The DPO decides what active information he shows on the screens, usually

the engines and the posplot. The symbols are plain but need to be

learned.



Posplot and the engines are normally shown. Every 6 hours a checklist

needs to be completed and the whole system is checked. The DPO usually

does his own system check every 30 minutes.



autonomously?

This is already done on board to provide training for the inexperienced

DPO’s, the ship is then taken into joystick mode for example. But I don’t

believe it is a good thing that the system is going to allocate tasks on his

own.



Yes this could be the case but more research is needed to investigate this.

The point is that you will also be introducing unwanted risks that are

normally cancelled out by the system.


A DPO, Captain, Engineer, Deck foreman and the supervisor

The DPO’s and engineer have a frequent communication.

Communication with the supervisor is more during subsea operations and

with the deck foreman during surface operations.



Pre shift meetings take place between the department heads every shift

this is done verbally and is lead by the OCM or shift supervisor. Topics that

are discussed are: planning, QHSE and weather. Then there is a toolbox

meeting with each team for the rest there are watch handovers.


Senior DPO or the captain if he takes over.




operation?

For advice until he takes over the operation or during emergencies.


No not yet it is just a computer, but in the future I could see this

happening if mutual understanding is introduced into the machine.


Yes. If you are actively involved with the DP system you are doing

something wrong, the system should be able to handle its self. But special

care has to be taken if it is used to sail, as the system is not designed for

this, then you should know quite well what you are doing.



I see it as multiple independent specific tasks that are eventually

combined to create the operation.


Yes multiple teams: Bride team and the muster team.




Yes home and on board are already two worlds apart. It is of course

dependent of the group of people and how well you know them. The less

acquainted the personnel is the more formal the communication will be,

but eventually this will fade as you get to know each other better and the

communication also improves.


To be aware of the state of the vessel and its equipment, what might fail,

what is the weather going to do, what are the characteristics of the vessel.

With our vessels the weather is especially important because of the

capabilities of our vessel and the nature of the operation.


It starts when you wake up and look out of your window as a lot can

change in 12 hours for instance you could be moored, then when you are

having breakfast in the mess room you might run into some one that tells

you what has happened in the last hours. In the pre shift meeting you will

be informed over the things to come in your shift. Then finally the watch

take over from your colleague and the first round on the bridge and the

equipment. The six-hour checklist that is filled out by your predecessor

also helps.




Cycling the system every 30 minutes or one hour, make a round on the

bridge, regularly check the weather forecast, filling out the six-hour

checklist and a continuous loop over all the systems for instance PMS

(Power management system) and the view outside i.e. monitoring for

anything out of the ordinary.



The general image is easy to maintain and thus doesn’t occur, you

perform the job together with your colleague, sometimes it is even

possible to be at the DP station simultaneously, there is plenty

consultation between the DPO’s. For instance during operations in a

windmill farm one DPO is behind the console and the other is on the

bridge wing to provide input for the other DPO. During critical operations

the tasks may be split in such a way that one DPO is solely doing the DP

task and the other DPO is taking care of communication etc.


out?

Yes this usually happens when a button is thought to be pressed twice but

is actually pressed more or less. Usually this is recognised quickly because

the ship does not move as anticipated.


Yes this is the most important skill of the DPO


This is where team meetings are for, so that everyone knows what is

going to happen if this is not done information will disappear. This limits

the overdoing of work and raises awareness of the current state of the

vessel and its operations. Furthermore the planning is an important tool to

maintain and acquire TSA.


SA?

44.

The same information that is important for individual SA.


lead?

This is usually the biggest or most expensive vessel, the client determines

this. One ship (usually the big one) generally stays in place and the other

vessel moves toward it so that you always know from each other what the

other is doing. The influences of the thrusters of the other vessel are

limited and are usually being neutralized by the system. Communication is

via VHF.




Too many to name them all. The DP operations manual is a ship specific

document that provides a lot of information. The project procedure is the

planning of the actual project at hand that provided birds eye view of the

site and contains all drawings. In IMCA 136 the roles of the crew are

described.


A couple are: Pre site checklist, 500-meter checklist, six-hour checklist.


This is done informally without procedures and normally takes only five

minutes. The essential information is exchanged and that’s it. This

information consists of: what did you see, what did you do and where

there extraordinary things? We don’t stay on the bridge for 15 or 30

minutes as is done on other vessels.


Yes they certainly do, they help guide to build up your SA and it ensures

that everyone knows what he or she is doing. Sometimes the procedures

are not entirely followed but this is done in consideration with the

management. The problem is that the procedures do no contain all the

information for a specific operation that is required.


More information could be shared about at what stage the operation is.

Although this provides benefits for SA this also gives the DPO a feeling of

power so that he can initiate the next step although this is not his job this

is the job of the supervisor.


By checking your alarms. All other ways of investigation are devious

because it is nearly impossible to understand these systems.

GPS provides a lot of updates for the system while fanbeam does not, the

DP system tends to pick the reference system that is updated the most,

i.e. special care should be taken because this is not always the best

position


We try to train our DPO when we have downtime when possible in the field

but this is not always possible. We have no formal training schedule or

follow courses at training centre. SA is not trained at all via a specific

training.


The senior DPO is always in charge until there is a supervisor or the

captain takes over.



54. Could you describe what a Heavy Lift DP operation looks like?

Special heavy lift i.e. a heavy lift operation where the stability of the

vessel is critical is not conducted on DP and outside of the harbour, as the

flipper that is needed for this operation cannot be used there. If such an

operation is conducted all personal needs to be awake and are not allowed

to be in the engine room or accommodation.

While conducting none special heavy lift operations on DP the ship is

allowed to move in a restricted area (usually one meter). A heavy lift

module in the DP system is used during these operations. The most critical

point is just before the placement of the cargo when it is going from fully

hanging in the crane to placement on the location. During the lifting

operation usually a hook centred position is chosen to rotate the vessel so

that the hook stays in the intended area during underwater operations,

while above the water the position of the centre of the vessel is used. The

movement of the cranes has no influence on the DP system because this is

measured by the processor RMU and corrected for by the system. We use

the heavy lift mode of Kongsberg that is developed by Heerema.

Usually there is a tolerance of a couple of meters in where you have to

place the piece, this can be seen via the survey system. You lower the

piece until it touches the seabed, and you drop a bit of the load out of the

crane for instance 50 tons. Then you measure if the piece is placed

correctly, if this is the case the piece can be lowered completely.

55. What is the difference between a Heavy Lift DP operation and a normal

Heavy Lift operation?

Critical lifts are not performed on DP and for the rest there is almost no

difference. The lifts that are done are heavy but not critical for the

stability.

56. Who are the parties involved in a (Multi-Vessel) Heavy Lift DP operation?

The crew of the vessel as previously discussed and other vessels such as

barges and tugs.

57. How long does the average (Multi-Vessel) Heavy Lift DP operation last

from vessel in position to operation completed?

The actual placement of the cargo usually takes around 15 to 20 minutes.

The duration of the entire lifting operation can vary from 45 minutes to 5

hours depending on the water depth and various other circumstances.

58. Could you provide us with any extra information about a (Multi-Vessel)

Heavy Lift DP operation i.e. procedures, handbooks, etc.?

SIMOPS procedure



Appendix VII Interview DPO Royal

Netherlands Navy Interviewee: Watch Officer

Company: Royal Netherlands Navy

Place: Den Helder

Date: 23-11-2015


The Royal Netherlands Navy


Zr. Ms. Karel Doorman and Zr. Ms. Johan de Witt (Navy)


Since 2011


The commander is in charge of the ship; below him are the heads of the

different operational departments such as: Logistics, technical, operational

and sometimes a Marine department. Sea service is a part of the

operational department comprised of: Officer, Petty Officers and sailors.

The officers of that department need to go to the Royal Netherlands Navy

College where they can follow a 5-year education or a 2-year education.

The 5 year education is a Bachelor program with the possibility to do a

Master study. The 2-year education requires some preliminary education

and allows for a more practical education. A part of both training programs

is an apprenticeship during which the officers are educated on board and

are allowed to do more things themselves as time progresses. After the

commander is satisfied that the officer can do the tasks on his own

permission is given to do the final exam at the Royal Netherlands Navy

College. If this exam is completed successfully and other prerequisites are

fore filled the officer is given his certificate of competency A.

During normal operations there are three people on the bridge: one officer

and two sailors of whom one is a helmsman and one is a lookout. During a

state we call ‘under procedures’, which is a mooring or an unmooring

operation or narrow channel sailing, the commander is on the bridge

and/or the navigation officer, that is an officer who has a lot of experience

as a officer of the watch and completed a two month course at the Royal

Netherlands Navy College and someone who does communication. The

commander has a supervisory and advising role while the navigation

officer is manoeuvring the vessel, however while in narrow channel sailing

the officer of the watch has the Conn and the navigation officer and/or the

commander have and advisory role.

The navy uses an Imtech DP to keep its ships in a stationary position. For

example the Zr. Ms. Johan de Witt is an amphibious transport ship and DP

is used to keep the vessel in position during the launch and retrieval

operations of those amphibious vehicles and while doing helicopter

operations. However the Zr. Ms. Rotterdam which is a sister ship of the Zr.

Ms. Johan de Witt does not have DP and therefore the officer of the watch

needs to keeps the ship in position manually during operations. This is



very exhausting if operations last days so it is something that is

automated on the Zr. Ms. Johan de Witt. The Zr. Ms. Karel Doorman is a

joint support ship which means that this ship is capable of doing multiple

things such as: amphibious transport, strategic transport, helicopter

carrier and unit carrier. The Zr. Ms. Karel Doorman also uses DP to remain

at a stationary position to launch and retrieve equipment.


The officer of the watch is usually in charge on the bridge, however if the

ship is in close proximity to for example underwater rocks and the

commander does not have enough time to reach the bridge in case

something goes wrong he or the navigation officer will be on the bridge for

that period of time.


The first thing the officer looks at is if the ship is capable to remain in a

current position. Usually the current and wind are faced with the bow so

the aft deck, where the launching and retrieval operations are on going, is

somewhat protected. Is there a treat and are you quickly available for

deployment. The question is will the limits of what the DP system can

compensate for be reached, if that is likely you have to make sure you

change things. This can be done by changing heading or by taking manual

control.



See question 7.


The problem is that the navy has such a full and tight schedule that there

is not a lot of time to get a full and in depth knowledge of the DP system.

Usually the time from Monday till Monday is completely planned in a

weekly practise program. Besides that the minimum amount of people

that need to be able to understand and have time to get to understand the

DP system is five, usually that number is higher as you have apprentices

on board. Besides that the navy has a clear policy that the commander

should always be able to sail his own vessel so that means that the

commander will be the first to get to know the DP system. After the

commander the navigation officer is next to get to know the DP system

and so it goes down the ranks. The DP system is complex in my opinion

but the amount of options available could be lowered because we usually

do not use that many options. To sort it all out we just need time, so if the

time is given than everybody can do it.


The bridge team communicates verbally or via the PA if there is some

noise on the bridge. During combat operations the command control room

is occupied, the advisor to the commander the CCO can in some cases

have the Conn while being in the command control room. If that is the

case the CCO and the bridge team has a headset on, the orders from the

CCO will be given to the officer of the watch. The officer of the watch has

to give the order to the helmsman or can overrule the order because the



officer of the watch is always responsible for the safe navigation of the

vessel. A hardwired communication line between the engine room and the

bridge is present.


See question 10.


See question 10.


Yes we always use closed loop communication. So the order is given,

repeated and then when the order is carried out feedback is given that the

order has been carried out.


If the communication lines do not work the backup needs to be used and

need to be working. If even the backup does not work we can always

revert to the use of the PA system. On board everybody speaks the same

native language so everybody understands what is said. However the

barrier we encounter is that the equipment used to communicate over the

bridge length is not used correctly which breaks up the message. What is

possible is that the words used refer to multiple items; however I cannot

give an example of that. Cultural differences are not something we

encounter mainly because the procedures are very precise and are very

clear. Perception of reality is something that is possible but it depends on

the situation whether we are able to discuss this. If the situation allows a

discussion will be held because we can all learn from each other, however

in the midst of a situation then there will be no discussion but orders will

be followed immediately.


a DP operation?

Generally there is, in my opinion, too much communication. It is the

navy’s way to sail the ship in the most difficult manner, this is to train for

an emergency situation. This means there are sometimes too many people

on the bridge (up to 15), which means noise.


the operation?

The person on the communication devises relays the messages from other

ships and stations to the officer of the watch. We use a special navy

system to which is encoded to communicate with other ships which are

part of the same operation.




The system is complex and we do not have enough time to really get to

know the system. I would like that the system provides the information

necessary but as little as possible. I think it is important that the system

provides us timely with an alarm if it is about to lose control. However it

does not always do that.


See question 17.



The system is a pressure relief for the officer of the watch because he

does not need to give heading and speed orders all the time to keep the

ship in position. However the system needs to be monitored continuously,

this s sometimes done by a sailor so the officer does not have to do this

himself.


The navy tries to uniformly equip its vessels so the officers are always

familiar with the equipment. I think that everybody can get used to each

layout if given enough time to get to know it, so I cannot say if it is good

or bad.


be?

We only had a trackball, which allows us to call up different screens and

options. You only had to make sure the trackball remained clean.


console?

Everybody has his own preference on what information he wants to see on

screen. The system allows for smaller information tables or graphs to be

put on screen, so I am content with the way the system provides

information.


See question 22.



It depends on the situation which information is displayed; this is

described in the procedures. Under normal circumstances I had the

vessels movement related to the ground and the water and the on screen.

Wind and current related to the wind and current on the optimal heading

is also something we looked at. If we are not in combat situations the

officer of the watch is in charge so he can choose what information he

wants.





autonomously?

The navy decides which systems are placed on the bridge. The officer of

the watch always needs to be able to keep the ship on position manually,

so this is something we already do and have the option for.



See question 25.


Usually there are only three people on the bridge, an officer of the watch,

a helmsman and a lookout. It does not matter whether we are on DP or

not. The helmsman and lookout functions rotate so they can both do each

other’s work. If we sail under procedures the commander and navigation

officer may be added to the bridge team.



It is common practise in the navy to keep meetings before an operation.

The officer of the watch who is not on watch or who has to do the

operation attends these meetings.


The officer of the watch is in charge. It is never unclear who is in charge

so during a handover the upcoming watch officer clearly needs to take

over command.


operation?

The commander comes on the bridge during procedures or during an

emergency situation other than combat. His task in general is to keep an

overview of the situation.


No, if it works its great but if it does not work we do it ourselves.


See question 31.



The officer of the watch is responsible for a safe navigation and to get

from A to B as quickly as possible. The entire crew is made up of

specialists who all do their specific task. If we work with other ships in an

operation the entire ship is just one part of the total operation. So

everybody contributes to the grand total and nobody wants to see things



fail because of their part in an operation. One of the great things of the

navy is this feeling that everybody, from sailor to commander, contributes

to a product and is part of a team. Everything is linked.


I was a backup flight deck officer, section control officer during a fire on

board, boarding officer and watch division officer.




Yes, I think it is applied leadership. It is vital that during a work under

load situation the team keeps performing at its best. This is something

that every officer should be aware of to see which leadership style works

best for each team you are part of. We do not know the off duty aspect,

we are always military personnel, however we do have our time when we

are not on the bridge or doing other work related things. At that time I

relax and can put my feet on the table together with other officers.


The officer of the watch carries a responsibility together with other bridge

personnel. SA encompasses everything that happens on the surface,

under water, in the air, drills, weather, operation, position, are we able to

launch amphibious vehicles or helicopters, state of the ship and engine

room.


Every morning or evening there is an update about the state of the ship

and the operation. It starts with a weather update, what are doing today

and what time and what the commander wants to achieve today. Once a

day there is a meeting where the officers of the watch sit together and

discuss things that need to be improved or went wrong and why. The

watch transfer is the moment when the upcoming officer and the officer of

the watch discuss the things that are not normal, for example something

is broken in the engine room and helicopters that are in the air etc. The

other things I can see for myself.


SA build-up and maintenance is what the officer of the watch and the two

sailors on the bridge are for. So continuously knowing what is happening

around you.


out?

This might have happened somewhere. The checklists are there to ensure

these things do not happen. Besides that I think it is the role of the officer

of the watch to compare the outside world with that that is represented on

screen, this also contributes to ensure you quickly find out if something is

wrong with the settings of the equipment.




See question 38.


Everybody knows to some extend what is happening. The officer of the

watch will hand over the watch about 15 till 30 minutes before or after the

two sailors do their handover, so there is always someone on the bridge

that has a complete picture of what has happened and is happening. The

two sailors can be an enormous help so I usually let them know what will

happen during the watch so they are also aware of the situation.


SA?

What has happened, what is happening and what will happen.


lead?

That is something that is determined by the navy before an operation

starts.


We have protocols and procedures for everything. The navy has

considered everything, even the most extreme situation, and made

procedures for that situation.


The checklists, flow diagrams and the routine book.


See question 37.


Yes, before you come on watch you know what is happening and what will

happen. This means you can compare what is happening outside and what

you can expect.


Basically everything that can be seen outside. Sea, weather, marine life,

targets (air and water). This is to check if the command control room and

the bridge have the same outside picture.




The conning screen is checked during every watch transfer. The DP

system itself is also looking at and checking the reference systems and

indicates this to the operator via a light that is red, orange or green. The

reference systems can be checked and compared manually. It there is a

deviation the technical department will need to see which reference

system is correct and which is not. The navy also uses its own reference

system besides the ones that the offshore industry uses. The watch officer

can also look outside and make three bearings to get a position on the

chart which he can compare to the positions indicated by the reference

systems.


The navy gives a one-day DP introduction course, besides that the navy

believes in training on the job. The navy cannot provide the officers the

full training to become DPO from the Nautical Institute because the

required training on bard will take incredibly long. The navy does not have

to comply with the same standards the maritime industry needs to comply

with. I think an in depth and type specific training would be a good step

forward and is something the officers would want to do. The current

situation is that everybody knows how to do it but the system is probably

not used to its full extend because there is not always enough knowledge

about the system. It is important to know that the DP system is used to

make life easier and the officer should always be able to take manual

control to keep the vessel in position.


The officer of the watch is always in charge unless the navigation officer

takes over the ship but under normal circumstances the officer of the

watch is in charge.



Appendix VIII Interview DPO Heavy Lift Interviewee: Anonymous

Company: Anonymous

Place: Rotterdam

Date: 25-11-2015


Captain: I am a DPO since 1991 on various DP vessels: Manly diving

support (15 years), pipe laying, light construction, and rigid pipe layer.

1st: I am a DPO since 2005, before I just worked in heavy lift. My first DP

vessel was a diving support vessel.


Captain: 6 years

1st: 4 years


It starts with mobilisation trials are a test of the complete vessel, DP wise,

even before the operation is conducted. The engine room is preparing for

DP operation as well, therefore the communication with the engine room

and electricians is essential. Then the vessel is brought into DP. Now the

vessel is ballasted to the required condition i.e. p Preparing the tanks and

have the right trim, ballasting effects the DP system because the

displacement increases and thus the forces that are needed to keep the

vessel in place are increased. Draught changes can be entered

automatically but we enter it manually because the sensors can change

value quickly during the lifting operation and then provide unintended

feedback from the DP system. Survey is preparing for the measurement

and the location of the piece. Permission from the surveyors and clients

need to be obtained as well. Depending on the lift, the cargo is usually

arrives by barge that is pulled by tugs. We start out with securing the

barge to our vessel. During this one DPO is on the control and the other

DPO is on the bridge wing behind a DP console. Once the barge is

alongside the DP console on the bridge wing is abandoned. The additional

forces that the barge creates on the DP vessel can be entered into the DP

system. If the go for an operation is given the lashings of the cargo can be

removed. Once all the lashings are removed, the hoisting gear is in place

and connected to the cargo the hoisting operation can commence.

The maximum allowable position error is usually within one meter and

sometimes this is two meters. The heading is not allowed to vary more

than 0.3 degrees. If the lift comes free from the barge there is always an

officer on the back who looks at the lift and when it comes free from the

barge. The barge needs to be removed if the cargo is lifted. With a subsea

installation it is possible that it is a multiple vessel are involved in the

operation. Communication with other ships in the area and other ships

(and the barge) within the operation is also done via VHF. The

communication on board goes via UHF.

The capability of the ballast system determines the lifting capability and

the speed of the operation. To lift from the stern it generally takes about

half an hour. The list and trim are also factors that determine the speed of



the lifting operation. Sometimes with very heavy lifts we set the cargo

down with the ballast system. The touchdown situation is dangerous

because the centre of gravity changes and the draught of the vessel

changes as well because you are effectively discharging. A smooth

placement is required, because the DP system needs time to compensate.

Huge forces are created when the lift touches down especially if this is

done quickly. These forces need to be predictable so the DPO can

anticipate on this. The distance between the structure and the vessel

changes when the cargo is place in its position because the cargo is no

longer suspended from the vessel. The placement of the piece is the most

critical part of the operation. The surveyors need to check if the structure

is placed correctly when it is on the sea floor.

After the touchdown and the checks by the supervisors the disconnection

happens as soon as possible. Sometimes the structure needs to be welded

to a subsea structure that is already in place on the sea floor and the ships

needs to stay into position for weeks. This dramatically decreases the

vessels capability to move. If the ship is connected via gangway the

allowable position error even lower. The DP operation then shifts from

dynamic to static. The SA may slip but there are always three people on

the bridge to check each other and keep the (team) awareness in place.


The first of chief officer that is the senior DP is in charge of the operation,

the captain is only in charge when he takes over the command, which

rarely happens. The shift foreman is giving requests to the bridge for

moving of the vessel and senior DPO then accepts or relays this request,

this is a very strict policy during close proximity movements.

Sometimes the captain comes to the bridge when the bridge team is very

busy and he helps them out where possible i.e. the captain is roaming.

During the heavy lift operation itself the captain is in charge.


Captain: The DP system is getting more complex over the years than as

they where, this is also a result of not being behind the desk that much

myself. You have to be careful not to become too detached from the

system. For example all the submenus have become less clear. I need

extra time because I don’t use it very often and you lose your skill

gradually, for the people working day to day with the equipment this

problem does almost not occur. It’s quite a complicated system, one DPO

needs to make the systems do what he wants, but to do this you need to

understand the vessel and the reference systems which is not always the

case. So no its not to complex but it is a complex system.

Throughout the years the application of DP systems changed. In my

younger years drilling rigs started using DP. One of the golden rules was

have a line of sight because this is your most reliable fact. The golden

rules start to disappear, due to new generations.

Not always, during heavy lift we prefer to keep control of draft system our

self so that the system cannot decide what it wants to do, there is a heavy

lift module, but we don’t like this because we cannot influence the system

and thus we have to see what it does.




On the bridge team this is usually verbally and of course nonverbal

because we are in the direct vicinity of each other. With the navigational

watch if he is on the other side of the bridge, we communicate via

telephone. With the deck crew the communication is done via UHF. Engine

room communication is done by phone, as well as communication with the

crane driver. We also have our own cellular phone network on board, with

this system we can call individuals at all times where ever they are.


Normally the First Officer is on the ballast panel, the 2nd officer is on DP

console and one officer is the navigational watch. On top of that all the

other teams that needs to be communicated with are for example: crane

driver, engine room, surveyors, deck crew, ROV pilots, barge etc.


Basically the communication is about the information that the DPO needs

from others to do his job, these include but are not limited to: Operational

requirements, distance to transferring loads, what kind of loads, where

does it need to go, any changes in status in the engine room, crane driver

change of slew, angles of the loads, information about shipping i.e.

navigational information, weather information etc.

If we have a heavy load slewing of the cargo requires ballast operations to

take place, of course the DPO as the whole bridge team needs to be

informed about this.


Usually we do use closed loop communication, but sometimes the shift

foreman and senior DPO do not do this.


Problems with jargon are seldom seen, the directions given by the crew

are normally clear. Sometimes with the barge there is a little confusion

about the heading i.e. is the heading of the barge used as a reference or

the heading of the own vessel. There are some things that can be

interpreted in multiple ways, for example the rotation of the crane this can

be seen from a crane operator point of view or the supervisors point of

view i.e. the operators left does not necessary have to be the supervisors

left. But normally when you land the load and you have to turn it, it is

always clockwise and counter clockwise. There are more terms that can

mean two things but everybody knows what this meant.

Another barrier we encounter on board is the cultural barrier. We work

with up to 15 different nationalities on board. This barrier is most notable

with the Malaysian crew, but this is not out of proportions in relation to

other vessels and although sometimes this comes up it is not frequent or

unworkable.

The culture barrier influences the all stop policy, not all cultures are able

to give such an order, as you are “not supposed to” from their rank and

culture.



The perception of reality shift is when this happens usually part of a

learning process and usually occurs between high and low rank personnel.

But I think a lot of process has been made in refining the policies in the

last five years and this occurs less often than before.


a DP operation?

In general not too much, so there is enough communication. When there

is to much communication this is only on the moments that you can’t use

it i.e. clients and surveyors on the bridge that make so much noise that

they interfere with your normal operations. When we tell them to shut up

its clear and quickly followed up and thus the problem is.

As DPO I could sometimes use more information but it is very personal,

you can get it if you want it you can get it through the radio or other

mediums.


the operation?

VHF for the bridge and UHF for the deck crews.


This is sufficient.


Yes if the system detects a fault this is showed immediately via an alarm.



The system does not do anything without my input. I don’t feel out of the

loop, because I am part of the loop.


This is very personal I for instance easily adapt to new systems. The

button okay but could be made a bit more clear. As for the screen most

changes can be made so that it shows what you want to. All the

information is there you can show it how you want it you can where you

want it.


be?

No need but there are quite a lot of buttons, which you get used to, they

are there for a reason. Furthermore it is just a tool of which you have not

so much influence to change it. All the buttons that you could want are

there.




console?

You can choose as a DPO what you would like to use everything is there.

But there is a minimum in the company because the captain or 1st Officer

can instantly see what its happening.

The liking into way the information is displayed for instance graph or raw

numbers is also very personal.


Its fine the way it is, but this is because I am so used to this system.



The power management system (PMS) of the vessel is far more detailed

than the power overview in the DPS. For the rest we show the reference

systems, thrusters and the position plot all the time. The operator has to

rotate views every 6 hours for his checklist and usually does this every

hour or 30 minutes for himself.



autonomously?

No during the under load of a DP operation we have a lot of side activities

we can do, which can be dropped right away because they are low priority,

so for this it is not necessary. We work this way all the time.

For myself I would not like any additional links between me and the DP

system, experience cannot be bought, I would rather use a real captain

then.



No we think that we are in control and the system is doing the monitoring,

not the other way around. The system is the monitor thus we don’t need

this insight as we call the shots. We have quite a lot of insight if you are

trained, you look outside and monitor the system. It this is the job of the

DPO to anticipate on what is happening. You can see feedback of thrusters

for example if they are not following your commands.


The three (all) officers on the bridge, it’s a 3 man team. Surveyors are

more or less part of the team although they are located on a different part

of the bridge.



Shift handover is the most common team meeting is the only real team

meeting other is between the captain and the senior DPO, the captain

goes to other meetings with the client etc. furthermore toolbox meetings

are held.




Yes, this is always the senior DPO. The captain will come on the bridge to

monitor and discuss the situation. Normally the captain is not taking over

the command, he will help out but the bridge team has enough experience

to cope with arising problems them self’s, I will take over if the senior

goes for another job. During emergencies the captain is always in control,

but only after announcing it.


operation?

The captain can step in but he is usually not on the bridge, if he does

arrive on the bridge this is mostly as an advisor or extra hand.


No definitely not, for now it’s still a tool. Maybe in the future this can be

the case.


The DPO is in control because he telling the system what to do. If he does

not do this the system wont work, this is why the DPO is not a backup.

You need to work the system in such a way that it works for you. You

should not feel like a backup, if this is the case you are a bad DPO in our

field of work.



It’s a bit of both, we are rotating in different roles, in general it think is

should be a group of people performing specific task. Not necessarily

always the same task. For instance we have people with a lot of anchoring

experience, but they are also DPO.

If it is possible we try to switch roles so that less experienced personnel is

also able to develop them self.


All bridge crew is involved in the fire and emergency teams, other teams

that they are part of are for instance the maintenance, mob, and first aid

team. If all tasks other tasks then DPO would be taken away it would

become boring job as the diversity is removed.

31. What do you think SA is on the bridge during DP operations?

Knowledge about: ships in the vicinity, weather, radio messages, and etc.

i.e. navigational awareness as a whole. There is a work permit system, so

I as a captain and the rest of the bridge team know the operations that

are being conducted on the vessel, i.e. what are the people on deck doing

and how does this affect my vessel, this is also part of the SA. This gives

an insight in the operations around the ship that influence the DP

operation, which is also a key factor. All meetings (for instance daily

progress meeting) and toolbox meetings help my knowledge of the jobs



that are done on the vessel. I demand a large amount of awareness of the

people working on deck so that they can do their job safely.


The permit to work system is the tool to acquire SA about the vessel state.

The planning of the project provides you with a reference for what is going

on at the moment. For the DP part I do the following: The first thing that I

do when I wake up is look out of the window, check the weather forecast

and then read my email. When this is done I go to the bridge to talk to the

officer in charge of the watch, look outside, and look at the DP desk and

all other navigational equipment that is being used. Then I have build up

my SA.


Usually I take my SA from the bridge to the meetings that are taking place

with vessel management. My SA is 24/7 available although with ups and

downs but I am always aware till some level. I am constantly working to

maintain my SA If I notice that something goes wrong I am on the bridge

as soon as possible. People know when to call the captain. Maintaining SA

is vital for everybody on board in order to work safely.



It does not quickly fade, because most of the time I go to the daily

progress meeting after being on the bridge and I share my information

here. If I go a quickly grab something from my cabin my SA does not

decrease.


out?

No, not on DP.


Yes a DPO can no go without this. But it is important for everyone on

board.


It depends on the situation, the more critical the faster action will be

taken, if the team is aware and if the DPO is aware of everything around

him. Also the ability of the team to inform other team members that they

might be wrong, if something is missed by the DPO for instance he will be

told, also advice will be given to improve the situation so that he is able to

learn from his slip. An easy way to probe someone’s awareness is to just

ask and see if he can provide the answer to that question. Or you can

observe him, what is he looking at and what is he doing.




SA?

This is in the basis the same as in individual SA because this is needed.

Good communication is the most important factor, the team is comprised

of individuals that all need information and good communication ensures

this. Furthermore the same information as with personal SA is needed. If

one member of the team does not have any or bad SA, the average of the

team plunges and mistakes can occur. Thus we need to have faith and

have confidence in the competence of the team. The general operation

needs to be understood by everybody.


lead?

The priority of the project is the leading factor and the client decides this.

The characteristics of the vessel and characteristics of the crew are very

important and needs to be known by the captain on order to be able to

corporate with different vessels. This means knowledge of their

restrictions and capabilities.


Yes we have plenty of those over 1000+ I suppose it depends on what you

want to involve but it is all interconnected.


The permit to work system is an essential procedure for a DP vessel

because this says something about the state of the vessel and everything

is connected to this system. This is connected to almost everything that is

done on-board. These procedures are work standards, and may in some

cases lead to the checklists.


We have a form to use during the shift and a hand over shift form. One on

one verbal transfer of the watch is changed, everything should be

explained there. We also fill out the 6 hours checklist. The guy who has

just arrived does this checklist. It’s definitely an aid to SA and that is the

purpose of the checklist.

There is also a verbal toolbox talk that is twice a day during the 12 o clock

watch change, a form accompanies this. It’s divided into chapters DP,

navigation, and safety.


Yes they provide guidance to building up you SA.


Going through the settings of the DP system, and all the changes that

occurred during the last shift, this encompasses navigational, vessel

information, etc.




You are expecting that the reference systems, which you got from the

previous shift, are working, because it is done via checklist. It gives you

input, or else the reference system would not be allowed into the DP

system, the system is monitoring your reference systems for you. You can

anticipate if the weather gets worse for instance with the fanbeam. Signal

strength is given on the screen and thus you can see how good it is.

There is no visual check on the tautwire while this was done on previous

vessels and we think of reintroducing this.


We are send to training centres for the DP system and the reference

systems, when new systems are introduced to our vessels. But training is

directed from within the company and is not required by law. Emergency

response training on DP facilities exist be we do not go there.

There are already a lot of trainings that need to be followed for a mariner,

these costs are immense and time consuming. On board of our vessels we

try to train on DP during down time and trails, for instance we will sail

patterns on manual DP control. This is promoted manly by the captain and

a little bit from within the company


This does not change, as the senior DPO is also the shift leader during

normal operations. In this case the First Officer will remain in charge

before during and after the operation.

48. What is the difference between a Heavy Lift DP operation and a normal

Heavy Lift operation?

The ship is steadier on DP than on anchors, under most circumstances.

The difference is to be aware that you are less flexible on anchors, on the

other hand are we more vulnerable on DP to blackouts. For the rest there

is not much of a difference to us.

49. Who are the parties involved in a (Multi-Vessel) Heavy Lift DP operation?

Clients are just witnessing and they are not a part of the job. After a

certain stage they cannot even influence the operation any more. The

barge is passive, and tugs are involved to place and remove it. Surveyors,

construction and internal crews such as ROV etc. We don’t use SIMOPS

module of Kongsberg.

50. How long does the average (Multi-Vessel) Heavy Lift DP operation last

from vessel in position to operation completed?

Depends on the definition of the start. The operation varies from a matter

of hours till days. Rigging can take a day, while sometimes the entire job

is done within one shift.

51. Could you provide us with any extra information about a (Multi-Vessel)

Heavy Lift DP operation i.e. procedures, handbooks, etc.?



The documentation is provided by IMCA, standards. Books about rigging

and heavy lifting exist but the nautical institute has something about

heavy lift DP operations I believe. The information is available within the

company but the company does not have experience the crew has the

experience.

Extra

I have seen over the years with the coming of the new generation that

basic DP rules from the old days are starting to disappear. These so-called

golden rules are a safety net and I think that they should be used.

The reporting is not anonymised enough, and can easily be traced back to

a particular vessel or ship. This is a reason why not all incidents are

reported within the DP world

Diving support vessel (DSV)

Everything is much more focused on position keeping during Diving

support operations. You would not think about leaving your desk during

diving support. You need very high awareness. But it is still a DP operation

so a lot of things are the same of what we do here. Purely that there are

people under water is the main risk.

Your DP alarms are much more important, during DSV. On heavy lift it is

not that important. On a DSV it is really a status light of diver underwater

or on the surface or vessel not ready for diving. And the bridge is more in

control on a DSV they give all the orders and note everything including the

time. You really have to think and plan in advance where you will need to

move and where your references come from and if you can maintain them.

You need a minimum of 3 independent reference systems. A DSV has a lot

more limitations in for example movability than other DP operations due to

the nature of their work.



Appendix IX Categorization assessment This categorization assessment is made in cooperation with M. Berendsen with

the aid of literature ( (Bray, 2008) (Brugts, 2008) (IMCA, 2007) (Helgøy, 2003))

and interviews with various DPO’s. (The interviews are included in appendixes III

to VIII)

IX.1 Anchor handling IMO Classification: Anchor handling operations are normally conducted under

IMO, no DP class or DP class 1. Class 2 might be used if the client requests

this. So the IMO class 1 is used normally.

Complexity: This kind of operation is normally not very complex; an anchor is

fetched from a platform or vessel and then dropped in the right location.

Special caution is needed to be able to drop the anchor underwater free of

submerged structures.

Allowable position error: The difference in the requested position and the

actual position may be rather large, usually it does not matter if an anchor is

dropped 10 meters before or after the desired location. Therefore the

allowable position error is high.

Operation aborting possibilities: The anchor can easily be dropped in case of

an emergency when no subsea structures are present. The operation can

easily be aborted, that’s why the allowable position error is rated high.

Error consequences (Lives): The consequences of a deviation in the desired

position are usually low, the only thing that might cause danger is that the

heading is not maintained and that the anchor chain or wire is swept across

the deck, therefore this factor is rated low.

Error consequences (Money): The consequences of a deviation in the desired

position are low money wise, the only thing that costs money is the extra time

involved to reposition in order to drop or pick up the anchor.

Communication Frequency: The communication with the rig that requires the

placement of the anchors is external. The rig communicates where it wants

the anchors and the anchor handler replies to where he dropped the anchors.

This communication is not continuous but frequent, therefore it is rated

medium.

SA requirement: The situation is not highly dynamic in comparison with other

DP operations, nevertheless sufficient SA is required. The SA requirement in

respect to the other operations is however low because of lack of a dynamic

situation.

Operation aborting consequences (Lives): In none extreme weather conditions

the aborting of the operation is not dangerous, therefore it is rated low.

Operation aborting consequences (Money): The costs involved in stopping the

operation are relatively low due to the low running costs of the operation,

therefore it is rated low.

IX.2 Cable layer Complexity: With all the different teams on board and the environmental

factors that work on vessel and cable this operation is quite complex, thus it

is rated medium/high.

Allowable position error: There is a little room for the ship to be out of

position but this is very limited, thus this factor is rated low.

Operation aborting possibilities: To abort a cable laying operation the cable

that is connected to the ship needs to be slacked, allowing for some

movement, but it is still very limited as the vessel is still connected to the

cable, that is why this is rated low/medium.

Error consequences (Lives): If a position error occurs the lives of the crew are

not directly endangered.



Error consequences (Money): A position error could cause a large part of the

cable to be misplaced, resulting in the necessity for redoing that part,

retrieving the cable, which involves a lot of costs, thus this factor is rated

high.

Communication Frequency: The internal communication between the DPO and

trencher is constant and as this is not the only communication that is going on

on the bridge, it is rated high.

SA requirement: The DPO needs to be aware of his surroundings as well as

the status of the cable reel at the back of the vessel, therefore his SA is rated

medium.

Operation aborting consequences (Lives): If the operation is suddenly aborted

this has no impact on the lives of the crew.

Operation aborting consequences (Money): As said earlier a lot of time is

involved in resuming the operation after it has been aborted, since time is

money the costs of this are rated high.

IX.3 Cruise IMO Classification: The simplest form of the DP system is used for cruise

purposes; this is why it is IMO class 1.

Complexity: The complexity of a DP operation in the cruise industry is almost

non-existent. The sole purpose of the DP operation is to allow for the

embarking and disembarking of tenders and to be able to “anchor” in areas

where dropping an anchor is prohibited. Therefore the complexity is rated low.

Allowable position error: The maximum difference in the position and the set

point can be up to miles depending on the location, but its position is not

critical for a good operation, therefore it is rated high.

Operation aborting possibilities: The cruise vessel can, at almost any time,

except the actual embarking or disembarking of passengers, instantly abort

the operation, therefore this is rated high.

Error consequences (Lives): Lives are not at stake as long as a drift off is slow

and the ship does not run aground, therefore it is rated low.

Error consequences (Money): A drift off does not result in loss of money as

long as embarking or disembarking can continue and the ship does not run

aground, therefore it is rated low.

Communication Frequency: Not much communication is needed to keep the

operation running therefore it is rated low.

SA requirement: The required SA for this operation is low because it is a static

operation. As with anchor handling a certain level of SA is needed but this is

relatively low.

Operation aborting consequences (Lives): When the operation is aborted no

lives are at stake thus rated low.

Operation aborting consequences (Money): Some costs may be involved if the

operation is aborted, but this is not significant thus it’s rated low.

IX.4 Diving support IMO Classification: The standard IMO class is 2 but usually the contractor

wants to use 3, therefore it is rated 2/3.

Complexity: Diving operations are typically very complex. Due to the different

underwater structures and the hampering of the vessels capabilities due to

safe zones for the divers, it is therefore rated high.

Allowable position error: Too much movement can entangle the divers but

some movement is possible therefore this allowable error is rated low/medium

Operation aborting possibilities: It takes time to retrieve the divers, therefore

the aborting possibilities are severely hampered so it’s rated low.

Error consequences (Lives): If a sizable position error occurs the divers could

easily be killed by various factors, so therefore it’s rated high.



Error consequences (Money): The main costs of an error are the lives.

Operational costs, although high do not weigh up to the cost of a dead

employee, therefore this is rated medium.

Communication Frequency: The communication lines are constantly

maintained communication is very frequent, the DPO needs to know where

the divers are.

SA requirement: It is of the upmost importance that the DPO knows what is

going on above a below the surface, the situation changes constantly

especially under water where the divers are moving, this is why this is rated

high.

Operation aborting consequences (Lives): The aborting of the operation can

cost lives if this is performed to fast, therefore this is rated high.

Operation aborting consequences (Money): Diving support vessels usually

have high running costs and do irreplaceable work, therefore if an operation is

aborted the costs are considerable, thus this is rated medium.

IX.5 Dredging IMO Classification: Dredging operations are mostly done under class 1, more

power is available for the operation and usually the operation is not that

critical.

Complexity: Depending on the type of operation (mining or fairway dredging)

the operation complexity increases with fairway dredging and decreases with

mining, these two operations combined make the factor medium.

Allowable position error: Depending on the type of dredging operation the

Allowable position error is determined, while mining sand this allowable error

is significant, while when maintaining a fairway it is important to have at least

dredged the whole width. That is why it is rated medium.

Operation aborting possibilities: The operation can quite easily be stopped but

it takes time for the suction arm to reach a position so that it does not impair

your capabilities as a vessel, thus it is rated medium.

Error consequences (Lives): There are no direct threats to the lives of the

crew if the vessel is out of position so this is rated low.

Error consequences (Money): Being out off position usually has low impact

money wise especially while mining sand then it has no impact at all.

Communication Frequency: The communication between the DPO and the

dredging master is frequent but not continuous, that’s why this is rated

medium.

SA requirement: The SA requirements differ between mining and fairway

dredging. With mining it is fairly low because precision is not needed while

with fairway dredging it is fairly high due to the fact that the job needs to be

done precisely and there is often continuous traffic around the vessel.

Therefore this is rated medium to accommodate both practices.

Operation aborting consequences (Lives): There are no direct threats to the

lives of the crew if operation is aborted so this is rated low.

Operation aborting consequences (Money): The only costs of aborting are the

running costs of the vessel, that is why this is rated low.

IX.6 Drilling Complexity: The drilling operation is not complex to the operator due to the

fact that the only thing he has to do is maintain his position and his heading.

Allowable position error: The position deviation is only around one meter, this

is very little, therefore it is rated low.

Operation aborting possibilities: It is difficult to abort the DP operation,

especially if 2 km of drilling pipe is connected therefore it is rated low.

Error consequences (Lives): When an error occurs the vessel may go adrift

and a blowout can occur with the loss of lives as a result. It is therefore rated

high.



Error consequences (Money): If a mayor error occurs there might be an oil

spill. If this is the case the environmental damage is tremendous, the cost of

cleaning up and the impact on brand image will be huge, this is why this is

rated high.

Communication Frequency: The communication is mainly internal and due to

the static nature of the operation not a lot of communication is required

between the DPO and the navigator.

SA requirement: Due to the non-dynamic nature of the operation the SA

requirement is relatively low in comparison to the other operations.

Operation aborting consequences (Lives): Aborting an operation in accordance

with the correct procedures does not cost lives thus this is rated low.

Operation aborting consequences (Money): Running costs and loss of

production are major financial consequences that arise if the operation is

aborted, that is why this is rated high.

IX.7 FPSO Complexity: In normal operations, under normal circumstances the operation

is not complex to the operator due to the fact that the only thing he has to do

is maintain his position and his heading. Complexity only occurs when the

shuttle tanker comes to collect his cargo. This being not a daily routine makes

the rating low.

Allowable position error: The allowable position error might have a radius of

up to 50 meters, this is a big radius for a DP system therefore it is rated high.

Operation aborting possibilities: A FPSO is quite capable of stopping the

operation although this is just limited to a quick release system. Therefore

this is rated medium.

Error consequences (Lives): If the vessel is drifting off the set position this

does not pose threats to the lives of the crew.


spill, if this is the case the environmental damage is tremendous, the cost of

cleaning up and the impact on brand image will be huge, this is why it is rated

high.

Communication Frequency: Normally the communication frequency is low due

to the fact that the operation is static. During tandem offloading on the other

hand the frequency is high. With tandem offloading not being the day-to-day

business the frequency is rated low.

SA requirement: Due to the non-dynamic nature of the operation the SA

requirement is relatively low in comparison to other operations. The only time

that a high SA is needed is when tandem-offloading operations are taking

place.

Operation aborting consequences (Lives): When an operation is aborted this

does not cost lives thus this is rated low.

Operation aborting consequences (Money): The loss of production and daily

running costs are sky high on an FPSO, therefore aborting the operation is

rated high.

IX.8 Heavy Lift IMO Classification: The standard IMO class is 2 but usually the contractor

wants to use 3, therefore it is rated 2/3

Complexity: Working with multiple moving objects/vessels under DP and the

precise nature of this operation make it very complex.

Allowable position error: Placing a heavy lift on another vessel or structure

has to be done with great accuracy, the margin of error is very small (less

than a meter) thus this is rated low.

Operation aborting possibilities: Once the lifting operation is started it is

nearly impossible to abort the operation therefore this is rated low.



Error consequences (Lives): If the lift deviates from its position or starts to

swing the chances a person will be injured or killed are significant thus this is

rated high.

Error consequences (Money): If the lifted structure is out of position it could

be damaged in such a way that it cannot be placed any more, with

tremendous costs as a consequence.

Communication Frequency: Contact has to be maintained between different

crewmembers on different places and with different vessels as well, therefore

the frequency as well as the intensity of the communication is high.

SA requirement: The highly dynamic nature of this operation needs a high

level of SA to be able to understand the whole process and to be able to make

the right decisions.

Operation aborting consequences (Lives): Aborting is mostly not possible but

if it is possible it still poses a real threat to the crew, this is why this is rated

medium.

Operation aborting consequences (Money): The daily running costs for a

heavy lift vessel are, depending on the size of the vessel, high, but the

delayed start of production of the facility it is building may involve even more

costs. Because this is very job specific the normal costs are used and these

are rated medium.

IX.9 Minehunter IMO Classification: With lives at stake the standard IMO class is 2/3 as there

is no contractor that decides the class and this is left to the operating

government.

Complexity: Diving operations are typically very complex now. ROV’s add to

this complexity even more. The vessel is hampered in its capabilities due to

safe zones for the divers, it is therefore the complexity rated high.

Allowable position error: Too much movement can entangle the divers, very

limited movement is possible therefore this allowable error is rated low

Operation aborting possibilities: It takes time to retrieve the divers and ROV,

therefore the aborting possibilities are severely hampered, that’s why it’s

rated low.

Error consequences (Lives): If a sizable position error occurs the divers could

easily be killed by various factors including the mines, it is therefore rated

high.

Error consequences (Money): The main costs of an error are the lives, the

operational costs are low because there is no consequential loss as is the case

with diving.

Communication Frequency: The communication lines are constantly

maintained, communication is very frequent, the DPO needs to know where

the divers and the ROV are.

SA requirement: It is of the utmost importance that the DPO knows what is

going on above and below the surface, the situation changes constantly

especially under water where the divers and ROV are moving, this is why this

is rated high.

Operation aborting consequences (Lives): The aborting of the operation can

cost lives if it is performed to fast, therefore this factor is rated high.

Operation aborting consequences (Money): Minehunters have a low running

cost and no consequential loss, therefore the total costs are low.

IX.10Pipe layer Complexity: With all the different teams on board and the environmental

factors that work on the vessel and the pipe, this operation is quite complex

thus it is rated medium/high.

Allowable position error: There is a little room for the ship to be off the set

position but this is very limited thus this factor is rated low.



Operation aborting possibilities: To abort a pipe laying operation the pipe that

is connected to the ship needs to be cut. This is a process that takes a lot of

time and resuming the operation afterwards takes even more time so this is

rated low.

Error consequences (Lives): If a position error occurs the lives of the crew are

not directly impacted.

Error consequences (Money): A position error could cause a large part of the

pipe to be misplaced or deformed This can result in the necessity for redoing

that part, involving a lot of costs thus this factor is rated high.


the tension controller is constant. This is not the only communication going

on at the bridge, so it is rated high.

SA requirement: The DPO needs to be aware of his surroundings as well as

the status of the pipe assembly factory at the back of the vessel, therefore his

SA is rated medium.



Operation aborting consequences (Money): As said earlier a lot of time is

involved in aborting and afterwards resuming the operation and since time is

money the costs are rated high.

IX.11 Rock emplacement IMO Classification: Rock emplacement operations are normally conducted

under IMO DP class 1. Class 2 is often used on request of the client. So the

IMO class used is 1/2 as these both occur frequently in normal situations.

Complexity: This operation needs to be conducted precisely, very good

teamwork is needed between the DPO and the ROV operator, so this

operation is rated medium in complexity.

Allowable position error: The rocks need to be placed accurately on the

bottom of the sea, a deviation from the set position will result in quality loss.

It is therefore rated low.

Operation aborting possibilities: The operation can be aborted almost

immediately by shutting down the hoppers. This is why this is rated high.

Error consequences (Lives): When the vessel is of its designated track this

has no impact on the lives of the crew or environment.

Error consequences (Money): The loss of capital due to a position error is

limited, the vessel would have to come back to redo that section which will

cost time and thus money, this is therefore rated low.


the ROV pilot is constant. This is not the only communication going on at the

bridge, so it is rated high.

SA requirement: The DPO and the ROV pilot constantly need to be aware of

each other’s moves while the Chief officer needs to keep the navigational

watch. Due to the highly dynamic environment for the DPO and the relatively

none dynamic situation for the Chief officer this is rated medium high.



Operation aborting consequences (Money): If the operation is suddenly

aborted there are no extra costs except the running costs thus is it rated low.

IX.12 Semi-submersible IMO Classification: Various companies use DP class 2 for Semi-submersible

operations

Complexity: Dealing with multiple vessels and the precision needed in this

operation make the rating medium.

Allowable position error: The margin for error is very small because items

placed on a Semi-submersible need to be positioned precisely.



Operation aborting possibilities: Once the cargo is floating above the Semi-

submersible the aborting possibilities are low, before that the operation can

be aborted easier therefore it is rated medium low.

Error consequences (Lives): Errors could result in the cargo coming into

contact with the vessel, this could result in los of life therefore it is rated

medium.

Error consequences (Money): Errors could result in the cargo coming into

contact with the vessel, which could result in damage that leads to

considerable costs that’s why it is rated medium.

Communication Frequency: Communication with other vessels involved and

the crew are continuous, therefore it is rated high.

SA requirement: The SA requirement is rated medium high because this

depends on the number of vessels involved. The more vessels involved the

higher the level of SA should be.



Operation aborting consequences (Money): The downtime of the Semi-

submersible may invoke downtime of the vessel it is going to transport,

causing additional costs. This combined with her own running costs rate this

factor medium.

IX.13 Shuttle tanker IMO Classification: IMO class 1 is required for loading on a mooring buoy or a

fixed loading structure at sea, class 2 is needed for tandem loading with an

FPSO.

Complexity: Loading a shuttle tanker behind a FPSO is a dynamic process with

a lot of variables, this makes the operation very complex.

Allowable position error: The allowable deviation from the set position is quite

big as long as the safe zone is not left. This safe zone has the shape of a cone

behind the FPSO and has a considerable size.

Operation aborting possibilities: A shuttle tanker is able to abort the operation

but this will take some time, therefore it is rated medium.

Error consequences (Lives): When something goes wrong this usually does

not pose a direct threat to the crew of the FPSO or the shuttle tanker.


spill, in this case the environmental damage is tremendous, the cost of

cleaning up and the impact on brand image will be huge, this is why this is

rated high.

Communication Frequency: The communication frequency is always high

during DP operations on a Shuttle tanker, contact and tuning should be

maintained with the FPSO and a tug (if a tug is used). An exception is when a

mooring buoy or loading platform is used, then it is low, but we looked at it

from a FPSO point of view.

SA requirement: During the shuttle operation the DPO needs to be constantly

aware of the position of his own vessel, the FPSO and the tug. To be able to

perform in such a highly dynamic environment a high level of SA is needed.

Operation aborting consequences (Lives): Aborting the operation does not

pose threats to the lives of both crews.

Operation aborting consequences (Money): The costs of aborting a loading

operation can be quite considerable therefore it is rated medium.



IX.14 Supplier IMO Classification: Usually 2 but 1 might be used if the risks are low.

Complexity: Usually the operations performed by a supplier are not very

complex, this changes when multiple vessels are involved, thus the rating

low/medium.

Allowable position error: Suppliers usually come within five or ten meters of a

platform, if the positions deviates more than their distance to the platform

incidents will occur, therefore it is rated low.

Operation aborting possibilities: If proper planning is conducted the escape

possibilities during an operation are high.

Error consequences (Lives): If the vessel experiences a drift off the people

working on deck could be injured, although this does not have to be the case,

which is why this is rated medium.

Error consequences (Money): The running costs and damage done by a

possible collision make this rated medium.

Communication Frequency: A supplier contacts the unit that it has to supply

frequently but not constantly, that is why this is rated medium.

SA requirement: The SA requirement is medium as the unit that is being

supplied is usually stationary and the supplier has to go to this unit, making

the supplier the variable. Sufficient SA is needed but this does not have to be

a very high level.

Operation aborting consequences (Lives): If the operation is aborted no lives

are at stake. It is rated low.

Operation aborting consequences (Money): Suppliers provide (critical)

supplies for offshore units and vessels. The downtime of the supplier may

invoke downtime of the offshore unit or vessel it was supplying causing

additional costs. This combined factor is therefore rated medium.

IX.15 Survey/ROV IMO Classification: Depending on the proximity of structures above or under

the surface of the water the classification is 1 or 2, 2 for being near them and

1 for not being near them.

Complexity: ROV operations can vary from low to high depending on the

variables in the operation, therefore it is hard to give a set rating to this. Thus

a rating of medium is chosen to be able to incorporate both ends of the

spectrum.

Allowable position error: The most ROV’s allow for some movement in position

before they become useless. Therefore this is rated medium.

Operation aborting possibilities: There are usually plenty possibilities of

aborting the operations but this might take some time if the ROV is not to be

damaged, it is therefore rated medium.

Error consequences (Lives): No lives are at stake by aborting the operation.

Error consequences (Money): Because of a position error the survey may

become useless, and has to be done again, therefore the costs are rated

medium.

Communication Frequency: The communication between the DPO and the

ROV pilot are frequent but not constant so this is rated medium.

SA requirement: The DPO needs to be aware of the position and limitations of

the ROV as well as the environment above and under the surface, the SA

requirement is therefore rated medium.

Operation aborting consequences (Lives): No lives are at stake when the

operation is aborted. It is rated low.

Operation aborting consequences (Money): The running costs of the operation

itself and the costs of the delay for the next phase of the operation makes this

rating medium.



Appendix X TNO Prezi This Prezi presentation was made and used by TNO for its Early Research

Program (ERP) during the Europort exhibition of 2015 in Rotterdam