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NATO Parliamentary Assembly

DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

AFGHANISTAN – POST-ISAF

SPECIAL REPORT

Julio MIRANDA CALHA (Portugal)Special Rapporteur

www.nato-pa.int 11 October 2015

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................1

II. RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION AND GOALS..................................................................10

III. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW............................................................................30A. TALIBAN TACTICS AND STRATEGIES.....................................................................46B. OTHER INSURGENT FORCES..................................................................................60C. NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.......................................................................................71

IV. AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES STATUS...............................80A. CAPABILITY GAPS AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT............................................91

V. GOVERNMENT STATUS.....................................................................................................97

VI. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS..........................................................................................128

VII. EVOLUTIONS AND ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE REGION..............................................154A. PAKISTAN.................................................................................................................163

VIII. STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE TALIBAN.........................................................171

IX. CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................................189

BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................199

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 1 January 2015, the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) replaced the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as an international force to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).1 Although an end-date has not yet been formally set for this mission, RSM is widely expected to conclude by the end of 2016 when the United States draws down to a normal Embassy presence, as outlined by President Obama in May 2014.

2. At the end of 2014, the Inteqal Transition Process, focusing on political, security, and socioeconomic sectors in the country drew to a close. On 1 January 2015, Afghanistan formally entered its Transformation Decade, where Afghanistan has full leadership and ownership of its national affairs (UN, 2015a). The 2014 political transition has lent new dynamism to the country’s relations with the region and the international community working to assist the country’s ongoing transition.

3. Although relations with Afghanistan are normalizing, the stakes remain high for NATO Allies and their partners in Afghanistan. Building a viable state in post-Taliban Afghanistan serves both strategic regional and global security interests. Continuing to degrade remaining insurgent forces in Afghanistan and maintaining a viable counter-terrorism capacity in the region is necessary, at least until a negotiated peace can be achieved. Progress on these fronts will undergird the stability of Afghanistan and contribute significantly to regional stability.

4. NATO and its partners must consolidate their gains and focus attention on the success of RSM. Encouragingly, the National Unity government under President Ashraf Ghani’s leadership has expressed the will to be a strong partner in this endeavour. This committee will remain seized with the issue throughout the mission, continuing to monitor the progress of the security situation in the country and the institutions charged with guaranteeing the future viability of Afghanistan.

II. RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION AND GOALS

5. NATO and its partners are leading and executing the Resolute Support Mission, for which NATO heads of state reaffirmed their support at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales. In addition to RSM, the United States will also maintain a parallel counterterrorism mission.

6. RSM is a train, advise, and assist mission aimed at supporting the ANDSF through the end of 2016, which places international forces in a non-combat role. RSM provides logistical, intelligence, and air support to the ANDSF as the security forces continue to build strength against insurgent forces (UN, 2015a). This will help further develop the Afghan security institutions and their capabilities, enabling them to conduct the various national-level functions needed for generating, resourcing, and sustaining fielded forces. These include planning, programming, budgeting processes, resource management, and procurement. Both the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior, which provide oversight for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) respectively, currently lack qualified and experienced leadership and suffer from low institutional prioritization of planning and budget functions ([US Department of Defense (DoD), 2014].

1 The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces is the official designation for the Afghan security forces used in the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and the Afghan government’s preferred designation for the overall force going forward (US Department of Defense, 2015). As a result of this change, the NATO PA will now use this appellation instead of the previous Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

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7. In order to develop the long-term sustainability of the Afghan security institutions and ANDSF, capacity development efforts are focused on eight essential functions: 1) plan, program, budget, and execute; 2) transparency, accountability, and oversight; 3) civilian governance of the Afghan security institutions and adherence to rule of law; 4) force generation; 5) sustain the force; 6) plan, resource, and execute effective security operations; 7) develop sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes; and 8) maintain internal and external strategic communication capability (US DoD, 2014). This includes the promotion, development and implementation of best practices and common guidelines for biometric data collection, storage, and sharing with RSM and NATO, enabling standardization of forensic and biometric data formats, technical interfaces, and methodologies.

8. In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2189 (2014), RSM works in close coordination with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and is operating from Kabul and four regional locations: Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Jalalabad (UN, 2015a). Four countries serve as framework nations taking the organisational lead in specific geographic areas of Afghanistan: the United States (east and south Afghanistan), Germany (north), Italy (west), and Turkey (Kabul).

9. Initial plans for RSM called for 12,000 troops to meet mission requirements, with the United States contributing the bulk of the forces. The United States initially planned to withdraw half of its remaining forces in Afghanistan by the end of 2015, with a view to complete withdrawal by the end of 2016. However, in response to a request from President Ghani, the United States is slowing its timetable for withdrawal. To date, the United States has agreed to keep 9,800 troops in Afghanistan through the end of this year to support both RSM and the US counterterrorism mission (SIGAR, 2015c). As of May 2015, the Resolute Support Mission was being executed by 40 troop-contributing nations (25 NATO Allies and 15 partner nations), consisting of 11,325 NATO and 1,900 partner forces. Approximately 6,500 RSM personnel are provided by the United States (US DoD, 2015). US troop levels for 2016 will be decided later this year.

10. President Obama and President Ghani stated that this change in the pace of the drawdown of RSM and US counter-terrorism operations was a necessary response to the expected Taliban aggression over the spring and summer months, along with a parallel realization that the ANDSF require additional training (Shear and Mazzetti, 2015). The US military presence in Afghanistan after 2016 is still expected to be limited to a security mission based at its Embassy in Kabul, with about 1,000 personnel. NATO Allies and Resolute Support operational partners are expected to reduce their forces in parallel by the end of 2016 (US DoD, 2015).

11. On 13 May 2015, NATO Ministers for Foreign Affairs endorsed a set of guidelines and principles for NATO’s post-2016 support to the ANDSF following the completion of RSM. The NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership will become a civilian-led mission, but will maintain a military component (UN, 2015b). The Enduring Partnership will continue NATO’s ministerial and institutional level advising beyond 2016 (US DoD, 2015).

12. Both RSM and US counterterrorism operations are enabled by two agreements signed in late 2014. Representatives of the Afghan government and the United States signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) on 30 September 2014, providing the legal basis for US forces to remain in Afghanistan post-2014. NATO representatives signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for a more broad-based international security force presence in the country immediately following the signing of the BSA. These documents were originally due to be signed in late 2013, and their delay caused difficulties for the detailed planning of RSM, and for force deployment by some NATO and partner countries. The United States provided an additional 1,000 troops at the beginning of 2015 to bridge the force generation gap and allow RSM to commence at full strength.

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III. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW

13. Afghanistan is actively threatened by a convergence of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks. The conflict has intensified since the launch of RSM, leading to a deteriorating security situation accompanied by historic levels of attrition and casualties not only for the ANDSF and the Taliban, but also among the civilian population. While the southern, south-eastern, and eastern regions continue to bear most of the violence, security incidents have spread into the north and northeast regions, which were previously considered relatively safe (SIGAR, 2015c).

14. On April 22, the Taliban launched its spring offensive. In the week following the announcement, there was a 45% increase in recorded armed clashes, compared to the week following 2014’s announcement (UN, 2015b). The Taliban’s stated primary targets are “foreign occupiers” as well as government offices and Afghan security forces. Nevertheless, the UN reported that less than 1% of attacks were directed against Coalition bases from 15 February to 30 April 2015. The majority of attacks instead targeted the ANDSF, Afghan government officials, and Afghan facilities (SIGAR, 2015c).

15. In 2015, the ANDSF is engaging in its first fighting season without the full support of coalition combat forces and with access to only very limited coalition air and ISR support (US Department of Defense, 2015). ANDSF forces are being stretched thin as they respond to increasing threats and conflict throughout the country. As of June 2015, 40 of 50 Afghan districts were facing security threats while the Afghan Ministry of Defense had ongoing counterinsurgency operations in 14 of 34 provinces (SIGAR 2015c; UNAMA, 2015).

16. The insurgency is resilient. While various organizations measure security in Afghanistan differently, most2 portray 2015 and 2014 as particularly violent years. The United Nations tracks the number of security-related events relevant to the work, mobility, and safety of civilians across the country impacting the delivery of United Nations-mandated activities and programmes. 2014 experienced an increase in such incidents of 10% over 2013 and 2014 was second highest for such events in the UN’s 13-year record, surpassed only by 2011 (UN, 2015a).

17. Civilian casualties are on the rise. The UN expects 2015 numbers to equal or exceed the record high numbers of civilian casualties documented in 2014, when UNAMA recorded the highest number of civilian casualties in any given year since it began documenting civilian casualties in 2009. In the first half of 2015, the UN documented 4,921 civilian casualties, a1% increase in total civilian casualties compared to the same period in 2014. Of particular concern, however, a 23 and 13% increase in casualties to women and children respectively. With 3,699 civilians killed and 6,849 civilians injured in 2014, Afghanistan saw a 22% increase in civilian casualties over 2013 (UN, 2015a; UNAMA and UN OHCHR, 2015).

18. In 2015, roughly 70% of these casualties were attributed to the Taliban and affiliated groups, not including casualties caused by unattributed fire exchanges with pro-government forces. Approximately 16% of civilian casualties were caused by pro-government forces, a 60% increase from 2014, mostly due to an increased number of ground engagements. In accordance with the insurgency’s reliance on ground attacks (as outlined below), ground engagements betweenpro-government and insurgent forces were the leading cause of civilian casualties for the first time in 2014, as well as in 2015, followed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), complex and suicide attacks, and targeted killings. The slight rise in civilian casualties in the first half of 2015 is due to 2 The US Department of Defense reported that security incidents declined by approximately 30% from

April to August 2014, in comparison with the same period in 2013. These numbers likely reflect a growing reliance on Afghan-provided data, which is typically less comprehensive thancoalition-collected data (US DoD, 2014). Thus UN data is considered more consistent for analysing trends.

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an increasing number of suicide and complex attacks, as well as targeted killings (UN, 2015a; UNAMA and UN OHCHR, 2015).

A. TALIBAN TACTICS AND STRATEGIES

19. The 2015 fighting season is particularly intense: violence has increased from 2014, when the Taliban conducted one of its most fierce and distributed campaigns since 2003. Ultimately the Taliban failed to achieve their objectives in 2014, including disrupting the Afghan presidential elections (US DoD, 2014). While the final head of Coalition combat operations believed that the ANDSF could beat the Taliban, at least tactically, if properly motivated (Ahmed, 2014), the path and timeline to peace is unlikely to be either fast or smooth (UN, 2015a).

20. The rising number of security incidents indicates a mounting challenge for the ANDSF(UN, 2015a). The strategies of core insurgent leaders focus on disrupting GIRoA and ANDSF authority channels, and undermining their standing among the civilian population. In 2014 and 2015, insurgent groups made serious attempts to capture territory, using as many as several hundred insurgents fighters in major ground offensives (UN, 9 December 2014; SIGAR, 2015c). Insurgents also emphasized targeting ANDSF and GIRoA officials and increasing the number of assassinations and kidnappings. From 10 February to 30 April 2015, the UN recorded160 successful and 40 attempted assassinations, representing a 10% increase from the same period in 2014. An additional 91 abductions were reported in the same period, an increase of 21.3% from 2014 (UN, 2015b).

21. High-profile attacks are becoming more prevalent, particularly in Kabul. While the ANDSF has been able to respond to attacks, the results have been deadly. On 22 June a particularly brazen attack on the Afghan Parliament took place as parliamentarians prepared to confirm the Minister of Defence nominee. Afghan security forces repelled and killed the attackers, but only after the attackers killed a woman and child and injured 31 others. No parliamentarians were hurt during the attack. In August 2015, following the announcement of the death of Mullah Omar, three bombs were detonated in four days, killing and injuring nearly 400 Afghans. In May 2015, the Taliban detonated a car bomb outside Afghanistan’s Ministry of Justice, killing five people and injuring at least 42 others (SIGAR 2015c).

22. As noted above, large-scale ground offensives became an increasingly common insurgent tactic in 2014, this trend continues into 2015. In 2014, several hundred combatants often engaged in protracted battles, with orchestrated major assaults against district centres and ANDSF strongholds in brazen attempts to seize and hold territory. Fighting was particularly fierce in the provinces of Helmand, Faryab, Ghor, Logar, Nangarhar, Nuristan, and Kunduz. With limited support from US and NATO forces and hampered by a lack of offensive air capabilities, the ANDSF experienced serious difficulties neutralizing insurgent advances. Despite suffering heavy casualties, the ANDSF proved capable of defending against the majority of the offensives and even recovered lost territory (UN, 9 December 2014). According to Afghan media, during the first six months of 2015, insurgents carried out attacks in larger groups of fighters, resulting in the capture of a number of districts (SIGAR 2015c).

23. Insider attackers continue to challenge the ANDSF and the Coalition. Seven insider attacks against US forces in 2014 resulted in four deaths and 15 personnel wounded. The most visible insider attack of 2014 took place at a Kabul training facility in August, when an ANA soldier killed US Army Major General Harold Greene, the deputy commander of Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and wounded 14 others. CSTC-A’s role and responsibilities are at the heart of Resolute Support Mission. While insider attacks have been mitigated by numerous security measures, including improved vetting and screening counterintelligence, they have not been eliminated completely, and continue to threaten RSM personnel (US DoD, 2014).

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As of 30 July 2015, three insider attacks against US forces occurred, resulting in one military and three civilian contractors’ death, and 12 wounded civilian and military personnel (SIGAR, 2015c).

B. OTHER INSURGENT FORCES

24. In addition to the Taliban, the Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda are expected continue to remain a formidable threat to coalition and Afghan forces. The Haqqani Network remains the insurgency’s most effective strain and the greatest threat to coalition forces, due to its focus on high-profile attacks. They are also critical enablers of al-Qaeda. The Haqqani Network will likely remain the most significant threat to coalition forces (US DoD, 2015).

25. Al-Qaeda retains a presence in Afghanistan, but it is mostly restricted to the isolated areas of northeastern Afghanistan. Counter-terrorism efforts have forced al-Qaeda in Afghanistan to focus on survival, rather than on operations against the West. Al-Qaeda’s relationship with local Afghan Taliban organizations remains intact (US DoD, 2014). The United States retains acounter-terrorism force in Afghanistan to continue to face this threat.

26. In mid-2015, Resolute Support officials acknowledged that Daesh had spread into Afghanistan, but characterized the group as nascent, relatively small, and operationally emergent rather than operationally capable, as the group has not shown the ability to coordinate operations in more than one part of the country at a time (SIGAR, 2015c; Tilghman, 2015). UNAMA officials have expressed concern that Daesh could offer isolated insurgent splinter groups an alternative flagpole to rally around (SIGAR, 2015c). This may already be occurring - US Department of Defense officials generally describe Daesh’s presence in Afghanistan as consisting of disgruntled Taliban leaders. Some Afghan and Pakistani Taliban commanders have declared allegiance to Daesh and an increasing number of commanders are reportedly seeking funding from and considering co-operation with the group (UN, 2015a), which has angered Taliban leadership. In June 2015, the Taliban issued an open letter to Daesh leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, warning him that Daesh’s interference in Afghanistan would cause unwanted divisions within the insurgency (SIGAR, 2015c). Most of the fighting from Daesh-aligned groups has generally been against the Taliban, which is likely due to the group moving into Taliban territory and interfering with its operations. The most intense fighting has occurred in Nangarhar province, near Jalalabad (Tilghman, 2015). From a western perspective, further divisions within the insurgency could strain and potentially jeopardize future peace talks with the Taliban, as there may be no single entity with which to negotiate.

27. In May 2015, the Afghan Ministry of Interior estimated that there were 7,180 foreign fighters across Afghanistan. The majority of these fighters are associated with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (UN, 2015b).

C. NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING

28. The Afghan government and international community remain challenged by the narcotics trade. The estimated gross value of opiates in Afghanistan in 2014 decreased by roughly 9% to $2.84 billion, but still accounted for the equivalent of 13% of Afghanistan’s GDP (UN, 2015b). Thus it is not surprising that influence over the Afghan narcotics economy is a major source of income for the Taliban. According to John Sopko, the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), “it is widely thought that every drug organization supports or works with insurgents in Afghanistan” even if they do not participate directly in production activities.

29. Afghanistan’s struggling economy could cause the problem to grow. The UN Special Representative of Secretary-General for Afghanistan (SRSG), Nick Haysom, believes that Afghanistan’s continued low economic growth could result in a shift of economic activity towards

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the illicit economy, to include narcotics production. He emphasized that the international community must guard against this possibility (UNSRSG, 2015).

30. In May 2015, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime published its World Drug Report, highlighting Afghanistan as the world’s largest producer of opium in 2014. Afghanistan accounted for 85% of global production with an estimated 6,400 tons. Afghanistan’s opium production continued to increase in 2014, following an increase in 2013. This increase in production led to a decrease in prices, resulting in an overall decline in the value of Afghanistan’s opium economy. 98% of total opium cultivation remains in the southern, eastern, and western regions of Afghanistan (UN, 2015a).

31. The Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics’ goal is to reduce poppy cultivation by 90% over 10 years. The new Minister of Counter-Narcotics (MCN), Salamat Azimi, has already presented her 100-day plan to begin to tackle the challenge, which includes changing the country’s counter-narcotics law and strategy, developing new antidrug policies, and building ministry employee capacity (SIGAR, 2015c).

IV. AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES STATUS

32. Attrition remains a major challenge for the ANDSF, although the Afghan Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior report that attrition rates are declining. Neither the ANA nor ANP have attained the goal of 1.4% monthly attrition. The ANA’s attrition rate reached a monthly average of 2.3% in May 2015, down from 2.55% in January 2015 and a 3.62% average in 2014. The ANP’s monthly attrition rate dropped to 1.56% in May 2015, down from 1.64% in January 2015. To help mitigate the causes of attrition in the ANDSF, Resolute Support has identified three areas for the Afghans to evaluate: fair assignments, promotions, and pay for soldiers and patrolmen; quality of life conditions, such as leave and casualty care; and leadership accountability (SIGAR, 2015c). 33. More than 5,000 members of the ANDSF were killed in 2014, with casualties in the ANP significantly outnumbering those in the ANA. This surpasses the entire coalition forces’ death toll since operations began in 2001, with 2015 casualty totals expected to be even higher. High casualty rates are making soldiers and officers are increasingly reluctant to leave their bases. Such casualty and desertion rates, for both the ANA and ANP, are unsustainable (Ahmed, 2014).

34. Worryingly, the ANDSF capability is declining. In the inaugural January 2015 Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report (MAAR), 93% of component categories assessed were rated capable, fully capable, or sustaining – the highest three of five potential rating levels. The April 2015 MAAR showed that only 83% of assessed component categories were rated similarly. US Forces – Afghanistan attributed the decrease to stresses imposed on the ANDSF with the beginning of the 2015 fighting season. At the institutional level, RSM has lowered the expected capacity levels ministerial offices should attain by the conclusion of its mission at the end of 2016. The current projection is that only 74% of MOD functions and 68% of MOI functions will be sustaining or fully capable at that time (SIGAR, 2015c).

35. It is important to note that it is becoming increasingly difficult to measure ANDSF progress, as NATO and its partners have to rely increasingly on Afghan reporting rather than Coalition reporting, which lacks the depth of detail typically found in Coalition reports. Furthermore, as Coalition personnel has withdrawn and moved into a train, advise and assist role, the data may be less accurate due to a smaller area of coalition coverage (US DoD, 2014).

36. Nevertheless, the UN SRSG asserts that the commitment of the ANDSF is beyond question and that they are demonstrating their resilience when faced with insurgent efforts to take and hold ground (UNAMA, 2015).

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A. CAPABILITY GAPS AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

37. ANDSF capability gaps persist; the most critical being in intelligence, aviation, special operations, and the security ministries’ ability to conduct tasks such as planning, programming budgeting, and human resource management (US DoD, 2015). Security sector reform andstate-building efforts in Afghanistan continue to face many of the challenges they have faced in the past decade: capacity deficiencies, endemic corruption, challenges of geography, ethnic and confessional differences, as well as general infrastructural weaknesses.

38. International aid is crucial to sustain the ANDSF – GIRoA continues to lack the funds necessary to pay for the force. While the international community expects GIRoA to take responsibility for a growing share of the costs of sustaining the ANDSF, starting with $500 million in 2015, it is unlikely enough to cover ANDSF costs for the foreseeable future: GIRoA only collected a total of $2 billion in domestic revenue in 2013 (US DoD, 2014). At the September 2014 Summit in Wales, NATO Allies and partners agreed to support the ANDSF at an annual rate of $5.1 billion from 2015 to 2017 in order to sustain an end strength of 352,000 personnel, a$1 billion increase over previous commitments. $4.1 billion of these costs will be shouldered by the United States. NATO Allies and partners also agreed to sustain the ANDSF financially over the next 10 years.

V. GOVERNMENT STATUS

39. The National Unity Government, under President Ashraf Ghani and Chief ExecutiveAbdullah Abdullah, has made strides to repair relations with the international community and the region, following formerly tense relations and disputes with President Hamid Karzai. While this is certainly a positive development, it is still too soon to judge the impact of these overtures.

40. Since President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah agreed to form a national unity government on 21 September 2014, they have been slow to fill key positions within the government. President Ghani took four months to introduce nominees for ministerial positions and the head of the Central Bank and National Directorate of Security. On 20 January 2015, 25 nominees were put forward, with only nine of those appointees being confirmed on 28 January. By 18 April 2015, Parliament had approved 24 of 25 members of the cabinet, excluding the Minister of Defence. Of the 24 confirmed ministers, four are women (UN, 2015b). The Afghan government also has yet to nominate a new attorney general.

41. President Ghani has nominated three people for the position of Minister of Defence, with the most recent, Massoum Stanekzai, rejected by the Afghan Parliament on 4 July 2015. President Ghani’s first nominee was also rejected by the parliament, while the second nominee withdrew his nomination on 8 April 2015, before the parliament was scheduled to vote. A new nominee for this critical position has yet to be named. Afghanistan has now been without a confirmed Defence minister since the end of September 2014.

42. As of 23 June 2015, 21 of 34 provincial governors had been appointed. President Ghani appointed women as provincial governors in Ghor and Daykundi Provinces, but protests continue to prevent the provincial governor of Daykundi from taking up her post (SIGAR, 2015c).

43. The prolonged appointment process has caused frustration for many Afghans and members of the international community who were hoping for more rapid progress, particularly in light of the formal conclusion of the ISAF mission and the need to capitalize on remaining good will and resources from the international community (UN, 2015a). Instead, the political impasse paralyzed

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much of the government, including the military and police bureaucracies (Ahmed, 2014). While frustration is understandable and the impasse highlights potential challenges ahead for the National Unity government format, it is encouraging to note that negotiations over Ministers and senior official appointments occurred in a mutually respectful manner (UN, 2015a).

44. President Ghani has introduced a number of measures enabling interim governance while appointments continue to be finalized. On 1 December 2014, President Ghani issued a decree removing all sitting Ministers from Karzai’s tenure and appointing Deputy Ministers to these positions. The decree also stated that Provincial Governors and Provincial Chiefs of Police would retain their posts in an “acting” capacity. On 13 December, another presidential decree was issued outlining the duties and authorities of the Chief Executive. On 20 January 2015, a presidential decree specified the committees and institutions that the President, First Vice-President, Second Vice-President, and Special representative of the President on Reforms and Good Governance would each oversee. President Ghani has also reshuffled leadership positions in a number of provinces (UN, 2015a). On 25 April 2015, the lower house of the National Assembly approved the appropriation of a budget for the Office of the Chief Executive and for a Secretariat Council of Ministers, also created by presidential decree. On 26 April, CEO Abdullah appointed the Head of the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers (UN, 2015b).

45. The political agreement of 21 September 2014, which set forth a commitment to national unity government, contained an ambitious schedule of elections and reforms. Due to continuing disagreements between President Ghani and CEO Abdullah on election reforms, the date for parliamentary and district council elections still has yet to be set. According to the Afghan Constitution, Parliamentary elections were mandated to occur 30 to 60 days prior to the expiration of the Wolesi Jirga’ (lower house) term. Although the Wolesi Jirga’s term expired on 22 June 2015, Ghani announced on 19 June that it would continue its work until elections are held and the results are announced; the legality of this decree is controversial. On 1 April, the Second Vice-President, Mohammad Sarwar Danish, announced the delay of the parliamentary elections until 2016, stating that Afghanistan needed time to allow for implementation of electoral reforms (UN, 2015b).

46. Some in the international community are wary about holding elections ahead of the needed reforms – only incremental progress has been made in this areas. On 21 March 2015, President Ghani announced the formation of a 15-member Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC). The commission is intended to introduce fundamental changes to the Afghan electoral system, strengthen the rule of law and the democratic process, and build trust between the people and the government. All appointments to the SERC were announced by 16 July, and the commission began work on 22 July (SIGAR, 2015c).

47. The lack of elections has direct implications for the governing of Afghanistan. The upper house of the National Assembly is composed of personnel chosen via three different mechanisms: one-third being nominees of the President; one-third elected by Provincial Councils from amongst their own membership; and one-third being members of District Councils. On 10 January, President Ghani requested that Provincial Council representatives who had been temporarily serving in the vacant District Council seats vacate those seats until District Council elections were held (UN, 2015a). This means that the upper house of the National Assembly will only be, at most, two-thirds full until District Council elections are held. District Council elections have never been held in Afghanistan.

48. Insufficient progress towards electoral reform and the lack of an electoral schedule also have budgetary implications for Afghanistan. International donors have reduced funding for Afghan electoral organizations, resulting in the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC) beginning the process of reducing staff and assessing ways to lower monthly running costs. These commissions are seeking

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supplementary funding through the Afghanistan’s Finance Ministry to maintain core capacities (UN, 2015b; SIGAR, 2015c).

49. While the pace of governance has been slow and uncertain due to these challenges with the National Unity government, President Ghani has focused particular attention on accountability and the return of assets stolen from the Kabul Bank. On 2 October 2014, President Ghani issued a decree reopening the Kabul Bank fraud case, which led to the tripling of the sentences of two former Bank heads. The Afghan government has obtained convictions or judgements against36 individuals and companies, including Kabul Bank’s ex-chairman and ex-CEO. According to the Kabul Bank Clearance Committee, established in March 2015, 30 debtors have repaid their loans, 10 have shown a willingness to do so, and the debtors who fled the country were reported to Interpol. On 22 June 2015, President Ghani set a one-week deadline for debtors to settle their accounts or be referred for prosecution and be barred from leaving the country. Travel bans and asset freezes against 150 debtors were announced on 6 July. Additionally, the director and deputy director of the Kabul Bank Clearance Committee were arrested for taking a $100,000 bribe from an unnamed Kabul Bank debtor. As of May 2015, total recoveries stood at $229.5 million, with $600-650 million outstanding (SIGAR, 2015c).

50. President Ghani has also led efforts to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the different anti-corruption institutions, as well as tried to ensure that senior officials declare their assets, as required by the Afghan Constitution (UN, 2015a). These are positive steps that will hopefully translate into real reforms.

51. Also of note, the US Department of State claims that Afghanistan’s Parliament is demonstrating growing capacity and political maturity. The parliament has successfully protected its legislative equities from the executive branch and directed a public spotlight on the ministries. While the parliament has struggled to achieve a quorum for legislating in the past, in 2015 the parliament has achieved quorum when critical decisions were before them. Additionally, the lower house had no difficulty achieving quorum during ministerial hearings. However, it is important to note that the parliament remains challenged by staffing struggles, corruption, and low levels of education and experience (SIGAR, 2015c).

VI. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

52. At the 4 December 2014 London Conference on Afghanistan, partner countries, international financial institutions, multilateral institutions and NGOs renewed their commitments to support Afghanistan’s progress towards security and stability during the “Decade of Transformation” (2015-2024). The international community had previously pledged to provide Afghanistan with at least $16 billion through 2015 and maintain support at or near the levels of the past decade through 2017 (SIGAR, 2015a). The Ghani Administration also presented its reform agenda in London, entitled “Realizing Self-reliance,” to address corruption, strengthen public accountability, promote better governance and economic growth, and address human rights concerns. Officials agreed to update the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework in line with the GIRoA’s proposed reforms at a Senior Officials Meeting, held in early September in Kabul. GIRoA is working to prepare its action plan for implementing the outlined priorities (UN, 2015a).

53. As Afghanistan transitions to a more normalized economy, sustained and predictable levels of donor support remain indispensable (UN, 2015a). The World Bank characterizes Afghanistan as an “extreme outlier” in its reliance on foreign aid for at least 50% of its gross national income. GIRoA explicitly states that Afghanistan is facing an economic crisis, with transition taking a heavier toll than expected on the economy and pace of reforms (SIGAR, 2015a). The World Bank currently predicts a total financing gap above 20% of GDP through 2025 (SIGAR, 2015c).

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54. Economic growth in Afghanistan has declined significantly over recent years. In 2014, Afghanistan’s economy grew at just an estimated 2.0%, compared to 3.7% in 2013 and 9.4% in 2003. This economic slowdown contributed to a slump in investor and consumer confidence in non-agricultural sectors and an overall decline in government revenues, constraining operations and potentially exacerbating future fiscal gaps. The World Bank projects increasing growth rates for 2015-2017 period (2.5% for 2015), but not at the rates witnessed in the past (UN, 2015a). The World Bank has emphasized that in order for there to be an economic recovery, Afghanistan needs to implement reforms to address revenue, corruption, and governance concerns, particularly those affecting confidence in the economy (UN, 2015b).

55. The lower house of the National Assembly passed the 2015 fiscal year (22 December 2014 – 21 December 2015) budget3, following adjustments from the initial draft that included lower revenue projections. Yet the FY 2015 budget still relies on ambitious revenue projections, such as domestic revenues of approximately $2.2 billion, about 30% more than was collected in the previous year. Thus the World Bank warns that Afghanistan could face budget shortfalls in 2015 similar to those faced in 2014 (SIGAR, 2015c). Nevertheless, this enacted budget allows for ongoing Government-funded development projects to continue, but it did not approve new discretionary initiatives for 2015. Notably, operating expenditures, including security costs, are budgeted to increase this year (UN, 2015a).

56. Revenue collection has proven a problem for the Afghan government. In 2014, government revenue collection fell short of its $2.2 billion target, coming at only $1.8 billion. Uncertainties from the political and security transitions exacerbated GIRoA’s struggle to collect revenues, but issues like delays in introducing new tax measures and weak customs and tax compliance also played a significant role. GIRoA wrote to donors in October 2014 requesting funds to fill the fiscal gap. Several donors responded with funding, a portion of which was shifted from funds previously intended to finance development initiatives. GIRoA shifted some of its own funds away from development initiatives as well. These funds were then used to address basic priorities, including salary payments and payment of arrears (UN, 2015a). Over the first four months of AfghanFY 2015, domestic revenue collection modestly exceeded FY 2014 actual collection levels by 7.5%. Yet even with the relatively successful revenue collection, Afghanistan continues to struggle to fulfil its governmental commitments and advance developmental priorities. As of 30 July, domestic revenues have paid for only 48% of Afghanistan’s total budget expenditures of $1.2 billion thus far in FY 2015, with donor contributions covering the difference (SIGAR, 2015c).

57. Additionally, the US Department of Defense reports that the Afghan economy cannot grow quickly enough to cover its security costs, regardless of its improving capacity to collect revenues. The US DOD reports that even if 2018-2020 growth averaged 9%, the2003-2012 average growth rate, and all gains went to fund Afghanistan’s Ministries of Defence and Interior, the funds would only cover 20% of total security costs at current force levels. This means that Afghanistan must reduce its security costs in order to be economically sustainable (SIGAR, 2015c).

58. On 20 March 2015, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced a nine-month (April to December 2015) Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) to focus on fiscal policy, monetary policy, financial sector reform, and better economic governance. It aims to address banking vulnerabilities, preserve international reserves and low debt, maintain low inflation and strengthen competitiveness (UN, 2015b). Successful completion of the program could encourage donor assistance and give the IMF confidence that the national authorities are committed to meeting their commitments under a more formal program, like an Extended Credit Facility (ECF)

3 GIRoA refers to 2015 as 1394 (Hijri calendar), FY 2015 is therefore recorded as FY 1394 in official government documents.

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arrangement. Afghanistan’s previous ECF expired in November 2014 after program reviews were suspended due to missed performance targets, uneven and delayed structural reforms, unanticipated shocks, and inadequate policy responses. The US Department of State reports that the IMF has been impressed with the Afghan government’s efforts to tighten its macroeconomic policy, cut down on corruption, beat IMF revenue targets for the first period of the SMP, and reduce spending (SIGAR, 2015c).59. Improved access to many public services, such as education and medical care, has undoubtedly improved the quality of life for Afghans over the last decade. In June 2014, the Ministry of Economy released the completion report for the five-year Afghanistan National Development Strategy, which formed the basis for the national priority programmes throughout its duration. The report identified the health sector as the strongest performing sector, with 99% of indicators achieved. All areas made progress, although private sector development and social protection were the weakest sectors, with only 45% and 46% of indicators achieved respectively (UN, 2015a). The continuation of this progress depends largely on President Ghani’s ability to implement his reform agenda and generate confidence in his ability to improve transparency and accountability of donor resources (US DoD, 2014). Again, while President Ghani has spoken well of his intent, little concrete progress has been made.

VII. EVOLUTIONS AND ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE REGION

60. Regional support remains critical for success of Afghan-led reconciliation efforts, as well as for sustainable economic development critical to Afghanistan’s future. The Beijing Declaration at the fourth ‘Heart of Asia’ Ministerial Conference in the framework of the Istanbul Process demonstrated that Afghanistan has the unanimous support of its neighbours and stakeholders in its goal of achieving rapid progress (UN, 2015a).

61. During his short time in office, President Ghani has worked actively to engage the region. In January 2015, an Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement was concluded between Afghanistan and the United Arab Emirates. Also in January 2015, the Iran Foreign Minister visited Kabul to discuss, amongst other issues, security cooperation and a proposed bilateral strategicco-operation agreement. Previously, in December 2014, the commander of the Iranian Border Guards and his Afghan counterpart signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) enhancing counterterrorism and drug trafficking cooperation. In April 2015, President Ghani visited Iran, resulting in the two countries pledging to increase cooperation in the areas of security information sharing, counter-narcotics, water resource sharing, and refugees and migrants. President Ghani also concluded a MoU with Turkmenistan on further development of co-operation in the area of electric power and supply and ratified a strategic partnership agreement with Turkey aimed at promoting cooperation in governance, social, economic, and political affairs. Additionally, President Ghani travelled to India in April 2015, where India reiterated its willingness to join the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (UN, 2015a; UN, 2015b).

62. Afghanistan also hosted the first round of the China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in February 2015, where discussions included the need to deepen trilateral co-operation in counter-terrorism and security. Both China and Pakistan pledged to support the Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process (UN, 2015a).

63. On 9 and 10 April 2015, experts from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan finalized the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Tajikistan Trilateral Transit Trade Agreement. On 24 April 2015, the final documents for the Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project were signed by the Ministers of Energy and Water of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Construction began in September 2015 (UN, 2015b).

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A. PAKISTAN 64. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have improved dramatically since President Ghani’s inauguration. This is particularly noteworthy given the strategic necessity of cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan to quell the insurgency. The resiliency of the insurgency continues to depend on sanctuary in Pakistan, making cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan critical to long-term stability in the region. NATO’s mandate does not extend to Pakistan, and has little influence there as a result.

65. President Ghani has repeatedly stated that Afghanistan needs to make peace with Pakistan in order to make peace with the Taliban. Over the past year, there has been greater recognition that the two countries face common enemies, with both President Ghani and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, echoing this sentiment in a 12 May 2015 joint press conference (SIGAR, 2015c). Both Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s leaders have expressed interest in a strongermilitary-to-military relationship, and Pakistan maintains a public commitment to supporting Afghan-led reconciliation (US DoD, 2014). This resulted in efforts to improve security cooperation, with outcomes including agreements to reopen the Joint Border Coordination Centres at the Torkham and Spin Boldak crossing points and for co-ordinated counterterrorism operations along the shared border (UN, 2015a). On 18 May 2015, the Afghan National Directorate of Security and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence signed a Memorandum of Understanding on counter-terrorism cooperation, which is still to be finalized pending wider consultations (UN, 2015b). Pakistani military operations in North Waziristan disrupted militant networks that used the area for safe haven, slowing extremist attack planning in Afghanistan. Pakistani officials have publicly committed to holding this cleared territory and preventing militant returns (US DoD, 2014).

66. However, President Ghani made a number of concessions to Pakistan to achieve this enhanced cooperation. While his efforts were initially rewarded by Pakistan bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table, as discussed in further detail below, he has been under intense criticism as the negotiations fell apart with the announcement of the death of former Taliban leader,Mullah Omar. Thus recent statements have seen President Ghani resume criticism of Pakistan, with a 10 August 2015 speech expressing his outrage that Pakistan continues to allow the Taliban to use Pakistani soil to kill Afghan civilians.

VIII. STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE TALIBAN

67. President Ghani has consistently emphasized the need to achieve national reconciliation through a formal Afghan-led process. His efforts were rewarded with significant process during 2015. 68. President Ghani opened his presidency by stating that he would be open to talks with the Taliban during his inauguration address. On 31 October 2014, at the fourth Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process Ministerial Conference, President Ghani reiterated this invitation for a peace dialogue. During President Ghani’s visit to Islamabad on 14 and 15 November 2014, the Pakistani leadership pledged support to Afghanistan to help bring the Taliban to the negotiating table (UN, 2015a). President Ghani has also welcomed the potential role of China in support of the Afghan peace process.

69. In reaction, a 14 January 2015 statement published on the Taliban’s website stated that the movement “wanted peace”, provided its preconditions are met. Neither the Afghan government nor the international community accept the outlined preconditions – the establishment of an Islamic government, the implementation of Sharia law, and the end of the foreign military presence (UN, 2015a).

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70. Nevertheless, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Pakistani Chief of ArmyRaheel Sharif successfully pressured the Taliban to meet with Afghan officials. A subsequent series of informal meetings between Taliban members and Afghan government officials attending the meetings in their personal capacity culminated in official talks this summer. On 7 July 2015, delegations from the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban held their first formal meeting for peace negotiations in Pakistan, with the United States and China attending as observers. The delegations reportedly included Hekmat Karzai, the Afghan deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as senior leaders from the Taliban and the Haqqani network. Pakistani officials indicated that the Afghan government and Taliban agreed to meet again to continue talks with the goal of creating “an environment conducive for peace and reconciliation” (SIGAR, 2015c). The next meeting was scheduled for 31 July 2015.

71. The first round of formal peace talks highlighted divisions within the Taliban. A front-page editorial on the Taliban’s website blasted the talks, but was subsequently removed without explanation. On 15 July 2015, a letter purportedly from Taliban leader Mullah Omar welcomed the peace talks as a legitimate means to end the foreign occupation (SIGAR, 2015c). Experts had repeatedly claimed that only Mullah Omar could hold the Taliban together to follow through on a deal, and that only through his endorsement would talks be viewed as legitimate. On 29 July, however, it was announced that Mullah Omar had died in Pakistan in April 2013, rendering the viability of future peace talks unclear. Since the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death, no new meetings have been scheduled (Malkasian, 2015).

72. Mullah Omar’s successor and former deputy, Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansour, rejected negotiations completely and instead called for a renewed jihad against the United States and the Afghan government. About a week later, over the course of four days, three bombs killed and injured nearly 400 Afghans in Kabul, with the Taliban claiming responsibility (Malkasian, 2015).

73. However, Mullah Mansour is locked in a power struggle. Rivals such as Abdul Qayum Zakir and Mullah Omar’s son, Mullah Yaqub, question his right to rule. Even if the Taliban stays united under Mullah Mansour, he may need to prove to his followers that he is fit to rule through waging war and rejecting peace negotiations, at least in the near term. Indications of Mullah Mansour’s true feelings towards peace negotiations are contradictory – he is viewed as a hardliner by his tribesmen but media reports had him bending to Pakistani pressure to send representatives to meet with Afghan officials and crafting an official message from the long-dead Mullah Omar in support of these negotiations (Malkasian, 2015).

74. If the Taliban splinters under the new leadership, various groups could break off and create their own insurgencies. Daesh may gain a significant number of followers as a result. If that occurs, the Taliban may start fighting with Daesh and its splinter groups, which could potentially alleviate some of the pressure on the Afghan security forces. However, under this scenario, there may be no single partner with which President Ghani can negotiate to end the violence. Instead, Ghani would have to create individual peace deals with each of the splinter groups, with each agreement reducing the violence rather than eliminating it (Malkasian, 2015).

IX. CONCLUSIONS

75. The Defence and Security Committee will remain seized with the progress of Resolute Support Mission throughout its duration. The development of the nascent state after the decapitation of the Taliban regime in 2001 has continued to be a central issue to the development of international peace and security. Every country represented in this committee along with NATO partners has invested significant blood and treasure into the successful outcome of the international community’s efforts in Afghanistan.

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76. 2014 and 2015 have been critical years for many reasons. Afghanistan witnessed its first Presidential election since the institution of democracy in the country. While a power struggle ensued between the final two candidates, creating a deep amount of uncertainty, a successful compromise ultimately prevailed and, as a whole, the elections were remarkable for their relative lack of accompanying violence. 2014 also witnessed the drawdown and end of the ISAF combat mission in the country, with a full security transition to the ANDSF. The ANDSF completed the transition, but now face significant casualties and persistent capability gaps. As such, the focused attention of a well-resourced train, advise, and assist mission is critical to Afghan forces facing down the challenge of the remnants of the insurgency over the coming years. As the severity of the 2015 fighting season has demonstrated, this will not be an easy task. 2015 also saw the first formal peace negotiations and the announcement of the death of Mullah Omar, the former leader of the Taliban.

77. In the opinion of the United Nation’s Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Nicholas Haysom, Afghanistan is making modest progress in meeting its economic, security and political challenges. However, Afghanistan will continue to be tested in all of these areas, noting that failure in any one area would jeopardize the overall success of the Afghan transition. In his words, “It is absolutely clear that Afghanistan continues to need the support of the international community” (UNAMA, 2015).

78. Ultimately the goal of the Resolute Support Mission is to create an internal security environment in the country allowing for the development of sustainable state institutions contributing to the continued wellbeing and prosperity of the entire country. A strong Afghanistan will go a long way to creating a stable region in an area of the world long burdened by the scourge of domestic and regional violence. It will also contribute to a safer international security arena, which is in the interest of every single member state of this Alliance and all of its neighbours.

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