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22ndnd GNSS Vulnerabilities and Solutions Conference GNSS Vulnerabilities and Solutions Conference
Baska, KrK Island, CroatiaBaska, KrK Island, CroatiaSeptember 3, 2009September 3, 2009
Hank SkalskiHank Skalski
U.S. Department of TransportationU.S. Department of Transportation
2
Overview
• The Challenge
• User Support
• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation
• Way Ahead
• Summary
• The Challenge
• User Support
• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation
• Way Ahead
• Summary
3
GNSS enabled applications and services are woven into the fabric of our daily lives
The Challenge
4
Overview
• All radio signals are vulnerable to man-made and natural sources of interference
• Global Navigation Satellite Systems are not immune from disruptions
• Intentional / Unintentional In-band transmission
• Out-of band / Harmonics
• Solar activity / Scintillation
• Satellite anomalies
• All radio signals are vulnerable to man-made and natural sources of interference
• Global Navigation Satellite Systems are not immune from disruptions
• Intentional / Unintentional In-band transmission
• Out-of band / Harmonics
• Solar activity / Scintillation
• Satellite anomalies
5
AFSPCGPSOCAFSPCGPSOC
USCGNAVCEN
USCGNAVCEN
FAANOCCFAA
NOCC
OtherSources
OtherSources
NANU
SystemPerformanceNOTAM
InterferenceReports
Notice toMariners
Testing
SpaceWx
UserFeedback
AugmentationReports
The Challenge
There is a substantial amount ofinformation that must be verified,
analyzed, and coordinated
There is a substantial amount ofinformation that must be verified,
analyzed, and coordinated
6
Overview
• The Challenge
• User Support
• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation
• Way Ahead
• Summary
• The Challenge
• User Support
• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation
• Way Ahead
• Summary
8
User Support
USCGUSCG
NAVCENNAVCEN
Notice to MarinersNotice to Mariners NANU’sNANU’s
List Server DistributionList Server Distribution
DGPS & NDGPSDGPS & NDGPS
General User InformationGeneral User Information
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USCGUSCG
NAVCENNAVCEN
User Support
Notice to AirmenNotice to Airmen
Aviation AdvisoriesAviation Advisories
WAAS & LAASWAAS & LAAS
RAIM PredictionsRAIM PredictionsFAAFAA
NOCCNOCC
10
USCGUSCG
NAVCENNAVCEN
User Support
FAAFAA
NOCCNOCC
Constellation
Performance Predictions
Constellation
Performance Predictions
Constellation
Health & Status
Constellation
Health & Status
Space WeatherSpace Weather
Anomaly AnalysisAnomaly Analysis
JSpOC and
Theater Support
JSpOC and
Theater Support
AFSPCAFSPC
GPSOCGPSOC
11
USCGUSCG
NAVCENNAVCEN
User Support
AFSPCAFSPC
GPSOCGPSOC
National Space-BasedPositioning, Navigation, & Timing
Policy
National Space-BasedPositioning, Navigation, & Timing
Policy
Tri-Lateral Memorandum of AgreementTri-Lateral Memorandum of Agreement
Interference
Detection & Mitigation
CONOPS
Interference
Detection & Mitigation
CONOPS
Standard Operating
Procedures
Standard Operating
ProceduresFAAFAA
NOCCNOCC
12
Overview
• The Challenge
• User Support
• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation
• Way Ahead
• Summary
• The Challenge
• User Support
• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation
• Way Ahead
• Summary
13
FAAFAA
NOCCNOCC
USCGUSCG
NAVCENNAVCEN
Civil Detection & Reports
Detection / Reporting
14
USCGUSCG
NAVCENNAVCEN
FAAFAA
NOCCNOCCAFSPCAFSPC
GPSOCGPSOC
Space Event Tracking System (SETS)
Detection / Reporting
15
AFSPCAFSPC
GPSOCGPSOC
Information & Data Analysis
Performance
Analysis
Performance
Analysis
Constellation
Health & Status
Constellation
Health & Status
Space WeatherSpace Weather
Engineering
Data Analysis
Engineering
Data Analysis
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USCGUSCG
NAVCENNAVCEN
FAAFAA
NOCCNOCC
Interference Detection & Mitigation
DHSDHS
Integrated Common Analytical Viewer
(iCAV)(iCAV)
DHSDHS
Integrated Common Analytical Viewer
(iCAV)(iCAV)
SETS
Data Fields
SETS
Data Fields
AFSPCAFSPC
GPSOCGPSOC
Purposeful Interference Resolution Team
(PIRT)
Purposeful Interference Resolution Team
(PIRT)
Information & Data Analysis
17
FAAFAA
NOCCNOCC
Interference Location
Identification / Location
Nine RFI
Detection Vans
Nine RFI
Detection Vans
200+ hand held
devices
200+ hand held
devices
26 Flight Inspection Aircraft
are Fitted with RFI Detection equipment
26 Flight Inspection Aircraft
are Fitted with RFI Detection equipment
Fixed Base
RFI Detection Systems
Fixed Base
RFI Detection Systems
18
FAAFAA
NOCCNOCC
Interference Location
Identification / Location
Nine RFI
Detection Vans
Nine RFI
Detection Vans
200+ hand held
devices
200+ hand held
devices
26 Flight Inspection Aircraft
are Fitted with RFI Detection equipment
26 Flight Inspection Aircraft
are Fitted with RFI Detection equipment
Fixed Base
RFI Detection Systems
Fixed Base
RFI Detection Systems
FederalFederal
CommunicationCommunication
CommissionCommission
19
FederalFederal
CommunicationCommunication
CommissionCommission
FederalFederal
Bureau ofBureau of
InvestigationInvestigation
Mitigation
Mitigation of Disruption Source
20
Overview
• The Challenge
• User Support
• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation
• Way Ahead
• Summary
• The Challenge
• User Support
• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation
• Way Ahead
• Summary
21
Way Ahead
• Continue improvements• Training & exercise• Maximize use of automation• Employ interference detection systems
• Cultivate international cooperation • Interoperability & Compatibility • ITU Spectrum protection • Communications
• Continue improvements• Training & exercise• Maximize use of automation• Employ interference detection systems
• Cultivate international cooperation • Interoperability & Compatibility • ITU Spectrum protection • Communications
22
Overview
• The Challenge
• User Support
• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation
• Way Ahead
• Summary
• The Challenge
• User Support
• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation
• Way Ahead
• Summary
23
Summary
• Major strides have been made in the dissemination and coordination of GPS operational information to serve all users throughout the world
• We need to cultivate the communications, cooperation, and coordination between all providers of GNSS services
• Major strides have been made in the dissemination and coordination of GPS operational information to serve all users throughout the world
• We need to cultivate the communications, cooperation, and coordination between all providers of GNSS services
24
Contact Information
Hank SkalskiDOT Liaison to Air Force Space Command
Air Force Space Command HeadquartersAFSPC/OST
150 Vandenberg St., Suite 1105Peterson AFB, CO 80914
Phone: +01.719.554.2570Fax: +01.719.554.6719
Email: [email protected]
Hank SkalskiDOT Liaison to Air Force Space Command
Air Force Space Command HeadquartersAFSPC/OST
150 Vandenberg St., Suite 1105Peterson AFB, CO 80914
Phone: +01.719.554.2570Fax: +01.719.554.6719
Email: [email protected]
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