2003/11/24-Calculation 32-2400573-00, 'Highway Propane … · 2020. 1. 7. · Document No. 32-2400573-00 Highway Propane Explosion Hazard Risk Determination Revision 0.I Page 6 of20

ATTACHMENT 3

Calculation 32-2400573-00,"Highway Propane Explosion Hazard Risk Determinationo

20597P46 121200)p --

IAFRAMATOME ANP

CALCULATION SUMMARY SHEET (CSS)

Document Identifier 32-2400573 00

Title Hiahwav Propane Exotoslon Hazard Risk Determination

REVIEWED BY:METHOD: 0 DETAILED CHECK I iNDEPENDENT CALCULATIONPREPARED BY:

NAME J.H. Snooks

SIGNATURE U te

TITLE S4enin ultant DATE I

NAME S.T. Thomson

SIGNATURE ~Sd n. tfrn.

3 TITLE sr. Engineer_

DATE II/

4CECOsT CENTER 41739 REF. PAGE(S) 7-8 1TM STATEMENt: REVIEWER INDEPENDEN

.

Ibs document Including the information contained herein and any associated drawings. Is the property of FramaitomeANP. Inc. It contains confidenial Information and may not be reproduced or copied in whole or in part nor may it befurnished to oters without the expressed written pemission of Framatome ANP, Inc.. nor may any use be made of itthat Is or may be Inurious to Framrnatome ANP, Inc. This document and any associated drawngs and any copies thatmay have been made must be returned upon request.

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS:

This calculation uses a hazard model to estimate the likelihood of a propane truck accident on New Mexico Highway 234/176md subsequent explosion that could Impact the National Enrichment Facilty (NEF) plant operations. The calculated yearlyprobability of the hazard Is 2.07 x le. As a result, the event Is considered credible in accordance with NUREG-1 520.

THE FOLLOWING COMPUTER CODES HAVE BEEN USED IN THIS DOCUMENT: THE DOCUMENT CONTAINS ASSUMPTONS THATMUST BE VERIFIED PRIOR TO USE ON SAFETY-

RELATED WORK

CODENERSIONtREV CODENERSIONIPEV

WYA

11 YES R NO

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Het . Document No. 32-2400573-00Highway Propane Excplosion Hazard Risk Detennination .Revision 0

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.O PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE ................................................. :.;. 32.0 BACKGROUND ......................................... 33.0 METHOD OF ANALYSIS ......................................... 34.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ......................................... 35.0 INPUT AND ASSUMPTIONS ......................................... 46.0 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS ......................................... 4

6.1 Truck Accident Rate (A).................................................................................................46.2 Number of Shipments (N)...............................................................................................56.3 Conditional Probability of Significant Incident (Rc)......................................................56.4 Exposure Distance (D)....................................................................................................66.5 Probability of Hazard due to Highway Propane Explosion ...................................... . 7

7.0 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ....................................... 78.0 REFERENCES ......................................... 79.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE ......................................... 8Figure 1, Location of Highway 234 near the Proposed NEF Site . . . 9Attachment 1: Truck Safety Data . . .10Attachment 2: Cargo.Tank Incident and Explosion Data . . .11Attachment 3: Highway Telephone Chronology . . .12Attachment 4: Fire Protection Handbook Input Data . . .14Attachment 5: Seabrook Station UFSAR Input Data . . .16Attachment 6: SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering Input Data ... 1 7Attachment 7: Handbook of Compressed Gases Input Data . . .......................... 19

Document No. 32-2400573-00|Highway Propane Explosion Hazard Risk Determination Revision 0

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1.0 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE

This calculation evaluates the hazard at the proposed National Enrichment Facility (NEF) inEunice, New Mexico due to the transport of propane along the nearby highway.

The evaluation is part of the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) for the proposed site, as requiredby 10 CFR Part 70, and was prepared in accordance with the Framatome ANP (FANP) QualityAssurance ProgranL

2.0 BACKGROUND

New Mexico Highway 234, which becomes Highway 176 in Texas, passes along the southernboundary of the proposed NEF, located in Section 32, Township 21 South, Range 38 East, NewMexico meridian, Lea County, New Mexico. Information gathered by telephone indicates thatbulk transport of propane passes the site on the highway at a relatively high frequency.Estimates of an in-place propane explosion on the highway adjacent to the site revealed that blastoverpressures could produce slight to moderate damage to plant buildings (Reference 2).

This calculation estimates the probability of a propane explosion occurring on the highway andwhether such an event is considered credible in accordance with regulatory requirements.

3.0 METHOD OF ANALYSIS

This calculation uses a hazard model to estimate the likelihood of a propane truck accident onHighway 234/176 and subsequent explosion that could impact NEF plant operations. In itsgeneral form, the probability, P, of an accident occurring that affects plant structures is

PAxNxRcxD

where,

A = annual truck accident rate per mileN = annual number of shipments passing plantRC= conditional probability that a significant incident will occur given the accidentD = exposure distance in miles

4.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

A propane truck explosion on a highway is an external event. In accordance with NUREG-1520,Section 3.4 (Reference 1), an external event is considered not credible if the probability of theevent initiation is less than 10'6 per year. If the probability is greater than 10' per year, the eventis considered credible and must be evaluated firther.

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5.0 INPUT AND ASSUMPTIONS

The analysis input and assumptions are as follows:

1. The largest volume of propane on a transport vehicle is 9,200 gallons (gals)(Attachment 3).

2. Truck accidents are based on total crashes for large trucks, i.e., over 10,000 pounds(Ibs) gross vehicle weight.

3. The external walls of the proposed NEF buildings that house critical components areable to withstand an explosion as determined by the safe separation distance inRegulatory Guide 1.91 (Reference 3).

4. The effective yield, which is the fraction of available combustion energy participatingin blast wave generation, is 5 percent (Reference 8).

6.0 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

6.1 Truck Accident Rate (A)

Historical data on highway incidents involving hazardous materials are available through theBureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) official website (Reference 7). The data are from theHazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) established in 1971 to fulfill therequirements of the federal hazardous materials transportation law. Attachment 1 is fromReference 6 and shows the U.S. truck occupant safety data from 1975 through 2001. Included isthe number of large truck crashes per 100 million vehicle-miles. From the most recent five-yearperiod, 1997-2001:

Year19971998199920002001Total

Accidents (per100 million

vehicle-miles)220200223213197

1,053

The annual, average number of large truck accidents, hence, is 211 (1053/5) per 100 millionvehicle-miles, or

A 2.11 x 10 accidentstmile

LHighway Propane Explosion Hazard Risk DeterminationDocument No. 32-2400573-00

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6.2 Number of Shipments (N)

Local propane distributors (Eddins-Walcher and K & W Fuels) provided information viatelephone on the size and frequency of propane transport vehicles using Highway 234/176(Attachment 3). Eddins-Walcher uses bulk delivery trucks of approximately 10,000. gallons(IOK) that pass the site on a daily basis. K & W Fuels uses smaller (approximately 3K-gallon)"bobtail" trucks. Using the larger 1OK-gallon trucks, deliveries pass the proposed NEF site up tothree times per day, alternating five days one week and six days the next week. Therefore, theannual number of shipments passing the plant is

N =(3 x 5 x 26) + (3 x 6 x 26) = 858, say 900

6.3 Conditional Probability of Significant Incident (Rc)

The conditional probability of a significant incident, Rc, has two parts. Given a truck accident,there must be an explosion (Rcu), and given an explosion, it must be substantial (RC2), i.e., be adetonation, to have an affect on plant buildings.

Attachment 2 summarizes the number of cargo tank incidents from the HMIRS database and thenumber of explosions that occurred following a cargo tank incident. Cargo tank trucks are thetype of large trucks used by Eddins-Walcher to transport propane.

The HMIRS database covers all reportable hazardous material incidents in the U.S involvingsignificant hazardous material releases. An incident report must be filed, for instance, when 1) aperson is killed or receives injuries requiring hospitalization, 2) estimated property damageexceeds $50,000, 3) an evacuation of the general public lasts one or more hours, and 4) a majortransportation artery or facility is closed for one or more hours.

For the same five-year period from above, 1997-2001:

Year19971998199920002001Total

CargoTank

Incidents.1,7771,8221,7871,8311,7808,997

IncidentsInvolving an

Explosion1513131910

70

Therefore, given a cargo tank incident, the likelihood of an explosion is

-Rc - 70 /8997 - 7.78 x 10O'

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As stated above, given an explosion it must be significant, i.e., a detonation. But not everyexplosion is a detonation. Instead, most explosions are deflagrations, which produce much lesssevere consequences than does a detonation. Reference 5 suggests a denotation rate, Rc2, givenan explosion of 0.28, which is considered conservative (Attachment 5). Therefore, in thiscalculation,

PC2= 0.28

6.4 Exposure Distance (D)

The exposure distance, D, is a function of the safe separation distance. If an explosion occursbeyond the safe separation distance for a plant critical structure, then the structure will beunaffected.

The method used to establish the safe separation distance is from Regulatory Guide 1.91(Reference 3), which is based on a level of peak positive incident overpressure, conservativelychosen at 1 pounds per square inch (psi), and TNT equivalent energy in the form

R = 45 W" 3

where,

R = the safe separation distance in feet (ft), and

W = the TNT equivalent weight of the exploding material in pounds.

From Reference 8, page 3-325, Equations 12 and 13 (Attachment 6), the TNT equivalent weightcan be expressed as

=a(A~Hc XMr'4500

where,

WWTT TNT equivalent mass in kilograms (kg).a = yield, which is the fraction of available combustion energy.AH, = theoretical net heat of combustion in kilo Joules per kilogram (kJ/kg).Ml = mass of flammable vapor released in kg.

The volume of propane available to explode is 9,200 gals (Attachment 3). From Reference 9(Attachment 7), the mass of flammable vapor, My, is

My= 9200 gal x 0.1337 &/gal x 31.20 lb/ft (at 70=F) 38,377 lbs

From Reference 4 (Attachment 4), Table A-I, AH, is conservatively chosen to be the gross heatof combustion, which is 50.35 MJ (mega Joules)/kg, or 50,350 kJ/kg; My= 38,377 lbs / 2.2 lbs/kg= 17,444 kg; and from Reference 8 (Attachment 6), the effective yield, a, is assumed to be 5percent. Substituting,


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0.05(50,350'w (17,444kg)

WT,,T = 4500 =9759 kg or 21,470 lbs (9759 x 2.2)

From above, the safe separation distance, R, is

R = 45 (21,470)"'= 1,251 ft

This means that NEF safety-related structures must be at least 1,251 ft (0.24 miles) from thepoint of explosion. This is the approximate distance from the highway to the Technical ServicesBuilding (TSB) which is the nearest critical structure (Figure 1). However, for conservatism, theexposure distance, D, is taken to be twice the safe separation distance, R. Hence,

D = 2 x 0.24 = 0.5 miles

6.5 Probability of Hazard due to Highway Propane Explosion

The annual probability of a hazard due to the explosion of propane on Highway 234/176 adjacentto the proposed NEF site can be written as

P=2.11 x 104 x900 x7.78x 10-3 x0.28x0.5=2.07x 10`

7.0 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The yearly probability of a hazard posed by an accidental truck propane explosion on NewMexico Highway 234 in the vicinity of the proposed NEF site is 2.07 x 10 . As a result, theevent is considered credible in accordance with NUREG-1520 (Reference 1).

The objective of this calculation has been met.

8.0 REFERENCES

1. NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a FuelCycle Facility, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission, March 2002.

2. Framatome ANP Document 51-2400528-00, Due Diligence Report for Proposed LESEnrichment Plant Site, Eunice, New Mexico.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.91, Evaluations of Explosions Postulated to Occur on TransportationRoutes Near Nuclear Power Plants, Revision, 1, February 1978.

4. Fire Protection Handbook, 17th Edition, 1991, National Fire Protection Association,Quincy, MA. (Attachment 4)


_ IPage 8 of 20

5. Seabrook Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Table 2.2-15. (Attachment 5).

6. National Transportation Statistics 2002, BTS02-08, Bureau of Transportation Statistics,U.S. DOT. (Attachment I)

7. Bureau of Transportation Statistics website: btt://wwwetranstats.bts.goV (Attachment 2)

8. SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, Second Edition, June 1995, Society ofFire Protection Engineers, Boston, MA; National Fire Protection Association, Quincy,MA. (Attachment 6)

9. Handbook of Compressed Gases, Compressed Gas Association, Van Nostrand ReinholdCompany, New York, Third Edition, 1990. (Attachment 7)

10. Framatome ANP Document 38-2400064-00, Letter from Mike Lynch dated September 9,2003, Urenco Authorization of Use of Documents for Design Input.

9.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE

In addition to Urenco supplied design inputs, FANP is also using design inputs supplied byLockwood Greene. Urenco has authorized FANP in writing (Reference 10) to use design inputsfrom Lockwood Greene for work in the preparation of the NEF License Application under thecontext of the FANP QA program.

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. Document No. 32-2400573-00Highway Propane Explosion Hazard Risk Determination Revision 0

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Attachment 2: Cargo Tank Incident and Explosion Data

- ---- -- .-: H RS kcidmnt RepoztSum: biddent by CargoTank

eepr Co:S.gBe d AoRowWgbe

I__ I.)1 124 3.671J _Ls~i.7471 15.7761 133341T VAN k~ftC~fi T 1 1,7771_IX1.322J7871I2]L11y701.173

M now~ -Om Ocka '= gdb4 40 15,493 J 17.64] 1775581 15,073

MMIRS: Incd&nt ReportSumi : Incidmnt by Explotion

ggt Cds:32.Sf* Nexta. AIKftmgh

i htp:tww&==t~sgovdaMSaisap?=mda-&sr~clum=&Sbj~kup-.10/21t200

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Attachment 3: Highway Telephone Chronology

TELEPHONE CHRONOLOGYREGULATORY COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS- MARLBOROUGH

Call With See Below Date See BelowPhone # See Below Time See BelowBy J.H. Snooks PIDSubject LES-NM: Highways

DISCUSSION:

07/01/2003 Lou Ethridge (505-396-8602), secretary to Lea County Manager Dennis Holmberg,called with the name of local propane distributor. I had called early in the day toget name of propane distributor because I was unable to contact Little's TransportCo., the name on a 10K-gal propane delivery truck w/ Missouri plates seen by G.A.Harper on a recent visit to the site. The distributor is Eddins-Walcher (915-758-2705) in Seminole, TX; local contact in Hobbs, NM, is Mike Kneese (505-393-2197).

07/01/2003 Called Mike Kneese (505-393-2197) to get info on size and frequency of propanedeliveries using Hwy Rt 234/176. Kneese said they have deliveries passing the areadaily. They use 10k-gal trucks, but only fill to about 80%/e, or 4,200 gal due to aweight limit. The DOT fill limit is 85%. Asked about other distributors, likeLittle's Transport. Kneese said K&W Fuels is also located in Hobbs and that theLittle's truck could have been coming from Mexico.

07/0812003 Called Mike Kneese (505-393-2197) to get additional info on size and frequency ofpropane deliveries using Hwy Rt 234/176. Transport trucks (1OK-gal) traverse Rt234/176 about 2-3 times per day, alternating 5 days one week and 6 days the nextweek. Contact at K&W Fuels is Keith Pearson (505-393-5135)

07108/2003 Called K&W Fuels (505-393-5135) to get info on propane transport along Rts234/176. Mike Pearson took the call. K&W don't use transport trucks (I OK-gal),instead, have 3 "bob tails" ranging between 2,100-2,600 gals. Usually don't gosouth of Hobbs to Rt 234/176 area; if so, only once every 2 weeks. Asked MPabout transport trucks traveling from Mexico. MP said gas companies used trucksto bring propane from processing plants to Mexico, but not too frequent and usuallyonly when trouble w/ gas pipelines.

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10/15/2003 Called Mike Kneese (505-393-2197) to verify size and frequency of propanedeliveries using Hwy Rt 234/176. Kneese confirmed that they have deliveriespassing the area 3 times per day, alternating 5 days one week and 6 days the nextweek. They use 10k-gal trucks, which have a 9,200-gal capacity, but only fill toabout 80%Y.-

10/29/2003 Called Mike Kneese (505-393-2197). He said 9,200 gal is the maximum the truckscan haul per DOT regulations, which is 85% of the trucks maximum capacity.

i Document No. 32-2400573-00Highway Propane Explosion Hazard Risk Determination Rvso

Attachment 4: Fire Protection Handbook Input Data

A

l Fire. Protection, HandbookTM

Seventeenth Edition

Arthur E. Cote, PEEEditor-in-Chief

Jim L LinvilleManaging Editor

-. er. ....... %.

N Fire Proztdon AssociationiFPA Qucy, Massachusetts

. I Document No. 32-2400573 00Highway Propane Explosion Hazard Risk Determination Revision 0

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U

TABlES AND QCARTS A-3

TABL A-. t. Cbwtfn u Rlatd 1 F Shlp b t_t. c,, c..,t

W 0f T* U d VorIUdcc- A4 0 , "add H"a d"tIo G= Ha L*r v.= bft.% V&Pwbi C= C0a

Maidd C oso WA k PM 0 AIU AQJ 0 b M Owft *

mO-A" C. 100.11 V7S7 25.1 1212 2M6 t10. SW 1.1, _We bw CIOS 77A*4 . 7.1 75.O 0.104 " A4 409 2.4 0* IP-O 14 o - boan,,tff C, 1.16 401 *4 126 RW96 217. _ 1.1t t1olrob-zwo CJ6 123.11 1.1 2422 14JO il 210.7 SW0 1.2 -

pI~og C$)40, 227J 612 6*4 - - atabb 402 1A. _ -waflWWO C8J43 tRM 11J2 10.54 15.0 m9 101.1 58? 1.74 0*04

*.4m CJ,16 12B15 4.76 44M3 1269 MM 1650 0 2.0

CH,,.O, W.2 35.10 MM 1s t.725 1.0 127 118 _*c C,"1,. 11422 47N0 44.44 12.9 302 t2a5 30 2.20 11AS

104D1. CH,, 11422 47.77 431 1215 302 117.7 m 1.s 1fS1I4mb" CH. 11221 47.33 420 12*22 - SA22 1213 30t 2.9 1.5VICcvllrm - 1dnI.Sj.pudWW C L. 47.21 4471 1SM 620 44* 406 221 116

C n C., 72.15 4814 44a 12.5 M548 80 LS? 2l3 1A67I1uSt C 7.12 47.7 4L44 1, A22 30.0 36 18 1.5peot "II 0.11 32A4 3116 1S.0M 0 I 151. 4M 14 1.10

WMe COCI 2 1.4 1J4 10.74 0.102 LS 247 1.2 an5CH 400 4&64 46.5 14.51 U.116 -34 - _ M 1.44

WPM 44D9 60M 466 1273 .W -42 - a23 1.67DIMn SO 6 S 3360. 121 6712 6a8 2.45 148

mmiol t 600 830.4 12.7t1 296 a 6 242 1a.4Ca)1 42De 46Z 47 1.38 3au2 -47.7 - - 1J2

d ir C.H.O 102.17 396 36.2 12.36 Lo1i 67J. 8 L14 155C~1. 40t 48 48.17 14.43 L195 -3.23 - - 111

e t. 101 42.21 42 11 S72 145.2 3SW .7 1.17t ,*O, MW 16A9 t5,0 ." t t t2 - - tM _

12210 42.040.60 120 3. L147 207J 425 1S4 1.10196*4120 -r 125.7 196,.- -

to t,# . 122 1217 3t26 1IC 4 36 is? 1.12C 174.15 3. 5 13.40 1.746 120. - 116 -

I'm=t;lt~ 4."S I=2 V." U1.3 1.77 3D _ _ _101.19 4.1 39 S1 &0 WA 3 2 1.50

g13342 7.77 T7 I12 tt0 i"* 2 1.11 6W711919 39 321 6.6 1&3 62. t24o 07 c5

dn"_ 0. 151*4 6A41 35 - - Wm"WC 327.13 15.12 144 19.90 0.740 4.0 3 1.4 _

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* 0te CDIO 886.9 24.10 2SW 13.54 17 M25 Is? 10 1.U4tt, 8.7 4715 46S8 14.75 33 3L1 - - 1I.41

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Midncilde 1.1*Odbftn0,1 106U4 429 40.2 t1so .165 132144 $4 1.72 III,h,,; t2122 M W.9 t7 28 tsz7 38 1.7 -

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Attachment 5: Seabrook Station UFSAR Input D~ata

ZK&3Ooi UMDTED nu

PUFFPS "UME MIALYSTS-PASMiP1V VMIMF

i

Probability that a release will occur (PI)*

Probability Ignition will be delayed (P2)**

Probability of Ignition at a critical point (PS)

Probability of unacceptable damage per criticalIgnition for a deflagration (P6)

Probability of a detonation occurring per criticalignition, for a detonation (P6)***

Site Temperature

Propane Kass Release

F1ashing Fraction

Propane Puff W ight (K)

Propane Vapor density at 104F (Pga)

Detonability LImits of Propane

10-' spills/year

0.24 delayedignitions per spill

1.0

1.0

0.28

104-F

2. 354l0 lb.

0.478

1. 2s105 lb.

D.107 lb./fe5

3.0 6. 6(RoE. S6)

C Reference 70 gives an upper bound for boiler failures of 10- per yearand Reference 98 gives the failure rate for fixed location chlorinetanks as lO 5 per year. excluding seiasie events. A value of l04 peryear is conservatively assumed.

** Study of rail car spllls (Reference 70) abows that 76 percent of thespills Ignited vithiA 100 ft of the relesse, hence. a value of 0.24delayed ignitions per *pill.

* Reference 71 suggests a detonation rate giting ignition of 0.28. whichia considered conservative.

J

Document No. 32-2400573-00

' Hlghway Propane Explosloh Hazard Risk Determination Revision 0

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Attachment 6: SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering Input Data

SFPE Handbook ofFire Protection Engineering

Second Edition

Editorial Staf

nllUp J. DiNeano. PJE, Hughes Anodates. Inc

Crag L. Bqer. PrD. Rues Assodat. Inc.

RidiUd L P. Custer. Custer Powce Inc.W. Douas Waiton FE. National latute el Sunards and Tecnology

John M. Watts. Jr. PhDh. c Fire Safety InstituteDaugal Drysdale. PhD. Undversity of Edk&urg

John L Hall. Jr. hD., NatimW Fire Prwtect[o Assodaion

ftIe NQael Firo 1 tectmsn cOrw QusiucY. MaspuAusetts

9-*ty of irue prntecton hngin& Boston. Ussmaebusetts

Docurent No. 32-2400573-00Highway Propane Explosion Hazard Risk Determination .Revision

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EXPLOSION rOtaECION 3-325

actual quenching or the advancing Rama front In lag ves-sels. Some agents provide chemical Inhibition effects ImostUkely via free radical scavenging in addition to dfluent andtbhenal benefits, but ti chemical Inhibition effectivenessIs both fuel dependent?' and dependent an the advancingflame frent apeed.

T M

Most of the suppression test data suggest that the van-WUs agents av comparable effectiveness for glow to mod-eage delagratlos but that ammonum phosphate (and to aiser extent potassium bicarbonate) bcomes decidedlyiore effective for tepid detlagrations. However. Bartknelitconcludes that none of thei agents. as presently used InsuppressIon ystems. can suppress explosions in Sae with

valuesxccding 200 b .or in duss withKsvaluesgreste than 300 barmla.

Recent lests at NLST5 In abock tube generating highlysurbalent lame nd quasudetonationa daionstraae that

thse hIgh-challenge axplosdons can be suppressed. pro-vided (il agent can be dispersed uniformly ahead of theabock wave. and 12) seous agent concentrations wre

round 10 vat percent ILa. about twice es high as the Halon1501 volumetrIc concentration used Fr more conventional.less challenging. axplosion supprOSSSon applicatIons.

The choice of agent must Involve other cooldleratioasbeides suppression effctiveness as detrmined by lestdata. Other relevunt consideratlons Include agent rtantiontime to pe wt meated igItioons, agent corupatiblhtywish pces stetenfa envronmental inspact reglaions,and potentsia toxicityaects at tbe agent design concentma-doe. U5S reulan that define aceptable end naccept-able suppression agents, fromsenvlroamenlal mud toxicitycoulnsidatons. e detc~e In a seignficant no chrudsen-tive policy for oa1pt1 chelcal1.

Genem"l gideines for the design, installation, andeiunterancc ofa relable and efective Ixon suppres-

don e b iuterature46 a in ttheas pr d by stem manufacturers. In addition.

n manufacturer and pprv l organitatlons have awealth d unpublsed test ad Incident dait that ar often

occur, since at eist 15 of 68 (22 percent) reported ignitionsIn snmiconfned environments resulted In Cash fires as op-posed to explosions (37 other Ignitions did xesult In explo-slann Damage surveys indicati that many of the vaporcloud explosions wer deflagrations rather than detona-ion. On the othethand, analyses ef pressure waves gener-

ated brm flae propagation through vapor clouds (eS.. Leeat oP33 Indicale tht m e speeds of at least 100 ms aeaere~ssa to geeae potentially destrutdive evaspessuegeterthan about 0. latm.LThus the most lklty scenarbo Isthat lame speeds en the elder ot a fewn hundred sahs (wrre

pedig e edquastdetonations) wet generted IntecutIndidents as a result of fle acelrtln around

buildin and structures.The most enunoft used mathod' to assess blast wave

aects from vapor doud explosions is to employ Ided (pointsource) blast wave earrelations based on the blast wave n-rgy. IJA the NTequivalent enwgy. This anrgy I sivenby

£ - eAlfern, (12)

g - blast wavenerw Mkla - yiid. La. the fIaction oravatlable combustion en-

argy participating in blast wave generationA - theoretical net beat of combustion (lWmr - mass of flammable vapor released (kgV

The corresponding TNT equivalent mass. kg. WTN, is

w,- E14S kg (13)

Uena In deeloping systempecuicauous u eps iorspecfc applcations.

VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSIONSRese of a lage quantity of lanabl s e r por

Into the ospre will result, t last tempo . Ic thef tion of a Iammsble vapor cloud Ignition vaporcloud may, under certain vagely deined conditios, r tIn ufficdently rpid Ramie propagntlon to generate derinic-live overpressures and blast waves. Qualitatively, the con-dtions required lor a vapm cloud explosion ae (2 l targeantityofd d nt~npr gartvapor nd () shra hshl

energetiC Ignition nc or* h y dstrcted envirnmmetsuppaetilo turbulenclIdued flame a oclotions.

istricalvl all eported vapor cloud explosionsbave Invdv~d Lrelese cf tlkast10 too ef Ilurniblepgs,With a quantity of 1000 to 1.M000 kgbng most common.The Sun most often invelved have bocn ottlylene. propane.

d bu e. Ad Wl na's compiation of Incdent deat all of the reported vapor doud sxplosions haveeund In n ld environments such that build.

gs erther large structures we within te vapor doud atthe time ef ignition. Wiaetna's data he ct t the a

en fa larhe buwlding or siuciueUi hedd1neesay. but wot suficient. condition for mu explosion bo

Fiau 3-1tl2 Is the Ideal blast wave O pressue vr-&Usdistanceconrlation used In confnctlon with Equations12 and 1 Distances In Figure 3-I14 ane scaled bythe cuberoot of Wwr In accordance with Idel blast wave theory.The overpressures in Figure -16.14 are eflected shockwave overpressures associated with reilections of the inci-dent shock wave off stlid surface erp cular to thewave p.plion direction. Nominal bul dami e dponncl WA.urr thresholds ae also Indicated Jngre2-1614 and In Cle 3-1S. Mor accurate and cOnprohen-ave damage sasessment should be based an &ctul siruc-tural dynamic loading calculatIons leading to Impulse-averpvssure damage thesholds as describod. for example.by Fickett and Davis.0

SeWorn EquatIons 12 and 13 can be used aflectively.some guidance Ie needed on the selection of approprtevalues of thze yid, a. Data compklld by Gup-nt5 U.Davenport" on the ffdectve yields from apomately 20vapor cloud exlos~ons showed a apread do orders ofmagnitude, with the highest value in one partIcularly dev-astating incdent being 25 to S0 pcent. Wickera'scompflalonss shows the efective ie to be ut one per.cent for relses of 1,O00 lo 10,0 k nporandobbln thctange oft 1 10 percent when more than 10.000 kg Is re-leased. The yield In the Fhnborough explosion (one of themost destructive and the moat thoghly Investigated andreported vapor doud explosion to date) Is 4 to S percentbased on the 30 to40 metric tons of cyclobexans releasedprimr to igultion.M Thus. the specification of yields forblastdamage predictions Is an exercise In dsk assessment, with

Although the TNT equivalenry stethodt Is aos! Commn In thleswted , ta.mpean otean eotherintheds

Highway Propane Explosion Hazard Risk Determination -Document No. 32-2400573-00

Revision 0Page 19 of 20

Attachment 7: Handbook of Compressed Gases Input Data

IHANDBOOK OF

Compressed GEThird Edition

ises

i'

I

I

.3

COMPRESSED GAS ASSOCIATIONArlington, Krginta

VAN NOSTRAND REINH=Ogo New York

Document No. 32-2400573-00IHighway Propane Explosion Hazard Risk Determination Revision 0. Page 20 of 20

i 'so il / Indivkndu Compxnd Gases and Miztes

PHYSICAL CONSTANTSPropane

I -I. :...

I ;

Otemical formulaMolecular weightVapor pressure

at 70F (21.1 *C)at 1008F (37.84C)at 115F(46.1*C)at 13OF(54.46C)

Density of the gasat 70F(21.IC) and I atm

Spedfic gravity of the gasat 70F ad I atm (air -)

Specirfc volume Of the sasat 60F (15.6CQ and I atm

Density of the Squidat saturation presure

at 60F (15.6IC)at 70F (21. 1C)at 105F (40.6C)at ISF (46.1 C)at 130-F (54.4'C)

Boiling point aa I atmFreezing point at I atmCritical temperatureCritical pressureCritical density

aent heat of vaporization:t st boiling point

Specific heat or gasat 60F (15.60C) and I aun

C,C.

109.73 pdg173.38 prig212.95 psig258.37 psig

U.S. Units

CH,44.097

Si UnitsCpHa44.097

756.56 kPa1195.41 kPa1468.24 kPa17S1.40 kPa

1.0 kg/rM

1.5223

0.5276 ml/kg

.,

0.115 99 lb/11'

1.5223

8.4515 ftsfib

SI-

31.59 WIll31.20 lb/fil29.33 Wbift28.70 Ib/ft'27.77 lb/ft'-43.67F-305.84F206.01OF616.3 psla13.5 lb/fI

183.05 Brurlb

AR I

a ;

506.02 kt/mr499.78 kg/ml469.12 kg/m459.73 kg/'444.13 ktg/rn-42.046C- 167A90C96.672-C4249.24 kPa abs236.25 kg/ml

425.77 J/kg

1.625 kl/(kgX-C

a

S..I

7a

IinW

I.

7 _

.._

0.3881 Btu/IbXOF)

0.3430 Btu/GbXF)

1.1312.2-9.5%

I.436 kJ/ftlX*C)

i.

Rato of specific heats, C,/C.Flammable limits Iin airSolubiliy In water. vol/vol

at 1001F (37.C)Weight of the liquid

at saturation pressureat 60-F (1.6 C)

Heat of combustiongressnett

1.1312.2-9.5%

0.065 0.06S

o1 L4.223 lb/gal 506.03 kg/m'

2517.5 1ttu/fts 93 799.41 k/ml2316.1 tu/l t6 295.45 kU/n' I

ii