2nd 2005 GaHRFS Papers

8/14/2019 2nd 2005 GaHRFS Papers

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The fact that democracy has not taken full root in any part of Asia has a deep

implication with Asia's deep-seated male-chauvinistic feudal beliefs. India's Indira

Gandhi and Sonia Gandhi, Sri Lanka's Sirimavo Bandaranaike Tunga and Kumar Tunga, Pakistan's Benazir Bhutto, the Philippines' Corazon Aquino, Indonesia's

Megawati, Burma's AungSan Suu Kyi and Korea's Park Geun-Hye are all examples of

how easy it was for women leaders to take up political positions and how the Asian

society is still far from breaking free of past ghosts, namely blood lineage and family.

3. Nationalism

Unlike Europe, the majority of Asian countries did not intrinsically embrace a unitary

concept of race or people, rendering difficult to create a single order of a nation-state based on race or people. However, colonial administrators adopted the concept of a

nation-state in order to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in governing its colonies.

Due to the underlying ideology of its creation, however, an incomplete form of

democracy was adopted. Consequently, contrary to Europe, where a nation-state of a

political unity had been developed, Asia saw nation-states being created around the

dominant majority in terms of race or religion and the latter two factors serving as a

mechanism to create state power. This is to say that nations were created before people

were defined and that tribes, clans, religious groups that did not form a majority became

the object of oppression and persecution in the name of the state. As a result, internal

colonialism and genocide were carried out.

In the end, incomplete nationalism begot religious nationalism and spurred the

development of separatist movements. This is the reason as to why the history of

conflict and war shows no sign of ending as could be seen in Kosovo, Ache, West

Papua, India and Miyanmar. Furthermore, the fact that all human rights are being

reserved within the rim of nationalism in many Asian countries can also be understood

in this context.

4. Division

One of the most notable characteristics of colonialism is that it incites division and

conflict within the colonized society. Although the method or form might show slight

difference among the British, the French and the Dutch (and the Japanese), the big

picture still remains the same. Because nation-states in Asia were purely formed by the

necessity of the colonial powers and were not based on race/people, Asian states found

themselves totally helpless in such situation. The instruments employed to provoke

division were the aforementioned religion, tribes and clans. Multi-racial societies such


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as Afghanistan, Burma and Indonesia disintegrated too easily while traditionally strong

homogeneous societies such as Malaysia were shaken up using imported Chinese and

Indian citizens.The biggest outcome of division is endless disputes and consequent social unrest.

Afghanistan has been plagued with a civil year for 24 years while the two Koreas and

India and Pakistan have suffered a gruesome partition. India and Pakistan, in particular,

are still mired in terrorist attacks, massacres and retaliative terror attacks due to conflicts

among communities.

5. Dictatorships

In the 1970s, dictators like Korea's Park Jung-Hee, the Philippines' Marcos, Iran's Paleviand Indonesia's Suharto all held absolute power and committed human rights violations

in the name of the state. Came 1980s and most dictators were dethroned from power.

However, the empty space was not immediately filled by a sound democracy. This is

attributable to the inability of the people to outgrow from the nationalistic ideas they

have been brainwashed with for decades and the fact that while democracy had been

unable to take root, feudal collectivism that had replaced its place. Iran's islamic

socialism led by Khomeini, Afghanistan's islamic fundamentalism led by the Muzahidin

and the Taleban, Korea's regional hegemony of Kyeongsang Province initiated from

Cheon Du-Hwan and North Korea's Juche (self-proficiency) principle led by Kim Il-

Sung and Kim Jung-Il are all good examples to the above point.

In the case of East Asia and South East Asia, most dictatorships are related to the

problem of "Asian values". Asian values are typically described as embodying the

Confucian ideals of loyalty to family, favoritism, rule of person, authoritarianism, the

belief that community is more important than the individual, ardor for education and

hard work and that such values have fueled Asia's stunning economic growth.

According to this thesis, individualism, rationalism, human rights and the rule of law

are all Western values that "do not fit" Asians. The term of Asian values was first used

by Western scholars and media to explain the fast and extensive economic growth that

East Asian countries experienced in the early 1970s but was taken up and further

developed by Singapore's Lee Kwan Yew and Malaysia's Mahathir. This is a concept

that is without a shred of doubt, undemocratic and runs contrary to the universality of

human rights.

The U.S. has played a major part until Asia was able to stand on its own two feet in

recent times. But their help was not driven by sheer altruism. Indeed, the U.S.

encouraged and interfered in the independence of Asian countries in order to weaken


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European colonialist powers such as Britain after the Second World War. Consequently

during the bipolar order, the U.S. locked in endless competition with the USSR and in

the process took the defense of Asia as its god-given mission. Amid such process, theWar of Vietnam was waged and Cambodia's "Killing Fields" massacres were executed

while military-based forces such as Korea's Park Jung-Hee and Cheon Du-Hwan, Irak's

Hussein, Pakistan's Zia-hul-Haq, the Philippines' Marcos, Burma's Newin and

Thailand's Suchinda were supported. Anti-communist ideologies alone drove U.S.

interests while despotism or democracy failed to raise any interest in them. Soon

afterwards, civil uprisings flared up in Kwangju, Bangkok, Jakarta and Manila and

countless civilians were murdered in the process. This is how the shameful history of

civilian massacres began in many countries in Asia. It comes as no surprise that suchincidents are linked to the U.S. and that the tide of anti-americanism is rising in Asia.

6. Anti-Americanism

After the Second World War, European colonialism was directly inherited by the

Americans. In the early 1990s, the bipolar order collapsed, the U.S. became the sole

superpower and its economy entered a recession. It was at this time that the U.S. began

to openly reveal its hegemonic ambitions over Asia. The reason as to why anti-american

movements are so widespread in Asia can be attributed to America's neocolonial

attitude. Anti-american movements in Asia can be categorized into two groups. The

first is the anti-americanism centered around leftist blocs. As the Soviet Union collapsed

and socialist values lost their luster and was replaced by neo-liberalism, the lives of

workers, farmers and the urban poor are becoming increasingly more difficult. Despite

such reality, some parts of the leftist bloc are only concerned with anti-american

activities while turning a blind eye to progressive values such as human rights, welfare

and the right to live. Such attitude illustrates that they are not free from the remnants of

colonialism, namely nationalism and anti-american sentiments. The latter type of anti-

americanism is the anti-american resistance of the Islamic bloc. This type of anti-

americanism can trace its roots to the American support of Israel and its Middle East oil

policies. As it was fully expected, fighting fairly against the U.S. and Israel - two

powers armed with massive economic and military strength - proved to be impossible

and futile. The only resort left was to turn to feudalistic methods, in this case, to resist

through religion.

7. Orientalism


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1Liquidation of the Past in Korea: Some Ground Rules

Prof. Dong Choon Kim (Sungkonghoe University)

1. What is liquidation of the past?

Liquidation of the past is a series of actions designed to uncover the fact on past

government wrongdoings and their consequences; restorethe lost honor of victims; and

make proper reparations for damages sustained by the victims. There is a reason that it

should be the liquidation of the "past", not the "past history". Obviously, the past is

something irreversible, butpast wrongdoings can still have a lingering impact on the present politics, laws and institutions. If the persons responsible for those wrongdoings

are still in powerful positions, and if the victims are alive, it is required to redress the

wrongs in oneway or another so that we can live in a society with real law and justice.

In traditional societies, decorations and rewards; punishment and redemption; and

writing a new history book were routine procedures in the changes of royal dynasties or

political powers. But in modern societies, public power is often exercised in a

systematic and even secretive manner, as we went through full-scale wars, coups and

revolutions. Public power also tends to rarely admit its wrongdoings. Therefore, fact-

finding activities take precedence over rewards or punishment.

Even in modern societies, the nature and scope of the liquidation can vary depending on

who is controlling the process. It can proceed in the form of retaliation through rulings

by a kangaroo court and "street justice" or "blanket amnesty"as demonstrated in Spain

where past wrongdoings were characterized as completely political mishaps and those

involved went unpunished. With no doubt, however, every attempt to liquidate the past

is a political behavior to a certain extent, which is often influenced by the current

structure of political power. It is also likely to face countless difficulties and even end

in failure, since old power dies hard in any society, exercising strong socio-political

influence and resisting vehemently to what they consider any attempt threatening their

vested rights.

Although liquidation of the past includes setting the history straight, it should be clearly

distinguished from the simple "interpretation of the history". With legal mandate, the

former is an effort to bring the violations of human rights by the previous governments

to light, disclose who committed such violations in what context, confirm the damages,


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and provide appropriate compensations. By contrast, the latter or history review is

designed to shed new light on some previously uncovered aspects of what happened and

suggest where we should go now from here, under the premise that we all know thetruth. Currently, the Grand National Party is claiming that independent research

institutes should lead the efforts of liquidating the past. This is nothing but an attempt

to reduce the liquidation of thepast to historical interpretation, on the pretext that a

liquidation process should not be tied together with political interests. By nature, the

liquidation of the past deals with crimes committed by previous governments or public

power. If investigation ofthe alleged violations of law by government institutions or

employees is not allowed; if the access to vital information is denied; if the confession

of those involved in wrongdoings cannot be induced; or if the disclosure of damages byvictims cannot be encouraged, there is virtually nothing can be done by those

independent historians.

The liquidation of the past is divided into individual and institutional liquidation.

Individual liquidation means punishing the wrongdoers or forcing them to step down

from influential positions, whereas institutional liquidation is associated with

transforming the settings that allowed wrongdoings to take place. With its strong

ethical tradition, Korea has a tendency to favor the first form of liquidation. It is irony,

however, that little progress has been made in the fact-finding and the reform of the

relevant laws and institutions in relation to the Gwangju Democratic Movement, the

civil uprising on 18 May 1980, even after former presidents were jailed for their crimes

during presidency. Actually, we may repeat such a practice in the future, unless we

repeal the National Security Law and other laws and institutions that have justified the

wrongdoings of public power and that have even promoted inter-Korean animosity and

national division. Although an emphasis on institutional frameworks may dilute the

accountability of individuals, it will prevent us from turning a blind eye to a reality

where individuals are often weak as a mere cog of the political machine. Indeed, the

unwavering commitment to the transformation of institutions and social environment

will make the liquidation a forward-looking process, promise a future with hope and

vision to the public, and ensure national unity.

2. Why is it important?


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A failure to change the conditions that enabled improper exercise of state power,

remove its direct cause, or bring the wrongdoers to justice may lead to the recurringcrimes by public power or emotionally-charged retaliation by victims. Of course, such

retaliation is far from resolving the real issue and can make it even worse. Social

reconciliationand integration will be attained only when people responsible for past

government wrongs are identified and take the consequences.

A course of action ranging from fact-finding, punishment and restoring one's honor to

redemption and compensation helps us to set the direction to move towards as a nation.

It is also considered a state-led public education process. If a political group controlsthis process according to their interests, it could be dangerous. The setback of the 1949

Special Committee on Pro-Japanese Collaborators is a good example. When the

Committee's effort to investigate those who collaborated with the colonial government

ended without avail, a widely shared notion was that even traitors would be forgiven if

they were anti-communist and that any behaviors would be acceptable if they were

based on anti-communism.

Leaning toward the right, German society is witnessing the neo Nazi group emerging.

But it will not happen again for Germany to invade its European neighbors, because this

country had a successful closure of the Nazi era through the trials of the major war

criminals. Japan, however, has followed a different path since 1945: the country has

restored its emperor system, punished no war criminals, and denied any wrongdoings

during its colonial rule. It does explain Tokyo's renewed shift to the right of the

political spectrum. Europe is moving towards integration, while East Asia is facing the

challenges of arms race and the rise of nationalism. This striking difference between the

two regions results from what they did to redress their past crimes. As the failure of the

1949 Special Committee defines the political and ideological landscape of Korea's

modern history, the present of Germany and Japan is also affected by their liquidation of

the past represented by their different treatment of war criminals.

If war or state-inflicted violenceis put to an end only when the international community

or a domestic political group embraces a new order without war or conflict, bringing

wrongdoers to justice will make just a starting point. Efforts to redress past government

wrongs are essential to break the vicious cycle of recurrence of such incidents and


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retaliation. But more important is a solid commitment to overcoming conflicts within a

country or between countries, which will lead to permanent peace.

A society where the rule of justice is not honored in the exercise of public power will

end up being disintegrated. A person does not turn into a thief only because of poverty.

It is when there is nobody being held accountable for any wrongs and the definition of

justice cannot be established that people will let their instincts govern their behaviors. It

is hard to develop a constructive interpersonal relationship in society where the victims

of politicalviolence can neither publicly discuss what they sustained nor identify who is

responsible for it. Therefore, justice that will be realized through a fact-finding mission

will ward off social disintegration.

As rightly pointed out in the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee of South

Africa, careful investigation of the human rights violations of government agencies or

employees is not condemning the evil or dealing with some psychological issues.

Instead, it should help people know what difference exists in the views of wrongdoers

and victims, and understand the impacts of various factors such as ideological or

political conditions (Cold War, anti-colonialism, and racism), peer pressureparalyzing

ethical judgment, internalization of the prevailing values within a group, and

contribution of languages dehumanizing others.

In the fact-finding activities, the process is as important as the goals. When state-

inflictedviolence and past government wrongdoings as well as damages and sufferings

of victims are disclosed, members of society will be able to share the victims' feelings

and understand what caused such tragic incidents. In this process, other members of

society will also have a time for reflection on their indifference and fear. Unlike other

illnesses, social illness can be healed with truth and justice. Without going though such

a healing process, society may seem working properly on the surface. But it is like a

seemingly healthy person with a mental illness. Social health will collapse when the

laws, norms, and ethical codes underpinning a society do not play their roles.

Forgiveness should be highly valued but it should be justified only after appropriate

fact-finding. You cannot simply forgive anybody without knowing who did what.

3. Definition of "the past"


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The scope of the liquidation of the past is, in principle, limited to redressing

governmentwrongdoings that occurred after the establishment of the moderngovernment on August 15, 1948. The government of the Republic of Korea should be

held accountable for state-inflicted violence, massacres, torture, and suspicious deaths

that have since taken place. But it could become a daunting task because of complex

issues in our modern history. Moreover, we cannot completely ignore what happened

before 1948 inthe liquidation process in consideration of the mission of a state.

First of all, forced labor and pro-Japanese collaborators were products of the political

circumstances where national sovereignty was lost and responsible public power wasinexistent. But from the point of view of an independent nation-state wishing to

overcome the legacy of the Japanese colonial rule, it is a right thing to do to closely

examine what was done in the past and ask for reparations. Unfortunately, however,

these tasks were put on a back burner in Korea, because of national division, military

rules and pro-growth policies.

Investigation of pro-Japanese collaborators is an essential element of redressing the

past, but it remains incomplete, sincemany of those collaborators joined the power elite

after liberation. If it were sixty years ago, they should be punished for their

collaboration with the forces of imperialism and fascism. But today many of those

involved already died, and the damages they caused would be considered affecting the

country and the people as a whole rather than particular individuals. Therefore, we

should first reveal who played an active role in the anti-democratic and anti-human

rights colonial government and then examine the serious consequences of their acts

from the historical perspective.

Civilian victims of various incidents occurring before and after the 1950 Korean War

constitute the next subject we should address in the liquidation effort. In this case, we

should focus on getting to the bottom of killings of civilians and other atrocities done by

soldiers, law enforcement officers, and para-military groups during the time period.

Since fact-finding works have been completed for several incidents, we now need to

consolidate these works. Investigation should be conducted carefully, because we are

dealing with a special wartime situation. What we should do now is to establish what

happened according to the 5 W's and 1 H rule and prepare a mechanism designed to


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prevent similar incidents from happening when war or armed conflict breaks out on the

Korean peninsula.

The last subject in the liquidation of the past is very complicated: the redress for the

wrongdoings of the past military governments. Falling under thiscategory are a number

of cases examined by the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths,

apparently government-concocted spy cases, and some cases for which the relevant law

enforcement processes seemed suspicious, even though they went through a legal

procedure. Unlike the previous two categories, this will focus on the activities of

various public security agencies and the roles of their employees. The work for the

1980 Gwangju Democratic Movement has been almost completed, while the cases of suspicious deaths in association with democratic movement in the 1980's require

additional investigation. The investigation of suspicious deaths should be expanded in

its coverage to include other incidents that are not related to democratic movement.

Violence of military governments is, by nature, directly linked to the present power

structure and governance. Investigation of such cases is destined to face strong

resistance from wrongdoers who are still alive and incumbent officials. Nevertheless,

redressing the past is critical to redefine the role of public security agencies as guardians

ofcitizens and help democracy to take root in Korean society.

In sum, redressing past government wrongs should focus on the damages caused by

anti-human rights and inhuman exercise of public power. Accordingly, any incidents

requiring just history review or judgment should not be subjectto the liquidation

process. The priorities are incidents where one can establish a direct link to the

damages, and circumstantial evidences were uncovered to a certain extent. The time

scope will range from the late 1860's to early 1990's. However, the oppression on Dong

Hak, the home-grown religion in the 19th century, is likely to become a subject of

academic research, while the abuse of public power after military governments can be

examined by the National Human Rights Commission. As a result, the practical scope

is believed to be from 1905, when Korea lost diplomatic authority to Japan, through

1992, which marks the end of military governments. One thing should be noted here is

that we need to seek cooperation of Japan and the United States to gain necessary

information for fact-finding in relation to the incidents during the Japanese colonial rule

and the war years. In addition, public power abuse occurred during the US military rule

raises a difficult question of how to deal with it, because Korea had no sovereignty at

that time. Likewise, civilian massacres by the North Korean or Chinese army during


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the Korean War may also become a subject of the liquidation process, but we do not

have the necessary data and the Korean government wasnot directly responsible for

those incidents. Therefore, we should start by studying the size and status of damagesthrough the data we can obtain in Korea or the testimonies of survivors before

launching the full-fledged investigation in collaboration with relevant countries.

4. Steps and rules for the liquidation of the past

As we often found in the fact-finding for suspicious deaths, a fact-finding cannot

achieve its goal of uncovering what is really behind particular cases when we just

identify the isolated incident and the person(s) responsible for the death, and stop shortof examining and confirming social conditions that had caused the death. In this case,

to what extent a person should be punished for his/her behavior is a controversial issue.

Indeed, the question of punishment remains the subject of a heated debate. Lower-level

officials often took a particular action by order ortacit consent of their superiors, who in

turn had to consider circumstances or political conditions. For this reason, some people

will say they are not guilty even though their behaviors caused deaths and loss of

assets. Nevertheless, people who did notfollow any orders and committed crimes on

their own should be punished. We should also continue to find out who was

masterminding particular cases. Because of the political nature of the liquidation

process, punishment should be minimized even if a case can still be prosecutedas it is

within the applicable statute of limitation. This rule should be applied especially when

it is very unlikely that the wrongdoers will be involved in similar incidents. Actually,

most bills now before the parliament do not require punishment of those involved in

past government wrongdoings. Compared to punishment followed by a pardon, "social

punishment" through a fact-finding process is more desirable. We should not let the

question of punishment trigger conflict among members of political community.

Restoring the honor of victims cannot be postponed. We should make sure that there is

nobody who suffers for the whole lifeand receives unfair treatment because he/she was

branded as a spy or leftist.

Reparation is a touchy subject. Material compensation is the best means to placate

victims when the government had to admit its wrongdoings. But the political power

lacking legitimacy tends to make a compromise with victims using reparations and


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compensations in return for their approval of ceasing fact-finding effort. This will make

victims question the equity in the reparation process and have conflict with each other.

Therefore, we should make sure that fact-finding comes before reparation andcompensation, and if reparation at the individual level is necessary before the fact-

finding, the exception needs to be allowed only for those with no income to cover their

medical care or other social security expenses.

History education and commemoration projects are the last set of tasks in the liquidation

of the past.History education is important, because one of the best ways to prevent past

government wrongdoings from happening again is helping members of society

recognize the injustice in our history and raise awareness of history. In commemoration projects, equity and continuity are essential elements. Projects without theses two

elements can be counterproductive. If we do not want to reduce such projects to just a

ceremonial event, we should keep in mind the followingrules. First, these projects

should be free from any political interest. Second, a communication channel should be

established between organizers of different projects so that they can exchange views and

share the vision and contents of their projects. And third, a centralized coordination

body is necessary. Coordinators of commemoration projects should keep abreast of the

current social agendaand invite experts in the private sector to participate in planning

and operation in order to develop substantive and useful projects.

Some aspects of the liquidation process are also involved with academic interpretation

and assessment. For example, the contents of the bills on pro-Japanese collaborators

and reparation for democratic movement may change in accordance with the result of

on-going history review. Thus, these bills should be fully reflecting the viewsof the

academic circle and based on social consensus. Details of the reparation bill are still not

decided, because consensus has not been reached yet among experts on the definition of

authoritarian rule and democratic movement against it. Likewise, the debate on the

collaborator bill is still under way, because we have just started discussion on how to

define pro-Japanese collaboration and democratization in Korea, topics overshadowed

for a long time by anti-communism and pro-growth mentality. Similarly, theApril 3

Jeju Uprising has not been properly defined as yet, even though the fact-finding

committee completed its job. It is important to maintain a balanced view in this

academic interpretation and assessment, because both too much negative andpositive

views run counter to the spirit of the liquidation process.


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Historically, there are two models of liquidation of the past: victors punishing losers in

Nuremberg Trials vs. truth and reconciliation in South Africa. The Presidential Truth

Commission on Suspicious Deaths in Korea is closer to the South African model in itsexperience, but it also does not exclude the possibility of punishment. Ifwe successfully

undertake comprehensive liquidation of the past, it will be something unprecedented in

the world. The issues of pro-Japanese collaboration and reparation for pro-democracy

movement require history review and interpretation. But many issues are involved with

incidents happened a long time ago and suspicious cases, so we need to focus on fact-

finding, restoring victims' honor, and setting the history straight rather than legal and

political punishment, where our process is different from that of other countries. In

short, the liquidation of the past in Korea will invest maximum resources in fact-findingand restoring victims' honor; exclude punishment; and use conservative guidelines for

reparation in order to strengthen national unity and reconciliation.

5. Participants and organization

Participants in the liquidation process will decide the direction of the task. Opposition

parties are opposing a process led by the incumbent government and instead proposing

that independent figures from the private sector should participate in the process. As I

mentioned earlier, if victims lead the liquidation of the past, it is very likely that they

will act out of personal grudge. If wrongdoers themselves or people who share the

same interests with them lead or influence the process, the liquidation itself will fail.

For example, the attempt to punish the person who issued a shooting order at the April

19 Uprising failed; and the fact-finding committee for April 3 Jeju Uprising had to delay

or even suspend its investigation because of members with the military background did

not cooperate.Consequently, there is a danger of nullifying or reducing the effect of the

liquidation process if the two groups with conflicting interests participate in the

process. So opposition parties have a reason to oppose the participation of the

incumbent government.

The dilemma is that liquidation of the past cannot proceed effectively without the help

of the political power. If an independent organization is the major player in the

liquidation process, their decisions will have no legally binding force and the outcome

is limited to the ethical aspect of the liquidation or historical assessment. It may sound

rational to say that the liquidation of the past should be led by independent figures, but

they will find ultimately that there is nothing much they can do.


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Then, what should we do now? First, legal framework can be formulated through

bipartisan effort; and an independent committee where the public is well-representedwill coordinate the plans and monitor a series of steps in the liquidation process so that

they can serve the great cause.

The Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths is a good precedent of such a

partnership between the public and private sector. But private sector involvement has

been recently constrainedafter conservative newspapers attacked some members of the

Commission, revealing their past record of spy charges. It is very dangerous to

determine the membership of the Commission by an agreement between political parties. We should not also allow people who have negative views on the issue of

suspicious deaths to join the Commission. The best candidate will be a person who has

firm commitment to the cause of the Commission and strong conviction not swayed by

either victims or wrongdoers.

Many people have noted the problem of overlapping organizations for the liquidation of

the past. If possible, it will be more desirable to establish a single body to address the

liquidation issue. If it is not possible, then a higher-level committee should be set up

and coordinate the activities of a number of sub-committees. The objective of the

committee will be to prevent wrongdoers from disturbing the liquidation process, to put

a proper limit on the demands of victims, and to ensure forward-looking liquidation of

the past from the perspective of the public. Members and investigators need to be

recruited in a transparent manner, and information on every activity should be made

publicly available. This is an ad-hoc committee working for a certain period of time, so

any unfinished job after the period should be passed on to other organizations. Once the

fact-finding, which is the major role of the committee, is completed, the rest of the work

will be left up to the academic community, and history review and awareness programs

will be launched.

Separatism here is used in the sense of a movement for the creation of a fully

independent state.


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Chad; Democratic Republic of Congo (Banyamulenge); Cyprus; France (New

Caledonia); India (Nagaland); Indonesia (Aceh); Indonesia (Kalimantan); Iraq (Kurds,

Shia); Italy (South Tyrol); Lebanon (Muslims); Macedonia (Albanians); Mexico(Chiapas); Moldova (Transdniestr); Myanmar (Chin/Zomis, Kachins, Karens, Karenni,

Mons, Wa); Niger (Tuaregs); Pakistan (East Pakistan/Bangladesh); Philippines (Moros);

Rhodesia; South Africa (during apartheid regime); Spain (Basques); Sri Lanka (Tamils);

Sudan (South); Turkey (Kurds); United Kingdom (Northern Ireland); and Yugoslavia

(Kosovo).

Eritrea, Palestine, West Papua, East Timor and the Western Sahara. The 1998

International Conference of Experts organised in Barcelona by UNESCO Division of Human Rights Democracy and Peace UNESCO Centre of Catalonia on the

implementation of the right of self-determination as a contribution to conflict prevention

proposed the following understanding of self-determination: an ongoing process of

choice for the achievement of human security and fulfillment of human needs with a

broad scope of possible outcomes and expressions suited to different specific situations.

These can include, but are not limited to, guarantees of cultural security, forms of self-

governance and autonomy, economic self-reliance, effective participation at the

international level, land rights and the ability to care for the natural environment,

spiritual freedom and the various forms that ensure the free expression and protection of

collective identity in dignity. Such an understanding is not however the same as the

right of self-determination from a legal, international perspective, where it is much

more limited in scope, and being traditionally viewed as limited to the entire population

(a people for the purposes of international law) of an existing state or non-self-

governing territory. See for example Rosalyn Higgins, Postmodern Tribalism and the

Right to Secession, in Peoples and Minorities in International Law, C. Brlman, R.

Lefeber, M. Zieck (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1993.

Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination

Movements, and Democracy , Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, Center for

International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland. Also

available online at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/peace_and_conflict_2003.asp

It should be pointed out that although it is normally members of an ethnic, religious or

linguistic majority who control the state machinery and can therefore see their own

language, religion or culture reflected or favoured in the operations of the state, there


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are in modem times well-known examples of a minority being politically dominant. The

political exclusion of the non-white majority in apartheid South Africa is perhaps the

most well-known. The subsequent preferences of the State for white languages and thewhite race had the effect of excluding or marginalising most non-white South Africans

from a variety of employment opportunities and levels of power within an otherwise

modern state structure. Not entitled to full citizenship, most South Africans were

politically excluded in a state that was overtly non-neutral to an extreme degree. In fact,

what occurred was the almost complete exclusion of the majority of the population from

effective participation and representation in the public life of the State. It should

nevertheless be added that there is nothing in international human rights to prevent a

state from privileging the cultural, religious or linguistic preferences of the State (and itsethnic, religious or linguistic majority). In other words, human rights do not in

themselves have the effect of automatically prohibiting such preferences, subject to one

major proviso: no cultural, religious or linguistic preferences are permissible in

international law if they amount to a violation of fundamental human rights such as

freedom of religion, nondiscrimination, etc.

Among possible exceptions one can mention the Mohajirs in Pakistan and the

Banyamulenge in the Democratic Republic of Congo, although one could argue that the

presence of the Banyamulenge is actually quite long-standing. In both cases the

minorities involved are very substantial.

Young, Crawford, "Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: An Overview", Occasional

Paper No. 8, World Summit for Social Development, UNRISD, 1994.

What constitutes discrimination under international treaties should be explained briefly.

Contrary to popular misconceptions, not all distinctions on the ground of religion,

language, race and other characteristics are prohibited in international human rights

treaties. While there is slightly different wording used in various decisional bodies such

as the European Court of Human Rights or the United Nations Human Rights

Committee, among others, the general approach is largely the same: for example, a

states religious, linguistic or racial preferences which have the effect of denying to,

excluding or disadvantaging individuals because of their religion, language or race

would be deemed discriminatory only if it is pursued for an illegitimate purpose, or is in

the circumstances unjustified or disproportionate to the objectives sought. Thus, the

United Nations Human Rights Committee concluded that the exclusive use of English

as the only language permitted under the Namibian Constitution and legislation was


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discriminatory in not permitting the use of Afrikaans by local administrative authorities,

and a breach of Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in

the absence of any reasonable justification for such an exclusive language preference(UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 760/1997, Diergaardt v Namibia ,

views of 25 July 2000). For a more detailed look as to what constitutes discrimination in

international law, see de Varennes, Fernand, Language, Minorities and Human

Rights , Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996, chapter 4.

Indonesia and a number of other states where ethnic conflicts erupted had policies by

which large numbers of individuals were transferred, usually, from more populous part

of the country to less densely inhabited areas. Sometimes presented as steps to assist the

development of less advanced regions, these policies often had disastrous consequences,as they generally meant that members of the ethnic or religious majority, with

government support, swamped areas to such as extent that local population, usually

indigenous, would lose ownership and use of traditional lands, often without appropriate

compensation in any. Additionally, the economic benefits associated with these

transmigration population movements within a state seldom flowed to the minority or

indigenous populations which were gradually marginalised.

Closely linked, though not always to transmigration programmes are state policies

which, in the name of development, nationalises or extinguishes traditional resources

uses or rights of minorities and indigenous populations. In Kalimantan, for example, the

Government of Indonesia effectively extinguished the traditional customary rights of the

indigenous Dayaks and others in order to grant vast land-holdings to corporations

involved in rice, oil palm and rubber plantations. This re-allocation of natural resources

also had a clearly discriminatory impact on the basis of ethnic origins or even race, in

the sense that the beneficiaries of these resource policies were almost always Javanese

or others linked to them, whilst the Dayaks for their part usually lost any legal title or

use of traditional resources and land.

Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova,

Myanmar, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Rhodesia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,

Sudan, Turkey, Yugoslavia

Chad, France, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Niger,

Philippines, Rhodesia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey.


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Chad, Congo, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Niger, Rhodesia, South Africa, Sudan,

United Kingdom

Cyprus, Eritrea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Myanmar, Philippines, Spain, Sudan,

Yugoslavia

Eritrea, Indonesia, Israel, Morocco

David Little, "Belief, Ethnicity and Human Rights", 1996, U.S. Institute of Peace

France (New Caledonia), India (Nagaland), Indonesia (Aceh), Italy (South Tyrol),

Mexico (Chiapas), Philippines (Moros), Spain (Basques), Sudan (Southern minorities),United Kingdom (Northern Ireland).

Eritrea, East Timor, East Pakistan (Bangladesh)

Cyprus, Moldova, Yugoslavia

See generally Christine Bell (2001), Peace Agreements and Human Rights, Oxford

University Press, Oxford.

This has occurred for example at various times in Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq,

Israel, Morocco, Myanmar, Philippines, Rhodesia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, and the

United Kingdom

There is of course always the argument that its the other side which failed first, as

shown in the recent travails of the Belfast (Good Friday) Peace Agreement. For the

purposes of this chapter, I have considered whether there has been a breach of the actual

commitments contained in an agreement, instead of the spirit of a text or some other

claimed misbehavior.

Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, Sri Lanka,

Sudan, United Kingdom

Most peace agreements, at least in the immediate, dramatically lower the level of

intensity in most of the cases observed (especially Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq,

Israel, Morocco, Philippines, Rhodesia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan and the United

Kingdom.

The human rights of minorities are fairly well elaborated in documents such as the UN

Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or


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Linguistic Minorities, the Framework Convention on the Protection of National

Minorities; the Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National

Minorities, the The Hague Recommendations regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities, and the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of

National Minorities in Public Life. They provide guidance as to the linguistic, religious

and cultural elements in state practices that have to be understood and in some cases

tempered in order to find that necessary balance to prevent ethnic conflicts. See also

generally on the issue of the use of language by state authorities de Varennes, Fernand

(1996), Language, Minorities and Human Rights, Kluwer Law International, The

Hague.

Fernand, could you mention the organizations that authored these documents and

provide references to each of the documents?

UN Doc. A/47/277, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and

peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by

the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992.

Civil Society, NGOs, and Social Movement


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(Presentation Notes)

Francis Daehoon Lee November 2005

Gwangju, May-18 Foundation

Civil Society

The idea of civil society often comes as a part of modern liberal thoughts: society of

free and equal individuals and the state protecting this freedom. Civil society is

understood as a space where citizens voluntarily form communities and express their diverse interests, very often in conflictual ways. In a democratic polity, civil society is

understood as a space fairly independent of the state and the market. In general, actors

in civil society engage with state agencies in different ways resisting, conceding or

collaborating. The state in its part tries to repress, persuade or mediate civil society

actors. State-civil society relationship depends on the kind of organisation and the kind

of issues a particular organisation raises.

In South Korea, awareness and discussion on civil society began to flourish since the

democratisation that roughly started in 1987. Civic groups began to describe themselves

as non-governmental and non-profit organisations. This reflects the change of the nature

of the state (from authoritarian to liberal, roughly) and the efforts of large number of

popular groups to enlarge spaces of life-world independent of the state intervention.

This change also leads to a changed relationship between the two sides.

Civil society is both a political community in the larger sense of politics, as well as a

space where economic and others conflicts express themselves. In other words,

communities formed in civil society are not homogeneous and are often in conflict,

henceforth creating constant state of hegemonic competition. This competition is

basically about what is and how to reach a better justice for larger groups of people.

Therefore, civil society-state relationship cannot be homogeneous in a country either.

Ideally, the more democratic a country is, such relationship, internal conflicts, and ways

of popular participation in larger politics are the more diverse. In the case of South

Korea, certain factors create push effects for civil society dynamism. One of them is

limited liberalisation of the institutional politics meaning the parliament does not


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sufficiently represent diverse civil society demands and therefore other ways of

representation is on demand.

However, there are critical issues to think about here. What are the essential freedoms in

the idea of free individuals. Usually it refers to liberal citizenship and market rules

(freedom in the market). An interesting reflection comes from the history of translation

of civil society along with that of civilisation in East Asia: civil in , ,

, for example. Other references are also useful:

- Marx: civil society = bourgeois society: a space class struggle

- Gramsci: State-civil society-market, space of hegemonic struggle (competitionfor consensus on the political and economic legitimacy)

- Harbermas: State (public authority) civil society (economics, labour, family

individual interest) public sphere (communications beyond individual interest)

NGOs (non-governmental organisations)

There are many names calling civic groups: non-governmental, voluntary, non-profit,

civil society, peoples, grassroots, organisations, etc.: NGOs, VOs, NPOs, CSOs, POs.

The attributes given to such groups also vary: social movement (traditional and new),

voluntary, autonomous, non-partisan or politically neutral, non-profitable, issue-

advocacy, public-good-oriented, service-delivery, revolutionary, etc. The origin of the

name NGO comes from a UN usage keeping central role for governments and

having non-governmental groups as subsidiary participants. Deeper understanding of

civil society dynamics always require an analysis of social movements, probing into

how activists are recruited, how people are mobilised, how groups are connected, what

issues gain public attention, how they contribute to social and political transformation,

etc.

In South Korea, the name NGOs become fashionable since late 1980s, coinciding

with the start of political liberalisation and diversification of social movements. Some

critiques say there are tension and difference between NGOs and POs. Many debates

run around some common questions:

- Are NGOs a way of liberal cooptation to the system, different from more

critical, resistant types of social movements?


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- Does democratisation create better ground for NGO activism and diversity?

- Do NGOs always work for public good? Is there a good distinction between

public good and collective self-interest?- Should NGO activities always be legal, non-partisan (neutral), ethical, non-

state? How far can NGOs participate in politics or work with government?

- How can diverse civic groups form solidarity over difference in values and

ideologies, etc (networking, alliance, front, issue coalition)?

- In view of growing global injustice (global market economy, inequality,

conflicts, ecological degradation), how can NGOs work in a way conducive to

global governance or global civil society?

Civil Society and Democratisation, Korea

Since 1945, the history of South Korea has been marred by the misery of the national

division and the war, the terror and suffocation of democracy inflicted by dictatorial rule

of authoritarian and fascist state. On the other hand, it is also a history of peoples strife

to restore human dignity in opposition to state violence and rule of dictators history of

peoples resistance to all sorts of oppression, exploitation, discrimination and

marginalisation, and struggle for deeper and wider democracy. In the process, major

political crises were created roughly in a ten-year cycle. With the political breakthrough

made in 1987, the country entered a transition period towards democracy. The transition

itself also contained tensions, conflicts and struggles at various levels in the process of

reforming and transforming the old system.

The democracy of South Korea unfolded in dynamic interactions among state, political

society and social movements, but the fundamental force moving it forward was the

movement from below. Democracy, in both its formation and progress, was possible

because there was a strong movement driving it forward. In the sense that democratic

restoration and progress come along with democratic rearrangement of the relationships

among state, political society and civil society, such a rearrangement was possible in

South Korea because there was continuously a strong driving force. A more systematic

understanding of democracy invites one to look at a democratic transition of a country

beyond an individual event of change from an authoritarian or military regime to a

civilian or elected government, and to look at democratisation movement beyond

popular struggles against dictatorship or for institutional democratisation of the state. In

the same token, the history of democratisation in Korea is to be seen as a macro-


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historical process that unfolded since the national liberation with repeated upward and

downward dynamics, and where wider range of movements coexisted and interacted

with each other for socio-economic democracy, producer-oriented democracy or democracy in the life-world.

NGOs, Market, and State

NGOs differ in their view and relationship to capitalist market economy. This is in

relation to questions such as inequality and conflict created in civil society by

capitalism, the role and limits of welfare states, neo-liberal globalisation logic, and ways

of redistribution of wealth. Understanding of capitalism is one of the key factorsdistinguishing NGO behaviour. Therefore, different views affect different NGOs in their

actions towards corporations. Most highlighted issues have been wage, working

conditions, participation to management, environment, gender, taxation and corporate

re-structuring. Corporations also make diverse relationship with NGOs

confrontational, consultative, co-opting, or even supporting through various funding

schemes.

In a democratic society, the state-NGO relationship is complex, differing from that in a

non-democratic society. It can be confrontational, cooperative, or co-opted. In some

countries, state totally dominates over civil society. It is difficult to generalise on what is

the state of maturity in civil society development or NGO development. In general,

most social issues taken up by NGOs have political effect and affect state behaviour.

NGOs and state agency often compete for state identity and legitimacy. In the process,

some NGOs work with political parties, even though NGOs usually refer to civic

groups not directly participating in electoral parties. Green parties and environmental

groups is one example. When there is a long tradition of corruption and nepotism in

party politics, NGOs close relationship with parties are not legitimised. In a transitional

society, NGO activities are more often politically interpreted as they clash with

formation of a new state identity and legitimacy.

Recently economic globalisation is creating huge challenge to NGO activities across

national borders. Large scale anti-globalisation demonstrations and regional and global

forums such the World Social Forum reflect this. The trend cannot be simplified to

internationalisation of NGO activism or formation of global civil society. As civil


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society and democracy have been bound by nation-state thinking, the challenge of

neo-liberal globalisation forces NGOs to re-think of their origin nation-state and

nationalism and devise alternatives to globalised capitalism through trans-border solidarity links. Formation of regional and global solidarity linkage is an enormous task

for anyone given the diversity of NGOs and all the cultural and technical difficulties.

Peace and justice now come under a new light in this respect what is justice for

peoples who live apart around the world when globalised capitalism serves only top

minorities so-well connected and backed by use of the most destructive power (the US

military).

Complex Interaction: Example of NGO-GO interaction in Human Rights Regime

- The types of human rights stipulated in international human rights laws

- The common features in the international human rights laws: individual rights,

intl monitoring and cooperation, domestic effect

- The components of international human rights regimes: norms, institutions,

procedures, actors

- What sustains the intl HR regimes?: Interdependence of nation-states,

legitimacy of the UN, practical procedures, non-governmental organisations,

power of liberal thoughts sanction of shame.

- Key norms (declarations, covenants, conventions, treaties; sometimes called

instruments) and institutions (the UN, regional, national)

- Key procedures of the UNCHR:

* 1235 procedure (open discussion) chairs statement, report, resolution,

special rapporteur, technical cooperation and advisory services, recommended

sanction to the UN Security Council.

* 1503 procedure (confidential review) communications, working group

review, report, pass to 1235 procedure.

Some Examples: local and regional NGOs

PSPD Peoples Solidarity for Participatory Democracy

ARENA Asia Regional Exchange for New Alternatives

GPPAC process Global Partnership for Prevention of Armed Conflict


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Exercise 3: The View of (Some) Experts on Violent Conflicts within States and

What should be done

1. Material Used for Discussions:

Extracts from various reports on violence in (mainly) Asian States.

2. Objectives:

To identify and critique the basis of violence in states according to a number of

reports/experts. Though the causes are of course many in any situation, the object

here is to point out some of the most prevalent in Asia (and elsewhere) and to single

out the ideology or commonalities involved in many of these conflicts.

Please note also that there is no consensus among experts on many of these issues,

and the extracts here are necessarily selective.

3. Method:

Each participant will be asked to:


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o Comment on one extract and indicate whether the point(s) made appear

consistent with what has been observed during this seminar

o Indicate in relation to his/her own experiences or observations thestrengths/weaknesses of the argument(s) made

o Suggest what should be done to address the causes of violent conflicts in

states


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MATERIAL FOR EXERCISE 3

1. PHILIPPINES: For hundreds of years, the government of Spain and then the

government of the Philippines had by decree or laws sent invaders, abolished the

laws of the Moros, expropriated much of their land, refused to use officially

their language, tried to discourage them in their Islamic practices, forced their

children to go to schools often controlled by Christians, etc.

2. SUDAN: The attempts of the north not only to define the identity [of Sudan] as

Arab and Islamic, but to structure and stratify the life and role of citizens along

those lines [has been an underlying cause of the civil war] Some northerners

sincerely feel that Sudan can only be united through religious and cultural

uniformity, and have therefore supported efforts to Islamise the south Far

from achieving the desired unity, however, the result has been continued civil

war.

3. MYANMAR (BURMA): At first, the special position of Buddhism was

recognised [in Burma], but in 1961 this equivocal phrasing was repealed by a

State Religion Act that made Buddhism the official religion. The Act required

the Public Service Commission, in recruiting candidates for government

employment, to accord the same weight to a knowledge of Pali, the liturgical

language, as to other subjects, a provision which reflected the careerist

motivation of some proponents. But the main support for the state religion


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movement came from the countryside, a fact which cannot be explained without

reference to the significance of the state religion as a symbol of Burman

hegemony. This is precisely the way it was interpreted by minorities, especially

the Kachins and Chins.

4. Most conflicts find their causes in the actions of government: the State and its

institutions are seen as acting against the interests of an ethnic group (by

discriminating, expropriating land, not giving jobs, causing poverty).

5. Rodolpho Stavenhagen, pp. 80-81: Ethnic conflicts generally involve a clash of

interests or a struggle over rights: rights to land, to education, to the use of

language, to political representation, to freedom of religion, to the preservation

of ethnic identity, to autonomy, to self-determination, and so forth.

6. BANGLADESH: When the Pakistani Government declared that Urdu and only

Urdu would be the national language, a language that virtually no one knew,

the Bengalis decided that this was the last straw. The primacy given to Urdu

resulted in the creation of the Bangla Language Movement which rapidly

became a Bengali national movement and the real beginning of the move

towards independence. There were riots in Dhaka, and on 21 February 1952, 12

students were killed by the Pakistani army. The Awami League, led by Sheik

Mujibur Rahman, emerged as the national political party in Pakistan, and the

Language Movement became its ideological underpinning. During the 1960s the


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Awami League grew more powerful and instigated numerous protests against

domination by West Pakistan. The catastrophic cyclone of 1970 devastated East

Pakistan, killing some half a million people, and while foreign aid poured in, the

Pakistani government appeared to do little. Support for the Awami League

peaked and in the 1971 national elections it won 167 of the 313 seats, a clear

majority. In East Pakistan it won all the seats except one. Constitutionally the

Awami League should have formed the government of all Pakistan, but the

President postponed the opening of the National Assembly. Riots and hartals

(strikes) broke out in East Pakistan. At Chittagong, a clash between civilians and

soldiers left 55 Bengalis dead. When President Khan secretly returned to Wwest

Pakistan in March 1971 after talks with Sheik Mujib had failed, Sheik Mujib

was arrested and Pakistani troops went on a rampage throughout Eeast Pakistan,

burning down villages, looting shops and homes, and indiscrimiantely

slaughtering civilians. While estimates vary widely, probably close to a million

people died in the conflict. [21 February (Amar Ekushe Ntional Day of

Mourning) is a public holiday: it commemorates the students who succesfully

opposed the governments attempts to deny Bangla the status of state language.

On 21 February 1952 several students from the Language Movement were killed

and subsequently awarded martyr status].

7. DR NEELAN TIRUCHELVAM: In the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh,

Bengali immigration with state complicity has transformed the patterns of land

tenure and radically altered the demography of this area. Non-indigenous settlers


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now occupy most of the fertile land. A very large-scale hydro electric project has

also had a damaging impact on tribal land security. It resulted in the submerging

of almost 40 per cent of prime agricultural land and the displacing of almost

100,000 tribals, with no compensation for most of the persons affected. It is now

estimated that the non-tribal immigrants constitute almost 40 per cent of the

Chittagong Hill Tracts. The Bangladesh government has been accused of

carrying out a programme of systematic extermination of the indigenous

nationalities of the Chittagong Hill Tracts because they are ethnically,

religiously and culturally different from Muslim Bengalis.5 Although the

government recently appointed a national committee to re-evaluate its policies

towards the Chittagong Hill Tracts, issues relating to political autonomy over

areas traditionally occupied by the tribals, and questions relating to the legal

recognition of tribal land rights are yet to be resolved. Similar issues have arisen

with regard to transmigration programmes of the Indonesian government

whereby hundreds of thousands of Javanese were resettled with World Bank

assistance in less densely populated, ethnically distinct areas such as

Kalimantan, West Papua, and East Timor. Stavenhagen has pointed out that the

impact of these programmes on minorities and indigenous people has been

disastrous. In Sabah and Sarawak, concessions to logging companies and other

logging projects have had an adverse impact on traditional forest dwellers such

as Dayak and Anak Negeri communities.


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The NGOs as Global Actor: Myth or Reality?

Prof. Hae-Young Lee (Hanshin University)

I. Introduction

One of the peculiar trends in the nineties in the international political arena is

doubtlessly the NGOs. With the 1989/90 collapse of the so-called real existent socialism

was boastfully proclaimed the New World Order. The World-Capitalism has

successfully proved its viability once again. As a result, the 'Age of Extremes' (E.J.

Hobsbawm) seems to expire now and forever without knowing its successor. After ten

years of anxious hope are many people now conscious that the "Age of Extremes" is

ended irreversibly but the next century also has nothing to do with the "brave new

world". On the contrary the U.S. as a sole empire on the globe is continuing the

"imperial overstretch" (P. Kennedy). Only the "neo-feudal" international system has

substituted its antecedent. One imperial state assisted by the "knight" states such as G7

dominates the most countries. One used to say that after "September 11" everything has

changed utterly. However, the hard core of the age, in my view, has not changed at all.

Amidst fin de siecle pessimism had J. Habermas 1984 diagnosed our times as

follows :

The future is negatively cathected ; we see outlined on the threshold of the twenty-

first century the horrifying panorama of a worldwide threat to universal life

interests: the spiral of the arms race, the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons,


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the structural impoverishment of developing countries, problems of environmental

overload, and the nearly catastrophic operations of high technology are the

catchwords that have penetrated public consciousness by way of the mass media.... The situation may be objectively obscure. Obscurity is nonetheless also a

function of a society's assessment of its own readiness to take action. What is at

stake is Western culture's confidence in itself .1

On the one hand, the aftermath of "September 11" has reactivated the pessimism of

"new obscurity." On the other hand it may imply no other than a warning signal which

urges us to take measures. The "optimism of will" (A. Gramsci) could be justified above

all by the fact that in the nineties the NGOs have increased their capacities at theinternational as well as at the national level so dramatically that the national

governments can hardly hold the countervailing power of NGOs under control. The

international institutions such as WB, IMF, WTO must react to them by any means.

Moreover, they are often considered as a recognized actor of world politics and people

demand them to hold even more accountability and morals than the politicians. In the

national politics many assign them to take the role of the "fifth pillar" next to

legislature, executive, jurisdiction and media. One often says, "taking NGOs seriously."

The NGO-activists' catchphrase may be: "Together, we are superpower."

Despite success stories of NGOs in the nineties, there may be still many

unanswered questions for closer examination. For some critics, "NGOs are the most

overestimated actor of the nineties." 22 However, others forecast the "shift of power"

from states to NGOs. 33 There are good reasons for the critical review of previous global

activity of NGOs: as many contradictions and divergences as harmonies and

convergences exist between

- NGOs from the North and South

- "Moderate" and "radical" NGOs

- Lobbying-oriented and movement-oriented NGOs

- Rich and poor NGOs

- Large and small NGOs

- National and international NGOs1 ) J. Habermas (1989), The New Conservatism , MIT Press; Cambridge, pp.50-51.2 P. Wahl (1998), NGO Transnationals, McGreenpeace and the Network Guerrilla,(www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/issues/wahl.htm)3 ) Jessica Mathews, the head of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote that "the steady

concentration of power in the hands of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia, is over, at least for a while." See Economist, December 11-17, 1999.


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- "Occidental" and "oriental" NGOs

etc.

The list could last endlessly. Nevertheless, central in my paper is the next

problem: Could NGOs be a political alternative in the future? In other words, are they

politically capable enough to articulate a vision of global governance that re-regulates

the "disembedded" economy into world-society without world-government? If such

expectation seems to be unrealistic for the moment, then, is NGOs' future confined to

play a role of "checks and balances" in world politics, namely, the "junior-partner" of

senior players like states and international organizations? Is their role simply a moral

counterpart of corporate- or state-led international system in order to bridge the gap between the people and international organizations? Is herein an alternative project to

the present international order included? This essay wants to contribute to such a

discussion.

II. Globalization and the rise of NGOs in the nineties

Although NGOs have existed for a long time in history (in the early 1800s, the

British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society played an important role in abolishing the

slavery system), they have not established themselves as an independent international

factor until the 1990s. The NGOs in the new age are one of unintended consequences of

neo-liberal globalization.

Most imposing is above all their increase in number. The Yearbook of

International Organizations has counted on the rather conservative basis - that is, groups

with operations in more than one country - the number of international NGOs at more

than 26,000 today, up from 6,000 in 1990. 44 In addition, the U.N. now lists more than

3,000 NGOs. The World Watch Institute suggested that in the U.S. alone there are about

2 million NGOs, 70% of which are less than 30 years old. In Eastern Europe sprang up

between 1988 - 1995 more than 100,000 NGOs. The big international NGOs are

concentrated mostly in three main areas: human rights, development and the

environment. Also remarkable is the membership growth in these areas; for instance, the

Worldwide Fund for Nature now has around 5 million members, up from 570,000 in

1985, which doesn't need to be shy to compare to the population of small countries.

4 ) Ibid.


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All this is a historically unprecedented phenomenon. In form, the "NGO

swarm" is amorphous, linked each other "online", organized highly decentralized andacts "molecularly". The NGOs as a whole are, in short, not an organization in classical

sense, but a "net" itself.

As mentioned, the dramatic proliferation of NGOs was a reaction against the

neo-liberal globalization realized at the outset as an anti-crisis strategy in the advanced

capitalist countries since the 1970s. It is first of all the globalization of the economy.

The Transnational Corporations are one of its most enthusiastic protagonists. The neo-

liberal offensive enforced the reorganization of traditional nation-states as the'transmission belt' of world market. With the transition of such nation-states into the

neo-liberal "competition-states", as J. Hirsch conceptualized, was every realm of life

threatened to subordinate into the logic of market. The hegemony of "Neo-liberal

International" (P. Anderson) accelerated, for instance, the shifts of the alliance between

the labor and the industry capital, which characterize the "Golden Age" of postwar

capitalism, to that of industry and financial capital against the labor. But the key

problem lies no other than in the fatal unbalance between the globalized economy and

the nationally structured politics. As a consequence, it is inevitable to reactivate the

critical potentials installed in the civil society and to mobilize its resources to block the

neo-liberal offensive from inside as well as from outside.

The list of achievements by the NGOs over the past decade is quiet

encouraging:

- Promoting agreements on controlling greenhouse gases 1992

- "Fifty Years is Enough" campaign 1994

- Campaign to outlaw anti-personal land mines 1997

- Establish an international criminal court

- Numerous concerted actions to improve labor conditions in the South against

individual corporations such as Nike and to control the genetically modified

organisms (GMOs)

etc.

The protest movement against such international institutions as WTO, World

Bank, IMF and the temporarily failed MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment)


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belongs to the latest and most spectacular events in the nineties organized by

international NGOs. If the 1992 UN earth summit in Rio was the first turning-point in

the history of modern NGOs, where for the first time NGOs participated in the globaldecision-making process not as protester, the anti-MAI campaign could be estimated as

an epoch-making second turning-point. In this campaign the NGOs as "global player"

experimented new methods of movement, which is "possibly turning out to be an

alternative to the transnationalization of large NGOs that is quite problematic from a

democratic point of view" 55. From now on, the NGO movement gains another

dimension. The global political terrain changed radically: Seattle (November 1999),

Washington (April 2000) , Prague (September 2000), Quebec(April 2001),

Gothenburg(June 2001), Barcelona (June 2001), Genoa (July 2001), Washington(September 2001) and now Qatar (November 2001). As C. Fred Bergsten commented

April 1999, "the anti-globalization forces are now in the ascendancy."

Of course, it is not true to say that the failure of MAI-negotiations 66 was

exclusively due to the NGO protest. P. Wahl highlights three characteristics of anti-

MAI-campaign. First, this campaign has confronted initially not with the so-called "soft

issues" on the international agenda - like as environmental or development issues - but

with the "hard" economic issues. Secondly, the - limited - success of NGOs was "not

achieved by large, transnational NGOs, but by a lose network of both, i.e., small NGOs

together with some large, transnational NGOs." Lastly, "the campaign did not aim at

improving a project promoted by the government, but classified the agreement as part of

the globalization process and rejected it completely."

Furthermore, the experience of MAI campaign could be very useful as a

strategic framework for the future of NGOs:

"- With the issues of neo-liberalism and globalization, NGOs have picked out a

fundamental social problem as a central campaign issue and have overcome their

traditional single-issue projects.

- Refusing the MAI instead of "improving" it did not harm the image of the

campaign in the media.

- NGOs are politically successful when their issues move and mobilize the public.

- Loose networks turned out to be efficient; centralized and hierarchical structures5 ) See Wahl (1998), op.cit6

) For the detailed description and critique, see M. Barlow/ T. Clarke (1998), MAI: The Threat to American Freedom , New York: Stoddart.


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were not necessary, and would have possibly been counterproductive.

- Small and flexible NGOs played an important role." 77

With the anti-MAI campaign begins the trends to change. The "hard" issues

were imported into the international NGO community. The NGOs turn to the "high

politics" and the core international institutions. As results, there took place a process of

differentiation from inside. The anti-globalization movement has become an

indispensable component of international NGOs.

III. The Strategic Framework for NGOs in Relation to Globalization

With the ongoing differentiation in the international NGO community, inherent

differences and disparities among various NGOs are confirmed inevitably. One of

decisive diverging points may be related to the problem of how to deal with the

economic globalization. In another words, - as W. Bello said - "should we seek to

transform or to disable the main institutions of corporate-led globalization?" 88: in short,

"Reform or Disempowerment" of international institutions.

7 ) See Wahl (1998), op. cit.8

) W. Bello (2001), Toward a New System of Global Economic Governance, manuscript presented ata seminar organized by Munwha Ilbo, PSPD, Suh Sangdon Committee in Seoul, February 22.2001

Tendency Main Argument Key Institutions

GlobalJustice

Movements

Against globalization of capital(not people),for "people-centered

development"

social/labor movements;environment advocacy groups;

radical activist networks; regionaland national coalitions; leftwingthink-tanks; academic settings

Third World Nationalism

Join the system but on much fairer

terms

Self-selecting third world nation-States

Post-WashingtonConsensus

Reform "imperfectmarkets" & "sustainable

development"

Most United Nations agencies;governments of France and Japan

WashingtonConsensus

Slightly adjust the statusquo (transparency,

supervision & regulation

U.S. agencies (Treasury, FederalReserve, USAID); Bretton Woods

Institutions; WTO, centristWashington think-tanks; British and

German governmentsResurgentRightwing

Restore U.S. isolationism;Punish bank's mistakes

Populist & libertarian wings of Republican party; American Enterprise

Institute, Cato Institute, ManhattanInstitute, Heritage Institute


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Especially, P. Bond has devoted his attention to this problem in recent years. He

categorizes five reactions to the globalization since the international financial crisis

around mid-1997 99(See the Table 1). Amongst the above five tendencies, this essay is of

course interested mainly in - following Bond's terminology - the "Global Justice

Movements", that is, international NGO movements. However, except the so-called

"Co-opted NGOs (CoNGOs)", which receive fund from the neo-liberal agency and seek

usually the "dialogue and compromise", there are also each other conflicting and

competing subcurrents within the NGO camp. With regard to the NGOs' global strategycan there be logically two main axes: Pro-Globalist or Anti-Globalist. But the empirical

reality must not be so simplistic. There also can be minute sub-categories. For example,

one could be against the globalization of capital, but in favor of the "democratic"

globalization of people or "from below". To which camp, then, does this tendency

belong? While someone criticizes the present form of globalization, can he or she

imagine or accept at the same time alternative ways to globalization? Therefore, all

strategic models of NGOs must take into consideration such a case.

Ideal-typically, three kinds of approaches to the problem appear, for the

moment, according to the main line of argument and attitude to globalization: 1)

"international reformism" 2) "globalization from below" 3) "delinking."

1) "International reformist" approach:

This view is a global version of social partnership or corporatism at the national

level, which has backed up the 'Golden Age of capitalism" in Western society. It refers

basically to the thesis of "democratic deficit" of international institutions and regimes

that can be covered only by the cooperation with international civil society. The

interests of NGOs as "stakeholder" could be accommodated with the business. The

political legitimacy grounded on the support from the NGOs as junior-partner is a

necessary condition for the viability of global capitalism. Therefore, it aims the

capitalism with "human face".

9

) Patrick Bond (2001), Strategy and Self-Activity in the Global Justice Movements, FPIF DiscussionPaper #5, August 2001.


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John Clark, a former leading Bank critic at Oxfam, issued an email memo now

as chief NGO liaison officer at the World Bank:

"[H]ow to respond to the demo organizers' request to all NGOs to boycott all

meetings with the Bank and Fund ... For some the compromise was to take part in

meetings with Bank staff off the premises (some said this was because they didn't

want to be seen and identified by demonstrators and be accused of cooption); but

others - notably Jubilee 2000 [U.S.] - were quite open that they intended to ignore

the request." 1010

The aim of "international reformist" lies not in the abolition of internationalinstitutions but in their improvement . From this viewpoint, it is not marvelous to find to

some extent the logical homogeneity with the so-called "Post-Washington Consensus"

of which World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz takes the initiative. Aimed at the

correcting capitalist system's "imperfect markets", he tried to introduce a "new

paradigm" into the neo-liberal economy. J. Stiglitz writes: "The policies advanced by

the Washington Consensus are hardly complete and sometimes misguided. ... The focus

on freeing up markets, in the case of financial market liberalization, may actually have

had a perverse effect, contributing to macro-instability through weakening of the

financial sector." 1111 This results in an elite fight between IMF and World Bank. The

World Bank shows, in comparison with its sister organization, the IMF, a relatively high

sensitivity to the activity of NGOs, which is well reflected in its document:

"Consultation with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs): General Guidelines for the

World Bank Staff. Some of lines in the document say: The primary objective of

consultations is to improve the quality of decisions by: capturing the experience of

specialized non-governmental agencies, tapping the knowledge of CSOs that work at

the community level, giving voice to the poor ..., and giving sustainability for proposed

reforms beyond any one government administration." 1212 The World Bank's co-optation

strategy may express its changed approach to the integrationist fraction in the

international neo-liberal blocks.

In recent years, the partnership between business and NGOs increased

10 ) Cited from Bond (2001). op. cit.11 ) Cited from P. Bond (1999), Global and National Financial Reforms, Proceeding at International

Conference on Neo-liberalism, Global Capitalism and Civil Alternatives, October 5, 1999,

Sungkonghoe University, Seoul Korea.12 ) See World Bank's homepage http://wbln0018.worldbank.org.


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variously. The Financial Times reported:

"For companies, the desire to work with NGOs stemmed from a recognition thatenvironmental and social issues can provide business benefits, ranging from

differentiating products to cutting costs. "In the world of business, environmental

performance is increasingly seen as a competitive and strategic issue for

companies," says SustainAbility. In several instances NGOs have been willing to

endorse products. In 1992 Greenpeace helped launch a hydrocarbon called

"Greenfreeze" that could replace an ozone-damaging coolant in refrigerators. Its

efforts resulted in 70,000 orders." 1313

The "symbiosis" between business and NGOs follows, as such, the business

logic: an equivalent exchange between profitability of business and fund-raising of

Documents

2nd 2005 GaHRFS Papers