2011 Electoral System Referendum

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2011 Electoral System Referendum

by Steve Baron B.A. (Political Science & Economics)

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The public policy issue this study will examine is the upcoming electoral system

referendum, to be held in November 2011 in association with the general election. From a

public policy perspective this is a rare occurrence because it is not the government, nor

parliament, that will make the final decision on this issue, as is the case regarding most

public policy issues. This issue will be decided by the New Zealand public, because the

adoption of a new voting system, if it should happen, must be made via referendum, as is

required by the Electoral Act 1993. The voting system may also be changed if seventy-five

percent of parliament decides so, however it is generally accepted by representatives that

voters should decide the outcome. What makes this public policy even more intriguing is

that it was only in 1992 that a similar referendum was held and the Mixed Member

Proportional (MMP) system was adopted. This study will delve into the reasons behind yet

another referendum on the electoral system as well as examining the problems with the

current MMP system, the stakeholders (see Appendix) involved, the voting choices on offer

and will also propose a number of considerations for the New Zealanders to evaluate

before making their decision. It must also be kept in mind that this referendum has

extremely important ramifications for New Zealand, because choosing an electoral system

makes an enormous difference to the eventual make-up of a government and parliament.

Introduction.

Five elections have passed since New Zealand changed from the First-Past-the-Post

(FPP) electoral system to the MMP electoral system in 1996. History tells us that prior to

1996 there was a real and pressing need for the electoral system to change. The main

impetus for change was the 'wrong winner' outcome of the 1978 and 1981 elections. The

Labour Party received more votes than the National Party, but the National Party remained

the government, because they held more electorate seats. That is how the previous FPP

system worked. The second major issue was that of 'wasted votes'. For examplein 1978

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the Social Credit Party (now Democrats for Social Credit) received 16% of the vote, but

only one seat in Parliament. Later they received 21% of the vote in 1981 which gave them

only two seats in Parliament. In 1984 the New Zealand Party received 12% of the vote, but

no Members of Parliament (Elections New Zealand, n.d. a). Citizens quite rightly perceived

this as a huge waste of votes being cast that counted for nothing, or at best, very little.

Along with a growing distrust of politicians, due to many broken election promises, New

Zealander's innate belief in fairness, and the disparity in voting, led to calls for a Royal

Commission. The 1986 New Zealand Royal Commission on the Electoral System made a

number of recommendations including the adoption of MMP. A two part referendum was

held in 1992 to decide whether or not to keep FPP or adopt another system. The result

was an overwhelming 84.7% of voters calling for a change to the electoral system. Part B

gave voters the option to choose from four other systems. The Supplementary Member

(SM) system received 5.6% support, the Single Transferable Vote (STV) 17.4%, MMP

70.5% and Preferential Voting (PV) 6.6%. A year later in September 1993 New Zealanders

were given the option to keep FPP or change to MMP (the highest polling option from the

previous referendum). The results of this referendum were much closer after an intense

debate between pro and anti MMP campaigners with 46.1% voting to retain FPP and

53.9% opting for MMP which was implemented for the 1996 general election (Elections

New Zealand, n.d. a).

The Electoral Act 1993 also made it compulsory for parliament to establish a committee to

review MMP as of April 2001. There were sixty nine submissions on the appropriate party

vote threshold. One fifth of the submissions promoted the preservation of the status quo,

almost half of them wanted the threshold to be lowered and about one fifth wanted the

threshold to be demolished altogether. Act, Green and United parties supported a four

percent thresh hold while Labour National and Alliance believed that there was no reason

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to lower the threshold and it should be left at 5%. The 2001 MMP review committee

suggested that there should be no changes to the threshold for representation for parties

and candidates should still be able to stand for both list and constituency seats. The

committee mostly focused on the number of MPs but rejected the possibility of open lists

(Gallagher & Mitchell, 2005, pp. 309-310).

Future reforms. So why another referendum? In August 2008 at a speech to the National

Party annual conference in Wellington, Prime Minister John Key announced that New

Zealanders had waited long enough for a chance to 'kick the tyres' on MMP, so National

would give them that chance to do so by holding a binding referendum on MMP by no

later than 2011 (Key, 2008). In November 2011 New Zealanders will get this chance under

almost exactly the same procedure as the 1992 referendum. The first referendum will be in

two parts asking two questions. The first, Should New Zealand keep the Mixed Member

Proportional (MMP) system? The second question will ask, If New Zealand were to

change to another voting system, which voting system would you choose? The options will

be FPP, MMP, PV, SM and STV. If at least half the voters opt to keep MMP, there will be an

independent review of MMP in 2012 to recommend changes that should be made to the

way it works. If more than half the voters opt to change the electoral system there will be

another Referendum in 2014 to choose between MMP and the alternative voting system

that gets the most support in the second question.

Two academics who have criticised the need for the 2011 electoral referendum are

professors Levine and Roberts (2009). Their argument appears to be that the publics

perceived problem with MMP are only minor issues that could easily be addressed by

parliament and do not necessitate a nationwide referendum. So why then would Prime

Minister Key have called for such a referendum? The author of this report suggest that it

was an astute and calculated political manoeuvre as the Prime Minister is in a no-lose

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situation. A change to any other system would only enhance the opportunity for one of the

two main political parties to govern without the need for a coalition, and given the political

ratings, this is likely to be Mr Key's National Party. On top of this scenario, by offering

voters the chance to 'kick the tyres' on MMP, he portrays himself as a man of the people

who is prepared to be guided by the New Zealander public.

The problems with MMP. On the whole, there does not seem to be major problems with

MMP, although there have been rumblings, but far from a public outcry for change. Overall,

New Zealander's seem to appreciate the representativeness that MMP offers. Since the

first MMP election we have seen a far more diverse representation as expected. A record

number of women were elected, along with an increase in the number of Maori and Pacific

Island MPs. Levine & Roberts (2009) sum up the problems well, giving five main areas of

concern; 1. The one-seat threshold. 2. The fact that the Electoral Act 1993 treats minor

parties and independents differently. 3. Overhang members of parliament. 4. Closed lists.

5. 'Back-door MPs'. Of this list it would be fair to say that the main public concern seems to

be with the one-seat threshold and 'back-door MPs'. As Levine and Roberts (2009) say,

The one-seat threshold has distorted the intentions of the Electoral Act 1993 and

the MMP system to such an extent that in the 2005 election only four of the eight

parties elected to the House of Representatives crossed the 5 per cent hurdle, and

in 2008 four of the seven parties elected to Parliament in 2008 won fewer than 4 per

cent (let alone 5 per cent) of the party votes cast throughout the country as a whole,

while New Zealand First - which won 4.1 per cent of the overall party vote - failed to

secure any seats at all in Parliament.

The term 'back-door MPs' refers to those MPs who lose an electorate yet get returned to

parliament through the party list, which voters have no control over as MMP operates

under a closed list scenario which is chosen solely by political parties themselves.

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Electoral system decisions and options. Depending on the electoral system New

Zealand decides upon in November 2011, there may be a totally different outcome at

future elections, so options need to be weighed carefully and serious questions need to be

asked. For example, when thinking about an electoral system Dummett (1997, p.16) says

it's important to ask, what is it that we want, and then how do we get it?. Is it best to have

an electoral system that creates a government that can govern alone, and make decisions

it alone considers best for all New Zealanders without having to accomodate smaller

parties? Or an electoral system that reflects the make-up of the population as a whole?

Should our electoral system reflect the wishes of the median voter or do we simply want a

majoritarian system? New Zealand has become a culturally diversified nation and it would

be fair to assume minority representation is welcomed, so which electoral system will best

represent this? Is there even a need for a drastic change of a system that appears to be

working reasonably well and really only just starting to become understood? If we changed

from MMP to another option what will these systems offer New Zealand? We will now

discuss these other systems.

FPP. Returning to FPP would mean voting for an electorate MP and the political party with

the most MPs becomes the government, regardless of the number of votes they get New

Zealand wide. This would bring a return to large numbers of wasted votes, the possibility

of 'wrong winner' outcomes and an increase in disproportionality that FPP brings with it.

PV. Toplak (2009) argues there is no single definition for 'Preferential Voting' as the terms

are used for a number of different election systems and groups of such systems. He says,

they can be synonymous with the single-transferable vote, the alternative vote, open-list

proportional representation, or the group of all ranking methods.. Elections New Zealand

(n.d. b) describes PV on their website as follows:

Each voter ranks the candidates 1, 2, 3, etc in the order they prefer them. A

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candidate who gets more than half of all the first preference votes (that is votes

marked 1) wins. If no candidate gets more than half the first preference votes, the

candidate with the fewest number 1 votes is eliminated and their votes go to the

candidates each voter ranked next. This process is repeated until one candidate

has more than half the votes.

This system would lead to a disproportionality of votes very similar to FPP and makes it

harder for smaller parties to gain representation, although still offering voters the ability to

select the order of their preferred candidates. Coalition governments are rare under this

system. PV will certainly stop the most unpopular candidate from winning (as can happen

under FPP). However, PV can allow popular candidates to be eliminated too early making

this aspect of the system unappealing. PV is also susceptible to insincere voting as well as

bullet voting. This is a tactic where even though a voter can select more than one

candidate, they only rank their first preference. If enough people do this, the system

effectively reverts to FPP, which may be undesirable should New Zealand decide it wants

to avoid the issues surrounding FPP mentioned in the previous paragraph. However, rules

can be imposed to penalise this tactic, although this could possibly result in high numbers

of spoiled ballots.

SM. Under SM there will still be 120 Members of Parliament with 90 electorates MPs. The

other 30 seats will be supplementary seats filled by MPs from the political party lists

proportionate to the percentage of votes received. Levine & Roberts (2009) conclude from

their study that there would probably have been single-party majority governments on

three occasions over the last five MMP elections and that the results of the 1996 to 2008

elections would have been three times more disproportionate than they were under MMP.

STV. There would still be 120 Members of Parliament under STV and each electorate

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would have more than one MP. Each voter has a single vote that is transferable. Voters

rank the individual candidates in the order they prefer from all the candidates. MPs are

elected by receiving a minimum number of votes as defined by the quota formula.

Candidates who reach the quota from first preference votes are elected. If there are still

electorate seats to fill, a two-step process follows. First, votes the elected candidates

received beyond the quota are transferred to the candidates ranked next on those votes.

Candidates who then reach the quota are elected. Second, if there are still electorate

seats to fill, the lowest polling candidate is eliminated and their votes are transferred to the

candidates ranked next on those votes. This two-step process is repeated until all the

seats are filled (Elections New Zealand, n.d. b). In Australia STV is known as the Hare-

Clark proportional method. STV is also used in Ireland, the Australian and South African

Senate, Malta, Tasmania and even in a number of local body elections in New Zealand.

The down side to STV is that very few people understand how it works, but that could also

have been said of MMP initially. STV was rejected by the Plant Committee, which reported

to the British Labour Party, because of non-monotonicity (Dummett, 1997). STV is also

susceptible to insincere voting.

Conclusion and considerations. It was Winston Churchill (Saidwhat, n.d.) who said,

Those that fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it. Like the names of loves long

lost, we often forget, and so it is with politics. Does New Zealand really want to return to

the previous FPP system or does it see a better option from what is described above? Or

perhaps it will stay with MMP and make incremental changes? If New Zealand does stay

with MMP there are several considerations we would pose in response to problems

previously highlighted regarding MMP.

The one-seat threshold could easily be removed to alleviate the disparity that was exposed

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at 2008 election where the Act Party with only one electorate MP were allocated five MPs

even though they received less votes than New Zealand First who did not received any

representation.

It would also seem reasonable to reduce the party representation threshold from 5% to 4%

as initially recommended by the Royal Commission on the Electoral System (1986). This

gives the potential for more parties to be represented in parliament and reduce vote

wastage.

If New Zealand wished for a more preferential system rather than simple majoritarianism,

other options could still be considered for electorate seats. MMP still uses the FPP system

in the electorate seats which often means an MP wins the seat with way less than a

majority vote. For example, if the votes are tallied up as 30%, 25%, 25% and 20% to four

candidates, this means that the electorate MP with just 30% of the vote wins, a situation

that hardly seems fair. Using PV or STV to decide electorate MPs may be considered far

more fair.

Voters could also have the option of making a preference selection from party lists and

therefore voters have the opportunity to ensure an unwanted electorate MP does not get

back into parliament through the present closed party lists. As suggested by Levine and

Roberts (2009), all of the above options are not major alterations to the electoral system

and could easily be introduced through the legislative process.

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References

Dummett, M. (1997). Principals of Electoral Reform. London, England: Oxford

University Press.

Elections New Zealand. (n.d. a). Retrieved June 5, 2011 from

www.elections.org.nz/elections/resultsdata/fpp-seats-won.html

Elections New Zealand. (n.d. b). 2011 Referendum on the voting system. Retrieved

June 6, 2011 from www.elections.org.nz/elections/2011-referendum-on-the-voting-

system.html

Gallagher, M. & Mitchell, P. (2005). The Politics of Electoral Systems. New York: Oxford

University Press.

Key, J. (2008). National's Blueprint for Change. Retrieved June 6, 2010 from

www.national.org.nz/Article.aspx?ArticleID=28318

Levine, S. & Roberts, N. (2009). MMP and the Future: Political Challenges and Proposed

Reforms. New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law, Vol. 7, No. 1, June

2009: 135-156.

Royal Commission on the Electoral System. (1986). Towards a Better Democracy.

Wellington: Government Printer.

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Saidwhat. (n.d.). Online quotes. Retrieved June 8, 2011 from

www.saidwhat.co.uk/quotes/political/winston_churchill/those_that_fail_to_learn_

from_2804

Toplak, J. (2009). Preferential Voting: Definition and Classification. Paper presented at the

annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National

Conference, Chicago, IL, April 2009. Retrieved June 6, 2011 from http://rcum.uni-

mb.si/~jure/preferential8_emlist.pdf

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2011 Electoral System Referendum