2007 - Bradley R. Trick - Death, Covenants, And the Proof of Resurrection in Mark 12.18-27

8/13/2019 2007 - Bradley R. Trick - Death, Covenants, And the Proof of Resurrection in Mark 12.18-27

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Novum estamentum 49 (2007) 232-256

Death, Covenants, and theProof of Resurrection in Mark 12:18-27*

Bradley R. rickDurham, North Carolina

AbstractInterpretations of the resurrection proof in Mark 12:26-27a must explain the relevance of

Jesus Exod. 3:6 citation and indicate how his conclusion points to resurrection rather thanimmortality. Current scholarly proposals often render the proof unconvincing in its logicand incompatible with / irrelevant to other N presentations of resurrection. Tis articleargues instead that Jesus proof rests on the premise derived from the Sadducees exampleof marriage that death annuls a covenant. Since the death of the patriarchs would thereforehave released God from his covenantal obligations, Gods faithfulness to those obligationsin the Exodus must imply the patriarchs continuing existence and eventual resurrection. Tisinterpretation not only shows Jesus response to the Sadducees to be a well-reasoned, coherent

whole, it also accords well with the presentation of resurrection elsewhere in the N.

Keywordsresurrection, covenants, marriage, Sadducees, O in the N

I. Introduction

In arguing for the basic historicity of Jesus dispute with the Sadducees overresurrection in Mark 12:18-27 parr.,1John Meier emphasizes the criterionof discontinuity.2He points to such factors as the lack of a realistic Sitz

*) I would like to thank Richard Hays for his helpful comments on earlier drafts of thisarticle.1) Parallel accounts appear in Matt. 22:23-33 and Luke 20:27-38, but, as W.D. Daviesand Dale C. Allison, Jr., A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to

Saint Matthew(ICC; Edinburgh: & Clark, 1997), note, Tere is no evidence of non-Markan tradition in either Matthew or Luke (221). Tis article accordingly focuses on theaccount in Mark while remaining attentive to the parallel versions.2) John P. Meier, Te Debate on the Resurrection of the Dead: An Incident from the

www.brill.nl/nt
http://www.brill.nl/nthttp://www.brill.nl/nt


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B.R. rick / Novum estamentum 49 (2007) 232-256 233

im Lebenthat could explain the storys invention by the early church andthe complete absence in both Jewish and early Christian literature of otherappeals to Exod. 3:6 as a proof for resurrection. Te main force of his argu-

ment from discontinuity, however, falls on his observation that Jesusmanner of arguing for a general resurrection in this passage differs mark-edly from the manner in which the early Christians argued for a generalresurrection:

In the debate in Mk 12.18-27, Jesus handles both the how(manner) and the that(fact)of the resurrection quite differently from the early Christians. Jesus answers the howby

a comparison to the angels and the thatby an appeal to Exod. 3.6. Te early Chris-tians, instead, handle both the how(see Phil. 3.21) and the that (1 Cor. 15.12-20)simply by pointing to the risen Jesus.3

In short, Meier argues for the pericopes historicity by suggesting that earlyChristians who wanted to prove a general resurrection would have appealedto Jesus resurrection rather than invent a story that sought to achieve this

polemical task simply by citing a single scripture passage whose relevanceto the discussion was far from established.

Meiers cogent observations naturally raise the question of whether thisdifference in theological reasoning between Jesus and the N authorsimplies a corresponding difference in their underlying theologies of resurrec-tion. Tat is to say, are the N authors christological justifications of resur-rection ultimately grounded in the same scriptural understanding that Jesus

answer here presupposes? Or, to put the matter in yet another way, howwell does the understanding of resurrection expressed in Mark 12:26-27acohere with the wider N portrayal of a general resurrection?

Given the proposed historicity of Mark 12:18-27,4the threefold inclu-sion of this pericope in the N, and the foundational significance of bothJesus and resurrection in early Christian theology, one might expect theportrayal of resurrection in this passage to have a fairly integral and reso-

nant relationship to other N discussions of resurrection. Scholarship,however, has often argued otherwise, frequently interpreting Mark 12:26-27ain a way that renders its theology of resurrection essentially incompatible

of the Son of God(vol. 3 of Christian Origins and the Question of God; Minneapolis: Fortress,2003) 418 n. 61.3) Meier, Debate, 14; italics original.4) See also Otto Schwankl, Die Sadduzerfrage (Mk. 12, 18-27 parr): Eine exegetisch-theologischeStudie zur Auferstehungserwartung(BBB 66; Frankfurt: Athenum, 1987) 501-587.


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234 B.R. rick / Novum estamentum 49 (2007) 232-256

with and/or irrelevant to the understanding of resurrection expressed else-where in the N. Tis state of affairs can be traced directly to two relatedexegetical difficulties in the passage.

First, it is not immediately clear how Jesus citation of Exod. 3:6I[am] the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God ofJacob5concerns resurrection at all, let alone how the verse could pos-sibly prove that the dead will be raised. Second, Jesus seeming inferencefrom this citation that [God] is not a god of dead people but of living(Mark 12:27a) sounds as if it would be more appropriate concluding anargument for some kind of immortality rather than an argument for resur-

rection. A twofold quandary thus faces the interpreter: Jesus argumentdoes not actually seem to prove anything, but if it does prove anything, itseems to prove immortality, not resurrection.

Te latter of these difficulties has led some scholars to conclude thatJesus here defines resurrection in terms of immortality. John Donahue, forinstance, argues that the

view of resurrection [in Mark 12:26-27] is . . . different from . . . [the view in] 1 Cor15:35-41 since in Mark there is virtually no hint of the resurrection and/or transfor-mation of the body, but rather a way of speaking closer to a doctrine of immortality. . . .[For the Markan Jesus,] [r]esurrection is not return from the grave, but enduring lifehidden in the power of God.6

In other words, Jesus here describes a non-physical form of resurrection

that stands in stark contrast to the emphasis on the physical resurrection ofboth Christ and believers elsewhere in the N (and, it must be added, in starkcontrast to the usual meaning of the word , resurrection).7Te Ns later christological justifications that tie a general resurrection ofbelievers to the physical resurrection of Christ would thus oppose the viewof resurrection implied by this reading of Jesus scriptural proof.8

5) Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.6) John R. Donahue, A Neglected Factor in the Teology of Mark,JBL101 (1982) 576,577-578.7) See Wright, who argues that resurrection always means life after life after death(Resurrection, 31).8) Other scholars who deny that this passage concerns physical resurrection include JohnHargreaves,A Guide to Marks Gospel(rev. ed.; EF Study Guide 2; London: SPCK, 1995)220; Pheme Perkins, Te Gospel of Mark, in Te New Interpreters Bible8 (Nashville:

Abingdon, 1995) 676; and Arland J. Hultgren,Jesus and His Adversaries: Te Form and Func-tion of the Conflict Stories in the Synoptic radition(Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1979) 126.


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Even for scholars who contend that the passage does concern physicalresurrection, the former of the exegetical difficulties listed above oftengives rise to an interpretation that renders Jesus theology of resurrection

irrelevant to the rest of the N witnesses. One of the most common expla-nations of the function of Exod. 3:6that the assumed present tense ofthe implied verb suggests that the patriarchs are still livingessentiallyinterprets Jesus as arguing based on thefactof the patriarchs continuingexistence rather than on the reason for that existence. Tis interpretivemove means that the later appeals to Christs resurrection would haveeffectively replaced this scriptural argument: rather than pointing to the

patriarchs, whose continuing existence presumably ensures their eventualresurrection, Christians could simply point to an already resurrected Jesus.(Te resulting irrelevance of Jesus argument has an added theologicalbenefit for many Christian scholars: it frees them to dismiss his, in thisreading, less-than-compelling logic without having to surrender their ownbelief in resurrection.)

Is Jesus justification of resurrection in Mark 12:26-27a truly as theolo-gically dissonant with the witness of the later N authors as these inter-pretations indicate? I suggest that it is not, and that the perceived dissonancearises from a misunderstanding of Jesus argument. Of course, to prove thisclaim thoroughly would require that I analyze the theology of resurrectionin Mark 12:26-27a and then compare the resulting picture with the theol-ogy indicated by the rest of the resurrection-related passages in the N.

Such comprehensive analysis lies well beyond the scope of this article.Instead, the article will focus primarily on the first (and more manageable)part of this project, namely, the analysis of resurrection in Mark 12:26-27a: how, exactly, does Jesus argument work?

I will argue that Gods faithfulness to his continuing covenant withAbraham provides the key to understanding Jesus line of reasoning. Tereis a sense in which this suggestion is not new. An increasing number of

scholars have, after all, claimed that Gods covenantal faithfulness forms animportant part of Jesus argument.9Yet even these interpreters seem to have

9) E.g., F. Dreyfus, LArgument scripturaire de Jsus en faveur de la rsurrection des morts(Marc XII, 26-27), RB66 (1959) 222-223; Richard B. Hays, Reading Scripture in Lightof the Resurrection, in Ellen F. Davis and Richard B. Hays (eds.), Te Art of Reading Scrip-ture(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003) 227; R.. France, Te Gospel of Mark: A Commentary

on the Greek ext(NIGC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002) 471-472; Douglas R. Hare,Mark (Westminster Bible Companion; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1996) 156;


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overlooked what I regard as the crucial step of Jesus logic: Gods faithfulnessto his covenant implies the patriarchs continuing existence since the patriarchsdeath would have released God from his covenantal obligations.

In order to make its case, this article will consider the context of thelarger pericope, seeking to understand both the Sadducees question andthe cohesiveness of Jesus answer as a response to that question. As part ofthis analysis, I will examine the two exegetical cruxes in 12:26-27a (andtheir proposed resolutions) in greater detail. Finally, lest the promptingquestion of theological coherence be forgotten, I will briefly discuss howthis interpretation resolves the theological difficulties identified above.

II. Mark 12:18-27

Appearing as the second of three vignettes in which religious leaders ques-tion Jesus, Mark 12:18-27 describes a dispute between Jesus and the Sad-ducees over resurrection. Te pericope itself constitutes a self-contained

unit composed of two main parts: the Sadducees rather involved question(12:18-23) and Jesus response (12:24-27). I will discuss each of thesecomponents in turn.

1. Te Sadducees Question

Te Sadducees present Jesus with a hypothetical scenario: seven brothers

successively marry the same woman in accordance with the Mosaic law oflevirate marriage. Nevertheless, the woman, who outlives all seven of herhusbands, eventually dies childless. Te Sadducees then want to knowwhose wife she will be in the resurrection.

Te inquiry, of course, is not sincere; as Mark informs us at the outset ofthe episode, the Sadducees did not actually believe in resurrection (12:18).10Accordingly, their constructed scenario appears to have been specifically

designed to bring out the absurdity of a belief in resurrection. At its mostbasic level, the story highlights a perceived logistical problem with such abelief: a woman who had outlived several spouses would suddenly find

James A. Brooks,Mark(NAC 23; Nashville: Broadman, 1991) 196; Schwankl, Sadduzer-frage, 384-396; Larry W. Hurtado, Mark (Good News Commentaries; San Francisco:Harper & Row, 1983) 183; William C. Lane, Te Gospel of Mark(NICN; Grand Rapids:

Eerdmans, 1974) 429.10) Cf. Josephus, B.J.8.2.165;A.J.18.1.16.


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them all simultaneously alive again. On what basis could one mans claimto be her husband be legitimated over the others claims?

Te Sadducees presentation, however, significantly strengthens the

force of this basic question. As their introductory citation of Deut. 25:5indicates, the Mosaic law itself requires the woman to have taken theseseven husbands. In other words, it is precisely her obedience to Gods com-mand that would have created this absurd situation in the resurrection.11Nor would this problem arise only in inconsequential cases: the Sadduceesadditional allusion to the fulfillment of this law in the lives of Judah andamar (raise up seed for your brother, Gen. 38:8; cf. Mark 12:19) implies

that the resolution of this issue affects even the patriarchs, the founders ofthe faith.12Viewed in this light, a belief in resurrection threatens to makea mockery of both the Mosaic law (scripture) and the patriarchs by impli-cating them in this absurd scenario. Tat is to say, it threatens to make amockery of the very foundations of Jewish belief.

In addition to this overt attack, a wordplay involving the concept ofraising up (, 12:19 / , , 12:23) suggeststhat the scenario also levels a subtler critique against resurrection. Te levi-rate marriage law provides for the preservation of a mans place in Israelthrough the raising up of offspring in his name. In the Sadducees story,however, none of the seven brothers are able to raise up such a child. J. GeraldJanzen therefore argues that the scenario implies the following critique:

If God by the very means divinely provided in the orahthe Levirate lawcannotor will not raise up children to a dead man (not even after an ideal number of oppor-tunities), on what basis is one entitled to hope that God either will or can raise up thatdead man himselfsomething for which the Mosaic orah makes no provision at all? 13

Te suggested lesser-to-greater logic of this implied argument follows acommon first-century Jewish exegetical principle (qal vahomer)14 and

11) For the legal difficulties this resurrection scenario creates with regard to orah, see Emman-uelle Main, Les Sadducens et la rsurrection des morts: Comparison entre Mc 12, 18-27et Lc 20, 27-38, RB103 (1996) 416-417.12) Cf.J. Gerald Janzen, Resurrection and Hermeneutics: On Exodus 3.6 in Mark 12.26,

JSN23 (1985) 46-47. Of course, unlike the woman in the Sadducees story, amar doesultimately bear children (Gen. 38:12-30).13) Janzen, Resurrection, 48.14) Te principle of qal vahomer appears as the first of Hillels seven exegetical rules int. Sanh.7:11.


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essentially critiques resurrection on two fronts: 1) if the natural raisingup of childbirth has failed, how much more so will the more difficultraising up of resurrection, and 2) if the means for raising up provided

by the orah have failed, how much more so will a raising up that is notordained by orah.15

Granting for the moment the presence of this implied critique, the Sad-ducees argument against resurrection operates on two levels. On a surfacelevel, they have constructed a scenario in which the application of thescriptural levirate marriage law seems to render a belief in resurrectionproblematic on logistical grounds. Lurking behind this seemingly innocent

request for logistical resolution, however, lies the more sinister suggestionthat the very existence of a scenario in which the levirate law could fail toraise up offspring implicitly rules out the possibility of resurrection. Tequestion therefore functions as a trap: Jesus must address the proposedlogistical objection to resurrection, but any resolution he could give wouldpresumably entail an acceptance of the basic scenario that in and of itselfrenders resurrection problematic.

Does such an analysisbased, as it is, on a proposed implied argu-mentread too much into the text? wo factors in addition to the word-play suggest that it does not. First, the literary context leads a reader toexpect that the Sadducees question will have some hidden twist. Te pas-sage comes as part of an escalating conflict between Jesus and the Jewishleaders in the emple courts. In Mark 11:27-33, Jesus traps the chief

priests, scribes, and elders with an unanswerable question of his own: Wasthe baptism of John from heaven or from men? (11:29). He then furtherinfuriates them by speaking the parable of the vineyard against them(12:1-11). As a result, these leaders desire to seize him, yet they cannot doso because they fear the reactions of the crowd (12:12). Tey accordinglywithdraw from the scene and send people to question Jesus so that theymight trap [] him in a statement (12:13). In the ensuing series

of vignettes, representatives of various Jewish groups approach Jesus andquestion him: the Pharisees and Herodians in 12:13-17, the Sadducees in12:18-27, and a scribe in 12:28-34. Jesus responds masterfully to eachquestion, with the result that, after the third episode, no one any longer

15) Cf. Main, who suggests that the Sadducees scenario essentially raises the question ofhow one achieves immortality: whether through descendants (the method specified in

orah) or through resurrection (a method that creates problems for the method establishedin orah) (Sadducens, 431).


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dared to ask him [anything] (12:34). Te proposal of an implicit trap inthe Sadducees question fits perfectly into such a framework.16

Tree potential objections to this analysis of the literary context need to

be addressed. It is true, for instance, that the Jewish leaders are only explic-itly said to send the Pharisees and Herodians to trap Jesus with their ques-tion about paying taxes to Caesar (12:13). Nevertheless, the arrival of theSadducees with an equally hypocritical question immediately after the firstgroups failure to ensnare Jesus suggests that they also form a part of theleaders plot,17especially since the Sadduceeswho can be linked to thehigh priests of 11:18 on socio-political grounds as well18appear nowhere

else in Marks gospel. Te suggested trap in the Sadducees question is alsoadmittedly subtler than the Pharisees trap, but such escalation should beexpected after Jesus had so cunningly discerned and avoided the firstattempt. Finally, the scribes question about the greatest commandment in12:28-34the third and final question in the seriesdoes not seem tofunction as a trap, thereby seeming to break the proposed pattern. Te textexplicitly states, however, that he asks his question after being drawn to thegroup by the earlier arguments (12:28), i.e., he is clearly not involved inthe leaders plot. Significantly, he is also the only questioner whom Jesuspraises instead of rebuking (12:34).19

In addition to the wordplay and the literary context, Jesus responseitself argues for the presence of this implicit trap in the Sadducees ques-tion. As the following section of this article will contend, Jesus not only

16) I therefore disagree with Mains conclusion that the evangelists give no indication thatthe Sadducees question is insincere (Sadducens, 416). Linking the Sadducees question

with the Jewish leaders attempt to trap Jesus also helps to explain the Sadducees purposein confronting Jesus. Te traditional answer that the Sadducees habitually quizzed religiousleaders about the resurrection (e.g., John R. Donahue and Daniel J. Harrington, Te Gospelof Mark [Sacra Pagina 2; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical, 2002] 349; cf. Josephus, A.J.18.1.16) is plausible but not particularly compelling.17) So James R. Edwards, Te Gospel according to Mark(Pillar New estament Commen-tary; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002) 361-362; and C.F.D. Moule, Te Gospel according to

Mark(CBC; Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1965) 97.18) See France,Mark, 470.19) Te divergent ways that Matthew and Luke adjust this episode reflect the ambiguity ofthe scribes role in Mark. Luke separates Jesus interaction with the scribe (a inLuke 10:25-28) from this entrapment context (20:27-38), suggesting that he regards thescribes question as substantially different in nature from the Pharisees and Sadducees

questions. Matthew, on the other hand, transforms the scribe into a Pharisee who explicitlytests Jesus (12:34-35), thereby linking this episode more closely to the preceding tests.


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solves the Sadducees logistical problem, he also addresses and refutes theirimplied critique that denies resurrection on the grounds that it 1) repre-sents a more difficult raising up than the natural reproduction that has

failed and 2) is not prescribed in orah. While Jesus could theoreticallyhave discerned a deeper theological issue of which his questioners wereunaware, his harsh rebuke and the other indications of a hidden trapimply the Sadducees duplicity.

2. Jesus Response

Jesus response consists of three parts: a frame asserting that the Sadduceesare mistaken (12:24, 27b), a statement that there will be no marrying inthe resurrection (12:25), and a proof that the dead will be raised (12:26-27a). As I intend to show below, the three components function as a cohe-sive whole that effectively addresses both aspects of the Sadducees challenge.Te analysis will begin with the frame.

a. Tey Understand Neither the Scriptures nor Gods Power: Te Frame(12:24, 27b)Jesus charge that the Sadducees are mistaken (12:24, 27b) appears some-what curious, at least initially. After all, the Sadducees have simply pre-sented a possible scenario and asked a question; they have not made anyovert claims. As we saw above, however, their question actually implies

two claims: 1) the surface claim that the scriptures (and the levirate mar-riage law in particular) render a belief in resurrection problematic and2) the underlying claim that Gods failure to act in the simpler raising upof offspring precludes the possibility of his raising up the dead. Jesusaccordingly asserts through his opening rhetorical question that the Saddu-cees are mistaken because they understand neither the scriptures (claim #1)nor the power of God (claim #2). In other words, Jesus opening remark

reveals that he has discerned the Sadducees trap.Te twofold nature of this opening critique naturally suggests a pro-

grammatic correspondence to the two internal segments of Jesus response.I accordingly propose that the two internal components (12:25 and 12:26-27a) demonstrate how the Sadducees have misunderstood the scripturesand the power of God respectively. Tat is to say, I will argue that the state-ment in 12:25 regarding the lack of marrying in the resurrection refutes

the Sadducees actual question about the woman and her seven husbands(claim #1) by revealing their misunderstanding of the very scripture to


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which they have appealed. Te resurrection proof in 12:26-27a then refutesthe underlying challenge posed by the scenario as a whole (claim #2) byshowing that such a critique essentially questions Gods power.

Tis suggestion reverses the typical scholarly conclusion. Having rightlysensed the programmatic nature of Jesus opening remark, many scholarsidentify the explicit appeal to scripture in 12:26-27a as evidence that thislatter segment corresponds to the initial charge of misunderstanding thescriptures. Such an association then leaves 12:25 to complete the chiasm asthe explanation of Gods power.20I will illustrate the difficulties with thisinterpretationwhich characteristically argues that the Sadducees have

misunderstood both the manner(12:25) and the fact(12:26-27a) of theresurrection21as I proceed through the analysis of the internal compo-nents of Jesus response.

b. Understanding the Scriptures: No Marrying in the Resurrection (12:25)Jesus begins his actual rebuttal of the Sadducees question in 12:25 with astatement about the lack of marrying in the resurrection:

For when they rise from among the dead, they neither marry nor are given in marriage,but they are like angels in the heavens.

As part of the chiastic analysis of Jesus response, many scholars interpretthis statement to mean that Gods power will so transform the body in the

resurrectionthey are like angelsthat the marriage state will be tran-scended.22Jesus thus refutes the Sadducees by highlighting the new state ofresurrection existence that Gods power will bring about.

20) So Donahue and Harrington,Mark, 350; France,Mark, 474; Francis J. Moloney, TeGospel of Mark: A Commentary(Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2002) 238; Main, Saddu-cens, 417; Robert H. Gundry,Mark: A Commentary on His Apology for the Cross(GrandRapids: Eerdmans, 1993) 703; Schwankl, Sadduzerfrage, 365; and Ezra P. Gould,A Critical

and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to St. Mark(ICC; Edinburgh: &Clark, 1896) 229.21) Edwards,Mark, 367; Meier, Debate, 14; Hugh Anderson, Te Gospel of Mark(NCB;Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976) 276; Eduard Schweizer, Te Good News according to Mark(trans. Donald H. Madvig; Atlanta: John Knox, 1970) 248; D.E. Nineham, Saint Mark(Westminster Pelican Commentaries; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963) 321; C.E.B. Cranfield,Te Gospel according to Saint Mark(Cambridge Greek estament; Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity, 1959) 375.22) For different suggestions on how this resurrection transformation will render marriageobsolete, see Caroline Vander Stichele, Like Angels in Heaven: Corporeality, Resurrection,


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Te chief problem with the chiastic explanation of Jesus answer liesin this analysis of 12:25: this reading assumes that it is the nature of theresurrection that renders the Sadducees argument irrelevant. In fact, this

assumption appears even in interpretations that do not tie this verse toGods power. Craig Evans, for instance, finds Jesus here to be making apoint about scripture, namely, that scripture nowhere suggests that themarriage state continues after the resurrection (italics added).23Althoughhe understands Jesus logic differently, Evans still identifies resurrection asthe event that enables a transcending of the marital bond.

While this scholarly emphasis on resurrection is understandable given

the pericopes topic, it does not adequately account for the sole emphasison theprocessof marrying in Jesus response.24Tis emphasis is all the morecurious since it at first seems to form a non sequiturto the preceding ques-tion. Te Sadducees, after all, had not asked, Which of the seven will shemarry? No, their questionWhose wife will she be?presumes thatthe womans marital relationship with at least one of the brothers wouldcontinue into the resurrected state.25Indeed, the absurdity that their ques-tion is intended to imply with regard to resurrection depends upon thisassumption: the scenario presents a conundrum only if the resurrectedwoman would suddenly find herself with seven living husbands. As a cri-tique of resurrection, then, the Sadducees question becomes moot if thewoman would have to re-marry one of the brothers.26

and Gender in Mark 12:18-27, in Jonneke Bekkenkamp and Maaike de Haardt (eds.),Begin with the Body: Corporeality Religion and Gender(Leuven: Peeters, 1998) 215-232, andSchwankl, Sadduzerfrage, 369-375.23) Craig A. Evans,Mark(WBC 34B; Nashville: Tomas Nelson, 2001) 255.24) France notes that Jesus denies the process of marrying rather than the resultant stateof being married, but he then qualifies this observation with the remark that if that stateis carried over into the next life, the problem of competing relationships remains (Mark,472). It is precisely this carrying over of the marriage relationship that I want to challenge.25) Scholars typically suggest that Jesus is critiquing the Sadducees assumption that life(and marrying in particular) will continue as normal in the resurrection. E.g., Schwankl,Sadduzerfrage, 368. Such analyses fail because the Sadducees question in no way presup-poses the contraction of new marriages in the resurrection. It requires only the continuityof the marriage state.26) John J. Kilgallen, Te Sadducees and Resurrection from the Dead: Luke 20,27-40,Bib67 (1986) 478-495, proposes that the Sadducees (serious) question should be under-stood as asking which of the seven resurrected brothers would be required to fulfill the

levirate marriage law and produce an heir. Jesus then responds that that law will becomeobsolete (484-7). Te lack of an heir, however, simply serves to keep the scenario going andprevent any of the brothers from having a special claim to be the womans husband. Te


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Contrary to the Sadducees assumption, Jesus reply effectively impliesthat for this hypothetical woman to be the wife of one of the brothers, shewould have to re-marry. Tis implication then leads to the question of

when her previous marriages would have ended, the answer to which helpsexplain why Jesus phrases his response solely in terms of re-marriage. I sug-gest that Jesus does not refer to the dissolution of the womans maritalbonds at the resurrection because those bonds would already have beenannulled. Tat is to say, I suggest that he refers only to re-marriage becauseit is deathnot, as the commentators all suggest, resurrectionthat ter-minates the marriage covenant.27

Tis conclusion should not be surprising; even modern couples pledgeto love one another til deathdo us part. Pauls letters to the Romans andthe Corinthians establish this principle as the prevalent first-century under-standing of marriage:

Or do you not know brothers (for I speak to those who know the law) that the lawrules over a person [only] as long as that person lives? For the married woman is bound

by law to a living husband. But if the husband dies, she is released from the law of thehusband. So then, while her husband lives, she will be called an adulteress if she is

joined to another man. But if her husband dies, she is free from the law, so as not tobe an adulteress even though she is joined to another man. (Rom. 7:1-3)

A woman is bound as long as her husband lives. But if the husband dies, she is free tobe married to whomever she desires, only in the Lord. (1 Cor. 7:39)

Te Romans passage is especially significant since there Paul cites the prin-ciple that death annuls a marriage bond as the shared premise from whichhe then proceeds to argue his case. In other words, it is a premise withwhich those who know the law could be assumed to agree.28

Sadducees scenario does not present a serious dilemma that has helped lead to their positionon resurrection but rather an absurd scenario constructed on the basis of that position.27) Jesus answer therefore does not address the question of what happens to the marriagecovenants of those who are still living at the time of the resurrection. Ben Witherington,III, Te Gospel of Mark: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001)argues from Jesus silence regarding existing marriages that only levirate marriages will bedissolved at the resurrection; all other contracted marriages will continue (328-329). Notonly does this suggestion impose an awkward distinction between levirate and normalmarriages, it also fundamentally misunderstands what constitutes an existing marriage.28) For rabbinic examples of this principle, see Walter Diezinger, Unter oten Freigewor-

den: Eine Untersuchung zu Rm. III-VIII, Nov 5 (1962) 272-273. On the lack ofexplicit Jewish references to the resumption of marriage relationships in the resurrection,see Gundry,Mark, 707.


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We need not look to modern wedding ceremonies or to the letters ofPaul, however, in order to establish death as the moment when a marriageceases. Te very levirate law that the Sadducees have cited depends upon

this fact. Otherwise, the woman marrying her late husbands brother(s)would be an adulteress (cf. Rom. 7:3). Te Sadducees have therefore mis-understood, not Gods power to transform the resurrected body, but thenature of the marriage covenant implied by the very scripture passage onwhich they have based their attack. Death breaks the marriage covenant,releasing the surviving party from further obligation. Once Jesus exposesthis mistake, the absurdity of the Sadducees scenario (and its accompany-

ing critique of resurrection) disappears.

c. Understanding Gods Power: Te Proof of Resurrection (12:26-27a)Having thus refuted the Sadducees explicit critique of resurrection, Jesusthen addresses their implied critique with his proof of resurrection in12:26-27a:

But concerning the dead, that they are raised, have you not read in the book of Moses[in the passage] about the bush how God spoke to him saying, I [am] the God of

Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob. He is not a god of dead peoplebut of living.

I will argue below that this proof is grounded in the same principle as the

first part of Jesus response, namely, that death ends a persons covenantalobligations. Before explaining my interpretation, however, it will first behelpful to survey and critique briefly the various other interpretations ofthis passage. Explanations of Jesus proof tend to ground the argument inone of three factors: 1) lexical-grammatical issues, 2) Gods nature as agod of the living, or 3) the literary context of the Exodus citation. More-over, although mixtures and slight variations occur, scholars have essentially

proposed two distinct ways of construing Jesus logic for each of these threefactors, leading to six main proposals. I will discuss each of these in turn.

Beginning with the lexical-grammatical solutions, Frdric Manns sug-gests that Jesus logic here depends on an instance of al tiqra, a method ofexegeting Hebrew texts by reading the consonants with a different vowelpointing. Basically, Manns argues that the phrase [Moses calls] the Lordthe God of Abraham () in Luke 20:37 reflects the

hrba. . . yhlahwhyof Exod. 3:15. He then suggests that the initial hw hy ](Lord) behind Lukes could, with a different vowel pointing, beunderstood as a hiphil of hyh(to be) or even (by Jesus listeners) as a


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hiphil of hyj (to live), yielding the meaning in Hebrew, God causesAbraham to be/live.29Although creative, this analysis makes Jesus argu-ment hinge on a Hebrew word play that is only recoverable through a

deconstruction of Lukes version. If correct, it would render Jesus argu-ment unintelligible in Matthew and Mark, not to mention in the surfacereading of Luke.

While Mannss interpretation has garnered little scholarly support, asecond grammatical explanation has long been one of the more influentialinterpretations. In this widely held construal, the tense of the implied verbprovides the key to Jesus case: the Lord says that he isthe God of Abra-

ham, Isaac, and Jacob, not that he wastheir God. Tus, the argument goes,Jesus takes the implied present tense of the reference to the patriarchs asevidence that they must have still been alive in some sense.30

Despite its widespread appeal, this proposal is problematic on severalgrounds, foremost of which is that the all-important present-tense verb doesnot even appear in Mark, Luke, or the M of Exod. 3:6. In other words, thesingle element on which, in this reading, the whole argument depends isomitted, an odd circumstance to say the least.31 Second, even assuming theimplied present tense of the verb, Exod. 3:6 is primarily a statement aboutGod (for whom the present tense would be appropriate), not about the patri-archs: he isthe God whom they worshipped. Tis observation then leads to athird objection, namely that this reading of the citation violates the origi-nal meaning of the verse in its Exodus context, transforming the passage

into a rather awkward proof-text.Not surprisingly considering these difficulties, few scholars who advocatethis explanation find it a very convincing proof of resurrection. Tey there-fore often qualify their analyses with statements to the effect that, althoughsuch arguments might not be convincing today, a first-century audiencewould have found Jesus reasoning compelling, a claim often buttressed byvague appeals to rabbinic methods of exegesis.32Rabbi D.M. Cohn-Sherbok,

however, has argued that this type of reasoning does not bear any resemblance

29) Frdric Manns, La technique duAl iqradans les Evangiles, RScR64 (1990) 6.30) E.g., Donald H. Juel, Te Gospel of Mark(IB; Nashville: Abingdon, 1999) 78; Harg-reaves, Mark, 221; Brooks,Mark, 196; Anderson,Mark, 279; Nineham,Mark, 322. Cf.Davies and Allison,Matthew, 232.31) Although Matthews addition of could be taken as evidence supporting this inter-pretation of Jesus argument (so Davies and Allison,Matthew, 232), the addition could alsosimply be intended to bring the text into agreement with the LXX.32) E.g., Anderson, Mark, 279: Te argument . . ., not very convincing by modern stan-dards, is a verbal one of the type common in contemporary rabbinic exegesis; Nineham,


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to known annaitic exegetical practices, raising the question of whether thisargument would actually have been convincing even in the first century.33

urning to the two modes of interpretation that focus on Gods nature,

they both suggest that Jesus ultimately grounds his proof in the principlethat God cannot be in relationship with the dead, a principle that findsexpression in 12:27a. Nevertheless, they differ in their analyses of Jesuslogic. Tey differ, that is, in their understanding of how 12:27a functionsin the flow of Jesus argument.

One interpretation regards 12:27a as the second of two parallel prem-ises: God is 1) God of the patriarchs (12:26) and 2) a god of the living

(12:27a). As Otto Schwankl suggests, the juxtaposition of these two prem-ises then implies, in typical rabbinic fashion, the desired-but-unstated con-clusion (that the patriarchs are alive and therefore) that there is a resurrectionof the dead.34Te strength of this view lies in its recognition that Jesusargument must have some type of implied conclusion; 12:27a, after all,does not state the point that Jesus is purportedly proving, namely, thatGod raises the dead. Yet even granting the cultural validity of 12:27a as anindependent premise,35this line of reasoning still has a major difficulty: asthe parentheses indicate, the logical combination of these two premisesyields only the result that the patriarchs are alive.36How this result might

Mark, 321: Te argument is typical of contemporary methods of exegesis and not alto-gether convincing to modern ears. Cf. Donahue and Harrington, Mark, 352. Similar

caveats appear with respect to other proposed solutions. See, e.g., Edwards,Mark, 368; andGundry,Mark, 704.33) D.M. Cohn-Sherbok, Jesus Defense of the Resurrection of the Dead, JSN 11(1981) 64-73. He even goes so far as to state that Jesus reasoning is defective by rabbinicstandards (72).34) Schwankl, Sadduzerfrage, 403-406. Te parentheses in the implied conclusion reflectSchwankls own formulation. Cf. Wright, Resurrection, 424; Main, Sadducens, 419.35) As Schwankl notes, the saying in 12:27a appears nowhere else in the extant literature

(Sadduzerfrage, 406). Since, in this reading, Jesus argument depends on the unquestionedvalidity of both premises, the unknown origin of this saying raises questions as to its poten-tial persuasiveness in this type of proof, especially given the unique application that thisview of Jesus logic would require. See too Main, who notes that the necessity of assertingthis external premise undermines Jesus claim to prove resurrection based on what was writ-ten(Sadducens, 419).36) Evans argues that the two premises lead to the conclusion that the patriarchs, thoughpresently dead, must someday live (Mark, 257). Cf. Gundry,Mark, 703-4. Tis proposed

conclusion, however, does not actually follow from the two premises; rather, it underminesthe second premise by suggesting that God is indeed a god of the (presently) dead.


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imply resurrection will be considered below. For now I simply note thatthis suggestion awkwardly requires Jesus argument to have not one buttwoimplied conclusions.37

In the second type of interpretive appeal to Gods nature, 12:27a pro-vides the key to resolving a temporal or philosophical conundrum per-ceived to be inherent in the citation of Exod. 3:6. Unfortunately, suchproposals often depend on problematic assertions about first-century Jew-ish thought.38 F. Gerald Downing, however, provides a more nuancedversion. Noting Philos embarrassment in De Abr.50-55 that the immor-tal God would define himself in Exod. 3:15 in relation to mortal men,

Downing suggests that Gods identification of himself as the God of thepatriarchs was perhaps more widely perceived as rais[ing] awkward andinescapable questions about mortality.39While the platonist Philo couldresolve the immortal/mortal tension simply by allegorizing the three patri-archs, Jesus instead reasons that Gods relatedness to the patriarchs requiresthat they still be alive. According to Downing, this particular case can thenbe expanded by implication to include all who respond to God, perhapseven indicating that relatedness to God constitutes a life that death can-not disrupt.40

Downings proposal for the flow of Jesus logic seems basically correct;I will similarly argue that the citation of Exod. 3:6 raises a question aboutmortality that Mark 12:27a resolves. I also agree with his conclusion thatJesus is here describing a life that death cannot disrupt. Nevertheless,

there seems to be little evidence for grounding these observations in theperceived philosophical difficulty that arises from relating the immortal to

37) Gould presents a variation of this argument that regards 12:27a more as a derived prem-ise/inference: it follows from the nature of God that, when he calls himself the God of anypeople, certain things are implied in the statement about these people . . . immortality maybe inferred from the nature of God himself [12:27a] in the case of those whom he calls his[12:26] (Mark, 230). Tis proposal falters by presuming the very point at issue, namely,that a relationship with God necessarily entails immortality/resurrection.38) E.g., R.A. Cole, Te Gospel according to Mark: An Introduction and Commentary(2nded.; NC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), suggests that Exod. 3:6 raises a temporalconundrum since a Hebrew mind could not conceive of God as being a God of the pastexperience of these men (265). Cf. Moloney,Mark, 239.39) F. Gerald Downing, Te Resurrection of the Dead: Jesus and Philo,JSN15 (1982)47. Cf. Henry Barclay Swete, Te Gospel according to Mark(3rd ed.; London: Macmillanand Co., 1909) 282.40) Downing, Resurrection, 44-45.


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the mortal.41As Downing himself admits, even the evidence from Philo isambiguous as to whether or not this relationship represents a true difficulty.42

F. Dreyfus offers a more promising approach for understanding Jesus

reasoning by contextualizing the citation, an approach whose aptness issuggested by the fact that Jesus himself points to the context ([in the pas-sage] about the bush). Based on a survey of contemporary Jewish litera-ture, Dreyfus argues that the phrase God of Abraham, God of Isaac, Godof Jacob usually emphasizes Gods role rather than the role of the patri-archs. Tat is to say, the phrase most often signifies, not the God whom thepatriarchs worshipped, but the God who protected them.43Te literature

typically invokes this name (and its equivalents) as an appeal for similarprotection (e.g., . Mos.3.9). Dreyfus finds the revelation of the name tohave this same significance in Exod. 3-4: as God protected the patriarchs,so he will now protect Israel through the Exodus.44

How does this understanding of Exod. 3:6 relate to resurrection? Accord-ing to Dreyfus, Jesus here adds a new dimension to the traditional under-standing of Gods sovereign protection by implying that for God to allowhis people to dieeven after a long lifewould make a mockery of hisclaim to protect. Gods protection must therefore ultimately entail resur-rection.45Dreyfus then suggests that Jesus conclusion represents the natu-ral outworking for the individual of Gods covenantal promises to restorethe nation of Israel (e.g., Ezek. 16:60; 37:1-28; Lev. 26:42; Ps. 106:45).46

While Janzen applauds Dreyfuss sensitivity to the original Exodus con-

text of the citation, he suggests that the Markan context of the citationfurther sharpens our understanding of Jesus argument: Jesus is not justinvoking in a general way the tradition of Gods protection and power; heis countering [the Sadducees] story [of hopeless sterility and death] with a

41) Te difficulty with positing a mortal-immortal tension as the basis for Jesus argumentcan be seen in Downings inability to make cohesive sense of the surrounding context:

he regards Mark 12:25-26a as a later insertion that breaks the flow of the argument (Res-urrection, 45).42) Downing notes that Philo does not seem to have a problem relating the mortal to theimmortal in De Fuga, raising the distinct possibility that Philo simply manufactured thephilosophical conundrum in De Abrahamobecause he wanted to talk about moral virtues(Resurrection, 50 n. 7).43) Dreyfus, LArgument, 216.44) Dreyfus, LArgument, 219-220.45) Dreyfus, LArgument, 221.46) Dreyfus, LArgument, 222-3. For scholars who follow Dreyfus, see footnote 9 above.


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reminder of the ancestorsstory.47For Janzen, the reference to God as theGod of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob recalls the repeated bouts of sterility inthe patriarchal families and, more importantly, Gods subsequent miracu-

lous provision of heirs. Similarly, in the Exodus story from which the cita-tion comes, God arises to preserve his now-numerous people miraculouslyfrom a new sterility imposed by the murderous decrees of Pharaoh. Inthis reading, then, Jesus argues for resurrection by taking this foundationalJewish tradition of God as the one who overcomes sterility and death andapplying it to the fate of the individual after death.48

Dreyfus and Janzen both helpfully advance the discussion by pointing to

the interpretive significance of the O and N contexts. Yet both also con-clude that Jesus argument ultimately hinges on the principle of situationalanalogy, a form of argument that, by its very nature, cannot be conclusive.Indeed, Dreyfus and Janzen both admit that the inferences they attribute toJesus stand in some tension with the very biblical texts that, in their view,gave rise to those inferences in the first place. For Dreyfus, Jesus groundingof resurrection in Gods saving power goes beyond the Pentateuchal por-trayal of Gods salvation as resulting simply in a long, fulfilled life.49For Jan-zen, Gods character as the one who overcomes sterility leads Jesus to inferresurrection in spite of the fact that the levirate marriage law itself essentiallyattests to the reality that God does not always overcome even sterility.50While it is true that ways can be found to resolve these tensionse.g.,Janzen notes that [r]etrospectively, the levirate marriage law could be

viewed as a promissory sign of Gods ultimate plan to overcome sterilityand death51it remains to be seen how Jesus could have expected the Sad-ducees to draw the correct analogies and inferences from these texts. oput the matter another way, why does Jesus rebuke them so harshly if hisown argument is less than decisive?

It could, of course, be argued that the desire for a reasoned proof unjustlyimposes modern concerns onto an ancient text. Richard Hays, e.g., sug-

gests that Jesus offers here not so much a logical proof as a reminder of

47) Janzen, Resurrection, 50.48) Janzen, Resurrection, 55. Janzen suggests that Jesus here employs a hermeneutics ofresurrection in which the citation has elements of both continuity and discontinuity withits original context (50).49) Dreyfus, LArgument, 221.50) Janzen, Resurrection, 51.51) Janzen, Resurrection, 51.


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Gods power designed to serve as a stimulus to the theological imagina-tion.52It is always possible, too, that Jesus criticism is simply unjustified, orthat his critique depends on some unmentioned factor such as his knowl-

edge of the Sadducees hardened hearts or the need for the Spirits guidancein interpretation. Such proposals, however, should only come into consid-eration if a more logical explanation of Jesus argument cannot be dis-cerned.53I suggest that paying greater attention to the idea of covenant inJesus argument both makes sense of his critique of the Sadducees andreveals his citation of Exod. 3:6 to be a reasoned proof of resurrectionaproof, that is, as long as one grants God the power to resurrect the dead.

As Dreyfus and Janzen suggest, the key to understanding Jesus proof seemsto lie in the O and N contexts of the Exodus citation. In its originalcontext, Exod. 3:6 introduces Gods plan to deliver his people from theirslavery in Egypt through Moses and the Exodus. Significantly, this burningbush episode is immediately preceded by the observation that God heard thegroaning of his people and remembered his covenant with Abraham, Isaac,and Jacob (Exod. 2:24). By invoking the three names again in 3:6, the textindicates that the Exodus to which God is calling Moses arises out of Godsfaithfulness to his covenantal obligations to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

It is at this point that the N context becomes significant. In the discus-sion of the first part of Jesus response (12:25) above, I argued that Jesuscriticizes the Sadducees for not inferring from the levirate marriage law

that death ends a marriage covenant.54

Te same principle appears to groundthis segment of his response, only in reverse. Tat is to say, if the death of acovenantal party effectively annuls the covenant, then the fact that the Exodusrepresents an act of Gods faithfulness to his covenant with Abraham, Isaac,and Jacob must imply that the three patriarchs are in some sense still alive toGod. Otherwise their deaths would have annulled the covenant.55Just to

52) His comment on an earlier version of this article. See too Hays, Reading Scripture, 224-9.53) For Jesus argument to rest on some unmentioned factor seems even less likely given thatin 12:25 he confronts the Sadducees on their own terms (i.e., exegesis). Cf. Kilgallen,Sadducees, 480.54) For the understanding of marriage as a covenantal relationship, see Gordon Paul Hugen-berger, Marriage as a Covenant: A Study of Biblical Law and Ethics Governing MarriageDeveloped from the Perspective of Malachi(VSup 52; Leiden: Brill, 1994).55) Tis principle suggests that, when a nation or tribe constitutes a covenanting partner

(as at Sinai), the covenant stipulations remain in force until the entire nation becomesextinct (e.g., 2 Sam. 21:1-14; cf. Josh. 9:1-27). God, however, clearly contracts his covenant


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be clear, it is not Gods covenant with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob that pre-serves their lives beyond physical death but their life beyond physical deaththat preserves the covenant. Jesus draws this implied conclusion: He is

not a god of dead people but of living (12:27a). Luke makes the reasoningeven more explicit by adding for all live to him (20:38).56With respectto God, human life extends beyond the death of the physical body.57

Tis argument, of course, only proves some kind of post-mortem existence,not resurrection. Te proof therefore requires the presence of an impliedconclusion, as Schwankl correctly observes.58In other words, the conclu-sion given in 12:27a functions only as a preliminary conclusion, a pre-

liminary conclusion that then implies resurrection so clearly that, as oftenoccurs in the rabbinic literature, the remainder of the argument goesunstated. How does the rest of the argument go?

Interpreters used to justify the jump from immortality to resurrectionby appealing to the unity of human nature. H.B. Swete, for instance, arguesthat God would not leave men with whom He maintained relations in animperfect condition.59Te continuing presence of these immortal soulsapart from their physical bodies undermines this suggestion. Alternatively,N.. Wright contends that the patriarchs immortality necessarily impliesa general resurrection because the two main Jewish understandings of theafterlife were 1) the Pharisaic, two-stage view in which an intermediatestate was followed by bodily resurrection and 2) the Sadducean, no-stageview in which physical death marked the end of a person. Proving the

existence of an interim state would therefore prove the Pharisaic two-stageview.60More promising because it does not require the prior assumption ofa Pharisaic view of the afterlife is E. Earle Elliss suggestion that Gods

with Abraham with an individual, as the extensions of the promises to Isaac (Gen. 26:3-5,24) and Jacob (Gen. 28:13-15; 35:12) show.56) Contra Kilgallen, this Lukan addition should not be understood to mean all people are

meant to live, not die (Sadducees, 492). It simply does not say anything about Godsintention or desire.57) Although Hurtado similarly points to the seeming incongruity of Gods having a con-tinuing covenant with the dead patriarchs, he resolves the tension by adjusting the natureof the covenant: [Jesus] point seems to be that Gods covenant is meaningless if it is can-celed by death (Mark, 183). Jesus answer in 12:25 and his inference in 12:27a support mycontention that he challenges the patriarchs status instead.58) Schwankl, Sadduzerfrage, 403-406.59) Swete,Mark, 282. Cf. Cranfield,Mark, 376.60) Wright, Resurrection, 424.


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[covenantal] relationship to the dead presupposes that the relationship willbe actualized by their deliverance from Sheol.61Although Ellis leaves hissuggestion at this fairly vague level, the basic thrust seems correct.

I propose that Jesus argument runs as follows. Because it is based onGods faithfulness to his covenant with the patriarchs, the Exodus out ofEgypt proves that the patriarchs are in some sense still alive to God, theconclusion drawn in 12:27a. But if they are still alive, then God remainsobligated to fulfill all of his covenantal promises, one of which is to givethe land of Canaan as an everlasting possession to the patriarchs (e.g.,Gen. 17:8; Exod. 6:4; Num. 14:23; Deut. 11:21) and their descendants.62

Indeed, the Exodus context of the verse that Jesus cites evokes this verypromise: almost immediately after revealing himself as the God of Abra-ham, Isaac, and Jacob, Yahweh goes on to identify the giving of this prom-ised land as part of the motivation for the Exodus itself (Exod. 3:8, 17; cf.Gen. 15:13-16). For the patriarchs to receive the land personally as aneverlasting possession, however, would presumably require their eventualresurrection.63

Te purportedly annaitic proofs of resurrection in San. 90b provideparallels to this suggested logic:64

It has been taught: R. Simai said: Whence do we learn resurrection from the orah?From the verse,And I also have established my covenant with them, [sc. the Patriarchs]to give them the land of Canaan [Exod 6:4]: [to give] you is not said, but [to give]them [personally]; thus resurrection is proved from the orah. . . .

Sectarians [minim] asked Rabban Gamaliel: Whence do we know that the Holy One,blessed be He, will resurrect the dead? . . . [Rabban Gamaliel did not satisfy them] untilhe quoted this verse, which the Lord sware unto your fathers to giveto them [Deut 11:21];not to you, but to themis said; hence resurrection is derived from the orah.65

61) E. Earle Ellis, Jesus, the Sadducees and Qumran, NS10 (1963/1964) 275.62) Cf. Edwards,Mark, 369: If Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are dead . . . then Gods promiseto them was limited to the duration of their earthly lives, which renders his promises finite

and unfilled; and Witherington, Mark, 329: Te biblical God had made promises tothese patriarchs, and since they had not all yet been fulfilled, it must be assumed that theyare still alive. Tese scholars essentially argue that Gods unfulfilled promises keep thepatriarchs alive. Tey thus reverse the relationship that I am proposing.63) Tus would I counter Gundrys critique that Dreyfus . . . cannot show that Gods faith-fulness to Gods covenant with those patriarchs demands their resurrection (Mark, 708).64) So Schweizer,Mark, 248; Nineham,Mark, 321.65) Sanhedrin(trans. H. Freedman [chps. 7-11]; vol. 3 of Te Babylonian almud: Seder

Nezikin in Four Volumes, ed. I. Epstein; London: Soncino, 1935) 604-605. All brackets anditalics original.


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Although little is known of R. Simai, Rabban Gamaliel was a prominentrabbi who lived at the end of the first century.66According to Cohn-Sherbok,his reasoning here exemplifies Hillels seventh exegetical principle, the expla-

nation derived from the context.67Of course, the attribution of this proofto Gamaliel could be apocryphal. Even if the attribution represents a laterdevelopment, however, the type of reasoning nevertheless seems consistentwith first-century Jewish exegetical practices.68Te above interpretation ofJesus argument thus places him squarely in his first-century context.

I argued above that the Sadducees basic scenario of a woman who isunable to bear children despite having seven lawful husbands essentially

attacks resurrection on two fronts since resurrection is 1) more difficultthan natural childbearing and 2) not prescribed in the orah. Jesus responds byreferring to Gods fulfillment of his covenantal obligations in the Exodus(Exod. 3:6). By alluding to this event, he implies that the orah does pre-scribe resurrection:69while God never promises that he will provide chil-dren through the levirate marriage law, he does promise to give the land ofCanaan to the patriarchs and their descendants. Tis promise saw an initialfulfillment in the Exodus out of Egypt; its complete fulfillment will requirethe eventual resurrection of the patriarchs and their (deceased) descendants.

If the orah thus establishes resurrection as a component of Godsintended plan, then the Sadducees critique effectively amounts to littlemore than a questioning of Gods power. Te Exodus story itself, however,is the story of Gods miraculous ability to overcome the seemingly insur-

mountable obstacles that threaten the fulfillment of his promises. As theLord explains in Exod. 6:6-8,

I will bring you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians . . . and I will redeem youwith an outstretched arm and with great judgments. And I will take you for my people,

66) Nineham,Mark, 321. Tis Gamaliel is presumably Gamaliel II, who headed the Yavnehacademy.67) Cohn-Sherbok, Jesus Defense, 71. According to Cohn-Sherbok, Gamaliel arguesthat, since Israel received the land after the patriarchs had died, God must have raised thepatriarchs back to life since this would be the only way that God could keep his pledge (73n. 14). Tis indication of apastresurrection does not disturb the parallel that I am suggest-ing: both Jesus (in my reading) and Gamaliel base their proof for resurrection on the factthat God will fulfill / has fulfilled his promise to give the land to the patriarchs.68) See David Instone Brewer, echniques and Assumptions in Jewish Exegesis before 70 CE(SAJ 30; bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992).69) Whether or not orah proves resurrection was an apparently heated first-century debate(m. San.10:1).


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and I will be your God, and you will know that I am the Lord your God who broughtyou out from under the burdens of the Egyptians. And I will bring you into the landthat I swore to give to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and I will give it to you as a posses-sion. I am the Lord.

Israels Exodus out of Egypt demonstrates the lengths to which God isboth able and willing to go in order to fulfill his covenantal promises. TeGod who sustains life beyond physical death, the God who delivered hispeople from the mighty Pharaoh through miraculous judgments and pro-vision, this God is surely capable of resurrecting the dead. Te Sadducees

are thus mistaken because they do not understand Gods power.

3. Summary

I began this examination of Mark 12:18-27 by arguing that the Sadduceesproposed scenario functions as a trap. On a surface level, it points to aseeming conflict between the scriptural levirate marriage law and a beliefin resurrection. On a deeper level, however, the very scenario itself, a sce-nario in which a woman and her multiple husbands are unable to raiseup children despite the provisions of the orah, represents an implicitdenial of the more difficult raising up of resurrection. Any attempt toresolve the logistical difficulties of the presenting problem would presum-ably involve an acceptance of the scenario itself and, thus, its implicit cri-tique of resurrection.

Jesus, however, manages to refute the Sadducees critiques while alsoavoiding their trap. He first demonstrates that their perceived conflictbetween resurrection and the levirate marriage law rests on the Sadduceesmisunderstanding of the very scripture that they cite: since the leviratemarriage law requires that death annuls the covenantal bond of marriage,none of the womans prior marital relationships would continue into theresurrected state. Jesus then addresses the implied critique, proving resur-

rection through a citation of Exod. 3:6. If, as he has just demonstrated,death annuls a covenantal bond, then the fact that God initiates the Exo-dus out of Egypt on the basis of his covenant with the patriarchs mustimply that they are still alive to God. In fact, the Exodus story itself dem-onstrates Gods desire and power to fulfill his promise to give the land ofCanaan to the patriarchs and their descendants, a promise whose fulfillmentwill ultimately require resurrection. Te Sadducees have therefore also mis-

understood Gods power.


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III. Teological Implications of Jesus Argument

Not only does this reading interpret Jesus answer as a coherent whole thatmakes logical sense in both the first-century and modern contexts, it alsoreveals a response that coheres quite well with the presentation of resurrec-tion in other N texts. I noted at the beginning of this article that currentinterpretations of Mark 12:18-27 often yield little if any theological reso-nance with the rest of the N. On the one hand, the suggestion that Jesushere defines resurrection in terms of immortality renders his logic incom-patible with texts such as 1 Cor. 15:35-41 that clearly envision a bodily

resurrection. On the other hand, the tendency for scholars to view Jesus asarguing from the factof the patriarchs continuing existence rather thanthe reasonfor their continuing existence renders his logic largely irrelevantonce believers could point to Jesus own resurrection. Te interpretationoffered in this article, in contrast, effectively resolves the theological dis-sonance that both of these readings create.

First, as I argued above, Jesus reasoning in Mark 12:24-27 does point

to the future bodily resurrection of the patriarchs. Te passage does not, ofcourse, argue that resurrection is bodily, but such an argument is unneces-sary since it represents the underlying assumption inherent both in thelanguage of resurrection and in the Sadducees scenario. Indeed, my sug-gested analysis of Jesus logic requires that rising from among the dead(, 12:25) refers to bodily resurrection: if the patri-archs current non-corporeal existence represents a resurrected rather than

an interim state, then they would presumably have already undergone adeath sufficient to annul Gods covenant, and Jesus whole argumentwould falter.

Te problem is that resurrection requires a death, but death annuls acovenant. o argue for resurrection based on Gods covenantal faithfulnesstherefore requires a kind of preliminary death, a death sufficient to experi-ence resurrection, yet not so complete as to annul the covenant. In other

words, Jesus argument requires a persons continued existence in a non-corporeal interim state after physical death. Te assumption of such aninterim state then enables the following distinction: whereas physicaldeath suffices to annul covenants (such as marriages) between physicalbeings, it cannot annul covenants with God since all peoplenot just thepatriarchscontinue living with respect to God even after physical death(cf. Luke 20:38). Resurrection must therefore refer, as it always does, tothe restoration of an embodied state.


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Second, the above analysis of Jesus response suggests that he does basehis proof of resurrection on the reason forand not just the fact ofthepatriarchs impending resurrection. Tat is to say, he grounds his resurrec-

tion belief in Gods faithfulness to the covenant with the patriarchs. Farfrom being irrelevant, this principle represents a fundamental tenet of Ntheology. In Gal. 3:15-18, for instance, Paul identifies Gods covenant withAbraham and his seed as the reason for Jesus receiving of the promisedinheritance, an inheritance that his resurrection presumably indicates andenables (cf. Luke 1:55, 72-73; Acts 3:25-26; 7:2-53). Paul then goes on tostate that his readers own hope rests in their status as heirs of Abraham

through Christ (3:29; cf. Heb. 2:16). Te debates with Jewish leadersrecorded in the N concerning who constitutes a true heir of Abrahamand his covenant (e.g., Matt. 3:7-10 / Luke 3:7-9; John 8:39-40; cf. Rom. 4)similarly attest to the theological importance of this principle.

Tis brief analysis does not exhaust the theological implications of thispassage and their resonances within the rest of the N.70For now, however,it must suffice simply to note that, in the reading proposed by this article,not only does Jesus refer to a bodily resurrection, but he also grounds hisproof in the same theological understanding that emerges in the appeals toJesus own resurrection made by the early church. Tis reading of the logicin Mark 12:26-27a thus achieves coherence with the other N portrayalsof resurrection at precisely those points where it might be expected, pointswhere more traditional interpretations have tended to see dissonance.

Documents

2007 - Bradley R. Trick - Death, Covenants, And the Proof of Resurrection in Mark 12.18-27