2.3 Procedural Justice an Interpretive Analysis of Personnel Systems

I PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: 1 AN INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS OF PERSONNEL

' SYSTEMS

Robert Folger and Jerald Greenberg

INTRODUCTION I The concept o f justice is prevalent i n personnel research and practice. Pervasive

attention to matters o f justice is evidenced b y the importance placed o n making "fair" employee selection decisions (Arvey. 1979). settling l a h r disputes "justly" (Walton & McKersie, 1965). and negotiating "equitable" wage settlements (Mahoney. 1975). to name just a few areas involving human resources man- agement. Empir ical and theoretical work within the broader psychological l i t - erature has also had much to say about justice.

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Most o f what we know about justice i n organizations concerns what is referred '

to as distributive justice (Ho~nans, 1961); that is, the manner i n which organizational resources are distributed among personnel ( for a review, see Freedman & Montanari. 1980). and o n employees' reactions to those resource distributions (for a review, see Greenberg, 1982). Research inspired by equity theory (Adams,- 1963. 1965)-mostly popular i n the 1960s ( fo r reviews. see Goodman & Fried-

i man, 197 1; Pritchard. 1969), although st i l l currently i n evidence (e.g., Greenberg & Ornslein, I983)--as wel l as more recent conceptualizations o f justice i n

I organizations (e.g.. Bies. 1983; Dalton & Ttdor, 1985, ftruses primarily on

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ROBERT FOI-GER and JliRA1.D GREENIII:Rc,

In contrast to Thibaut and Walker's orientation toward prcxcdural justice as

a consideration i n the dispute-resolution process, 1-eventha1 (1976. 1080) con- ceive.(\ of prtxedural justice (what he has called "prcx-edural faimess") as a

neglected aspect o f reward alltration. Initially described i n 1976. LeventhalTs o f procedural justice is more fully developed in two subsequent

publications (Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal. Kanrza. & Fry, 1980). he essence elf [evcnthal's conceptualization is that various procedural ele-

nients are used to form evaluations o f fairness. Specifically, seven different rc~cdura l e!_cm_en_ts are identified. each representing a pr t~edura l aspect con- _ I-'--.

sidcrcd ;evaluating the fairness of alltxations. These elements arc as follows:

I. selection (4 agenrs-procedures for determining who makes allwation decisions; I

7. set tin^ ground rules-prclcedures for determining and evaluating ptcr l t ia l I

rewards, and the behaviors necessary to attain them; 3. ~urhe r ing infurmurion-procedures for obtaining and using information

about reward recipients; 4. ~lecision struc.ture-procedures for defining the structure o f the allocative

decision process (c.g.. the successive ordering o f individual and group I

decisions); 5 . trpp'~~(rIs-procedures for seeking redress against unsatisfactory decisions; 6. .~cl/r~rtc~rd.~-procedures for ensuring that the decision-making h tdy does

not abuse its power; and 7. & rn~e m e ~ l u m i . ~ m . r - - p r t ~ ~ d ~ ~ s enabling allocation practices to he altered.

Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry (1980) postulated that the @@mation gathered 7 about each of these seven prtlcedural elements (when available) is .. used ~ . ~~ to evaluate the fairness o f the procedure itself. The fairness o f the prc~edures may he

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evaluated according to each o f six proredurn1 rult-s. These rules arc as follows: - I

I . conrirnncy ride-allocation procedures should be consistent across persons I and over time;

2. bias supprcs..~ion rule--personal self-interest in the allocation process should 1 be prevented;

3. accuracy rule--decisions must be based on accurate information; ! I

4. correctahilil?, rrtle--opportunities must exist to enable decisions to he mcdilied;

5, rppresenrutiveness rrtle-the allocation process must represent the concerns o f all recipients; and

6. erh;culiQ rule-allocations must k based on prevailing moral and ethical standards.

'The weighting of t h c ~ v:irious nllcs in dc t c r~~~ in ing fi~irnsss is ;111othc.~ c.ctnce1.n of Lrvcnthal's. Hc as.~l~lllle(I Itlilt i n c l i ~ i ~ l ~ ~ ; ~ l s ;~pl)ly t l ic r~rlcs sclcctivcly, giving certain ones different weights ;it various tirnes. Spc ih r predictions ahout the wcighrinp o f these procctl~lr:ll nllcs. howcvcr, ;lrc not offcrcd. Thcrc i s solne

from f~ l l ow-up resei~rch hv Fry ant1 I,cventh;ll (1079) th;~t inconsis- tency i n the setting of ground n~ les is given the greatest weight i n JuLlping the u n f ; ~ i r n ~ ~ ~ o f prt~edures. Ilowcver. i n thc ahuencc of any addition;~l c ~ ~ ~ p i r i ~ ; ~ I investigations into Levcnthal's conccptuali7ation. t h~s finding must h consitlcred tentative. Despite the pallcity of empirical valitl;~tion o f Levcnthal's framework, we w i l l show i t to provide many uscl'ul insights into personnel mnnagenlcnt procctlures i n the sccontl half o f this pirpcr

Recause Leventhal's approach is aiorc structural. an<l Thihatct and Walker's approach is more process-oricntctl, dircct comparisons h twccn them are di f l ic l~ l t to make. There are, however. a few impnrtant issues about which the theorists agree. as well as some apparent disagrcemcnts. -

One especially important area o f tlisagrc.ement concerns the relationship between procedural and distrihutive justice. Lcventhal (1976) argued that "pro- : cedural fairness is a necessary precondition for the establishment and maintenance ! o f distrihutive fairness" (p. 2.10). Furlhcrmorc, he added, "Unless procedural faimess exists, distrihutive fairness is sure to he violated" (Levcnthal, 1976, p. 230). I n contrast, Thihaut and Walker (1975) asserted that procedural justice and distributive justice can he independent. In this regard they claimed that, "Although procedural justice may often lead to and prtwluce distributive justice, it is possible for distrihutive justice to he achieved without the application of any special procedure" (p. 3).

Leventhal (1980) also argued that distrihutive outcomes are seen as a more - I important determinant of fairness than the procedures used to determine them, primarily because procedures are usually well-established routines and are gen- erally not fully understorxl hy recipients. Only when a new distributive system '

is being developed or an existing one is being changed. or when an influential-- recipient is dissatisfied, are procedural systems likely to become perceptually figural. One thrust apparent i n Thihaut and Walker's (1975) work, however, has been their desire to emphasize the key role that procedures can often play i n

- individuals' assessments of distributive Justice. That is. although these authors '

insist on the conceptual independence o f distributive and procedural justice i n principle (as noted above, where we distinguished between their stance and Leventhal's postulation o f the conceptual necessity o f procedural justice as a Prerequisite for distrihutive justice), they also asserted that i n actual situations there can be a significant form of pc.rc.eptuul overlap regarding these two forms ofjustice. This perceptual overlap can he conceptualized as a t y p o f halo effect

ROBERT FO1,GER and J1'RAI.D GREENBERG

i n which evaluations o f pr t rcdura l justice influence ev;lluations o f distrihulivc- iusticc-the fairer the procedure used to detcnnine outcomes. the tnorc psycho. ,

logically ncceptahlc those olltcomes are l ikc ly to hc ti.e.. the nlorc they are l ikely to k evaluated as k i n g distrihutively just). l ' h ~ s , r i ~ t h e i than supp)rting Lrventhirl 's p s i t i o n that distributive concerns have a predominant impact on ovcrall evaluations of a situation and that procedural conccrns are salicnt only

I

tinder special circulnstanccs. Thihaut and Walker's approach is more C o n ~ p a t i h l ~ wi th predictions that horh procedural and distributive concerns w i l l ordinarily !. he mmifestcd. Moreover, the evidence gathered hy Thihaut and Walker ( to he 1 reviewcd below) actually suggests that i n a sense procedural matters are more l igural than distributive. Specifically, thcy consistently found main effects of- prcxredural factors on ratings o f distributive justice (along wi th main effects of distributive factors on those ratings), hut they d id not find corresponding effect, ol' distributive factors (i.e.. the fairness o f received outcomes) o n ratings (11 procedural justice (although procedural factors d i d significantly influence such ratings).

i Despite these differences, both conceptualizations share a common concern‘.^

for ident i fy ing control over procedures (dispute-resolution procedures i n Thihaut _ and Walker's case and resource-distribution procedures i n Leventhal's casc) as a central aspect o f procedural justice. Indeed, each o f Leventhal's p r t ~ e d u r a l elements may be viewed as defining more precisely specific aspects o f process ;

control described b y Thibaut and Walker. Both perspectives agree, then. that procedures providing the involved parties (be they litigants i n a courtrtwm, or reward recipients i n an organization) some control over the procedures affecting their outcomes are essential to procedural justice. The importance o f procedural control i n b t h allocation procedures and dispute-resolution procedures has been the focus o f a considerable amount o f research that we w i l l review i n the ncxt section o f this paper.

LESSONS FROM PROCEDURAL JUSTICE RESEARCH

As we have noted. Thihaut and Walker (1975) and Leventhal(1976, 1980) have , expressed dissenting opinions ahout the interrelationship between the fairness of decision outcomes and the procedures used i n determining those o u t c o m e 5 However, they also both have stressed the importance of g iv ing affected persons control over the decision-making procedures affecting them, although they d o so wi th respect to different decision domains. Each o f these issues-the in&- I

pendence o f procedures and outcomes, and the importance o f process control- I

has generated a considerable amount o f w e n t r e r a r c h that w i l l he reviewed ' here. W e do not mean to imply that these represent the only foci o f procedural justice research (although they certainly appear to be the most popular concerns). hut that they are both most representative o f existing lines o f investigation and

The Inclt .pcndcnt In lp i~< . t o f I ' r o c c d ~ ~ r r s and Outconles

~ h c question o f whctllcr p r t~c t lu res c;111 h;~vc an 1111pi1ct on perccivc(i f:lirncs5i, th;lt i s indcpendcnt of c)utcon~cs has hccn of' ron\idcrahle intcrcst to p l i t i c r r I scicn!ist~. Kefcrring to a focus on p rc~cdurcs ;IS "process politics" (Optr~ll.;,-- 1977), polit ical scientists have cn~phasizctl that i n the cases o f such cheriqhcd nlcchanis~lls as the jrltlicial prwcss i ~ n d the procedures for conducting clcctions, the prcwcdurcs thclnselves contrihute to citi7ens' perceptions o f faimcss Inore than the outcomes of thcsc prtwcdurcs (I'dclman. 1964; Scheingold, 1974).

Tyler and Folgcr (1980) conductetl ;I survey study that examined the rel:~. tionship hetween outcomes and p rc~cdurcs i n the context o f police-citizen en-

counters. Questioning citizens who c;~llcd the police themselves and those who were stopped by the policc for an alleged driving violation, they found that the outcome o f the encounter (i.e.. whether or not the problem was satisfactorily resolved and whether o r not the citizen was cited for a viol;ltion) d id not influence judgments regarding the overall fairness o f treatment. Instead, how fairly subjects helieved they werc treated by thc police officer depended on the officer's procedural behaviors during the cncountcr. Citizens are satisfied wi th police officers who follow appropriate procedures, such as fi l l ing out a thorough report o f a crime, even i f doing so fails to uncover evidence leading to the arrest o f 3 suspect (Parks, 1976). Apparently, the procedures followed, and not the outcomes, are<' more likely to influence overall judgments o f fairness. -

I n a series o f studies. Ty ler and Cainc (1981) extcnded examination o f this issue to the domain o f leadership endorsen~cnt. Specifically, they sought to determine whether satisfaction with leaders was hased on the procedures used to allocate outcomes. independently o f thc outcome levels themselves. I n their first study, undergraduate student subjects rcad and suhsequently evaluated sccn- arios depicting a student enrolled i n a course i n which the grades were awarded following a fair o r an unfair procedure, and i n which the grade received was either less than. greater than. o r equal to the grade the student actually deserved. Interestingly, i t was found that subjects rated the teacher more positively along a number o f dimensions when the teacher followed fair as opposed to unfair Procedures. O f even greater importance was the finding that the actual grade given by the teacher d i d not significantly influence ratings o f overall fairness. although the grading procedures did. Extending these findings to a naturalistic Setting, the authors also conducted a questionnaire study to determine the extent to which actual teacher evaluations are influenced by outcomes and procedures. This study found that students' perceptions o f the fairness o f the grading procedures o f courses they recently took accounted for more variance i n their teacher evaluations and ratings o f teacher fairness than the grades they received. I n fact,

ROBERT FOLGER and 1ERAI.D C R E E N R E ~ ~ 1 rlR.l., i l l r ~ l /~tst;ie

emulate legal conditions (Brett, 1973-74). i t provides US with an interesting and reliable set of findings about the inllucnces o f prcress control.

Several studies have shown that s:itisfaction with the adversary prcedurc . .--: 1s j greater than satisfaction with the inquisitorial procedure. One o f the f irst expcr- ,

iments to find this result was cond~~cted by Walker. LaTour, Lind, and .rhibaut~- (1974). Their subjects played the role o f either litigants in, or observers of, a tr ial in which either an adversary procedure or an inquisitorial procedure was used. In the adversary procedure condition. subjects were ahle to select attorneys 10 represent their sides; in the inquisitorial prtredure condition. a single representative was expected to represent both sides. Not surprisingly, fiivomble out-

comes (i.e.. innocent verdicts) were preferred to unfavorable outcomes (i.e., guilty verdicts). However, an independent effect o f procedures was found that was particularly interesting: both trial participants and observers preferred the adversary procedure. Compared to subjects who either experienced or observed the inquisitorial procedure. those i n the adversary procedure condition were more satisfied with the procedures and believed them to be fairer. These effects were subsequently replicated by Lind. Kurtz. Musante. Walker, and Thihaut (1980). who found that adversary procedures were preferred to nonadversary procedures. m e former process was considered to be more satisfying, accurate, and unbiased. Corroborating evidence has also been reported by Lind. Lissak, and Conlon (1983). and by Walker. Lind. and Thibaut (1979).

I t i s tempting to explain these results in terms o f a cultural bias that the subject$-1 in these investigations might have had in favor o f the adversary procedure. That- is, having grown up with the adversary procedure, American students are certainly more accustomed to, and familiar with. the adversary procedure than the inquisitorial procedure, and may be expected to favor it. This explanation, however, is inconsistent with evidence gathered by Lind, Erickson. Friedland, and Dickensberger (1978). who compared preferences for various legal systems among groups of students in the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Ger- many. Although the inquisitorial procedure is used in France and West Germany. subjects in these countries reported disliking the inquisitorial systems as much as those from the United States and Great Britain, who were less familiar with_- i t . The adversary system was preferred by subjects from all nations. suggesting ' that a preference for procedures offering process control is not the result of - cultural bias (see also Lind, 1982a). -

11 is important to note that the trial and procedures employed also influenced !

perceptions o f the resulting verdicts. Not only were adversary procedures PE- ferred to nonadversary ones, but they also appeared to encourage greater satic* faction with the verdicts and the belief that these verdicts were fair (LaTour. 1978; Walker et al.. 1974). I t makes sense to interpret these results as further evidence o f the positive reaction to control-giving, adversary procedures. Con- sider. in this regard, that the greater satisfaction with the outcomes of advercaq prtredures occurred even when the litigants believed their case was favored by

nonadvers;~ry prwetlures (L.intl et al.. IOXO). Morcc,ver, the prcfcrcncr I;)r procedures (e.g., more positivc attituclcs tow;hrO I;~wycrs, prc;lter si l t -

isfaction with thc evijcnce prcsentetl) was cvcn found hc./hrc the vcrtlict w;is

anno~~n~ed. The iniportancc o!' prnccss control illso h:~s heell dcnlonstrated recently in

of dispute-resoliltion procedures in nonlegal settings. In one such inves- .oation, Lind. LissaL. ant1 Conlon ( 1983) exnmincd the effects o f process control

(1, in the context o f an organizational hearing in which the outcomes were either binding or nonhindirig. Regardless o f whether or not the outcomes were believed--'

hinding, prtrcdures that afforded tlisputants greater prcress control were prceived to be fairer than those in which less prtxcss control was available. similarly, Musank, Gilbert, ancl Th iba~~ t (IYX3) f o ~ ~ ~ i d that decision makers in .-;

hr;lring evalu;~tzd the outconics ;~nd the prt~(.tlures more favorably when they i were given an op~) r tun i ty to chcu)sc the ;~pplicahlc decision rule than when they

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could not do so. /.

To summarize. the research on dispute-resolution procedures, whether in legal or nonlegal settings, clearly indicates that proceclures giving disputing parties

over the resolution process are preferrctl to those that do not offer any such process contrc~l. Greater satisfi~ction with the prwcdures, as well as with thc resulting outcomes, is protluccd hy process control-giving proceclures.

Partly because interest in procedural issues has a long and cherished tr;ldition in dispute-resolution contexts (Hazard. 1Y63), ;~ntl kc;luse interest in reward distribution has been guided primarily by the tradition of equity thcory ( I x v - enthal. 1976), i t is not surprising that theoretical intercst in proceclural justice emerged in the area o f dispute resolution before i t did in the area of reward allocation. Nevertheless, parallels between the dispute-resolution context and the reward-distribution context have led to sevcr;~l stutlies explicitly exnniining wedura l effects in the latter.

Rewards are equitably distributed when the relationship between (a) the amount of rewards a person receives and (b) the extent o f a prson's qualilications on wine appropriate entitlement dimension (e.g.. amount o f work performed) is the same across people-that is, in Adanis's ( 1965) terms, when the outcome1 input ratio is equivalent. An equitable outcome in a reward-distribution context 1s analogous to the outcome an innocent defendant receives in a trial when a verdict o f "innocent" is handed down. Just as such a defendant is likely to be

about that verdict regardless of the courtrtwni prcrcdure used, so-it is masonable to expect that satisfaction with eqi~iluhlc outcomes in a reward-dis- hhution context w i l l not vary greatly as a f u~~c t i on o f p r ( ~ e d ~ ~ r ; ~ l differences (i.e.. a ceiling effect could easily preclutlc evitlence o f p r t~edura l impact). On lhe other hand, there is evidence that an innocent person found guilty wi l l react

ROBERT FOLGER and JFRA1.D C R E E N R E R ~

quite differently depending on the perceived fairness o f the procetlure responsible for that vertlict (I*nTour. 1978). For this reason. we wi l l f ~ c u s on re;lctions ir~cqrtirtrhle outcomes in reviewing reward-distribution studies.

Folger ( 1977) condi~cted an early laboratory investigation of procedural cffecls i n a reward-distribution context. Male subjects ("workers") performed a t;,,k during I 0 work peritds and were notified o f their earnings on I 0 COITcsp,nding "pay peritd" c~casions. These earnings were allegedly determined by a who received money from the experimenter (the amount received being the sanlc for each pay period), and who was responsible for deciding each time how much o f that amount to keep for himself and how much to give to the worker (in actuality, the announced division was controlled by the experimenter). The situation had been described in a manner encouraging the workers to believe that an equal share between worker and decision maker would be equitable, and the predominant response of workers-when asked in advance to indicate on a card what their "fair" share per pay period should be-was an endorsement of equal shares (the few exceptions deviating only slight1 y from equality).

Several sets of experimental conditions were examined i n this study, and one o f these yielded an effect that has come to be the most common finding in reward- distribution contexts. I n this set o f conditions (labeled "inequitable-constant"), workers learned on each o f the first two pay periods that the decision maker had purportedly elected to keep two-thirds for himself and to give the worker only one-third o f the arnount available. The procedure manipulation was introduced at this p i n t , when the experimenter met briefly with each worker after the second pay period announcement. I n the "mute" procedure condition, the worker was given no opportunity to influence the decision maker, and the supposed purpose of the experimenter's visit was only to see i f there were any questions about the task. B y contrast, workers i n the "voice" procedure condition exercised an opportunity to influence the decision maker: after asking for questions, the experimenter took the worker's "Fair Payment Card" and said i t would be shown to the decision maker. (The term voice was coined by Hirschman. 1970, as a generic description for oppdrtunities to influence decision making; it is thus analogous to process control i n dispute-resolution contexts. but without the connotations o f "control" inherent i n the latter term.)

Regardless of procedure, the workers' payments remained constant thereafter; that is, the decision maker continued to keep two-thirds o f the available amount on each o f the subsequent pay periods, so that the cumulative amounts for worker and decision maker were highly inequitable at the end o f the 10 pay periods. In response to a questionnaire item asking about the perceived fairness o f those totals, however, "voice" workers reacted significantly more favorably than their "mute" counterparts. This type o f result has been referred to as a "fair process effect" (e.g., Greenberg & Folger, 1983). Such an effect involves a situation in which the same outcome is produced by either o f two procedures that differ

in ,,prceived fairness. with the orltcorllc itselt' k i n g pcrccivctl ;IS faircl (nlc,rc '

satisfyir~g, acceptable, etc.) when a s ~ c ~ i i ~ t c t l with IIIC I;~ircr prcwcdirrc. Ancjthcr set o f conditions ("rncqt~il;~hlc-i~~iprovc") in t1lC l.olger ( 10.77) ex-

Frilllent fount! evidence for ;In opp)site type of rcsult, which has heen cnllcd a .sfnls~ra~ic)n effect. " In these conditions, the workcr ;~~nounts for the first two pay peritds wcre even Irlore highly incqtlit;lhlc thiln in the conditions dcscr ikd above (i.e.. ;~pproxinlattly only 10 percent of what was available). Again the m u t e - v e r s ~ ~ - ~ o i c ~ manipulation was introducctl after the second pay pericd. In contrast to the schedult- (?f paynients used for the inequitable-constant conditions, however, the subsequent worker amounts in these inequitable-improve conditions

increased. 'The cun i~ l i ~ t i vc amounts i~f tcr I0 pay periods were -identical across conditions (viz,. the workcr reccivctl one-third o f the total. and the decision Ill;~kcr two- th i rds tyc t within the inequitable-improve conditions, the fairness7 ratings regarding these amounts wcre significantly higher from "mute" workers than f r o ~ ~ i "voice" wwkers. Several possible explanations of this effect have k e n proposed (e.g.. see decarufel & Schopler. 1979). some o f which we w i l l touch upon later. For the moment, however, we simply note that although similar results can bc fount! in some earlier studies (e.g., Thibaut. 1950; Thibaut. Friedland, 8i Walker. 1973). subsequent research (e.g., Folgcr. Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran. 1979) hassuggested that the frustration o f having influenced-' a decision maker "coo late" (the experience o f the voice-improve workers& such that the restc~ration o f equity is only partial-is likely to he manifested only under a reslriclrrl set o f circ~~mstanccs (see Greenberg & Folger, 1983).

A series of recent studies by Tylcr. Rasinski. and Spd ick ( 1985) have followed up on Folger's studies o f the voice-induced fair process effect. I n their one experimental study, these investigators created scenarios in which leaders allo- cated resoilrces, nianipulating the degree o f process control and decision control. It was found that even when decisions could not he controlled directly, procedures giving people a voice were perceived as bcing more prtwredurally fair and led to more positive evaluations of the a l l t ~a t i ng decision niakers than were procedures in which voice could not be exercised. Analogous findings were obtained In their two questionnaire studies correlating procedural justice judgments and leadership endorsement with prceived degree o f process control+jne studying defendants' reactions to legal cases and one studying students' reactions to grades they received. In both surveys, greater degrees o f prceived control over t h f Prtress were associated with heightened feelings o f procedural justice and more '

positive attitudes toward the reward allocator (the judge or the instructor). The effects o f voice-giving procedures has also been demonstrated in a series

of studies by Lissak ( 1983) in a variety o f allocation settings. Lissak's first study was a laboratory simulation study in the tradition o f Thibaut and Walker's paradigm. Subjects played the role o f adveriising exccutivcs involved in com- Petition for a contract from a sponsor and had prepared a hid in an attempt to

156 ROBERT FOLGER and JERALD G R E E N B E R ~

secure that contract. The manipulation of how much input. or voice, the subjects had i n presenting information ahout their ideas (in an atten~pt to secure contracl) was very influential in determining their reactions l o the pr()cedure. Those who were able to present information on their hehalf were more satisfied--; with the procedure and k l i e v e d i t to be fairer than those who only had a limited voice i n influencing the sponsor's decision. I t is interesting l o nole that subjects who had a voice i n the decision rated the procedures more positively than thoseL who had no such voice. even before the sponsor's decision was made. These findings are analogous t o those o f Lind et al. (19801, who found the same thing wi th respect t o the presentation o f evidence in a legal setting.

Additional 'studies by Lissak (1983) demonstrated similar effects i n the questionnaire responses o f actual organizational employees-specifically, members o f the Canadian Forces. One o f the field studies compared the enlisted menas reactions to two personnel evaluation procedures: one in which they had "no input concerning the behaviors and activities that they were rated on." and one i n which they were permitted t o "provide a written statement on their duties and noteworthy accomplishments" (p. 5 1 ). Consistent with the previously noted findings, respondents who were given the opportunity t o provide input into their 1 evaluations reacted to the performance appraisal procedure more positively. A) second field study found analogous results when the procedural manipulation of interest was input into the procedure by which transfers to different bases were made. Once again, those who had input into the (personnel) allocation procedures. expressed greater satisfaction wi th them.

T o ~ p m a r i z ? , studies o f reward allocation procedures have clearly demon? strated the prevalence of enhanced outcome-acceptance effects and greater perceived procedural fairness associated with procedures that give people process control i n the form o f "voice." These tindings lend support to both Thibaut and I Walker's ( 1975) and Leventhal's ( 1976, 1980) conceptualizations o f procedural justice.

Now that we have reviewed the conceptual background o f procedural justice and the research findings bearing o n it, the stage is set for our attempts to apply this work to various personnel procedures. Specifically, we w i l l focus on four varieties o f personnel systems-performance evaluation systems, compensation systems, participatory decision-making systems, and dispute-resolution sys- terns-each o f which contains procedures analyzable i n terms o f ~ r c redu ra l justice.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEMS W e believe that performance appraisal situations represent an especially fertile field in which to examine the implications o f research and theory on procedural justice. I n fact. two studies by Landy and his associates deal directly with the fairness o f performance appraisal procedures, although they do hot couch their

work in p r t~edura l justice terms. I n the fiisl_mcly. I.andy. Harncs, and Murphy (1978) questionecl over 700 rll;~nagcrial ;111d prolsstoo;rl cr~~ployccs o f a large ,,lanufacturing company ahout the ni~turc 01' tlrcir pcrlor11l;rnc.e cv;~luations and ,heir reactions to the~l l . I2;!ntly et ;I!. hound th;~t e111ployccs' pcrccptiolrs o f the-; f;limcss o f cv;~luation systcr~ls was signifir;lntly pohitivcly re1;ucd to "prc~ess vnriahles," srlch as the freq!rcncy o f evaluations, the rater's familiarity with the' ratees, and the opportunity 10 cxpress feelings. l'hcse findings were successfully cross-validiited. and thcy were replicated i n ;In identical follow-up-study hy Landy, Barnes-Farrcll, ant! Cleveland (1980). Furthermore, this follow-up in- - vestigation found that percrptions o f fairness were not related to the respondents' ! own performance ratings, therchy discounting the possibility that the outcomes of the rating prtress inll\rcnced the fairness ratings. These findings are perfectly consistent with those o f Tyler and Caine (19HI) ohtaincd in educational and-- pc)litical settings. showing that perceived fairness is more strongly rclatcd to the process by which the ouicolnes are ohtaincd than to the outcomes themselves.. They are a150 consistent with the organizationally based findings o f Alexander

1 and Rudernlan (1983) showing the dominance o f p r t ~cdu ra l justice over dis: tributive justice and their statistically independent impact.

Having established that reactions to performance evaluations depend more on the procedures by which they%are conducted than on what the evaluation outcomes may be, we have set the stage for a more tlctailed examination o f reactions to spci f ic procedures that may form the hasis o f these reactions. Four aspects o f performance evaluation procedures w i l l be analyzed: procedures allowing worker input into the evaluation; self-appraisal procedures; appraisal interview pr t re - dures; and rccord-kecpi~tg prcredurcs (see (;rcenhcrg. i n press).

I n p u t In Eva lua t ion Procedures

As part o f his dissertation, Robin Lissak (1983. Field Study I ) examined the impact o f input into performance evaluation prmcdurcs in the Can:ldian Forces on enlisted men's reactions to these procedures. Distinguishing between evaluation prtredures i n which the soldiers could and could not explain their performance to their supervisory raters ( in the form o f written narra~ives). Lissak found significantly more Fivorable reactions 'to high-input procedures than t< low-input procedures. Specifically. suhjects who had input into their evaluation: procedure rated that procedure higher on a p rc~edura l Fairness index (composed of highly intercorrelated items assessing satisfaction with. fi~irncss of. and trust and acceptance o f the evaluation system) than those who had no such input. Similar results have been reported in ;I field study by Diphoye and de Pontbraind (198 1 ). Thcse investig;ltors fcouncl that clnployccs' opinions o f their ;~ppraisal system were more favorable to the extent that thcy helicved they had an opportunity to express their own viewpoints.

In addition to this work, a recent experiment hy Kanfer, Sawyer, Early, and

Lind (1083) further supported the role o f input in the performance evaluntion process as a deterniinant o f prtwredural justice. Undergradu;~te stuclcnts serving ;IS subjects in this laboratory investigation perk)nned a task for which they were evaluated by a supervisor. Manipulated were (a) subjects' opportunities to offer information ahout their performance to their supervisor and (b) the presence or ahsence o f information provided by the supervisor regarding the evaluation criteria. Kanfer et al. found that subjects performed at the highest level when high input opportunities were combined with an explicit statement about prforniance criteria. Additionally. high input into the appraisal led suhjects to perceive the appraisal procedure as k i n g fairer than when opportunities for input were denied. The high-input procedures also were found to enhance satisfaction with performance outcomes as well as satisfaction with the supervisors. These laboratory results are consistent with the findings o f held questionnaires (L l ipbye & de Ponthraind, 1981; Lissak, 1983). which also reported favorable re;rctions to the feedback from evaluation procedures that provided opportunities for input hy thc evaluated worker.

These findings not only invite comparison with Folger's (1977; Folgcr et al., 1979) studies o f "voice," but can be explained in terms o f the same mechanisms. Indeed, they reveal further instances o f the "fair process effect" (e.g., Greenberg & Folger. 1983) described earlier in this paper (i.e.. the tendency for greater outcome satisfaction to result from voice-giving procedures than from mute procedures). A likely expl;~nation for the effect, particularly in the context of perfomlance appraisals. is that voice-giving (high-input) procedures allow participants to ensure that the evaluator has more complete, accurate inforn~ation to consider in making his or her evaluations than mute (low-input) procedures (cf. Folger el al.. 1979; Thibaut & Walker, 1978). This notion is consistent with Leventhal's ( 1980) procedural elements o f "setting ground rules'' and "gathering information," ones subsequently shown to c;rrry the greatest weight in judg~iients of fairness (Fry & Cheney, 1981; Fry & Leventhal. 1979).

At the same time. however. we must emphasize that the effects o f procedures are twofold, and that predictions regarding the impact o f procedures must take their dual nature into account. Specifically, while procedures are inevitably; instrumental in character (i.e.. they constitute the means for accomplishing someJ end result. such as when performance appraisal procedures are used to generate evaluations upon which such outcomes as salary increases. bonuses, and pro- motions are based), reactions to a given procedure may also at times reflect an-.? assessment of that procedure as an md-in-ifself. Part o f the favorable reaction .:, to voice and enhanced process-control procedures, as suggested above. is probably due to their being perceived as an efficient-a_nd accurate -- -. means .. - for accu- mulating the information most relevant to a decision or judgment. o n t h e other -- - hand, another part o f such reactions may stem from aspects of these p c e d u r s - considered to be desirahle. regardless o f the particular decision they yield on a given occasion. A n important aspect o f the contrast between mute and voice --

procedures, for exanlplc. ni;ly bc th;~t the I;~ttcr rcllcctc nlorc th:ln thc fonllcr ;I dcgrec of trust in. and rc.g;~rd for (rc5pct v i s - i v i \ the opinions ot). those who ;Ire given voice. This i~nldicit recognition 01- sonic potcntiill value in the voice- rccipicnt's views may constitute a psychologically signilicant "outcollle" in itself. and thc positive al'fcct thcrcby asstri;lted with k i n g given a voice may gcnerali7e to wh;~tevcr other outcolncs ;Ire obtaincd from the evaluation.

In light o f this dual nature o f procedures, it is important to note that two - different kinds of favorable reactions involving perfomlance appraisal systems have been obtaincd in the studies rcviewcd hove, and that these reactions correspond to two different types of me;lsllres i~sstwriated with prc~edural justice research in general. reaction is to the performance app~ i . y l system itself 1 (high-input -- systems k i n g evaluated more f;~vor;lbly thi"low-input systems). and the obtained effect is comparhle to the strong preference for adversary rather than inquisitori;rl legal systems that has been so thoroughly docunlented by Thibaut and Walker (1975) and their associates. The second -- .. type o f reaction r.

involves f+gs_~hout the feedba.ck_received from performance appraisals. and the findings reported to date (Dipboye & de Pontbraind, 1981; Lissak, 1983; Kanfcr et al., 1983) are consistent with the fair process effect in reward-distribution studies. Nevertheless, given the occasional presence o f a frustration effect in the latter context, we would car~tion that reactions to the outcome o f a per- fonnance appraisal n ~ y - b .g~fun-ti!)-n~jf-twth the appraisal system used (e.g., <, high versus low input) and the actual appraisal received (c.g., its relationship to the appraisal that was expected or considered to k deserved).

Although conducted in a reward-distribution context, the Folger (1977) experiment can be used to illustrate the distinction between reactions to a procedure and reactions to its consequences, as well as to il lustrate the circumstances under which frustration effects might arise. Subjects in that experiment provided t p t y p e s o f questionnaire responses: ratings o f prtwredural fairness a@ ratings o f outcome fairness. In the inequitable-constant conditions. voice workers gave more positive ratings to both items than did mute workers. In the inequitable-improve conditions, however, the pattern o f responses differed hetween the two items. As noted earlier, the voice workers in these latter conditions gave more nexafir,e ratings o f outcome fairness than did the mute workers (the frustration effect). Nevertheless, the voice conditions produced more posirive ratings o f prtredural fairness than did the mute conditions. Together, these results show that positive reactions regarding a pro-? cedure do not_a_leys spill over to reactions regarding the outcomes ohtained i as a consequence o f that procedure. --

The caveat suggested hy the possibility of a frustration effect is that in providing the opportunity for expression of one's opinions, voice procedures may also raise one's hopes and expectations ahout the prospects o f influence. Indeed. whereas mute-improve workers were no tloubt plc;~santly surprised by the upward turn in their fortunes, voice-improve workers prcsu~nably thought their gradually

lfrl ROGER FOLGER A N D JERALD GREENHERc,

(tlistributive justice) as contributors to pay satisfaction. In a somewhat strongcr I

vein, Mahoney and Weit7,el (1978) suggest that impersonal referents. such as the compnsation system itself, rather than personal referents, such as interper- sonal wage comparisons, provide the basis o f satisfaction.

Both the findings from studies o f open pay systems and the above conjectures are consistent with leventhal's (1980) analysis o f the elements of prwedural justice. Specifically. open pay systems assure those covered hy them that procedures are in place for ensuring against i~buses o f power by decision-making bodies-leventhal's (1980) procedural element, "safeguards." Indeed, the very transparency o f the system discourages abuse and favoritism, thereby promoting procedural fairness based on "consistency" and "bias suppression." Thus, although open pay systems do not provide assurances o f procedural justice based on the opportunity to exert direct control over the payment process, opportunitir\ to openly monitor that process's operation are likely to make workers feel con- fident that the procedures w i l l not be abused, thereby resulting i n consistent and unbiased (i.e., procedurally fair) decisions.

Before concluding this section, we would l ike to comment on a law that has. since September 2. 1974, acted to ensure procedural justice in the area o f fringe benefit administration, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The intent o f this law was to set up procedures ensuring that participants in benefit plans know what they are entitled to and to guarantee that they get it. The law distinguishes among (a) information regarding benefit programs that must be communicated to workers, (h) information that must be provided by the employer upon request by the worker, and (c) information that the employer must make available for examination (see Fleming. 1975). We believe ERISA's stipulations help ensure that procedural justice wi l l be accomplished in niuch the same way as open pay systems. That is, by assuring access to inforn~ation. the law protects employees from procedures that might deny them an opportunity to receive the benefits coming to them.

Cafeteria-Style Benefit Plans

Cafeteria-style benefit plans, also referred to as flexible benefit plans, represent another type of compensation system analyzable from the perspective o f pm- cedural justice. These plans allow employees to "determine the relative mix of their fringe benefits and wage package" (Werther, 1976, pp. 41-42). Social - conditions leading to changing demographics o f the work force (Milkovich & Delaney, 1975) and changes i n American income tax regulations (Treacy & Tane. 1982) have contributed to the growing popularity o f cafeteria-style benefit plans (Lawson, 1982). leading one industry analyst to refer to them as the "buzzword o f the 'NOS" ("Social Changes." 1981). Although such plans have met with economic success in many o f the companies using them, such as American Can Company. TRW, and the Educational Testing Service ("Em-

,,li)yees Satisfied." IOH3). and have hcc~ i ;~ssociatrd with [he satisfaction of tllcir t.rllployees, sonie prohlcriis h;~vc k c n reportrd with rvspcct to unforscen ex- pnditures (Dlitzer, I O H I ). d i f f ic~~l t ics in adr~iini\tration she;^, IYXI), and en,- ployces' not making their decisiol~s rcspt~nsihly (Schlacht~neyer & Bog;lrt, 1970) Still, because flexihlc benefit plans have k e n seen as a virtual condition of empIoy~ncnt in some cases (Harris. 1975) and as a motivational t(n,I (Cole, 108.3). interest in such plans has remained high enough to encourage personnel administrator^ to devise ci~reful systclns designed to avoid the sllortcomings (Werther. 1976).

Th:~t cafeteria-style benefit plans are so well-received by employees is not particularly surprising from the sti~ndpoint o f pr t~edural justice. Using Thibaut ;~nd Walker's (1978) terminology. such pl;~ns give employees decision con t ro~ . ( i . ~ . , the opportunity to make decisions concerning their outcomes). I n writing earlier on this topic (Greenberg & Folger, 1983). wc have identified such direct decisions as those involving "choice." to distinguish them from those more indirect decisions involving "voice" (or process control). According to o u r , analysis, there i s nothing particularly surprising about the increased satisfaction resulting from choice-giving procedures, such as cafeteria-style benefit plans. J After all, allowing people to chtwse what benefits they want increases their chances o f receiving highly desired outcomcs, relative to a system ill which the employer makes the choice for all elnployccs.

We helieve. however. that the psychological mechanisms underlying the ben--~ eficial effects o f choice lie beyond this s~~pcrf icial simplicity. The crucial question concerning the effects o f choice is whether individuals are happier with the outcomes they have selected than with the same outcomes selected for them. Several experiments suggest that the act of making a choice is in itself incre- mentally responsible for outcomc satisfnction. Greenkrg (1983). for example, had subjects in a marketing-prefercnce study sample desirable-tasting or unde- sirable-tasting breakfast cereals that they were either given a choice. or had no choice, in selecting. I t was fount1 that the chosen cereal was nrore liked by^; subjects than the nonchosen one. whether or not it was desirable tasting. Sim- ilarly, in an experiment mentioned earlier. Musante, Gilbert, and Thibaut (1983) found that subjects in a hearing were niore sati.ficd with outcomes when they chose the decision rule that governcd the outcomes o f the hearing than when no choice was available. Unfortunately, no comparable studies have been conducted regarding choice o f fringe benefits. Indeed. i t would be very difficult to find matched pairs o f subjects containing one member who selected his or her own benefits and another for whom the same benefit package was chosen by another. Generalizing from the experiments conducted in other contexts, however, we2 suggest that the satisfaction resulting from choice-giving procedures goes beyond simply assuring that the choosers get what they want.

A likely explanation for the increased satisfaction resulting froni choice i s ? that. according to cognitive dissonance theory (e .g., Insko, Worchel. Folgcr. Kr _/

170 ROBERT FO1,GER and JERALD GREENBERG

than whcn the lack o f support for a suggestion is unaninlous. I n terms of our social influcncc explanation o f the fair prcxcssefl2ct (Gwenhcrg & I;olgcr, 1 9 ~ 3 ) ~ unanimously rcjccted suggestions are analogous to the voice-constant condition of 1:olger's (1977) experiment ( in which a fair process cffect was obtained). That is, aftcr the suggestion has k c n submittcd (a voiced request). subsequent acticJns show that the validity o f the suggestion has heen denied (outcomes remain unchanged). I n the Folger ( 1977) experiment. the prsuasivencss o f those actions (the cxtcnt to which the sincerity of the decision maker was "augmented" by his having so emphatically denied the request) may have k e n enhanced hecause the worker had n o source o f social support for his own viewpoint. as would he the case i n the unanimous committee rejection. Other research is consistent in showing the strong social influence o f a unanimous majority (e.g., Asch. 1952) and the tendency toward accepting a decision when social support for a dissentinF opinion is absent (Folger et al.. 1979; Michener & Lyons. 1972; Michener & Tausig. 1971 ). O n the other hand, a spl i l opinion i n the suggestion con~mittec offers partial support for the validity o f the suggestion, a condition that leads to less acceptance o f decisions (Folger et al., 1979) and to the reduced influence o f majorities (Asch, 1952).

Thc situation is also particularly problematic when several employees submit the same g d suggestion at the samc time and some hybrid suggestion is enacted (Sandell, 1979). Possible problems may result from workers' believing that their credit (recognition and monetary reward) was unfairly diluted b y another's seem- ingly inferior suggestion, or perhaps the fear that the ideas was stolen b y another (Reuter. 1977). One proposed;olution to this problem is that bonuses be distributed on a companywide basis rather than on an individual basis (Olsen, 1976). ~ l t h o u g h i t would be inappropriate herc for us to debate the merits o f shared versus individual incentive systems, we should note that shared incentivcs for

suggestions may he expected to alleviate some o f the dissatisfaction expected to result f rom partial acceptance o f one's decisions.

Fair Administration of thc Plnn . A second reason why the benefits o f suggestion systems may not be realized '

is that they may lack appropriate procedurally fair elements. Indeed. several - recommendations for the implementation and administration of suggestion systems coincide wi th the procedural elements identified b y Leventhal (1980). For example. i t has been recommended that the suggestion committee, which eval- uates suggestions and sets policies concerning the system's operation, be corn- posed o f representatives o f the various departments o f an organization (Gunter & George, 1975). This advice i s congruent with Leventhal's hypothesis that the -- selection o f appropriately representative decision-making agents contributes to procedural fairness. Another recommendation is that suggestion systems be based . o n "clear. publicized politics." thereby avoiding dissatisfaction resulting f n ~ m _

S,,spctcd parti;~litv (Rcutrr. 1977. p. 8x1. .l'hill i\. tilt .'tirscihron htnrct~lre," 1 c,,enlhal's tcm?inology, nccds to he dcli~~c.tl.

Probably the nlost ilnpc~rtnnt rcc.o~nn~cnd;~tion. I~C'~;IIISC it htlS the preatc,, ,-,,,tentiili for callsing probiellls. i s ti1:11 "A11 v f ' ~ c c t i ~ e CL)SI S Y S ~ C ~ ~ , llllIs~ avilil -- able as a prr~rr(llll.rilf I() .fair ~r@rrllrrllion upon which to h;rsc tin: v;,lue o f a,l award" (Reuter. 1977. p. 8H. emphasis i ~ d d ~ d ) . This advice is in keeping wit\ l

~ ~ ~ ~ n t h a l ' ~ (l')XO) idc;~ o f "scltin&! ~ro i rnc l rules" (i.e., creating prtx.cdurcs cletem~ining and cv:~lu;llinl: potential rcw;irtls and the hhaviors lleressary I,, att;lin them). The advice is prc)hicnri~tic, howcvcr, in that (a) there are oftcl,

a n l b i g u i t i ~ ~ inhcrcnl in the ;~ccourlling systcms used to dctcnninc an illca\ linancial worlh l o the company (hence the s~~ggcstcr's share) and (h) the saving5 rcsuiting from inlplcmenting the plan aftcr thc first year are 1y1iic;~lly not con- ~ idcred whcn the amount of an individual award is dctcrmincd, despite the company's continued benefits (Olscn. 1976). As a result, drtennining awards in a procedurally fair manncr miry bc tliflicult to accomplish. I n view of the [rustrating effects l ikely to result f r o n ~ thc irnplc~ncntation o f unfair p r t ~ e d u ~ e s . our analysis furthcr undcrscorcs the reco~~~rncndations noted here.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS If we were to idcntiSy any onc area o f personnel work as traditionally being most concerned with procedures. i t w o ~ ~ l d have to be the area o f organizational disputc resolution. Because many organizational dispute-resolution procedures may hc viewed as private, intraorganizational lcpal systems. it should not he surprising that they share an interest i n prcretlural matters with the external legal systems within which they are based (Evan. 1962). B y setting up their own dispute- resolution systems, organizations h o p to avoid the acrimony and costs o f formal litigation through the legal system (Coulson, 1978). Our analysis o f the procedures used in these systems w i l l distinguish between traditional organizational due process systems and some much morc rccent approaches that have been advanced.

T rad i t iona l D u e Process Procedures

The term "organizational due process" procedures refers to procedures ex--i isling within organizations that attcnlpt to provide an opportunity for employer- :

employee dispu~es to be resolved internally, without relying on formal litigation through the court system (Aram & Salipante, 1981). Fueled by a widening -.

recognition o f the need to extend the application o f constitutional rights to employees on the job (Ewing, 1977a), sevcral types o f due process mechanisms have become popular. Specifically, survey studies (e.g., Ewing, 1977b; Scott

"r 1965) have reported thc existence o f due process procedures ranging from ex- ecutive open door policies to appeals systcms. corporate ombudsmen, and man- :

Documents

2.3 Procedural Justice an Interpretive Analysis of Personnel Systems