21st Army Group High Command in War

8/2/2019 21st Army Group High Command in War

1/48


2/48


3/48

\ V"

21 ARMY GROUP

HIGH COMMAND'"

IN WAR

This pamphlet must NOT fall Il\to enemy hands. Officers Inpossession of a copy will be responsible for Its safe custody.

L'GERMANVo:f/ JUNE, 1945.1/1'I (Reprinted in Canada ("'iov.1946l by Edmond Clouti l : r , C. l .G . B.A. , L. Ph. ,King'5 P r i n t ~ r an d Cont ro l le r of Stat ionery by p ~ r m i 5 s i o n of the Control ler ,Hi5 &ajes ty ' s S ta t ionery Off ice . )

1 ~ - 1 1 " 4 6 (9769) H . Q . ~ 2 J - 1 4 - 4


4/48


5/48

IntroductionI HAVE i . s s ~ e d thoree pamphlets to the forces under mycommand. - . (a) The infantry division in battle.

(b) The armoured division in battle.(c) Notes on the use of air power.in support of landoperC;ltions.'"2. I consider that this fourth pamphlet is nownecessary to complete the series, and .it isentitled:-" High Command in War."

3. The first part of this pamphlet deals with theprinciples of war as I consider them to be.These are:-

(a) Air power.(b) Administration.(c) The i n i t i a t ~ v e . (d) Morale. .(e) Surprise. .(f) Concentration.(g) Co-operation.(h) Simplicity.

I have written at some length on the first fouras their great. i,fllportance has come to the fore in thiswar. The last.four, are old stagers and can speak forthemselves.


6/48

4. The second part of the pamphlet deals with"Command and Control". The section dealing with"The Chief of Staff" was written for me by MajorGeneral de Guingand, who has been my CHief of Stafffrom Alamein to the Baltic. '5. I must emphasise that these pamphlets have noofficial significance.' They represent ~ own views,and they are .based on my own practical experienceduring a long period of hard fighting which began atAlamein in October. 1942. and finished on the shoresof the Baltic in May, 1945.6. I do not expect for a moment that all seniorofficers in the Army will agree with my views. But ifthese pamphlets prove to be of assistance only to oneor two commande.-s in the stress and strain of modernbattle, they will have been well worth the writing.

Field-Marshal.C-in-C.21 Army Group.

Germany.June. 1945.


7/48

THE PRINCIPLES ''OF WAR


8/48

5THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

I . A war is won by victories in battle. Novictories will be gained unless commanders will sortout clearly in their own minds those essentials whichare vital for success, and will ensure that those thingsform the framework on which ~ 1 action is based.. 2.' There are certain points which are fundamental;they are important always, and to neglect any of themwill probably lead to failure; they will apply, in agreater or lesser degree, to all commanders at alltimes.3. I give below those points which, in my opinion,are fundamental and are vital for success. Closeattention to these points has paid me a good dividend,and I COllBpend them to all commanders. I considerthat these points form the principleS of modern war.

Air Power'4. Experience in this war has proved beyond doubtthat all modem military operations are in factcombined Army/Air operations. Any officer whoaspires to JIold high command in war must understandclearly certain principles regarding the use of airpower. .

~ . 5. The first and basic principle is that you mustwin the air battle before you embark on the land, orsea, battle. If this is not done, then operations onland will be conducted at a great disadvantage. Oncethe air battle is won, then air power is available toprovide the ground forces with more direct forms pfa s s i s ~ n c e . 6. The greatest ~ of air power is its flexibility.Within the r a ~ g e limitations of their aircraft, the Air


9/48

6IForces, whether Strategical or Tactical, are able without change of base to be switched quickly from oneobjective to another throughout the theatre of opera

t i o n ~ . Because of this, the whole weight of theavailable air power can be used in selected areas intum; this concentrated use of the air strikipg force is abattle-winning factor of the first i m p o r t a n ~ : e . 7. I f the ability to attack in depth is to be fullye x p l o i ~ e d , it will happen that on occasions the, localrequests of Army formation commanders will be overridden by more important strategic requirfements. Thedistribution of air resources will be conSjtantly underreview by the higher joint command.' ,8. It follows that control of the available air powermust be centralised and command mustibe exercisedthrough Air Force channels. Nothing could be morefatal to successful results than to dissipate the airresources into small packets placed under. command ofArmy formation commanders with each packet workingto its own plan. Once priorities have been allotted bythe joint command to a particular sector whereconcentration of effort is required, it, may be advantageous and at times will be essential to decentralisecontrol of a proportion of the effort in. order to bringabout quick and immediate air attacks closely relatedin time and space to the action on the ground.9. The commander of an army in the field mustdeal in the planning of air operations with onf; AirForce c o m m ~ . n d e r and one only. Under c ~ r t a i n circumstances it may be: necessary for: the air commander to. call for air resources beyond his immediatecommand 10 order to meet the Army's requirements. I fthat is so, additional Air (Force representatives. may bebrought forward to give expert advice, but the one toone channel must not be \traversed. This is a funda ..meutal principle to which there. should be no exceptions, The orders for air: operations will he given by

t.


10/48

7the Air Force commander within the framework of theArmy/Air plan approved by the military commander.10. The conception ~ making an Army plan andthen asking for air assistance to ' be provided mayresult in air power being. overlooked during theimportant preliminary phases, or even in a misunder-standing of the plan as a whole. I t is essential, there-fore, that the staUs of both Services should wor!:together from the outset on a joint basis in plamlingoperations, with complete mutual understanding andconfidence.I I . In order to ensure efficiency in planning airsupport operations, it is essential for the Army andAir Foi'ce commanders and their staffs to understandthe requir,ements, the capacity and the limitations ofeach other's service.To reach proper standards in these things, it is neces-sary for both Services to recognise their responsibilitiesin a practical manner and to introduce appropriateinstruction at all levels and at all stages of training. Inaddition, as well as possessing a sound knowledge ofthe tactical characteristics of aircraft, the Army mustunderstand thoroughly the following precepts:-

(a) Thfl Air Force cannot produce it.s maximumsupport without adequate airfields. I t is theduty of the military commander to ensure thattheir early provision is 'catered for in his plans,and that adequate engineer and labour resourcesare allotted for this purpose.(b) Given adequate airfields, the efficiency of theair forces depends on good communications.Proper priority must be given to Air ForceSignal requirements.

(c) To plan for air operations successfully, the AirForce must receive adequate and timely infor-mation about the targets they are to attack, andthe objects to be achieved.

I


11/48

8(d) Fire support from the air is dependent on theweather. I f air support is essential for success,

operations must "'ait for good weather; if thetime factor precludes the acceptance of Qelay inlaunching an operation, the overall plan )Tlustaim at provi,ding adequate fire support fromthe ground, and must regard the air support asa possible b o n u s ~ (e) The moral effect of air action is very great andis out of proportion to the. material damageinflicted. In the reverse direction, the sight and

sound of our own air forces operating againstthe enemy have an equally satisfactory effect onour own troops. A combination of the two hasa profound influence on t h ~ _ I T I Q ~ _ t j g t p C ? ~ ! ~ _ ~ t .~ ! . D g J ~ . f ~ _ ~ j g r j l l yyar-ffi9f.li1e..The contribution made by the Air Forces to thecampaigns of this war- has been very great. Technicaldevelopments in the air weapon continue apace andtheir p o s ~ i b i l i t i e s are bounded only by the imagina-tion; proccqure and technique, 'however satisfactory,can always> be improved. The future potential 'of theair weapon, therefore, is greater still. The' fulltxploitation of this potential can ,best be guaranteedby joint study and research at all levels and by recog-nition of the fact that, from their experience and fromthe parts they have to play, both Services' have some-thing to contribute to future development and progress.The Army and the Air Forces have fought in this waras a combined team, and much of our success is dueto th( joint approach and this team spirit. As inwar, so in peace.

Administration12. In modern warfare new factors have b e ~ n introduced which make it vital that a commandershould t'nsure that his admini:;trative arrangements are('qual to the strain imposed in carrying out his tactical


12/48

9plan. The chief of these ,factors are the speed ofadvance of a m c ~ h a n i s e d army, the increased vulnerability of lines of communication to attack by :air orarmoured columns, and the vast organisation requiredfor the maintenance of. the force and for the repair ofvehicles ,and equipment. 413. In formulating the administrative plan and inadvising 'the commander of the possible scope of operations which can be supported by the a d m i n i s t r a t i \ " l ~ resources, there is usually a tendency, t o w a r d ~ 0.\:c't'-insurance. The results of under-insurance inevitablybecome apparent to all, whereas the crime of overinsurance does not become apparent, and may, indeed,lead to a feeling of satisfaction that supplies of allsorts are plentiful and that the administrative arrangements are excellent. The reverse is, of course, thetruth, as 'any form of over-insurance must" inevitablycramp the commander in his operations and preventhim from making full use of his opportunities.It is, therefore, of prime importance that a C-in-C inselecting a Chief Administrative Officer 5hould choo..:ethe man who can nicely calculate his risks in the lightof the probable course of events, and who moreovc,rhas sufficient detailed experience to know and to checkthe potential sources of, o\'er-insurance on the part ofthe Services or Staff. Among the many examples ofsuch possible over-insurance are the calculating ~ o M1'turnround at too Iowa figure, the under-estimating ofthe petrol mileage per gallon; and the ignoring of'such hidden reserves as heavy tonnages of unbalancedrations. Although the calculation of ammunitionrequiremrnts is a, matter for the General Staff, the'Chief Administrative Officer should have a good kno"-ledge deriw'd from his experience of previous campaigns which will e n a b l t ~ him to offer advice nIl t1wscale n e c ~ ' s s a r y , and to point out the s e r i o t l ~ d f { ~ c t ~ ontransport and loss of time in the over-calculation ofammunition required fnr a particular task.


13/48


14/48

\1 \\of thc unborn- plans anelof their p o s s i b l ~ implications.Early consideration of all possibilities '\by hcads ofbranches and servicc5 is e ~ s e n t i a l as administrativeplans have to be laid a long tiIl)c in advane. Shippingin particular, 'and the p r o y i ~ i o n of adequatc reinforcements, are matters' which take time to arrange, andcannot be put into operation at the last hour. Nosituation should be allowed to a r i ~ e to which somethought has not already 4been g h e ~ . 16. It is a matter of considerable importance thathigher forI1!CJ.!i9.I1?in .. the f i e I d s ~ O l l l ( L c , ~ r r Y ( ) I . l t . ~ ~ : h ~ r c ipossible'theurgel)t. demands ..,.Qt 1 9 ~ \ ' ( ' r , _ J91"IllCltiQnsduring ()perCi tion!:\L \\'ithou targu meIltQrdC'Jay . It willbe time enough to hold an i n q u e ~ t on the desirabilityof thc demand when thc operational situation haseased. Completc confidence betweenthc' administrative staffs of higher and lower formations is essential.Heads of branches and services must never lose sightof this, and must do everything in their power to see. that the spirit of co-opcration is f o s t ~ r e d . Personal,visits of scnior staff officcrs should be made frrquentlybetween formations.' ,17. The administrath'c functions of HP, L of C,and of its dependent Area and Sub Area HQ, have aconsiderable bearing on the s u c c e ~ , : o i f u l issue of theadministrative plan. The commanders and staffsrequire careful selection.The respective duties of the Army Group Staff and ofthe HQ, L of C, must be clearly undcr$tood: theformer being responsible for policy and general administration 'of b a ~ c installatiol1:-, pnrt:-, I\VT" railwaY$,ctc.; thc lattrr for local a d m i n i ~ t r n t i o l l only.I8. In addition to the' maiIlt.enance of th(' ~ o u n d forces, the Army ha:, cc'rtuill ( ' ~ ~ C ' n t i a l a d m i n i ~ t r a t ~ \ ' e responsibilities to the I ~ . \ F . such CIS ~ l I p p l y of commonuser items and th(' alloca tion of thc l 1 e c ( ' - ~ ~ a r y transport


15/48

12facilities to move RAF requirements from ports anddepots to rail or road, heads. Experience has shownthat Army and RAF requirements can both he handledon the same L of C but, in order that this can be donewith the maximum efficiency and economy, it isessential that Army and RAF staffs should work inclose co-operation and that "Q" staff officers have aconsiderable knowledge of the administrative organisation of the RAF.19. The responsibilities of the It A" Branch haveincreased in proportion to the complexities of a modernArmy. Medical Services, Welfare and Personneldemand a continually higher standard. In the sameway that "Q" provides services, and repairs andreplaces equipment, material and stores of all kinds,so ItA" carries out almost similar functions with regardto p e r s o n n e ~ . A good "A" staff officer must, inaddition to the qualities of foresight, accuracy, andattention to detail, be the possessor of the humantouch. He must have a ,thorough knowledge of, theArmy and be able to realise the effect of his orders onthe eventual recipient. 6 ~ d , s t ~ f t W g I " k . Q R , J h ~ , p ~ I " t ,,9fthe "A""s.taffpr.oc111CeS djssCJ,tisfa::tigpCiJ!1(>IlgJlle,men,and dissatisfCi::tion JeadsJo ,10,55, QfmQr(lle. '20. The calculation of' reinforcements over a periodmany months ahead, together with a correct balancefor every arm and trade, requires considerable foresight and experience. Their arrival in the theatre mustbe planned well in advance. Without' an adequatereserve of manpower, divisions will waste away and thepossibility oT cannibalisation must be foreseen. Alesser numb(>r of divisions well up to strength in officersand other ranks may well be preferable to a' largernumber for which adequate reinforcements are notavailable.21. In previous wars the system adopted for maintenance' of an Army was that its requirements weredelivered daily by pack train, 'or similar means, to a

I )


16/48


17/48

14inaccuracy of a demand placed some time in advance.The F)IC is also the ,focus of the administrativeactivities of the formations: the shopping centre of theCorps. It may be that one or more divisions are maintained from each FMC. but in all,' c a s e ~ the FMC isessentially a C ( ) r J : > ~ ~ r ~ ~ ~ t ~ l l ~ t i o I 1 . 23. A further link in the chain is the Army Roadhead. This is in fact an advanced depot area undercontrol of an Army. desigped to give it the necessaryadministrative flexibility and to overcome the difficultyof the supply of Fl\ICs direct from Base or AdvancedBase Depots.24. The scale of reserves held both at the ArmyRoadhead and at Fl\lCs is largely controlled by thetactical situation. It is essential to remember that influid warfare neither of these installations are secure.and the Chief Administrative Officer must keep himselfcontinually in touch with. the C-in-CC so that therisks of these stocks iialling into eriemy hands can bedetermined and their l ~ o l d i n g s varied according to thesituation. The capturt\ of stores by the enemy maypresent him with the 'qnly means by which he canmake an effective counte1;'-stroke. As a general guide.it may be stated.that these forward reserves should beheld to a minimum. .25. When operating in divilised countries the maintenance problems of modern\armies are, to a large andincreasing extent. bound up': with the maintenance ofthe civilians living in the o p e ~ a t i o n a l areas and on theL of C. Unless these civilialPs are maintained in areasonable state of health a ~ are given adequatefood and the bare necessities\ of life, they quicklybecome an operational hindrance which may curtail theradius of action of formations or. even armies. Addedto this, large numbers ot' civilia:ps, apart from thoseenlisted into military units. are r ~ q u i r e d as labour forworks services on the L of C. . \


18/48

1526. In order to administer the civil population, theimport,manufac.ture, and movement of certain essentialsupplies for .civilian use must continue. All these threefactors conflict directly with the maintenance ofmilitary for,es. Priorities have to be decided c ~ m s t a n t l y between the military and. civil requirements, Thesepriorities can be decided only by the Chief Adrtinistra-tive Officer in consultation with the Chief of Staff.

I

27. The importance of Movement Control: by air,road, rail, sea, and IWT to Armies in the f i e ~ d cannotbe overstressed. Without a highly efficient ',organisa-tion, operations will be seriously handicappEid. Thisis even more the case where, as will be usual in modernwarfare, there is destruction in a greater. or le'ss degreeof national transport facilities.The responsibility of Q(Mov and Tn) is: firstly, tocontrol the even flow of shipping, and of railway, IWT,air and to some degree, road transport; and secondly,to repair, maintain and operate ports, railway5, railwaybridges and IWT installations. This may in factamount to the complete rehabilitation, control andoperation of the transportation sen'ices of one or morecountries.The Movements Staff are required to give advice at alllevels to the General Staff on operational matters, tothe "A" Staff on questions of personnel movementand to the "Q" Staff on maintenance. It is only J;ya free interchange of ideas ',with other sta,f branchesthat the Movements Staff can' hope to achieve maximumefficiency. i '

j'28. At GHQ, or Army Group, level in the field theimmense importance of tl;1ese duties warrant theestablishment of Q(Mov and'Tn) as a separate' Branchof the Staff, operating in the same way as the"A" 'and"Q" Branches, directly undqr the' Chief Adminis,trativcOfficer. At the same time, the highest degree of


19/48


20/48

17I f you lose the initiative against a good enemyyou will very soon be made to react to histhrusts; once this happens you may w e lose thebattle. It is very easy in large-scale operationsto 'lose the initiativc, and great energy and driveare requirep' to prevent this from happening.A c o m m a n d ~ r must understand very clearly thatwithout) the initiative he cannot win.

Morale31. Morale i thcrn()stiIllportaIlt sil1gle f l i ~ t o r i ! : 1 " _ w a ~ . : A--llign-iriora]eis based on disCipline,self-respeCt,and confidence of the soldier in his commanders andin his weapons. Without a high morale, no success canbe achieved-however good may bc' the strategic ortactical plan, or anything else.32. A 'high morale is a pearl of very great' price..And the surest way to obtain it is by success in battle.All operations staged must have a good and reasonablechance of success; the scope of sucll operations must belimited accordingly; there must be no failures.33. A higher commander cannot often speak to histroops personally. He can, and should, speak toofficers collectively whenever suitable opportunities'exist.Though he cannot often speak personally to his troops,he can keep in touch and get his personality across bymeans of personal messages. Before any big operation,. and at other times such as Christmas, a personal andinspiring message from the C-in-C will be of greatvalue; such messages must be drafted very carefully;they must be exactly right; they must not be toofrequent but should be kept for very special occasions.


21/48

1834. .New and untried troops must be introduced tobattle carefully and gradually, with no failures in theinitial ventures.A start should be made with small raids, then big-scaleraids, leading up gradually to unit and brigade operations. Great and hlsting harm can be done to moraleby launching new units into operations for which they'are not ready or trained, and which are therefore likelyto end in failure.\Vhen ne\\" units and formations are introduced to battlethere must be no failures.

Surprise35. Strategical surprise may often be difficult toobtain. But tactical surprise is always possible, andmust always be given a foremost place in the planning.

Concentration36. A sure way to victory is to concentrate greatforce at the selected place at the right time, and tosmash the enemy.Dispersion of effort, and of resources, is fatal to success.

Co-operation37. Successful battle operations depend on theintimate co-operation of all arms; no one arm, aloneand unaided, can do any good in battle.

Simplicity38. The first requirement of a simple plan is thateach component part of the force .should have its owntask to carry out, and its operations should not bedependent on the success of other formatiuDs or units.Once complications creep in, then troubles arise.


22/48

COMMAND ANDCONTROL


23/48


24/48

21COMMAND AND CONTROL

The Commander39. One of the first responsibilities of a C-in-C inthe field is to create what I would call "atmosphere",and in that atmosphere his staff: his subordinate commanders and his troops will live, and work, and fight.His armies must know what he wants; they must knowthe basic fundamentals of his policy and must be givenfirpl guidan.ce and a clear "lead". Inspiration andguidance must come from above and must permeatethroughout the force.Once this is done there is never any difficulty,. sinceall concerned will go ahead on the lines laid down;the \vhole force will thus acquire balance and cohesion,and the results on t h day of battle will be veryapparent.40. GenctaJly speaking, it may be said that thereare. two things to be done:- .

First -T o create the fighting machine, and toforge the weapon to his liking.Second-To create the HQ organisation, or setup, that will enable the weapon to bewielded properly and to develop its fullpower rapiply.

41. Subordinate commanders must be chose"n car/;fully; in war it is "the man" that matters.Commanders in all grades must have qualities ofreadership; they must have initiative; and they musthave the "drive" to get things done; they must havethat character and ability which will inspire confidencein their subordinates.Above all, they must have that moral courage, thatresolution, and that determination which will enablethem t9 stand firm when the issue hangs in thebalance.


25/48

22Probably one of the greatest assets a commander canhave is the ability to radiate confidence in the plan andoperations, when inwardly he is not too sure about theoutcome.A C-in-C must, therefore, be a good judge of men, and, be able to have the right man in the right place atth.e right time. I42. A C-in-C must watch carefully his own morale.The battle is in effect a contest between two wills, hisown and that of the enemy commander. I f his heartbegins to fail him when the issue hangs in'the balance,then the enemy commander will probably win.43. I t is absolutely vital that a C-in-C should keephims,elf from becoming immersed in details.He must spend a great deal of time in quiet thoughta ~ reflection, in thinking out the major problems, inthinking how he wiU defeat his e n e ~ y . I f he gets involved in details he cannqt do this; he willlose sight of the essentials that really matter;' he willbe led off on side issues that will have little influenceon the battle; and he will fail to be that solid rock onwhich his staff must stand.44. No officer whose daily life is spent in considering details, or' who has not time for quiet thought andreflection, can make a sound plan of battle on a high'level or conduct large-scale operations efficiently. I tis for this reason that the plan must always be madeby the commander and NOT by his staff.45. The wise commander will see very few papersor letters; he will refuse to sit up late at hight conducting the business of his army; he will be well advised to'withdraw to his tent or caravan after dinner at nightand have time for quiet thought and reflection.It is vital that he should keep mentally fresh.

I


26/48

23,

46. On the operational side the C-in-C has got tostrive to read the mind of his o p p o n ~ n t , to anticipateenemy reactions to his own moves, and to take quicksteps to prevent any enemy interference with his ownplans; he must aim to be always "one move" aheadof his opponent. He has got to be a very clear thinker,and able to sort out the essentials' from the mass offactors that bear on every problem.He has got to inspire confidence in his soldiers on thebattle front, and in the general public in the home.country. He must keep his finger on the spiritual pulse of hisarmies.Obviously, therefore, he must decentralise. He mustlay down "the form" very clearly; he must then trusthis subordinates, and his staff, and must leave themalone to get on with their own, jobs.He himself must devote his attention to the 'larger. issues; he must NOT "belly-ache" about details. '

Organisation for Command and, Control47. A higher commander in the field must organisehis headquarters in three echelons:-

(a) Tactical Headquarters.(b) Main Headquarters(c) Rear Headquarters.These are usually known as Tac, Main, and Rear.Together they form one team.48. Tac HQ is. the headquarters from which thecommander' exercises personal command and ... control ofthe b a t t l e ~ I t must be small and highly efficient,completely mobile' on its own transport, and selfcontained as regards defepce; it consists chiefly ofsignals, cipher, liaison staff, defence troops, I ~ i t h avery srn.aIl operations staff for keeping in touth withthe battle situation.

'

.


27/48

24Tac HQ of 21 Army Group consists of 50 officers, 600other ranks, of which about ha.lf are defence troops,and 200 vehicles.Tac HQ of an Army Group must be located well forward in the battle area, near the tactical headquartersof . armies; there J!lust be telephonc communicationbetwecn Tae and Main, either by linc, or by secureUltra High Frequency wireless (UHF), e.g. No. 10Set.The only orders issued from Tac HQ are those givcnverbally to Army Commanders by the C-in-C; theseare never confirmed in writing.BefQre definite phases in the operations thc C-in-C willnorme.lly issuc a written directivc to Army Commanders, giving the full scope of his intention and hisplan to achieve. it.49. I consider that a C-in-C, or Army Commander,should command always from his Tac HQ; he shouldlive therc permanently; even if it should happen thatTac and Main are close together. This will enablehim to keep clear of details, and givc him somesecurity from visitors; only in this way will he havetime for quiet thought and reflection.50. Main HQ is the central corc of thc whole headquarter organisation. The C-in-C givcs verbal ordersfrom Tac HQ; the staff work consequent. Of} thoseordcrs is done at Main and Rear.In a large force of a million men, or more, thc volumeof this staff work is immense. It follows that MainHQ is a large HQ, and cannot be moved r a p i d l y ~ 51. Rear HQ is thc administrative echelon of theheadquarter organisation. There are located the "Q"and "A" branches, and the services and departments.The Chief Administrative Officer must live at MainHQ, with the Chief of Staff.


28/48

25The Human Factor

52. In war it is the man that counts, and not onlythe machine.A good tank is useless unless the team inside it is welltrained, and the men in that team have stout heartsand enthusiasm for the fight; so it is in all other cases.With good men, anything is possible.53. A commander has at his disposal certain humanmaterial; what he can do with that material will dependentirely on himself. He must gain ~ h complete trustand confidence of his men. There is no book of ruleswhich will help him in this rriatter; each commanderwill adopt his own methods, and ones best suited tohis own make-up. Success in battle will produce quickresults; all soldiers will follow a successful general.54. Probably one of the most important requirements in a commander is that he must be a good j ~ d g e of men. He must be able to c h o o ~ e as his subordinatesmen of ability and character who will inspire confidencein others.55. It is necessary to remember that all divisionsare different; some are good at one type of battle, othersare good at another type of battle; the art lies inknowing what each division is best at, and havingthe right divisions in the right place at the right time.It is the same with commanders in their several ranks;one is best at this, another at that; you require theright commander in the right place at the right time.

Method of Exercising Command56. 'A commander must train his subordinatecommanders, and his staff, to work and act on verbal


29/48

26orders and instructions. There is far too much paperin circulation in the Army as a w h o U ~ ; no commandercan have time to read all this paper and also 40 hisj ~ properly.Much of the paper in circulation is not read; much ofit is not worth reading.57. Operational command in the field must be directand personal, by means oJ visits to subordinate HQ,where orders are given verbally. It is quite unnecessaryto confirm these orders in writing; commanders whocannot be trusted to act on clear and concise verbalorders are useless. With the modem use of light intercommunication aircraft, command by this system isquite Jeasible: even when the operations cover a largearea. 'o f58. A commander must know in what way to giveverbal orders to his subordinates. No two commandersare the same; each 'will require different treatment;some will react d i f f e r e ' ~ t 1 y from others; all this must beknown. 'Eventually a mutal confidence will grow up between:the commander and his\ subordinates; once this hasbeen achieved there will ~ e v e r be any more difficultiesor misunderstandings. ,

\.59. - An essential feature the method of direct andpersonal command is the system of lia,ison officers.A C-in-C in the field r e q u i r e ~ a team of highly-trainedliaison officers; these officers ,tour the battle, area andvisit subordinate HQdown to\divisions and sometimeslower, and they bring back' to the C-in-C each night

. LD accurate and vivid picture of what is going on., ,This is skilled work of great importance and first-class

officers are required for it. 1\hey must be young,active, fearless, very tough. and hard, ana mentallyalert; they must have an a t t r a c l i ~ e personality .which\\\\,

,.- , /


30/48


31/48

28I f the higher commander wishes to give some instructions regarding training ta his subordinate generals, heshould do so verbally. I f this is not possible, theinstructions may have to be written; in this case onlyone copy is required by the subordinate commander,and he will take whatever action he considers suitable,and will take it in his own way.Higher commanders should never want to issue detailedinstructions on training; they should concentrate onensuring that a c ! ~ _ ~ ! _ 9 g ~ J l j n e Q t w a L _ e x J s t S . r h ~ ~ ~ ~ t t r a m l I l ~ - m:truction .is ( ) l 1 ~ _ . W h i c h _i n J l i c a t ~ _ h 9 W t l l ~ baltle- -wil1t>e---f6uglif; subordinate commanders willthen--aCljqsf tneif-1raIiiing accordingly.

....

The Chief of Staff(Written by my own Chief of Staff)

61. These notes apply in particular to a Chief ofStaff of an Army Group, but are in many respectsequally applicable to Chiefs of Staff at lower levels.The various comments and suggestions are based upona considerable period' of pr.actical experience in thefield, and, it should be added, under one particularC-in-C. It is realised that commanders' methodsof exercising command differ widely.62. A Chief of Staff cannot be said to 'have accomplished his task successfully unless:-

(a) He takes all detail and sufficient other workoff his C-in-C's shoulders, and thus allows hisChief to devote the maximum time to exercisepersonal command, and for undisturbed reflection and thought.(b) He .ensures that the various echelons of the

Army Group HQ work as an efficient team, andthat a good esprit de corps is developed.


32/48

29(c) The relationship between the Army Group HQand Supreme, lJeadquarters and: the War OffL:eis harn;lOnious, and is based on mutual CI)n-fidence. \Cd) lie ensures that t h Armies recognise that /theArmy Group HQ exists to serve them.

63. There m u ~ t be' c o ~ p l e t e mutual confidence andtrust between the C'-in-Cand his Chief of Staff. In theirdiscussions no subject should be banned, and the Chiefof Staff must at all times be open and frank. Unpleasant facts must never be hidden from the Chief-although there are the right and wrong times to presentthem.The Chief of Staff must be able to adjust himself tohis commander's habits, his likes and his dislikes. Heshould watch out for even little things that irritate hiscommander\ . - .The C-in-C shoulders great responsibility and is theman who matters in the eyes of the fighting troops.The Chief of Staff therefore must be careful to donothing which will detract from his Chief's position.Experience suggests that the following are useful tips:

(a) Avoid all publicity, and never give press interviews or conferences which appear in the nameof the Chief of Staff, e.g. use "a staff officerfrom HQ".(b) As far as possible, do not accompany the C-in-Con his visits to troops. In any case, to do thejob properly, there isn't the time. Attendanceat conferences is, of course, a very differentmatter.

(c) Don't make a habit of a ~ ) p ( ' a . r i n g at c,ercmonialswith the C-in-C. The honour is meant for himalone.


33/48

30To sum up, the Chief of Staff should keep in the background, and get on with his work.When the C-in-C is c o ~ m a n d i n g from his Tac HQ, theChief of Staff should hold frequent telephone conversations with him. He should also pay frequentvisits to Tac HQ. It is important that the Chief ofStaff should collect as many subjects as possible thatcan be dealt with at one time-either on the phone orby personal discussion-and so avoid interrupting theC-in-C too frequently.I t is most undesirable that the C-in-C and the Chiefof Staff should write "papers" to each other. Endlesstime is saved if all business is transacted orally. Toachieve this desirable end, it is of course essential thatthe G-in-C has the capacity for assimilating rapidlythe sl1bjects d.iscussed, and is therefore able to givedecisions without spending long periods studying theproblem committed to paper. .64. In a large community like an Army Group, it isimpossible for a Chief of Staff to know more than afraction of the officers working under him. He should,however, see frequently the Heads of Branches andAdvisers, and keep them fully in the picture.The following points are considered important:

(a) Be accessible.(b) Let Heads of Branches, Advisers, e t c ~ , feel that

you will always hear all the relevant argumentsbefore making a decision.(c) Don't dilly-dally over making decisions, otherwise work is held up all round.(d) Encourage ideas.(e) Keep calm, and never be pompous.(f) Give credit where it is due, and when possiblelet the C-in-C know the originator of any particular "bright. idea."


34/48

31(g) Watch for over-strain amongst officers andclerks.(h) Know when to:take time off.

65. If members of other Services and/or Allies are.attached to the Headquarters, they should be; treatedin exactly the same way as your O\vn staff; subjectin the case of some Allies to certain security restrictions.The point is that they should be made to feel mt'mbersof the team.When dealing with parallel RAF and Allied Headquarters, be tactful but frank. Put your own cards onthe table and avoid any suggestion that you wish toplay theirs for them.66. The following are suggested as the moreimportant points to be remembered by the Chief ofStaff:- . . '

(a) Ensure that all executive action (this is usuallyconsequent on verbal orders already given bythe C-in-C) is taken by Main and Rear Headquarters. See para 50.(b) The Chief of Staff and the Chief AdministrativeOfficer (CAD) should be in constant contact, livein the same mess, and be firm friends.~ c Interfere as little as possible with Rear Headquarters. I f something is unsatisfactory at RearHeadquarters, have it put right through theCAD.(d) Decentralise and don't harass Branches, etc., 'when you have given them a job.(e) Do as much b ~ s i n e s s as possible verbally.Encourage this right down through all levels.


35/48

32\(f) A Chief of Staff' cannot go into \all details; hemust trust the offic,ers working qnder him. I fthey fail. then a change is necessary. '

(g) The following are the officers With whom the'Chief of, Staff has almost daily contact:* CAO ' * BGS (I). MGRA * BGS (SO)CE BGS (Plans)CSO GR (Deception)MGRAC * Q (Plans)Dr G Mil GOVll Brig P & PW BGS (Ops) Dep Mil Sec* means very frequently.

67 . large amount of planning goes on at Main andRear HQ; a separate planning branch, with a "G" and"Q" element, is essential. 'The planning is broadly of the following kinds:-,

(a) Working out the details of the outline plans pfthe C-in-C for future. operations.(b) Detailed investigation 'of possible courses ofaction that are contemplated by the C-in-C orby Supreme HQ.(c) Investigations as may be ~ r d e ~ e d by the Chief ofStaff. I

Upon the Chief of Staff rests the responsibility of anticipating as far as possible the requirements of theC-in-C; he must make sure that all the information theC-in-C is 'likely to require is available in time, s h o ~ l d he want it.When the examination of a certain project is complete,it is best, in order to save the C-in-C's time, to stage a'presentation at. Tac HQ with the appropriate officersand maps. .'68. Conferences are the easiest C].nd quickest way ofkeeping the headquarters machine running smoothly.

I


36/48

33They save issuing a lot of paper, keep everyone in thepicture, and give officers a chance of obto.ining d c c i ~ i o n s upon matters affecting Qther branches. A conft:rencemust be clear, crisp, and decisive.(a) Dailv Conference.' ,A daily conference early in the morning isessential. I t is better to have too many than toofew attending. The latest operations and enemysituation are given out. The Chief of Staff thep.raises matters of general interest, arranges formeetings, obtains information and gives decisions

to those requiring them. A vast amount of paperwork is saved by such conferences.(b) Conferences a f t ~ r visits and tours

It is also a good plan to hold a meeting withHeads of Branches, etc., i m m e d ~ ~ t e l y afterreturning from visits to the C-in-C, Army Commanders, etc. Again, it is better to err on thelarge side, and so make Gcrtain that all whomight require the information are in factpresent.The following is a suggested list of those whoshould attend:-

All those mentioned in para 66(g) aboveNLOBGS (Ops) AirDAG or r e p r e s e n t ~ t i v e D of Svy.

(c) Daily conference with RAFThis conference is a great help and ensuressmooth: working between the 1\\'0 Services. Manydifficulties are thrashed out at these meetings.and. operational and enemy information isexchanged. On the Army side, it is suggestedthat the following should attend:-


37/48


38/48

I

3572. Organisation, layout and mor/es of an Army. Group H(>aclquarters:

(a) Organ:".r:afion(i) The Headquarters of an Army Group isnormally organised into three divisionsTactical, Main Ci-nd Rear. See para 47.

(ii) In the case of ,Main and Rear, it is convenient to sub-diYidethe staff into a seriesof groups, each group having a commanderand second-in-command appointed. Thismakes possible the decentralisation of muchof the detail concerned in moving andorganising the Headquarter3. For example,a possible division of Main HQ i s : -A G r o u p ~ - C h i e f of Staff's GroupB -:'-Operations GroupC , " .-:,Jntelligence GroupD -Staff Duties and General Staff

, Advisers GroupE -A(lministration GroupF -Cailpp Commandant's Group.(b) Moving au .1rm), (SlouP HQ

(i) After the Chief\',of Staff has approved proposa Is for a m o \ \ ~ , the following precede themain body:Pre-reconnaissanc& party - of mlllimumstrength to select the site and make aroug-h allocation to Groups.Reconnaissance patty - of Group Commanders to lay 9ut their Groups.Advance party-of Branch representativesand Camp worki,ng parties to set up, offices and constrttct rest areas.\Signals parties-move'\ to the new s i ~ e asrequired.


39/48


40/48

37The Stage Management of Battle

73. To be successful in battle the fighting machinemust be so set in motion that it can develop its maximum power rapidly. amI the troops must then belaunched into battle properly.I t follows that what may be called "the stage management of the battle" must be first-class.74. I t is stated in para 44 that the plan of battlemust be made by the commander and NOT by hbstaff. I consider that this statement admits of noargument.75. Having made a sound and s:mplc plan) thefollowing points are then highly important:-

(a) The essentials of the plan must be known rightdown through the chain of command, andfinally down to the rank and file. Every singlesoldier 'must know, before he goes into battle,how the little battle he is fighting fits into thelarger picture, and how the success of his fighting will influence the battle as a whole.A careful system is necessary to ensure thatsecrecy .is not compromised; commanders intheir several grades, and finally the rank andfile, must be brought into the picture at theright moments and not so late that they cannotdo their jobs properly.(b) All commanders must have complete confidencein the plan.(c) The troops must be brought to a state of wildenthusiasm. They must enter the fight with- thelight of battle in their eyes, and definitely wanting to kill the enemy. In achieving this end itis the spoken word that counts, from the commander to his troops; the spoken word is farmore effective than any written matter.


41/48

76. In his plan of battle the C-in-C ,.nust give careful thought to the correct grouping of bis divisions, hisarmour, his a r t i l l ~ r y , and other resources.He cannot decide on this grouping until the problemhas emerged and he has decided how he will solve it:he must then so group his divisions, his armour, andhis artillery, that Corps-who have to fight the tacticalbattle-are suitably composed for their respective tasks.As the battle proceeds he may frequently re-group.77. Skill in grouping, and in qUick re-grouping tomeet the changing tactical situation, plays a large partin successful battle o p e ~ a t i o n s . I t is a great art, and" requires much study beforeproficiency is attained. i

-:;"98. A Corps HQ must\ be able to handle armoureddivisions, or infantry divisions, or any combination ofthe two types.79. The surest way to v i ~ t o r y is to develop the fullfighting power of divisions 0 1 Corps plans, the whole.~ e i n g directed in accordance ",ith the Army plan.No good results will be o b t a i n ~ d by splitting up divisions; such action affects m o r a r ~ adversely.Nor can a division 'conduct effective offensive operations against even moderate oppGsition in good delaying country if strung out on a \wide front, since itcannot then develop its full fighting power.. IBo. Having made his plans, there will be muchdetailed work to be d ~ n e ' before., the operation islaunched. This detailed work is tl)e province of thestaff. .The higher commander himself S h O U l ~ ' stand right backand have time- to think; his atte tion should bedirected to ensuring that the basic oundations and. \


42/48


43/48


44/48

4185 Finally, I would say that the whole essence ofmodern tactical methods in battle lies in the followingfactors:- SurpriseConcentration of. effortCo-operation of aU armsControl "SimplicitySpeed of actionGreat energy and determination are essential in o ~ d e r tomaintain the tempo of the operations at a high level;the commander who lacks these qualities, and wholacks the "drive" to get things done, will never achievesuccessful results.

Airborne Operations86. The timely use of airborne fcrces may oftenplaya deCisive part in land operations. The hazardsand complications are, however. considerable and ,thereare certain basic factors to be taken into consideration,before deciding whether an .airborne operation isjustified. These factors are outlineg below.81. Could the objective be gained in sufficient timeby normal ground forces?Would the air effort involved be more usefullyemployed elsewhere? This applies particularly to transport aircraft: often so essential to sustain a rapidadvance.88. Large airborne operations require a great dealof time to plan; there is often a danger that events mayovertake the project. Experience has shown that airborne forces are normally best used in the moredeliberate type of operations e.g.

(a) seaborne assaults(b) an assault over a major obstacle.


45/48

4289. Re-supply must be assured. This may be: -

(4) by air; weather is often an uncertain factor.(b) by normal supply columns; the "drop" should near enough to allow an early link-up, other

wise the whole operation may become anembarrassing commitment.As a large dropping zone (D.Z.) is needed for re-supplyby .air, a considerable part of the force landed willbe employed in a purely defensive role holding thisarea.90. I f the weather conditions are uncertain thecommander must decide how long he is prepared towait for s u i t ~ b l e weather if conditions on "D" dayare unfavourable.91. _ The commander must ensure that the forcesdropped have adequate artillery support.

Overseas Campaigns92. Any overseas campaign will involve the closestco-operation between the navy, the army, and theair forces.The navy has got .to take the army across' the seas,and it requires good beaches for landing; the armywhen on shore cannot be maintained indefinitely overopen beaches, but requires a good port very early;the air forces require good airfields.But the overall plan of battle must not be built up .solely on the need to acquire quickly good beaches,good ports, and good airfields.The matter involves the whole question of the conductof offensive operations in an enemy country with theobject of destroying the enemy's armed forces andoccupying his territory; the army has got to carry outthis task, and no other service can do it.


46/48

43Therefore, the first need is to decide how vou want theoperations on land to be developed so that the objectcan be successfully attained in the simplest and quickestway. .I t is then for the navy to say whether the army c;:anbe put on shore in such a way that the land battlecan be developed in the required manner; it is for theRAF to say whether this will, suit the air plan.And so the plan is built up; some compromise may benecessary, but. eventually an agreed plan will emerge.The beaches, ports, and airfields then become objectives in the general plan of battle.93. The early appointment of the commanders whowill carry out the operation is cseential. They shouldbe appointed before the planning begins.

Risks in Batde94. I t will be exceptional to win a battle withouttaking certain risks. I t requires a nice judgment todecide what risks are legitimate ~ n justifiable, andwhat risks are definitely not so.A commander who is not prepared to take a c ~ a n c e Iand who tries to play for safety on all occasions. willnever reap the full-fruits of. victory.

Final Advice95. My final advice to any officer who may becalled on to exercise high comma'ld in war is asfollows:-(a) Have a good Chief of Staff.(b) Go for simplicity in everything.(c) Cut out all paper arid train' your subordinatesto work on "erbal instructions and o r d e r ~ .


47/48

44(d) Keep a firm gnp on the basic:fundamentalS:the things that really matter. \,(e) Avoid being involved in details, leave them to. your staff. '(f) Study the factor of morale; it is the big thing in. war and without a high mbrale you can achievenothing. '(g) When the issue hangs in the balance radiateconfidence in the plan and in the operations,even if inwardly you feel not too certain of the

outcome. (h) Never worry.(i) Never belly-ache.(j) Keep fit and. fresh, physically and mentally.You will never win battles if you become .mentally tired, or get run down in health.

B. L. M.

1.D.I"c .3564


48/48

Documents

21st Army Group High Command in War