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Eurasia Outlook

2014: Russia’s New Military DoctrineTells It All

Posted by: DMITRI TRENIN

MONDAY, DECEMBER 29, 2014 14 РУССКИЙ PRINT PAGE

As one of his final acts of 2014, on December 26 President Vladimir Putin signed Russia’s new militarydoctrine. In principle, the doctrine, an official statement on national defense, is regularly updated and madepublic. Its previous iteration had been in place since February 2010. In the run-up to the publication of thetext, there were gloomy predictions. One suggested that the United States and its NATO allies would beformally designated Russia’s likely adversaries. Another one, based on the remarks of a senior servinggeneral, expected Russia to adopt the notion of preventive nuclear strike. Neither of these provisions foundits way into the published document. The doctrine does, however, faithfully reflect the sea change whichoccurred in Russia’s foreign policy and security and defense postures in 2014.

Essentially, for Commander-in-Chief Putin and for his generals, admirals, and security officials, war in 2014ceased to be a risk and turned into grim reality. Russia has had to use its military forces in Ukraine,arguably the most important neighbor it has in Europe. The conflict over Ukraine, in Moscow’s view,reflects the fundamental reality of an “intensification of global competition” and the “rivalry of valueorientations and models of development.” Against the background of economic and political instability—crises and popular movements—the global balance is changing in favor of emerging power centers. In thisnew environment, the doctrine highlights information warfare and outside interference in Russia’s domesticpolitics as risks of increased importance.

The list of main external risks has not changed much, but the nuances are important. As in the past, top ofthe table is NATO-related issues: its enhanced capabilities, global reach and enlargement, which bringsalliance infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders. After the risk of NATO comes the risk of destabilization ofcountries and regions, which can be taken to mean Libya, Syria and Ukraine, and foreign forcedeployments close to Russia, which presumably refers to additional NATO aircraft in the Baltic States,BMD assets in Romania, and naval ships in the Black Sea. The top portion of the list of risks containsreferences to U.S. strategic ballistic missile defense, its Global Strike concept, and strategic non-nuclear

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systems.

The latter two risks have attracted a lot of attention in Moscow recently, which put them on a par, along withstrategic BMD, as key risks to Russia’s deterrence capability, the apple of the eye of Russia’s entiredefense posture. The danger is, of course, that Russian officials may exaggerate the risks and overreact—as they did once under Mikhail Gorbachev, when they fell under the spell of Ronald Reagan’s StrategicDefense Initiative (SDI) with its “brilliant pebbles” and such. As a result, much of Gorbachev’s disarmamentagenda was based on the need to avert something which was not coming.

Some standard notions in the doctrine have acquired new urgency. Threats to territorial integrity and foreignclaims to parts of Russia have always been there, but, with the acquisition of Crimea, Moscow mustseriously consider the need to protect the peninsula against Kiev’s irredentism. Consequently, Russia has,since last summer, been turning Crimea into an area of major military deployments.

Notably, other risks, which do not directly impact on Russia, have moved down on the list. Among theserisks are: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and missile technologies; globalterrorism, potentially with the use of radioactive and toxic materials; arms and drug trafficking; armeddomestic conflicts along ethnic and confessional lines; and the activities of armed radicals and privatemilitary companies—a provision covering both the Islamic State and the successors to Blackwater.

The concept of what constitutes a military risk has been broadened to include the use of information andcommunication technologies—which may mean anything from Twitter/Facebook flash mobs, as during theArab Spring, to cyber attacks—to achieve military-political goals. Another risk added to the doctrine is thetoppling of legitimate governments and subsequent imposition of regimes inimical to Russian interests—aclear reference to Kiev’s Maidan and the overthrow of President Yanukovych.

This reference is also linked to the list of domestic military risks. First on that list are violent attempts atchanging the constitutional system. During the winter of 2011-2012, the Russian authorities watched thegrowth of the protest movement in Moscow and across the country with increasing concern. Vladimir Putinthen accused the protesters of colluding with the U.S. government. In May 2012, on the eve of Putin’spresidential inauguration, the Russian authorities reacted strongly against the protesters scuffling withpolice in central Moscow, and then worked effectively to degrade and stifle the radical opposition. However,the Kiev Maidan, which began in late November 2013, soon gave them an example of the successfuloverthrow of an entrenched regime.

The doctrine elaborates on Russia’s relationships with its allies, partners and other countries. It singles outBelarus as Moscow’s closest ally, whose armed forces are practically integrated with Russia’s. Thissituation explains the Kremlin’s tolerance for Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s undisguisedblackmail of Russia. The next category is the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization(CSTO) of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, which have agreed tocoordinate their policies and have formed rapid reaction forces for various contingencies—mainly in CentralAsia, with a view toward countering risks coming out of Afghanistan (a cause of rising common concern). InDecember, Putin welcomed CSTO leaders to the new National Defense Control Center in Moscow andinvited their countries to join the center. In the Caucasus, the Russian republic of Chechnya has emergedas Moscow’s security stronghold and a paramilitary resource. Also, under a treaty concluded in November,Abkhazia has merged its forces with Russia’s. South Ossetia is de facto a Russian military protectorate.This completes Russia’s defense perimeter as of late 2014.

Even though President Putin continues to make tongue in cheek reference to the United States and itsNATO allies as “partners,” the military doctrine is blunter on the issue. Only countries deemed to be friendlyto Moscow are labeled partners: members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (China and CentralAsia) and the BRICS group. Placing China in the SCO context, the doctrine proposes to “coordinate effortsto deal with military risks in the common space.” This, of course, falls far short of any form of military

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alliance with Beijing.

To the United States, NATO and the EU, the doctrine offers “a dialogue of equals” on European and Asia-Pacific security, arms control, countering WMD proliferation, and confidence building measures.Interestingly, it also contains language about joint missile defense, Russia’s 2010 proposal to NATO whichdid not fly then. Realizing that that proposal is now absolutely dead, the doctrine vows not to allow theUnited States to achieve military superiority through development of BMD or strategic non-nuclear systems.For the foreseeable future, Russia should feel absolutely confident about the deterrence capabilities of itsstrategic nuclear forces.

Despite the public debate, the Russian doctrine makes no change to the principles of using nuclearweapons. As before, Russia will retaliate against a nuclear/WMD attack against itself and/or its allies; and itwill also go nuclear if an existential threat is posed by a conventional attack.

The new iteration of Russia’s military doctrine makes it clear that even if the West is not officially anadversary, it is a powerful competitor, a bitter rival, and the source of most military risks and threats. Evenfaced with a coming recession, upgrading defense capabilities and force readiness remain Russia’s clearpriority. Russia is also strengthening integration and cooperation with its several allies and partners inEurasia, even as military contacts with the West are downgraded to Cold War levels. A watershed hasbeen passed.