EditorsDenisa KostovicovaVesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic

AustrianPresidencyof the EU:

RegionalApproaches

to the BalkansForeword byChristophe Solioz &Vedran Dzihic

The book offers an illuminating and balanced assess-ment of the main challenges facing the EUs policy in the Balkans.

With contributions by Peter Atanasov, Dimitar Bechev, Marie-Janine Calic, Michael Daxner, Milica Delevic Djilas, Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vedran Dzihic, Vjekoslav Domljan, Vladimir Gligorov, Claudia Grupe, Enver Hoxhaj, Jasmina Husanovic-Pehar, Tim Judah, Denisa Kostoviceva, Tihomir Loza, Silvana Mojsovska, Iavor Rangelov, Senad Slatina, Christophe Solioz, T. K. Vogel.

All rights reserved. No part of this may be printed or

reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,

mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter

invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any

information storage or retrieval system, without permissi-

on in writing from the publishers.

ISBN -

Edited by

Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic

Foreword by

Christophe Solioz and Vedran Dzihic

Austrian Presidency of the EU:

Regional Approaches to the Balkans

Vienna 2006

Published by Center for the Study of Global Governance and the Center for European Integration Strategies.

In Cooperation with the Renner Institute

Acknowledgments 6

Contributors 7

ForewordChristophe Solioz and Vedran Dzihic 14

Introduction Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovicand Denisa Kostovicova 17

PART I: BORDERS AND POLITICSBackground Brief 1Tim Judah 24

Background Brief 2 International Responses to SecurityChallenges in Bosnia and HerzegovinaSenad Slatina 34

Kosovos Nation Building and Serbias TerritorialismEnver Hoxhaj 41

Macedonia and EU Integration:Common Problems and Common GoalsPetar Atanasov 50

Keeping the EU Dream Alive Tihomir Loza 54

CONTENTS First published 2006 by

Center for the Study of Global GovernanceHoughton StreetLondon WC2A 2AE

Center for European Integration Strategies (CEIS)Rue Versonnex 191027 GenevaSwitzerland

Renner InstituteKhleslplatz 121120 ViennaAustria

2006 Center for the Study of Global Governance and the Center for European Integration Strategies; individual contri-butors their contributions

Printed and bound in Austria by Stiepan Druck

4 5

Why the EU Needs to Embrace Politicsif it Wants to Make the Balkans WorkT. K. Vogel 62

PART II: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO DEVELOPMENTBackground Brief 1 Institutions and PoliciesVladimir Gligorov 71

Background Brief 2 Criminalisation of theeconomy as a development problemin the Western Balkans Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 80

Crowding out the Unobserved Economyin the Western BalkansVjekoslav Domljan 89

Need for Innovative EU Approach toSupporting the Western Balkans Silvana Mojsovska 98

Entrepreneurship Promotion in theWestern Balkans in the Context of Regionaland EU-integrationClaudia Grupe 105

PART III: SOCIETY AND CULTUREBackground Brief 1 Perspectives forthe Austrian Presidency of the European Union 2006in the Fields of Education and CultureMichael Daxner 116

Background Brief 2 EU War Crimes Policy in the Western BalkansIavor Rangelov 121

Platform For Action in the Cultural Sector:A View from Bosnia and HerzegovinaJasmina Husanovic-Pehar 131

PART IV: EU WORKING METHODSBackground Brief 1 EU and the Challengesof the Weak State in the BalkansDenisa Kostovicova 140

Background Brief 2 Regional Approaches vs.Bilateralism in the EUs Balkan Strategy Dimitar Bechev 148

EU Working Methods: Assessmenet,Potentials and Lessons for the Austrian Presidencyof the EU - A View from Serbia Milica Delevic Djilas 158

Prospects and dilemmas of Europeanisationin the Western Balkans: The Case of Bosniaand Herzegovina Vedran Dzihic 163

EU Policy and its Transformative Impact in the BalkansMarie-Janine Calic 168

PART V: POLICY BRIEF 175

6 77

Petar Atanasov is Research Fellow at the Institute for Sociological Political and Legal Research, St Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje. His main area of research is sociology of ethnic groups. He has published on the topics of nationalism, multiculturalism, national identity, ethnic con-flicts, national security, civil-military relations and others.

Dimitar Bechev is Research Associate at the South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) in the University of Oxfords European Studies Centre. His research focuses on the EUs policy towards South East Europe and the politics of state-building in the region. In 2005 he obtained his doc-torate, focusing on the process of regional cooperation in the Balkans, from Oxford Univeristy. He holds MSc from the University of Oxford and a MA from Sofia University.

Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic is Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her main research interest is the political economy of transition in South East Europe with a particular focus on economic criminalisation and the impact of the recent wars in the region. Her latest publi-cations include Informality in Post-Communist Transition: Determinants and Consequences of the Privatization Process in Bulgaria (with V.D.Bojkov) in Journal of South East European and Black Sea Studies, 5(1), 2005.

Marie-Janine Calic is Professor of East and South East European History at the University of Munich. She worked as Senior Research Associate at the German Think Tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin) in the period

The organisers would like to thank the Renner Institute in Vienna, the Austrian Foreign Ministry, Siemens, and the Wiener Stdtische for their generous support that made the Vienna meeting and this publication possible. We are also grateful to Professor Mary Kaldor of the London School of Economics and Political Science for her invaluable input in conceiving and implementing this initiative.

6

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS CONTRIBUTORS

8 9

1992-2004. She also held the position of the political adviser to the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe in Brussels (1999 - mid-2002). She has worked and consulted for UNPROFOR-Headquarters in Zagreb, the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-mer Yugoslavia (The Hague) and the Conflict Prevention Network of the European Commission and Parliament (Brussels). She has published widely on the Balkans.

Michael Daxner is Professor of Sociology and Jewish Studies at the University of Oldenburg. He has worked extensively in expert and consultancy capacities on issues of education in the Balkans and Caucasus, and has served as Head of the UNMIK Department of Education and Science, as well as International Administrator of the University of Pristina. In the period 19861998, he has served as President of the Carl-von-Ossietzky University in Oldenburg (Germany).

Milica Delevic Djilas is Lecturer of Foreign Policy of Serbia and Montenegro at the Faculty of Political Science at Belgrade University. She studied economics at the University of Belgrade and International Relations and European Studies at the Central European University (MA) and University of Kent at Canterbury (PhD). She was Deputy Director of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (March 2002August 2003) and Director of the Serbia and Montenegro European Integration Office (August 2003August 2004). Currently she is also coordinating, on behalf the Serbian European Integration Office, the work on the National Strategy of Serbia for Serbia and Montenegro Joining the EU. She is a

member of the Steering Committee of the Standing Group on International Relations. Her academic interests, apart from Serbia and Montenegro and the EU, include Serbia and Montenegros foreign policy, political conditionality as applied by the EU and other international organizations, and EU Common Foreign and Security policy.

Vjekoslav Domljan is an independent researcher. He led the team who prepared the Entrepreneurial Society (Global Framework for B-H Economic Development Strategy 2000 2004) for Council of Ministers of B-H. His recent publicati-ons include: A Bosnian diplomat reflects on a federation on the fault lines of three civilizations, Federations, 4(4), 2005.

Vedran Dzihic is Lecturer and Researcher at the Department for Political Sciences at the University of Vienna and Director of CEIS. Born in Bosnia-Hercegovina, he stu-died Political Sciences and Communication Sciences in Vienna. He also currently lectures at the post-graduate programme, Interdisciplinary Balkan Studies (Diplomatic Academy Vienna) and coordinates the project Imagining Europe: Perceptions of Europe and Changing Statehood in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia and Serbia. He is the editor of Balkan anders (Vienna). His recent publications include The Intellectuals in the Yugoslav Crisis (2004) and The Kosovo-Balance (together with Helmut Kramer, 2005).

Vladimir Gligorov is a Senior Economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW).

Claudia Grupe is Research Assistant at the Chair for

10 11

Economics, especially Comparison and Transition of Economic Systems, at Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University, Frankfurt, Germany. Born in Frankfurt, she has studied law and economics at Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University. She graduated in February 2005, majoring in internatio-nal economics. Since then she has been working on her doctorate at the School of Business and Economics at Goethe-University, supported by the scholarship granted by Frankfurter Graduiertenfrderung. Her main research inte-rests include behavioural economics and financial markets, with a focus on Yugoslav successor states.

Enver Hoxhaj is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, the University of Prishtina. He at the Vienna University from 1994 to 2000, where he received his PhD in History, while also serving as Fellow at Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Human Rights. Since then he has been teaching at the University of Prishtina. From 2003 to 2004 he was Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for Study of the Global Governance at London School of Economics and Political Science. His publications on Southeast European subjects in a Western academic journal and edited volumes include studies and papers on history and politics of ethnic conflicts, nationalism, human rights violations, international interven-tion and governance. Currently, he is a Member of Kosovos Parliament (Head of Committee for Education, Culture and Youth) from the Democratic Party of Kosovo.

Jasmina Husanovic-Pehar is Lecturer in Cultural Studies and cultural and political theorist at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2003

she received her doctorate from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, and since 2004 has been teaching at the University of Tuzla. Her recent publications include In Search of Agency: Reading Practices of Resistance to Old/New Biopolitics of Sovereignty in Bosnia, in Sovereign Lives: Grammars of Power in an Era of Globalisation (2004) and New Politics and the Sphere of Cultural Production in Bosnia, in Dayton and Beyond: Perspectives on the Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004).

Tim Judah is a journalist who has covered the Balkans since 1990 for publications including The Economist and the New York Review of Books. He is the author of two books on the region: The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, and Kosovo: War and Revenge. He lives in London.

Denisa Kostovicova is Lecturer at Government Department and Development Studies Institute, and a member of the Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She obtained her doctorate in Geography and MPhil in International Studies from Cambridge University, and MA in European Studies from Central European University, Czech Republic. She was also educated at the University of Maine, US, and Belgrade University, Serbia and Montenegro. Her present research interests include nationalism and democratisation in the global age, post-conflict reconstruction and security, and European integration of Western Balkans. She held Junior Research Fellowships at Wolfson College, Cambridge, and Linacre College, Oxford. Her monograph entitled Kosovo: The

12 13

Politics of Identity and Space was published by Routledge in 2005.

Tihomir Loza is Deputy Director of Transitions Online and also the editor in charge of its Balkan output. He was born in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he worked as a journalist for a number of outlets until 1993. He has since worked as an editor and writer with a number of media organizations, including IWPR, the BBC television and Transitions magazine.

Silvana Mojsovska is Research Fellow and Assistant Professor at the Institute of Economics, Department of International Economy, at the University St. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje, Macedonia. Her research and publications focus on issues related to political economy of globalisation, regio-nalism, the EU policies, and EU integration processes of the South-East European countries. She teaches Global Economy, International Trade and Economics of European Integration at the masters level courses of the Institute of Economics in Skopje. In 2004, she worked as Head of the Socio-Economic Unit at the Sector for EU Integration of the Macedonian Government.

Iavor Rangelov is a PhD Candidate at the Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, working on nationalism and the rule of Law. He has previously worked on a wide range of transitional justice issues in the former Yugoslavia for Notre Dame Law Schools Centre for Civil and Human Rights, as well as for the Humanitarian Law Center in Serbia and its regional partner organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia.

Senad Slatina is a consultant and a former Head of International Crisis Group Sarajevo Office.

Christophe Solioz is Executive Director of the Centre for European Integrations Strategies (CEIS). Born in Bremen as a Swiss citizen, he has studied philosophy, psychology, ped-agogy, and Italian and German literature at the Universities of Zurich and Geneva and worked as a visiting professor of sociology, social therapist and language teacher. He has coordinated a number of projects in the field of civil-society development in the former Yugoslavia since 1992. He was also the initiator and executive director of the Association Bosnia and Herzegovina 2005. His recent publication entitled Turning-points in Post-War Bosnia was published by Nomos in 2005.

T.K. (Toby) Vogel is a PhD candidate at the New School for Social Research in New York, where he is writing his disser-tation on external state-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina after several years in the Balkans. He is an associate editor with Transitions Online and has written for the International Herald Tribune, the Wall Street Journal Europe, and the Neue Zrcher Zeitung.

14 15

A few weeks prior to Austrias assumption of the rotating EU presidency on 1 January 2006, the Centre for the Study of Global Governance (London School of Economics and Political Science) and the Center for European Integration Strategies (formerly the Association Bosnia and Herzegovina 2005) orga-nised in cooperation with Renner-Institute a seminar in Vienna focusing on the EUs approach towards the Western Balkans. The main goal of that event was to provide analysis and advice to the incoming presidency on key issues of EU enlargement.

It is evident that Austria will have to address a number of issu-es important for the future of Europe during its EU presidency. Due to its geo-strategic position and its history, Austria is in a privileged position to act as a driver for a refocused enlar-gement, especially with regards to the future of the Western Balkans. As discussed during the seminar there is a need and a chance for Austria to present a pragmatic but innovative vision and strategy for the future of the Western Balkans in the framework of the EU and to demonstrate in this way its commitment to the Western Balkans also beyond the six-month Presidency.

The seminar provided a link between an international confe-rence held in Geneva in October 2005 to mark the tenth anni-versary of the Dayton peace accords and an ongoing initiative by the two organising partners to review developments within the EU and the Western Balkans as they unfold during the Austrian presidency as well as subsequent presidencies.

The Vienna seminar also employed a regional approach that treats the Western Balkans Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

FOREWORD

Serbia and Montenegro, Albania, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia1 as a region facing similar challenges while also encompassing important differences. Based on that approach, the seminar:

- highlighted the successes and shortcomings of existing EU policies and mechanisms towards the Balkans affecting the regions politics, economics and security;

- suggested ways to refine the EUs policy instruments towards the region to enhance their effectiveness and impact on the ground;

- analysed the EUs future involvement in the Balkans as part of the broader transformation of the EUs external relati-ons;

- identified the best modes of the EUs cooperation with other international actors in and towards the Balkans, especially considering the implications of the EUs growing role in the region.

This collaborative project employed an interdisciplinary approach and gathered academic researchers, political ana-lysts, and experts from various backgrounds and countries. Four separate sessions covered specific topics in the following issue areas: borders and politics; reconstruction and deve-lopment; society, culture, and education; and EU working methods. These four sessions were complemented by a final, comprehensive session in which findings from those sessions were summarised, contextualised, and put into a comprehen-

1 An abbreviated form of the countrys name, Macedonia, is used in the continua-

tion in this publication.

16 17

sive policy framework. For each session the organisers produ-ced short briefs as background papers for a discussion.

The Centre for the Study of Global Governance and the Center for European Integration Strategies are pleased to present the seminar proceedings, including background papers and the interventions of discussants, in this publication.

Vedran Dzihic and Christophe Solioz

INTRODUCTION

The start of negotiations to determine the final status of Kosovo; initiatives for constitutional reorganisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina; uncertainty over Serbia and Montenegro state union; the post-referendum stabilisati-on of Macedonia (FYROM); the consolidation of Albanias reform process and progression in accession and association negotiations all these represent important challenges for the European Union (EU) both in its role as a political actor projecting stability to the region through its association and enlargement instruments, and as a security actor playing a growing stabilisation role on the ground. Importantly, this moment of change in the Western Balkans also represents a window of opportunity for the EU to develop a more focus-ed, comprehensive and effective approach to the countries of the region.

The EUs expanding involvement in the Western Balkans and its political, financial and security commitment have cont-ributed to the significant improvement in the political and security situation in the region. However, the progress that has been achieved in not yet irreversible. Parts of the region still remain a serious and credible source of instability with a potential to affect the entire region and to reverberate even more widely. The sources of instability have in fact multiplied and become even more complex over past years. What was once a predominantly ethnic issue is now combined with political, economic and social grievances, which cut across individual societies. In addition, the very process of European integration of the Balkan states is itself dividing the region into countries that have a credible prospect of accession within a half-decade (Croatia) and those whose membership

18 19

might well get caught up in the political turmoil that will, on current analysis, be generated by the approach of Turkey. This division has potentially serious negative implications for the regional integration that has already been achieved, and that remains of utmost importance for self-sustained stability in the region. All this suggests that the Western Balkans at pre-sent poses different security challenges from what they were in the immediate aftermath of the wars in the region.

As a political, economic and security actor in the Balkans, the EU has a privileged position to assist the regions transit to stability in the short and medium term. Its role in stabilising its neighbourhood is that more important since the Balkans lacks a regional leader which would provide a moving force for the complex reforms that are needed to that end. A defi-nitive change of direction in the regions trajectory requires strategic vision against which various aspects of the EU policy in the region will cohere in a constructive and effective approach. In creating that vision proper understanding of the key issues that will have to be dealt with to move the region onto the path of self-sustained stability is essential. There are three broad areas i.e. border and politics, economic development and society, culture and education covering a range of mutually interconnected issues that the existing EU approach is not capable of tackling effectively, and yet are at the heart of regions continuing instability. Some of the main issues and dilemmas are briefly elaborated in the rest of this introduction.

The politics of ambiguity over the issue of external and internal borders in the region applied in the aftermath of

the conflicts in the Balkans has reached its limit and there is a clear momentum towards its final resolution. While there is a specific agenda in each of the cases involved, there will be undoubtedly important regional implications. One of the main challenges that the EU is facing is to identify correctly regional actors involved, their political agendas and likely strategies. There are forces in the region that remain posed to push forward with the nation-state building (territorial) agenda, that would be encouraged by the weaknesses in the EU approach. The security outlook for the region is additio-nally complicated by a mixture of traditional and non-tra-ditional security challenges. The resolution of border issues and a security effect it may produce is likely to be under-mined if the consideration of other non-traditional sources of insecuritysuch as poverty, organised crime and state weaknessare left out of the regional stabilisation package. The centrality of the border issue for the normalisation of the situation in the region and its political sensitivity require careful consideration of the most appropriate regional and institutional setting and procedures that will be used to advance the resolution of outstanding territorial issues at the state and sub-state level in the Balkans. This requires a careful balancing of the role of various institutions that will take the lead in a diplomatic effort to settle these questions and is premised on achieving an international consensus on parameters and principles for resolution of border issues in the Balkans. Among the plethora of international actors engaged in the Balkans the EU is likely to play the key role. To further its political interests in the region and maximise its input the EU will have to refine and develop an appropriate set of instruments.

20 21

Stabilisation and post-war physical and institutional reconstruction have been the main focus of policies aimed at economic rehabilitation of the region. The recovery from the war and transition related destruction and disruption has been protracted with growth returning to the region only in the last several years. While overall macroeconomic situation in the region has improved, the prospects of achieving long term sustained growth and development remain uncertain. Without this, no durable stability in the Balkans is possible. Much of the more recent growth is driven buy the expansion of domestic demand, and is not based in the type of structu-ral change in the production base that would help improve export competitiveness of these economies. The lack of broad-based economic recovery has had two major implica-tions: high structural unemployment and an expansion in the informal economy, both of which with important security implications. Pervasive informality has been a response to economic distress the countries have endured over the last fifteen years, and has been exacerbated by some of the eco-nomic policies. The growth in organised crime, which often involves the elements of state apparatus, is a profoundly regional phenomenon, that has not been sufficiently nor adequately addressed in the assessment of the regions eco-nomic problems. Even less so the link between widespread informality and weakness of the states has received the attention it deserves nor have appropriate adjustments to the policies that would tackle it in a meaningful way have been made. The region is in need of a strong developmental push for which it lacks local capacity- in terms of resources, institutions and governance. The current framework of assis-tance both in terms of the main policy focus and institutional

arrangements which involve a multiplicity of actors with often inconsistent policies, e.g. international financial insti-tutions on the one hand and the EU on the other, has so far underperformed in this respect. There is a need to consider what scope there is for the EU to act as a developmental actor and how it can adapt and develop instruments that would reshape the accession process into a modernisation framework. Despite improvement in regional cooperation, the EU is the regions main economic partner both in terms of trade and investment patterns. That does not mean that there is no scope in assisting regional cooperation in support of development oriented policies, through initiatives and in a way in which regional cooperation can be more effectively linked with the accession process.

Mobilisation of the state and sub-state actors is essential to underpin the regions long-term stabilisation and to make it sustainable and durable. Both the mechanisms within the Stabilisation and Association process and the Stability Pact have been focused on the state and its institutions in an attempt to stabilise the region. While the weak state in the Balkans is in need of an external support, so is a rather neg-lected non-state sphere. It is the progressive (typically non-state) actors who are expected to play a leading role in foste-ring the European cultural pluralist and integrationist project in the Balkans. Arguably, strengthening of civil society should be one of the mechanisms to deal with state weakness in the Balkans. Against the regions specific experience there are a number of particular issues in which civil society initiatives could provide enormous contribution towards normalisa-tion of the relations in the region. Regional cooperation on

22 23

the issues of truth and reconciliation related to the recent conflicts, restoration of destroyed churches and mosques, collaboration in the sphere of education, and media are some of the areas conducive to the development of a network of societal links that would act as a strategic complementary partner to the state- centred approaches to the stability of the region. Outside actors have had an ambiguous effect on promoting regional collaboration, at times promoting but also hindering local initiatives. As a result, numerous initiatives have failed to energise the existing cultural and educational capital and empower its agent to become a cre-dible political force. There is a need to address the challenges to long-term stability stemming from the sphere of society, culture and education, and developing more efficient mecha-nisms to promote the stabilising role of non-state actors.

The complexity of issues outlined above requires rethinking of the EU policies in the Balkans in order to achieve their gre-ater coherence. The policy mix that has been pursued in the region has reflected the tensions between the EUs dual role in the region: the EU as embodied in the Balkan countries aim for European integration and the EU as a security player on the ground. There are however the potential benefits stemming out of this dual role that the EU could try to utilise in a pragmatic way and adjust its policies accordingly. This would require that the EU re-formulates its role both in rela-tion to local efforts and international actors alike. The EU has so far put inadequate emphasis on creating local EU integra-tion capacity at an institutional level. Arguably, the accession process of the Western Balkans has been stalled by the weak-ness in the local capacity and hence the inadequate ability by

governments in the region to execute and apply a number of programmes comprising an accession package, rather than by flaws in those very same programmes. The EUs coope-ration with other international actors in the Balkans has at times been insufficiently coordinated; the experience of the past fifteen years provides enough ground to assess which modes of the EUs cooperation at the international level have advanced best the stabilisation of the region. This collection of background briefs and conference discus-sants comments deals with the issues and dilemmas briefly outlined in this introduction in greater breadth and depth. Together with the overall policy brief, it offers an illuminating and balanced assessment of the main challenges facing the EUs policy in the Balkans.

Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Denisa Kostovicova

24 25

BACKGROUND BRIEF 1 BORDERS AND POLITICSTim Judah

This purpose of this paper is to provide a brief overview of the situation in the Western Balkans for the session entitled Borders and Politics, while the accompanying brief by Senad Slatina will focuses on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Firstly I would like to look at some of the pointers given in the introductory paper sent to us all before the conference. Let us look at the rationale. This argues forcefully that: Despite the expanding involvement and commitment of the EU to the Western Balkans, the EUs political, financial and security commitment has not been matched by expected political and security dividends in the region. Parts of the region still remain a serious and credible source of instability with a potential to affect the entire region and to reverberate even more widely.

But is this true? In English there is a phrase, which comes from Scoop, a famous satirical book on journalism publis-hed in 1938. Not wishing to offend his powerful boss, the newspaper proprietor who has said something nonsensical, his secretary appears to agree but says: Up to a point, Lord Copper.

In this case however I really mean up to a point. I would argue that 10 years after the end of the Bosnian and Croatian wars and six years after the Kosovo war the situation in the western Balkans is far less gloomy than some would have us believe. That is not to say however that there are still credible

PART I: BORDERS AND POLITICS

sources of instability but as I will argue, essentially they come down to one core issue and its ramifications: Kosovo.

Secondly I think that recent events have shown that, far from being forgotten, more diplomatic activity has gone into the region of late than at any time in the past few years. This may not generate much international media coverage, but it does not mean it is not happening. This is true both for the EU and for the US, which with under-secretary of state Nicholas Burns, has begun to take an energetic look at the whole region once again.

As for the EU, work has been intense. On November 9, the European Commission adopted an overall enlargement stra-tegy for the Western Balkans. Olli Rehn, the Enlargement Commissioner argued that: A carefully managed enlarge-ment process is one of the EUs most powerful and most suc-cessful policy tools. The pull of the EU helps the democratic and economic transformation of countries. All European citizens benefit from having neighbours that are stable democracies and prosperous market economies. The EU cannot abandon its responsibilities. But the pace of enlarge-ment also has to take into consideration the EUs absorption capacity.

This policy has been summed up by the Commission as one that aims at consolidating the EUs commitments on enlargement, applying fair and rigorous conditionality and, communicating enlargement better. The latter, of course, is a question above all of communicating to citizens of the existing EU, but with the exception of Croatia, none of the

26 27

countries of the Western Balkans has a serious hope of acces-sion within a decade, and so there should be ample time to combat so-called enlargement fatigue. I also believe that the question of Turkey and the Western Balkans are fundamen-tally different and will be seen as such.

Let us look at the activity concerning the region. Each of the individual countries or territories which had seemed stalled in different ways, have recently begun to move again in terms of the EU or in different ways, or both.

On October 3, 2005 Croatia was given the green light to pro-ceed to the next stage of membership talks. On October 10, 2005 talks on an SAA began with Serbia and Montenegro. On October 21, Bosnia and Herzegovina was given the green light to begin talks on an SAA. On November 9, 2005 Macedonia was given a positive avis. This led at the EU summit in Brussels on December 15 and 16, 2005, to candidate status with conditions albeit without a date to start accession talks. The Commission also said it believed that Albania, which has been negotiating an SAA since 2003, was ready to complete these talks.

There is no point here in examining the contents of the November 9 enlargement strategy save to say that the accompanying reports and recommendations for each coun-try come to hundreds of pages combined and deal with thou-sands of individual points. That is to say that the political, economic and social grievances of our given rationale, the traditional and non-traditional sources of insecurity such as poverty, organised crime and state weakness that the Borders and Politics section invites us to examine and which

it states are left out of the regional stabilisation package are, in my view, far from ignored.

Not only that, but a major and increasingly obvious problem of the last few years, the question of constitutional change in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also being dealt with. The need for reorganisation in Bosnia is clear to everyone. The aim has to be to increase the functionality of the central state, not only to make for a better run country but precisely to ready it to be able to tackle the necessary reforms and legislation need for the upcoming EU process. Even Bosnian leaders them-selves agree on this and they signed a declaration to this effect in Washington on November 22, 2005 in the presence Condoleeza Rice, the US Secretary of State. Exactly what and how to reform remains to be seen though.

In parallel to all this EU and Bosnia related activity we also have the question of Kosovo. After six years in the freezer the process of future if not final status is beginning. The question is about to be tackled.

This is the up to a point bit then. Brussels, Washington and individual capitals are well aware of the problems facing the Balkans and they are, as I have described, making a vigorous and renewed effort to deal with the situation and to keep the region moving towards the EU and a better future. That is not say that all is well taken care of though and certain points need underlining.

Let us take Macedonia first. Clearly still a fragile state but one, which has come so far from the situation of 2001

28 29

that few would have believed it possible. The problem now is to keep the recent momentum for change and EU accession going because it is the main factor which unites both Macedonian and ethnic Albanian leaders. The promise of membership and the aid that candidate status should bestow on Macedonia must be seen to make a visible change in peoples lives if elements of aggressive nationalism on either side of the domestic divide are not to be given a new opening. If, of course Macedonia does not get candidate status, then we are moving into potentially dangerous and unpredictable territory.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is unrecognisable from ten years ago and, as I have said, Senad Slatina, will examine it in detail but I would like to make one small point here. A pro-cess has been underway for sometime now to move powers towards the centre, and it is a process, which as I say, may well be gathering pace. A more rational state structure can only benefit Bosnians. A real problem however, is the dilem-ma of the international actors involved. Bosnia suffers from a deep rooted political culture which has since the fifteenth century, seen its leaders taking orders from what we might call the High Representative sent in turn from Istanbul, Vienna, (in a different way) Belgrade, and now Brussels. They themselves say that they are not yet ready to take full responsibility for their country, and yet without taking responsibility it cannot advance. For the moment then and judging by the decision not to switch now from Bonn Powers to EU conditionality it seems a decision has been made to make the move incrementally, because no other choice seems available.

As for Croatia and Albania, both albeit at very different sta-ges, are moving forward. The problems affecting both are well known and there seems no need to repeat them here. Indeed, Croatia is virtually out of the woods and Albania, although still a chronically weak state has made much pro-gress in recent years.

So, to come to the nub of the problems: Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. This session has invited us to look at borders. In fact borders as such are not an issue. The question of revising tiny frontier issues between Croatia and Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia or Serbia and Bosnia are hardly insuperable. I suppose therefore that the question of borders relates to the status of existing borders. Since Bosnias borders are sealed by treaty and mutual recognition this leaves the question of if and how the internal borders of Serbia and Montenegro become international ones.

Let us deal with the easy one first. There seems little doubt that Montenegro will move towards a referendum. Few dis-agree that appropriate safeguards must be in place to ensure that the referendums essential fairness cannot be challen-ged and in this various international actors will have to play their role. If the result is only marginally in favour of indepen-dence or for that matter against, then instability could result but no one expects violence. I expect that if, say, the result is 55-60 per cent of those voting in favour of independence then, the question for the EU and others in its wake will be to help the transition and to use its leverage at ensuring cleaner government in a country whose reputation has clearly fallen since the days when its government was championed by the west during the latter Milosevic years.

30 31

In the next few weeks and months however political insta-bility can be expected. The EU demands an internal dialogue in Montenegro, but the opposition says it will not talk to the government. They have a clear aim, and it would be bad for all concerned if they believed, as the latest International Crisis Group report has noted, that they were being encoura-ged in this direction by the office of EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana. They want the referendum postponed until after the Montenegrin elections of October next year at which they could do well and perhaps even win capitalising on the general disgruntlement of the population especially concerning standards of living. If they won of course they could change the rules of the referendum to make sure that independence could not pass, by for example, giving a vote to Montenegrins in Serbia. By contrast premier Milo Djukanovic and his team need to have the referendum in about April so they can go to the October elections as victors saying we delivered the dream of independence!

Some have raised the question of whether the secession of Montenegro will lead or contribute to instability in Serbia. I think this will not happen. Montenegro will never be hostile to Serbia and the divorce will be unlike the divorce with the other former Yugoslav republics. Indeed this divorce in particular should pay dividends in the sense that Serbia, a country with a population barely the size of Londons, will have the opportuni-ty to rid itself of a cumbersome and expensive two tier level of government and thus be run on far more efficient lines.

Let us now turn to Kosovo, the real source of instability in the Balkans today. Talks on future status will begin soon and in all

likelihood lead to some form of conditional independence. What this means remains to be seen. Several options are open. What seems possible is that initially the sovereign link with Serbia will be broken but that Kosovo will not yet be fully independent and that international safeguards, borrowing from the Bosnian model, will be employed in the next few years. Negative consequences or turbulence can be expected. These include violence from both the Albanian and Serbian sides in Kosovo. Recently armed Albanians have again been seen on the roads of Kosovo. Whether this presages some-thing bigger remains to be seen. Albanian leaders are deeply divided amongst themselves and president Ibrahim Rugova is extremely ill with lung cancer. Will some form of Albanian uprising begin if full independence is not the result of talks or will protests from tens of thousands wipe away an already feeble government, leaving a chaotic situation? Probably not, but there is a risk.

On the Serbian side one scenario envisages incidents being staged, or provoked, which would lead to the flight of at least the two thirds of the Serbian population in Kosovo who live in the enclaves to Serbia or northern Kosovo. Although this could not lead to de jure partition it would consolidate de facto partition. One idea being canvassed is that a UN missi-on similar to the former UNTAES in eastern Slavonia be crea-ted for northern Kosovo, but for the moment, that remains in the realms of speculation.

Several things are clear though. De jure, there will be no border changes, nor Greater Kosovo nor Greater Albania. Just as northern Kosovo will, formally, remain in Kosovo, the

32 33

Presevo valley will remain in Serbia. Thus, although there may be potential for trouble making in the Republika Srpska by Serbia, there is no prospect whatsoever of any compen-sation for Kosovo being given to Serbia and thus I suspect, and given the moves already afoot in Bosnia to revise the constitution, not much scope for serious destabilisation in Bosnia thanks to Kosovo, despite what certain politicians in Serbia say.

If there is scope for destabilisation, it is in Serbia if, because of Kosovo, the government resigns or falls and the Radicals come to power. I am not certain that, even despite their high poll figures, this will come to pass, but it is a possibility. However, what could a Radical led government in Serbia do? Serbia has no capacity to launch wars and Serbs have no desire to return to the isolation of the Milosevic years. Economically, and despite a huge expectations gap, the Serbian economy is on the up. Recovery, though geographically patchy, is happening. So, Serbs will face a difficult choice faced with the loss of Kosovo: Resist and fall out of the race for Europe or swallow hard and absorb the shock. One idea now being canvassed is that as Serbia would have no capacity to resist an imposed solution, which would result in eventual independence for Kosovo, it should simply not recognise this solution or the emerging state. Thus the Radicals and the Serbian Orthodox Church have said that, in this case, Kosovo be declared occupied territory. In this way the current generation of politicians believe they might be able to put off the day when Serbia would need to formally recognise the loss of Kosovo and could argue that one day, if international circumstances change, then maybe Kosovo could be restored to Serbia. In

fact this is nonsense. It is highly unlikely that Serbia could enter the EU with a huge irredentist claim on a neighbour. Nicholas Burns has also pointed out that Serbia could not be a member of NATO if was involved in a major territorial dis-pute. So, sooner rather than later, Serbia will have to choose between the EU, NATO and continuing integration or Kosovo and isolation.

In conclusion the picture across the region is far more posi-tive than negative, although Kosovo and the consequences of probable eventual independence of Montenegro need to be especially carefully managed. A final point is the question of the EUs planned Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) due to begin on 1 January 2007. Under the terms of the proposed draft candidate countries will benefit from much of the available assistance while aid to the potential candidates will drop dramatically. In view of the EUs pledge that all of the Western Balkans should join, is this sensible and perhaps it would be better to treat all the countries as candidates now? As it stands for example EU aid to Bulgaria will rise from 300m in 2003 to 1.6bn in 2009 but aid to Serbia, with the same population could fall from 240m to 117m. Those countries not officially candidates then will not be able to access funds, for example for agriculture under the successor to the SAPARD program which are vitally needed now and could well help to keep the region on track to eco-nomic recovery and thus dampen the scope for instability. Commission officials argue that this line of thought, which has been propounded by the Berlin-based think tank, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) is flawed and that potential candidates do not need the same type of aid as candidates

34 35

and that substantial amounts of aid will continue to flow to the potential candidates. They also point out that, in the absence of an EU budget the question is somewhat the-oretical. But, still, this issue will loom large in the coming months and years and careful, long-term strategic thinking is required to deliver the best deal possible for the Western Balkans, both for the region and as Olli Rehn pointed out, for the sake of Europe as a whole.

BACKGROUND BRIEF 2 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO SECURITY CHALLENGES IN BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA Senad Slatina

The purpose of this paper is to provide a short summary of major security challenges in Bosnia and Hercegovina (Bosnia) and to offer some ideas as to how to address them.

Most of current analyses on the security situation in Bosnia state that the prospect for re-emergence of violent conflicts in the country is minimal. In addition, most conclude that the situation is still fragile, that many issues remain unre-solved and thus the international security presence is still necessary at least at a symbolic level.

This paper tries to go beyond these general assessments. It presents the current situation with domestic and internati-onal security mechanisms on the ground in Bosnia, points to some dilemmas concerning them, and addresses pres-sing security threats for Bosnia in the short term.

The prospect for violence in Bosnia in the short term is, inde-ed, low. With wounds and memories of war still fresh, rare are the topics that can invoke passions for renewing ethnic conflicts. People in Bosnia have new priorities that post-war development has brought and new, political ways of addres-sing and resolving their disputes.

Yet, in the long run there are two worrying phenomenon that affect almost any political problem in the country. If not pro-perly attended they will continue to be sources for renewed anxieties in Bosnia. Both are rather general, but can become the basis for concrete, negative developments.

The first is tolerance of the policy of Radovan Karadzic.

As the result of the indecisiveness of the international com-munity, ten years after the war ended we are still dealing with the policy of Radovan Karadzic in Bosnia. As a public figure he has been dethroned. However, his policy the policy that resulted in actions for which he was later accused by the Hague Tribunal is still legitimate and alive. In other words one political monster has been de-legitimised, but his monstrous policy is still a lawful partner in building the new Bosnia. That should not have been permitted.

Since Karadzics policy was an equal partner in develo-ping the new Bosnia in the past ten years, it gave birth to dozens, if not hundreds, of small Karadzics in Bosnia. In such circumstances, people who were pre-destined to be moderate, non-nationalistic leaders have turned into hard nationalists.

36 37

Any reform proposal that comes from anyone, no matter how progressive it may be, needs to anticipate resistance that it will face from the current proponents of Karadzics policy. If anything substantive is ever to be achieved in Bosnia, inter-national political institutions need to focus on this issue and once and for all de-legitimise the policy of ethnic exclusivities and obstructionisms, thus opening a space for new policies to prevail in the country. Only after this policy is truly aban-doned will conditions will be made for genuine, domestic political development.

Linked to this problem, is the other security challenge in Bosnia - the weakness of its newly formed, state level insti-tutions.

The focus of activities of the international community in Bosnia in past years has been shifting key security mecha-nisms from the entity to the state level. Some impressive results have been achieved. Let us be aware that these are sensitive areas and even mentioning the need for reform was a strict taboo several years ago. Intelligence reform, taxation reform, defence reform have established state level institutions that will have prime responsibility for designing policies in these areas. Hopefully something similar will soon be achieved with police reform as well.

Yet, all these newly established security mechanisms at the state level have one conspicuous trait in common they are much weaker than entrenched, entity institutions that they were supposed to replace and that still exist in the transitio-nal period. If any tense situation occurs, these new institu-

tions would collapse, and the situation would within days be reversed to the one we had in Bosnia in 1995 at the end of war. Further more, entity parliaments can easily decide to deny the authority of the newly created institutions on their territories.

We are probably not likely to see such dramatic development, but the weakness of state level security mechanisms can cause additional problems. We can anticipate the negative competiti-on between entity and state level security agencies, for examp-le, in areas where their responsibilities overlap, resulting in a significant increase in most serious crimes in Bosnia.

In any case, state level security mechanisms need to be better equipped and in all other aspects become superior to other security agencies in the country. It is of critical importance to quickly build their credibility and efficacy. Integrating them into the larger Euro or Euro-Atlantic security structure would be desirable, but that is not going to happen soon. Another possible way forward is to insist that once the new instituti-ons are formed the institutions that they are to replace need to cease to exist in the shortest possible time.

These two overarching phenomenon stand to influence any security related developments in Bosnia.

A few words now on major international security mecha-nisms currently present in Bosnia.

There are three major international security agencies in Bosnia: 1) the relatively small NATO office, 2) the European

38 39

Union military contingent, EUFOR, with around 6.000 sol-diers on the ground, and 3) the European Union Police Mission, EUPM, whose mandate (fortunately) expires at the end of 2005, and will likely get tougher, better authority for the follow-up mission.

Although the mandates of NATO and EUFOR do overlap, we have been fortunate that in the first year of their co-exis-tence in Bosnia, there were no visible problems in that regard. Experienced British generals at the top of EUFOR, and the American commander at the command post in the NATO office co-operated successfully. It is important that NATO and EUFOR in Bosnia keep working in co-ordination and co-operation. For this it is, of course, important that the U.S. and EU have a good understanding as to how EU security mechanisms are evolving outside NATO and that Bosnia does not become a field in which possible global misunderstandings start reflecting.

In addition to mandates that overlap, the two missions have another thing in common. Both are designed to suit interest of their centres - that is of Washington and Brussels, respec-tively - rather than of Bosnia or Sarajevo.

The U.S sees Bosnia primarily as potential front in the fight against terrorism. Intelligence gathering operations have thus been devoted disproportionably more to pursuing alle-ged Islamic radicals in Bosnia, rather than prosecuting offi-cially indicted war criminals.

The EU sees Bosnia as a testing ground for its nascent securi-ty policy. Thus, they focus on trade in immigrants, drugs and

weaponry through Bosnia. Those are key security concerns for EU regarding Bosnia.

Bosnia needs to react to this and concentrate on its own key issues including:

- the arrest of war criminals, - the control of storages of heavy weaponry throughout

Bosnia,- training of Bosnias security forces for their smooth accep-

tance to NATO structures.

Last among international security mechanisms in Bosnia is the EUPM.

The EUPM in Bosnia definitely did not help the image of EU security institutions. It had a weak mandate, and it inter-preted this mandate in the narrowest possible fashion. They avoided tough situations and tough measures. They tried to leave everything for the locals to agree upon, and if the locals failed, they would simply leave the problem for another time. Such approach was applied even in situations when it was obvious that one side was blocking the process for purely obstructionist reasons. In other words, the EUPM did not want to truly engage. Work is now underway to design a new mandate for a follow-up mission.

It would be in the best EU interests to properly weight securi-ty threats in Bosnia and direct international security mecha-nisms accordingly. Keeping in mind that reform of the police is one of the most important outstanding tasks in Bosnia, it

40 41

will be necessary to equip any follow-up EUPM mission with proper mandate for a fully engaging mission.

This was a brief introduction of the general security environ-ment in Bosnia.

The most pressing potential threats for Bosnia in the short term come from the combination of the rise of radical nati-onalism in Serbia and the result of negotiations on the final status of Kosovo. More and more radical Serb leaders publicly state that if Kosovo becomes independent, Serbia will seek compensation in parts of Bosnia.

International analysts and officials tend to dismiss this prospect as an empty threat. Yet, there are a lot of political leaders in RS who listen to these passionate messages with sympathies and who will - in a radicalised situation - do their best to have them realized in Bosnia. This is something that we all need to be alert to. Once the nationalistic passions start to reign, simple dismissals of the problem are not enough. We all remember how we were in Sarajevo in the 1990s - dismissing the prospects of war. Yet it suddenly hap-pened. And it always happens suddenly. Thus, both domestic and international security structures need to be vigilant to what these developments may bring for Bosnia. Mere words of deterrence will certainly not be sufficient.

In addition, these worrying developments coincide with the opening of debate on constitutional changes in Bosnia. Wider regional context and political bargains possibly readied there will have their reflections on this debate.

Keeping in mind the sensitive nature of the constitutional debate it might be prudent to view it as a process rather than one grand event. Incremental changes, as Bosnia has seen in defence, taxation, intelligence, and hopefully policing, are the pattern to be followed. With Bosnia about to start nego-tiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU and with the parallel phasing-out of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the process of entering a contractual relationship with the EU might be the best forum for achieving incremental but substantive changes in this country.

KOSOVOS NATION BUILDING AND SERBIAS TERRITORIALISMEnver Hoxhaj

On 24 October 2005, the United Nations Security Council voted to begin the process for determining Kosovos final status. This important phase for Kosovos future will also shape the future of the Western Balkans, moving the regi-on towards stability, predictability and EU integration once reforms take place. It will end the ethnic conflict over Kosovo after its occupation by Serbia (1913), which was followed by systematic ethnic discrimination, apartheid and even genoci-de over Kosovars under the Milosevic regime. This disastrous event was stopped by the NATO humanitarian intervention and by putting Kosovo (1999) under the control of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The purpose of this paper is to provide a short summary of major challenges towards final status. It attempts to answer the questions why the politics of territoriality dictated more

42 43

than anything else Serbian politics and how this impacts Kosovo and regional stability in the Western Balkans. International ambiguityThe establishment of the UN administration meant a de facto contraction of the Serbian state and the ending of its hegemony over its citizens. Nevertheless, the conflict, which was a conflict for territory and power between Serbian state expansion policy and Albanian majority population, did not end. Furthermore this interim administration created con-ditions for territoriality to remain the main feature of ethnic politics. It made possible the continuation of the aggres-sive war of words between both capitals, Prishtina and Belgrade, about Kosovos new political reality and its future.

This happened as the result of Resolution 1244. Rather than promoting statehood and self-determinationas was the case with Resolution 1272 in 1999 regarding the future poli-tical status of East TimorUNSC Resolution 1244 foresaw substantial autonomy and preparing Kosovo for final status talks. But no one knew what that status should be. Although UNMIK implements this Resolution by controlling and administrating its territory and has factually suspended the former sovereignty, 1244 reaffirmed the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over Kosovo.

This legal situation reflects the paradox of Yugoslav his-tory, the UNMIK mandate and current Serbian politics. Yugoslavia, which died in 1989, when the autonomy of Kosovo (which was an entity of the federation based on the

1974 Constitution) was violently abolished by the Milosevic regime, was attempted to be resurrected again in Kosovo. UN officials in New York and Prishtina were very clear from the beginning that Kosovos possible return to Belgrade authority belongs in the past. However, they referred over and over again to it with regard to different administrative and economic issues such as Kosovar mail and privatisation of socially-owned enterprises.

Of course, the promulgation of the Constitutional Framework for Kosovos Provisional Institution of the Self-Government (PISG) and, then establishment PISG, the transfer of powers and responsibilities from UNMIK to PISG as the central governing authority, were always for Belgrade officials proof that Kosovo is running towards independence.

The irony was, and still is, that Yugoslavia and its heritage were dying daily within Serbia itself. The creation of the union of Serbia and Montenegro, new laws, new instituti-ons and other policies were building a new Serbian reality. However, when it comes to Kosovo, Yugoslavia and its legacy are reinvented. For Serbian officials it suddenly started to exist, and they always refer to territorial integrity and state sovereignty. Not only for the Belgrade state elite, but also for the UN officials in Prishtina, Yugoslav laws were still in power in UNMIK-Kosovo. Even Vojislav Kostunica, who as young tea-cher the Belgrade University was openly against Constitution of 1974, considering it a cause of weak Serbia whereby it was losing its control over Kosovo, as current Serbian prime minis-ter, he refers again and again to this Yugoslav document.

44 45

This happened due to the ambiguity of the international community, which put Kosovo in limbo in 1999 and left its final status undetermined. Therefore, a decision by internati-onal community should resolve its final status and underline every aspect of governance and territory. It should not put Kosovo again in a yet another status quo situation, that would continue the conflict between Prishtina and Belgrade and undermine political, social and economic reforms. If the Security Council had authorised UNMIK in June 1999 not as the interim but as the transitional administration as it did some months later in East Timor, Kosovo would have made more progress, and the decision on the final status would be easy in 2006.

Nation building exerciseIt is clear that 1244 suspended Yugoslav sovereignty and made Kosovo an international territory. Today, Kosovo pre-sents a typical exercise of the nation building process, like Bosnia or Afghanistan and Iraq. In other words, the huma-nitarian military interventions after a state collapse made possible rebuilding of state order and reconstruction of war-torn societies. Intervention in Kosovo took place not only because of ethnic cleansing but also for the sake of regional stability and security. Its nation building process is similar to those in other parts of the world, from decolonisation to reconstruction of failed states and/or disintegration of com-munist empires, undertaken mostly by UN peacekeeping and peace-building missions.

Kosovos nation building demonstrates again that states and territories are not given, but made and remade. Such UN

missions have as their agenda administering and controlling a territory and its people, but the outcome has often been the creation of a new state.

Therefore, the position of some states that Kosovo, after the final status, should have a form of conditional independence does not reflect the reality. Firstly, with the policy of the stan-dards before status, it had its policy of conditionality and the phase of earned sovereignty; secondly, by the building of PISG and the creation of the new reality, it is de facto a state. Though nation building paves the way for a political process designed to determine Kosovos future status, there are three main developments, which had a deep impact since 1999 on the general situation in Kosovo. They could threaten its future if not properly addressed during the status settlement.

i. The first is self-determination. This was and is the main characteristic of Kosovos history and politics, where 90 per cent of Albanians want political self-determination. Kosovars regard themselves as a separate nation, as a group of people who belong to the same community, who are committed to each other and who seek their political independence. They share common origins, history, language and culture with Albanians in Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro and joined together in the Albanian national movement in its struggle against the Ottoman Empire. Today they believe that after Kosovos conquest by Serbia, they have made their own history in the fight against the Serbian and Yugoslav regimes. Kosovo as an autonomous province was equal to other Yugoslav republics. After the Yugoslav collapse, they sought their independence not only as a nation, but also

46 47

based on self-determination for other federation units. For them, Kosovo was lost through the Serbian occupation war and won by the KLA and NATO liberation war.

ii. Territory presents the second important political develop-ment and is related to the first. Self-determination means the right for Kosovo to exercise its independence within a compact territory and established borders as a former Yugoslav unit. Kosovars are attached to their homeland and claim to exercise continuing political authority over the whole territory. They have created their own governing insti-tutions and laws, engage in public works, have established individual and collective property rights and even shaped its physical appearance. The situation after 1999 regarding territoriality was for them frustrating and it created uncer-tainty about their future. UNMIK failed to govern the whole territory and allowed the operation of Serbian state parallel structures within Kosovo. Consequently, there was a de facto ethnic division of the northern part of Kosovo, which includes the division of the city of Mitrovica, as well as the towns of Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic. Such territorial and eth-nic division seems to have a deep impact on the modalities of the final status settlement.

iii. The third development has much in common with the first and second. Self-determination does not mean a change from an ethnically heterogeneous community to one that is ethnically homogenous. Kosovo has always been diverse along ethnic and religious lines, which played a crucial role in the building of the identities of Albanians, Serbs, Slavic Muslims, Turks and Roma. Bloody conflict bet-

ween local Serbs and Albanians in the past and the ethnic divisions between their communities today have never been entirely clear-cut. There was even ethnic-linguistic assimilation and a shared way of life. For these historic and demographic reasons, it was clear from the beginning that Kosovo should remain ethnically and religiously diverse as it always has been. Herein lies a consensus on building a civic state and a political community based on citizenship. The power sharing governing model within PISG, which reflects the requirements of Western liberal democratic instituti-ons, has been supported by the Albanian majority. But the effects of such institutions were, and are still, limited when it comes to the integration of the local Serbs and Belgrades obstruction of PISG through state parallel structures. Thus, ethnic identities are and will be stronger than civic one. However, this does not mean that a conceptualisation of identity cannot change in the future towards building a common political community.

The politics of territorialityKosovo proves that state building and democracy in war-torn countries can function only if there is first a state authority recognised by its population and outside actors; if its territory and borders are not claimed by others; and if politics is able to secure political recognition for different cultural groups and affirmation of their identities. In reality, Belgrade was obstructing the political process on all these levels. When it was unable to do so, it promoted maintaining the status quo. The new Belgrade leadership, which came to power after Milosevic fell, was faced with a de facto absence of control over most of Kosovos territory and with little

48 49

chance of a return to the pre-1999 situation. Territorial and ethnic partition presents Serbias current political agenda. Therefore, the idea of ethnic division of Kosovo into entities or cantons through a process of decentralisation and ter-ritorial reorganisation is widely supported by the stronger political parties and opinion makers. Therefore, it seems that Belgrade operates with two scenarios.

1. The partition of northern Kosovo and its incorporation into Serbia is still on the table for them. However, after the Serbian state withdraws from Kosovo, the best way to secure its state and national interest, is to divide it and to get as much territory as possible. Belgrade seems to belie-ve that partition into an Albanian south and Serbian north would be an outcome agreeable to both. This would be a compromise that would allow Prishtina to gain indepen-dence over most of Kosovos territory and Belgrade to save face in front of Serbian citizens.

2. If independence means the secession of the whole of

Kosovo, then Belgrade would aim for an internal ethnic division on the Bosnian or Cyprus models. Northern Kosovo (north Mitrovica, Zvecan, Leposavic, Zubin Potok) would be factually and legally an entity. South of the river Ibar, the goal would be large territorial autonomy, cantons for local Serbs, in the majority inhabited Serb municipalities like Strpce and Novo Brdo and other villages including Gracanica, Partes, Gorazdec and Velika Hoca. A territo-rial and cultural autonomy for some Serbian orthodox monasteries and churches seems to be part of this second scenario.

The main concern here is that both scenarios come at a very dangerous moment for Kosovo, and for the whole Western Balkan region. They would make Kosovo like the Bosnian failed state in the Balkans - a country without political and social cohesion. It would cause further violence, forced mass migration and lead to a disastrous return to ethnic conflict. Both scenarios would actually make a deep impact within Kosovo and Serbia. There are 130,000 local Serbs in Kosovo today, two-thirds of them south of the river Ibar. If the inter-national community accepts either territorial solution, this would not be in the interest of the traditional Kosovar Serb population. Such ethnic conflict resolution method cannot be accomplished without exchange of people, territories and ethnic violence.

Further, the decentralisation discourse regarding Kosovo and the position of local Serbs illustrates another absurdity within Serbia. Serbia is the most centralised state in the Balkans and five-times larger than Kosovo, but it never developed a plan on decentralisation, and territorial reorganisation. Although a Hungarian majority inhabits Vojvodina, where autonomy was abolished in the 1990s by the Milosevic regime, and the communities of Slavic Muslims and Albanians inhabit the Sandzak area and the Presevo valley respectively, devoluti-on of power and territorial reorganisation was never a real Serbian concern. Thus, the decentralisation process Belgrade prefers in Kosovo could provoke a chain of similar events within Serbia. Hungarians, Slavic Muslims and Albanians could struggle for similar internal and/or external territo-rial solutions. Furthermore, Albanians in Macedonia, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even Albanians in

50 51

Montenegro could ask for the same territorial autonomous rights if the borders of Kosovo, as a former Yugoslav federati-on unit, were to change and the territorialisation of collective rights of local Serbs, who comprise less than 10 per cent of the total population, were to be accepted.

MACEDONIA AND EU INTEGRATION: COMMON PROBLEMS AND COMMON GOALSPetar Atanasov

The Institute for Sociological and Political Research has recently asked 1,600 members of the general public in Macedonia about their views on the two biggest problems in the country. The results were not surprising for those familiar with the conditions within Macedonia. 71.7 per cent of the public thinks that the biggest problems for Macedonia are unemployment, poverty and the weak economy. Just 1.5 per cent chose security. These views were almost equally shared by Macedonians and Albanians. When asked what were the two biggest problems they faced personally, unemployment, poverty and the low standard of living were cited by 69.3 per cent of respondents. Just 2.2 per cent said security. These figures indicate that Macedonia, just 5 years after the con-flict, has become a unified society. Unfortunately, however, people are united behind the common problems of unemp-loyment and poverty.

The second unifying factor is definitely EU integration. The decision on candidate status in December 2005 is and will be a strong integrating factor for the country. In the above-

mentioned poll, when asked would you like Macedonia to become a member of the EU, 91.2 per cent of the respondents answered positively. Thus, Macedonia as a society has at least one common goal and that is EU integration.

At the same time, while the people struggle for survival due to an unequal social distribution of the wealth in the coun-try, the pressure of the EU upon Macedonia is on political issues such as democratic parliamentary elections, judicial reforms and police legislation. Progress on these issues will strengthen the democratic capacity of the state. However, the population needs a visible improvement in the economic welfare.

The EU should be aware that progress for Macedonia in the process of accession would be also a strong positive signal for the region. It will be strong message for the retrograde forces of every provenance that still exist in the Balkans (extremists, nationalists, criminals).

So far Macedonia has gained from the implementation of the Framework Agreement and subsequent constitutional amendments. Macedonia is definitely on the path to build a functional multi ethnic society. This is an important condi-tion for the peaceful balance in society. Some Albanian ini-tiatives are seen as overstepping the mark, but hope is that these will go away. But for this to happen, tangible economic progress must be seen in the short term.

In sum, public perception is that the EU is taking two approa-ches towards the Western Balkans: strong pressure and soft

52 53

pressure but also soft pressure and soft support. While the strongest pressure is on Bosnia and Herzegovina and on Kosovo, the EUs soft pressure to soft support approach to Croatia frustrates Macedonia. Macedonia desperately needs soft pressure in order to speed up political tasks ahead but also needs soft support in the field of investments, unlike Croatia.

The lack of resources from the EU for Macedonia will endanger the progress made so far. As much as Macedonia needs Europe, the EU also needs Macedonia to show that prosperity and sta-bility in the Balkans can be achieved and will be rewarded.

Macedonia made significant progress towards stability and ethnic reconciliation after the conflict. People today do not speak about security and ethnic tensions but instead they seek jobs and ways how to escape from poverty. According to the World Bank, 22 per cent of Macedonians live in absolute poverty. This is heavy burden that slows down public support for the reforms. There is hope that the closer Macedonia gets to the EU, the more investments it will attract. So far this hasnt happened, and Macedonia lags behind its neighbours on direct foreign investment and new job creation.

Nevertheless, there has been some success. Out of 70,000 internally displaced persons in 2001, today there are barely 700. If this means reconciliation, then it points to a forward-looking society unwilling to reopen old wounds.

The second success is on decentralisation. Some positive examples like Gostivar and Strumica (with ambitious may-ors) show that democracy and prosperity on the local level

are not unimaginable. In just 5 months, these mayors did more than others had done for decades. This should encou-rage the government to increase support for the decentra-lisation process. Before this process started, problems were created and solved in Skopje simultaneously. That was frust-rating for both the Albanians and the Macedonians.

The progress that Macedonia has achieved in 5 years puts her in a stable position concerning any unexpected events in Kosovo. Macedonia today has gained political stability that should resist any additional crisis in Kosovo. This gives the government the opportunity to follow the negotiations on the final status of Kosovo with the attitude that any solution reached will be acceptable for Macedonia.

Macedonias relationship with Serbia and Montenegro, par-ticularly with Serbia, has blown hot and cold in the past two or three years. The ups and downs between Belgrade and Skopje do not give positive contribution in the period when most probably the last hot issues of the Balkans will be closed. My deep impression is that the Yugoslav crisis did not start on Kosovo and will not end there. The Yugoslav crisis started in Belgrade a long time ago (with Serbian nationa-lism) and it will end there. I hope peacefully. Macedonia can contribute to the stabilisation and associa-tion of the Balkans and deserves full support from the EU, especially in using European funds for its pre-accession pro-cesses and building proper infrastructure. The Macedonian model can be a model for others in the Balkans as well: perhaps not all of the innovations of the model will be

54 55

transferable, but political participation in state institutions of the non-majorities and proper decentralisation of the central government is something worth thinking about.

If Macedonia successfully manages to improve this functio-nal, multi ethnic society and upgrade it to a functional multi cultural democracy, then it would really be something special in one of the most neuralgic parts of Europe. This would mean less ethnic and more democratic elements in political and social life. Nevertheless, economic prosperity is conditio sine qua non for most of this.

KEEPING THE EU DREAM ALIVETihomir Loza

In early December 2005, Macedonia looked very much like a victim of collateral damage resulting from the European Union leaders divisions over the future of Europe and the Unions next budget in particular. But Macedonia was officially a candidate for full EU membership at the end of the year, though in granting this status to the country the European Council followed the advice of the European Commission not to commit to a specific date for the start of accession talks. The EU leaders also cautioned, rather incon-clusively, that the absorption capacity of the EU will have to be taken into account as well.

But even incomplete, the news was good enough to spread through Macedonia, a country of two million, which felt proud and relieved, feelings that have been shared by the

rest of the Balkans, but that perhaps few leaders and citizens of the EUs core countries may be able to fully relate to.

Macedonia had left behind Balkan macadam and was now firmly on the European motorway, Macedonian Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski said as congratulations from other Balkan capitals poured in.

The prospect of the EU putting on hold its enlargement project now that it has reached the Balkans fills Macedonian and other Balkan leaders with dread. Bosnian Prime Minister Adnan Terzic even warned that a return to the carnage of the 1990s was possible should this happen.

A lot of this kind of talk should, of course, be taken with a grain of salt, but by no means be dismissed. Had the EU leaders denied Macedonia candidate status, that would have indeed been a piece of reckless decision-making. No, such a development wouldnt have instantly undone all the progress made in Macedonia and elsewhere in recent years, as Balkan-friendly observers were bound to say, but it would have undoubtedly sent all sorts of confusing messages where clarity is traditionally in short supply.

If there ever was a clear case for rewarding a Balkan govern-ment for constructive behavior, it came during the December 2005 EU summit. In many respects, Macedonia is indeed a moderate success story and it is very much an EU success story. With Brussels help, the country pulled itself back from the brink of an all-out civil war in 2001 and has since become a reasonably well-functioning multi ethnic democracy to the

56 57

delight of many Balkan watchers, who now even recommend that the Macedonian model be applied elsewhere, even though it is perfectly obvious that Macedonias circum-stances are different from those in other fragile countries and entities of the region.

Bosnia and Kosovo, but also Serbia and Croatia, can indeed learn from the spirit of constructive inter ethnic dialogue that has taken root since ethnic Macedonian and Albanian parties signed the 2001 Ohrid Agreement. Few specific con-stitutional arrangements stemming from Ohrid could, howe-ver, be applied elsewhere in the Balkans.

In Macedonia, at issue wasat least for the time beingits internal makeup and constitutional arrangements governing the relations between its two largest ethnic groups, not the countrys international status or the permanency of its borders.

In contrast, Kosovos future status is almost all that the concerned care about, with those actually living in Kosovo viewing their positions inside it as a function of that future status.

Bosnias three main groups seem to have accepted the countrys external status, though they disagree over the internal makeup and the relationship between that makeup and the permanency of Bosnias external position.

While the levels of animosity between Macedonias two main ethnic groups shouldnt be underestimated, their rela-

tions are burdened with far less bloody and antagonistic history than those between the Kosovo Serbs and Albanians or Bosnias three groups. Unlike the Serbs and Albanians of Kosovo, ethnic Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia are able to share many elements of their everyday lives, though with not much enthusiasm. In Kosovo this is likely to remain a practical impossibility for reasons raging from basic securi-ty to mass psychology.

In Bosnia, the country with the bloodiest recent history in the region by far, the three groups share many, though not all, aspects of their everyday lives without major difficulty whe-rever they still live together, though most Bosnians today live in communities of different sizes and constitutional positi-ons that are heavily dominated by one group.

While Macedonias main minority group, the ethnic Albanians, has seen its constitutional position upgraded, Kosovos main minority, the ethnic Serbs, are bound to view any arrangement in a Kosovo outside Serbia as downgrading their overall position.

Though not exactly in the same way as the Kosovo Serbs, the Bosnian Serbs and Croats too measure their positions in todays Bosnia with those they had in the former Yugoslavia, with their bids to maintain or gain explicit territorial rights within the country being a tool for halting what they see as an erosion of those positions. The fact that people are getting carried away with Macedonias success may also illustrate how little other ele-

58 59

ments of the international peace- and nation-building effort in the Balkans have actually worked, or have been seen to have worked. In reality, Macedonias peace process is far from being a huge success.

To be sure, the 2001 conflict between ethnic Albanian rebels and the government did not go as far as one would have expected a Balkan conflict to go. It is to the credit of Macedonias politicians on both sides of the ethnic divide that, unlike their counterparts elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, they cooperated with Western peace mediators from the outset, soon reaching a comprehensive framework agreement that laid the groundwork for the more equitable Macedonia that is emerging today.

A slightly more cynical explanation of the 2001 events is also possible. Perhaps the countrys ethnic Albanian rebels always knew that, unlike their brethren in Kosovo, they stood little chance of provoking the Macedonian government into responding brutally and recklessly enough to bring upon themselves a NATO intervention?

Many of the rebels moves suggest they may have been smart enough to realise that the international community would under no circumstances support a dismemberment of Macedonias territory, so they needed to limit their goals at this historical junction and consequently mount a care-fully dosed rebellion. And could it also be the case that Macedonias security forces at the time almost entirely eth-nic Macedonian appeared so restrained primarily because they were and felt weak?

None of this should matter much now. Whatever their moti-ves, Macedonias leaders have indeed behaved responsibly. Their very hard and often unpopular work over the past four years unfolded within the framework of the countrys EU bid. In fact, Macedonias constitutional reform largely aimed at incorporating the ethnic Albanian minority into the social and political mainstream would have been impossible without that framework. It can be argued that politicians and laymen alike often swallowed unpalatable bits, because they had been persuaded that doing so would in the end help Macedonias EU bid. It would have been absurd not to reward Skopje now that the whole society rightly felt it had done a lot to make Macedonia a suitable membership candidate.

It would, of course, be very wrong of Macedonian leaders to think that getting candidate status is the most difficult part of the road to the EU. It is not, and especially not in the case of Macedonia. Along with the recommendation to the EU leaders to make Macedonia a candidate for membership, the November 2005 avis by the European Commission contained quite a long list of policy areas in which the country needed to raise its game before the actual membership talks could start.

The Macedonians need to realise as soon as possible that it will no longer be enough to say the right thing when it comes to police and judicial reform, corruption, or the economy, to mention just a few gray areas of Macedonias political and social landscape. Both will and skill will now be needed to get to the nitty-gritty of specific policy issues, something that the regions leaders have rarely been good at. On the contrary, complex policy issues tend to be addressed or even dismissed

60 61

in broad sweeps. Worse still, there is a tendency, fortunately not yet dominant, to view the regions institutional and poli-cy shortcomings as incomparably small in relation to the EUs perceived institutional, political, and economic might, so that once the Balkan countries become part of the EU those short-comings would sort themselves out by default. The European Commission should be merciless in disabusing the region of such misconceptions.

At the same time, too much praise for the success of Macedonias peace project wont necessarily help anyone. Macedonias ethnic divisions have not healed, nor are they likely to fully do so in the coming decades. Although some of its politicians and citizens may yearn for the type of internal cohesion they see, or think to see, in some of the more eth-nically homogeneous countries of the region, the EU should help Macedonia to learn to live with its internal divisions.

The 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, whose stipulations now govern the bulk of Macedonias thinking on the issue, is an excellent starting point. More realization that Macedonia is not the