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Survey Summary Eterno & Silverman
SMOKING GUN EMERGES: FINDINGS OF 2012
NYPD RETIREE STUDY• STRONGLY SUBSTANTIATES PRESSURES TO
PLAY NUMBERS GAME
• CONFIRMS CRIME REPORT MANIPULATION
• OVERWHELMING CONFIRMATION OF
PRESSURES TO WRITE SUMMONSES, MAKE
ARRESTS, AND CONDUCT FORCIBLE STOP
AND FRISKS
• GLARING EVIDENCE THAT CENTRAL
PROBLEMS PROMINENTLY EMERGED
DURING THE KELLY/BLOOMBERG ERA
Principal Investigator:
John A. Eterno, Ph.D.
Molloy College
Eli B. Silverman, Ph.D.
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
June 14, 2012
Survey Summary Eterno & Silverman
Page 2 of 9
Introduction
Principal Investigator John A. Eterno, Ph.D. in conjunction with Eli B. Silverman, Ph.D.
recently conducted an extensive survey of NYPD retirees of all ranks. The results of this new
study not only completely confirm the findings of their first survey of captains and above
reported in February 2010 in the New York Times (conducted in September 2008), but also
provide more in depth insights into the NYPD’s performance management system (known as
Compstat) which has been emulated throughout the world. These new findings clearly debunk
the NYPD’s rotten apple theory of isolated crime manipulation. Instead, this survey
demonstrates that the manipulation of crime reports is widespread and systemic. Furthermore
the bulk of this manipulation has occurred in more recent years - from 2002 onward.
Using innovative internet based techniques, the investigators were able to conduct the
survey in March 2012 and produce preliminary results in a timely manner. The instrument was
sent via e-mail to 4,069 retirees with 1,962 responses. This indicates a return rate of 48.2%
considered very good for an e-mail survey of retired government employees. The large sample
size adds assurance that the findings accurately reflect the experiences of retired officers. The
range of respondents’ date of retirement is from 1941 to 2012. This wide range allows
comparisons over three key periods: pre-Compstat, before 1995 (562 respondents); early
Compstat 1995-2001 (382 respondents); the Kelly/Bloomberg era 2002-2012 (871 respondents);
and the remainder not giving a retirement year.
The characteristics of survey respondents closely mirror those of NYPD retirees. This
survey includes all ranks: 10 chiefs, 36 inspectors, 63 captains, 262 lieutenants, 382 sergeants,
Survey Summary Eterno & Silverman
Page 3 of 9
1,154 police officers/detectives, 3 other (52 did not indicate their rank). The number of retirees
in each rank comports well with known rank distributions of the NYPD. That is, police
officers/detectives are the largest group with descending counts as one goes up the ranks. Thus,
as expected, there are fewer sergeants compared to police officers/detectives and so forth.
Education level is also as expected: 8 percent with a high school only education (NYPD now has
a 2 year education/military requirement to join), 44 percent with some college, 30 percent with a
college degree, 7 percent with some graduate education, and 11 percent with an advanced degree.
Results
Crime statistics: Results indicate that the majority of retirees (60%) lacked confidence in
the accuracy of official NYPD index crime statistics which proclaim a huge decrease of about 80
percent since 1990. Most of these respondents (89.2%) felt that crime did decrease but not to
the extent claimed by NYPD management. Of those who indicated crime declined but not as
precipitously as NYPD suggests, on average, felt it was about one-half of what NYPD claims.
Specifically, on average, these officers felt that crime actually went down 42% in New York
City. Interestingly, this comports almost exactly with the nationwide drop in crime during the
same period.
Pressure from management/supervisors: Officers were also asked to gauge the levels of
pressure they felt from management/supervisors. They were asked to base their answers on
their personal experiences/knowledge. With respect to pressure to increase summonses,
increase stop and frisk, increase arrests, decrease index crime, and downgrade index to non-index
Survey Summary Eterno & Silverman
Page 4 of 9
crime, there is a clear pattern that completely corresponds with our previous research. Namely
pressures were greatest for every variable for officers who worked during the Compstat era.
Thus, results indicate that pressures significantly increased from 1995 to 2001 (the Giuliani
years). In this study we were able to parse out the effect of those who worked 2002 and onward.
Importantly, we also find that the pressure markedly increases from 2002 onward to much higher
levels. Thus there is increasing pressure in the Compstat era and then significantly added
pressure in the current era. This is clearly demonstrable throughout the data.
We also note that the pattern is similar when it comes to protecting Constitutional rights
and ensuring crime statistics are accurate. For these variables, however, we see the least
pressure to obey the law and accurately report statistics in the current era (the Bloomberg/Kelly
years). We do note that initially during Compstat’s first years, these percentages were favorable.
This precisely substantiates our long standing position - that Compstat was initially a
positive development but morphed into a “numbers game.” Every indicator supports our
basic theme.
Importantly, we observe that the increase in stop and frisks is particularly strong ranging
from about 9 percent before Compstat to over 35 percent feeling high pressures in the current
Kelly/Bloomberg era. Additionally, we note that downgrading is itself suspect activity. While
there was a modest increase at the beginning of Compstat, it appears that the bulk of
downgrading pressures are more current. The large percentage indicating high pressure to
downgrade has grown astoundingly to nearly 40% in the current era. This is a major concern.
Combined with these facts are the weakest pressures to accurately report crime statistics and
Survey Summary Eterno & Silverman
Page 5 of 9
obey legal restrictions in the current era. We now specifically examine crime report
manipulation.
With respect to the following criteria and based on your personal experience knowledge...how
much pressure did precinct (patrol) personnel receive from management/supervisors to.... (See
notes 1 and 2)
Retired before 1995 Retired 1995-2001 Retired 2002+
Increase summonses 37.3% 49.2% 61.6%
Increase stop and frisk 9.1% 19.1% 35.1%
Increase arrests 18.4% 35.3% 49.3%
Decrease index crime 19.9% 33.0% 43.2%
Downgrade index
crime to non-index
crime
15.8% 21.8% 37.9%
Accurately report
crime statistics
29.1% 35% 27.9%
Obey
Legal/Constitutional
restrictions
44.65 46.9% 35.7%
1. Numbers in cells represent respondents who indicated that the pressure on them was HIGH
(answered 8-10 on a 10 point scale).
2. These differences were all statistically significant meaning that it highly unlikely that these
results are due to chance alone.
Crime Report Manipulation: We also asked officers a variety of questions about whether
they had personal knowledge of crime report manipulation. Again, a clear pattern emerged with
Survey Summary Eterno & Silverman
Page 6 of 9
the most recent era (2002 and onward) showing the highest personal knowledge by officers of
such manipulation - by far. Approximately 50 percent of officers who retired in 2002 and after
had personal knowledge of crime report manipulation. Also note the very high percentages of
respondents who worked after 2002 indicating they had personal knowledge of 3 or more such
incidents. This is clear evidence that this is systemic throughout the NYPD.
CRIME REPORT MANIPULATION
Retired
before 1995
Retired
1995-2001
Retired
2002+
For 2002+ - percentage
responding 3+ to, ‘how
often?’
...changed to make
numbers look better
30.2% 34.9% 55.6% 90.8%
...not taking reports
when should have
28.2% 32.2% 46.7% 82.8%
...changing words... to
downgrade...
25.3% 28% 50.8% 85.7%
A few examples of open-ended responses:
1. As a [supervisor] and an attorney with 30 years experience I was ordered not to review
complaints because I often raised the charges and refused to lower crime classifications. False
reporting is endemic in the police department.
Survey Summary Eterno & Silverman
Page 7 of 9
2. Assault becomes harassment, robbery becomes grand larceny, grand larceny becomes petit larceny, burglary
becomes criminal trespass. All with editing/creative writing on complaint reports by supervisors after
submission.
3. The heightened emphasis by COs on "crime reduction" (or under-reporting) occurred mainly due
to the implementation of COMPSTAT meetings, whereby Pct Cos were belittled, humiliated,
ambushed and confronted with crime patterns of which they were unaware, and embarrassed in
front of (and by) the brass ... After one beating, you'd have to be a consummate idiot to report
higher crime stats the next time.
4. Pressure to lower crime stats came from 1 PP. Dramatic lows were unattainable year to year yet
Commanding Officers had to withstand "public flogging" and embarrassment at Compstat
meetings. Those meetings were the driving force to keep numbers low…
5. Years ago, the 61's were done by the police officer on the street and turned into the 124 room for entry into
the system, they were only looked at for errors and omissions. Now before they are turned in they are
looked at to see how the crime can be downgraded, and as such sometimes the report that is entered into the
system is not what the street Officer had written and it is changed without knowledge or consent of the
officer. Many times the 61 was totally re-written and the officers name and signature were photocopied on
to a new report and a copy of the whole report was filed and the original was never to be seen again. the
statistics game has changed the way we do policing but not for the good, and the average person that wants
to make a legitimate complaint is totally discouraged and a report will be taken to placate them only till they
leave and another report will done downgrading the original report to a lesser crime thus making it seem
like things are better, when in reality it is just the opposite.
6. Heard Deputy Commissioner XXXXX say in a pre Compstat meeting that a CO should just
consolidate burglaries that occurred in an apartment building and count as one. Also not to
count leap year stats. Make reporting a crime difficult to discourage the victims from
Survey Summary Eterno & Silverman
Page 8 of 9
following through such as asking for receipts and making the person appear in person at the SH
[station house]. Discouraging Schools from reporting thefts or if they did consolidate thefts into
one felony report or separate into multiple misd [misdemeanor] reports. Shred reports for those
with no insurance etc. Inventory shrinkage from retail stores would be classified at the wholesale
value of item rather than retail value to downgrade to misd [misdemeanor]. Reckless
Endangerment used instead of attempted assault especially in shoot and miss situations.
Survey Wording Issue
Our initial 2008 survey triggered a barrage of spin from the NYPD and its allies. They
claimed that: 1. the study was funded by the Captain’s Endowment Association (CEA); 2. the
study did not ask about personal experiences; 3. the study did not ask for counts of incidents.
On the first issue, the NYPD spin was simply wrong. The CEA did not pay for the study; rather
a grant from Molloy College did - the CEA only gave us access to their retired members.
Their claim has no merit whatsoever. The second two issues had little possibility of accuracy
for numerous reasons outlined in our book and articles; however, it was remotely conceivable.
So in response to the NYPD’s non-scientific critical comments (as evidenced by two accepted
peer reviewed studies and an academic book published by the authors on their previous study),
the authors incorporated the following wording into the most controversial questions: “Based on
your experience, do you have any personal knowledge of...” This 2012 study shows clear
evidence that our 2008 interpretations are absolutely accurate exposing the NYPD’s position as
misguided, at best.
Survey Summary Eterno & Silverman
Page 9 of 9
Conclusion
Frank Serpico in testifying before the Knapp Commission stated,
“The department must realize that an effective, continuing relationship between
the police and the public is more important than an impressive arrest record.
The system of rewards within the Police Department should be based on a
policeman’s overall performance with the public rather than on his ability to meet
arrest quotas. And merely uncovering widespread patterns of corruption will not
resolve that problem.
Basic changes in attitude and approach are vital. In order to insure this, an
independent permanent investigative body dealing with police corruption, like this
commission, is essential.”
His words are prophetic and, unfortunately, still ring true today. This study and what is now
overwhelming evidence from numerous sources (including whistleblowers with recorded
evidence to support them) as well as NYPD’s impotent response (a 3 person panel that has yet to
report its findings long overdue and meaningless without subpoena power, immunity, and
independence from the NYPD; and, a few lower level scapegoats punished) is a clear
demonstration of the need for as Frank Serpico states “an independent permanent investigative
body dealing with police corruption.”