2643421

8/13/2019 2643421

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/2643421 1/13

Sri Lanka's 1977 General Election: The Resurgence of the UNPAuthor(s): Vijaya SamaraweeraSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 12 (Dec., 1977), pp. 1195-1206Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643421 .

Accessed: 22/02/2014 11:38

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian

Survey.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 217.73.166.10 on Sat, 22 Feb 2014 11:38:07 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucal

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643421?origin=JSTOR-pdf






http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643421?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucal

8/13/2019 2643421


SRI LANKA'S 1977 GENERAL ELECTION:THE RESURGENCE OF THE UNP

VijayaSamaraweera

THE RECENT CHANGE in the political complexion ofSouthAsiawiththe electoraldefeat f Indira Gandhi and the CongressParty n India and themilitary ake-over f power n Pakistanhas nowbeen given a further imension with the stunningelectoral loss ofSirimavoBandaranaike's ri Lanka FreedomParty SLFP) in theJuly1977 general electionfor the National State Assembly NSA) of Sri

Lanka. The defeat f theSLFP and the reemergence f the United Na-tionalParty UNP) as themajor political force n the sland was antici-pated by all observers, ut the magnitude f the UNP victory xceededeven themostoptimistic rojections f ts supporters. urthermore,hetotal elimination f theMarxistparties from he legislaturewas a de-velopment hat even theirstaunchest pponents hardly expected. Inwhatprovedto be the hardestfoughtgeneral electionin Sri Lankasince independence n 1948, the electoratehas wrought remarkablechange n the national postureof the country's olitical parties, nd

there s little doubt that thisgeneral election will attract s muchscholarly ttention s the "1956 Revolution,"which carried S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike nd his SLFP topowerforthe firstime.

TheNewElectoral elimitation

The generalelection ofJuly 1977was the first o be held undertheRepublican Constitution f Sri Lanka enactedin May 1972.ThenewConstitution, owever, id not call for ny changes n the previous

electoralsystem; ndeed, its provisionsrelatingto delimitation-theformalprocessthroughwhich the parliamentaryeats wereredefinedafter ach newcensus-were identicalto those in the Constitutiontreplaced.Followingtheprocedure aid down in theConstitution,hePresident f Sri Lanka appointed a three-mana Sinhalese, a Tamil,and a Muslim) DelimitationCommission n August 1974 to proceedwiththe task fdelimiting lectorates fresh n the basisofthepopula-

1195






8/13/2019 2643421


1196 VIJAYAAMARAWEERA

tion figuresn the1971 census.The Commission ompleted ts delibera-tions ndpublished ts findingsn October 1976.' Its workhad been in-terrupted y a change n membership nd, more importantly,y an

amendment o the Constitution rought nto force n February 1975whichnecessitated reconsideration fmatters efore t. The Commis-sion initiallyas was requiredof the twopreviousDelimitationCommis-sionsof 1946and 1959aswell) had toassign o each of the sland's nineprovinces ne seat forevery1,000square miles in its area, givingdueconsideration o "the transport acilities n the province, ts physicalfeaturesnd communitynd diversityfinterests f the inhabitants."2The populationcriterionwas changedto 90,000 by the First Amend-mentto the1972Constitution nd this hangeofcourseforced hecom-missionto reexamine ts work as well as to provide an opportunity othepublic once again tomakerepresentations.

The FirstAmendmentwas justified y the rulingcoalitiongovern-mentprimarilys a cost-cutting easure. t was argued that theexpan-sionoftheNSA from 51 to220 electedmembers nderthe75,000pop-ulation criterionwas a measurewhichcould not be supported n viewof thesevere conomic nd financial risis acing hecountry. everthe-less,the ncrease n thepopulation as reflectedn the 1971Censuswas

a factorwhich could notbe easilyoverlooked nd thegovernment e-cided upon the figure f 90,000 as a "happy medium."3The 90,000figure educed thenumberofelectorates n populationbasis from195to 143 seeTable 1) andwiththe area weightagewhichwas not affectedby any change n thepopulation criterion) henew NSA consists f atotalof 168electedmembers.

The FirstAmendment id notdrastically lter the patternof dis-tribution fparliamentaryeeats n the sland.The originalpopulationcriterion f75,000 and the areaweightage ad effectivelyesulted n a

heavy ilt n favor f the rural areas in the nterior n the allocation ofseats. t has been argued that the rural bias in delimitationwas theresultofan expectation n thepart of thepolitical leadership n 1948thattheirprimary ourceof political strengthwould be in the ruralareas, n contrast o theirMarxistopponentswhose supportbase waslargely onfined o thepopulous and urbanizedSouthwest.4 he FirstAmendment,y increasing hepopulationcriterion,worked o the dis-advantageof thedenselypopulatedregions theWesternProvince ostthemost-eightseats),whiletheretention farea weightagemeantthatthe parsely opulated nterior ontinued oreceive higher roportionofseats elative otheSouthwest.

ThoughinitiatedbytheSLFP, whichtraditionally as relied more

1Report of theDelimitationCommission 1976,Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1976.2 Ibid., p. 3.3 Lankadipa, November 11, 1974; Ceylon Daily News, December 5, 1974.4 Robert N. Kearney. The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (Cornell University

Press, 1973),pp. 133-134.






8/13/2019 2643421


Uo ( g:

Q0 CO~~~

bD Go c r- o r .< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.2

ct ~ 0~t~j( U

b))~~~~~~~~~0

q; bO Cr

OD.- -cO

cm

iOn.0 CI-C, On mr_

U)

0

U

0 ~~ O (0 00 - ~0) 0) c)

00

o cT C. OT K ce C. C4 -CK-4 n ":t On IC CC t- a OC'

~oft-s ooroo o -tu

,^ lf~Cr cx) Ir IC IC co >,tM: U Crt omt~U)

o

tC

~~~~~~~~O) e n M mo

If) l. (= (M - -4>G 0 )9

ar-- t-CZ

E

O~~~~~~~~~~~~C CDdLU Q), =.>

W Uh c a t c) o.l - - -

m ~~~~~~~~~~~~;o~~~0o~~oo~i .0I-Cd

Cl






8/13/2019 2643421


1198 VIJAYA AMARAWEERA

on rural areas forpolitical support, heFirstAmendmentwasendorsedby the twoMarxistparties that had joined hands with the SLFP toform he United Front UF) governmentnderMrs. Bandaranaike. tis clear, however, hat the Marxistparties-the Lanka Sama SamajaParty LSSP) and theCommunist arty CP)-were less thanhappywiththe measure,which, fter he break up of theUF coalition, the Marx-ists haracterizeds detrimental o the nterests f the working lasses.5On the otherhand, the amendmentwas heavilyattackedfrom hebe-ginningby minority roups, especially the Muslims and the IndianTamils, on the grounds hat ny ncrease n the averagevoters erelec-toratewould tendto dilute their lectoral trengthn areas where they

wereconcentratednpockets.6 he DelimitationCommission, owever,assuagedtheir fears to some extentby creatingmulti-memberonsti-tuencieswith therepresentationf these nterestsn mind.7

The Campaign

Two pertinent oints houldbe kept nmind whenthepreelectionpreparations nd the campaignsof the respective olitical groups areexamined. irst, he break-up f theUF was ofcrucial mportance. his

split, ne commentator as argued, amounted to a virtualrejectionofthe searchby SLFP-led coalitions ince 1956 for eft-wing adical solu-tionsto theproblems rising rom he country's olonial socioeconomicstructure."8t is not only n terms f ideologyand policy-makinghatthisdevelopment hould be evaluated. t also had considerable mpacton the election ampaigns nd electoralfortunes f the SLFP as well asthe LSSP and theCP in the 1977 election.Second, the failureon thepartof the Bandaranaikegovernmento make any major headway nsolving he economicand social problemsfacingthe island after evenyears npowerposed questionsofcredibility,ot onlyfor he SLFP butalso fortheMarxistpartiesthathad been associatedwith theSLFP asjunior partners n thegovernmentoroverfiveyears.

It is clear that the UNP was the best preparedof the politicalparties or he1977electioncampaign.Electioncampaignsn Sri Lankausuallybegin n earnest nly afternominations or the electoralcontest

5 See forexample, The Nation (LSSP), December 12, 1975.6 For representative iews of these groups, see Ceylon Observer,December 1,

1974. The minority nterestswere also perturbedby the elimination of the systemof Nominated Members of Parliament under the Republican Constitution. Thiscategoryof members were meant to representthose minoritygroups who foundno representation hrough the electoral process.

7 See Report of the Delimitation Commission 1976, p. 5 and p. 7. Multi-memberconstituencieswere to be created"if the racial composition of the citizensof a Province is such that it is desirable to render possible the representationofanysubstantial oncentration f citizens n thatprovince." bid., p. 3. Two 3-memberand four2-member onstituencieswere formed.

8P.V.J.Jayasekera,Sri Lanka in 1976: ChangingStrategies nd Confrontation,"Asian Survey,17:2 (February1977), p. 208.






8/13/2019 2643421


SRI LANKA'S1977 ELECTION 1199

have been formally ccepted,9 ut on this occasion the UNP clearlyhad begunthetask much earlier. t had had seven years to devote tothe preparation orthe next polls,unhampered y the problemswhichinevitably acedthe governing roups.However, the early yearswerelargely penton internal onflicts hatarose after he election of J. R.Jayawardene s the party eader followingthe death of Dudley Sen-anayake n April1973.The conflictseemedto have primarily temmedfrom he claimsmade by the members fthe Senanayakefamily whichhad produced hefirst wo Prime Ministers f Sri Lanka) and the asso-ciates of the ate leaderforpositionsand authority n the party truc-ture.Arguing hatthe UNP, as a mass-based olitical party, hould not

be subjected to the pressures xerted by familyor kinship groups,Jayawardene eftly utmaneuvered hose who challenged him. Thecontroversyulminatedwith the expulsion of Rukman Senanayake(who had won the late leader's constituencyor the party) from theUNP fordisciplinary easons.Thereafter, ayawardene urnedhis well-knownorganizational alentsto thereshapingof the party's deologyawayfrom ts identifications a strictlyightist rganization o a cen-tristposition, s well as to the revitalizing f the demoralizedpartyorganizations t the district nd village levels. n particular, he selec-

tion ofprospective andidatesfortheforthcomingolls was givenhighpriority; ndeavorswere made to recruitnew "faces," especiallyfromtheyoungergeneration, o lead the party t constituencyevel. TheUNP, of course,was able to exploit fullythe considerableeconomicdifficultiesacedbythe Bandaranaikegovernmenturingthisperiodoftime.

The newdelimitationnecessitated revisionof theUNP's listofcandidates as well as its campaign strategies ut, nonetheless, y thetimenominationswere submittedJune6), the UNP was amply pre-paredto face thevoters.The party'smain strategy learlywas to iden-tify heMarxistpartieswith the SLFP in the errors f omission andcommissionmadebythepreviousgovernment. greatdeal ofemphasiswas placed on the excessescommittedduring two traumatic ventswhichtookplace in the ast sevenyears-theAprilRevolt of 1971andthe police-studentslash at the University f Sri Lanka PeradeniyaCampusin December1976.One other ssuereceivedequal attention:thealleged nepotism fMrs. Bandaranaike as thePrimeMinister.10

The SLFP facedthepolls withmanydrawbacks. ts poor recordas the dominantparty n theUF government as no doubt a liability.Equally, the challengewhich it receivedfrom ts former llies, theLSSP and theCP, provedto be a sourceof embarrassment.he SLFPhad oinedwiththetwoMarxistpartieswith committmento,as their

9Kearney,Politics of Ceylon,p. 148.10A reading of the UNP's election pamphlet literature in particular reveals

how cleverly nd effectivelyhese issueswere exploited by the party.






8/13/2019 2643421


1200 VIJAYA AMARAWEERA

Common Programmedeclared, "rapid progress towards a socialistdemocracy." ut with the ousterof the LSSP from he coalition,therewas an increasing hift n the partofthe Bandaranaikegovernmento

the right nd towards dismantling f manycherished rograms f theleft.This remarkable ransformationf the ideologyand policycouldnot be easily explained away and undoubtedlydamaged the SLFP'simageas a "socialist"party.On the otherhand, theSLFP was verymuchawarethat ts electoral uccessesn thepastweregreatlynfluenced ythepresence r absenceof"no-contest acts"withthe Marxists."'Thedisintegration f the coalitionalso forced he SLFP to think n termsof organizing nd presentingandidates n electorateswhichhad beenconcededto theMarxistswhentheUF was first ormed n 1968. t also

had theaddedburdenof severaldefections romts ranks n the egisla-ture n the monthspreceding he nominations. he formulationfthelist of candidateswas furtheromplicatedby the decisionof severalseniorparliamentarians ot to face theforthcomingontest.The con-sequenceof all these factorswas that the SLFP was inadequatelypre-paredforthepoll. This inadequate preparationwas especially evealedin the attemptsmadeby party eaders,ratherbelatedly nd hastily, oforgeonce again the Pancha Maha Balavegayal2which had played a

crucialrolein the

"1956 Revolution."The efforts ailed; theBuddhistpriestsn particular,whowereperhapsthe most mportant lement n1956,wereby now equally attracted o the UNP (with ts anti-Buddhistimage considerably iminished y a new commitment oBuddhism)asto theSLFP and, indeed,some of the morecharismatic ublic speakersamongthesangha Buddhist lergy) ad joined the UNP ranks.

The LSSP and CP revived the United LeftFront (ULF), whichalso includedthePeople's DemocraticPartyestablishedby a groupofleft-wing arliamentarians ho had leftthe SLFP. Though the LSSP

and the CP heavilyconcentrated heirattackson the SLFP in theircampaigns, either arty ould avoid beingtaintedby the poor perfor-mance of the Bandaranaikegovernment. heir role as champions oftheworking lasseshad been tarnished ytheirparticipationn a gov-ernmentwhichhad made increasing se of statepowerto curb tradeunion rights. he success f theJanataVimukti eramuna JVP) n thefirst ears f theUF government ad revealed thatthe traditionalup-portthe Marxistsreceivedfrom heyouthwas no longer assuredandthat eft-wingrganizationswhichtook more extremepositionscould

becomepowers obe reckonedwith.The JVP movement,fcourse, ost(perhaps emporarily)tsmomentum iththecrushing fthe 1971AprilRevolt,but the association f thetraditionalMarxistparties n the re-pression eemedtohave ingered n in the people's memory.Moreover,afterdecadesof usingrhetoric-this use is worthexploringfurther-

IIA. J. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973 (St. Martin's Press, 1974), pp.211-212.

12Dawasa, July2, 1977. The Pancha AMahaBalavegaya or "Five Great Forces"is comprisedof Buddhistpriests, eachers, yurvedaphysicians, armers, nd workers.






8/13/2019 2643421



"socialism" s an ideological tool seemsto have lost much of its luster.In any case,with the other politicalparties including theUNP) alsoadvancingclaims of "socialist" goals in their partymanifestos, he

Marxists o longerhad the monopoly ver the deology r the rhetoric.As in thepast,theUNP, SLFP, and the Marxists oncentrated heir

electoraleffortsn theSinhalese areas. They entered the foray n theEasternProvince, ut theNorthernProvince apart fromwhat couldbe deemedtoken gestures)was once again left to the Tamil politicalorganizations. owever, herewas a notable differencen thisoccasionin theNorth.The intraparty ontests, hich had alwaysbeen a featurethere since 1949 when the Federal Party (FP) was establishedby abreakaway roup fromthe Tamil Congress TC), was absent on thisoccasion.The newunity esulted rom he almostunanimous ppositionof the major Tamil political leaders and organizations o the 1972Constitution, hichthey irmly elievedaccorded the Tamils a second-classcitizenshiptatus.Tamil grievances gainstthe majority inhalesecommunitynd its political leadershad long precededtheenactmentofthe newconstitution,3but theprevious ttempts o carry ut a poli-ticalstruggle nder one bannerhad foundered n personaldifferencesamongtheTamil leaders.The climate created n 1972effectivelyver-

rodepersonalclashesand theTamil UnitedFront,which becametheTamil United LiberationFront (TULF) prior to the 1977 election,wasborn.What s also significants thatthisnewumbrellaorganizationunitedforthe first ime theTamil political parties n the Norh withthe major trade union-cum-political arty active among the IndianTamils in theplantationsector.The importance f thisdevelopmentshouldbe viewed n the ightofthe ncreasing rift owards eparatismon thepartof the Tamil people. Sentiments f separatismwere muchmorepowerfullyrticulated n the1977election thanin previous lect

tions.The SLFP, UNP, ULF, and the TULF were themajor politicalparties ontestinghe1977 generalelections, ut therewerealso a hostofminorparties nd independent andidateswho facedthe electorate.As the analysisof theelection resultswould reveal,the latterprovedto be of essthanmarginal mportance.

It is quite evident hat all the differentolitical partiescontinuedto be conscious fcaste,religious, nd otherparochial interestsn theselection f theirrespective andidates nd in their ampaigning. hisconsciousness as alwaysbeen a feature f politics n Sri Lanka where"as in otherdemocratic ountries, bewildering onfusion f person-alities, policyissues,parochial concerns, nd loyaltiesand prejudicesare interwined n theelectioncampaign."'4Partymanifestosnd pro-gramswerenot unimportantn thiselection;but in a climatewhere

13 See K. M. de Silva, "Discrimination n Sri Lanka" in Case Studies in HumanRights and Fundamental Freedoms (Foundation for the Study of Plural Societies,1977), pp. 73-119.

14 Kearney,Politics of Ceylon, p. 149.






8/13/2019 2643421



therewas such a strong eaction against the rulingparty, t is difficultto assesstheweight hesecarried n the minds of the voters s againstsuch ssues s competencyn powerorcorruption xcesses.

Finally, t is worthwhile otingbriefly he impact the outcome ofthe ndian polls had on SriLanka. There were,of course,parallels be-tweenthesituationsn the twoneighboring ountries: he primemin-isters fbothnationshad governed nder emergency egulationsn theyears mmediately receding he electoral contests,while the sons ofboth had emergedto become the key figures n the youth wings oftheirrespectivepolitical parties. Anura Bandaranaike had, in fact,claimed thathe and Sanjay Gandhi were "Asia's two rising sons," a

claimwhichwas tohaunt himduring hecampaign.Given theparallels,it is no surprise hat the opposition, nd especially he UNP, used Mrs.Gandhi's defeat as an examplewhich should be followedby thelocalelectorate.ndeed,theUNP, whichhad consciouslyooked towards heyouthto lead its electoralcontests, ortrayed he party eader, J. R.Jayawardene,s an elder statesmenwho could be comparedtoMorarjiDesai, thenew PrimeMinister fIndia.15 t is pertinent onotein thiscontext hatpolitical parties n Sri Lanka have always oughtto focusattention n theirrespective eaders in theircampaigns; the leader's

public image has- nevitably roved to be of crucial importance oralltheparties.

The Results

The 1977 polls saw the maintenance f theremarkable ecord ofhighvoterparticipationn the nationalelectoral ontestsn Sri Lanka.Witha turnout f 85.8% (in contrast o 84.7% in the 1970 polls), thelatest lectionmarkedthehighest oterparticipation incean electoralsystemwas introduced nto the island.This figures ample testimonyto theheightened olitical partycompetition hatwas evident at thecampaign stage tself.

The national party preferencessee Table 2) reveal the successachievedby the UNP over ts opponents-the SLFP and theULF. Inthepast, the highest hareof thepopular voteusuallyhad been moreor lessequallyshared betweentheSLFP and theUNP, but on thisoc-casion the UNP clearlyeclipsed the SLFP. The UNP received53.9%

of thepopularvote as against 31.2% for the SLFP; forthe first imesinceindependence, political partywon an absolutemajority f thevotes n a nationalelection.The UNP won 139 seats,or 83.7% of allthe eatswhichtheparty ontested. his percentage ompares avorablywiththe70.2% seatswonbytheUF in the1970generalelection.

The figures orthe1977 provincialpartypreferencessee Table 3)

15Riviresa,July3, 1977.






8/13/2019 2643421


SRI LANKA'S 1977 ELECTION 1203

TABLE 2: National PartyPreferences, 1970 and 1977 General Elections

1970 1977

Number Number Number Numberof of Percent of of PercentSeats Seats Popular Seats Seats Popular

Party Contesteda Won Vote Contesteda Won Vote

UNP 129 17 38.0 154 139 53.9SLFP 108 91 36.9 147 8 31.2Marxist Partiesb 31 25 12.0 136 0 6.8FP 19 13 4.9 - - -

TC 12 3 2.3 - - -

TULF - - - 23 17 6.6Minor Partiesand

Independents 141 2 5.9 296 2 1.6

SOURCE: Data for 1970 from K. M. de Silva and Vijaya Samaraweera, T heLegislaturesof Ceylon, 1833-1972: A Source-Bookon Elections and Legislators (Un-published mss.); data for 1977 computed from information n Ceylon Observer,July 24, 1977.

a The numberof seats for 1970 was 151 and for 1977, 168. There was no con-test for one electorate n 1970 and the electoral contestfor one constituencywaspostponedin 1977.

b Marxist partiesfor 1970 are LSSP and CP; for 1977,ULF.

showthat, partfrom he Northern rovince, he UNP's political sup-portwas well distributed ver the sland; indeed, t received n absolutemajority fthevotes n all but thetwo Tamil-speaking rovinces. hedistributionf the UNP's strengthn the Sinhaleseareas was consistentwith its past performances. owever, f the provincial figures re ex-aminedmoreclosely,ome mportant evelopments an be observed.Ofthe totalof 154 candidateswhichthe UNP put forward, 26won withan absolutemajority. he SLFP has traditionally ad theedge over the

UNP in theprimarilyural Central,NorthCentral, nd Uva Provinces,but in the 1977 contestthe UNP was able to tilt the supporttheretowards t in a remarkablefashion.Equally importantly,he UNPshattered hevirtualmonopolyheld in the pastby the Marxists n theclusterof constituenciesn the Western and Sabaragamuvaprovincesand along thecoastalbelt. The UNP has alwayshad considerable uc-cess n theconstituenciesn thetwo main citiesofColombo and Kandy,but tsstrengthn the otherurban and semi-urbanreas had been weak.In this context tselectoralwinsoverthe ULF are noteworthy. fur-

therpertinent ointneeds to be made. The Marxist partieshad tradi-tionallyreceivedcaste-protestotes in theseregions,especially fromthe Kardva,Saldgamaand Durdva castes, gainsttheUNP whichhadthe reputationofbeing a Goyigama conventionally he highestrank-ing caste) dominated political organization.The failureof a caste-protest ote to surface n thisoccasion can perhapsbe interpreteds areflection f thesuccessthe UNP has achieved n changing ts publicimage.Finally, t is relevant oobserve hereemergencefMuslimsup-






8/13/2019 2643421


DJOAOCMIWSJo II I I - I 1

S>BC1)iUOTh)JOON I I I I I I ? 4

>aloa ~~~~~~~~0 0,

> co c

aDIUMoUB~aosoooos3oNA Sal~~pl~~DIOON0 C'Csoc O 0t_ CD

__ _________ _________ >N

D4OA0% % O 0 C' C OO r UC

1Z UOMWh 00000 p CC nn ha

V> uoS+clf ?c

-)C- CCCC) ~

$_4| szaLTMU ot~ 'ON c)l cl ucr < ,P

cu 3sAp JON CO - CC -- - CtD 14

aoAo % I C . ?Cd u~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C

UOMis113as ZI OOI0

saILpipuLmJOo 0 I I I

_~~~~~~DOO l.o 0zC ~ t , C) in ~o0

U1OAJOE `1 CefC Q) C

_____td_____ COt+COC CCCCCC c\ 1t- JrHQ

1Jo | 0| 5 r:- ) r C

0) '>S 00 o Cd

U0 DIOA JO % C, to 00 ~ ~ ~ JO-

41, 01CppCJJO0COa C) - -0 - C

U-1 C O O ICI C~ Cd

SZ 1oCPujJo%-O ' tCCO0OCOOCinC\T COf1 ~ C -

-SP PU~~~30AJOO%.6

ZC CO02O Cl

t- 0) m Ic-'t

C) ~~~OAJO~~~ ~ 1t~- C) C>0 Co 1.0 1.0 1.0 COJoi.0 N1C 1.0CC--

Ca C-

N- 0) UOMSW~~~ OCCCC ~~0Cl)- Q0e

0) -~~~~~~~~~~~~~4C -

c\C

C~t CfCo )o 3N- Cl)"alplp n .C'O C CW ~ ~ )IAO 'O C 0 4 C;)

CC) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~~~ ~~~~n \[C

a. 0) C:)Q

C ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~:

0 u~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.. 0

. o C

1. .r.

F_ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c 0C0C 4lOC C~






8/13/2019 2643421



port for the UNP. The polls in the past had revealeda gradual shiftof Muslimsupportfrom heUNP to the SLUP, but the 1977generalelectionmarkeda reversal f this trend;of the 11 Muslimmembers

electedfrom he areas n whichthere s a concentrationf the Muslimpopulation,10 werefrom he UNP and only one from heSLFP.

The 1977 generalelection demonstrated hat the SLUP had notonly lost groundnationallybut also in areas in which it had tradi-tionallyrelied forsupport.The ruralvote, whichhad been ardentlywooed by theSLFP from hebeginning nd whichwas generally ck-nowledged o favortheparty,failed it in 1977; in Uva ProvincetheSLFP did not capture a single seat,while in the Central and North

CentralProvinces t won only three.Again,in areas wherethe much-heralded land reforms f the Bandaranaikegovernmentwere intro-duced (in the nterior rovinces, or example) whichwereexpected toyieldpoliticalreturns otheSLFP, theparty aredno better. he dismalperformancef theSLFP was no betterdemonstratedhan in the de-feat of its seniorparliamentarians: romthe last SLFP cabinet onlytwo (includingMrs. Bandaranaike)were returned nd both of thesewere n fact heonlysittingmembers ffiliated iththe SLFP who weresuccessfuln 1977. To take another ndicator,one which was high-

lighted n thelocal press, he twositting LFP memberswho were re-turnedwon with considerably educedmajorities.It is clear that theUNP cut sharply nto theelectoral upportof

the SLFP and theMarxists,particularly he latter.While the SLFP'spopularvote was reduced only by about 5%, theMarxist upportwasreducedbynearlyone-halfwhen comparedto theirrespective erfor-mances n 1970.This loss of votesby the Marxistparties, t should benoted,took place despite a considerable ncrease in the number ofcandidates etup in 1977.The LSSP and theCP, as the durableMarxistgroups,had maintained a relatively nchangedsupportbase over theyears, houghtheir share of thepopular vote had graduallydeclinedwiththesteady xpansionoftheelectorate.n 1977,however, hetotalvotespolledbythetwoparties reatly eclined o that ven the stalwartsof the eft-who had first ntered hepoliticalarena in theearly1930sand who since thenhad been consistentlyeturned rom heir consti-tuenciesn the Southwest-weredefeatedn the 1977election.

The 1977 polls reemphasized he dominance of Tamil political

organizationsn the Tamil-speaking reas. In the NorthernProvince(85.1% Tamil in the1971Census)theTULF swept heboard,winningall the electoral ontestsnd 68.7% of thepopularvote. n the EasternProvince,where here s a greater acial mixture41.2% Tamil, 33.5%,Muslim,and 22.7% Sinhalese in 1971), the TULF achieved a morelimited uccess,winning nly3 seatsout ofthe10contestedwith 27.1%of thepopularvote.However,n all but one oftheconstituenciesn theprovince n which the Tamils formedthe majoritycommunity,heTULF was victorious. he TULF's performancen the 1977 general





8/13/2019 2643421



election s undoubtedly furthermilestone n theemergence fwhatA. J.Wilsonhas called "Tamil subnationalism."16here was one not-able failure, owever,nd thatwas the inability f theTULF-repre-senting amil nationalist entiments-togain thesupport f theTamil-speakingMuslims.On thisoccasion, the Muslimsvoted fortheUNP.Both theUNP and the SLFP have attempted omakeinroads ntotheTamil areas,but the 1977 polls once again demonstratedhat this s amostdifficultask.

Recent studieshave demonstratedhatminorpartiesand indepen-dentshave been increasinglyosing their importance n Sri Lanka'selectoral ystem,17nd the 1977 generalelectionconfirmedhistrend.

In 1977the numberofcandidates n this categorywas double the 1970figure,ut their hareof the popularvotefurther eclined.The minorpartiestotallyfailed,and only two independentcandidateswere suc-cessful one of these s the eaderof the CeylonWorkersCongress-theIndian Tamil organization ffiliated iththeTULF-who was electedfrom hemulti-memberuwaraeliya-Maskeliyaonstituencyn whichthe Indian Tamils formed 1.2% of thepopulation).

The 1977general lection lso confirmedhe "turnover attern"ntheparty ompetitionn Sri Lanka. Controlof thegovernmentgain

changedhands,the seventh uccessive hangeto takeplace since 1952.The results an no doubtbe interpreteds a further emonstrationftheviability f Sri Lanka's parliamentaryemocracy, ut this shouldnot obscurethe challenges heestablishedpolitical order has receivedfromdifferentuartersovertheyears, hemost recentbeingthe 1971AprilRevolt.As forthefuture,muchsurely epends upon thecapacityoftheUNP governmentosolvethegrave conomic nd socialproblemsfacing hecountry.

16Wilson,Politicsof Sri Lanka, p. 165.17Calvin A. Woodward, "Sri Lanka's Electoral Experience: From Personal to

PartyPolitics,"PacificAffairs, 974/75,47:4, pp. 455-471.

VIJAYASAMARAWEERA is a Lecturer n Historyat WesternCarolina University,Cullowhee,NorthCarolina.

Documents

2643421