2 - Introduction to Civil-Military Operations (Student)-Form

8/2/2019 2 - Introduction to Civil-Military Operations (Student)-Form

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Abuja, Nigeria

15 19 September 2008

Civil-Military Operations Course

Introduction toIntroduction to

Civil-Military RelationsCivil-Military Relations

Presented by Dr. Pita AgbesePresented by Dr. Pita Agbese


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ObjectivesObjectives

To explore the dimensions of civil-militaryoperations and to show why they constitute a criticalpart of modern military operations

To explore methods and mechanisms for repairingthe armed forces for effective civil-militaryoperations

To demonstrate how the ability to project softpower improves and validates military performance


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The New VisionThe New Vision

A new avenue for the armed forces of West Africa to

create new relevance for themselves

West Africa and the entire African continent have

witnessed many humanitarian crises that required militaryskills and professionalism

- Civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia,

Uganda, DRC, etc.

- The 1994 Genocide in Rwanda

- The on-going genocide in the Darfur region of the

Sudan


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Civil-Military Operations: Definition

Activities involving the use of bothmilitary and non-military instruments ofpower to achieve military objectives

In CMO, the military takes on activities

or functions normally carried out bylocal authorities or NGOs


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Objectives of CMO

Create collaborative relationship among

Armed Forces

IGOs & NGOs Civilian Populace


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Objectives of CMO Contd

Limit collateral damage

Create stability

Counter insurgency

Respond to irregular threats Hasten an end to violence/hostilities

Restore confidence/trust

Gain legitimacy for a new government

Reduce hardships of civilian populace

Turn foes to friends


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Arenas of CMO

Hostile Environment War

Terrorist attacks

Friendly Environment Natural disasters---floods, earth-quakes, etc.

Neutral Environment


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Functional Levels of CMO

Strategic Reconstruction Economic development Political stability

Operational Security Feeding/shelter Restoration of health other social infrastructure Creating legitimacy for a new administration Coordination of military operations with NGO/IGO activities

Tactical Minimization of friction with the civilian populace

Security operations Health service support


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Phases of CMO

Counter-Insurgency Phase Major focus: Use military capabilities to help civilian

populace Primary Objectives

Reduction of dissatisfaction of the populace

Depriving the insurgency of local support

De-legitimizing the insurgency


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Phases of CMO

Peace Operations Central focus:

Protection of vulnerable population

Foster cooperative relationship among the:

Military

Civilian organizations

Government

People


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Phases of CMO

Stability Operations

Central focus

Securing/safeguarding the populaceRe-establishing law/order

Protecting infrastructure

Re-building infrastructure

Restoration of public services


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Activities of CMO

Public infrastructure Water

Sewer

Electricity

Economic stability Rule of law

Policing

Judicial reform

Governance Anti-corruption programs

Public health/welfare

Public education/information


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CMO: Responsible Units

Bulk of CMO activities are undertaken by Civil

Affairs Unit

Other units of the armed forces involved are:

Special Operations Forces Psychological Operations Unit

Legal Support Unit

Engineering

Transportation unit Military Police

Health Service Support


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Challenges of CMO

Conflicting goals with humanitarian organizations

Coordination of activities with NGOs/IGOs

Language barrier

Inherent hostilities

Lack of proper equipment

Unclear or ambiguous mandates


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All disaster plans should be built to diminishAll disaster plans should be built to diminish

fear and povertyfear and poverty

Key ConsiderationsKey Considerations


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Getting OrganizedGetting Organized

When a crisis occurs, it is too late to get organized

For domestic deployments, you should have trained withyour national crisis response office

For foreign deployments, military commanders at all levels

must know how to lead or how to work with internationalorganizations and local leadership

Field exercises with realistic scenarios and the participationof relevant civilian operators are strongly recommended

You should have prepared rules of engagement forstabilization, humanitarian or international emergencyoperations


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The Military as the SupportedThe Military as the Supported

or Supporting Forceor Supporting Force

There are many reasons why the mosteffective posture for the military force is tothink of itself as a supporting force within a

large complex operation The military is likely to be the first to leave the

deployment area before the civilian agenciesare done, and not being in charge facilitates

continuity of the overall operation


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A great reward of

humanitarian work is

the knowledge that

your efforts save lives

Frequently, the militarys

chief contribution is heavy

transport

The Military as the SupportedThe Military as the Supported

or Supporting Forceor Supporting Force


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Measures of EffectivenessMeasures of Effectiveness

When members of your force are seen as protectorsand not predators by the people you are there to protect

When you are able to maintain friendly and productiverelations with local authorities and general population

When your troops are so well disciplined that there areno reports of misbehavior against innocent men, womenor children

When local people start to inform you of the presence oftrouble-makers

You have been successful:


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The International Intervention CommunityThe International Intervention Community

UN Agencies

HOSTNATION

InternationalOrganizations

DonorStates

MILITARYFORCES

Regional

States and

Institutions

Diaspora

communities

OPS CTRSECRETARIAT

OCHA; DPA; DPKOICRC

IOM

IFRC

UN

Operational

Agencies

UNHCR, WFP

UNICEF

Non-

Governmental

Organizations

(NGOs)

International

Corporations

The Press& Media

AFRICAN

UNION


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Military First Responders FaceMilitary First Responders Face

Many Critical and Difficult IssuesMany Critical and Difficult Issues

The arrival of a military force in a distressed stateinevitably changes the political chemistry of thecountry

People who have nothing have very few options, andrarely are they going to throw flowers at the feet ofmilitary personnel

If you are wearing a military uniform, there is really

no such thing as disinterested, neutral interventionAll soldiers have a role in Civil-Military Relations as

soon as operations begin


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Building Capacities ofBuilding Capacities of

Your PartnersYour Partners

We must give consideration to increasing thecapacities (access via security) and profile of IO/NGOcommunities, including those that do not wish to workwith the military

The services provided by humanitarians are not athigh cost, other than the fundamental requirement toprotect them and to generally support them

The possible loss of public relations value from doingthe work ourselves is easily made up by theproductive image of protecting IO/NGO care givers


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What Is Humanitarian SpaceWhat Is Humanitarian Space

on the Battlefield?on the Battlefield?

When a military is deployed to respond to a crisis, it willfind civilian responders already there or soon to arrive

If the situation is serious enough to warrant deploymentof military forces, there will be dangers for intervening

forces The professionalism of the military forces will be

determined by their ability to achieve mission goals whileminimizing the risks to innocents

Military rules of engagement (ROE) should be consistentwith the desired end-state of the operation

Desired end-state is a functioning, infrastructure-viablecommunity with sustainable and transparent economicand political structures in place


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Enemies on the HumanitarianEnemies on the Humanitarian

Battlefield (NGO perspective)Battlefield (NGO perspective)

Impunity of Warlords and Criminals WhichEscalate Instability

Targeting of Humanitarian or Civilian

Officials that Reduces NGO/IO Mobility toProvide Basic Services

Bad Information

Distrust of Civilian Authorities

Water-borne diseases; Lack of Shelter; Lackof Food; and Fear of the Unknown


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Some of Your Partners on theSome of Your Partners on the

Humanitarian Battlefield (NGOs)Humanitarian Battlefield (NGOs)

Relief and rehabilitation (CARE, MSF, OXFAM)

Human rights and advocacy (Amnesty International,Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group)

Citizen diplomacy (African Center for Conflict Resolutionand Development, Carter Center)

Religious and academic (Pearson Center, TuftsFeinstein International Famine Center)

Landmine eradication (ICBL)

Medical emergencies (IMC, MSF)

Camp and community sanitation (IRC)

Senegal Specific (Student Feedback)


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Some Useful Guidelines for ManagingSome Useful Guidelines for Managing

Relations with IO/NGO WorldRelations with IO/NGO World

Learn their priorities and offer assistance asappropriate

Do not let your mission timetable upset the

broader relief effort Keep in mind that you do not own their assets

Share information especially damage estimates

and human casualty data, weather, routesecurity, physical security and explain militaryproblem-solving procedures


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More Civil-Military ChallengesMore Civil-Military Challenges

The rules of engagement for civil-military relations areundergoing significant changes around the world

All professional militaries must be prepared to be judgedon the basis of their abilities to harmonize their efforts on

the humanitarian battlefield with civilian governmental andnon-governmental agencies

Governments and their militaries must develop reliablemechanisms for interagency and multi-force planning

In an era of ambiguity in military interventions, we all mustimprove our diplomatic and planning tools

We must refine our current doctrines to develop viabletotal force concepts


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WHAT MAY YOU

EXPECT FOR LONG

DAYS IN A POSSIBLY

DANGEROUS

ENVIRONMENT?

CERTAINLY THE

APPRECIATION OF

YOUR NATION, BUT THESHY SMILE OF A CHILD

IS NOT SO BAD.

RewardsRewards


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The Responsibility to ProtectThe Responsibility to Protect

When is it appropriate for the internationalcommunity to intervene to protect people whoare either mistreated or unprotected by theirgovernments?

Sovereignty versus human rights: a moderndilemma

Issues of protection, prevention, reaction,rebuilding and re-establishment of authorityremain ambiguous

This is a very controversial issue which iscurrently subject to broad international debate


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ConclusionsConclusions

Soldiers, whether engaged in directmilitary action or in civil-military

operations, must be adequately trainedto discharge their duties in aprofessional manner consistent with thetenets and requirements of democratic

societies


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QuestionsQuestions

Documents

2 - Introduction to Civil-Military Operations (Student)-Form