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TO: 4.B7743,:!Runich FROY: AB,-51,Amzon SUBJECT: Stefan BANDMA._ RRF: R-60641 LI'S 746 1) As you know, the purpose of Colonel ANTOTIUK's recent visit to IISfET was to aid the U.S. authorities in the detection of BAvt[510Vs viereobouts Source Josephine reports that ARTONIUK is now devoting all his energies to the accomplishment of this ,-:ne aim and,. needless tc emphasize, BANDERA's delivery into the Soviet hands would be the crown- ing success in ANTONIUK's career as an intelligence officer: We should, therefore, not underrate the determination Cf . ' thb —"- Soviets to bring this to pais. The attached report was passed by ANTONIUK to G-2, USFET. It - is of considerable interest ..);inasmuch as it list e one 'ITTSKO, Yaroslav, (also spelled STECHNO„ . STECZKO and STECZO). who is about to be arrested in " Munich and broUght to UISC, Oberursel, for interrogation. The following comment upon likely. implications of STETSKO's Arrest, offered by our USFET-repreeentativey-can-he-a=epted as inspired by official USFET sources. 2) "If STETS 0-reveals BANDERA's hideouts, G-2 officially will probably try to pick him up and deliver him to the Soviets. I think, however, that they would wink at A3ANDERA's being tipped off. Some people here are worried about the possibility that STETSKO may be a soviet penetration agent who will report to the RI S all information given to • , UISC so they are bound to go ahead on whatever inforMatien- ,-, he gives. If BAUDERA is found the-Political Adviscr,"ttr. ftecio Would umdoUbtedly concur in his delivery to the Soviets.)' , ------7-1)---/R-II-ef-the-sorious-cempromise:whiCh no doubt would result toAmerican interests in any form of col- laboration with UHVR, should BINDESA be turn& over to the •Soviets by the U.S. authorities and, on the other hand; -con- sidering the equally serious effects on Soviet-American re= lotions-likely to ensue from open U.S. connivance in the un- hampered continuance of his anti-Soviet activities on German soil, we shou - d take spocial pains at steering a judicious • / ) 7/ - 0.s •figAkgr . ./ ECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELL (BENCE AGENCY SOURCES MEINDDS-EX E - M7T - 10N3B - ZE - NAZI WAR CRIMESDISCLOSUREACt DATE 2004 2006 28 October 19.4.6--- -

28 October 19.4 .6--- - WordPress.com · ears of the tHVB, we ceUld expect withcertainty that the Soviets would learn about it sooner or later ,. ThiS dilemma . could best be avoided

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TO: 4.B7743,:!Runich

FROY: AB,-51,Amzon

SUBJECT: Stefan BANDMA._

RRF: R-60641 LI'S 746

1) As you know, the purpose of Colonel ANTOTIUK'srecent visit to IISfET was to aid the U.S. authorities in thedetection of BAvt[510Vs viereobouts Source Josephine reportsthat ARTONIUK is now devoting all his energies to theaccomplishment of this ,-:ne aim and,. needless tc emphasize,BANDERA's delivery into the Soviet hands would be the crown-ing success in ANTONIUK's career as an intelligence officer:We should, therefore, not underrate the determination Cf. 'thb —"-Soviets to bring this to pais. The attached report was passedby ANTONIUK to G-2, USFET. It - is of considerable interest

..);inasmuch as it list e one 'ITTSKO, Yaroslav, •(also spelled •STECHNO„ . STECZKO and STECZO). who is about to be arrested in"Munich and broUght to UISC, Oberursel, for interrogation.The following comment upon likely . implications of STETSKO'sArrest, offered by our USFET-repreeentativey-can-he-a=eptedas inspired by official USFET sources.

2) "If STETS 0-reveals BANDERA's hideouts, G-2officially will probably try to pick him up and deliver himto the Soviets. I think, however, that they would wink atA3ANDERA's being tipped off. Some people here are worriedabout the possibility that STETSKO may be a soviet penetrationagent who will report to the RIS all information given to • •

, UISC so they are bound to go ahead on whatever inforMatien-,-, he gives. If BAUDERA is found the-Political Adviscr,"ttr.

ftecio Would umdoUbtedly concur in his delivery to the Soviets.)',

------7-1)---/R-II-ef-the-sorious-cempromise:whiCh nodoubt would result toAmerican interests in any form of col-laboration with UHVR, should BINDESA be turn& over to the•Soviets by the U.S. authorities and, on the other hand; -con-sidering the equally serious effects on Soviet-American re=lotions-likely to ensue from open U.S. connivance in the un-hampered continuance of his anti-Soviet activities on Germansoil, we shou - d take spocial pains at steering a judicious •

/ ) 7/ - 0.s

•figAkgr .

./ ECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BYCENTRAL INTELL (BENCE AGENCYSOURCES MEINDDS-EX E - M7T - 10N3B -ZE -NAZI WAR CRIMESDISCLOSUREACt

DATE 2004 2006

28 October 19.4.6--- -

;,•

/2/

middle-ccurse. The following course suggests self as bestSuited to avoid either pitfall. •

4) You should contact the Lynx group and, referringback to yor last r,eeting • vhen you nade at abortive attenntat drawing them cut regarding BANDERA's present whereabouts,point out that the secrecy surrounding his movements would inthe long view create mere harm than good. You would point cutthat rather than asking a direct question nod courting anotherrebuff, you preferred to place yourself squarely on record asgreatly concerned as regards BAYDERA's security but equallyunable to materially contribute to its preservation, becauseyou had tot been taken into the complete confidence of the UHVR.Yomdid no t share the view that irre parable damage would hecaused by BANDERA's extradition, although it. would doubtlesslyconstitute a heavy blow to the prestige for the Ukranian move-ment. Your main concern was, however, to establish a perfectunderstanding with tbe-UBVR that. BANDERA, once captured, wouldInevitably be handed over to the Soviets by the U.S authorities.It would then be too late' to intervene and isgoompe4ag protestawould be absolutely tc no avail. ,The UHVR would only have toblame itself in that case.- Any demands ,-.ade.on you for a specificundertaking to guarantee BANDERA's security, visa vie the U.S.authorities, should be declined,, even if UHVH sees fit to let •you in on the secret Of his whereabouts.

- 5)--rn-baSe-STETSKO-should-coPe-forward .with inforMationI containing a lead to BARDERA's 'A.diug place, we shall try toinform you on time. If we ' , eve reason to, believe that coverageof that lead is likely to result in BANDERAi s Capture, we.thall •

. have to lay out our poUrse'cf aCtion in the.light:ofi-our con- .Meting interests in the natter. Tipping . off BAFORA, , it thisshould be decided upon, Wouldhave to be done . with - Utmost'dis-cretion obviating the remotest posSdbility that his escape i.e ' •

traced back to a U.S. .agency, In anticipation of such contin-gency, • you should now cast about.fcr Secure ,neans of passing .such information, taking . into-acteunt,. of ccurae, that shouldany int i mation of our connivance in • DAiTERA's escape reach the'ears of the tHVB, we ceUld expect withcertainty that theSoviets would learn about it sooner or later ,. ThiS , dilemma .could best be avoided we believe,.if the tip-off be launchedinto THVR - channels through an elaborate chain of notional and/oractual cutouts.

,• Distribution: 1 7 AB-43, • Uunich (Attach) 1 -=J7SFET Det.

- SC,JVashingto (Attach) 1 - Registry • .

1 - Cps1 - SC

'

r

L.UI EI

-"kAtef,i

•20 November 1948_ .

-

SUBJECT : Search forB DERA, leader of the

REF : 12X-787, Wash 4345

1) The risk of compromise in attempting to HOIP -- -BANDERA either directly or indirectly has been kept downto the absolute minimum. G-2 MEET is definitely loathto comply with the Soviet request to find BANDER& and torepatriate him as a "war oriminal".; This, we have beengiven to understand unofficially of course, and we canbe reasonably sure that a warning passed to a UHVR rep-resentative will not be considered aa-an act of badfaith on our part if, by et remote chance, G-2 USFETshould learn about it.

2) As far as oompromising ourselves vie a vie theSoviets is conned, we have taken pains not to letthis Warning appear in the light of an official "tip-off",but rather in the nature of a genera/ observation. OnceBANDERA has been apprehended we would decline to be inany way connected with the case, a point we stressed inIDS'767. In tilia connection we shduld like to mentionas an'interesting Side-light that It Col Dasher recentlyexpressed to AB 52 his disappointment that G-2 COTT hasfailed to honor its pledge to Colonel ANTONIUK to makeever* conceivable effort to locate TAFTERA.

3): 'Rair question whether there are compellingreasons for us to help BANDERA directly or indirectly,can be answered in the affirmative if you accept thepromise that we are definitely interested in cautiously .cultivating our contacts -with the UBVR if not along:linesof active cooperation, then with at least the objectiveto keep ourselves informed on what its plans are and to- fwhat extent it has succeeded in building up and servicingcells in the Ukraine. We asked , HIIKENNT;how our relation-ship with the CHM, at present and in the future, would be

'affected if the Americans were to lend a hand in the cap-ture and repatriation of BANDERA to the Soviets. He saidbe could answer this question in one word: FINITO. Inorder to enable you to appraise the importance of BANDERAin the hierarchy of Ukranian Underground leaders - and weare thinking here of the trkran1447mori t as a whole_ .

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irrespktive of its many factions who differ in methodsrather than in the main objective - we have requested•=LONNY to prepare a study which you will find attachedherewith.

4) In attempting to visualize the effects of theloss of BANDERA through American connivance there isone more consideration which should be brought to yourattention. The URVR is avowedly a terrorist organization,determined to accomplish its objectives by terroristicmeans. (That appears to be one of the main reasons forthe pre-occupation of the Soviet-Intelligence with Ukran-ian rather than other dissident groups like e.g., theCaucasians.) It should therefore not be ruled out thatthe UHVR would want to retaliate by terroristic means andthat its suspicions would fasten on the American repre-sentatives with whom they have been exclusively dealing.

Distribution:

2 -_Wash1 - A31`.45.1 - r1 -1 - AB 59 -1 •• Atint.1 - =11 - ups1 - Registry