2020 Discussion Paper 38

Development Strategiesand Food and Nutrition

Security in AfricaAn Assessment

Franz HeidhuesAchi Atsain

Hezron NyangitoMartine PadillaGérard Ghersi

Jean-Charles Le Vallée

International Food Policy Research Institute2033 K Street, NW

Washington, DC 20006–1002 USADecember 2004

Copyright © 2004 International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved.Sections of this report may be reproduced without the express permission of but with acknowledgment to the International Food Policy Research Institute. Contactifpri-copyright@cgiar.org for permission to reprint.

ISBN 0-89629-651-2

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Contents

List of Tables iv

List of Boxes iv

Foreword v

Acknowledgments vi

Executive Summary vii

1 Introduction 1

2 Food and Nutrition Security and the Evaluation of Development Strategies and Programs 3

3 The Conceptual and Strategic Responses of Various Stakeholders to the African Food Security Crises 7

4 Evaluation of Subregional and National Programs, Strategies, and Policies 21

5 Conclusion 38

Bibliography 41

Acronyms and Abbreviations 49

About the Authors 50

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Tables

1 Eastern and southern Africa: Grading of policies, strategies, programs, and action plans 36

2 Northern Africa: Grading of policies, strategies, programs, and action plans 37

Boxes

1 Food security strategy in Cameroon 24

2 Agricultural policy in Uganda 30

3 Food security strategy in Kenya 31

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Momentum is building in and around Africa today for policy action to decisively confronthunger and malnutrition. If we are to succeed, it is vital that food and nutrition security strate-gies be both sound and able to be implemented. Ultimately, strategies deficient in either ofthese two areas will be ineffectual. Lessons from past strategies provide a valuable resourcein the design of future strategies, yet there is a dearth of programmatic information and rig-orous evaluations of the approaches used in the past.

With this in mind, the authors of this 2020 discussion paper—Franz Heidhues, AchiAtsain, Hezron Nyangito, Martine Padilla, Gérard Ghersi, and Jean-Charles Le Vallée—review the multitude of approaches and strategies for achieving food and nutrition security inAfrica within the context of development over the past four decades. They assess the extentto which these plans have been implemented and identify the key constraints and limitations,along with the priority investments needed for more effective design and implementation inthe future.

This paper was commissioned for the IFPRI 2020 Africa Conference, “Assuring Food andNutrition Security in Africa by 2020: Prioritizing Actions, Strengthening Actors, andFacilitating Partnerships,” which was held in Kampala, Uganda, from April 1 to April 3,2004. There, the lessons learned from decades of successes and failures in designing andimplementing strategies in and for Africa contributed to an informed and informative discus-sion of how to improve the implementation of action to end hunger and malnutrition. Wethank the authors for setting the stage for the systematic examination of these extremely impor-tant issues and hope that this paper is only the beginning of such endeavors.

Joachim von BraunDirector General, IFPRI

Foreword

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The authors gratefully acknowledge the research support provided by Helene Heyd of theUniversity of Hohenheim, Germany. They also thank three anonymous reviewers for valuablecomments, as well as the editors for their input. Rajul Pandya-Lorch provided overall guidanceas the head of IFPRI’s 2020 Vision Initiative and the organizer of the 2020 Africa Conference.

Acknowledgments

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Numerous strategies, policies, and programs intended to assist Africa’s development havebeen conceived and implemented by international bodies, regional and subregional groups,and national institutions. On average, a typical developing country in Africa is assisted byabout 30 aid institutions to implement these strategies, yet Africa is still far from achievingfood and nutrition security. This paper examines whether those strategies and policies fit thegoal of achieving food and nutrition security, how they were implemented, and why the resultshave been so variable and often lacking. Further, this paper considers the lessons of theseprojects in terms of strategy formulation and implementation, and how they can be used toeffectively and sustainably reduce hunger and malnutrition.

The implementation of a strategy requires its clear formulation, a conducive policy andinstitutional environment, a widely shared consensus about the strategy and its measures, thehuman capacity for implementation, and sufficient financial resources. In order to evaluate astrategy in detail, it is necessary to address the following issues:� Have key issues been clearly identified, properly analyzed, and located within their polit-

ical, economic, and sociocultural contexts?� Are objectives clearly defined, internally consistent, and formulated realistically, and have

possible conflicts between the objectives been identified and trade-offs between thembeen addressed?

� Are policies and programs for achieving these objectives appropriate to, congruent with,and supportive of, the strategy?

� Is the capacity to implement the strategy available—that is, are there sufficient financialresources, the necessary human capacity, the requisite institutional framework, and ade-quate infrastructure?

� Has the time required for implementation been estimated realistically, taking into accountthe demands of institution building, education, and training?

� Have all stakeholders been included in the process of strategy development, and, in par-ticular, have they been involved in identifying priorities, defining objectives, and in plan-ning and implementing the strategy?

� Have the lessons of past experiences of development strategy implementation been takeninto account?In the two decades after most African countries became independent in the early 1960s

there were high hopes for rapid development, and much was achieved. The overall economicgrowth in Sub-Saharan Africa averaged 3.4 percent per year between 1961 and 1980.Agricultural development contributed enormously to overall growth and was crucial to thegains achieved in food and nutrition security. But by the end of the 1970s, the major socialand economic indicators for African countries began to decline. Agricultural productiondropped, resulting in massive food imports. The output of both industry and manufacturing

Executive Summary

also declined. Adverse terms of trade, the oil crisis, and the slump in the world economy exac-erbated these negative trends in African economies. At the same time, domestic problemsthreatened the stability of many African state institutions and even the existence of some states.There were widespread coups d’état, civil strife, and ethnic violence.

Two early responses to these African socioeconomic development crises were the LagosPlan of Action (LPA) and the Regional Food Plan for Africa (AFPLAN). These started from thepremise that, given the limited size and capacity of the private sector, the states had to takeon the dominant role in development. Thus governments drew up comprehensive five-yearplans, invested in large state-run basic industries and market structures, and enacted perva-sive regulations to control prices, restrict trade, and allocate credit and foreign exchange, allgenerally carried out with full donor support. Publicly funded programs in support of agricul-tural research and extension, fertilizer supply, export production and marketing, and food dis-tribution were the essential components of this approach.

When by 1980 it had become apparent that Africa’s crisis was deepening, the WorldBank and IMF argued that a fundamental shift in approach was needed to stabilize Africaneconomies, increase efficiency of investment, and reinvigorate growth. Their new concept ofstructural adjustment programs (SAPs) implied a move away from state-dominated develop-ment to reliance on the private sector. . Food and nutrition security were addressed only indi-rectly in these programs through the aims of improved economic stability and higher eco-nomic growth.

In response to concerns about the deleterious impact of SAPs on health services, educa-tion, infrastructure, rural support institutions, and employment, all of which had particularlyaffected Africa’s poor, the approach of the World Bank and donor community shifted, return-ing to a more balanced treatment of state and private sector functions in development, whileat the same time maintaining the emphasis on efficiency in resource allocation. TheComprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper(PRSP) both emphasized the need to integrate cultural, social, political, and environmentalconsiderations into development strategies, and to apply these considerations to reducingpoverty and creating a framework for pro-poor growth. Each process was intended to be ledby the countries concerned, and to be based on the partnership and participation of all stake-holders at the national, regional, and local levels. The emphasis on poverty in the CDF/PRSPconcept implies that agricultural and rural development were envisioned as playing vitallyimportant roles.

Building on the CDF/PRSP process, African leaders at the turn of the century developedthe New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). This approach intended to combineAfrican initiatives and ownership of the development process with neoliberal concepts.NEPAD supports liberalization and globalization but emphasizes that these processes needto be fair and accompanied by a leveling of the playing field for international trade. Byaccepting NEPAD’s policy framework, African leaders jointly took responsibility for eradicat-ing poverty and placing their countries, both individually and collectively, on the path of sus-tainable development and growth. Furthermore, they committed their countries to people-cen-tered participatory development processes. The NEPAD strategy seeks to produce agriculture-led development that eliminates hunger and reduces poverty as well as food insecurity.

SAPs and PRSPs have shaped regional approaches and country policies and their imple-mentation throughout Africa. A significant number of African countries have carried out suc-cessful programs of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform. Reforms and retrench-ment of the public sector have been carried out in numerous countries, although often at the

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costs of increasing unemployment—and thus vulnerability to food and nutrition insecurity—and a decline in public services, even in essential areas such as health, education, andresearch and extension. International trade has been liberalized in many countries, andparastatal marketing boards no longer enjoy market monopolies. A major issue in mostAfrican countries remains the failure of the weak private sector in taking up the functions onceperformed by government marketing monopolies. A further key problem is the unevenness ofthe playing field in international trade, with the EU, Japan, and United States continuing toprotect their markets against imports from developing countries, including those in Africa.

Many countries have formulated poverty reduction policies, with an increased emphasison agricultural development. More progress is needed in key areas, however, such as inreducing social and economic discrimination against women, particularly in improving their access to land, credit, and input and output markets, and in fostering the education ofgirls. Similarly, in areas such as employment creation, natural resource protection, and gov-ernance reform, some countries have initiated encouraging measures, but much moreprogress is needed. The most successful reformers have been countries without war or civilunrest, and with reform processes characterized by strong political leadership and a com-mitment to reforms with wide domestic participation and ownership. This review makes it clearthat peace and security are prerequisites for development and thus for poverty reduction. Incountries that have been plagued by conflict and war, development has been pushed backby years, if not decades.

Political will and the commitment to reform within a framework of good governance arecrucial features of successful reform and development. Experience has also shown that reformprocesses are most successful with the wide involvement and participation of people at all levels of society and across different organizations and social groups. For poverty reductionin particular, civil society and private sector groups representing the poor need to be includedin the consultation, decisionmaking, and implementation process.

Capacity building must be a high priority. The very recent and still patchy experience of African countries with PRSP implementation demonstrates that capacity building requiresmore attention and more resources. Capacity and competence are required at all levels ofAfrican administration.

Agriculture should be returned to the top of the development agenda. The priority givento agriculture and water in NEPAD and the Maputo 2003 Declaration of the Heads of Statesof the African Union is encouraging in this respect. It is essential for the World Bank and bilat-eral donors to follow the lead of African states and support agricultural development.Prioritizing agriculture cannot be achieved without making additional resources available tothese programs. Countries must act on the Maputo Declaration’s target of allocating 10 per-cent of each country’s budget to agriculture.

Governments and donors face a joint challenge to achieve greater cohesion in theirapproaches to the various strategies promoted by, and the requirements of, the internationalcommunity. For example, monitoring poverty reduction in a given country is important withinthe PRSP process, but care needs to be taken not to overburden that country’s capacity andinstitutions. Too often, donors have instituted reporting and monitoring requirements that placetheir internal institutional needs ahead of the needs of the recipient country. Donors need toagree on a coordinated and unified monitoring and evaluation system that serves primarilyto improve policy implementation in recipient countries.

Adequate attention must be devoted to micro-level activities. The project approach domi-nated the development scene in Africa until the 1980s, but its limitations in nonconducive

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policy environments soon became obvious. Deficiencies in project environments resulted in a180-degree shift in approach toward lending for policy programs, as opposed to extendingloans for projects. This forced the private sectors of the targeted countries to take up micro-level activities. Correcting policy environments and strengthening institutional frameworkswere necessary aims and remain a high priority, but development only occurs if investment,innovation, and action are carried out on farms, in households, and in villages. This meansthat development strategists must reaffirm the value of the project approach.

Finally, the design and implementation of good policies, as emphasized repeatedly in thisreview, are dependent on clear, relevant, and consistent policy objectives, financial resourceavailability, and human and institutional capacity. Even under these ideal circumstances, theseprocesses often involve risks to the political and social stability of targeted countries. Thespeed of reform and the implementation of policies and programs must be appropriate toeach country’s political and social absorptive capacity.

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Most African countries became independent in the1960s. The relatively positive socioeconomic per-formances of African countries during the “post-independence boom” years were followed bydownturns, which continue in some countries to thepresent date. The downturns in 1973 and 1974were principally due to the overall deterioration ofinternational economic conditions as a result of thefirst oil crisis. Two fundamentally different approach-es to furthering Africa’s development emerged inthe late 1970s and the early 1980s and were pur-sued simultaneously; all subsequent initiativesemerged from these two positions.

The first position was that held by theOrganization of African Unity (OAU) and was usedto formulate the strategies that made up the LagosPlan of Action (LPA) and the Regional Food Plan forAfrica (AFPLAN). This position perceived Africa’scolonial heritage and continued dependence onwestern donors as the main problems besettingfuture development. Thus the LPA emphasized dis-association from western donors and concentrationon self-centered development, with each country orienting production toward its own markets.Development aid was seen as rightful compensationfor colonial injustices. Programs formulated subse-quently, such as the African Priority Program forEconomic Recovery (APPER, 1986–90), followed asimilar line, while also recognizing internal institu-tional and policy deficiencies.

The second position was based on the neolib-eral understanding of economic development andwas typically held by donors and international insti-tutions (such as the World Bank and theInternational Monetary Fund [IMF]). This positiontook concrete form in the structural adjustment pro-grams (SAPs), with their emphasis on macroeco-nomic stability, elimination of market distortions,

subsidies, and price controls, liberalization of tradeand exchange transactions, reduction of govern-ment and elimination of parastatal activities, andencouragement of the private sector.

When the weaknesses of the SAP approach—such as the resulting social disruption, worseningincome distribution, unemployment, and anti-poorbiases inherent in public sector retrenchment, andits short-term orientation—became increasinglyapparent in the 1990s, the World Bank extendedthe SAP framework to include a “social dimension.”This led to the World Bank conceptualizing a moreholistic approach, the Comprehensive DevelopmentFramework (CDF), which tries to involve all stake-holders in the development process and to integrateeconomic, social, political, cultural, and environ-mental needs. This new approach focuses on pover-ty reduction and emphasizes each country’s owner-ship of its national, regional, and local government,civil society, and private sector. Transparency,accountability, and the monitoring and evaluationof performance of societal institutions are alsoemphasized. This strategy was integrated into thepoverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) process foreach individual country—a participatory processwhereby countries outline a strategy, including spe-cific policies for reducing poverty, restoring macro-economic equilibrium, and establishing a frame-work conducive to pro-poor growth. PRSPs also linkthe CDF to the Highly Indebted Poor Countries(HIPC) initiative.

An initiative known as the New Partnership forAfrica’s Development (NEPAD) was started byAfrican leaders in 1999, and builds on the CDF bycombining African initiatives and program owner-ship with neoliberal concepts. NEPAD supports lib-eralization and globalization but emphasizes thatthese processes need to be fair and simultaneous

1. Introduction

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with the leveling of the international trade playingfield. It calls on African leaders and governments toimprove governance, eliminate corruption, facilitatethe creation of democratic structures and processes,encourage a free press, and establish an inde-pendent, fair, and reliable judicial system. It also re-emphasizes that agriculture and rural developmentare crucial to poverty reduction and food and nutri-tion security. NEPAD enjoys strong support from theinternational donor community.

These positions on development have informedall African socioeconomic development programsand have had different impacts. This paper focuseson food and nutrition security developments inAfrica with an emphasis on a review of the strate-gies and programs that have been used and theirimplementation statuses, with the aim of drawinglessons from them in order to deal with the present-day food and nutrition crisis in Africa. We examinethe following questions, among others: What strate-gies, policies, and programs have addressed orwere intended to address the crisis? To what extenthave individual countries in the region adoptedthem? And, to what extent were they implemented?

Given the multitude of strategies, policies, andapproaches; the large number of countries in Africa,each with its own cultural heritage; and the diversi-ty of ecological, economic, sociocultural, and polit-ical conditions and traditions, this paper does notaim to be comprehensive. We have instead chosento focus on those countries and strategies that bestillustrate what has been learned about strategy for-

mulation and implementation, with a view to pro-viding policymakers and development agencieswith input that may help them to avoid repeating the ineffective policies of the past and to improvepolicy design and implementation in the future.

The paper is organized as follows: Chapter 1outlines how the different paradigms have influ-enced the formulation of strategies for overallsocioeconomic development. Chapter 2 reviews theevolution of the concept of food security from itsfood production focus in the 1970s to the currentbroader concept of food and nutrition security with-in the overall livelihood context. It also outlines aframework for evaluating development strategies.Development strategies emerge from particular his-torical contexts, so to understand today’s strategieswe need to review their evolution within their par-ticular ecological, political, and socioeconomiccontexts and to elucidate how and why attitudes todevelopment have changed over time. Chapter 3applies this approach to food and nutrition strate-gies, and reviews from a continental perspective thestrategies, policies, and programs formulated byinternational institutions and regional organiza-tions. A summary of the adoption and implementa-tion in Africa of these strategies and programs, witha particular focus on their food and nutrition securi-ty implications, is presented in Chapter 4. Finally,Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of our review,which draw on both the successes and failures ofdevelopment strategies and their implementation.

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2. Food and Nutrition Security and the Evaluation of Development

Strategies and Programs

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BackgroundFood security is now defined as the situation “whenall people, at all times, have physical and econom-ical access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food fora healthy and active life” (FAO 1996). However,this term has gone through stages of definition andredefinition; approaches to its definition haveranged from an emphasis on self-sufficiency to anemphasis on coping with vulnerability and risk infood and nutrition access. In the 1970s, food secu-rity was equated to adequate food production. Inthe 1980s, food security was considered to refer tothe security of food access and availability. In the1990s, the importance of nutrition was recognized,and hence the concept of food security was com-bined with that of nutrition security. In the 2000s,the concepts of food and nutrition security were inte-grated with vulnerability, risk coping, and risk man-agement considerations.

Much of the recent discussion of food securityhas revolved around the following major topics(ODI 2002):� What are the links between food availability,

access, and nutrition, given that food availabil-ity does not ensure nutritional well-being?

� What implications do the new challenges toAfrica—notably globalization, rapid urbaniza-tion, market liberalization, health and HIV/AIDS, and biotechnology—have for the food-security agenda?

� Does food security remain a useful concept forthe discussion of development assistance andnational policies, given the new approachescoming to the fore (for example, livelihoodsanalysis) and the current focus of donors onpoverty reduction?

� Does food aid still have an important role insupporting food security, and how can it beshaped to support long-term food security?Recognizing the distinction between food and

nutrition security as well as the links between the twoconcepts is imperative for the success of na-tional development strategies (Benson 2004). Thesecure access to food that is necessary for food secu-rity must be complemented with access to healthservices, education, sanitary environments, and safewater sources, among other resources, to achievenutrition security. A much more comprehensivedevelopmental approach is thus required to ensurethat all groups in a population achieve both foodand nutrition security. The following research find-ings on the links between food availability, food ac-cess, and nutritional well-being are relevant to Africa:� Women’s education has accounted for over

40 percent of the reduction in malnutrition overthe past 25 years because of its strong influ-ence on child nutrition. Other major factors areimprovements in per capita food availability(25 percent), health, environment, and women’sstatus (Smith and Haddad 2000). About 26 per-cent of the hungry have caloric intakes so lowthat they are unable to work or care for them-selves (Millennium Project 2003).

� How food is made available is just as importantas the overall supply. Strategies to boost nation-al food production only improve food access if they raise the incomes of large numbers ofrural farm and nonfarm households and re-duce the consumer prices of food, particularlyfor net buyers.

� Agricultural market reform may improve thefood security of poor consumers by improving

the private production, distribution, and pro-cessing of the types of foods consumed by them.

� A higher household income does not alwaystranslate into more and better food for all fam-ily members. If women control the household in-come, otherwise undernourished children arelikely to benefit.Food security is increasingly though not univer-

sally treated as a basic human right. The inter-twined relationships between food security, poverty,and development have moved to the forefront oncurrent thinking about food security, as has therecognition that long-term food security is a functionof current policies and actions, such as develop-ment strategies, macroeconomic policies, trade andexchange rate policies, research and innovationpolicies, and modifications to institutions and infra-structure. More specifically, it remains vitally impor-tant to raise food production, create employment,and improve the institutional and policy frameworkfor agriculture, as well as to rehabilitate and ex-pand physical and social infrastructure in ruralareas, all of which require increased and sustainedinvestment and support for agriculture.

Typology of Food-InsecureHouseholds and MeasurementIssuesTo develop a strategy for reducing hunger andundernutrition, the Millennium Development Goals(MDG) Hunger Task Force has broadly distin-guished four major groups of food-insecure house-holds and thus of highly vulnerable individuals bytheir principal means of securing food. While manyhouseholds have multiple means of obtaining food,the typology focuses on their principal strategies,identifying the following four groups (with a roughapproximation of their relative size):1. Farming households (50 percent of the food-

insecure)2. Rural landless and nonfarm households (22 per-

cent of the food-insecure)3. Urban households (20 percent of the food-

insecure)4. Herding, fishing, and forest-dependent house-

holds (8 percent of the food-insecure)

Measuring food and nutrition insecurity is amultidimensional problem that requires accountingfor both short- and long-term food and nutrition inse-curity, as well as considering chronic, transitory,and periodic food and nutrition insecurity.Measures of household food and nutrition security,such as those based on surveys of dietary intake,must be compared with adequacy norms. Finally,the use of potential substitute indicators such as realwage rates, employment, price ratios, migrationflows, changes in consumption structure, incidenceof illness, and so forth may be appropriate at times.

Policy Challenges

Guaranteeing food and nutrition security at themicro level requires policymakers to go beyond thequestion of physical access at the national level,that is, whether there is sufficient food at the nation-al level to feed all people. A number of considera-tions are required, including the following:� Physical access at the local level—making sure

food is available in local markets and in localfields;

� Economic access—addressing the question ofwhether households can afford to purchase thefood items they need for food and nutritionsecurity;

� Social access—promoting adequate access tofood for all household members;

� Food quality and safety—ensuring food of suf-ficient diversity and safety to promote goodhealth;

� Proper physiological access—providing high-quality care and good health and sanitationenvironments so that ingested nutritious foodresults in healthy growth and development;

� Low risk of loss of access—providing institu-tional set-ups that enable households to absorband manage shocks, cycles, and seasonality,and reduce their vulnerability; and

� Access to food as a human right—promoting the capacity of the food system to deliver needed food and to enhance the capacity ofindividuals to press their claims to food.To summarize, the main determinants of food

and nutrition security in Africa are the adequacy of

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the food supply produced by or accessible to house-holds; access to income and markets to purchasefood, as well as to land and inputs for food pro-duction; and the adequacy of sanitation, health,and feeding practices, and of the support of socialclaims to food. National policies must be adoptedthat sustain these key priorities in political process-es so that they are not moved aside in times of cri-sis or even of strong growth. Governments havefluctuating concerns and tend to take a short-termview; for example, during a good production year,less attention is often given to food security. Theevaluation of how governments have developedstrategies, programs, and policies to address theabove policy challenges is central to this paper.However, measuring the extent to which food secu-rity and nutrition have been achieved by the conti-nent’s regions and countries is not a focus of thispaper (for such a discussion, see Benson 2004).

Evaluating Strategies, Policies,and ProgramsDevelopment strategy must be seen as inextricablylinked with the identification of needs, priorities,and constraints; with the creation of action plans;and finally with the implementation of those plans.This paper focuses on the implementation of devel-opment strategies, policies, and programs in Africa.Strategies, policies, and programs have been for-mulated and implemented in Africa by internationalinstitutions, individual donors at the regional andsubregional levels, and by institutions within Africancountries; all of these levels of contribution areincluded in this review.

The implementation of a development strategyrequires its clear formulation, a conducive policyand institutional environment, a widely shared con-sensus about the strategy and its measures, thehuman capacity for implementation (including therequired management capability and technicalknowledge), and sufficient financial resources foragencies to carry out the strategy. Finally, agenciesand stakeholders need to have adequate incentivesto take the planned action. Implementation is thusinextricably linked with strategy. A strategy that failsto take these requirements into account is deficient.

How should strategies be evaluated? Imple-mentation criteria, such as the resource and timerequirements for implementation and the conditionsthat enable strategies and policies to be translatedinto action, are intended as yardsticks for evaluat-ing and rating strategies. Our evaluations alsoassess whether strategies are relevant, clear, con-sistent, realistic, and able to be implemented; hencethey involve the following considerations:� Problem definition. Are the key issues identi-

fied, properly analyzed, linked to the historicalcontext (in economic terms, path dependency),and located within their political, economic,sociocultural, and ecological contexts?

� Objectives. Are the objectives clearly defined,internally consistent, and formulated realistical-ly? Are possible conflicts between the objectivesidentified and the required trade-offs addressed?

� Policies and programs. Are the proposed instru-ments for the strategy’s objectives appropriate,and are these policies and programs congruentwith and supportive of the strategy?

� Capacity to implement. Are the strategiesbacked by sufficient financial means for imple-mentation? Are the human capacity (that is, theavailability of capable and experienced per-sonnel), the institutional set-up, and the infra-structure adequate?

� Time frame. Has the time required for imple-mentation been estimated realistically, takinginto account the requirements of institutionbuilding, education, and training?

� Stakeholder participation. With which methodand to what extent were different stakeholdersinvolved in identifying the priorities, definingthe objectives, and implementing the programsof the strategy? The different types of participa-tion include asking questions and extractinginformation (extractive), discussing issues,objectives, and program measures (consulta-tive), sharing in decisionmaking about objec-tives and program measures, and taking onresponsibilities in implementation (active).

� Integrating lessons from the past. Have pastexperiences been taken into account, and havemeasures designed to avoid earlier mistakesbeen implemented?

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Based on our assessment of the relevant poli-cies and strategies according to these criteria, anattempt has been made to grade them as “good,”“intermediate,” or “poor.” This approach is not

clear-cut in all cases given the information baseavailable, and was found to be feasible only forsome regions and countries.

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3. The Conceptual and Strategic Responses ofVarious Stakeholders to the African

Food Security Crises

There are numerous strategies and programs andeven more aid agencies assisting individual coun-tries in Africa; for instance, a typical developingcountry is assisted by 30 aid institutions (Eicher2003). Most agencies emphasize the same priori-ties, pursue similar objectives, and address relatedissues; however, a number of agencies have specif-ic features that deserve highlighting. In this chapter,we discuss the key features of the important strate-gies and programs, beginning with the response toAfrica’s crisis in the 1970s, then moving on to therecent strategies of international institutions andNEPAD.

Historical Perspectives: 1960–80After independence was gained, citizens in mostAfrican countries had high hopes for rapid devel-opment. New energies were released by the end of colonialism, and African leaders were deter-mined that their countries would catch up with thedeveloped world. “Africans must run while the others walk” captures the spirit of those early days;no time was to be lost in overcoming ignorance,poverty, and disease. Africans were encouraged to be bold by the many who argued that Africacould find shortcuts to development. The donor com-munity shared this optimism and contributed sub-stantial resources.

Indeed, the first generation of African leaders,influenced by the prominent economists of the UnitedNations Economic Commission for Latin America,adopted strategies focused on industrialization asthe engine of economic growth and the key to trans-forming traditional economies. It was believed thatthe prospects for commodity exports were poor, andthe desire to reduce dependence on manufactured

imports was widespread in the continent. Agriculturewas relegated to the secondary role of supplyingraw materials and providing tax revenues that couldfinance other development.

Given the limited size of the private sector,African leaders believed that government had toplay the dominant role. This view translated into theconcept of the provider-state in which the govern-ment thinks and acts for individuals and is the bestprotector of their rights and economic welfare. As aresult, and generally with full donor support, gov-ernments drew up comprehensive five-year plans,invested in large state-run core industries, and enact-ed pervasive regulations to control prices, restricttrade, and allocate credit and foreign exchange.

Much was initially achieved with this frameworkof policies. There was enormous growth in the num-ber of trained people, major investments were madein Africa’s infrastructure—roads, ports, telecommuni-cations, and power generation and supply—andthere were significant improvements in health andeducation. The overall economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa averaged 3.4 percent per yearbetween 1961 and 1980 while agricultural growth,which is closely linked to food and nutrition security,averaged about 3 percent per year. As the 1970sadvanced, however, African countries began tostumble; by the mid-1970s, their performance hadfallen below that of other parts of the develop-ing world. By 1980, output was actually declining.By the end of the 1980s, Sub-Saharan African coun-tries were facing surprisingly widespread problems:high rates of population growth, low levels of invest-ment and saving, inefficient resource use, weak institutional and human capacity, and a generaldecline in income and living standards. Africa’s generally poor performance between 1970 and1980 was reflected in the weak growth of the

productive sectors, poor export performance, mount-ing debt, deteriorating social conditions, environ-mental degradation, and the increasing decay ofinstitutional capacity. This poor performance furtherresulted in a crisis of confidence. The crisis was also visible in the high deficits of both public budg-ets and balances of payments, which led to signifi-cant public debt. These factors started to seriouslyundermine the very basis for growth and for Africataking control of its own destiny.

This crisis prompted responses from internation-al agencies, including the United Nations EconomicCommission for Africa (ECA) and the World Bank,and a vivid debate among African leaders at OAUmeetings and summits over the causes of Africa’ssocioeconomic decline. Some laid the blame farbeyond Africa’s control: bad weather, weak worldcommodity prices, fluctuating international interestrates, and too little aid. Others blamed policies,especially poor management of public resourcesand inappropriate incentives. The internationalfinancial institutions such as the World Bank and theIMF held the view that African leaders were partlyresponsible for the poor economic performance ofthe region. These institutions stressed the importanceof structural factors in the decline, especially that ofhigh population growth.

In short, African leaders and the major interna-tional financial institutions offered contrasting analy-ses of the crisis. These different ideological positionsled to a number of concurrent initiatives to reversethe negative trends observed toward the end of the1970s. The first initiatives were the policies home-grown under the auspices of the OAU and formu-lated as strategy in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)and the Regional Food Plan for Africa (AFPLAN).The second set of initiatives were policies based onthe neoliberal understanding of economic develop-ment held by donors and international institutions(such as the World Bank and IMF) and were com-monly referred to as structural adjustment programs(SAPs). These initiatives formed the frameworks with-in which food and nutrition security programs andstrategies were developed in Africa during the pastthree decades. Most of the programs of bilateraldonors and other agencies are in one way or anoth-er built on these frameworks. The focus of this paper

is the OAU and ECA and World Bank and IMF pro-grams and the subsequent initiatives.

The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA),1980–85, and the RegionalFood Plan for Africa (AFPLAN),1978–90AFPLAN and LPA both gave highest priority to thedevelopment of the agricultural and food sectors.Their goal was to substantially increase food self-suf-ficiency by the end of the 20th century and, sincethis sector was at the root of the social and economicdevelopment of most African countries, to providethe impetus for their development.

AFPLAN and LPA were based on a criticalassessment of the African food situation in the 1960sand 1970s, which showed that Africa was the onlycontinent in the world where per capita food pro-duction had declined over those two decades. Thisanalysis also showed that the most important char-acteristic of the food situation was the gap betweenthe increase in food production and the growth inpopulation. Food production increased at 2.3 per-cent per year in the 1960s, yet increased at only 1.5percent per year in the 1970s. At the same time,population growth accelerated from 2.5 percent peryear in the 1960s to 2.8 percent per year in the fol-lowing decade.

As a consequence, food production per capitadeclined by 7 percent in the 1960s, and fell by 15percent in the 1970s. A decline in incomes, whichis the major factor determining food demand, exac-erbated the drop in food production, leading to anincreased global deficit during this period. To closethis food deficit, the region had to double its foodimports between 1975 and 1980; the average ratioof food self-sufficiency of the continent, which hadbeen estimated at 98 percent in the 1960s,dropped to 86 percent in 1980. This meant that theregion was importing 14 percent of the food it wasconsuming in 1980, as compared with 2 percent inthe 1960s. Furthermore, fluctuations in food produc-tion were large and frequent in many regions of thecontinent. Chronic malnutrition and famine persistedamong marginal groups, including the urban poor,nomads, peasants in marginal areas, and farmers

8

without land who, for various reasons, were not ableto obtain food in sufficient quantities.

This assessment also established that Africa’sfood problem was both a short-term problem creat-ed by weather changes and other factors, and along-term problem resulting mainly from the degra-dation of the ecosystem. Some of these causes wereinternal and others had their origin in the economiesof non-African countries. Among the internal causes,weaknesses in African systems and organization ofagricultural production, as well as in the distributionof food, inputs, and services, constrained both pro-duction and access to food for a large proportion ofthe population. These weaknesses included distor-tions in government development policies, the struc-ture and organization of production, inadequatetechnologies, natural resource and environmentalconstraints, changes in consumer tastes, social andinstitutional bottlenecks, inadequate investment, fail-ures of the distribution system, and failure to accountfor demographic trends and their effects. The exter-nal causes were identified mainly as distortions ofthe terms of trade, changing trends in food aid, anddeclining international aid for development.

AFPLAN provided a framework for understand-ing the food situation in Africa until 1990, and pro-posed long-term (1978–90) policies and programsfor food development at national as well as inter-governmental levels. The plan particularly targetedfood self-sufficiency—that is, to reduce the region’sdependence on food imports—as well as to fighthunger and reduce malnutrition. African govern-ments were encouraged to design and implementpolicies and projects that aimed at ensuring foodself-sufficiency. At the intergovernmental level,African countries were pressed to work in commonenterprises to increase food production and intra-regional and regional trade.

The LPA formed the strategy for implementingAFPLAN and was adopted in April 1980 in Lagosby the heads of state and governments at theirextraordinary session. The plan defined long- andmedium-term (1980–85) development strategiesand focused on measures that gave priority toachieving an immediate improvement of the food sit-uation, while at the same time working toward thelong-term goal of food self-sufficiency spelled out in

AFPLAN. It also outlined a political direction forAfrican governments and provided a precise frame-work for restructuring and transforming African agri-cultural and food sectors, with particular emphasison measures that would result in reducing food loss-es, increasing food security, and stimulating thediversification of agricultural production (that is, intoareas such as the production of tropical cereals, live-stock, and fish), as well as other basic measures toimprove agricultural life in rural areas.

Evaluation of LPA and AFPLAN

As African governments became more and moreaware of the food crisis, they made greater efforts toimplement AFPLAN and LPA with the assistance ofAfrican development organizations and internation-al donors. Some countries reoriented their policiestoward stimulating economic growth and povertyreduction and at the same time improving the incen-tives for agricultural and rural development. Othersmade substantial efforts to remedy disequilibria inthe allocation of resources and other economic poli-cy weaknesses, and to put into place research struc-tures to support the development of techniques andinnovations that would improve the efficiency of theiroverall system of agricultural production, with spe-cial emphasis on food production.

At the subregional and regional levels, about 50intergovernmental organizations were involvedentirely or partially in the development of Africanagricultural and food sectors. Some of their activitiesdealt with exploiting lakes and river basins (forexample, the Commission of the Basin of ChadLake). Some were programs for collective food se-curity and food self-sufficiency, such as in the Sahel(the Comité Permanent Inter Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel [Permanent InterstateCommittee for Drought Control in the Sahel, orCILSS]), in Northern Africa (Fund of Egypt-Sudaneseintegration), and in Eastern and Southern Africa(Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa[COMESA] and Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, or SADCC). Other pro-grams fought plant and animal diseases. Other ini-tiatives aimed at harmonizing agricultural price poli-cies or attempted to improve intra-African trade,

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such as the creation of the Economic Community ofCentral Africa (CEAC).

The OAU General Secretariat was coordinatorand supervisor of the implementation of the LPA, andhence organized seminars and produced publica-tions focused on increasing agricultural growth. Italso attempted to monitor implementation of the LPAthroughout the region. For its part, UNECA insistedthat assistance be provided to member countries andNGOs in order to increase their agricultural devel-opment planning and programming capacity (par-ticularly in the areas of forest and livestock manage-ment) and to improve their food self-sufficiency andfood security. The African Development Bank (ADB)approved loans to agriculture for a total amount ofUS$1.379 billion, representing 28.7 percent of itscumulative loans over the period 1980–90. Fromthe mid-1970s, and especially after 1982, the ADB’sloans clearly emphasized the agricultural sector, par-ticularly the food subsector. During the course of theimplementation of the LPA, the ADB’s commitments tothe sector rose from 27.8 percent before 1981 to30.4 percent during the years 1982 and 1983. It isworth noting that these figures are for agriculture ingeneral, not for the food subsector alone. The ADBalso provided political and institutional support to itsregional members and to subregional institutions.

It is not clear, however, to what extent the inter-national community helped African countries to fi-nance responses to the food crisis during 1976–86.There are indications that the World Food Councilmade an indirect contribution by implementing therecommendations of the World Food Conference.Similarly, FAO made indirect contributions by col-laborating with African institutions such as the ADBand the Africa Rice Center (WARDA). Furthermore,many other international organizations realized thatthe African food crisis would wipe out all their devel-opment assistance to African countries and provideddiverse indirect contributions. What is not clear is the extent to which the OAU General Secretariatwas able to mobilize international support in termsof human and financial resources to address foodand nutrition security.

In conclusion, AFPLAN and LPA were excellentstrategies and programs for agricultural develop-ment in Africa and, by extension, for food and nutri-

tion security. However, it is questionable whether theimplementation of the programs at the level of indi-vidual countries has been successful, given the per-formance of the agricultural sector during this peri-od. A review by the World Bank of Africa’s ruralstrategy in 2002 blamed faulty policies for the limit-ed impact of the implementation of the initiatives(World Bank 2002). It argued that the past neglectof food production, the slowness with which somecountries implemented plans and resolutions, or theirincapacity to do so, contributed to the poor results ofthe various initiatives.

OAU also observed that inadequate monitoringof these efforts aggravated the overall slowness with which the objectives of AFPLAN and LPA were pursued. Member countries did not realize that they had to report periodically to OAU, ECA, andFAO. At the same time, missions to examine thestrategies and monitor progress were never under-taken as expected, because of organizational andfinancial difficulties and because the member coun-tries failed to request that these missions be sent.Further, no national-level updates on the food andagriculture activities of African countries were avail-able, although many disparate indicators of the success of implementation were available for thesubregional level.

The World Bank View of theAfrican Crisis: StructuralAdjustment Programs (SAPs)and the Washington Consensus(1980–99)The approach of the World Bank and IMF, con-sisting of SAPs and stabilization policies, is one of the most important policy frameworks and hasgreatly influenced both strategies and programs forfood and nutrition security in Africa and the frame-work for overall economic development. The SAPapproach was the response of the World Bank andIMF to the African economic crisis of the 1970s.SAPs began to sweep across Africa in the 1980sand continued to operate throughout the 1990s.During this period, the World Bank and IMF workedclosely together, with the IMF heavily involved in set-ting the macroeconomic development and policy

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agenda, while the World Bank provided structuraladjustment lending.

According to World Bank (1981), the deepen-ing of the African crisis in the 1970s was character-ized by weak agricultural growth, a decline in indus-trial output, poor export performance, climbingdebt, and deteriorating social indicators, institutions,and environment. The World Bank argued thatalthough many African countries saw their develop-ment disrupted by sharp falls in the internationalprices of key commodities, the long-term fall in percapita incomes since the late 1970s could beexplained largely by the declining level and effi-ciency of investment and the compounding of theresulting problems by accelerating populationgrowth. External factors were not seen as the pri-mary reasons for the crisis, although the World Bankdid recognize that many countries, especially thepoorer ones, suffered severe external shocks.

The World Bank and IMF also argued that theproblem of low returns from investments was themain reason for Africa’s decline in the 1980s.Africa’s investment and operating costs were typi-cally 50 to 100 percent above those in South Asiaduring this period. Weak public sector managementresulted in loss-making by public enterprises, poorinvestment choices, and costly and unreliable infra-structure. Price distortions, especially overvaluedexchange rates, government-determined prices, andsubsidized credit resulted in inefficient resource allo-cation. Furthermore, wage costs were high relativeto productivity (particularly in the franc currencyzone [CFA]), even though real wages fell by 25 per-cent on average across Africa in the 1980s. All ofthese factors added heavily to the cost of doing busi-ness and discouraged investors.

The World Bank diagnosis concluded that thepost-independence development efforts failed be-cause the strategy they attempted to implement wasmisconceived. Governments had made a dash formodernization by copying, but not adapting, west-ern models. The results were poorly designed invest-ments in industry; too little attention to peasant agri-culture; too much intervention in areas in which thestate lacked managerial, technical, and entrepre-neurial skills; and too little effort to foster grassrootsdevelopment. This top-down approach had demoti-

vated ordinary people, precisely those whose ener-gies were most needed in the development effort.

Given the World Bank’s diagnosis and the needfor money and advice on development strategiesfrom the World Bank and IMF, most African govern-ments recognized the necessity of adopting SAPsand stabilization policies to solve the crises theircountries faced. The new strategy under these poli-cies stated clearly that if Africa was to avert hungerand provide its growing population with productivejobs and increasing incomes, its economies neededto grow by at least 4 to 5 percent per year. The pri-mary source of this growth would, in this strategy, beagricultural production, which was itself targeted toexpand annually by 4 percent. With this growth,African countries could then not only meet their ownfood requirements but also generate the foreignexchange needed for development.

The main elements of SAPs were their classical/neoliberal features, which emphasized institutingmacroeconomic policies for reducing inflation andre-establishing economic stability, controlling budgetdeficits (mainly by containing government deficits/public expenditure), privatizing public sector com-panies and services, dissolving parastatals, eliminat-ing subsidies, and cutting public support for socialservices. A typical SAP called for devaluation andtrade liberalization to improve the country’s balanceof payments and control its foreign indebtedness;debt rescheduling and stricter debt managementwere usually requirements. Food and nutrition securi-ty were addressed only indirectly by this framework.

This long-term strategy envisaged a move awayfrom earlier practices. It aimed at releasing the ener-gies of ordinary people to enable them to takecharge of their lives. For the private sector, profitswould now be seen as the mark of an efficient busi-ness. Agricultural extension services would be seenas responding to farmers, not commanding them.Foreign investors would be welcomed as partners,not discouraged. The state would no longer be anentrepreneur but a promoter of private producers.The informal sector would be valued as a seedbedfor entrepreneurs, not dismissed as a hotbed of rack-eteers. The key concept of the World Bank strategywas that successful development depends on gettingmost policies reasonably right and none of them

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hopelessly wrong, rather than on getting just a fewpolicies perfectly right.

Evaluation of SAPs

SAPs and neoliberal policies, often called the“Washington Consensus,” provoked considerabledebate within development circles. Supportersargued that the reforms they put forward were essen-tial and that reforms should be implemented soonerrather than later. Critics charged that theWashington Consensus paid insufficient attention tothe social aspects of development and to the institu-tional weaknesses of developing countries. Further,the adjustment policies also often failed to take into account the political implications of reform and the risks these policies posed for the stability of developing countries. Development under theWashington Consensus was seen as overly eco-nomic and characterized by excessive conditionali-ty as well as the absence of genuine ownership bythe countries concerned. Since countries that failedto abide by SAP conditions were denied financialsupport until all conditions were met, it has oftenbeen argued that this development framework wasforced on the developing world.

The impact of SAPs on Africa remains a matterof intense debate. Many empirical studies have con-cluded that with some exceptions (Ghana andUganda), SAPs have typically had a negligibleeffect in Africa (Klasen 2003; Easterly 2000, andthe literature cited therein; Mosley, Harrington, andToye 1995). Some studies (such as Christiaensen,Demery, and Paternostro 2001) have argued thatSAPs induced growth and reduced poverty in thoseAfrican countries where they were successfully imple-mented. However, as Klasen (2003) has pointedout, these results have not been clearly linked to SAP-related macroeconomic policies.

The issue of whether the overall disappointingperformance of SAPs in Africa is due to incompleteand half-hearted implementation, adverse externalfactors, or inappropriate policy components of theSAPs lies at the heart of the debate. A review of theavailable studies suggests that in most cases a com-bination of these three factors is at work. It is cer-tainly true that the markets for primary producers

deteriorated (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999); thatthere was partial, half-hearted, and “stop and go”implementation (World Bank 2001); and that therewere deficiencies in sequencing, lack of coordina-tion of policies, and inappropriate policy design(Cornia and Helleiner 1995; World Bank 2000c).

SAPs implemented in African countries werepredicted to have an impact on poverty by fosteringeconomic growth and shifting relative prices in favorof agricultural and rural areas, where most of thepoor live (World Bank 1981). Given that SAPs failedto promote growth, no improvement in poverty couldbe expected. The impact on poverty and food secu-rity achieved through the shifting of relative agricul-tural prices has been mixed. The winners have beennet surplus producers of agricultural products amongrural households, particularly those with exportcrops, while the losers have been net consumingpoor households and the urban poor (Christiaensen,Demery, and Paternostro 2001).

Of particular concern for poverty and food secu-rity are the fiscal measures implemented as part ofSAPs. While there is wide consensus that low budg-et deficits are essential for achieving macroeconom-ic stability, there is intense debate regarding how toachieve them—that is, on the proper mix betweentax increases and expenditure reduction. In manySAPs, particularly the early ones, the expenditureside of the budget had to carry the main burden.There was little room for raising tax revenues, forexample through import duties, without producingconflict with the trade liberalization objective.Because of this emphasis on expenditure cuts, pub-lic support for infrastructure, education, social serv-ices, as well as for research and extension suffered,and rural areas, with their high proportion of thepoor, were particularly hard hit.

In conclusion, although SAPs and stabilizationpolicies were widely adopted in Africa, their im-pact on both economic development and food andnutrition security is debatable. The implementation of the policies was poor—only stop-go and half-hearted in most countries—and there has been alack of political will to implement the policies,despite the financial support and conditions placed

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on that support by the promoters, mainly the WorldBank and IMF.

The ComprehensiveDevelopment Framework (CDF)and the HIPC/PRSP Approach(1999 to the present day)In the later phases of SAP implementation, the viewsof strategists began to shift toward a more flexibleand gradual approach to budget cutting, largely inresponse to criticism from African leaders, OAU,ECA, many NGOs, and scholars (Owusu 2003),with greater tolerance of short-term deficits duringstabilization (Klasen 2003; Cornia and Helleiner1995; Bevan and Adam 2001). At the same time,there was increasing recognition of the role govern-ments play in providing the necessary support foreducation, health, and research and extension, mostnotably in agriculture, rural credit, and institutionaldevelopment. It was realized that scarce publicfunds need to be focused more on the needs of thepoor so as to increase their access to these vital serv-ices (Bevan and Adam 2001). Thus, as the 1990sapproached, there were increasing calls for “adjust-ment with a human face,” which meant renewedattention to the social dimension of development andwidening the role played by the state in societaldevelopment. This broader view of developmentwas strengthened by a series of UN conferencesthroughout the 1990s that dealt with such issues asgender equality, human rights, population, socialdevelopment, and the environment.

In response to worldwide criticism, and as aresult of a change in its top management, the WorldBank started to rethink its approach in 1999. Thethen-new President, James Wolfensohn, a critic ofSAPs, initiated a process for establishing a newdevelopment framework that would move beyondpure macroeconomic stabilization and structuraltransformation, and integrate a society’s social, polit-ical, environmental, and cultural aspects into devel-opment. This framework would also be based on theassumption that all development agencies (govern-ments, multilaterals, bilaterals), civil society, and theprivate sector must play a part in poverty reductionand equitable, sustainable development (World

Bank 2003). The World Bank’s CDF is based on thefollowing four principles:1. Development strategies should be holistic, take a

long-term perspective, and be comprehensive inaccounting for the economic, social, political,environmental, and cultural aspects of the socie-ty concerned.

2. Development should be results oriented.Performance should be measured not in terms ofinputs such as disbursement of loans but in termsof outcomes, impacts, and results on the ground.

3. Development should be “owned” by the recipi-ent country; development goals and strategiesmust be based on broad citizen participationand commitment, that is, they should not onlyinvolve national and local governments but alsocivil society, the private sector, and local infor-mal groups.

4. Development should be based on country-ledpartnerships. Recipient countries should be incharge of managing and coordinating aid, act-ing through consultation and partnerships withmultilaterals and donors. This approach aims toreduce donor dominance, inefficiencies, andasymmetrical power relationships, and thusdonor–recipient tensions.As the CDF took hold, the World Bank and IMF

launched a new program in 1999 aimed at debtrelief for 60–70 highly indebted poor countries(HIPCs), on the condition they followed poverty-oriented development programs. Following the CDFprinciples, governments were expected to formulatetheir own development strategies, articulate their pri-orities and policies, and integrate them into theirexpenditure plans using the guidance of what wereknown as PRSPs. Resources released through debtreduction were to be directed toward poverty reduc-tion. PRSPs require countries to outline a strategybacked by specific policies for reducing poverty,restore macroeconomic equilibrium taking intoaccount poverty issues in particular, and establish aframework conducive to pro-poor growth.

The PRSP process has two steps. Each countryprepares an interim PRSP as a key condition forreaching the decision point (step 1). The preparationof a full PRSP, involving all stakeholders, is then a

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condition for reaching the completion point (step 2),which triggers debt relief and resource flow.

A key feature of the PRSP process is the empha-sis on country ownership. The process moves frominitial consultation with each recipient country to thecountries setting their own development prioritiesand making and implementing the necessary deci-sions involved. To ensure ownership and a focus onpoverty within recipient countries, the process callsfor wide ranging participation of all levels of publicdecisionmaking and of civil society, local groupsrepresenting the poor, minorities, and the privatesector. It was intended that recipient countries takethe lead in managing their aid processes and coor-dinate donors within joint PRSP processes.

The CDF and PRSP models recognize that thereis no single path to development, that its many ele-ments need to be considered in turn, and that theirrelative weight and importance will vary from onesituation to another. Another important aspect of theCDF and PRSP approaches is the role of gender inpoverty. It specifically considers the differencesbetween how women and men experience poverty,as well as the kinds of discriminatory practices thatmake women more vulnerable to poverty than men.

Because the development strategies aredesigned by the governments and people of devel-oping countries and thus reflect their priorities ratherthan the priorities of donors, the PRSP approachrequires a strong focus on strengthening the capaci-ty of developing countries to plan and manage theirown development. Local partnership is seen as away to ensure that donor efforts respond to local pri-orities, and that programs or initiatives supported bydevelopment programs are sustainable, particularlyonce donor investments are wound down.

This approach also calls for improved donorcoordination. Recipient countries bear the mainresponsibility for coordinating their developmentactions, although external partners must also ensurethat their aid programs complement each other. Incases where planning and management capacity isweak, bilateral and multilateral donors must encour-age the use of regular forums for coordination andthe promotion of local participation. Further, themodel calls for a results-based approach withimproved monitoring and evaluation of development

programs. Finally, the approach seeks greater cohe-sion among the non-aid policies of industrializedcountries that can have profound effects on thedeveloping world—for example, policies on trade,investment, and technology transfer.

In summary, the CDF and PRSP models enjoywide acceptance among international organiza-tions—international financial institutions and theUN—and bilateral donors, as well as in the devel-oping world. Bilateral donors, UN agencies, andinternational financial institutions (IFIs) are now mak-ing efforts to put these models into practice withintheir project portfolios, as well as in a number ofnew program approaches, such as the World Bank’sAfrica Region Rural Strategy (ARRS), the UN’sDevelopment Assistance Framework, and instru-ments such as sectorwide approaches (SWAPs). TheCDF informs all these efforts, draws together the prin-ciples of effective development programming, and isbased on a holistic approach to development.

Evaluation of the CDF and PRSPs

Implementation of the CDF only began in 1999;hence it is perhaps too early to evaluate its out-comes. The World Bank’s Operation EvaluationDepartment (OED) has instead evaluated the extentto which CDF principles have been implemented insix countries chosen as case studies, three of whichare in Africa: Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Uganda.The following discussion draws on this evaluation(World Bank 2003).

The CDF’s long-term holistic development frame-work was intended to become operational by iden-tifying clear and affordable priorities and linkingthem to the central budget process. Of all the coun-tries studied, “only Uganda follows such a processof costing and setting priorities and linking them to amedium expenditure framework” (World Bank2003, xix). Such a process requires the availabilityof sufficient know-how, competence, and institution-al capacity. The evaluation thus calls on donors toprovide sustained, long-term support for capacitybuilding, public sector reforms, and institutionalstrengthening.

Most donor agencies and recipient governmentsdo not have the internal structures and processes

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that are conducive for the cross-sectoral dialogueand multisector programs required by a holistic ap-proach. Such an approach is often further hamperedby prevailing departmental thinking and intersectorcompetition in donor agencies.

The CDF’s results-based orientation is intendedto shift attention to results on the ground; however,the evaluation found that the weak capacity of pub-lic service providers and institutions significantly con-strained the implementation of this principle.Inadequate incentives and fragile accountabilitystructures further hampered efforts to install a “resultsculture” in the daily operations of governments. Inaddition, the complex reporting and monitoringrequirements of donors placed undue burdens onrecipient governments. Donors continued to pursue“complex, special-purpose approaches withunwieldy indicators that conform more to donors’reporting requirements than to what is needed tomanage national service delivery” (World Bank2003, xx). The demand in the CDF for country own-ership of the development process is not novel.However, the evaluation found that country owner-ship was too narrowly based when consultationswere confined to the ministerial level. Parliaments,local governments, civil society, and the private sec-tor have regularly been bypassed, and those wholack an organized voice, such as women, the land-less, and minorities, have been left out entirely. To theextent that CDF principles are applied to PRSPprocesses, their approval by the boards of the WorldBank and IMF (if funded by a Poverty ReductionSupport Credit [PRSC] or Poverty Reduction andGrowth Facility [PRGF]) have tended to limit theoptions of countries and to inhibit their full ownershipof their development processes.

The PRSP process has, despite its short history,assumed a significance far beyond the need forcountries to fulfill the HIPC-1 (decision point) andHIPC-2 (completion point) conditions. First, it hasbecome a key frame of reference for both multilater-al and bilateral donors. Second, the PRSP processhas led the World Bank and IMF to introduce newlending facilities in the form of the PRSC and PRGFprograms, respectively. Third, PRSPs address threecritical problems:

1. fragmentation of and inconsistencies in donors’development assistance behavior;

2. governance and institution deficiencies in recip-ient countries; and

3. weaknesses in the legitimacy and institutional-ization of participatory decision processes with-in countries.On the basis of an evaluation of the PRSPs of

eight African countries in 2000/01, Booth (2003,135) concluded that “there is also a distinct possi-bility that PRSPs will make a real difference.” He alsoemphasized that the PRSP process requires support,strengthening of its weaknesses, and expansion ifthat optimistic view is to become a long-term reality.

First and foremost, PRSPs need to emphasizeand allocate more resources to capacity building atall levels, including resources for budgeting process-es and financial accountability monitoring, for sectorlevel priority setting and policy formulation, and atthe local and micro level administration, project eval-uation, and management.

Second, many PRSP processes are still heavilyfocused on the “capital city” and fail to involveregional authorities and local institutions andgroups. Within government, responsibilities are dif-fuse, and line ministries are not involved—or evenfighting for influence—in the PRSP process.Parliaments are often even less involved, which isalso true of civil society, private sector stakeholders,and local representatives (Eberle 2001). If owner-ship of PRSP processes is to be broadly based, par-ticipation needs to be institutionalized more effec-tively. Parliaments, regional and local representa-tives, as well as private sector and civil societygroups, all need to be made part of the consultation,decisionmaking, and implementation process.Moreover, the role of the World Bank and IMFapproval process in releasing PRSC and PRGF fundsneeds to be clarified; at present it is seen as dis-couraging participation and limiting true recipientcountry ownership.

Third, increasing the openness of agreementswith PRGF or PRSC would encourage participation.These agreements tend to be treated as secret, oftenwithout justification; they are thus not widely disseminated, which creates the image of exclusion,secrecy, distrust, and the evasion of accountability.

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Fourth, it was found that the monitoring of manyPRSP processes remains weak and progress in mon-itoring patchy. One reason may be that stakeholdersare not convinced that the monitoring system is feeding evidence back into policy decisionmaking.It follows that monitoring processes are seen merelyas technical matters that are best handled by na-tional statistical services. Monitoring PRSP processesshould be seen as a strategic task with a short timehorizon that can provide information to povertyreduction programs. Monitoring should focus ontracking the delivery of financial and other inputs to poverty reduction programs and in particular tofood- and nutrition-related programs (Booth 2003).

In conclusion, the commitment to reduce povertyexpressed by governments at the World FoodSummit and in the Millennium Development Goalsand PRSPs has shifted attention to rural people andto agriculture. Most of Africa’s poor are engaged infarming, and without a development push in agri-culture, poverty reduction efforts are futile. After aperiod of declining support for agricultural and ruraldevelopment, African governments now placeincreasing attention on enlarged public and privateinvestment programs to foster agricultural and ruralgrowth (World Bank 2002). Thus, the PRSPs canimprove food and nutrition security in Africa if theidentified needs and programs are implemented bygovernments and stakeholders.

Recent African Agricultural andRural Development InitiativesTwo high-profile agricultural production/food securi-ty initiatives are currently underway in Africa: FAO’sSpecial Program for Food Security (SPFS); and theWorld Bank’s Africa Region Rural Strategy (ARRS).Another noteworthy initiative, the Sasakawa–Global2000 Food Production Initiative, has been helping

farmers to raise food production since 1986.1 Theseinitiatives are discussed below.

FAO’s Special Program for Food Security (SPFS)

FAO developed a program of special support foragriculture, known as the Special Program for FoodSecurity (SPFS), in 1996. The program is now oper-ational in 62 countries. Its objectives are to help low-income food-deficit countries to increase food pro-duction and productivity on a sustainable basis,reduce annual fluctuations in food supply, andimprove access to food (FAO/DFID 2001). It seeksto generate rural income and employment, reducepoverty, and enhance social and gender equality.

SPFS has four key components: (1) water/mois-ture management and irrigation; (2) crop intensifi-cation and productivity increases through the devel-opment of a technology package providingimproved seeds, fertilizers, and plant protection,combined with extension and farm managementadvice; (3) diversification of the range of products toreduce ecological, market, food supply, and nutri-tion risks; and (4) policy and institution creation toimprove incentives for and access to agriculturalservices, infrastructure, and knowledge. The pro-gram focuses initially on high-potential areas andemploys the farmer field school extension model,with outreach demonstrating the effect of innovationsto interested farmers through farmers’ groups.

A recent evaluation of the program (FAO 2002)concluded that SPFS has helped to raise nationalconsciousness about food and nutrition security inthe targeted countries. SPFS has moved attentionback to agriculture and its role in enhancing foodand nutrition security, as well as to poverty reductionin rural areas. Its participatory approach recognizesthe importance of demand orientation in technology

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1 The Sasakawa–Global 2000 program combined the financial backing of Mr. Sasakawa with agricultural know-how in the formof technical packages comprising manual fertilizer and improved seeds, and then supported their transfer to farmers. It graduallyexpanded from its original base in Ghana, Sudan, and Zambia to about 12 countries, and is continuing its efforts to develop atechnology package that is sufficiently attractive to farmers to achieve a wide impact in Africa.

design, and of linking national concerns with local-level actions. It also recognizes that solving the foodsecurity problem requires a multifaceted and inte-grated strategy involving water management, cropintensification and diversification, and institutionaldevelopment.

This evaluation also produced important lessonsfor future agricultural support programs. First, thefocus on high-potential areas renders upscaling andreplication difficult, given Africa’s ecological diversi-ty and the predominance of ecologically and eco-nomically marginal areas. The high-potential focusalso highlights national, as opposed to household,food security, and thus tends to weaken the povertyreduction orientation of the program. Second, SPFSmakes extensive use of subsidies to encourage tech-nology adoption, which raises concerns about thesustainability of the program and its replicability ona wider scale. Therefore, the innovation packageapproach must be handled flexibly, as farmers oftenprefer partial adoption, and the guidelines and infor-mation the approach produces must be use oriented,easily accessible, and adapted to the local commu-nication tradition.

Spread over 62 countries, SPFS has had only a weak impact at the individual country level inimproving household food and nutrition security anda practically unnoticeable impact on national poli-cies. Further, donors do not seem to have modifiedtheir aid strategies as a result of SPFS (FAO 2002).

The World Bank’s Africa Region Rural Strategy (ARRS)

The World Bank’s development efforts in the 1980sand 1990s were guided by the SAP approach, andhence focused largely on stabilizing the macroeco-nomic environment, reforming macroeconomic poli-cies and institutional frameworks within countries,and investing in health and education. Support foragriculture became partly neglected as a result. Innominal terms, World Bank lending to agriculturaland rural development dropped by 75 percentbetween 1990 and 2000, and the number of newprojects fell from 23 to just 8. As a proportion oftotal lending to Africa, the rural sector’s share

declined from 28 percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 2000. Recognizing that Africa’s populationremains predominantly rural and that measures toreduce poverty are most needed in rural areas,ARRS aims to correct the neglect of agriculture in pre-vious SAPs. ARRS is building on a growing consen-sus that macroeconomic stability and institutionalreforms are necessary but not sufficient to generatethe widely shared growth required for effectivepoverty reduction.

This approach emphasizes the essential role ofthe private sector in production and trade, liberal-ization of markets, enhancement of the activity oflocal governments and private firms in public serviceprovision, participation of community and producerorganizations, and transparency and accountabilityin the use of public funds. It places a high priority onthe following considerations:� raising agricultural productivity and increasing

investment in all factors contributing to agricul-ture, particularly research and education;

� reversing the degradation of natural resources,improving soil fertility and water management,and protecting forests, wetlands, and range-lands;

� rehabilitating and expanding rural infrastruc-ture services (transportation, water supply andsanitation, energy, and communication) andimproving access to them for the rural poor;

� meeting the Millennium Development Goals foreducation by building schools, training teach-ers, and providing textbooks for 80 million chil-dren during the next 15 years; and

� increasing health services to achieve the goalsof reducing infant and child mortality by two-thirds and maternal mortality by three-quartersby 2015 (this component is closely integratedwith the World Bank’s special program for cop-ing with and preventing HIV/AIDS in Africa).In designing specific programs, ARRS particu-

larly emphasizes land rights for women, the inclu-sion of women in community development pro-grams, and improving women’s access to agricultural services, farming inputs, and markets(World Bank 2002).

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ARRS is too new for its performance to beassessed. Therefore this review is limited to examin-ing whether the preconditions for successful imple-mentation have been established. ARRS is imple-mented mainly through the PRSP process, whichemphasizes productivity growth in agriculture, natu-ral resource conservation, rural infrastructure andinstitution building, and improving health and edu-cation in rural areas. The strategy’s objectives arerelevant to and consistent with poverty reduction andfood and nutrition security improvement. Many ofthese components require specialized expertise inagricultural production and rural institution building.If bank and bilateral donors focus their staffing andrecruitment policies on this requirement, agriculturaldevelopment may regain its potential for improvingfood and nutrition security.

NEPAD’s Response to thePresent Crisis in AfricaThe present crisis in Africa is a major challenge forthe international community as well as for Africa’sleadership. In response, African leaders assembledin Sirte, Libya, in September 1999 to search for aparadigm shift in the way Africa conducts its affairs.A consensus emerged that what was needed was aholistic, integrated, and coordinated agenda for theregeneration of the African continent. Given the evi-dence that the continent was failing on every front,ranging from economic management to social sta-bility to adoption of new technologies to capacitybuilding, African leaders agreed on a new devel-opment agenda for African renewal. What finallyemerged from their deliberations was NEPAD’sstrategic framework document.

The African leaders formally adopted the vision,principles, objectives, goals, and priorities outlinedin the NEPAD document at the OAU Summit inLusaka, Zambia, in July 2001. This new initiativeaimed to build on the CDF–PRSP process, and amal-gamates African initiative and ownership of thedevelopment process with neoliberal concepts.NEPAD supports liberalization and globalization ifthe process is fair and the playing field of interna-tional trade is level. By endorsing NEPAD’s policyframework, African leaders jointly accepted respon-

sibility for eradicating poverty and placing theircountries, both individually and collectively, on thepath of sustainable development and growth. At thesame time, they committed themselves to principles,values, priorities, and standards of governance that are in line with international best practice.Furthermore, they committed themselves to people-centered, participative development processes.

Within NEPAD’s overall vision, its vision for agri-culture seeks to maximize the contribution of Africa’slargest economic sector to achieving a self-reliantand productive Africa that can participate fully in the world economy. The NEPAD strategy aims foragriculture-led development that eliminates hungerand reduces food insecurity and poverty, therebyopening the way for an expansion of exports, andthat puts the continent on an improved economicgrowth path within an overall strategy of sustain-able development and the preservation of the natu-ral resource base. NEPAD’s strategy consists of the following aims:� improving the productivity of agriculture, with

particular attention to small-scale and womenfarmers;

� ensuring food security for all people, and in-creasing the access of the poor to adequatefood and nutrition;

� promoting measures against natural resourcedegradation, and encouraging productionmethods that are environmentally sustainable;

� integrating the rural poor into the market econ-omy and providing them with better access tonational and export markets;

� transforming Africa into a net exporter of agri-cultural products; and

� making Africa a strategic player in agriculturalscience and technology development.None of these goals for African agriculture are

new. These goals have been proclaimed in everystrategy that African leaders have designed oradopted with the aims of resolving the food crisisand reversing the effects of poverty. What doesappear to be new is the high recognition of thesegoals by the African leaders who currently drive theimplementation of NEPAD’s strategy. The newemphasis and priority given to agriculture and waterwithin NEPAD and in the 2003 Maputo Declaration

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of the Heads of States of the African Union is alsoencouraging in this respect. The Lagos Plan of Actionand initiatives of the past did not have the benefit ofsuch strong political leadership in their implementa-tion phase. To ensure its full success, NEPAD mustintegrate lessons from OAU’s past involvements ininitiatives conceived or adopted by African leaders.

The International Trade Context

The WTO Agreements

Africa’s food and nutrition status has also beenaffected by international developments in trade, inparticular by the World Trade Organization (WTO)agreements. The WTO agreements, which were oneoutcome of the Uruguay Round (UR) of multilateraltrade completed in 1993, resulted in particular inradical changes in the global environment for agri-cultural development and trade. These agreementsprovide the institutional setting and rules that governbroad agricultural production policies and agricul-tural trade relations among countries. These reformsare important for most African countries becauseagriculture remains their dominant economic sector.

The main thrust of the Uruguay RoundAgreement on Agriculture (AoA) is to remove pro-duction- and trade-distorting practices and thus facil-itate a fair and market-oriented agricultural tradingsystem. The Uruguay Round addressed market dis-tortions by banning some previous protectionistpractices, and developed new rules described bythe AoA for other practices. The main goals of theAoA are to improve market access and to reducedomestic support measures and export subsidies.

Market Access: Under these agreements, all membercountries of the WTO are required to substitutequantitative trade restrictions by tariffs, bind their tar-iffs against further increases, and reduce them overtime (by 24 percent over an eight-year period fordeveloping countries). The agreements also requirethat all duties and charges applying a bound tariffbe included in the schedule of commitments. Thisrequirement ensures that a bound tariff concession isnot nullified by the imposition of other duties orcharges. Countries are required to provide informa-

tion on the products subject to tariffication and abouttheir current minimum access conditions, where min-imum access is defined as 3 percent of domesticconsumption in the base years, rising to 5 percent by 2004. When current access is already above the required minimum, no further import provision is required.

Most countries in Africa have done away withnontariff barriers as required by the AoA, but at thesame time developed countries have adopted sani-tary and phytosanitary standards as well as techni-cal barriers to trade. While developed countries areusing the Sanitary and Phytosanitary StandardsAgreement to limit access to commodities from devel-oping countries, most developing countries find it dif-ficult to meet the standards of this agreementbecause of numerous problems with implementationand their lack of technical capacity. The emerginguse of standards related to labor, environment, com-petition, and investment by developed countries canbe seen as a way to create barriers to trade for com-modities from developing countries.

Domestic Support: The provisions of the AoA dividesupport measures into three groups: green, blue,and amber box measures. Green box measures areagricultural production measures with minimumtrade distortion, such as agricultural extension andresearch services, which are permitted by theAgreement. Blue box measures include indirect sub-sidies related to production quotas, such as pay-ments to farmers to reduce production, which lead totrade distortion. These measures are to be reducedgradually with the aim of their total elimination in thefuture. Amber box measures are direct subsidies ofagricultural production such as input subsidies.These measures are not permitted by the Agreementand are to be gradually reduced and eventuallyeliminated. Finally, the special differential treatmentclause allows developing countries to use productionsubsidies under special circumstances, such as inpoverty programs for disadvantaged regions. Theleast-developed countries are exempt from the AoArequirements of the domestic support provisions.

The emerging consensus is that most developedcountries have managed to package their substan-tial support commitments into the blue and green

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box categories, enabling them to provide support tofarmers of as much as 80 percent of the value ofagricultural production. Developing countries and,in particular, African countries have been less adeptat using such opportunities for exemptions fromrequirements to reduce aggregate measures of sup-port. They have also underestimated the importanceof aggregate measures of support, thus excludingmeasures that should have been included either ingreen box submissions or as part of the de minimisexemption—that is, the minimum level of allowabledomestic support, in value terms, that is not subjectto reduction. Worse still, programs such as SAPs ledmany developing countries to reduce levels of agri-cultural support, and this has affected agriculturalproduction. The combination of these factors hashad adverse effects on African agriculture and onAfrica’s food and nutrition security.

Export Subsidies: The AoA permits export subsidieson agricultural products but imposes constraints onusing them liberally, and member countries havemade commitments to reduce these subsidies. Thebase period for computing export subsidies was1986–90. Subsidies must be reduced from the baseby 24 percent (for developing countries) over aneight-year period, during which time the subsidiescannot be increased. Subsidies that reduce costsrelating to export marketing and internal transporta-tion are exempt from these considerations for devel-oping countries, although no new subsidies can beintroduced. Export subsidies can, however, be coun-tervailed by importing countries if they cause seriousinjury to their domestic industries.

For many African countries, the key issue in ex-port subsidies is under use since few African coun-tries provided export subsidies at the time of signingthe AoA. The indirect effects of the heavy use ofexport subsidies by developed countries can be sub-stantial. These subsidies encourage surpluses of agri-cultural products in the world market, which depressprices and therefore make products from Africa lesscompetitive. However, net food exporters benefitfrom the low prices that result from export subsidies.Countries can face higher import bills once subsidies

are withdrawn, which is likely to negatively affectfood and nutrition security.

Other Issues: The AoA has three other elements thatare important to African countries. First, it containsnew rules on sanitary and phytosanitary measures.Although intended only to protect food safety as well as animal and plant health, applications of therules can constitute unfair technical barriers to tradewhen used indiscriminately. Provision is also madefor technical assistance for developing countries tohelp them comply with standards imposed byimporting countries, which could lead to increasedexports and therefore to improvements in food andnutrition security.

Second, the agreement includes special and differential treatment for developing countries andleast-developed countries, granting them 10 years to implement their reduction commitments. Further,least-developed countries are not required to makereduction commitments in any of the following three areas: market access, domestic support, andexport subsidies.

Third, the Marrakech Declaration, which ad-dresses the special difficulties of least-developedcountries and net-food-importing developing coun-tries, proposed that support be provided to thesecountries if they suffer sharply increased food im-port bills following reductions in food export subsi-dies by developed countries. However, there wereno operational mechanisms developed for imple-menting this decision.

In conclusion, while African countries havemoved toward liberalization and the opening ofmarkets, industrialized countries are still protectingimportant sectors and markets, notably those in agri-culture. African countries are increasing the pressureon industrialized countries—particularly the EU,Japan, and the United States—to lower the protec-tion levels in these markets. The uneven playing fieldof international trade constrains the export and production potential of African producers, reducesemployment and income, especially in rural areas,and thus negatively affects Africa’s food and nu-trition security.

4. Evaluation of Subregional and NationalPrograms, Strategies, and Policies

Africa remains in crisis today. Hunger and povertyare a major threat to many people there, particular-ly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Over 300 million Africanslive on less than US$1 a day. More than a quarterof the population of Africa, about 200 million peo-ple, are chronically hungry, 30 million require emer-gency food and agricultural assistance in any oneyear, and in 2003 about 14 million people were onthe brink of starvation in the Southern AfricaDevelopment Community (SADC) alone. It is expect-ed that the number of undernourished people in Sub-Saharan Africa will increase from 180 million in1995–97 to 184 million in 2015. This stands insharp contrast to the Millennium Development Goalof halving hunger and poverty by 2015.

These negative trends are associated with theelusiveness of economic growth, especially in agri-culture, persistent conflicts, and the rampant HIV/AIDS epidemic. However, a closer look at the regionreveals some variability among countries and sub-regions. For example, in northern Africa, both theprevalence and the absolute number of people whoare malnourished have been decreasing, and sever-al countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Angola, Ghana,Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, and Tanza-nia) have introduced policies that have successfullycombated either hunger or malnutrition, or both.

There are especially difficult situations in central,southern, and eastern Africa, where violent conflictsand HIV/AIDS epidemics thwart all efforts to estab-lish food and nutrition security. In northern Africa, thesouth–north migratory streams, coupled with rapidurbanization in the south of the Mediterraneanregion, are likely to intensify in coming years. Thedisparities between north and south show up in sub-stantial differences in human development indicatorssuch as illiteracy rates, sanitation, child mortality,and life expectancy. The average GDP per capita

today is five times higher in the northern Mediter-ranean countries than in the south. Similarly, agri-cultural labor productivity is currently five times lessin the south.

Further, with only a few exceptions, all the coun-tries in eastern and southern Africa have per capitaincomes lower than the average for low-incomecountries, estimated at US$430, as well as povertyrates that are over 40 percent. With regard to the prevalence of undernutrition in this region, onlyNamibia, Swaziland, and Uganda had prevalenceslower than 25 percent, which is the average forleast-developed countries. In central Africa, the num-ber of undernourished went up from 22 million people in 1992 to 45 million in 2000, which is a 100 percent growth rate in malnutrition. The re-gional hunger and malnutrition rate in central Africais 57 percent.

At the same time, most African economies areheavily dependent on agriculture as their mainsource of livelihood and many have the naturalresources to support these activities. In eastern andsouthern Africa, for example, more then 90 percentof potentially arable land is unexploited. CentralAfrica contains the second-largest forested area inthe world and agriculture is the principal economicactivity, accounting for 67 percent of all employ-ment, 28 percent of GDP, and 5 percent of allexports. However, agricultural exports fell fromUS$1.4 billion in 1980 to US$0.72 billion in 2002,while agricultural imports grew from US$0.95 bil-lion in 1998 to US$1.6 billion in 2002. Seven of the11 countries in central Africa have experienced conflict, which is contributing to the poor perform-ances of their agricultural sectors.

In addition to the strategies discussed in earlierchapters, a number of food security programs havebeen designed and implemented in Africa through

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regional economic organizations. In eastern andsouthern Africa, for instance, SADC and the coun-tries belonging to the Common Market for Easternand Southern Africa (COMESA) have undertakenregional efforts in food and nutrition security. In cen-tral Africa, food and nutrition security programshave centered around the efforts by the EconomicCommunity of Central African States (ECCAS) andits Regional Programme of Food Security (PRSA).The Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) has also taken steps to address the foodsecurity situation in its member countries. The follow-ing sections provide more detailed descriptions ofsome of these initiatives.

Subregional Initiatives

Southern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC)

SADC was established in Lusaka, Zambia, on April 1, 1980, following the adoption of the LusakaDeclaration. Its main objective is to promote region-al cooperation in economic development amongmember states.

SADC’s Food Security Program is the implemen-tation of a food security strategy that addresses boththe supply and demand sides of the food securityissue by focusing on household economies and vul-nerable groups. The program comprises a numberof national and regional projects that help memberstates improve regional, national, and householdfood security. It encourages activities that increasethe ability of all people to acquire an adequate dietthrough improved productivity and increasedincomes, especially for the rural population, and isbased on wise use and long-term conservation of theregion’s natural resource base. The Food SecurityProgram has several regional projects that includean early warning system, remote sensing, food secu-rity training, small-scale seed production, a foodsecurity database, vulnerability assessment, and afood and nutritional information system. These proj-ects are implemented by member states with fundingand technical assistance from various donors.

Much has been achieved in SADC in terms offood security since its inception in April 1980. In

particular, the small-scale seed production projecthas been successful and led to the development of anumber of seed varieties catering to the different cli-matic conditions in SADC. Other achievements havebeen in training, disaster management, informationmanagement, and emergency operations. However,the financing of projects remains problematic andweaknesses in the individual countries’ implementa-tion of the programs may be responsible for theproblems in food security and nutrition in the region.

Common Market of Eastern andSouthern Africa (COMESA)

The treaty establishing COMESA was signed onNovember 5, 1993, in Kampala, Uganda, and wasratified a year later in Lilongwe, Malawi. COMESAwas formed to replace the former Preferential TradeArea (PTA), which had existed since 1981. Foodand nutrition security are coordinated by the agri-culture, trade, and customs unit of COMESA. A new program for regional agricultural trade pro-motion and food security was proposed in 2003and is technically coordinated by the committee on agriculture.

COMESA and its predecessor, PTA, have pro-duced significant achievements in the areas of trade,customs, transport, development finance, and tech-nical cooperation. Impressive progress has alsobeen made in the productive sectors of industry andagriculture. However, COMESA member countriesface frequent food insecurity as a result of the con-fluence over a long period of time of several factors.Droughts, floods, and related natural disasters havebeen some of the major causes of food insecurity,exacerbated by other factors such as conflict, pov-erty, and HIV/AIDS. The region has been unable toadequately respond to the continued recurrence ofclimate-induced disasters, despite the existence of awell-assembled body of knowledge and early warn-ing systems. For example, the Horn of Africa isprone to food famine almost every four years.

The region has developed a food security pro-gram that builds on the 1992 FAO-approvedTechnical Cooperation Programme (TCP), whichwas created to assist COMESA in formulating aregional food security program. This project identi-

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fied a number of priority intervention areas forenhancing food security in member states, but theseinterventions have not proceeded because of a lackof financial resources.

COMESA has a draft regional agricultural strat-egy that was presented and discussed during themeeting of the COMESA committee on agriculture inJune 2000. The committee recommended that thisdocument be revised to focus on those areas that arebetter addressed at the regional rather than at thenational level. There is a provision in the above-mentioned TCP to improve this strategy, but it willnevertheless require further refinement and periodicupdating in the future. Furthermore, once the strate-gy is finalized, an action plan and program will stillneed to be formulated for its implementation.

The Economic Community of CentralAfrican States (ECCAS) and theRegional Programme of Food Security (PRSA)

ECCAS was established on October 18, 1983, bythe members of the Central African Customs andEconomic Union (UDEAC) and the members of theEconomic Community of the Great Lakes States(Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire), as well as by SaoTome and Principe. ECCAS began operation in1985 with the goals of promoting regional eco-nomic cooperation and establishing a CentralAfrican Common Market. Since 1992, however, theactivities of ECCAS have been limited due to thenonpayment of fees by its member states.

Among the major challenges to the establish-ment of food and nutrition security in central Africaare the dependence of its member countries onimported food, primarily due to the urban demandassociated largely with a rural exodus to urbanareas, and inadequate domestic production due tothe low productivity of their agriculture sectors. Withthe assistance of international donors, ECCASintends to mobilize an amount estimated at aboutUS$20.1 billion to finance the Regional Programmeof Food Security (PRSA).

The ECCAS ministers of agriculture argue that aPRSA must be implemented to increase agriculturalproductivity and to contribute to the creation of a

food reserve. The program should also stabilizeinternal and external markets, which in turn wouldhelp strengthen trade and promote various exportcrops. The important elements of this regional inte-gration are macroeconomic liberalization and theprovision of incentives for commerce and privateenterprise through a supportive legislative, fiscal,financial, and institutional framework that is favor-able to private agents.

The latest PRSA has a mid-term time frame(2003–07) and includes components that addressimplementation capacity, such as partnering in tech-nological support, coordination, and implementa-tion. It also emphasizes stakeholder participationand commitments in accordance with NEPAD. Ourrecommendations for the implementation of thisPRSA are summarized as follows:1. Advocacy, participation, and research should

be the favored implementation strategies for allimplementers, and increased incentives lead toimproved implementation. Better collaborationbetween government, the private sector, civilsociety, and farmer organizations in the imple-mentation of food security programs is stronglyencouraged. Nongovernmental and civil societyorganizations work best when they are treatedas partners by governments. These organiza-tions can provide essential assistance to govern-ments willing to invest in public goods and mo-bilize local participation in both the planningand construction phases. Local participation iscrucial to ensuring affordable maintenance andsuccessful management of public goods througha greater sense of local ownership.

2. Governments need to address policy imbal-ances by shifting their reform priorities towardagriculture: agriculture and nutrition need amuch more focused, sustained, and long-termapproach.

3. The experience of Cameroon (see Box 1) showsthat the interconnectedness of food policy andother sectors makes it necessary for countries toput a policy-coordinating mechanism in place toreduce nonimplementation of programs and inefficiency. Consequently, research must be pur-sued not only within sectors such as population,agriculture, and the environment but also into the

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interactions between sectors. Greater investmentin human capacity building is also required,given the interdisciplinary aspects of food andnutrition security recognized by the RegionalProgramme of Food Security (PRSA) and demon-strated by the United Nations Population Fund’s(UNFPA’s) experiences in Cameroon.

4. There is a lack of statistically supported evidencethat could be used to inform policy- and deci-sionmakers about progress in implementation,especially for nutrition. Implementation actionsmust be monitored and evaluated through acommon database for the countries of the re-gion, which would allow comparisons betweenits departments and countries.

National Programs, Strategies,and PoliciesAs has been discussed, food insecurity and malnu-trition remain major challenges for most countries inthe region. At the policy level, issues of nutrition con-tinue to be crowded out by the emphasis on pover-ty reduction and food security; however, more agri-

cultural production does not necessarily produce bet-ter nutrition. When agricultural produce is sold andthe income is used for nonhunger-related expendi-ture, the malnourished continue to suffer. Further,increased food consumption does not translate intobetter nutrition because the consumed food may lackessential nutrients.

The following subsections briefly examine therecent policies that have both directly and indirectlyimproved food and nutrition security in Africa. Forthe most part, this analysis is based on the experi-ences of countries in southern and eastern Africa aswell as those of a number of northern African coun-tries. Although we at first analyze these regions indi-vidually, the concluding section of this chapter tiesour findings together.

Macroeconomic Policies

Many African governments have been implementingmacroeconomic adjustment programs in associationwith the World Bank and IMF for as long as twodecades, but the success of SAPs in Africa has beenmixed. Most of these reforms were adopted under

Box 1—Food security strategy in Cameroon

Cameroon’s sustainable development is threatened by its agricultural practices, high birth rates,and forest exploitation. The country has recognized the linkages between food insecurity, demo-graphic pressure, and environmental degradation. Thanks to the recognition of these linkages andof the sources of pressure on sustainable development, policymakers have developed cross-sectoralpopulation, agricultural, and environmental policies and programs. These policies address (1)human development, particularly family planning through education and societal change, accom-panied by measures for poverty reduction and for achieving gender equality; (2) agricultural andrural development, through investment in productivity and intensification, advocating market-orient-ed production and access to credit, and reforming pricing policy; and (3) environmental manage-ment, through improving natural resource management, protecting biodiversity, forests, and landcover, and encouraging stakeholder participation and adoption of new technologies.Support frominternational partners is critical to the successful implementation of these policies, as are good gov-ernance and strong administrative frameworks. The country’s poor human capital and institutionalframework has led, however, to the lack of implementation of demographic policies. Another bot-tleneck has been the lack of infrastructure for coordinating policies and actions in each of the pop-ulation, agriculture, and environment sectors. Further, the nutritional dimension of food security hasnot been addressed. Nonetheless, the country’s increased awareness of the interconnectedness ofthese sectors has enabled the state to adopt a multisectoral approach to food security.

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World Bank/IMF-funded programs, such as eco-nomic recovery programs in Tanzania and Uganda;SAPs and the enhanced structural facility programsin Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda; and fis-cal restructuring and deregulation programs inMalawi. More recently, most countries in easternand southern Africa have adopted the medium-termexpenditure framework to further consolidate theirmacroeconomic reforms. The overall objective ofthese reforms has been to achieve macroeconomicstability by ensuring low inflation rates and high eco-nomic growth rates. Attaining these objectives wouldopen up further income-generating opportunities forthe population and fortify their purchasing power,and thus promote food and nutrition security.

Some countries, such as Botswana, Mozam-bique, and Uganda, have carried out successful pro-grams of macroeconomic adjustment and structuralreform, and have achieved high and sustained eco-nomic growth and low inflation. However, the highlevels of economic growth at the national level hidethe huge segments of the economy that have notenjoyed any benefits. Other countries like Kenya,Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia have not achievedhigh levels of economic growth, although their infla-tionary levels have been stabilized.

Reforms in the financial sector have led to anincrease in the number of financial institutions innumerous African countries, including Kenya,Uganda, and Zambia. In many of these countries,however, these increases have not been accompa-nied by increases in savings and domestic invest-ment. Access to credit is generally poor because of high interest rates and tight lending conditions.The costs of doing business remain high in manycountries because of poor communication, high elec-tricity charges, and poor security services. Revenueperformance is still poor in most countries, becauseof a narrow tax base, noncompliance, and cor-ruption. The fiscal situations of most African coun-tries are characterized by high deficits and heavyaid dependency.

The countries of northern Africa have been intransition toward market economies for more than10 years in association with the World Bank andIMF. In addition to the restoration of macroeconom-ic stability and balance of payments equilibrium,

SAPs have aimed at a reorganization of theeconomies of these countries through the liberaliza-tion of production and market systems, including theliberalization of prices, abolition of subsidies, dis-mantling of state intervention and marketing, and theprivatization of land.

In northern Africa, the stabilization policiesimplemented to control government expenditurewere appropriate. However, the priorities of gov-ernment expenditure should also have been rede-fined; education, training, health prevention andcare—that is, the bases of human development—should not be left behind. The liberalization of for-eign trade has led to internal competition betweenimported and home products, and exports are con-fronted with nontariff barriers established by import-ing countries. After a period of improvement, tradeand budget deficits still prevail.

The food and nutrition security strategies of allAfrican countries were defined by the macroeco-nomic policies implicit in agricultural programs. Thedisparities in implementation of macroeconomic pol-icy may be responsible for the differences in foodand nutrition status between the countries of theregion. However, in many countries, food deficitsare visible not at the national level but at the house-hold level. Thus, good performance at the macrolevel may mask weaknesses in food and nutrition atthe household level.

International Trade

Like the macroeconomic policy reforms, trade liber-alization efforts were initiated under World Bankand IMF programs. Further, membership of variousregional trade blocs such as SADC, the East AfricanCommunity (EAC), COMESA, and internationaltrade organizations such as the World TradeOrganization (WTO) has led African countries toadopt multilateral trade liberalization policies.Several countries enjoy the EU preferential arrange-ment for Sub-Saharan Africa under the LoméAgreement between African, Caribbean, andPacific countries and the EU, as well as general pref-erential trade arrangements with many developedcountries. In northern Africa, Algeria reached agree-ments with the EU for freer trade, ensuring that its

exports to the EU benefit from a complete eliminationof customs duties, and that imports from the EU willbe progressively liberalized. Egypt participates inthe U.S.-Egyptian Partnership Agreement, theGreater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), COMESA,and the Euro-Egyptian Partnership.

International trade has been liberalized in mostAfrican countries, price controls have been removed,and the once monopolistic marketing boards nolonger enjoy market monopoly. Some countries havecarried out aggressive export promotion and encour-aged foreign investment (Botswana, Kenya, Uganda,and Zambia). Most countries have also removedquantitative restrictions and lowered tariff barriers. Ingeneral, trade liberalization ensures free importingof food from the rest of the world during food def-icits, as well as higher incomes for local exporters.Freer trade was thought likely to enhance food secu-rity and has indeed made it possible to import food-stuffs from other countries whenever a country has adeficit. It has also benefited those consumers whocan now access foodstuffs more cheaply, but it hashurt producers, who now face stiff competition fromcheap imports, which lowers their incomes and isthus detrimental to food and nutrition security.

In most countries the private sector has failed toadequately take up the role once played by govern-ment marketing monopolies, which has created bot-tlenecks in the marketing of food products, althoughthere has been an increase in the number of privatebusiness players in some countries (such as Kenya,Malawi, and Uganda). In northern Africa, the num-ber of private agencies is increasing, but theiractions are also strongly influenced by regulationsand limits on market access and by support meas-ures benefiting national producers.

Since the second half of the 1990s, theMediterranean basin has attracted a great deal ofattention from multinational agro-industrial groups.Foreign investors now control nearly one-third ofnational market shares. The multinational groupsbring not only their technology but also their man-agement methods and international distribution net-works. The presence of multinational groups is anadvantage for the companies of host countries facedwith the nontariff barriers of international trade andwith barriers to entering the world food oligopoly.

The liberalization of international trade and thecommitment to globalization in northern Africa weremade without careful analysis of the possible conse-quences; these strategies were mainly seen from theperspective of intensifying trade exchanges withEurope. To promote trade with European countriessubstantial European funds have been made avail-able to help upgrade companies so they can meetEuropean safety and quality standards, but such up-grading is unaffordable for many companies (espe-cially in Algeria and Egypt), given the enormouschanges needed in financial management and hu-man resources, the investment required, and the im-portance of training both executives and employees.As a result, northern African countries are disillu-sioned about the promised expansion of exports toEurope and increasingly use devices that enable thecircumvention of the difficulties of gaining marketaccess in Europe.

On the other hand, the potential for internal andregional trade has not yet been fully exploited.Neighboring countries are far less demanding inquality standards and product sophistication, andcould thus be important trading partners.

Public Sector Reforms

Broad reforms were carried out in the civil servicesof most African countries under the World Bank andIMF programs. The overall objective of these publicsector reforms was to improve the efficiency and pro-ductivity of civil service. The reforms included cuttingthe size of civil service, and thus lowering the wagebill, which would enable governments to devotemore resources to areas that would directly improvethe welfare of the people, such as education, health,and infrastructure improvement. Other public sectorreforms included the introduction of cost sharing inthe provision of some essential services to bringdown government expenditure, and the privatiza-tion of government parastatals with the aim ofenhancing their efficiency by placing them in privatehands and thus reducing the burden on the statetreasury. The improved delivery of essential humancapital investment in health and education, alongwith strengthening of the private sector, would, it

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was hoped, in turn facilitate the achievement of over-all food and nutrition security in the region.

However, in many countries the public sectorreforms have been slow and incomplete, and haveoften exacerbated, rather than improved, food secu-rity. In some countries, the large-scale retrenchmentof civil service employees left many families withouta source of income and hence vulnerable to foodinsecurity. In others, the reluctance of the state to besidelined or its inability to create a sufficient numberof alternative jobs produced hesitancy in public sec-tor retrenchment. In Egypt, for instance, retrenchmenthas been reversed, and the public sector has evenexpanded in an effort to reduce the unemploymentrate. In many cases, the public sector constitutes animpediment to the ongoing liberalization and priva-tization reforms because these reforms threaten civilservants’ job security (Ayad 2002).

In many instances, the private sector did notcome onstream until after the dissolution of theparastatal companies, so unemployment grew. Lack-ing the financial means and the capacity to organ-ize such a complex restructuring process, northernAfrican countries have generally been unable to setup structures in the private sector that could replacethe dismantled public structures. Further, in the ab-sence of civil society groups, northern African stateshave not had a public dismission of the role of thestate in their development process. Redefinition ofthe role of the state remains to be carried out in thesecountries, and the mentalities of civil servants mustevolve accordingly.

Public sector retrenchments have also nega-tively affected the delivery of services by govern-ments, such as medical and extension services. Theresources freed up by retrenchment have rarely been translated into increases in public sector invest-ment. In fact, public expenditures have mainlydecreased in the sectors of major importance forhuman development—namely research, education,and health. The figures for social welfare expen-diture show that priorities vary from country to country, especially with regard to health care andhousing. Algeria is one of the countries that hasopted for a very strong social policy, but most others are yet to shift their focus toward the poor and disadvantaged.

In particular, food and nutrition security have not generally benefited significantly from publicreforms. However, the constraints on social expen-diture in the SAP framework have recently led to a re-examination of this problem and the encour-agement of private sector participation in the area of education and health services. Thus, privateschools have proliferated, as have private clinicsand even universities (all formerly forbidden inEgypt, for example). Continued engagement by the private sector may translate into job creation,lower prices, expanding markets, better provision of basic services, and subsequent improvements infood security in Africa.

Poverty Reduction Policies

The links between poverty and hunger are unam-biguous, which means that poverty alleviation effortsmust play a major role in securing access to foodand proper nutrition for all. For almost all Africancountries, local initiatives to fight poverty have beenoutlined in PRSPs, as well as in other national pro-grams and action plans. African countries have com-mitted to eradicating poverty, as stated in theMillennium Development Goals. Most countries inthe region have also signed the Rome Declarationon World Food Security, which committed them tohalving the number of undernourished people by nolater than 2015, mainly by fighting poverty, whichwas identified in the declaration as a major cause offood insecurity. Very broad measures to achievethese goals were outlined in this declaration, includ-ing restoring and maintaining high levels of eco-nomic growth, improving governance, increasingincome opportunities for the poor, improving qualityof life, and improving equity.

The countries in eastern and southern Africahave very high levels of poverty and have adoptedthe goals of accelerated economic growth andgreater equity in the distribution of national wealth.Except for a small number of countries (Botswana,Mozambique, and Uganda), however, these coun-tries have not achieved high and sustained economic growth, and all these countries haveshown poor equity performance. In northern Africa,on the other hand, extreme poverty has been suc-

cessfully limited; only about 2.5 percent of the population lives on less than US$1 per day.

Algeria’s efforts to reduce poverty during thepast decade demonstrate that targeted anti-povertypolicies can be successful. Social policy reformswere introduced that aimed to solidify the finan-cial situation of the social security system, graduallyeliminate food subsidies, establish a system of unem-ployment insurance and a compensation system for workers dismissed from state-owned companies,and identify the underprivileged members of thepopulation and provide them assistance within the framework of the social development fund.However, inadequate targeting, the absence of follow-up, the policy of setting quotas per muni-cipality, and the large proportion of unwarrantedbeneficiaries have limited the extent to which the ultimate objectives of this program—that is, to helpthe most vulnerable members of the population—have been achieved.

Morocco has also adopted various anti-povertymeasures, with programs aiming to open up poorrural areas by improving their infrastructure. Suchmeasures can be effective if poverty-oriented devel-opment projects are matched by microcredit and areefficient. However, even in northern African coun-tries, poverty has been increasing since the mid-1980s, especially in Algeria and Morocco, becauseof a decline in real wages, increasing income dis-parities, and growing underemployment (EconomicResearch Forum 2002). Moreover, recent economicpolicies have reduced some of the practices of mutu-al aid and led to increased disparities.

The main focus of the poverty reduction strate-gies of most countries has been employment cre-ation. Policy reforms have aimed at increasingemployment opportunities, as well as developing therural areas where the majority of the poor live, invarious ways, including facilitating growth in agri-culture through improvement of extension services,promoting nonfarm employment opportunities, andimproving rural infrastructure. These reforms havehad mixed direct and indirect effects on employ-ment. Institutional reforms have had serious directnegative effects, while the associated competition-enhancing policies have had mixed effects, withsome causing contraction of employment and others

having expansionary effects. Further, real wageshave declined during the adjustment period in mostcountries; this decline has had negative effects onfood security. In some countries, such as Egypt andMorocco, job creation was expected to improve asa result of the microcredit programs supported bythe Social Fund of Development. The results of theseprograms remain disappointing, however, principal-ly because of the lack of the management skills nec-essary for their implementation.

Unemployment is becoming a major problem inAfrica, in part because of the negative impact ofpublic sector policies. The hope placed in measuresto boost employment creation through liberalizationand privatization remains unrewarded. Employmentenhancement schemes have so far proved inade-quate. In Algeria, the main emphasis has been ontemporary employment; in Egypt, the number ofpoorly paid civil servants has increased; and inTunisia, these schemes have promoted vocationaltraining, but graduates are released into unemploy-ment. Moreover, given the very low salaries, indi-viduals have been compelled to take on several jobssimultaneously.

As long as private companies cannot offer suf-ficient jobs to absorb those released by public com-panies or utilities, there can only ever be faint hopeof a solution. The task of creating a satisfactoryemployment environment is considerable and canonly be undertaken as a long-term project. The risks of civil uprisings and the growth of religiousextremism will increase if liberalization does notimprove living conditions, and particularly levels of employment.

Other poverty reduction efforts have includedthe empowerment of women, assisting the most vul-nerable groups of the population with food andincome subsidies, and investing in core infrastruc-ture. Women are discriminated against in manycountries. Although women form the bulk of the farm-ing population in these countries, they have lessaccess to productive resources and opportunities, aswell as to the benefits of their work. To combat dis-crimination against women, women’s rights activistgroups have been created in some countries, suchas in Kenya and Uganda. Some governments haveestablished legislation to integrate women’s empow-

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erment into the overall framework for national devel-opment; in Kenya, for example, legislation has beenpassed at the national level to address issues of gen-der equality. Northern Africa is one of the least-favored areas in terms of gender disparity: on aver-age only 31 percent of women are employed. Ma-jor reforms are needed in this region to improve thestatus of women and achieve the goals of povertyreduction and improved nutrition and food security.

Production Support Policies

Production support policies were part of the WorldBank and IMF programs for various countries andaddressed broad areas such as research and ex-tension, investment, infrastructure, finance and mar-ket institutions, land markets, input subsidies, and output pricing and marketing. The overall focus ofthese liberalization policies was aimed at increas-ing competition so as to bring down the cost ofinputs, create incentives for producers through freermarket access, and increase incentives for local andforeign investors. This approach aimed to addressfood insecurity directly by providing cheaper accessto production inputs, bringing down the prices offoodstuffs, and creating more income-generatingopportunities.

In eastern and southern Africa, input subsidiesand price controls have progressively been phasedout in most countries (Kenya, Mozambique,Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). Pricedecontrols were approached with hesitation, espe-cially for staple foods (for example, maize inKenya), and there were some policy reversals, butby now these decontrols have largely been complet-ed. As a result of these reforms, most countries havedeveloped policy frameworks focusing on agricul-ture, such as in Uganda (see Box 2). In other coun-tries, specific food security policies have been devel-oped, such as in Kenya (see Box 3). Most of thesepolicies include reforms that aim to support the agri-cultural sector and thus to implicitly ensure food andnutrition security.

In northern Africa, the increasing support foragricultural and food production during the past two decades is a result of radical changes in the role of the state. Liberalization has affected both gov-

ernment enterprises (parastatals, administrations,and marketing institutions) and the private or semi-private sector.

Egyptian agricultural policy reform began withthe SAP established in 1987 and continued into the1990s (Siam 2003; DAI 2002). The delivery of allcrops to governmental bodies was obligatory until1987. In 1987, the marketing of crops (except cot-ton, rice, and sugarcane) was liberalized. At thebeginning of the 1990s, reforms liberalized the mar-keting of rice, eliminated subsidies for agriculturalinputs (chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and seeds),liberalized the markets for agricultural inputs, elimi-nated subsidies on the interest rate of agriculturalcredits, and abolished compulsory crop rotation.During the second half of the 1990s, further reformsliberalized the marketing of cotton and the prices ofland and farm rents. Thus, from 1987 to 1997, stateintervention in agriculture fell drastically, mainly viathe privatization of governmental bodies and theprogressive closing down of “offices” (state market-ing organizations). Today, only two crops are stillunder state control—sugar and rice. The liberaliza-tion of agricultural policies was accomplished whileunder protection from foreign trade.

In post-independence Morocco, agriculturalstrategies continued the policies established duringthe colonial period (Doukkali 2003; Arndt and Tyner2003). Of these policies, the goal of reaching 1 mil-lion irrigated hectares by the year 2000 had themost significant effect on Moroccan agriculture. Theincrease during the 1970s in the price of phos-phates, of which Morocco was the world’s leadingexporter, allowed for substantial state intervention inthe agricultural and food industries. In 1986, Tunisiaembarked on its first SAP, which consisted of a seriesof reforms, including increases in the prices of keyfarm products and the elimination of subsidies foragricultural inputs. Production prices for grainsincreased up to levels surpassing internationalprices, and subsidies for fertilizers, herbicides,seeds, and cattle feed were gradually eliminated. Atthe same time, large public investments in the agricultural sector continued to occur; the mostimportant investment was in irrigation infrastructureand the installation of public irrigation systems (35 percent of the total volume of financing).

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In northern Africa, SAP commitments specifythree objectives: (1) agriculture should be liberal-ized, (2) agricultural productivity should be raised,and (3) agriculture should be export oriented. Theresulting programs and policies must be consistentwith these objectives. Heavy public investment inwater resources and the end of state monopoliestogether with the liberalization of prices have led to significant progress. However, agricultural devel-opment policy needs to take into account the im-pact on the sustainability of renewable resources(lands, water) and also the constraints of the ex-ternal markets, such as nontariff barriers and strictproduct standards.

The privatization of formerly state or parastatalcompanies has significantly transformed agriculturalactivities in northern African countries. Autonomousdecisionmaking has allowed farmers to reorient theirproduction (Egypt) and exporters to develop more

active export strategies (Morocco). Liberalizingexternal trade has improved the agricultural balanceof the countries studied. Farmers in this region havedemonstrated a good capacity to adapt, in spite oftheir poverty.

Food Policies

Some northern African countries have subsidizedbasic products as part of their food policy, hopingthat these measures could improve food securitywithout the need for significant social reform or forquestioning the foundations of the economy. Al-though the SAPs required the progressive eliminationof these subsidies, some basic products still benefitfrom state support or regulation: bread and grain inAlgeria; soft wheat, hard wheat, olive oil, and milkin Tunisia; and soft wheat, vegetable oil, and sugarin Morocco. These products have been judged too

Box 2—Agricultural policy in Uganda

Uganda’s current agricultural policy is enshrined in the Programme for Modernization ofAgriculture (PMA), a holistic strategic framework for increasing agricultural productivity, eradicat-ing poverty, and improving food security through multisectoral interventions. PMA’s objectives areto increase the incomes and improve the quality of life of poor rural smallholder subsistence farm-ers, improve household food security, provide gainful employment, and promote sustainable useand management of natural resources. PMA hinges on eradicating poverty and food insecurity bytransforming rural smallholder subsistence agriculture into commercial agriculture. The broad strate-gies for achieving the objectives of PMA include:� making poverty eradication the overriding objective of agricultural development;� decentralizing service delivery to lower levels of local government;� removing direct government involvement in the commercial aspects of agriculture and establish-

ing incentives to attract private sector participation;� supporting the dissemination and adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies through agri-

cultural extension services;� guaranteeing food security by increasing production for the market and improving incomes;� ensuring that all intervention programs are gender-focused and gender-responsive;� promoting a two-way planning and budgeting process by empowering local governments; and� ensuring the coordination of the multisectoral interventions that aim to remove constraints on agri-

cultural modernization.A National Agricultural Advisory Service has been created to coordinate the provision of serv-

ices to subsistence farmers.Source: Opolot, Wandera, and Abdala (2003).

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strategic for the liberalization of their prices. Egyptalso continues to subsidize a number of productsheavily within its green card system: bread (56 per-cent), wheat flour (50 percent), sugar (55 percent),and oil (56 percent). Red card beneficiaries can buy

sugar subsidized at 32 percent and oil at 38 per-cent. These food subsidies represented 4.5 percentof government expenditure in 2000.

In Algeria, the objectives of food policy were toreduce food dependence and to provide the popu-

Box 3—Food security strategy in Kenya

Food security is of paramount importance to Kenyan development policy, as is reflected by its cen-tral position in several recent policy documents and plans. The objective of Kenyan food policy isto maintain a position of broad food self-sufficiency so that scarce foreign exchange resources arenot used on food imports. This objective was the rationale behind the government’s long-termreliance in the 1960s and 1970s on agricultural policies such as the application of input subsidiesand the controlled marketing of food commodities.

Kenya’s policy reforms aimed to develop the agricultural sector, and were broad enough toinclude trade and production support. Trade policy reforms and SAPs were used in the 1980s toliberalize markets that had previously been dominated by government controls. As far as agricul-ture was concerned, the aim of the SAPs was to dismantle the government monopoly on the mar-keting of agricultural commodities; remove the associated price controls; and end government con-trol over the importing, pricing, and distribution of farm inputs such as fertilizers, improved seeds,pesticides, vaccines, and machinery. As a result, the input markets have been liberalized and thecountry has developed a network of agricultural input markets. The monopoly on output marketingpreviously held by parastatals such as the National Cereals Produce Board has been dismantled,and private sector and farmer organizations are now taking the lead in organizing the marketingof these products.The implementation of these reforms met with significant covert and overt resist-ance in the 1980s but proceeded with greater commitment from 1993 onwards. Although thereforms have helped to bring about macroeconomic changes, they have been less successful instimulating agricultural growth. The appropriate complementary policy components and sequenc-ing of the reform measures were often missing. For example, no institutional framework was estab-lished for the efficient operation of markets, and no system of rights and obligations was created toknit society together and respond to citizen needs. The Kenyan government seems to have equatedliberalization and privatization with an abdication of its responsibility for economic development.After the many years of government monopolies in production and marketing had ended, privateentrepreneurs lacked the managerial skills, financial capacity, and physical infrastructure to takeover. These factors may have played an important role in compromising the response of the agri-cultural sector to policy reforms.The food insecurity and poverty situation in Kenya may also bedue to the poor performance of agriculture in recent years, because this sector dominates theKenyan economy. The full potential of the agricultural sector is yet to be realized, although inrecent years the development of nontraditional exports such as horticultural products have con-tributed significantly to agricultural growth and therefore to food security. The major challenges tothe agricultural sector include low farm-level productivity, poor marketing, lack of infrastructure, lim-ited access to credit, and the high costs of farm inputs. The sector is also affected by lags in thereform of policy and legal frameworks, which are not yet in line with those associated with a liber-alized economy.

Source: Nyangito et al. (2003).

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lation with a well-balanced diet. The products bene-fiting from food aid, such as flour, legumes, milk, oil,semolina, and sugar make up the bulk of the dailydiet of the population. Financing the gap betweenthe equilibrium price (import price) and the con-sumer price has for a long time been accomplishedthrough general foodstuffs support, chargeable tothe state budget.

Maintaining generalized food subsidies is notjustified, because high-income groups benefit morefrom them than low-income groups. For example, the red card system in Egypt should be abolished.Targeting the needy should be a required pro-cedure, provided the costs of this targeting can becontained. Since subsidies are generally not appliedto the most nutritional products, it appears that polit-ical economy plays a key role in subsidy targeting.Thus food policy, including subsidization, is oftengeared not toward food security but toward achiev-ing internal stability, and to removing some of theburden from social policies. In the trade-off betweenthe rural sector, which benefits from high pro-ducer prices, and the urban sector, which benefitsfrom low prices, governments have so far favoredthe urban sector. Food subsidies have thus not promoted stronger local demand for local prod-ucts but have caused countries to become moredependent on foreign trade, while at the same timealso burdening their budgets.

Governance

Governance plays a critical role in the achievementof food and nutrition security. Countries that havewell-developed governance structures haveachieved better levels of food and nutrition securitybecause such structures facilitate the overseeing ofthe development process, and thus make it less sus-ceptible to corruption. Insecurity and corruption arehigh on the list of factors constraining private partic-ipation in economic activities in the region. Goodgovernance is particularly important for the poor. Ifthe poor have opportunities to exercise their politicaland civil rights, governments are more attuned totheir needs and demands, and, among other effects,are more likely to focus on better allocation and use

of resources for food and security programs. Finally,the absence of armed conflict is a fundamental com-ponent of good governance and a prerequisite ofsound food and nutrition policy. The focus of Africangovernance initiatives has varied, depending onwhich aspect of governance required the most atten-tion at the time.

Measures aimed at improving governance wereadopted under World Bank/IMF initiatives, interna-tional initiatives (such as the UN conventions oninternational corruption), and domestic programssuch as PRSPs and anticorruption strategies.Although most African countries have fared poorly incombating corruption, some hope remains.Botswana has over the years been ranked amongthe least corrupt nations in the world and the best inAfrica, but other countries rank very poorly.Nonetheless, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, andUganda have also attempted to implement reformsaiming to rid the judiciary, police, and civil serviceof corruption and inefficiency. Their overall objec-tives were to improve security, lower the cost ofdoing business, speed up the process of dispensingjustice, and establish a relatively predictable and sta-ble environment for investment.

Successful policy reform has usually only beenmade possible by strong political leadership, suchas in Uganda after the 1986 change of government,the sustained democratic leadership of Botswana,and the democratic governance in Mozambiquethat has persisted since 1992 when war ended.Reform is also only successful where there is gov-ernment commitment to the reforms, and where thereis a wider domestic ownership of the reforms (forexample, in Uganda). Some of the less successfulreformers experienced stiff internal resistance toreforms or external hostility due to overall nationalpolicies, such as the socialism of Tanzania. Othercountries, like Kenya, have expressed reluctance to reform but have also only achieved poor management of their economies.

In northern Africa, policy reforms aimed to mod-ernize the public sector and encourage a civil soci-ety to emerge on the basis of privatization.However, their policies and programs do not go farenough in clarifying and adapting the rules for the

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legal and banking sectors. Thus while this processhas been steadily progressing in Algeria and inTunisia, it is still lagging behind in Egypt andMorocco. The capacity to implement these changesis constrained by cultural attitudes and the difficultyof modifying long-lasting management practices.The time span allowed for these changes is general-ly too short. Moreover the level and type of trainingavailable for civil servants and entrepreneurs are notsuited to the management methods of a privateenterprise in a liberal market context. The stateapparatus, laws and regulations (at different levels,such as trading, business start-up, and credits), andthe modes of governance were geared in thesecountries to centralized decisionmaking and haveturned out to be significant barriers to liberalization.

Many countries in Africa have instituted signifi-cant measures to ensure democratic governance,such as creating multiparty democracy and encour-aging greater political tolerance. But in someregions such as northern Africa, the peoples’ partic-ipation in decisionmaking is close to zero. Indeed,according to usual practices, the new rules and pro-grams are decided at the highest levels of gov-ernment. This is not surprising, given that there are no independent professional organizations, and the organizations that do exist are subject to heavy state control, partly because of fear of political opposition. It is only very recently in Algeriaand Morocco that it has become possible to expressany opposition.

Lastly, many countries in Africa are experiencingviolent conflicts in their territories. Central Africa isespecially plagued by conflict, which renders eco-nomic and social development activities impossibleand endangers the food and nutrition security oflarge parts of the population. In November 2003,the UN introduced a report on the conflict-plaguedECCAS (United Nations Security Council 2003) andcalled on the Security Council to assist the area in itsefforts to stabilize itself and build peace and democ-racy. In this report, submitted to the UN SecretaryGeneral and later forwarded to the Security Council,the mission concluded that the root causes of the cur-rent situation in the central African subregion can betraced to at least two main internal sources—the cri-

sis in governance and the widespread poverty,which have, in several cases, been compounded byexternal factors.

Conflicts are often triggered or exacerbated bypoor governance practices, such as lack of account-ability and transparency, impunity, exclusion, socioe-conomic marginalization, and the absence of therule of law and respect for human rights. Yet encour-aging examples do exist. Some countries, such asMozambique and Uganda, came out of long peri-ods of civil war and are on the path to full recovery.Other countries, like Zimbabwe, however, are slip-ping back into political turmoil with a risk of exclu-sion by the international community.

Human Capital Formation

Most governments recognize that human capitaldevelopment is the key to poverty reduction andhave therefore implemented programs in the centralareas of education, health, nutrition, and familyplanning. These reforms have typically been carriedout under country development programs, WorldBank/IMF-initiated programs, and UN internationalconventions. The overall objective of these reforms inhuman capital has been to enable citizens to havebetter access to services and to promote better useof productive resources, and thus improve the foodand nutritional status of the population.

Most African countries have increased theirbudgetary allocations to social services; howevermost indicators of human capital for these countriesrank poorly compared with those of other develop-ing countries. Illiteracy levels remain high, access tohealth services is poor, sanitation is poor, and accessto modern family planning methods has shown onlymarginal improvement. With regard to health, thenational health plans of various countries have setclear goals for improving the health status of their citizens. Measures that emphasize preventive or pro-motive rural health services with community-levelmanagement have been outlined, for example inKenya and Uganda. The government of Botswanahas set up a national health scheme that gives all citizens access to basic medical care. With regardsto education, some countries have initiated free or

universal primary education programs (such asKenya, South Africa, and Uganda), but in most ofAfrica basic education is inadequate and not avail-able to all. In spite of serious efforts in the field ofschooling, the level of illiteracy remains significant.

The approach to human capital formation hasbeen biased in two directions. First governmentshave addressed the training of executives, but large-ly neglected the education and basic training of thepopulation. The policies and programs of northernAfrican countries favor better schooling, particularlyfor the rural population, but they also favor expen-sive private education that is inaccessible to a largenumber of poor people. Second, the serious prob-lems of gender discrimination mentioned above arewidely ignored. The capacity to implement neededreforms to reduce the biases is weak because accessto good-quality training is limited.

Most countries have invested in research andextension services with the aim of improving thehuman capacity to increase agricultural production.These efforts contribute to increased food and nutri-tion security only if well tailored to the issues. Forexample, the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute, aparastatal established by Parliament in 1979, dom-inates research and extension in Kenya. Yet,although Kenya’s agricultural research system isstrong, the lack of progress in increasing total factorproductivity in agriculture suggests there are weak-nesses in subsequent technology development andtransfer, which have been attributed in particular toweaknesses in priority setting, financing, manage-ment, and interagency linkages.

Natural Resource Management Policies

The combination of increasing population and stag-nating yields often forces farmers onto new lands,either forests or other lands poorly suited for agricul-ture, causing deforestation and land degradation.Poor people are the most adversely affected by lackor loss of access to critical natural resources, unsus-tainable use practices, and environmental degrada-tion. Therefore, national environmental concernsmust be addressed to prevent such developmentsand promote sustainable agricultural practices. Inaddition, securing access to land for farmers facili-

tates such practices, and enhances their food andnutrition security.

Long-term economic and ecological issuesshould be of major concern in African development,but sustainable development is not among the mainconcerns of those in charge of resource manage-ment. There is a conflict between agricultural policiesaimed at intensification and environmental policies.Subsidies for water use, price supports for water-consuming products, and promotion of tourism arefactors liable to affect sustainable water manage-ment. In northern Africa, so far only Algeria’s Plan ofDevelopment includes natural resource managementpolicies. Unmonitored liberalization risks are alsointensifying the pressure on scarce natural resources.This problem is likely to undermine efforts to increaselocal production and reduce food dependence.Public sector research needs to give higher priorityto natural resource management, which is particu-larly important for marginal areas and fragile envi-ronments. The lessons of the past have hardly beenconsidered; some lands are already unusablebecause of excessive intensification, agrochemicaltreatment, or grazing, and some cities face increas-ing water shortages.

However, many countries have adopted meas-ures aimed at protecting the environment andattempted to establish early warning systems as wellas disaster and emergency coordination units, real-izing that the livelihoods of most rural people inAfrica are dependent on natural resources.Furthermore, some countries have establishednational environmental authorities to oversee envi-ronmental conservation (for example, Kenya andUganda). In Malawi, the national environmental policy emphasizes a community-based naturalresource management approach. Under thisapproach, communities control their own naturalresources, which discourages individual overuseand reduces damage due to external factors.Similarly, the environmental support program inZambia aims at supporting community-based pro-grams. Environmental protection in Zambia hasbeen hindered, however, by weak law enforcementcapacity and corruption.

Several countries in eastern and southern Africahave also attempted land reforms to improve access

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and enhance security by instituting stable landtenure, but these reforms have often met with resist-ance. In Zambia, a land bill intended to convert cus-tomary ownership to private ownership was rejectedby parliament. In Zimbabwe, land reforms (througheviction of white settlers from their land with theintent to redistribute it to the natives) have been high-ly controversial and met with stiff opposition, espe-cially internationally. In Kenya, a presidential com-mission was set up to look into the problem of landaccess, but its recommendations are yet to be imple-mented. In some countries such as Mozambique,land markets are poorly developed, with most landbeing vested in the government. In 2002, the gov-ernment of Botswana engaged consultants to reviewthe country’s land policy. The aim of the new landpolicy was to integrate and consolidate all existingpolicies, procedures, and programs used in admin-istration, management, development, acquisition,and disposal of land in the country. The report hasyet to be considered by the government. In general,land policy is crucial for food and nutrition securityand needs to be given serious attention.

The progress toward sustainable developmentis slow in northern Africa. In Algeria, the conserva-tion of natural resources became a political priorityonly with the National Plan for AgriculturalDevelopment, established in 2001, and, morespecifically, with the report on “Environment andSustainable Development (PNAE-DD).” This reportfocuses on inefficient water use, land degradation,deforestation, desertification, and erosion (Bedrani2003). In Egypt and Morocco although environ-mental concerns have been widely acknowledged,specific and relevant programs to address theseconcerns do not exist. Companies in favor of theconservation of natural resources are still hesitant totake resource protection measures. In Tunisia, watermanagement is the main area of concern. The coun-try’s 10-year plan, which started in 1990, aimedessentially to transport water for irrigated agri-culture and to provide drinking water for the popu-lation, rather than to save water or increase effi-ciency. The Tunisian Ministry of Agriculture fosterswater-saving techniques and pays a subsidy for drip irrigation equipment, amounting to 40 to60 percent of its total cost.

SummaryOur closer look at individual African countries andsubregions has shown that the progress toward foodand nutrition security has not been consistentthroughout Africa. Since the root causes of povertyand hunger vary from country to country, highly con-text-specific policies and strategies are required.Recommendations for African governments andother agencies with respect to hunger alleviationshould therefore be based on the particular featuresof the subregion or country in question.

A more systematic grading of countries’ poli-cies, strategies, programs, and action plans basedon the criteria outlined in the conceptual frameworkin Chapter 2 and the review in this chapter has beenattempted for eastern and southern Africa, as sum-marized in Table 1, and for northern Africa asshown in Table 2. For central Africa, which has suf-fered most severely from conflict and devastatingdestruction in recent decades, and where the inter-national community has shown little interest, only ageneral assessment has been possible.

It is apparent that the overall performance ofthese programs and strategies for eastern and south-ern African countries is intermediate to good, andfor northern Africa, intermediate. In northern Africa,although the main macroeconomic balances havebeen restored, economic development has beensluggish and accompanied by high unemploy-ment, a decline in real wages, and gender dis-crimination. The liberalization of the economy andthe retrenchment of the state, particularly in socialsectors, has resulted in the appearance of a newtype of poverty and its accompanying social prob-lems. While extreme poverty has disappeared, awider and more diffuse type of poverty hasemerged with adverse effects on food and nutritionsecurity in the region. This assessment indicatesthat there have been remarkable achievements, butalso that there is room for improvement in theirimplementation, which is essential if food and nutri-tion security are to be achieved in these regions.

Attention to food and nutrition has improved,and political will has been mobilized. The centralAfrican countries are now making a renewed effortto ensure greater food and nutrition security, and areshowing increasing willingness to collaborate. The

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various agencies and stakeholders should takeadvantage of this wave of spirited and galvanizedpolitical will, which is an important foundation ofsuccessful policymaking and implementation. Toensure the achievement of sustainable food andnutrition security by 2020, the subregion needs

good governance, investment in public goods, ana-lytical tools, research, capacity building, partnershipbuilding, and added collaboration from all agenciesand stakeholders. The latest PRSA for central Africa,for example, meets most of these evaluation criteriaand is thus considered “good.”

Table 1—Eastern and southern Africa: Grading of policies, strategies, programs, and actionplans

Policy category Grading Remarks

Macroeconomic Good � Dependent mostly on conditions set by donors/external pressures � Commitment to implementation of programs varies

International trade Good � Built on global conditions, taking into account a changing world trade

environment � Inadequate stakeholder involvement and therefore some resistance and

complaints, mostly from the farming community

Public sector reforms Intermediate � Significant reductions in the number of civil service employees, but slow

progress in privatization of public enterprises, and inadequate imple-

mentation of employment policies and programs

Poverty reduction strategies Intermediate � Policies and programs well developed but inadequate implementation,

a reflection of capacity constraints

Production support Intermediate � Policy and program changes mostly responding to external pressures·

Inadequate implementation frameworks and low levels of stakeholder

involvement

Governance Poor � Only a few countries have shown serious commitment to implementa-

tion, but external pressure has induced most countries to develop sys-

tems to deal with governance problems

Human capital formation Good � Policies and programs high on agenda for most countries, but success-

ful implementation limited by financial constraints; most programs are

donor driven

Natural resource management Intermediate � Policies and programs given priority in recent times, but some areas

such as early warning systems still weak

Source: Devised by authors.

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Table 2—Northern Africa: Grading of policies, strategies, programs, and action plans

Policy category Grading Remarks

Macroeconomic policies Intermediate � Well identified problems and clearly defined objectives � Formulation of policies and programs and implementation deficient � Involvement of stakeholders minimal

International trade Intermediate to good � Policies and programs with well defined objectives generally imple-

mented as scheduled � Little participation by stakeholders

Public sector reforms Intermediate � Objectives clear and consistent, but implementation of policies and

programs met heavy resistance � Much remains to be done

Poverty reduction strategies Intermediate � Efforts made also involving stakeholders; policies and programs less

clear� Feedback of lessons learned lacking

Production support Good � High on the priority list of most countries; action taken also in

response to external pressure

Governance Poor to intermediate � Problems and objectives recognized, but policies and programs half-

hearted and capacity to implement inadequate

Human capital formation Poor � Objectives and policies and programs partly inconsistent � Constraints in capacity to implement within time frame set

Natural resource management Very poor � Little attention given to the issue� Policies and programs not well defined� Stakeholders participation minimal and implementation deficient

Source: Devised by authors.

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5. Conclusion

After decades of sluggish growth and economicdecline in many African countries, there are signsthat some of these countries have succeeded in re-versing the trend. There have been remarkable suc-cesses, particularly in establishing macroeconomicstability, liberalizing trade, moving exchange ratesto more realistic levels, and removing price controlsand marketing board monopolies. There have alsobeen improvements in social services and efforts inhuman capital formation, although financial con-straints have prevented fully satisfactory progress.

Peace and security are a conditio sine qua nonfor any progress in development. Where wars, civilunrest, insecurity, large numbers of refugees, andwarlords dominate the scene, as has been the casein central Africa, no development can be expected.In these situations, restoring peace, resolving con-flicts, and establishing the rule of law should havethe highest priority for the countries concerned andfor the international community. For the many coun-tries plagued by conflict, these measures need to beaccompanied by postconflict support. For example,where large numbers of people have fled andassembled in refugee camps, it is critical to pursueresettlement under safe conditions and provide infra-structure and start-up resources for re-establishing abasis for their lives.

Successes in socioeconomic development andby extension in food and nutrition security have beenachieved in countries with strong leadership and thepolitical will to address the key problems. Wherepolitical will has been lacking and where no seriousattempts have been made to address food crises,such as in the early response strategies the LagosPlan of Action and the Regional Food Plan forAfrica, the crises deepened and often reached des-perate proportions. Stiff internal resistance to reformshas also hampered implementation, however, par-

ticularly where public sector retrenchment resulted injob and income losses, making many families vul-nerable to food insecurity.

Good governance, the rule of law, and a reli-able and independent judicial system are precondi-tions for decentralization, community empowerment,and privatization. Private sector initiatives, entrepre-neurial activity, and ownership by local people can-not be expected in an environment of arbitrariness,corruption, lawlessness, and insecurity. Some coun-tries have formed anticorruption bodies and haveinitiated serious programs to fight corruption. Wherecorruption of public administration, arbitrariness,and extortion by state powers are prevalent, enforc-ing accountability and strengthening law enforce-ment is of prime importance. Where the political sys-tem excludes large numbers of people, particularlythe poor, women, and landless, from participating inpolitical decisionmaking, it is essential to strengthendemocratic processes.

Related to good governance is broadly basedcountry ownership of development. Although coun-try ownership is not a novel issue, it has been neg-lected in many policies. Even in the more recentPRSP process, where country ownership was specif-ically advocated, it was too narrowly based.Consultations have too often been confined to theministerial level; parliaments, local governments,civil society, and private sector organizations haveregularly been bypassed and those who lack anorganized voice, such as women, the landless, andminorities have been left out entirely. If ownership(such as of PRSPs) is to be broadly based, partici-pation needs to be institutionalized more effectively.Parliaments, regional and local representatives, andcivil society and private sector groups need to beincluded in the consultation, decision, and imple-mentation processes. This approach also requires

changes in the practices of donors. Donors’ govern-mental or board approval procedures, their condi-tions and processes for releasing funds, and theirtendency to micromanage aid programs have dis-couraged participation and local ownership.

Capacity building is also a high priority. Thevery recent and still patchy experience with PRSPimplementation demonstrates that there is a need forgreater emphasis on capacity building at all levels:in budgeting processes, in linking budgets to long-term national strategies, and in financial accounta-bility monitoring at the macroeconomic level; in pri-ority setting and policy formulation at the sectorlevel; and in local administration and in project eval-uation and management at the local and micro lev-els. Capacity building needs to include all levels ofeducation; primary education should be made uni-versal, and the neglect of secondary and tertiaryeducation by many African countries should beaddressed. Lack of finance has played a decisiverole. Apart from rebuilding the university capacity,there is a need to provide adequate working condi-tions for graduates and postgraduates to avoid theirmigration to countries with more attractive workingenvironments. For example, nowadays scientistswithout computers and access to the Internet are iso-lated and will be unable to link up with the sciencecommunity and new scientific developments.

Agriculture needs to be returned to the top of thedevelopment agenda. The priority given to agricul-ture and water under NEPAD and in the 2003Maputo Declaration of the Heads of States of theAfrican Union is encouraging in this respect. TheWorld Bank and bilateral donors must follow thelead of African states and support their agriculturaldevelopment initiatives. The World Bank’s AfricaRegion Rural Strategy is showing the way in empha-sizing productivity growth in agriculture, naturalresource conservation, rural infrastructure and insti-tution building, and health and education in ruralareas. The strategy’s objectives are relevant for andconsistent with poverty reduction and food and nutri-tion security improvement. Many of these compo-nents require specialized expertise in agriculturalproduction and rural institution building. If the WorldBank and bilateral donors move their staffing andrecruitment policies in this direction, agricultural de-

velopment will have a good chance to regain the im-petus it needs to enhance food and nutrition security.

The specific support needs of agriculture aremanifold. Agricultural research and extension arecrucial to Africa’s agricultural development, whichneeds a steady stream of research to support agri-cultural innovation. Research must focus on produc-tivity-increasing technologies, including biotechnolo-gies, and the development of drought-tolerant andpest-resistant varieties, and at the same time bedirected at natural resource conservation. Moreover,in many countries agriculture suffers from additionalconstraints: insecure property rights, poor infrastruc-ture that constrains domestic markets, unreliablefood chains, and lack of rural development activitiesto increase the purchasing power of rural peopleand thus strengthen regional markets.

Strengthening agricultural research and exten-sion requires reform of research policies and supportfor extension institutions that involve private sectorand farmer organizations. Soil fertility, water man-agement, and water use efficiency are in generalcrucial to raising agricultural productivity in a sus-tainable manner. Involving farmers in the innovationprocess through participatory technology develop-ment is essential to ensure that the innovations aresuitable for their needs. This requires strengthenedinstitutions and the involvement of civil society andfarmers groups at the local level; building farmerorganizations and coordinating the civil societygroups in support of innovative adoption processesremains a challenge for the future.

Raising agricultural productivity needs to beclosely linked with support programs for rural health,particularly for fighting HIV/AIDS, and with efforts toenhance the empowerment of women and toimprove their access to education, land and water,production factors, and markets.

Prioritizing agriculture cannot be carried outwithout additional resources. The Maputo Decla-ration’s target of allocating 10 percent of the budgetto agriculture needs to be translated into reality.Governments and donors must achieve greatercohesion in their approaches to the various stra-tegies that governments have been urged to implement by the international community. Mon-itoring poverty reduction within the PRSP process is

39

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important. In many countries, assistance has beenprovided for flexible and decentralized monitoringof poverty. At the same time, care needs to be takennot to overburden a targeted country’s capacity andinstitutions. Donors have too often instituted reportingand monitoring requirements that serve their internalinstitutional needs ahead of the needs of the re-cipient country. Donors need to agree on a coordi-nated and unified monitoring and evaluation systemthat serves to improve policy implementation inrecipient countries.

Micro-level activities require more attention.While the project approach dominated the develop-ment scene in Africa until the 1980s, from industri-alization via import substitution to agricultural andrural development projects, its limitations in a non-conducive policy environment have become increas-ingly obvious. Deficiency in project environments ledto an about-face regarding policy lending, leavingthe private sector to pick up the micro-level activities.SAPs, the CDF, PRSPs, and other strategies share anemphasis on policy- and institution-strengtheningactivities, but few of the strategies discuss projects.Correcting the policy environment and strengthen-ing institutional frameworks remains a high priority;however, development takes place only if there areinvestments, innovations, and actions carried out onfarms, in households, and in villages. This meansthat the development approach must again recog-nize the value of the project concept.

Many African countries have made substantialprogress toward liberalizing trade, and their call to Japan, the EU, and the United States to level the international trade playing field and reduce protection of their agricultural and other sectors is more than justified. Still, the pressure to furtheropen up African markets continues. The European–Mediterranean Free Trade Zone is a case well worthstudying; it provides valuable lessons for a model ofdevelopment among unequal partners. The northernAfrican countries’ experience after seven yearsshows that opening up to international trade ex-

poses agricultural producers and processors of poorcountries to stiff international competition, pushingmany of them to lower-quality and less remunerativesegments of markets. Based on the northern Africanexperience, there is increasing skepticism about thepositive effects of a too-rapid opening up of poorcountries’ markets to full international competition. A study by the German Ministry of EconomicCooperation and Development has found that therural sectors of the less-developed Mediterraneancountries, if exposed rapidly and without adequatepreparation to European competition, are likely todecline (BMZ 2001). Under existing technologicalinstitutional and infrastructure conditions, local ruralproducers will be pushed out of their own markets,and, lacking other opportunities, rural people willsuffer unemployment and there will be an increasein rural–urban migration. Food and nutrition securitywill also suffer.

The experience of Asia’s emerging economiesseems to confirm this conclusion. The lesson is thatopening up the markets of poor African countries tointernational trade and competition with advancedcountries requires a carefully synchronized policy ofraising the competitiveness of producers, improvingrural infrastructure, and strengthening rural andtrade-promoting institutions. Increasing exposure toworld market competition and building the competi-tiveness of local producers need to go hand in hand.

Finally, the design of good policies and theirimplementation is, of course, a matter of clarity, rel-evance, and consistency in policy objectives, offinancial resource availability, and of human andinstitutional capacity. Yet there are often associatedrisks of such programs to a targeted country’s politi-cal and social stability. Thus the speed of reformsand the implementation of policies and programsneed to be adapted to each country’s political andsocial absorptive capacity.

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AFPLAN Regional Food Plan for AfricaARRS Africa Region Rural StrategyAoA Agreement on AgricultureCDF Comprehensive Development FrameworkCEMAC Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale [Central African

Economic and Monetary Community]CFA Franc Currency ZoneCILSS Comité Permanent Inter Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel [Permanent

Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel]COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern AfricaEAC East African CommunityECCAS Economic Community of Central African StatesECOWAS Economic Community of West African StatesEMPRES Emergency Prevention System for Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests and DiseasesESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment FundESP Environmental Support ProgramEU European UnionFAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United NationsHIPC Heavily Indebted Poor CountriesIDA International Development AgencyIFIs international financial institutionsIMF International Monetary FundLPA Lagos Plan of ActionMDG Millennium Development Goals NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s DevelopmentOAU Organization of African UnityOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentPMA Programme for Modernization of AgriculturePRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth FacilityPRSA Regional Programme of Food SecurityPRSC Poverty Reduction Support CreditPRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy PapersPTA Preferential Trade AreaSADC Southern African Development CommunitySADCC Southern African Development Co-ordination ConferenceSAP Structural Adjustment ProgramSPFS Special Program for Food SecuritySWAPS sectorwide approachesTCP Technical Cooperation ProgrammeUNECA United Nations Economic Commission for AfricaUNFPA United Nations Population FundUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundWARDA The Africa Rice CenterWTO World Trade Organization

Acronyms and Abbreviations

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Franz Heidhues is professor at the University of Hohenheim, Center for Tropical Agriculture in Stuttgart,Germany. He conducts research on poverty, rural development, and natural resource management; foodand nutrition security; and rural finance, primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. Before joining the University of Hohenheim Heidhues worked at the World Bank. He holds a Ph.D. in economicsfrom the University of Muenster, Germany.

Achi Atsain is professor of economics and econometrics at the University of Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, sen-ior research fellow at the Ivorian Center for Economic and Social Research, and president of the WestAfrican Economic Association. An IFPRI Board member, Atsain was a member of Parliament for 10 years.His research has focused on macroeconomics, regional integration, and sustainable development in WestAfrica, though more recently he has focused on the issue of good governance. Atsain holds a Ph.D. in eco-nomics from the State University of New York, Albany, USA.

Hezron Nyangito is a principal policy analyst and head of the Productive Sector Division at the KenyaInstitute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) in Nairobi. He has wide experience in policyresearch and analysis focusing on development economics with particular emphasis on agricultural andrural development and international trade. Hezron is also a senior lecturer in the Department of AgriculturalEconomics at the University of Nairobi and the coordinator of IFPRI’s 2020 Vision Network in Kenya. Heholds a Ph.D. in agricultural economics from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, USA.

Martine Padilla is a development economist and policy analyst at the Mediterranean Agronomic Institutein Montpellier, France. As a senior researcher, she manages the Agro-food Department in addition to teaching and managing M.Sc. training on public choice in agriculture and food. Padilla holds a Ph.D. ineconomics and is accredited to supervise researchers from the University of Montpellier I.

Gérard Ghersi is director of the International Center for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies atthe Institute of Montpellier, where he conducts research on the analysis of the agri-food system and on foodpolicies. He is also a professor at Laval University in Québec, Canada, where he is head of the Departmentof Rural Economy and director of the International Cooperation Centre. Ghersi holds a Ph.D. in economicsfrom the University of Montpellier I , France.

Jean-Charles Le Vallée is an agricultural economist, agronomist, ecologist, and nutritionist. He hasworked as a food security specialist with several universities, consulting firms, the Canadian government,FAO, IFPRI, and the World Bank. He has taught at Cornell University, coordinated Canada’s Food SecurityBureau, and has been the food security guide for the Development Gateway Foundation since its inception.Le Vallée is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in food security at Carleton University.

About the Authors