2014 Cohort Capstone Projects · capstone project that includes an action plan to solve many of the state’s most challenging educational issues. The Executive Leadership Academy

2014 Cohort

Capstone Projects

Dedicated to the children

of the State of Nevada

Overview

The Public Education Foundation understands that the highest-performing organizations, including our

public schools, need to recruit and retain top talent. In order to bring about real and lasting change to

public education, it is critical that principals and other top administrators have the vision, knowledge and

courage to develop innovative solutions that produce results. The Foundation’s Leadership Institute of

Nevada is building a network of leaders from Nevada’s public schools and businesses to drive statewide

school improvement.

Our Executive Leadership Academy is a 15-month, intensive executive leadership experience for a

select group of educational and business leaders. The program prepares participants for strategic

problem-solving and the effective use of talent, tools, time and money. Participants engage with world-

class leaders in the fields of education, business, finance and public policy to discuss and debate

strategic solutions to the problems we face in public education. These solutions balance the needs of

children, the state and our nation. Some of the nation’s top scholars and practitioners in education –

including those from the American Enterprise Institute, Harvard University, Georgetown University and

Rice University – comprise the Academy’s faculty. Participants complete their Academy experience with a

capstone project that includes an action plan to solve many of the state’s most challenging educational

issues. The Executive Leadership Academy provides participants with an opportunity to impact public

education today and in the future.

Another essential component of the Leadership Institute of Nevada is the Education Leadership

Summit. Two times per year – once in Southern Nevada and once in Northern Nevada – principals,

business leaders, elected officials and stakeholders from across the state are invited to attend each event

featuring the nation’s best practitioners, scholars and business leaders. Participants from Northern and

Southern Nevada are exposed to new ideas, entrepreneurial thinkers and best practices intended to

motivate, inspire and foster awareness of innovative problem-solving. To date, we have conducted five

Education Leadership Summits, engaging approximately 1000 principals, education administrators,

business executives and community leaders from across Nevada.

The final component of the Leadership Institute of Nevada is Leadership Development for

Policymakers. The Foundation facilitates leadership development for policymakers, including school

board members. For example, in conjunction with each Executive Leadership Academy course session,

the Foundation facilities a community roundtable discussion during which Academy faculty discuss issues

such as school finance and data-based decision making. Like the Executive Leadership Academy,

participants are challenged to identify innovative solutions to the challenges we face in Nevada public

schools.

For more information, please contact Dr. Brian Myli at (702) 799-1042 or [email protected].

Table of Contents

Executive Summary – Are You Sick?

End of Career Excessive Sick Leave Use..………………….page 1

Full Report - Are You Sick? End of Career Excessive Sick Leave Use …..……….page 3

Executive Summary – Leadership Matters Most………………..……..……..……..page 25

Full Report – Leadership Matters Most..………………………………..….…….......page 27

Executive Summary – SIERRA Project…………..………………………………......page 49

Full Report – SIERRA Project……………………….…….……………………...…...page 51

Executive Summary – Incentivizing High Performing School Administrators

to be Placed in At Risk School..…………………………......page 71

Full Report – Incentivizing High Performing School Administrators

to be Placed in At Risk Schools..…………………………...…….......page 73

1

Executive Summary

End of Excessive Career Sick Leave Use

Children across the nation deserve to have the best instructional leader present in their

classrooms every day. Quality teachers in classrooms have the largest impact on increasing

student achievement; however, when teachers are absent, district budgets and instructional time

are reduced and there is a negative impact on student achievement. School districts with liberal

sick leave policies and limited incentives for accumulated leave enable teachers to use excessive

leave near retirement; inevitably, such policies encourage teachers to be absent from their

classrooms more toward career end. Many districts have policies driven by negotiated

agreements that inadvertently facilitate excessive sick leave use near retirement. This study

discovers school districts across the nation with fewer teacher absences, gleans best practices

from these districts, reviews many ideas to discourage absenteeism, and makes specific

recommendations to decrease the abuse of sick leave near retirement.

Are you Sick?

End of Career Excessive Sick Leave Use

Mr. J. M. Lamers

Mrs. Brenda Nielsen

Mrs. Pamela Goynes-Brown

Dr. Carrie A. Buck

The Public Education Foundation

Executive Leadership Academy

October 2014

SICK LEAVE USE

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Are You Sick?

End of Career Excessive Sick Leave Use

A major challenge facing public education in Nevada is the excessive use of sick leave as

employees approach retirement. In fact, current sick leave policies enable employees to accrue

and use substantial amounts of leave toward the end of their career. Although sick leave abuse

near retirement is a problem across all employee groups, the focus for this study will be on

teachers because they have the greatest impact on student achievement. It must be noted that

teachers within Nevada school districts accrue up to 15 days of sick leave per year, potentially

resulting in 450 days within a 30 year career (Clark County Education Association, 2012). This

equates to two and a half years of paid leave. Most teachers utilize a few sick days per year,

while accruing the majority of them. At retirement, the offered payout for unused sick leave

equates to pennies per day. As a result, the system encourages teachers to utilize more sick leave

near retirement as opposed to collecting a small check at the end of their career for unused sick

days.

The purpose of this study is to examine the systematic problem of sick leave abuse closer to

retirement, educate employee groups about sick leave practices, and make recommendations to

Nevada school districts to improve employee attendance. Suggested solutions could be

successfully implemented for other employee groups as well. The goals of this study are to

increase instructional time with consistent, certified classroom teachers; improve student

achievement; escalate employee morale and school climate; recognize unfunded liabilities;

stabilize expenses; reduce the impact on already strained budgets; as well as develop consistent

expectations by improving communication and accountability for use of sick leave. This paper

will reveal the problem of sick leave abuse at career end, investigate best practices across the

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country, and develop a strategic plan of recommendations to present to Nevada‘s school district

policy makers.

Problems with Teacher Absenteeism

The cascade of problems associated with sick leave abuse include disrupting the

consistency of the classroom environment, hiring random substitutes to fill vacant positions,

requiring other faculty to cover the absent employee‘s work duties, thereby impacting employee

morale and school culture, as well as straining limited budgets, costing state and local tax payers

millions of additional dollars. Most importantly, the research is evident that there is a significant

negative impact on student learning and achievement.

Implications on District Budgets

Teacher absenteeism costs school districts a tremendous amount of money annually. A

comprehensive cost figure is extremely difficult to calculate; however, estimates indicate teacher

absences place a substantial burden on school district budgets (Miller, 2012). In considering

there are more than 13,000 public school districts across the nation, the real monetary cost of

teacher absenteeism is incalculable and staggering. Out of the 40 districts analyzed by Joseph,

Wymack, and Zielaski (2014) , ―approximately $424 million was spent on substitutes in 2012-13

school year‖ (p. 2). This is roughly $1,800 per teacher to cover their absences (Joseph,

Waymack, & Zielaski, 2014). An absence costs $90 to $160 per day for a substitute teacher to

fill one vacancy at a school (Brill, 2011). Considering that schools spend more on salary and

benefits of teachers than any other category of expenditure, the financial implications of teacher

absences are disastrous. With 5.3 percent of teachers absent on any given day, stipends for

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substitute teachers and associated administrative costs amount to a minimum of four billion

dollars annually (Joseph, Waymack, & Zielaski, 2014).

Implications on Instructional Time/Student Achievement

When looking at the non-financial impact, a direct correlation exists between higher

teacher absenteeism and lower student achievement. With that said, teachers are the most

important factor in determining student academic success and excessive absences have a

tremendous negative impact on student learning (Fryer, 2012). Therefore, student learning and

achievement is the true ‗cost‘ of teacher absenteeism (Kronholz, 2013). According to several

academic studies, teacher absences negatively correlate with standardized assessment scores. In

some cases, a full day of being absent equals a 1.75 percentage-point drop in reading and math

proficiency rates (Kant, 2011). Furthermore, teacher absenteeism seriously disrupts the learning

environment of the classroom and lowers standardized test scores (Brown & Arnell, 2012).

Miller (2012) discusses the significant ―negative impact on student learning and achievement

when the regular teacher is not in the classroom‖ (p.5). Many times, absences suspended any

progress a class might be making and in some cases, classes actually regress when a teacher is

excessively absent (Brill, 2011). Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2007) found that a teacher

missing 10 days creates the educational equivalent of a student being taught for the year by a

novice, ineffective teacher, rather than an experienced, effective teacher. Joseph, Waymack, and

Zielaski (2014) realized that in terms of achievement, "every 10 absences lowers students‘

mathematics average equivalent to a half year of learning‖ When teachers were absent, the

learning environment is disrupted, negatively impacting student achievement. As a result of

frequent teacher absences, individual standardized test scores decrease, student rank in the grade

level drops, and overall school scores go down (Jacobs and Kritsonis, 2007).

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Teacher absences require schools to cover classrooms using a variety of means.

Ultimately, administration bares the responsibility of classroom coverage, by relying on other

school colleagues to cover, combining classrooms, or locating substitutes or guest teachers. In

fact, the majority of the time substitute teachers fill vacant positions. Studies show that students

learn less with a substitute teacher than when the regular classroom teacher is present (Miller,

2012). Although substitute teachers may typically follow a given lesson plan, they do not know

the students, the culture of the building, or normal procedures and routines that are common and

most familiar to students (Miller, 2012). Further compounding the problem, instructional time is

spent on menial classroom management and procedures as opposed to learning new content.

Students are more apt to behave differently when they have a guest teacher or feel their

environment is more relaxed with little or no expectations because their regular teacher is absent.

When a substitute is present, they do not know the learning needs of the children or the

curriculum as well as the regular teacher. ―Despite their best efforts it‘s often a diminished day

compared to having the regular teacher in the class‖ (Konz, 2014, p.1). Therefore, when students

are left with a substitute teacher, students miss out on quality instruction and are less focused on

learning core content (Miller, 2012).

Review of Literature

According to a myriad of data points in research surveys, articles, and studies, teacher

attendance is a substantial problem across the nation. Beginning in 2009, the Office for Civil

Rights and the U.S. Department of Education included a new item on its biennial survey: teacher

absences (Miller, 2012). The survey analyzed 56,837 schools and realized that in a typical school

year, nationally, 28% of teachers missed between 11 and 17 days, defined as ―frequently absent,‖

with eight percent absent more than 17 days and ―chronically absent‖ during the 2009-10 school

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year (Miller, 2012). A more recent study indicated that on average, teachers were in the

classroom 94% of the school year, which correlated to 11 missed days (Konz, 2014). In many

districts, a significant percentage of teachers exceeded that number. In 2014, the same percent

(28%) of teachers missed between 11 to 17 days, while 16% or roughly one in six missed 18

days or more. Nine districts surveyed had over half their teachers absent more than three weeks

annually (Konz, 2014) and new teachers were absent less than veteran teachers, indicating

possible abuse by more secure teachers (Kronholz, 2013). Research has shown two common

factors in teacher absences. Teachers were absent more frequently on Monday and Fridays

(Freyer, 2012) and the days they were absent were shorter than the three days requiring a

medical release or note from a doctor (Kronholz, 2013). Joseph, Waymack, & Zielaski (2014)

also indicated that schools in low socioeconomic neighborhoods have higher absenteeism rates

compared to schools in more affluent areas.

Further compounding the problem, contractual agreements and board policies across the

114 districts grant teachers an average of 12.7 days of general (sick or personal) leave each year

with accrual of days. This ranges from a low of 8 days in Dallas, to a high of 25 days for tenured

teachers in Hartford (Moored, 2010). In 73% of districts, teachers utilized less short-term leave

than what the district offered within negotiated agreements. However, in Nashville, Sacramento,

and Portland, OR teachers exceeded the annual allocation offered by districts. In fact, these

districts offered 15 to 17 days of general, short-term leave and their teachers exceeded this

amount by one or two more days (Joseph, Waymack, & Zielaski, 2014). Comparatively, other

districts with the lowest teacher absenteeism rates across the nation were: Indianapolis (6.1

days), District of Columbia (7.3 days), Louisville (8.1 days), and Tampa (8.6 days) (Konz,

2014). With some of the lowest teacher absence rates in the nation, Indianapolis teachers were

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absent on average 6.1 days and only 3.14% were considered chronically absent. The Indianapolis

policy included all teachers receiving only 10 days of leave their first year and seven days each

year after with an increase in the payout for accumulated days. At retirement, the teachers

received $35 for every 7 hours of unused sick time deposited into a retirement account (Joseph,

Waymack, & Zielaski, 2014). The other school districts offered incentives to keep teachers in

school by allowing teachers to accumulate unused sick and personal days or districts allowed

teachers to cash out a percentage of sick leave when they separated from the organization

(Kronholz, 2013). This additional incentive payout of accumulated, unused leave days were

cashed out close to retirement (Kronholz, 2013) or annual awards were designed to discourage

unnecessary absences (Moored, 2012). Other incentive options included days being held in an

account teachers could use in future years or teachers could turn days into cash when they retire

(Brill, 2011). In some districts, these payout costs came in the form of enhanced lifetime pension

benefits or payout dollars at retirement (Moored, 2012). Some districts put a ―use them or lose

them‖ model in place and capped the number of days teachers could accumulate per year, while

other districts set up some type of reward system to pay the teacher a yearly bonus for the days

they did not take off or give the school the money saved from less absences (Kronholz, 2013).

Other best practices in schools with lower teacher absenteeism rates were substantial buy back

policies at daily rates of pay, offering less than the median (12.5) of leave days to begin with,

providing an annual payment for a percentage of unused sick leave at the daily rate of pay,

and/or placing limits on sick leave accumulation (Konz, 2014). In a study done at Duke

University, researchers proposed that ―increasing teacher salaries by $400 a year and then

charging teachers $50 for each day they take off‖ would reduce absences by about one day per

teacher per year and largely pay for itself; however, the arguments raised against the proposal

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was that the policy would hit female teachers with children harder than it would hit men

(Kronholz, 2013, p. 5). Another best practice discovered that the top 10 districts include teacher

attendance as part of a broad evaluation measure describing the teacher's competency. The metric

is also considered in employee promotions (Moored, 2012).

When considering educational institutions across the nation with lower teacher absentee

rates, charter school teachers were absent less frequently than educators at public schools.

Furthermore, teachers were absent from traditional schools more than 10 times per year at a rate

more than 15% higher than charter school teachers (Freyer, 2012). The data points were clear

that charter school teachers were significantly less likely to utilize excessive sick days compared

to traditional public schools because of the way they offer teacher contracts (Kant, 2011). In fact,

teachers in one Connecticut charter school were ―absent an average of 1.8 days,‖ compared to

the public schools in the same region where ―teachers were absent 16.5 days, 10% of the school

year, or a full month of school‖ (Kant, 2011, p.3). In Harlem Success I, a charter school in New

York City, ―teachers were absent an average of 1.1 days‖ (Brill, 2011, p. 15). Oftentimes, charter

schools lengthen the teacher contract day and year, offer less leave with limited accrual than

traditional schools, provide more autonomy in classrooms, ensure nonrenewal policies, pay a

percentage for unused leave, and build professional development into teacher contracts (Freyer,

2012). Kronholz (2013) explained that some charter or private schools with low absence rates do

not hire substitutes, thereby, placing pressure on the individual teacher to pass on responsibility

to their colleagues. Due to this accountability, these teachers were absent less. Freyer‘s (2012)

study indicated that teacher absences had a direct correlation to the culture of the school. The

research was clear that school culture guides teacher behavior. Many times, excessive teacher

absences significantly above the national average were a symptom of a dysfunctional

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professional culture at the building level (Kronholz, 2013). As opposed to schools with a positive

culture and specific high expectations for teacher attendance, teachers were less likely to be

absent because they exhibited ownership in the values of the school and were more focused on

student achievement (Freyer, 2012). Accountability and high expectations in Kronholz‘s (2013)

study recognized that teachers who were required to call in to speak with the site administrator

were absent less than teachers who would call in to a computer-based system.

In the research, overall attendance incentives did not affect the attendance of chronically

absent (18 or more days) teachers; however, in districts that implemented policies to encourage

good attendance, frequently absent (11 to 17) teachers were out of school approximately two

fewer days than absent teachers in districts that did not implement such policies (Moored, 2012).

This could be interpreted as districts that place an emphasis on good attendance tend to develop a

culture that places greater value on teacher attendance. Therefore, the chronically absent are

policed by their peers to the extent that it reduces absences below the norm.

Teacher Absenteeism in Nevada

Focusing specifically on the problem in Nevada, a 2012 Center for American Progress

report on how teacher absences impact student achievement ranked Nevada 42nd

out of 50 states

because Nevada‘s teachers missed, on average, 10 or more days in a school year. Nevada

reported a 29.1% absence rate, trailing Utah with only 17.8% of teachers absent (Miller, 2012).

Nevada Revised Statue 288 (NRS 288; 2013) outlines the relationships between governments

and public employees in the state of Nevada. The provisions of this statue allow Nevada school

districts and employee organizations the right to collectively bargain for conditions of

employment, which include sick leave policies. The Nevada school districts that are discussed

below have negotiated agreements that shape current sick leave policies.

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Washoe County School District (WCSD) is the second largest school district in Nevada

serving approximately 64,740 students enrolled in 111 schools and employs 3,144 licensed

teachers. As defined in the collective bargaining agreement, each licensed employee is credited

with fifteen days of sick leave at the beginning of each school year with unlimited accumulation.

Licensed employees with at least 10 years of continuous service are entitled to payout dollars for

accumulated sick leave. The rate of pay is determined by 25% of the days of accumulated sick

leave for a maximum of 100 days, multiplied by the employees‘ daily rate of pay at the end of

the previous fiscal year. The first 15 days of sick leave are not earned until the employee has

completed the entire school year. If an employee leaves the system before all of their sick leave

is earned and the 15 days of leave have been used, a payroll deduction is made for the unearned

portion of the used sick leave (WEA, 2013).

Elko County, ranked as the third largest school district in Nevada, employs 602 licensed

employees. With 9,612 students enrolled in 32 schools in this rural Nevada County, the

negotiated agreement states that sick leave should be granted in the amount of 15 days per year,

given at the beginning of each contracted year. Upon retirement from the Elko County School

District, the employee is entitled to a sick leave payment at the rate of 50% of the substitute‘s

daily rate of pay. An employee who has accumulated 15 years but less than 20 years of service is

entitled to a payment to exceed no more than $5,000. Those who have served 20-25 years will

receive a payment of no more than $6,250. Employees who have 25 or more years of service will

receive no more than $7,500 as payment (ECCTA, 2012).

One of the smallest school districts in Nevada, Humboldt County, employs 221 licensed

employees. Educating 3,436 students in their 11 schools, Humboldt School District is located in

rural north-central Nevada. As agreed upon, 12 month employees are provided with fifteen sick

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days per year and 9 month employees receive 12 sick days with no limit on the number of

accrued days. Upon retirement, employees may select $40 per day for unused sick leave or have

it applied to health insurance costs (Jensen, 2014).

The largest district in Nevada is the Clark County School District (CCSD) where

approximately 317,000 students are currently enrolled. CCSD employs 17,979 licensed teachers.

Currently, negotiated agreements between CCSD and the teachers‘ union allows employees to

earn 1.5 days per month for a maximum of 10 months, not to exceed 15 days per year, with year-

to-year accumulation of leave without limit. Upon retirement or death, a licensed teacher who

has been employed by CCSD for 10 consecutive years is compensated for a maximum of 100

sick days. The District allocates $196,197.24 to the Clark County Education Association

(CCEA) to divide and pay retiring teachers‘ a portion for accumulated, unused days of sick

leave. This amount is divided by the total number of eligible unused sick days allowed for all

eligible employees to yield a daily unused sick leave rate. Each entitled employee is paid the

daily unused sick leave rate for each day of unused sick leave (CCEA, 2013).

In 2014, sick leave forms submitted to the CCSD Human Resources Division tracked

teacher absences. In consideration of the actual implications of teacher absences in the confines

of instructional time and dollars, the current costs of teacher absences tracked by substitute jobs

requested in the CCSD was $13,315,300 with a total of 133,153 missed instructional days. (See

Table 1). With 133,153 missed days, this was equivalent to 739.7 school years of missed

instructional time. The overall teacher absentee rate was 7.4 days. When compared to the 278

teachers within a year of retirement, the number of absences increased to 24.29 days as indicated

in Table 2 (Clarke, 2014). Table 2 also shows the cost of $675,450 for retiring teacher

absenteeism, with a total of 6,754.5 sick leave days the last year before retirement. Therefore, the

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teachers closer to retirement were three times more absent (24.29 days) than the overall rate (7.4

days) of teacher absenteeism (Clarke, 2014). For the 2013-2014 year of school, the total

substitute teacher cost was $13,315,300 and with compounded expenses of prep buyouts being

$1,164,405, the total was $14,479,705 as indicated in Table 1 (Clarke, 2014). Therefore, the 278

teachers retiring at the end of the year consumed $675,450 or approximately 5% of the entire

amount ($14,479,705) as shown in Table 2.

Research Design

This study will identify the problem of sick leave use near retirement in Nevada school

districts. Once the problem has been defined, research will entail a thorough analysis of best

practices from districts across the country. Districts with the least amount of sick leave used will

be investigated to glean strategies for reducing sick leave use during retirement. When reviewing

all the data, a strategic plan of action will be developed with recommendations for Nevada

school districts. The process of this study is to:

Research a variety of different sized districts across the nation with fewer absences per

employee group and determine best practices, policies, and procedures.

Research successful public entities, city governments, or businesses with fewer absences

and determine best practices, policies, and procedures that can be replicated to public

school districts.

Identify current data points on use of sick leave, programs, and resources for Nevada public

education employee groups.

Identify budgetary expenses as a result of the use of sick leave for Nevada public education

employee groups.

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Determine recommendations to consolidate services, gain efficiencies, and improve

effectiveness of sick leave policies.

Create a strategic action plan of recommendations established on research-based best

practices, policies, and procedures across the nation, with immediate, as well as secondary

recommendations that would require revision within negotiated agreements.

Utilize a year one plan of action reflection component to ensure implementation, initiate

and evaluate progress toward plan recommendations, further researching for strategy

development and future planning.

Recommendations

The Strategic Action Plan of recommendations consists of three-fold strategic plan to

remedy the problem of sick leave abuse near retirement. The first recommendation requires a

board policy communicating and developing accountability triggers to deter use of sick leave

carried out by a central office. Within recommendation two, a creative approach, the accrual of

sick leave is limited and financially incentivizes employees who do not use their leave.

Recommendation three, guarantees every employee access to long term disability policies. The

limitations to this study include research articles and best practices across the country discuss

general teacher absences and do not specifically reference teachers near retirement. In addition,

districts have systems to keep up with the number of days a teacher is absent but not necessarily

to track achievement as it is tied to teacher absence.

Recommendation I

Establish a School Board policy addressing employee sick leave use to ensure

consistency and hold employees accountable to the policy for proper use of sick leave.

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Communicate sick leave expectations and accountability to all stakeholders, as well as add

attendance to staff evaluation with the Nevada Evaluation Performance Framework (NEPF;

2014). Implement a district policy which includes a review of attendance to be considered for

promotion and/or lateral movement. Develop centralized enforcement of current contractual

policies written in negotiated agreements, transferring responsibility from site administrators to a

centralized subset of the Human Resource (HR) department called a Leave Management

Department (LMD). Develop trigger points for communication of expectations, notification of

policy requirements, submittal of doctors‘ notices, updates on sick leave days used, and/or

disciplinary actions.

The estimated cost of this recommendation is approximately $425,000. This would

include a Human Resource Leave Management Department (LMD) Administrator ($125,000),

four support staff members ($250,000), communications, materials, and printing ($20,000), as

well as technology and software applications ($30,000). CCSD would budget for the LMD and

consolidate efforts into a comprehensive program to reduce the misuse of sick leave in the

district. This recommendation would reduce absences by at least four percent. If the outcome

reduced teacher absences by four %, this new department would pay for itself. The goal would

be to reduce teacher absences by considerably more than 4%.

Recommendation II

Renegotiate to allow up to 11 days paid time off. Renegotiate for up to 100 days

maximum accrual. After accruing 80 days, if using less than three days that year, $50 per day

will be paid for a total of five days. After 20 years of service and an accrual of 80 sick days, if

three or less days are used that year, $100 per day will be paid for five total days. After 25 years

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of service and an accrual of 80 sick days, if three or less days are used that year, $200 per day

will be paid for a total of five days.

The estimated cost of this recommendation is six million dollars. Therefore, if

approximately 8000 eligible teachers took advantage of the yearly buyout incentive, it would

cost an average of $750 per qualifying teacher. For example, in CCSD teachers take an average

of 7.4 days per year. This recommendation would allow eligible teachers with three days or

fewer to collect this benefit. Thus, the goal would be to reduce overall teacher absence by nearly

50%, which equates to $6,657,650 in CCSD alone. If the end goal is student achievement by

rewarding teachers who are present more often in the classrooms, this is well worth the

investment.

Recommendation III

Educate teachers on the importance of disability insurance and ensure all teachers have

access to guaranteed-issued long term disability plans. Work with a provider to get the most

reasonable group pricing for long-term disability insurance for each teacher. Negotiate this into

the benefit package for all teachers, as this will certify that all teachers are covered at a

percentage of their income in case they exceed their available sick leave.

A potential barrier during collective bargaining would be the reduction of days given and

the limited accrual of 100 sick days. Therefore, offering disability insurance would cover the best

interest of the teacher in case there was a severe illness or injury. The selling point with this

recommendation is that the disability insurance transfers the risk, expense, and accountability

associated with long term sick leave to the insurance company. The guaranteed-issued long term

disability plan benefit would be favorable for all teachers, no matter their years of service. It

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would be especially favorable to those teachers early in their careers who have limited amounts

of sick leave. Another advantage to this recommendation is that disability insurance would pay

the employee a benefit until the age of 65, in some cases lengthening the compensation period by

decades.

With an average group long-term disability plan costing $450 a year, this would cost about

$8,090,550 if the district were to purchase this plan. Another viable option could be working this

into negotiations as a part of the benefit package with an impact on future cost of living raises. If

the cost of disability insurance was optional and paid for by teachers, further savings would result.

For example, instead of getting a one percent cost of living raise, teachers would only get a three-

fourths increase with the other one quarter offsetting the cost of disability insurance. Work with a

provider to get the most reasonable group pricing for long-term disability insurance for each

employee. Negotiate this into the benefit package for all employees. This will certify that all

teachers would be covered at a percentage of their income in case they need to utilize multiple

days of sick leave.

Conclusion

Student achievement is the goal of education and student achievement happens with focused

instructional time from a quality teacher present in the classroom each day. Therefore, the

objective of school district policies must be to keep quality teachers in classrooms throughout the

school year as much as possible. Many school districts have negotiated and built systems that

enable teachers to use more leave near retirement -- moving farther from this goal — and

inevitably, negatively impacting student achievement. With the implementation of some or all of

this study‘s recommendations, the goal of increasing the time quality teachers are present with

children in classrooms will increase student achievement. We owe this time to our children.

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Table 1: 2014 CCSD TeachersSick Leave

Elementary Teachers Middle School Teachers High School Teachers

$6,972,700

Average of 8.87 days off for

elementary teachers

7,863 teachers

108,408 Total Sub Jobs

Elementary

55,630 51% personal illness

14,097 13% illness in

immediate family

3,684 days 1% bereavement

73,411 days

$2,737,900

Average of 9.2 days off for

middle school

2,976 teachers

42,113 Total Sub Jobs Middle

School

21,633 51% personal illness


immediate family

1,529 days 1% bereavement

28,908 days

$2,940,200

Average of 7.74 days off

3,798 teachers

45,497 Total Sub Jobs

High School

23,923 52% personal

illness


immediate family

1,441 days 1%

bereavement

30,834 days

Table 2: 2012-2014 Retiring Teachers’ Use of Sick Leave

2012 2013 2014

Total number of retirees:

343 Teachers

Total hours of sick leave:

71,008 hours

Sick leave days used:

8,876 days

Average per retiree: 25.87

days

Total $887,600


370 Teachers


77,044 hours


9,630.5 days


days

Total $963,050


278 Teachers


54,036 hours


6,754.5


days

Total $675,450


56 Administrators


7,832 hours

Sick leave days used: 979

days


days

Total number of retirees: 51

Administrators


11,624 hours


days


days


30 Administrators


5,376 hours


days


days


372 Support Staff


73790 hours


9,223.75 days


days


380 Support Staff


65,816 hours

Sick leave days used: 8,227

days


days


184 Support Staff


29,269 hours


3,658.63 days


days

SICK LEAVE USE

20

Table 3: Nevada School Districts Sick Leave Policies

School District Sick Days

Given in One

Year

Buy-Out Option Max

Accrual

COST PER

DAY:

Average Cost of

Substitute

Clark County

School District

15 days 100 days buys one

year at 29 years of

service

No Max $90.00-$110

Average $100

Washoe County

School District

15 days No Max $82.00-$97.00

Average $90

Humboldt County

School District

15 days $40 for each

unused day, or

have that applied

to insurance costs

No Max

$106-$116

Average $111

Elko County

School District

15 days No Max

Douglas County

School District

15 days 186 days $64.00-$88.00

Average $76

Table 4: National School Districts with Fewer Teacher Absenteeism Rates

School District Average

Sick Days Used

Indianapolis, IN 6.1

District of Columbia 7.3

Louisville, KY 8.1

Tampa, FL 8.6

Table 5: Human Resource Leave Management Department

Item Estimated Cost

Human Resources Leave Management Administrator $125,000

Four Support Staff Leave Management Staff Members $250,000

Communication Materials & Printing $20,000

Technology – Hardware, Software, & Computer Applications $30,000

SICK LEAVE USE

21

References

American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological

Association (6th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association..

Brill, S. (2011). Class welfare: Inside the fight to fix America’s schools. New York: Simon

& Schuster Paperbacks.

Brown, S., &Arnell, A. (2012). Measuring the effect of teacher absenteeism has on

student achievement: ―At an urban but not too urban Title I elementary school.‖

International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 172.

Clark County Education Association. (2013). Negotiated Agreement Between the Clark

County School District and the Clark County Education Association, Article 18.

Retrieved from http://www.nctq.org/search.do

Clark County School District Fast Facts 2013-2014. (2013). Retrieved from

http://www.ccsd.net/district/news/general/2013/nov/1/check-out-the-2013-2014-fast-facts

Clarke, A., (2014, June). Data Performance and Project Management Coordinator. Clark

County School District Human Resources Unit.

Clotfelter, C., Ladd, H., & Vigdor, J. (2007). Are teacher absences worth

worrying about in the U.S.? National Bureau of Economics, 1-51.

Elko County Classroom Teachers Association and the Elko County School District Final

Agreement July1, 2012-June 30, 2013. (2012). Retrieved from

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:gIbcwS5laHkJ:www.elkocounty

teachers.com/uploads/8/8/3/4/8834970/2012-

2013_negotiated_agreement.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

SICK LEAVE USE

22

Fryer Jr., R.G. (2012, September). Learning from the successes and failures of charter schools, in

the Hamilton Project. Retrieved from

http://scholar.harvard.edu/fryer/publications/learning-successes-and-failures-charter-

schools

Jacobs, Karen D., & Kritsonis, William A. (2007). ―An Analysis of Teacher and Student

Absenteeism in Urban Schools: What the Research Says and Recommendations for

Educational Leaders.‖ The Lamar University Electronic Journal of Student Research.

Jensen, D. (2014, June). Superintendent of Humboldt County School District.

Joseph, N., Waymack, N., & Zielaski, D. (2014, June). Roll call: the importance of

teacher attendance. National Council on Teacher Quality, 1-14.

Kant, N. (2011). Interactive tool: Teacher absence rates by district & school. Connecticut Policy

Institute, 1-4.

Konz, A. (2014, June). JCPS teachers absent less than most nationwide, The Courier-

Journal. Retrieved from

http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/education/education/2014/06/03/jcps-

teachers-absent-less-nationwide/9889687/

Konz, T. (2014, June 3). Big city school districts have teacher attendance problems. USA

Today. Retrieved from

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/03/teachers-attendance-

study/9889949/

Kronholz, J. (2013). No substitute for a teacher. Education Next, 13, 1-5.

Miller, R. (2012, November). Teacher absence as a leading indicator in student

achievement. Center for American Progress, 1-14.

SICK LEAVE USE

23

Moored, G. (2012, August). A closer look at teacher benefits: An apples to apples

comparison.National Council on Teacher Quality, 1-12.

Nevada Educator Performance Framework 2013-2014, 2014-2015. (2014). Retrieved from

http://rpdp.net/pdfs/RPDP%20NEPF%20Overview%209%2030%2013.pdf

Nevada Revised Statutes. 288. (2013). Retrieved from https://www.leg.state.nv.us/law1.cfm

Washoe County School District Website (http://washoeschools.net)

Washoe County Negotiated Agreement: Agreement between the Washoe County School District

and the Washoe Education Association, 2013-2015. (2013). Retrieved from

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:7O2RcSMTt1cJ:www.weatoday

.org/WEA_WCSD_Negotiated_Agreement_2013-

2015.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

25

Executive Summary

Leadership Matters Most

Students in Nevada are not achieving at an academic level necessary to attract and retain

leading businesses in order to develop a vibrant and knowledge based economy. Educational

bureaucracy and funding have been blamed for the decades of disappointing statistics touted by

the press. An effort to isolate variables leading to educational underperformance is like trying to

determine the reason that two people fall in love. In fact, academic success is impacted by a

variety of factors that have a compounding effect throughout a student’s academic career.

Examples of these factors include: the quality of the student’s teachers, administrators and other

school staff; socioeconomic indicators; language; transiency; family perceptions of educational

value; access to educational materials, and likely hundreds more. While lawmakers are well

intentioned in trying to isolate and “fix” these factors, changing one variable in an equation of a

multipronged analysis is unlikely to have the desired outcome of dramatically improved student

success. However, some factors can have a larger impact on student success than others. One

clear area of research is the effect that school leaders have on student success in persistently

underachieving schools.

Developing a system through which we can encourage excellent school leadership while

improving or eliminating ineffective leaders should be a top priority for lawmakers and

education advocates in Nevada. Currently, after two years of less than effective performance

ratings, principals can revert to probationary status. After a year on probation, should expected

outcomes not be improved, that principal is subject to termination or demotion. However, three

years of an ineffective administrator in a school can be incredibly damaging for student success.

26

In order to more effectively enhance academic instruction through effective

administrative performance, three primary recommendations are provided:

1) Address ineffective administrators in a timely manner;

2) Modify the current administrator evaluation system to avoid a disincentive for our

highest performing administrators; and

3) Provide meaningful incentives to encourage change at our lowest performing schools.

This change will not be easy. In response to the current political environment, including

legislative hesitancy to modify existing statute, the recommendations will present difficulties for

collective bargaining units that represent administrative personnel. This self-preservation will

likely become evident as administrative team members begin to evaluate the potential outcomes

under the proposed changes. Accomplishing this change will require a substantial team effort

with strategic team members. School board leadership, district superintendents, and business

leaders will need to partner with powerful and well-funded state teacher unions to demonstrate

the necessity to execute this change while holding districts accountable for successful

implementation.

Ultimately this change will not singularly improve student success. It is not a panacea.

Rather, based on the extensive research demonstrating the importance of school leadership on

academic success, it is obvious that a laser focus on ensuring every school has an effective leader

should be a primary focus of our society as we all stand to benefit from high achieving schools.


Lindsay Anderson

Dr. David Jensen

Mike Paul


Leadership Institute of Nevada

October 2014

LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST

28


More than thirty years ago, the National Commission on Education Excellence delivered

the report, A Nation at Risk (1983). This eye-opening report specifically recommended that

leadership should be developed for schools to succeed. The school principal is viewed as one of

the single most influential individuals on a school campus (Cohen, McCabe, Michelli, &

Pickeral, 2009; Edmonds, 1979; Kelley, Thornton, & Daugherty, 2005; Leech & Fulton, 2008).

According to Rooney (2009), “Schools are, in some ways, „long shadows‟ of their principals.

The school looks and feels like its leader” (p. 89). While the principal is viewed as critically

important in influencing the school environment as a whole, leadership is second only to the

classroom teacher in influencing student learning (Leithwood, Louis, Anderson, & Wahlstrom,

2004; Wallace Foundation Report, 2012). Whitaker (2003) explained that “great principals know

that if they have great teachers, they have a great school; without great teachers, they do not have

a great school” (p. 7). It is critical for school leaders to exert this influence in a manner that

allows great teachers to perform their duties free of unnecessary encumbrances while still

holding student achievement as the priority. Furthermore, “Principals are central figures in

schools whose actions directly shape their schools‟ climate” (Price, 2012, p. 40).

The Issue

A large body of research exists on the positive consequences of effective school

leadership in relation to student achievement and school climate (Hallinger & Heck, 1998).

Extensive research also exists on school climate and its effects on student achievement (Cohen,

Fege, & Pickeral, 2009; Cohen et al., 2009; Freiberg, 1999; Hoy & Woolfolk, 1993; Mitchell,

Bradshaw, & Leaf, 2010; Stewart, 2008). In persistently underachieving schools a highly skilled

and knowledgeable principal is of the upmost importance for such schools to begin to break the


29

cycle the underachievement. An underperforming principal can cause lasting damage to any

school. In today‟s system of heightened accountability, the great sense of urgency to improve

that exists for chronically underperforming schools is a continual topic of conversation in the

education and public setting. In order to begin to address this issue of chronic underachievement

the performance of the principal must be examined.

Principal Leadership

According to Kouzes and Posner (2012), the definition of leadership is the relationship

between those who desire to step into the forefront to lead and those who choose to step in line

and follow. “Leaders never get extraordinary things accomplished all by themselves. Leaders

mobilize others to want to struggle for shared aspirations, and this means that, fundamentally,

leadership is a relationship” (Kouzes & Posner, 2012, p. 30). Suber (2011) found that

characteristics that define successful school leadership include building strong staff relationships,

empowering teachers, and setting examples for all involved stakeholders. Leithwood et al.

(2004) define leadership, at its core, as providing direction and exercising influence.

With direction and influence, the link between leadership and student achievement is also

evident (Ovando & Cavazos, 2012; Robinson, Lloyd, & Rowe, 2008; Sergiovanni, 2001;

Tschannes-Moran & Gareis, 2004). “Quality schooling indeed leads to quality learning, and an

important key to quality schooling is the amount and kind of leadership that school principals

provide directly and promote among teachers and supporting staff” (Sergiovanni, 2001, p. 162).

Central to school effectiveness is the ability to build and maintain trusting, positive relationships

among school staff and leadership (Price, 2012). “When principals establish trusting school

spaces, serious school improvement and success can occur” (Price, 2012, p. 42). Meister (2010)


30

noted that it is frustrating for teachers when the principal disregards the knowledge of teachers,

takes only superficial input from staff, and/or exhibits a lack of cooperation.

There is an indirect relationship between school leaders‟ behaviors and student outcomes;

however, teachers make a more direct impact through their daily interactions with students. At

the same time, effective leaders support teachers with resources, provide professional learning

opportunities, and organize student groupings (Robinson et al., 2008; Soehner & Ryan, 2011).

Leaders establish a vision and shape a climate that is supportive of that vision. Simultaneously,

they must inspire their people by bringing out their individuality, talents, and energies toward a

well-intentioned future (Brown & Posner, 2001). DuFour and Eaker (1998) added that principals

who identify, promote, and protect shared vision and values, regard these behaviors as the most

important responsibilities to promote student success. Additionally, researchers suggest that

schools of all sizes and types that have leaders who effectively share leadership responsibilities,

create collaborative cultures, promote collective learning and application, and have shared values

and vision will have increased effectiveness (Brown, Finch, MacGregor, & Watson, 2012;

Fullan, 2003).

This effectiveness is particularly enhanced when a principal serves as an instructional

leader. As an instructional leader, the principal is expected to know quality instruction and

possess knowledge of the curriculum that is commensurate to the needs of all students

(Wahlstrom & Louis, 2008). It is presumed that the instructional leader is able to provide quality

constructive feedback, improve the practice of teaching, and/or construct a system for others to

provide this support (Wahlstrom & Louis, 2008).

The National Association of Elementary School Principals (NAESP, 2004) identified six

standards for effective instructional leaders. The first standard was to place student and adult


31

learning at the center of all decision making. The next standard focused on setting specific, high

expectations for students and adults. Along with this, the third standard was established

demanding content and instruction to promote student achievement. The final three standards

related to the creation of a culture of continuous learning, to the use of multiple sources of data,

and to actively engage the community (NAESP, 2004).

School Climate

As principal leadership continues to be a focus of studies, school climate also serves as a

focus of school research. Yet, a clear definition for school climate has not been determined

nationally or internationally despite more than 100 years of discussions on the topic (Cohen,

Fege, & Pickeral, 2009; Cohen et. al., 2009; Perry, 1908; Thapa, Cohen, Guffey, & Higgins-

D‟Lessandro, 2013). Throughout the body of research on school climate, many interpretations of

the definition of school climate exist. As early as 1908, Perry began a conversation regarding

school climate by describing it as:

A school “atmosphere,” school loyalty, school moral, esprit de corps, - all these, so

essential to securing the best results in the development of a school organization, cannot

be gained in a day. School spirit, pride in the school and thought for its name and honor

must become a matter of tradition, and once established, be handed down from one set of

pupils to another (p. 332).

In modern times and in simple terms, school climate is the personality of the school (Hoy

& Tarter, 1997; Hoy, Tarter, & Kottkamp, 1991) or its heart and soul (Freiberg, 1999). In more

complex language, school climate is “the set of internal characteristics that distinguishes one

school from another and influences the behavior of its members” (Hoy & Tarter, 1997, p. 6). It

has also been defined as the “quality of a school that helps each individual feel personal worth,


32

dignity and importance, while simultaneously helping create a sense of belonging to something

beyond ourselves” (Freiberg, 1999, p. 11).

Despite the varying definitions, school climate is larger than any single person‟s

experience; it is a group phenomenon that describes the quality of school life (Cohen et al.,

2009). More specifically, Cohen et al. (2009) described school climate as “the character of the

school, refers to spheres of school life (e.g., safety, relationships, teaching and learning, the

environment) and larger organizational patterns (e.g., from fragmented to cohesive or „shared‟

vision, healthy or unhealthy, conscious or unrecognized)” (p. 182). According to Hoy and Miskel

(2005), “School climate is a relatively enduring quality of the school environment that is

experienced by participants, affects their behavior, and is based on their collective perceptions of

behavior in schools” (p. 185). Principals‟ and teachers‟ attitudes create an atmosphere for

learning referred to as a school climate that has a great influence on school success (Price, 2012).

Price (2012) noted that this school climate is guided in a positive direction when an atmosphere

of trust, shared vision, and openness is created. Similarly, Mitchell et al. (2010) emphasized that

shared beliefs, values, and attitudes shape interactions and define school climate. Thapa et al.

(2013) added that school climate is a reflection of social, emotional, civil, ethical, and academic

experiences of students, educators, and parents that comprise the school community.

This unique reflection of many individuals and experiences demonstrates that the

“relationship between school climate and trust is extensive and consistent” (Hoy & Tarter, 1997,

p. 11). They explain that in a school where trust is prevalent, a generally productive and happy

climate prevails. At the same time, in a school with a positive climate students view school not

as a place they have to attend, but somewhere they want to be. Additionally, teachers share in the

long term commitment of school endeavors and are willing to put in the extra effort that is


33

needed to accomplish organizational goals (Hoy & Tarter, 1997). The open and healthy school

leader allows and encourages teachers to take risks for the sake of improving the school (Hoy &

Tarter, 1997). Tschannen-Moran (2001) stated that “expert principals know how to construct

processes in which important decisions are made through collaboration” (p. 309). However,

Tschannen-Moran (2001) cautioned that teachers could become disillusioned with involvement if

an administrator does not genuinely seek teacher input. Essentially, the open and healthy school

principal must also be willing to accept teachers who may ignore advice that conflicts with

professional decisions and high levels of autonomy (Hoy & Tarter, 1997).

It has been found that principals in open and healthy school climates indirectly foster

school success and teacher outcomes by impacting the school climate (Hallinger & Heck, 1998;

Hoy & Tarter, 1997; Price, 2012). Leithwood et al. (2004) agreed, “Mostly leaders contribute to

student learning indirectly, through their influence on other people or features of their

organizations” (p. 13). Meister (2010) contributed in that, over time, administration has a small

impact in the daily endeavors within in a teacher‟s classroom. The commitment and trust of the

faculty as a whole is key in school effectiveness (Hoy & Tarter, 1997). At the same time, “The

relationships of principals, as the school leader, strongly and directly affect teachers‟ attitudes,

which define the schooling climate” (Price, 2012, p. 40).

In order for these relationships to have successful outcomes, a shared definition of

expectations between the principal and teachers is critical (Price, 2012). According to Mitchell et

al. (2010) teachers indicated that a higher student-teacher ratio and larger class sizes contribute

to decreased levels of job satisfactions and overall decreases in school climate more so than

instability in leadership. MacNeil, Prater, and Bush (2009) added that “Ultimately, the

relationships that shape the culture and climate of the school are strongly influenced by the


34

school principal” (p. 76). Kelly, Thornton, and Daugherty (2005) highlighted that effective

leadership is critical, especially because the behaviors of building level principals are uniquely

linked to school climate.

The aforementioned NAESP (2004) report suggested that an exceptional school cannot

exist without an exceptional principal. The report acknowledged that leadership is a balancing

act with staff support. Specifically, NAESP (2004) affirmed that principals cannot perform the

many tasks of a school on their own; rather, distributed leadership must occur, and people must

know the values behind the many tasks.

While all people must know the values behind tasks, Esquith (2014) stated that the

climate and morale of a school starts at the top when the leader respects and believes in the

teachers. “Most staff members are more than willing to do some of the more unpleasant parts of

their jobs because they work for a principal who rolls up his sleeves and works alongside them”

(Esquith, 2014, p. 21). Cohen et al. (2009b) agreed that positive school climates start with strong

collaborative communities.

Thapa et al. (2013) found that, according to teachers, several factors contribute to a

positive school climate, which include the work environment, peer relationships, and feelings of

respect and inclusion. Thapa et al. (2013) continued, “School leaders and teachers should strive

to clearly define the sets of norms, goals, and values that shape the learning and teaching

environment” (p. 366). These researchers explained that cooperative learning, group cohesion,

respect, and mutual trust are byproducts of a positive school climate. Also, higher rates of

teacher retention can be linked to a positive school climate (Cohen et al., 2009b; Fulton, Yoon, &

Lee, 2005; Miller, Brownell, & Smith, 1999; Thapa et al., 2013).


35

Proposed Solutions

As previously indicated, the impact of effective administration is clear. The quality of

principals and teachers has been demonstrated as accounting for nearly 60% of a school‟s impact

on student achievement, with principals accounting for 25% of this impact (Marzano, Waters, &

McNulty, 2005). The principal is critical to this factor based on the required actions taken to

develop the conditions necessary to support academic learning, which include: effective hiring

practices, meaningful and relevant professional development, effective evaluation, as well as

efforts to support retention and dismissal.

Though there is a growing body of research that supports the premise that effective

instructional practice is directly correlated to the effectiveness of the site administrator, little has

been addressed in terms of removing ineffective administrators. Recent changes to the Nevada

Revised Statutes (NRS, 2013) provides the flexibility to deem a post-probationary administrator

(or teacher) as probationary following two years of unsatisfactory/less than effective

performance, while extending the time required to establish post-probationary status to three

years for probationary administrators. Despite this enhanced flexibility, there remain incidents in

which two years is too long to remove an ineffective administrator.

In order to more effectively enhance academic instruction through effective

administrative performance, three primary recommendations are provided:

1) Address ineffective administrators in a timely manner;

2) Modify the current NEPF to avoid a disincentive for our highest performing

administrators;

3) Provide meaningful incentives to encourage change at our lowest performing schools.


36

The impact of an effective administrator is clear. However, an ineffective administrator

can have an equally aversive impact. Currently, Statute allows for the removal of ineffective

administrators through a disciplinary process (NRS 391.31297(1)(a)). However, the process is

mired in legal expectations and requirements which could negate efforts to make the necessary

changes (NRS 391.313). In such circumstances, both staff and students are negatively impacted

by a continuation of ineffective leadership.

Recommendation: Allow for a reversion to probationary status for principals identified as

“ineffective” following the first evaluation in which such a classification is identified, based

upon modified expectations in the Nevada Educator Performance Framework (NEPF;

2014).

In addition, the current NEPF (2014) provides a disincentive to attracting and retaining

highly effective administrators at our lowest performing schools. School Turnaround models

incorporate the replacement of the site level administrator as the first and most important step in

transitioning the educational practices of a school (Kutash, Nico, Gorin, Rahmatullah, & Tallant,

2010). Despite the importance of facilitating and implementing a change in leadership, research

on change theory also confirms that the implementation of the change process does not occur

over night. Rather, researchers frequently site the need for three to five years of sustained efforts

to facility lasting change (Roy, 2013).

With the understanding that change is a process and often requires several years of

sustained focus, current requirements that 50% of an administrators evaluation be tied to

academic performance provides a disincentive for high performing administrators to assume the

leadership role at underperforming schools. The currently defined evaluative process would

likely identify a Turnaround principal as “ineffective” prior to the ability to implement


37

meaningful change. This impact is evident when it is understood that the data used in the

evaluative process is based on the prior academic year and fails to account for the necessary time

required for an effective change process to be implemented.

Understanding that student academic performance is a key indicator of leadership impact,

such measures must inherently be part of the evaluation system. However, the currently

identified 50% student academic expectation in the evaluative model is unrealistic and requires

modification.

Recommendation: Student academic achievement for evaluative purposes not exceed 25%

of the total evaluation. In addition, for new administrators at a school, academic measures

not be factored into the evaluation (although notation of growth be included) during the

first two years of placement.

Given the intent to draw our most highly skilled administrators into our lowest

performing schools, measures to provide meaningful incentives will be necessary. This need is

particularly noted in smaller districts where opportunities for movement are limited. As a result,

previously effective administrators place themselves in jeopardy if they are unable to facilitate

the anticipated improvements. Rather, the ability to implement an incentive-based system to

enhance the motivation of our highest performing administrators to take on the lowest

performing schools is deemed appropriate.

Understanding that fiscal resources are limited, legislative funds could be targeted

through an application process to enhance the performance of schools currently identified as

FOCUS and/or 1-star schools, with the understanding an expectation for funding includes a

change in site leadership. Selected administrators willing to take on the change process could be


38

incentivized through additional compensation or purchased years of service through the PERS

system.

Recommendation: Provide legislatively driven fiscal or purchased years of service for a

new administrator willing to take on a low performing school through a “Turnaround”

type model.

Why This Solution

Evidence has clearly identified that ineffective administrators are damaging towards

effective instructional practices. In addition, ineffective administrators have been found to lead to

higher rates of staff turnover, while decreasing an academically based culture within the school

setting. This enhanced teacher turnover rate has been directly correlated to decreases in student

academic achievement (Meyer, 2013).

Though recent legislation has provided additional means and supports towards removing

ineffective staff, including administration, the process remains cumbersome and time consuming.

In a best case scenario, outside of addressing a termination through the disciplinary process,

Statute requires three years before removal can be implemented: two years of unsatisfactory/less

than effective ratings, plus one of probationary status. During this time, the culture and academic

performance of individual school sites are impacted negatively. As a result, it is imperative that

methods be implemented to facilitate an expedited process for the removal of administrators that

have been deemed to be “ineffective.”

At the same time as we work to remove ineffective administrators, it is essential that a

mechanism be in place to attract and retain highly effective administrators within our lowest

performing schools. The current evaluative methodology proves to be a disincentive towards

taking on the change process required at our lowest performing schools. Until such time that


39

effective mechanisms are in place to both incentivize and reward administration to take on

schools requiring a high level of support, the likelihood of a “revolving door” administrative

pattern will become the norm.

Barriers

In presenting recommendations to address the issue at hand, it is essential to recognize

barriers to change. Two primary areas of concern to the proposed recommendations are

identified: political perception and individual protectionism.

With the introduction of Senate Bill 407 (2013) sponsored by Senators Smith and

Woodhouse, with Joint Sponsorship by Assemblywoman Dondero Loop, bipartisan support was

implemented with the intent of enhancing the evaluative process of Nevada‟s teachers and

administrators. A component of this bill requires designation of teachers and administrators as

“highly effective,” “effective,” “minimally effective” or “ineffective.” In addition, the bill

implemented pupil achievement as a component of the evaluation process, and required that such

account for “at least 50 percent” of the evaluation (NRS 391.465).

The adopted legislative action was consistent with a broad movement to enhance

accountability for academic practices in schools throughout the nation. When accountability is

considered, student academic performance was deemed as the clearest measure of teacher and

administrative performance. In reviewing other states practices, Nevada mirrored the national

trend, including recommendations by educational leaders (Marzano, 2010) to include student

outcomes at a minimum 50% threshold in the evaluative process.

This determination solidified the commitment felt by state legislators to ensure that all

students receive a meaningful educational program. As a result of this unified commitment, a


40

reversion on the 50% threshold may be seen as weakening of the commitment made by law

makers and educational partners.

In addition to legislative hesitancy to change statute, the state recommendations will

present difficulties for collective bargaining units that represent administrative personnel. This

self-preservation will likely become evident as administrative team members begin to evaluate

the potential outcomes under the proposed changes. As a result, state legislators will likely be

faced with a “quid pro quo” dilemma, outside of overt changes to collective bargaining law, to

incentivize administrative personnel to willingly agree place themselves at risk.

Advocacy Plan

While these barriers are substantial, with an appropriate political approach and a modest

awareness campaign, ultimate approval and passage of this proposal is achievable. In the past,

the emphasis on accountability and evaluations has been squarely focused on rank and file

teachers. With robust research that documents the tremendous impact classroom teachers have

on student success combined with the sheer number of teachers, that laser focus was probably

appropriate. However, as has been documented in our earlier research, the school leader also has

a profound impact and arguably even good classroom teachers can be negatively impacted by an

underperforming school administrator.

Teachers feel targeted and even persecuted. Many of the complaints teachers have about

the new evaluation system is the underfunded training effort of administrators who are charged

with completing the evaluations. By approaching teachers to partner in the advocacy efforts to

change the evaluation system for administrators, a credible and well-funded effort can be

launched. While teachers are often criticized for appearing to skirt accountability, this could be

seen as a method to increase accountability in education. Simultaneously, it would give teachers


41

an avenue to address the legitimate concerns about using un-validated and unidentified student

achievement data as half of their evaluation.

A coalition between the Nevada Association of Superintendents (NASS) and the Nevada

State Education Association (NSEA) would be necessary to execute a policy change at this level.

The collective voice of the 17 superintendents in the state is an untapped resource in Nevada

politics. The sheer size and financial ability of the NSEA could put political pressure on elected

officials in a way almost no other political organization can. NSEA spends roughly half a

million dollars during an election cycle to support candidates, parties and coalitions that help

them achieve their legislative priorities. If this proposal to enhance flexibility to ensure strong

school leadership is a top priority of the NSEA, it would increase the likelihood of success in a

Democrat-controlled legislature.

While many high profile issues like evaluations require some level of public (constituent)

awareness and support, achieving public understanding of this complex issue could be very time

intensive and thus expensive. On the contrary, the key decision makers in the process are the 63

legislators who get a vote and the Governor. While term limits have increased the number of

freshman legislators, the leadership of each party has remained relatively consistent and they

were essential in the evaluation reform of the 2011 and 2013 legislative sessions. The amount of

information sharing and educating of the legislative leadership will have to be targeted and clear,

yet shouldn‟t require a significant amount of resources. Convincing legislative leaders of the

importance of school leaders on our educational is believed to be attainable. Convincing those

same leaders about all the risks and inadequacies of the data available to connect teachers to

student outcomes will be a much more rigorous process, and rightfully so. In fact, districts and

superintendents largely supported and pushed for teacher evaluation reform in both 2011 and


42

2013. After four years of pilots and validation studies, Nevada (along with the nation) is no

closer to a reliable way to connect teachers to student success. This work has been riddled with

unpredictable variables including changes to standards and curriculum, assessment systems,

changing student information systems and the big question about untested grades and subjects.

Politicians who spent a substantial amount of political capital supporting these changes in years

past are frustrated that the educational institutions who philosophically supported these changes

in the past are now back in front of lawmakers asking for continued implementation delays or

studies. Political lifecycles are much shorter than the time necessary to plan, develop and

execute monumental shifts in evaluations for the education profession. It will take time, patience

and persistence to help our lawmakers realize that developing a legally defensible system that

doesn‟t create any perverse incentives to teach at high need schools is worth the wait. A unified

effort between the superintendents and the teachers is a powerful combination that will take on

this task.

Ultimately, policy change at this level is not accomplished on information alone.

Educational administrators will have valid concerns and expect some protection from any

potential system design flaws. Superintendents and teachers will have to be prepared to make

some compromise and make the proposal more enticing. There is agreement that Nevada wants

a system that encourages its strongest leaders and teachers in the schools that serve the most

challenged students. Incentivizing that has been a challenge. Financial incentive packages have

met with “luke warm” success. Offering non-financial incentives like autonomy have had some

success, but haven‟t been implemented systematically on a statewide level. This proposed policy

change may be a good opportunity to attempt to create a positive incentive for our most effective

administrators to take positions at our most impacted schools.


43

Working at a school with a large percentage of students struggling with poverty, mobility

and language is incredibly exhausting and difficult work. While it can be equally rewarding, the

“burn out” rate of administrators at these schools is alarmingly high. Thus, there is evidence to

show that many of those effective administrators can‟t stay in the schools that need them the

most because of the emotional, professional and physical burdens of that work environment. Our

proposal would be to acknowledge those challenges and much like public safety officials getting

“hazard pay”, we offer retirement benefits to our most effective administrators at our highest

need schools. This proposal would have to be negotiated depending on the political realities of a

legislative session, but could include options like purchasing years of service towards an early

retirement benefit, or increased contribution rates for qualified administrators. We recognize that

this side the proposal has a fiscal impact that may be a non-starter for some legislators, but like

any meaningful change, there are rarely examples of change that could have this level of impact

on schools without a price tag associated with it. We will work with each group to overcome as

many of the obstacles as possible while focusing on improving schools and student achievement

as the ultimate goal.


44

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49

Executive Summary

SIERRA Project

S(Strategic), I(Improvement), E(Empowering), R(Reform), R(Raising), A(Achievement)

STRATEGIC PLAN OVERVIEW

Improving a persistently underachieving school is an enormous challenge. A State law must be

designed to impact district policy regarding leadership at the lowest performing schools. It is our

belief that to improve persistently underachieving schools the process must begin with an

effective, experienced, well-trained leader. Nevada must craft a law that will ensure that

principals who are identified to lead the lowest performing schools will have prerequisite skills,

training, and experiences as well as school empowerment latitude and the opportunity to

participate in on-going training and support in order to be successful.

GOALS

Create law/policy that mandates the follow at identified low performing schools:

SIERRA Master Principal Certification Endorsement

Empowerment autonomies

Incentives for all staff

OBJECTIVES:

Identify core competencies that selected school leaders will possess in order to participate

in the Leadership Academy.

Create an intensive Master Principal Certification Endorsement program to develop high

quality leaders to lead persistently underachieving schools.

Allow for empowerment autonomy at identified schools.

Implement incentive plans for school leaders who will participate in the Master Principal

Certification Endorsement and be recruited to lead persistently low achieving schools.

Implement incentive plans for school staffs to better attract strong, effective teachers.

IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE (12/18 MONTH)

6 month - Application process that will identify candidates to participate in the

Leadership Academy. Develop curriculum and essential experiences for Leadership

Academy.

12 month - SIERRA Leadership Academy for school leaders.

TRANSITION PLAN/ TIMELINE FOR EXISITING TURNAROUND PRINCIPALS

Previously appointed Turnaround principals will be granted the option to participate in

the SIERRA Leadership Academy or request an alternate placement.

Principals who have demonstrated two consecutive years of increased student

achievement will be provided the opportunity to apply for a waiver to the SIERRA

program.

BUDGET CONSIDERATIONS

SIERRA Leadership training

Incentives for Principal

Empowerment

Incentives for Teachers

SIERRA Project:

S(Strategic), I(Improvement), E(Empowering), R (Reform), R (Raising), A (Achievement)

Belinda Jones, Cortez Elementary School

Greg Mingo, Derfelt Elementary School

Tim Adams, Martinez Elementary School



October 2014

SIERRA PROJECT

52

SIERRA Project:


THE PEOPLE AND THE STATE OF NEVADA, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND

ASSEMBLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. Chapter 386 of the Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS, 2013) is hereby amended by

adding thereto the provisions set forth as sections 2 to 5, inclusive, of this act.

Section 2. As used in sections 2 to 5, inclusive, of this act, unless the content otherwise

requires," SIERRA Project" (Strategic Improvement Empowering Reform Raising Achievement)

refers to a model program of education for use by school districts to train and develop highly

qualified administrators to lead consistently underachieving schools.

Section 3. 1. There is hereby established that the State Board shall develop a model program of

education for use by school districts to train principals who have been identified, by a rigorous

selection process, to lead consistently underachieving schools.

2. The board of trustees of a school district which participates in the SIERRA Project

must create a task force for the school district. The members of this task force must consist of

the following persons appointed by the board of trustees or a designee:

(a) One representative of the board of trustees;

(b) The superintendent of the school district, or his designee;

(c) Educational personnel employed by the school district, including, without limitation,

school principals who have demonstrated consecutive years of increased student achievement;

(d) Representatives of organizations that represent administrators;

(e) Representative from the Public Education Foundation; (f) Such other members as

the board of trustees determines are necessary.

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3. The design team created for the SIERRA Project shall:

(a) Recommend policies, procedures and courses relating to the SIERRA Project to the

board of trustees, superintendent of the school district and the state department;

(b) Work with educational institutions in this state as well as the State Board to offer

courses of study and training for the education of principals accepted into the SIERRA Project.

(c) Develop a screening and application process that allows equal opportunity for

licensed principals seeking SIERRA Master Principal Certification an opportunity to apply for

said endorsement.

(C.1) Administrators who are already serving as principals at a school that is

deemed a new "underachieving school" will have two (2) years from the date of classification to

complete the SIERRA. Endorsement in order to remain at their current position;

(C.2) Administrators who are serving as principals at a school that is deemed a

new “underachieving school" will have the option of completing the SIERRA Master Principal

Certification endorsement or requesting to be moved to another school;

(C.3) Principals who can demonstrate two (2) consecutive years of increased

student achievement at a former underachieving school will be given the option to apply for a

waiver to automatically be granted admission into the Master Principal Certification program;

(C.4.) Principals who have successfully completed the Public Education

Foundation Executive Leadership Program shall automatically be granted the Master Principal

Certification;

(d) The design team along with the board of trustees shall review and evaluate a course of

study and training offered by an educational institution which is designed to provide the

education required for the endorsement in the field of SIERRA Master Principal Certification;

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(e) The SIERRA Program will be a twelve (12) month program;

(E.1.) Certification will require twelve (12) credit hours covering topics

determined in conjunction with board of trustees, superintendent of the school district, the Public

Education Foundation, the state department and educational institutions; such as:

(E.1.1.) Effective Leadership Practices

(E.1.2.) Instructional Talent Development

(E.1.3.) Resource Management

(E.1.4.) Law and Ethics

(E.1.5.) Local / Regional Service Project

(f) Determine renewal requirements, if any, for principals with SIERRA Master Principal

Certification;

(g) The board of trustees of a school district may accept gifts, grants, and donations from

any source for the support of the SIERRA Project which may include but not limited to, tuition

reimbursement, salary advancement for master principals when placed in an underachieving

school and staff incentives to attract and retain teachers at an underachieving school and/or

bonus when pre-established goals are met.

Section 4. The board of trustees of a school district that participates in the SIERRA Master

Principal Certification program will upon principal completion of program and placement in a

determined underachieving school, may establish policies and procedures for that school

principal within the school district, which may provide for:

1. Autonomy for the principal to decide issues relating to the operation of the school,

including, but not limited to, the school schedule, governance, staffing, budgeting and provision

of instruction;

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55

(a) Prescribe the manner by which all licensed educational personnel will be selected and

hired for the school, which must be determined and negotiated pursuant to chapter 288 of NRS;

(b) Prescribe the manner by which all other staff for the school is selected and hired,

which must be determined and negotiated pursuant to chapter 288 of NRS;

(c) Prescribe the manner by which all staff, licensed or support, can opt out of working at

an underachieving SIERRA school based on a fundamental disagreement with the school’s plan

and beliefs;

(d) A peer review model will be developed and have the option of removing and

replacing a teacher who is not compatible with the SIERRA model;

(e) Any teacher removed by peer review will fall into the involuntary transfer provisions

of Article 35 of the Negotiated Agreement;

(f) If the time frame does not allow for participation in the surplus meeting, the teacher or

staff member will be administratively reassigned by the Human Resource Division into a vacant

position for which they are qualified;

(g) Teachers who choose not to remain at a SIERRA school may apply and transfer to

another CCSD school during the annual transfer season;

(h) If a position is not secured during voluntary transfer, this employee will fall within the

involuntary transfer provisions of Article 35;

(i) The principal has the final say in all staffing matters;

(j) Allow for incentive/bonus pay for staff.

(k) Have autonomy over implementing research based quality instruction and/or

programs adopted;

SIERRA PROJECT

56

(l) Have the authority to opt out of any pilot testing or programs that will cause

summative assessments to be skewed or irregular; this includes but not limited to research, new

curriculum or any procedures that affect data or interruption of student instructional time;

(2) A procedure to obtain a waiver from certain requirements and regulations of the board

of trustees of the school district. The board of trustees may not waive:

(a) The requirements of a state or federal law or regulation;

(b) A policy or requirement relating to safety of school personnel, the students or the

safety of the school;

(c) State summative assessments.

Section 5. Upon successful completion of the SIERRA Master Certification training and

assignment to a classified underachieving school, the principal will be placed on the salary

schedule two (2) ranges above the district's current adopted Administrative Personnel Salary

Schedule;

(a) Principals will follow the Administrative Personnel Salary Schedule as outlined until

they have completed SIERRA Master Certification training and have been placed at a classified

underachieving school;

(b) Once placed at an underachieving school, principals will stay at the advanced salary

schedule (two steps above) for the expected duration of a minimum of three (3) years to improve

proficiency and set in place procedures to allow the improvement to be sustainable at an

underachieving school;

(c) Once the school is no longer considered underachieving the SIERRA principal will

have the option of staying at that school and returning to the regular Administrative Personnel

SIERRA PROJECT

57

Salary Schedule or requesting to be transferred to another underachieving location as to remain

at the higher pay rate;

(d) If there is not an available underachieving school, the principal may opt to stay at the

current assignment for the duration of up to three (3) additional years, at the increased pay rate,

until a suitable position at another underachieving school becomes available.

SIERRA PROJECT

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SIERRA Project


A 2013 report from the National Association of Secondary School Principals and the National

Association of Elementary School Principals states, “Principal development remains a low priority in

most education policy agendas” (p. 1). As school reform movements continue across both the country and

the state of Nevada, very few initiatives have proven to be successful. This lack of success is continually

evident in the state of Nevada as for many years we have found ourselves at the bottom of almost every

education poll published in the mainstream media. The "Kids Count" report recently released by the

Annie E. Casey Foundation (2014) placed Nevada last in education and 48th overall in the United States.

Education reform in the state of Nevada has been a scatter plot of design and very few if any initiatives

have been proven to be successful or shown longevity. The SIERRA project is a new way of tackling

educational reform. Research has shown that an effective building principal has the biggest impact on

school improvement. “Given the impact school leadership can have on student outcomes, providing every

school with an effective principal should clearly be among the top priorities” (Sun, 2011, p. 4). Current

practice in the state of Nevada has never put a focus on the development of effective school leaders. Until

recently even the biggest university in southern Nevada no longer offered an Educational Leadership

program to develop these leaders. The talent pipeline for school administrators has in a sense dried up in

Nevada, and not only are school districts scrambling to find teachers, the struggle to find effective

administrators has become very problematic as well. This lack of talent to fill these ever-important

positions is exponentially more difficult to fill the needs of the persistently underachieving, high needs

schools. As of recent, in the Clark County School District, several administrator positions at these schools

took weeks or months to fill as the applicant lists were not filled, and the desire to work at a high needs

school was not very appealing. In many cases, if not all theses schools, were staffed with brand new and

very inexperienced school administrators to run the most difficult schools in the district. This continual

process of selection and appointment to schools that persistently underachieving has contributed to the

fact that Nevada remains at the bottom.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/25/kids-count-report-child-poverty-on-the-rise_n_1703668.html?utm_hp_ref=education&ir=Education

SIERRA PROJECT

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In a system where it is understood that talent equates to positive results, the state of Nevada must

ensure that the top talent is in the schools that have the most needs. The state of Nevada must develop a

law to force districts to fill these schools with its most effective administrators that have been trained to

lead this type of school. As previously pointed out the talent pool has all but dried up, and there must be

added incentive for teachers and administrators to accept and lead these schools. The SIERRA project is

deigned to address both the lack of highly effective administrators in the state and designed to ensure the

most effective administrators are in the highest of need school, as well as being compensated for taking

on this additional challenge.

Application/Screening Process

Unlike traditional postgraduate degree programs offered by several universities, the SIERRA

project comes at no cost to the participants. It is fully funded by the local school districts under the

premise that effective leaders will make the most impact on persistently underachieving schools. This

investment will in turn be more effective and more sustainable then any other reform initiative being

purchased at this time.

Candidates will be recommended to the SIERRA program by current and former supervisors, and

selected through a written application and in-person interview process. In all cases, the principal shall

have two years of successful experience as a building principal as evidenced by relevant data, including

data supporting student growth in three of the principal's previous five years, and formal evaluations or

letters of recommendation from current or former supervisors.

Each candidate must meet the following minimum requirements:

A valid and current K-12 Nevada Administrator License

Submission of a portfolio that presents evidence of a candidate’s achievements during his

or her administrative experience in each of the following categories:

o Support of all students in the classroom to achieve high standards of learning;

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o Accomplished site based leadership, which shall include data providing evidence

of two years of student growth and learning within the last five years;

o Significant leadership roles at the district level;

Strong oral and written communication skills;

Analytic abilities needed to collect and analyze data for student improvement;

Demonstrated respect for family and community partnerships;

Strong interpersonal skills; and

Extensive knowledge of curriculum and instructional practices

Candidates successfully completing the SIERRA program shall obtain a principal endorsement on

their State of Nevada Educator License and will be eligible to work as a principal, in a state identified

persistently underachieving school, or state labeled turnaround school.

As each cohort group will only consist of 25 applicants, a board of designated district officials and

community leaders will screen and interview all applicants and determine the top 25 applicants to proceed

into the SIERRA project. All applicants who attend the SIERRA project will do so with the

understanding and drive that once completed will qualify them for the SIERRA plan endorsements and

allow them to apply for and work in schools that are persistently underachieving and with high needs. It is

also understood that these graduates once selected for these positions would be granted both the increased

salary as well as empowerment capabilities.

Timeline

As the need for school reform increases and the number of persistently low achieving schools

increases, local school districts within the state will be given 18 months to graduate their first set of 25

administrators into the SIERRA project applicant pool. Each subsequent year, local districts will continue

to train school based administrators using the SIERRA curriculum, thus increasing the applicant pool

each year and building a strong talent pool that will effect more schools each year. During the first year

local districts will be given 6 months to develop the SIERRA curriculum and screen for applicants to

SIERRA PROJECT

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participate in the first SIERRA cohort. The first graduating class of the SIERRA academy must be

completed within two years of the laws inception and SIERRA endorsed administrators will be able to

apply for vacant positions under the SIERRA classification at that time.

SIERRA Endorsement Course Descriptions Requirements

The SIERRA Project will encompass a 12-month intensive professional development program to

help successful school leaders become great school leaders. This 12-month program shall offer a

curriculum that addresses student learning and school growth and improvement and will address the

following:

A Pre K- 12 continuum.

The role of instruction (with an emphasis on literacy and math), curriculum, assessment

and needs of the schools that are persistently underachieving.

The Nevada Educator Performance Framework (NEPF; 2014).

Providing researched based instruction to all children (EL, SPED, Poverty).

How to cultivate and maintain collaborative relationships with all members of the school

community.

How to establish effective school cultures.

The importance of human capital.

School Based Finance - How to Rethink it.

Union Contracts/ Laws.

How to use data and ensuring it is the right data.

Concurrently with the last 6 months of the professional development program, a school-based

internship of 60 hours will take place within identified mentor based schools.

The internship portion of the program shall be conducted at one or more public or nonpublic schools

so as to enable the candidate to be exposed to and to participate in a variety of school leadership situations

SIERRA PROJECT

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in settings that represent diverse economic and cultural conditions and involve interaction with various

members of the school community (e.g., parents, school board members, local school councils or other

governing councils, community partners).

Curriculum programs will be developed collaboratively with input from a multifaceted task force

including stakeholders from the local school districts, school boards, and community partners.

Budget Narrative

Because talent attracts talent, because talented people want to join winning, talented

teams, designing and running a leadership academy to prepare leaders to meet the challenges of

guiding the lowest performing schools should be a budget priority for school districts and State

Departments of Education. Each organization should be dedicated to talent development. It’s

hard work to get there and the process never ends.

The path through the Executive Leadership Academy brought to life a set of priorities for

creating a great school. Priority #1 is securing the right person to lead the school; nothing matters

as much as leadership. Leadership is the most critical factor in determining the student learning,

the climate, and the professional collaboration that occurs across a school. Effective leaders are

a key factor in developing effective teachers. Quality school leadership is critical for consistent

student achievement across classrooms and grade levels. Therefore, incentives to change the

culture of persistently underperforming school must begin with an incentive for the principal.

Teachers and Teacher Leaders are also significant factors for impacting student achievement.

Leadership provided by identified Lead Teachers within the building will receive incentives.

Assistant Principals in SIERRA schools will be participating in essential experiences and

training that will earn them credit for certification and the opportunity to lead a SIERRA school

themselves.

SIERRA PROJECT

63

A. Personnel – List each position that pertains to the proposal. The cost calculation should show

the employee’s annual salary rate and the percentage of time devoted to the project.

1. Principal: $8,943-$9,394/year. SIERRA Principals will move up two steps on the

Administrative Personnel Salary Schedule (Clark County School District, 2014). The

majority of elementary and middle school principal positions are classified as a Range 42

or a Range 43. The following is a breakdown of the annual incentive for a principal that

was SIERRA endorsed and chosen to lead a SIERRA school.

If the principal were on Range 42, Step F ($7,917/mo.) and they were moved up to Range

44, Step F ($8,713/mo.) they would realize an incentive of $813 per month. This

individual’s annual salary incentive would total $8,943. ($813 x 11 months = $8,943)

If the principal were on Range 42, Step G ($8,312/mo.) and they were moved up to

Range 44, Step G ($9,166/mo.) they would realize an incentive of $854 per month. This


If the principal were on Range 43, Step F ($8,312/mo.) and they were moved up to Range

45, Step F ($9,166/mo.) they would realize an incentive of $854 per month. This


If the principal were on Range 43, Step G ($8,730/mo.) and they were moved up to

Range 45, Step G ($9,617/mo.) they would realize an incentive of $887 per month. This


The total yearly principal cost for 10 SIERRA Schools would be in the range of $89,430

to $97,570 based upon the principal position Range for the individual schools before

SIERRA designation.

SIERRA PROJECT

64

2. Licensed Staff: All licensed staff will receive an annual incentive of $5,000. The

incentive will be received each year that a staff member remains at a SIERRA school.

The average staff size for an elementary school is 40 licensed staff members. The total

yearly staff incentive cost for the average size elementary would be $200,000 per school.

A total of 8 SIERRA elementary schools would cost $1,600,000.

The average staff size of a middle school is 65 licensed staff members. The total yearly

staff incentive would be $325,000 per middle school. Two SIERRA middle schools

would cost $650,000.

3. Licensed Staff – Lead Teacher: Licensed staff identified as a Lead Teacher (7 lead

positions per SIERRA school) will receive an additional $1,500 annual incentive. The

creation of these positions and incentives emphasizes the importance of teacher

leadership, collaboration, and input on the school improvement process. Lead teachers

should have positions on the School Improvement Team and the Governance/Budget

Team. Teacher Leaders should play a vital role in all decision making that impact

students or families.

The total yearly Lead Teacher incentive cost would be $10,500 ($1,500 x 7 Lead

Teachers) per SIERRA school. The total annual cost of Lead Teacher incentive pay for

10 SIERRA schools would be $105,000.

The total annual licensed staff incentive cost for 10 SIERRA schools, 8 elementary

schools and 2 middle schools would be $2,355,000.

The grand total for all performance incentives, administration and licensed teachers,

would be $2,452,000. The figure seems large on the surface, but when considered in the

scope of federal funding for at risk schools, it would be manageable. Specifically,

SIERRA PROJECT

65

Title I-A Basic funding for Clark County during fiscal year 2013-2014 totaled more than

104 million dollars. A 2.5 million dollar allocation to improve the 10 lowest performing

schools would account for less than 3% of the funds received. Schools in Clark County

regularly receive a reduced amount of funding so that the district may allocate additional

dollars to specific improvement initiatives such as PASS.

Table 1: Listing of SIERRA Incentives

Principal Monthly Salary 2 Ranges Higher Incentive Per Mo. Annual

Incentive

Range 42 - Step F $7,917 $8,713 $813 $8,943

Range 42 - Step G $8,312 $9,166 $854 $9,394

Range 43 - Step F $8,312 $9,166 $854 $9,394

Range 43 - Step G $8,730 $9,617 $887 $9,757

Licensed Staff Annual Incentive Avg. # of Staff Ind. School Total School Level Total

Elementary (8) $5,000 40 $200,000 $1,600,000

Middle School (2) $5,000 65 $325,000 $650,000

$2,250,000

Licensed - Lead Teacher

Additional Incentive

# of Lead Teachers Ind. School Total School Level Total

Elementary (8) $1,500 7 $10,500 $84,000

Middle School (2) $1,500 7 $10,500 $21,000

$105,000

Grand Total: (Dependent upon Pay Range Classification of future SIERRA Schools) $2,444,430 to

$2,452,570

SIERRA PROJECT

66

B. Internship for future SIERRA Principals – The internship for SIERRA Endorsement

would be possible through two paths locally: (1)a partnership with a beneficiary such as the

Public Education Foundation or the Lincy Foundation to compensate the presenters and program

organizers’ or (2) the program could be developed by the Clark County School District

Administrative Leadership Development Program (ALDP) which is responsible for designing

and implementing professional development for and experienced administrators.

1. District expenditure per participant for CCPEF Partnership: $5,000. 15 participants per

cohort would cost CCSD a total of $75,000 per cohort.

2. There would be no additional cost to make Sierra Endorsement a component of the

CCSD ALDP.

C. SIERRA Project Assistant Principal Internship – There would be no cost associated with

providing opportunities for assistant principals to participate in an internship working with

principals to earn partial credit toward a SIERRA Endorsement. Placements would be made by

the Superintendent, the Chief Academic Officer, and the Assistant Chief Achievement Officer in

charge of the Turnaround Schools. Assistant Principals who have completed the Public

Education Foundation’s Executive Leadership Academy will automatically be granted SIERRA

Endorsement until the SIERRA endorsement program officially begins.

Evaluation

Increased funding, for any reason or incentive, comes with increased accountability.

Evaluation of initiatives is an essential component of accountability that ensures that progress is

realized and there is a return on investment. Evaluation measures for the SIERRA Project would

come on multiple levels: school performance rating, talent pool size, talent pipeline

infrastructure, and school climate/satisfaction survey results from students, parents, and staff.

SIERRA PROJECT

67

School Performance Framework and Measuring Progress

SIERRA schools growth on the Nevada School Performance Framework (NSPF; Nevada

Department of Education, 2014 school rankings. The state ranking system classifies schools on a

1-5 star system using multiple measures of student achievement and other data. SIERRA schools

would be identified from the lowest performing schools, 1-star or 2-star schools as identified by

the NSPF (Nevada Department of Education, 2014).

Talent Pool & Pipeline

The human capital goal of the SIERRA Project is meant to put in place the architecture

that allows Nevada school districts to build and maintain a talent-rich pipeline and to become a

talent magnet. The evaluation and development process for building based administrators

(Principals and APs) is designed to promote effective leadership by providing regular and

comprehensive feedback at all stages of the SIERRA endorsement process, feedback that both

encourages growth and carries professional consequences. Evaluation of the initiative’s progress

and sustainability would take into account the overall number of qualified administrators,

principals and assistant principals who are in the process of earning a SIERRA Endorsement.

Annual increases in the number of SIERRA endorsed administrators would indicate success in

meeting the goal.

School Climate Surveys

SIERRA schools will implement an annual School Climate Survey with specific focus

given to the change process and instructional improvements. This survey will collect feedback

from students, teachers, and parents about their individual schools. Survey results will be used

as a significant factor in monitoring progress of the schools. Each school’s annual review of its

http://www.nhps.net/scc/index

SIERRA PROJECT

68

own school improvement plan will take into account how well that schools used their survey

results to make improvements.

SIERRA PROJECT

69

References

Annie Casey Foundation. (2014). Kids Count. Retrieved from

http://www.aecf.org/work/kids-count/

Clark County School District. (2014). Administrative Personnel Salary Schedule. Retrieved from

http://ccsd.net/employees/current/employment/salary

National Association of Secondary School Principals and National Association of

Elementary School Principals. (2013). Leadership Matters. Retrieved from

http://www.nassp.org/Content/158/leadership_matters_screen.pdf

Nevada Department of Education. (2014). Nevada School Performance Framework.. Retrieved

October 1, 2014, from http://nspf.doe.nv.gov/



Nevada Revised Statutes. 386. (2013). Retrieved from https://www.leg.state.nv.us/law1.cfm

Sun, C. (2011). School leadership: Improving state systems for leader development (NASBE

discussion guide). Retrieved from

http:// nasbe.org/wp-content/uploads/DG_School_Leadership _August_2011.pdf

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Executive Summary

Incentivizing High Performing School Administrators

to be Placed in At-Risk Schools

Strategic Plan Overview

Transform existing pay structures in CCSD into opportunities to incentivize high

performing leaders to assume positions in the schools where they are needed most.

Goals

Develop a pay structure that compensates principals based on the complexity of

their assignment and the quality of their performance.

Provide leaders with salaries that are commensurate with the amount and level of

challenges they will face.

Objectives

Redesign the compensation model to more accurately reflect the current CCSD

enrollment.

Readjust the “points” system and determine appropriate “add-ons” within each

compensation package. (e.g. special education, year round/multi track, FRL, high

school activities, athletics, ELL, transportation, magnet, etc)

Implement the new model: base pay + performance incentives = total

compensation

Implementation Timeline

This new compensation proposal will take time to be accepted and fully integrated into

CCSD. Data collection will be a significant process in the development of this model and

current salaries are locked through the collective bargaining agreement through 2015. A

specific activation timeline has not yet been determined.

Challenges

With this new compensation model there does propose the opportunity where principals

could earn more than their non-school based principals. This could likely lead to some

resistance. This will raise policy considerations as to whether building-level administrators

should earn more than non-school based administrators and suggests that adjusting

principal compensation should trigger consideration of adjusting area manager

compensation as well. Data collection is another barrier as the new base pay model will

require additional achievement data be captured and used for compensation purposes.

There could also be challenges surrounding the process of determining points and weights

because of varying viewpoints.

INCENTIVIZING HIGH PERFORMING

SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS TO BE

PLACED IN AT-RISK SCHOOLS

Ronnie Guerzon

Principal, Canyon Springs High School

Sami Randolph

Assistant General Counsel, Clark County School District

Victor Wakefield

Executive Director, Teach For America – Las Vegas Valley



October 2014

INCENTIVIZING HIGH PERFORMING SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS TO BE PLACED IN AT-RISK SCHOOLS

74

Incentivizing High Performing School Administrators to Be Placed In At-Risk Schools

There are several significant challenges in human capital for educational leaders, one of

which is incentivizing high performing administrators to be placed in at-risk schools. In many

school districts, administrators‟ compensation is based primarily on years of service, post-

secondary degrees and credits, school grade levels and school size. This is also true in the Clark

County School District in Las Vegas, Nevada. The purpose of this research study is to identify

opportunities for school districts to thoughtfully consider changes to administrators‟ job

descriptions and compensation packages, so that administrative positions in at-risk schools are

more attractive to high quality leaders. Current compensation packages and job characteristics

for leadership positions in at-risk schools do not necessarily attract high quality candidates. The

changes proposed here will transform existing pay structures into opportunities to incentivize

high performing leaders to assume positions in the schools where they are needed the most.

Critical to this discussion is an agreed upon definition as to what constitutes a “high

performing school administrator.” In addition, to fully respond to the question posed requires a

working definition of an at-risk school. This paper proposes solutions that contemplate prior

agreement as to the definition of these terms. To some extent the Nevada State Legislature is

currently seeking to establish guidelines that delineate effective and highly effective school

administrators. For our purposes those forthcoming definitions can be used to identify the pool

of administrators that we seek to incentivize.

Scope of the Problem

The Clark County School District (CCSD) is the fifth largest school district in the United

States. CCSD has a student enrollment in excess of 300,000. Enrollment data reflects that

student population of CCSD is majority minority. It employs over thirty thousand employees.


75

For the 2013-2014 school year, CCSD employed 1,291 administrators. These administrative

employees included principals, assistant principals, deans and central office employees. (Clark

County School District Fast Facts 2013-2014, 2013). The administrators are represented by the

Clark County Association of School Administrators and Professional-Technical Employees

(CCASPE). Similar to other districts, the Clark County School District, employs an

administrators‟ salary schedule and a school-based site management plan that only reward

longevity, educational credits, and post-secondary degrees. A salary schedule that is based

primarily on step increases associated with years of service does not reward new or veteran

administrators who produce extraordinary results in student achievement. Furthermore, a salary

schedule such as this one does not reward or incentivize administrators to assume leadership

positions in at-risk schools. In a study commissioned by The Wallace Foundation, Mitgang

(2003), suggests that the “policies and practices aimed solely at adding more certified candidates

to the pipeline miss the core challenges underlying the difficulty many districts are having in

attracting and retaining high quality leaders. These challenges include inadequate incentives to

draw high quality leaders to the neediest schools with the most difficult working conditions…”

(p.2 ).

A review of the current distribution of CCSD administrator compensation, depicted in

Figure 1 , highlights the fact that the existing method for determining administrator

compensation results in a grossly skewed range distribution. Range is determined by the

presence of certain district-set criteria that will be more fully addressed in subsequent sections.


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Figure 1: Current Distribution of CCSD Administrator Compensation

Elementary Schools

Middle Schools

High Schools


77

Alternative Schools

Special Schools


78

The salary ranges depicted in Figure 2 determine administrator placement on the salary

schedule.

Figure 2: Salary Schedule for CCSD Administrators

A review of the Figures 1 and 2 invites numerous questions regarding the job being performed

by administrators. Is each principal within a given range performing the same job? Are the principals

within a given range performing at the same level?

In general, an employee earns a step increase on the salary scale by moving one column

to the right of the current column after each year of service. An employee‟s current column is

determined by their cumulative years of experience.

Returning to the issue of range, the range determination is based on a point system.

CCSD and CCASAPE are party to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Article 20 of the

CBA addresses professional compensation. Relevant here is article 20-11-5 which states, “On

or shortly after state-count day, or when enrollment is finalized for funding purposes, the Human

Resources Division will review the results of the point system applied to each school, taking into

consideration all information available” (Clark County School District and Clark County


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Association of School Administrators and Professional-Technical Employees Negotiated

Agreement 2013-2015, 2013, p.34). The discussion of administrator compensation is

particularly relevant at this time because section 20-12 of the CBA states “Nevada Revised

Statutes requires the implementation of a performance and enhanced compensation for school-

based administrators commencing with the 2015-2016 school year,” (p.35).

The yearly review to determine range is based on a point system. Table 1 displays the

School-Based Site Management Plan (SBSMP) for CCSD (Clark County School District, 2003).

Relevant data include the school‟s grade levels, number of students, number of students who

qualify for free or reduced lunch, number of English Language Learners and the number of

students who qualify for special education services. Each aforementioned factor is assigned a

specific weight. The combined weight for all factors and the school‟s staff size determines the

salary range.

Table 1: Clark County School District School-Based Site Management Plan


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To determine the pay range for a principal in the Clark County School District, we must

consider the total staff size and the factors delineated in (SBSMP). The total staff size refers to

the total number of teachers and support staff assigned to the specific building or school. The

total staff size and the total number of points earned, as displayed in Table 1, can be applied to

the information in Table 2 in order to determine the salary range for the principal of any

particular school.

Table 2: Clark County School District School-Based Site Management Plan (cont’d)

There are several things that appear to be outdated with the Clark County School District‟s

process for determining a principal‟s salary range. The point system was last modified in 2003,at

which time the demographics of CCSD looked considerably different. In addition, points are

generally awarded in a lump sum. For example, if one school has 9 special education programs

and a second school has 18 special education programs, both schools would earn an equal

amount of factor points, which in this case is 8 points.


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Little consideration is given to the barriers that adversely impact student

achievement. Only 11% of the total possible points are dedicated to at-risk factors. Currently,

the only measure for at-risk points is the number of students who qualify for free or reduced-

price lunch. Factors such as the students‟ present scholastic ability levels are not taken into

consideration.

The award of points for ELL (English Language Learner) is 4 points if 25% or more of

the student population receives ELL instruction. This method of awarding ELL points fails to

consider the curriculum challenges that differ among schools with a 25% ELL enrollment versus

a school with a 75% or more ELL population.

At present, points are awarded for activities, athletics and transportation. Though

important, the weight assigned to each of these factors does not coincide with currently

articulated district priorities. Neither the principal‟s role in fostering academic growth nor

enhancing proficiency are acknowledged or rewarded. The current compensation system does

not directly align to the district‟s Pledge of Achievement (Clark County School District, 2014).

Tables 1 and 2 show that the total number of possible factor points is 53. However, as

shown, the threshold number of points is 17 points. In other words, a school with 17 factor

points could yield the same principal‟s salary as a school with 53 factor points. Clearly, the

system currently for compensation purposes treats the administrators at dissimilar schools the

same. More importantly, the current system creates a disincentive for high performing

administrators to lead at-risk schools. The evidence provided here supports a consideration

raised by researchers, in that perceived “shortages are largely a problem of distribution rather

than of absolute numbers” (Darling-Hammond, 2000, p.136). If school districts do not employ


82

a more differentiated pay structure for principals, what will incent high performing leaders to

take on more challenging, at-risk schools?

Solutions

Similar to other large districts, the Clark County School District is well positioned to

develop a compensation program that “compensates principals based on the complexity of their

assignment and the quality of their performance” (Providence Public School Department, 2013,

p.1). In order to attract high performing leaders to at risk schools, school districts must consider

offering higher levels of autonomy, special staffing considerations and a differentiated pay

structure. Simply put, school districts must provide leaders with salaries that are commensurate

with the amount and level of challenges they will undoubtedly face. “A complete performance

incentive program for a school or a school district will include means for considering and

rewarding the contribution of the school principal” (Schuermann, Guthrie, Prince, & Witham

2009, p.1).

Miami-Dade County Public Schools in Florida is the fourth largest school district in the

United States with an enrollment of 345,000 students (Miami-Dade Public Schools, 2014). The

district is the second largest majority-minority district in the country. Miami-Dade employs in

excess of 40,000 employees. A Differentiated Compensation Model (PDCM) is used to

determine principal compensation (Miami-Dade Public Schools, 2013). This model starts with a

base pay that is the same for all principals. The base pay is not tied to the school being an

elementary, middle or high school. Add-ons to base pay are awarded based on categories

identified as membership, economic disadvantage, reading levels, school configuration,

exceptional student education and fragile school. This compensation model considers factors not

currently used by CCSD. One significant difference is the number of categories in the Miami-


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Dade system that is tied to student performance. Reading levels, exceptional student education

and fragile schools are categories that emphasize student performance. The Miami-Dade model

recognizes and provides compensation associated with the administrative challenges that come

with seeking to raise low reading scores, provide a rigorous curriculum for exceptional students

as well as the challenges inherent in seeking to reform a fragile school. To this end, the Miami-

Dade model provides some guidance regarding student achievement factors that can help

restructure the existing CCSD system.

The system for determining administrator compensation used by the Houston

Independent School District (HISD) provides additional considerations for CCSD. With an

enrollment of over 210,000 students, HISD is the seventh largest school district in the United

States (HISD, 2014) . Administrator salary in HISD is based on a combination of three

variables. Principal experience and school type, size of school and site complexity are used to

determine administrator compensation. (Houston Independent School District Compensation

Manual 2014-2015, 2014). Campus variables from the prior year are used to calculate

components and principal salaries.

The experience component is tied to the administrators credited years of experience. The size of

school component is based on size of enrollment and whether the school is an elementary, middle or high

school. The site complexity component is based on the percentage of students that are economically

disadvantaged as well as the number of students that are considered gifted and talented. However, unlike

CCSD, HISD provides monetary add-ons based on the percentage of students that are economically

disadvantaged and/or gifted and talented. Another area in which CCSD and HISD differ is that awards

are not lump sum awards. HISD provides graduated salary add-ons based on a linear system of

percentages. For example, as displayed in Table 3, salary add-ons for economically disadvantaged


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students are staggered based on the percentage of enrollment. HISD also provides additional salary

add-ons for gifted and talented students.

Table 3: Salary Add-Ons for Administrators at HISD

Percentage of Economically Disadvantaged Students

% of student 0-35% 36-50% 51-75% 76-

90%

91% +

$ add-on 0 $2,700 $4,000 $5,000 $6,000

Percentage of Gifted and Talented Students

% of students 0-11% 12-40% 41- 80% 81% +

$ add-on 0 $2,000 $3,000 $4,000

The monetary awards for size of school and site complexity are added to the years of

experience component resulting in a total compensation package. Similar to Miami-Dade the

model used by HISD provides increased add-ons for higher populations of economically

disadvantaged and exceptional students. However, the system used by HISD does not provide

salary add-ons related to student achievement criteria such as reading levels as was seen in the

model used by Miami-Dade.

The compensation model used by Providence Schools, the public school district serving

students in, Providence, Rhode Island provides a third example that can be used to shape a

compensation system for CCSD. With an enrollment of 23,561 students, this district is

significantly smaller that the districts previously referenced (Providence Schools, 2014).

However, Providence Schools is a majority minority district, with a minority enrollment of 87%.

In addition, Providence Schools has a significant ELL population associated with 63% of

students of Hispanic origin. Providence Schools created a principal compensation program that


85

reflects the difficulty of the principal‟s specific assignment and the quality of the principal‟s

performance in that role during the preceding year (Providence Schools, 2013-). Within this

model annual compensation is the result of (1) base salary based on the specific school

assignment, (2) individual performance compensation based on evaluation and service to the

district, and (3) length of contract based on evaluation during contract year. The compensation

framework recognizes three levels of principals. The levels are basic, proficient and

distinguished. The district adopted the Vanderbilt Assessment for Leadership in Education

(VAL-ED) to determine movement across levels (Providence Schools, 2014). It is clear that the

task of reforming administrator compensation in this district was deliberate and purposeful.

Available documents reveal the developers of the model reviewed models from other districts

and created a system tailored to the needs of their district.

Each of the three districts discussed here are meaningful for different reasons. The sheer

size of Miami-Dade and Houston are important for CCSD because of inherent difficulty in

reforming a large urban system. The demographics populations of Miami-Dade and Houston

and the resulting instructional considerations associated therewith provide points of

consideration for CCSD. The model created by Providence is extremely helpful because of the

deliberate, purposeful and systematic process by which changes were made. Before seeking to

reform their system, the developers of the Providence model clearly identified their goal. With

this guidance in mind, the authors of this paper have created a model for CCSD that includes the

formula: base pay + performance incentives = total compensation.


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Part 1: Base Pay

A closer look at the Clark County School District‟s process for determining salary ranges

for principals yielded promising opportunities for change within the structures that already exist.

For example, more emphasis could be placed on at-risk factors and students in special programs

such as special education and English Language Learners. One might consider a more linear

approach to assigning points for quantitative factors like the number of buses needed to transport

students, the number of special education programs offered by the school and the number of ELL

students enrolled. Table 4 displays the School-Based Site Management Plan (Clark County

School District, 2003) that was presented as part of the Leadership Institute on August 8, 2014.

The proposed plan is a hybrid of the Clark County School District‟s existing plan. The new plan

places greater emphasis and weight on at-risk factors and presents a more linear approach to

awarding points in the areas of special education, at-risk, ELL and transportation.

Table 4: Comparison of Current CCSD Plan vs. Proposed Plan

Current Plan Proposed Plan

Weight Factor (points earned) Weight Factor (points earned)

Weight Special Education

8-12 (8) 3-4 units

(10) 5-8 units

(12) 9+ units

Weight Special Education

0-16 (1) per unit, up to 16 units

Weight Year Round, Multi Track

8

Weight Year Round, Multi Track

8

Weight At-Risk

6 (6) Based on 50% or more students receiving FRL

Weight FRL

0-18 (1) 11-20% FRL

(2) 21-30% FRL

(3) 31-40% FRL

(6) 41-50% FRL

(9) 51-60% FRL

(12) 61-70% FRL

(15) 71-80% FRL

(18) 81% or more


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Weight At-Risk

6 (6) Based on 50% or more students receiving FRL

Weight Below Grade Level - Reading

0-15 (3) 11-15% students below

(6) 16-20% (9) 21-25% (12) 26-30%

(15) 31% or more

Weight High School Activities

6 Extra-curricular functions

Weight High school Activities

6 Extra-curricular functions

Weight Athletics

6 Athletics program

Weight Athletics

6 Athletics program

Weight ELL

4 25% of students ELL

Weight ELL

0-12 (3) 1-9% of students ELL

(6) 10-29%

(9) 30-49%

(12) 50% or more

Weight Transportation

3 # of buses = 10 or more

Weight Transportation

0-9 (1) 4-9 buses

(3) 10-15 buses

(6) 16-20 buses

(9) 21+

Weight Magnet 2 Separate Academic Program

Weight Magnet 2 Separate Academic Program

Weight Middle/Elementary School 2 Activities

Weight Middle/Elementary School 2 Extra-curricular functions

Weight Sole Administrator 2 Single administrator

Weight Sole Administrator 2 Single administrator

Weight Rural Site

2 Weight Rural Site

2

Weight Multiple Sites

2 Principal supervises 2+ sites

Weight Multiple Sites

2 Principal supervises 2+ sites

Weight – Total Possible

53

Weight – Total Possible

100


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The proposed plan presents opportunities for a more differentiated salary structure when

compared to the current CCSD plan. As shown in Table 5, the proposed plan includes 16

possible salary ranges compared to only 8 in the current CCSD plan. The proposed plan has

multiple thresholds that take into consideration all of the 100 possible factor points that can be

earned. The staff size calculation for the proposed plan is the same as the current plan.

Table 5: Range Determination of Proposed Plan

Factor Pts. →

Staff Size

0-25 26-50 51-75 76-100

0-50

Range 41 Range 42 Range 43 Range 44

51-100


101-150


151+


Thus far the discussion has focused on school factors. That focus is only half of the

equation. Administrator performance is the second half of the equation. Individual

administrator performance must factor into total compensation. If performance is left out, the

resulting system still misses the objective of attracting and rewarding high performing

administrators.

Part 2: Performance Incentives

As referenced earlier, this is an important time in Nevada to thoughtfully develop new

models of compensation that reward principals for achieving positive student achievement

outcomes and incentivize the actions of hiring, developing, and retaining teachers. This is

especially important at this moment in time given the growing understanding of the principal‟s

role in driving student success, a variety of initiatives that move additional decision making


89

rights to the school level (e.g. more budgetary autonomy), and state law that mandates a

performance pay system for principals in the upcoming years.

It is not our intention to suggest a specific model of performance pay in the context of

this section. Instead, we hope to articulate a contextual back drop of the issue and share some of

the benefits of a sophisticated and balanced system. In addition, we hope to highlight the

limitations and risks of a pay for performance system. Finally, we will share three general areas

of measurement that seem most aligned to Nevada‟s unique context that we would suggest be

considered in the principal review process.

The case for a pay for performance system for principals.

When considering the positive impact that an effective principal can have on student

achievement (upwards of 25% of student success in their building), there are surprisingly few

examples of school systems that have implemented a pay for performance system for principals

(New Leaders, 2014). In addition, from a research and practice perspective it is surprising how

limited the general body of work has been in studying the impact of incentivizing placement or

retention of our most effective school leaders in the schools that need them the most.

Part of the challenge may stem from the fact that our current systems typically work

counter to the goal of placing and retaining our highest achieving principals in our highest-need

schools for two distinct reasons. First, principals, like teachers, seek employment in pleasant

workplace settings and the additional demands of the work in our low income schools as well as

the instability of leadership or staff may make low income schools less „pleasant‟ places of

employment (Goldhaber, 2007). Secondly, some of the factors that are easier to measure and

logically expected to lead towards desired results do not. For instance, some studies have found

an inverse relationship between higher degree attainment of school leaders and impact on student


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achievement (Goldhaber 2007). In all, today‟s system of compensation is antiquated and

incongruent to the goal of incentivizing the most effective leaders to move to and stay in our

highest-need schools. When considering the current status quo, it becomes more and more

apparent that it is time to reform compensation practices as one lever to drive change.

Some of the same challenges exist that make fair and accurate teacher compensation

challenging. For instance, it is difficult to measure the precise impact of a principal given our

bureaucratic structures and antiquated policies and data systems that do not isolate school based

factors of spending, performance, or contextual challenges adequately. All of this said, there is

potential to significantly mitigate the barriers that impede teacher evaluation models in

measuring school performance. First, the current systems of school monitoring are considerably

more aligned to accurate measurement for the state of performance for an entire school compared

to individual classrooms. In Nevada, the Nevada School Performance Framework (NSPF)

considers absolute achievement levels, student learning growth, and other factors (Nevada

Department of Education, 2014). In addition, measuring a school‟s achievement involves the

composite of multiple samples of student test scores and the multiple snapshots of data. This

limits the concern over a test irregularity. Finally, the smaller number of school leaders

(compared to teachers, for instance) makes the work of rolling out a new system and investing

and training people to use it much more reasonable.

Limitations and challenges of a pay for performance system for principals.

While less contentious, the multi-dimensional nature of the work of a principal still gives

us concern over the limitations of an evaluation system – both from a multiple data point

perspective, but also from a locus of control perspective. First, relating to the idea of multiple

data points, no matter how many data points can be included in the school‟s performance review


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there will likely continue to be the concern that the state of student learning and teacher practice

cannot be boiled down to a single test or evaluation (or even multiple standardized assessments

or multiple administrations of an evaluation). In addition, the design of our school system will

lead to concern over „locus of influence.‟ There is and will continue to be questions as to how

much influence the school leader has over the results of that campus. For instance, if the

principal is dependent on the Human Resources function of the school district for staffing and

there is a staffing shortage across the entire district, the principal will likely question their locus

of influence over that function and the subsequent achievement results. In addition, the

contextual setting of the school (e.g. the level of poverty, or if students are learning English as a

second language) will further create challenges in ensuring the review is normative and considers

all factors that influence student achievement. Arguably, our current school district‟s structure,

data limitations, and external factors make it a non-experimental environment.

Systems to learn from that have considered or implemented pay for performance.

In addition to the three case study districts referred to earlier in this paper – Houston,

Miami-Dade, and Providence – we would like to reference the other district and charter school

operators that have informed our work. These entities are displayed in Table 6.

Table 6: Additional Educational Entities that have Considered or Use Pay for Performance

Name Description of approach Resource Link

Charlotte-

Mecklenburg

Schools,

North

Carolina

Strategic placement of strongest

principal talent in highest need

schools with increased

compensation and bonuses

http://annenberginstitute.org/profiles-

transformation-charlotte-mecklenburg-

north-carolina-public-schools-strategic-

staffing-initi

Washington

DC Public

Schools

Uses student achievement goals

and leadership framework

standards to annually review

performance and pays bonus

based on results

http://dcps.dc.gov/DCPS/Files/downloads/A

BOUT%20DCPS/Human%20Resources/20

12-

13%20DCPS%20School%20Leader%20IM

PACT%20Guidebook%20(Principal).pdf

http://annenberginstitute.org/profiles-transformation-charlotte-mecklenburg-north-carolina-public-schools-strategic-staffing-initi




http://dcps.dc.gov/DCPS/Files/downloads/ABOUT%20DCPS/Human%20Resources/2012-13%20DCPS%20School%20Leader%20IMPACT%20Guidebook%20(Principal).pdf






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KIPP Houston Has moved to a stipend model-

mostly paying for principals

who have a “successful” year-

the goals vary based on the

principals, multiple versions

http://kipphouston.org/

Uncommon

Schools

Give strong school leaders the

opportunity to take on more

leadership (write books, run the

RELAY graduate program)

http://www.uncommonschools.org/

http://www.relay.edu/

KIPP

San Jose

Give a big bump in year three to

principals

http://www.kippbayarea.org/schools/sjcolle

giate

General Recommendations for successful implementation of a review process for principals

that could be tied to pay for performance.

We recommend considering multiple snapshots of data that represent the broad

aspirations that we have for student outcomes and ensuring the data are reliable and

normative over a long period of time.

We recommend mirroring the principal evaluation system for the supervisor who

oversees the schools. For instance, we suggest making the area manager‟s review based

on the composite of the results of all of the schools they oversee. (In our model, this

would mean the aggregate evaluation scores of all teachers at the schools they oversee.)

Consider the approach of compensating for additional responsibilities as a means of

compensating for the ability to contribute rather than awarding a one-time bonus on

narrowly defined results (e.g. additional budgetary discretion for school leader who has

shown consistent results; or for principals who can inform district-level strategy or coach

incoming school leaders).

http://kipphouston.org/

http://www.uncommonschools.org/

http://www.relay.edu/

http://www.kippbayarea.org/schools/sjcollegiate

http://www.kippbayarea.org/schools/sjcollegiate


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It is imperative that there is adequate training around any new system – especially one

tied to compensation. We recommend rolling out the system and training around it before

using it and also suggest field testing in advance of wide-scale roll out.

Model system for a principal performance review tied to compensation decisions.

Our model system for a principal performance review to tie to compensation decisions

would be based upon the following factors:

Student level data

The NSPF (Nevada Department of Education, 2014) is a good starting point. The NSPF

has measurements that capture the student achievement and student growth as well as

some additional factors like attendance. We would recommend that the NSPF is used as a

set of guide posts for principal review and that the district, and potentially zone, further

contextualizes the NSPF to be more specific for the context of the school type and school

community.

Teacher-level data

We recommend using the teacher ratings from the Nevada Educator Performance

Framework (NEPF) to review the impact of the principal (Nevada Educator Performance

Framework, 2014). The growth of teacher ratings from minimally effective to effective,

or effective to highly effective, etc. would be a proxy for the level of teacher

development occurring at the school site and would incentivize a focus on teacher

development. Similar to student achievement data, it is critical to have a combination of

absolute ratings data as well as growth data. In this case we suggest growth data is given

a larger weight so that the system incentivizes developing the talent at a school site. It

will be imperative that these ratings are normative. One example to draw from is


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Washington, D.C. in terms of ensuring a normative system. Part of the review process for

principals in Washington, D.C. is how closely aligned their educator ratings are to the

central office staff who also administer teacher ratings across the district. This would

ensure that the system controls for inflated ratings. It may be worth giving the degree of

alignment between the principal and central office the largest weight in the evaluation

system to ensure normative ratings.

Human resources data

Third, we would recommend using some Human Resources (HR) proxies in the principal

review. We would have to work closely with HR to develop the right metrics but the

spirit of this recommendation is to incentivize principles to retain their effective staff

members and to ensure their buildings are staffed by the first day of school. This is

especially important considering Nevada's unique context and limited teacher pipeline.


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Figure 3 captures the spirit of our recommended review framework.

Table 7 displays our draft of a pay for performance compensation system, and an example of an

end-of-year bonus model.

Table 7: Draft of Pay for Performace Compensation System and Example of End-Of-Year

Bonus Model

Factors Example of target Bonus

School level data Improvement in SPF

composite score

1 year = +1

3 years consecutive = +2

Teacher level data Evaluation Scores within

__% normative scores

from central office review

Positive trend in % of

effective staff members

Evaluation scores within 5%

margin of error = +2

Score within 10% margin of

effort = +1

Higher percent of effective staff

year over year = +1

HR data Fully staffed by first day

of school

Fully staffed on First day of

school = +1


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End of year stipend

bonus system

+0 = no bonus

+1 or +2 = 5% bonus

+3 = 10% bonus

+4 or +5 or +6 = 15% bonus

As displayed in Table 8, we recommended a system that uses the evaluation score as a

gateway to giving the principal greater responsibility and compensating for that additional

responsibility.

Table 8: Provisions for Using Principal Evaluation Scores to Determine Principal

Responsibilities and Compensation

Alternative system:

Principal will qualify

for additional

responsibilities and

will receive additional

compensation for

those additional

responsibilities

+0 = no additional responsibility options

+1 or +2 = option to serve on principal onboarding group to

help train new principals for 5% pay increase

+3 = option to serve on principal onboarding group for 5% pay

increase and option to take on greater budgetary

responsibilities for school for 10% pay increase

+4 or +5 or +6 = option to take on greater budgetary

responsibilities for school and option to serve on

superintendent‟s advisory committee or take on full

mentor role to new principals for 15% responsibility pay

increase

Challenges

Shifting to a base pay + performance incentive = total compensation model of administrator

compensation will be met will considerable resistance. As proposed here the base pay plan does

not result in any school based administrator being paid less. The most significant change is the

shifting of district priorities whereby school based principals could earn more than their non-

school based supervisors. This raises policy considerations as to whether building- level

administrators should earn more than non-school-based administrators and suggests that


97

adjusting principal compensation should trigger consideration of adjusting area manager

compensation as well.

If the district preferred to implement changes in a cost-neutral way, the proposed point

system could be modified to redistribute points rather than add additional points. Such

modifications, however, would result in some school-based administrators earning less than they

currently earn, which would likely receive resistance. It addition, it may not be possible to take

this action in the short-term given the hold harmless language currently contained in the

collective bargaining agreement (CBA; Clark County School District and Clark County Association

of School Administrators and Professional-Technical Employees Negotiated Agreement 2013-2015). At

present, a principal‟s higher salary is protected for several years even if the points awarded to the

school correlate to a lesser salary. However, this further illustrates the need for reform because

administrators are being paid more even when data suggests the job is not as difficult when

compared to other school based administrators.

Data collection is another barrier to implementation of both the base pay and

performance incentives components. The new base pay model will require additional

achievement data be captured and used for compensation purposes. Specifically reading data is

needed and that data has to be uniformly collected. Points of collection will also be an issue

given the varying standardized tests that are administered at various grade levels. The process of

determining points and weights will be an uncomfortable exercise because of varying

viewpoints. Specifically, reform will require prioritizing which administrator functions are most

important and deserving of more weight. Some of the areas of consideration may have a limited

research basis. CCSD will also have to grapple with categorizing student factors and evaluating

which factors make a principal‟s job more difficult.


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Careful consideration must be paid so that principals are not rewarded for poor

performance. Safe guards must be put in place so that principals at poorly performing schools

are not paid more because students continue to struggle. In addition, the financial incentive

associated with performance pay can create a climate in which professional integrity becomes

questionable. As such, any new system of compensation must balance these considerations.

Neither the point redistribution here nor the performance incentives are cost-neutral.

Administrator compensation cannot be addressed in a vacuum that ignores teacher compensation.

Any administrator incentive program should be coupled with a process whereby performance

incentives for teachers are also provided. In addition, it will likely take compensation reform for

the administrators who supervise principals as well.

Even when considering all of the challenges, there is a major opportunity here. By taking

cues from other districts CCSD has the opportunity to create an administrator compensation

framework that aligns with district priorities and incentivizes high performing administrators to

be placed at at-risk schools.


99

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Documents

2014 Cohort Capstone Projects · capstone project that includes an action plan to solve many of the state’s most challenging educational issues. The Executive Leadership Academy