2 27 13 0204 063341 067980 Email to Lindsay and WCDA Helzer Lipparelli Kandaras Watts Proposal That Might Global Resolution

7/28/2019 2 27 13 0204 063341 067980 Email to Lindsay and WCDA Helzer Lipparelli Kandaras Watts Proposal That Might Gl

1/27

2/28/13 Outlook Print Message

https://bay002.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=2afdd127-d712-43dc-8b9f-820ddd7a9a5a,m&isSafe=false&FolderID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-

proposal that might be your office some more

money and resolve this whole thing.

From: Zach Coughlin([email protected])Sent: Wed 2/27/13 9:14 PM

To: Robert Lindsay ([email protected]);[email protected] ([email protected]);[email protected] ([email protected]);[email protected] ([email protected]);[email protected] ([email protected]);

[email protected] ([email protected]);

[email protected] ([email protected]);[email protected] ([email protected])

49 attachments

2 14 11 0204 063341 In Re Beckett Petition for Reinstatementpursuant to SCR 111(10) 57763 - Copy.pdf (763.2 KB) , 2 25 12 0204Order to Show Cause Order 2012-01 RJC Sferrazza Pearson -Copy.pdf (1216.6 KB) , 2 27 13 0204 063341 Motion to DismissProbation Violation - Copy.pdf (303.7 KB) , 3 27 12 0204 03628

02733 bates stampes SBN 11 7 12 Flanagan Order Denying 2nd MtnShow Cuase - Copy.pdf (1244.2 KB) , 4 4 11 0204 03341 In ReBecker Order Granting Petition for Reinstatement 57763 - Copy.pdf(664.0 KB) , 6 13 12 0204 063341 065630 email from WCPD DoganStates Offer detailing plea deal 067980 was latter added to it -Copy.pdf (123.2 KB) , 6 27 12 0204 063341 065630 email fromWCPD regarding plea deal day before 12-067980 arrest - Copy.pdf(122.2 KB) , 8 24 12 0204 063341 065630 067980 email from WCPD

Leslie Couglin Settlement regarding settlement plea deal - Copy.pdf(132.6 KB) , 8 24 12 0204 063341 065630 067980 email from WCPDLeslie FW Couglin regarding settlement plea deal - Copy.pdf (196.2KB) , 0204 063341 Gagnon Right to Counsel in probation violationcases 063341 - Copy.pdf (208.6 KB) , 0204 063341 In Re Beckettcases - Copy.pdf (75.0 KB) , 0204 distinguishing civil and criminalcontempt - Copy.pdf (1625.0 KB) , 0204 iowa bench book on civiland criminal contempt of court - Copy.pdf (450.1 KB) , 0204 NCGuide on Right to Counsel indigent 22176 60838 063341 - Copy.pdf


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https://bay002.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=2afdd127-d712-43dc-8b9f-820ddd7a9a5a,m&isSafe=false&FolderID=00000000-0000-0000-0000- 2

(453.1 KB) , 0204 Wiki on 0204 22176 60838 063341 SixthAmendment to the United States Constitution - Copy.pdf (390.4 KB) ,atty discipline duress mitigation - Copy.pdf (7.5 KB) , pat king kitchensink pleading - Copy.pdf (47.4 KB) , pauperis ifp indigent appealtranscript - Copy.pdf (166.3 KB) , right to counsel civil contempthearing cases - Copy.pdf (226.4 KB) , 2 27 13 0204 063341 Motion to

Dismiss Probation Violation.pdf (303.7 KB) , 2 25 12 0204 Order toShow Cause Order 2012-01 RJC Sferrazza Pearson.pdf (1216.6 KB) ,2 14 11 0204 063341 In Re Beckett Petition for Reinstatement

pursuant to SCR 111(10) 57763.pdf (763.2 KB) , 4 4 11 0204 03341In Re Becker Order Granting Petition for Reinstatement 57763.pdf(664.0 KB) , 0204 NC Guide on Right to Counsel indigent 2217660838 063341.pdf (453.1 KB) , right to counsel civil contempt hearingcases.pdf (226.4 KB) , 0204 distinguishing civil and criminalcontempt.pdf (1625.0 KB) , 0204 iowa bench book on civil andcriminal contempt of court.pdf (450.1 KB) , 0204 063341 In ReBeckett cases.pdf (75.0 KB) , 0204 063341 Gagnon Right to Counselin probation violation cases 063341.pdf (208.6 KB) , 0204 Wiki on0204 22176 60838 063341 Sixth Amendment to the United StatesConstitution.pdf (390.4 KB) , 8 24 12 0204 063341 065630 067980email from WCPD Leslie Couglin Settlement regarding settlement pleadeal.pdf (132.6 KB) , 8 24 12 0204 063341 065630 067980 emailfrom WCPD Leslie FW Couglin regarding settlement plea deal.pdf

(196.2 KB) , 6 13 12 0204 063341 065630 email from WCPD DoganStates Offer detailing plea deal 067980 was latter added to it.pdf(123.2 KB) , 6 27 12 0204 063341 065630 email from WCPDregarding plea deal day before 12-067980 arrest.pdf (122.2 KB) , attydiscipline duress mitigation.pdf (7.5 KB) , pat king kitchen sink

pleading.pdf (47.4 KB) , 12 18 12 0204 599 and 607 atty immunityfrom service of process.pdf (24.6 KB) , 3 15 12 0204 374 Affidavit ofLandlord for Non-Payment of Rent Filed.pdf (69.9 KB) , 4 10 12 to 4

30 12 Couglhin v Nichols 075658.pdf (115.8 KB) , 12 22 11 020403628 1708 Notice of Posting Supersedeas Bond as set by Statute withSferrazza Note Order atop it.pdf (205.6 KB) , 2 1 12 Notice of Appeal12 21 11 Order Resolving Contest Ppty Lient in 1708 0204.pdf (590.6KB) , 12 12 11 0204 1708 wcll stamped Emergency Ex Parte MotionHearing Sooner than 12 20 11.pdf (1501.2 KB) , 11 23 11 Motion toSet Bond and Stay on Appeal 0204 1708 law of case as to 11 7 11Order Sferrazza which void anyway given excees NRS 40.385


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jurisdiction see Venentian v Two Roads.pdf (19.9 KB) , 12 15 110204 1708 Emergency Ex Parte Amended Case Appeal Statement 44

pages not counting 5 attached Exhibits.pdf (2.4 MB) , 12 15 11 02041708 Stamped with no fax header fax cover shieet 12 14 11 fax toClifton Sferrazza and Baker re Merliss v Coughlin Hearing Set forDecember 20th, 2011.pdf (22.9 KB) , 11 1 11 0204 1708 03051

stamped and digitized Emergency Appeal and Motion to StayEviction.pdf (1362.7 KB) , 10 15 11 0204 036281708 email to Bakersome real legal quagmires for you.pdf (431.8 KB) , 12 27 11 02040362 1708 email to RJC Schroeder Stancil Tuttle Sferrazza BakerJCRCP 84 needs attachment.pdf (251.2 KB) , 5 14 12 and 7 31 120204 RX history email to @nvbar.org with attachment to email [email protected] from Zach Coughlin rx history since February 2008.pdf(1324.4 KB)

Dear Mr. Lindsay and WCDA's Office,

I respectfully submit this in the hopes that a global deal can be entered into, aswithout that, I will certainly be disbarred irrevocably, and Judge Clifton andJudge Pearson, I am pretty sure, will be sentencing me to substantial amountsof jail time, in addition to what may issue incident to the 3/6/13 arraignmenton allegations of violating the SBN TPO/EPO and the 12-01 Administrative

Order by Judge Sferrazza. It would mean so much to me and be so veryappreciated. I lived here my whole life, its would be pretty sad to see thingscontinue where they are going (ie, me disbarred permanently, doing lots oftime, etc...). I realize I am not special and I haven't handled things very well inmany instances, but, I am doing my best, and have been. I don't get help frommy family, in fact, my Dad often seems to be trying to sabotage my life insome misguided attempt to twelve step me/hijack my mental health care...

I complete my intake with Northern Nevada Adult Mental Health this Monday,and am starting counseling and am set to meet with a Dr. Kim on 3/13/13 tosee about arranging for my medications to always be available to me if Icannot afford them (and therefore, hopefully avoid the free fall my life hadbeen in since that occurred and was followed by a string of arrests andevictions starting in August 2011 (please see my email to Bar Counseldetailing that and attaching proof thereof with my complete prescriptionhistory since about 2008, showing I went off Adderall and Wellbutrin in early


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August 2011...Please see my 5/14/12 email to SBN Bar Counsel detailing thefall out of my not being able to afford my medications starting in August2011, the string of arrests and eviction occurring immediately thereafter, etc.

Judge Weller, Judge McGee, and Judge Van Walraven are all mentors to meand I believe would be willing to indicate that I am probably not competent to

stand trial at this point, and that I am not such a bad person in the grandscheme...I have been attending Coe Swobe's Thursday Night 7pm LawyersConcerned for Lawyers meeting, and Coe would confrim that at 322-2154. Itruly do want to resolve all these criminal matters and don't want to pursueany civil claims. I just want to get back to normal life and am sorry to haveupset so many people. I did my best under some extremely tryingcircumstances that one likely could not fully understand without livingthrough them.

Please note, I have not filed the attached 2/27/13 Motion for Continuance orwhatever, its just a proposed thing to provide some suggestions for how allthe various criminal/civil/administrative things might be resolved, if I am very,very lucky and fortunate.

Maybe the State can pay Mr. Lindsay in exchange for appearing for me in these

various criminal matters and brokering this global resolution. The Gagnoncase set out below provides support for such right to counsel under thesecircumstances. Today, I checked in with DAS. Upon checking in the RJCBailfifs served me a new Order to Show Cause for the Administrative Order12-01 entered on 12/20/12 by Judge Sferrazza. the hearing to be held on3/5/13 at 2 pm. See both the 2/25/13 Show Cause Order and the underlying12/20/12 Administrative Order 12-01 attached. I believe I am still anattorney, even where suspended (under Florida Bar v. Ross) and, as such, am

immune from service of such process (in addition to the service of processattempted by RJC Bailiffs during other DAS Check ins for the WCPD andSBN Protection Orders against me in 607 and 599.

attorney's exemption from service of process, see Am. Jur. 2d, Process 35.While DDA Watts made a nice argument in objecting to my subpoenas on2JDC personnel in my formal bar hearing, based upon my being suspending, Ibelieve Florida Bar v. Ross, the fact that I was given permission to issue my


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own subpoenas therein (ie, even if NRCP 45(a)(3) applies, I was "authorizedto appear" in that "court") would provide a counter to any extension of thatargument that would suggest that my being suspended by the State Bar ofNevada (but not the USPTO, therefore, I am still a patent attorney, I think...)would vitiate any "attorney immune from service of process of the TPO/EPOapplications or Orders while doing his DAS probation check-ins in the RJC

filing office"argument...Try to ease up on me a little here, I am doing the best Ican everyone. I took in about $13,800 in fees while practicing law betweenJuly 2011 and my suspension in June 2012, and lost way, more money thanthat (especially counting the sanctions awards that remain unpaid, etc.)...Onecost saving measure to the county would be to work out a deal very soon (likebefore the 3/5/13 Show Cause Hearing in the RJC, that would avoid thepreparation of about 15 hours of trial transcript at public expense incident tothe 1/9/13 Order by Judge Elliott in the appeal of the conviction in 11-

063341 (CR12-2025). I'll sign away any civil law claims I have against anyCounty entities, personnel, etc., especially if my SBN woes, RJC criminal lawwoes, and hopefully a thing or two else, can be bargained away (if that islegal...I think it is, but the WCDA's Office would need to approve of it, Ibelieve...).

II. AMENABILITY TO SERVICE OF PROCESSB. Persons Immune to Service of Process

2. Persons Attending Court or Governmental Hearingsc. AttorneysTopic Summary Correlation Table References 35. GenerallyWest's Key Number DigestWest's Key Number Digest, Federal Civil Procedure k415, 416West's Key Number Digest, Process k117, 118Attorneys at law at times enjoy certain privileges and exemptions not generally

enjoyed bylay persons, when they are considered necessary for the due administration ofjustice and theprotection of a client's rights.[FN1] At common law, an attorney was exemptfrom the serviceof civil process while attending court.[FN2]Currently, whether an attorney at law is exempt from the service of process ina civil action


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while attending court may turn upon the attorney's residence within the stateor county ofsuit. Immunity from the service of civil process has been extended to anonresident attorneywhile going to, remaining at, or returning from the place where the client'sbusiness is transacted,

upon the ground that the administration of justice demands such anexemption,[FN3]even though resident attorneys have no such immunity.[FN4]Some jurisdictions take the view that an attorney is privileged from the serviceof processwhile attending court in a professional capacity in a county other than thecounty of his or herresidence,[FN5] while others hold that the attorney is not immune from

service.[FN6][FN1] Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law 196.[FN2] Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 55 S. Ct. 21, 79 L. Ed. 208 (1934); Lambv.Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932).[FN3] Durst v. Tautges, Wilder & McDonald, 44 F.2d 507, 71 A.L.R. 1394(C.C.A.7th Cir. 1930).

[FN4] Williams v. Hatcher, 95 S.C. 49, 78 S.E. 615 (1913).[FN5] Ada Dairy Products Co. v. Superior Court, Seminole County, 258 P.2d939(Okla. 1953) (holding that a duly licensed and practicing attorney of onecounty, whilepresent in another county to represent the client, may not be served withsummons of asuit against a corporation of which he is the president, in the second county).

[FN6] Parker v. Reddick, 196 Tenn. 472, 268 S.W.2d 357, 45 A.L.R.2d 1096(1954).

Here's an idea...the 3/6/13 arraingment for the felony and gross EPO/TPOviolations, what about a Motion to Set Aside both the WCPD and SBN, orjust the SBN EPO itself based upon Coughlin's immunity from service ofprocess while attending court, especially where his attending was at leasttangentially related to the basis or subject matter of the TPO/EPO. If the


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service was no good, the violation charge fails...

Please consider:

" 25. The role of retained counsel; in generalSettlement or

disposition without hearing; form of release

Settlement is the ideal goal in every case. Seldom can any goodcome from having a hearing. Even though the accused attorney

claims complete innocence, the committee members may wonder

why the matter was not disposed of earlier. They are quite aware

of the fact that such matters do not get to the hearing stage

without the recommendation of the investigating bar attorney,

who must have found evidence of wrongdoing to justify filing

formal charges. Thus, the defense is faced with a suspicion of

some act of misconduct. Logically, therefore, the goal of avoiding

a hearing is the most desirable one, and the approach taken

should be one that is least likely to lead

to a hearing. It makes little sense to set one's goal for a hearing

when the use of diplomacy can avoid it. Settlement is possible

only up to a point prior to the hearing, however. Once the hearingcommences, it is usually too late for the accused attorney to

settle with the complainant. The most satisfactory and beneficial

settlements are those reached within two weeks of the filing of

the complaint. The potential for various settlement possibilities

are plentiful, but, unfortunately, they are usually predicated on a

commodity in short supply for most attorneys: money. Often it

will be necessary for the client to contact family members andgive promissory notes for loans in order to bargain with cash that

may be easily replaced, rather than his license, which cannot. It

should be noted that while it is unethical conduct to "buy off"

complaining witnesses, nearly all states provide that if the

district attorney either approves or encourages a civil


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settlement, then disciplinary proceedings may be avoided.

Retained counsel must make certain he violates none of the

canons of ethics himself. The key to avoiding trouble is to be open

and candid with all concerned. Retained counsel should

immediately make clear to the accused attorney that he is to take

no action whatever following representation, and a carefulinquiry should be made to determine what action he has taken to

date. Invariably, steps will have to be taken to straighten out the

harm that he may already have done. The single most important

ingredient for success is the attitude of the accused attorney. If

the grievance committee receives the impression that he is

merely interested in a "dodge" to avoid the consequences of hisacts, then great difficulty can be expected. If on the other hand

the accused is genuinely contrite, both in his words and his

actions, few committees are likely to take severe action, even in

serious cases. On the other hand, some attorneys may attempt

some sort of cover-up. They may lie to the committee or may

otherwise do great disservice to their own cause when they are

not represented. It should always be kept in mind that a contriteattitude by the accused attorney is a difficult one for a grievance

committee to resist, particularly when it is coupled with a clear

and definite plan of corrective action. Contrition, however, must

always be coupled with cooperation, and cooperation must

always be coupled with corrective action. Should one of these

elements be missing, a good result cannot be expected. Once

defense counsel takes the client firmly in hand, directs a

corrective-action program, and, most importantly, establishes

and maintains a good relationship with bar counsel, he may

expect good results, even in serious cases." from "Defending

Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings"m 31 AMJUR TRIALS 633.


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Coughlin would stip to anything that would essentially put the EPOs back inplace thereafter, he doesn't want to bother anybody or any drama, etc.Coughlin realizes it would be a mistake to try to "expose" Bar Counsel King,and anyways, Coughlin generally likes Mr. King, that whole formal hearingjust got a bit contentious, but Mr. King need not be worried about any damage

to his reputation or allegations of his being a "fraud". There may be someissue with the manner in which the WCSO carries out 24 hour lockoutORders incident to evictions. Coughlin doesn't intend to pursue having DDAWatts-Vial answer his SCR 110 subpoenas, especially if all thisSBN/criminal/civil stuff can be resolved, hopefully with Coughlin still havinga law license at some point, but if necessary, a disbarment by consentcontingent upon all the criminal stuff (an, if permissible things like the $42Kattorney fee civil award in 03628 being addressed) may be a path to pursue.

Doesn't sound like the most heart warming resolution, but if everybody is thatmad at Coughlin and truly cannot see any basis for mitigation or why hecontested this or that or how the manner in which the eviction in 1708 wascarried out may have been a bit harsh, well...

As to the manner in which the WCSO carries out 24 hours eviction orders tomean "within 24 hours" as meaning that the Sheriff can race over to a houseright after the hearing, versus, must wait at least 24 hours...Coughlin would

enter a confidentiality agreement or some agreement whereby he will be quiteabout that/relinquish any claims he may have, forego any qui tam action (justkidding, really), etc., etc.

How about this, I apply tomorrow for appointed counsel for the 3/5/13 ShowCause Hearing, and to officially have Bruce appointed for the 3/11/13 DASProbation Violation Hearing, in addition to in the appeal in CR12-2025 (the1/9/13 Order granting me IFP by Judge Elliott might help with that) and in the

appeal I filed from the 2/13/13 hearing wherein Bruce appeared, for theContempt Hearing, "free of charge" as you indicated (under Feick, I believeBruce should have been paid). I filed a Notice of Appeal of that 5 daycontempt conviction (not sure if it was civil or criminal, if its criminal, I haveto report it to the SBN and USPTO, thus I appealed it, but the RJC probablyjust viewed that as me being more a pain in the ass and not getting thepicture...I don't want to fight it unless its a criminal contempt conviction....). Ithink filing the Notice of Appeal in 12-065630 may have resulted in the


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https://bay002.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=2afdd127-d712-43dc-8b9f-820ddd7a9a5a,m&isSafe=false&FolderID=00000000-0000-0000-0000 10

2/25/13 Show Cause Order, that, or Judge Pearson was upset that the 2/25/13DAS Probation Violation Hearing didn't go on as scheduled on 2/25/13....See the language in the 2/25/13 Show Cause Order that suggests that, if Iapply for counsel by 4pm on 2/28/13, that some will be appointed (ie, moneyfor your office, a good thing in my opinion).

More money hopefully upon your office being appointed in the appeal in cr12-2025 and the new appeal I filed within the 10 days pursuant to NRS 189.010from the 5 day incarceration order for Contempt ( I guess) from 2/13/13 (thehearing Bruce appeared at, to my surprise).

Right to Counsel

here is no absolute due process right to counsel in probation revocation

proceedings. (Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at 790.) On the other hand, there are

"cases in which fundamental fairness - the touchstone of due process - will

require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent

probationers or parolees." (Ibid.) Although there are no rigid guidelines, the

United States Supreme Court has suggested that counsel should be provided

anytime the defendant makes a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not

committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or

(ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there

are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make

revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult

to develop or present.(Ibid.) In California, however, the Supreme Court has

proclaimed a right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings as a judicially

declared rule of procedure. (Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at 461-462.)

The totality of the circumstances, including the DAS materials Coughlin was

provided, extreme health problems (including a reaction preventing Couglin from


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appearing at a 1/3/13 EPO hearing in 12-599 and 12-607, even to contest service,

process, or juridiction, includign to assert an attorney's (even a suspended

attorney appearing pro se) immunity from service of process at the courthouse,

including under courthouse sanctuary doctrine, situational stress incident to

Coughlin's formal disciplinary hearing regarding the irrevocable revocation of his

law license, misleading sworn statements by both SBN Bar Counsel Pat King and

WCPD Jim Leslie, and verbal statements and writings to Coughlin by DAS staff,

including Officer Celeste Brown, support this colorable claim by Coughlin that he

has not violated the terms of his probation , much less in a manner sufficient to

support a summary arrest. Coughlin has received indications from DAS staff

including Officer Brown that, in exigent circumstances calling or writing,

especially ahead of time, may provide a basis for not finding a probation violatin,

and Coughlin submits that both alleged probation violation (incident to DAS

Officer Ramos's PC sheet of 2/1/13, which indicate such violation occured on

1/3/13 and 1/24/13...which just happend to be days where Coughlin had deadlines

in 62337 and where Couglin now faces felony and gross charges upon allegations

of TPO and EPO violations occuring on those dates) augers towards eitherdismissing the charge of an alleged probation violation or affording Coughlin

representation at publice expense, especially where, apparently B. Lindsay, Esq.

Showed up to the 12-067980 contempt hearing on 2/13/13 as a freebie,

upbeknownst to Coughlin and counter to at least the implicit representation made

to him by the Court and Lindsay upon being led into court in restraints that

morning, absent any consultations with Lindsay beforehand whatsoever..

I think Mr. Lindsay and his paralegal Diana are doing a good job and we aremaking progress towards ultimately (hopefully, fingers crossed) getting theoriginal plea deal that I voluntarily accepted on 8/27/12 put back on the recordand accepted by the RJC, even disposing of the appeal of the convictions in11-063341 (now on appeal in CR12-2025):


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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnQWmL4_chY That is the audio of the 8/27/12 hearing in 11-063341

where Couglin voluntarily accepted the plea, though it was rejected. Next time, Coughlin promises, he

will hit his mark more cleanly and get his lines right.

The other stupid youtube stuff is coming down. The plea deal was as follows:

From: Leslie, JimSent: Friday, August 24, 2012 11:17 AM

To: 'Zach Coughlin'

Subject: Coughlin: Settlement of RCR11-063341, RCR12-065630 and RCR12-067980

Mr. Coughlin:

As I had noted earlier, I had relayed the offer you had sent for a settlement.You had sent it to Zach Young directly, as well as me and other recipients. Ithen forwarded your email offer to Mr. Young and asked him to reply.

Mr. Young took the position that any prior State offers had been rejected byyou or had expired by their terms or by virtue of lapse of reasonable time.Nevertheless, he has replied indicating willingness to settle as follows:

The entry of plea pursuant to this settlement must occur in Reno JusticeCourt no later than Monday August 27, 2012.

The plea would be to two misdemeanor disturbing the peace charges, onesuch charge in RCR11-063341 (the iPhone case) and once such charge inRCR12-065630 (the 911 case);

Sentence would be 90 days jail on each charge, suspended and concurrent toeach other, with the following conditions: (1) obey all laws (except that theparties agree that traffic violations do not constitute violation of thiscondition), (2) mental health counseling as recommended by yourpsychiatrist or mental health treatment provider, with regular reports every60 days for a period of one year, (3) take medications and engage incounseling as recommended by said psychiatrist or mental health treatment

provider.In exchange for this plea settlement, the State will dismiss RCR12-067980(resisting case).

Please note that Mr. Young was emphatic that this plea settlement must beentered by the August 27, 2012, expiration date or it is rescinded. The August29 trial in RCR11-063341 will not be vacated until the settlement plea isentered on monday.

Time is of the essense, since any settlement must be entered at RJC bymonday, so please reply via email with your acceptance and I will set up a
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnQWmL4_chY


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hearing for monday.

Thank you,

James B. Leslie, Esq.

Chief Deputy Public Defender

Washoe County Public Defender's Office

I would absolutely voluntarily agree to that plea deal right now, especially ifit could dispose of the appearl in CR12-2025 in a manner that would allowfor a SCR 111(10) application like that in the setting aside of the conviction offormer Pahrump DA Beckett in In Re Beckett.

The only reason I went into court is because I am self representing on 063341.Bruce Lindsay is not my attorney of record on that case, nor have I everconsented to his becoming my attorney of record therein. I believe

I am asking in writing if Bruce Lindsay, Esq. was appointed as my counsel ofrecord in 2012-065630 for the 2/13/13 Contempt Hearing, at which Ireceived 5 days in jail for being late, wherein Judge Clifton alleged I hadalready had the benefit of a warning, yet I maintain that Robbin Baker told methe start time of the trial in that matter on 12/11/11 had been moved from 9am to 1:30 pm. Judge Clifton maintained that he did not change the start time,then insisted Robbin Baker did not tell me that, then refused to indicate just

how he could possibly know what Robbin Baker had told me. Subsequently itwas learned that Robbin Baker was not even at work that day, and that no onehad called her that day to inquire as to whether I was correct in my assertion asto her having communicated the start time of the trial as having changed. Ibelieve it is situations like that that resulted in the current AdministrativeOrder 12-01 (which may not even still be binding considering it was from2012 and by former Chief Judge Sferrazza) wherein I seemingly am preventedfrom communicating with any court personnel besides the Bailiff's, based


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upon some unnoticed finding that I had caused distruptions in the filing office,an accusation to which I was never provided an opportunity to be heard on.

Previously, Judge Sferrazza refused to allow me to appear on my own behalf,despite my having been a licensed attorney in Nevada at the time in 11-063341, and despite my having filed a Notice of Appearance therein, and an

Authorization to represent. Then Judge Sferrazza, at trial on 8/27/12 and8/29/12 refused to allow me to self represent still. Then he refused to acceptthe plea agreement that would have disposed of all three matters to which I ama defendant in the RJC (11-063341, which is now on appeal in CR12-2025,with the Appeal Brief, per the attached Briefing Schedule, on March 9th,2013, and where Judge Elliott entered an Order granting my IFP on 1/9/13providing for the preparation of the transcript at public expense; 11-065630,which stemmed form a 1/14/12 "misuse of emergency communications" gross

misdemeanor arrest, that had the trial start on 12/11/12, where the WCPD wasreleived on 11/27/12 (the day pre-trial motions were due, I maintain I wasforced to proceed pro se due to Biray Dogan's complete lack of representation,including failing to appear where required at the 2/14/12 arraignment on agross misdemeanor (indigent defendnans entitled to representation on grossmisdo and felonies "at all stages"...); and the matter wherein Bruce is counselof record, 12-067980, where Bruce has stipulated to severalcontinuances...and now today apparently DDA Young tried to pull something

where he failed to stip to the continuance in 11-063341, refuses to take mycalls or respond to any written communications. Further WCDA LegalAssistant Tina Galli informed me today that I am not to call their office on 11-063341 and that "Diana from Bruce Lindsay's Office is handling it". That isnot true at this point, as far as I understand, but I think Mr. Lindsay and Dianacould be very instrumental in resolving these various matters, saving theCounty a great deal of money and resources expended prosecuting me, etc. andhelp me to save myself from myself. I am self representing, I never consented

to Bruce Lindsay, Esq. appearing as attorney of record in 11-063341.Further, I never expressly consented to Lindsay appearing in 11-065630 at the2/13/13 Contempt Hearing, wherein I was brought in upon being summarilytaken into custody the day before, and without consulting with Lindsay at allor ever consenting to his appearing on my behalf, Lindsay was seated at thedefendants desk.


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From: Charles M. McGee([email protected])This sender is in your safe list.

Sent: Fri 1/18/13 1:39 PM

To: zach Coughlin ([email protected])

Dear Zach,

I can, I think, but only with your assistance and approval, help you.

And the only avenue that I think is left to you Zack (my godson is Zach--sorry for the misspell) is a SCR 117

Disability Petition.

You, in my opinion, after considerable though on the matter, need to realize that you need some help.

You shoot you own self in the foot every time.

But if I am wasting my time, let me know.

My heart is in the right place.

Chuck"

I would prefer that all three matters be resolved (and hopefully the appeal of11-063341 in CR12-2025 before Judge Elliott can be included in such aglobal resolution) in accordance with the terms I agreed to on the record on

8/27/13 in 11-063341 (a hearing which arguably was combined with the othertwo matters).

B. Due Process Rights 1. Background The loss of liberty entailed in therevocation of probation is a serious deprivation requiring that the defendant beaccorded certain due process rights. The minimum due process requirementsfor a probation revocation proceeding are: (1) written notice of the claimed

violation of probation; (2) disclosure of the evidence against the probationer;(3) an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses anddocumentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine adversewitnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for notallowing confrontation); (5) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (6) awritten statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on and the reasonsfor revoking probation. (Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 786.) InGagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at pp. 781-782, the United States Supreme Court
https://bay002.mail.live.com/mail/options.aspx?subsection=6&n=1315498107&selection=judgemcgee%40msn.com


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applied its parole revocation due process jurisprudence to probationrevocation. Parole-14- revocation due process rights were established inMorrissey v. Brewster (1972) 408 U.S. 471. Before Gagnon was decided,however, The California Supreme Court, in People v. Vickers (1972) 8Cal.3d 451, 457-458, had applied the Morrissey parole revocationrequirements to probation. In Vickers, supra, at 458, the court said: [T]he

precise nature of the proceedings for such [probation] revocation need not beidentical [to parole revocation proceedings] if they assure equivalent dueprocess safeguards. Subsequent California cases concerning the sufficientamount of due process required before probation may be revoked have reliedon Vickers. The few that have indirectly addressed the question of whetherGagnon requires greater due process than Vickers have disagreed. (ComparePeople v. Mosley (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1167, 1173- 1174 [noting that anyuncertainty remaining in the wake of Vickers appears to have been quelled

by...Gagnon... which explicitly requires written notice of any claimed violationas part of the minimal due process requirements in probation revocationcases] with People v. Buford (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 975, 981 [whichcontinues to cite Vickers and Morrissey as allowing for flexible due processstandards without any due process sine qua nons]). 2. Written noticeConcerning written notice, People v. Mosley, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p.1174, held that where the defendant was given written notice of certaingrounds for violation, it was improper to base a revocation on other grounds

not included in the notice, even though the other grounds were shown at thehearing. (See also In re Moss (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 913, concerning theimportance of written notice.) However, in People v.-15- Felix (1986) 178Cal.App.3d 1168, 1171-1172 [First Dist., Div. 3], the court held that the trialcourt's offer to grant a continuance where the defendant clFelix (1986) 178Cal.App.3d 1168, 1171-1172 [First Dist., Div. 3], the court held that the trialcourt's offer to grant a continuance where the defendant claimed he had notreceived notice of certain grounds for revocation was sufficient to meet

constitutional concerns. Felix did not address Gagnon, and its ruling may notmeet the due process standards of that case.(See People v. Mosley, supra, 198Cal.App.3d at pp. 1173-1174). 3. Motion for revocation There is scant caselaw on the question of when a motion to revoke has been made too long afterthe defendants violation of probation to satisfy due process concerns. Peoplev. Villines (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1298, 1303-1304, cites two federalappellate decisions concerning the timeliness of motions to revoke probation:United States v. Tyler (5th Cir. 1979) 605 F.2d 851 [due process concerns not


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satisfied when the alleged violation of probation occurred more than one yearbefore the motion to revoke and a probation officer had previously made adecision not to make a motion] and United States v. Hamilton (9th Cir. 1983)708 F.2d 1412 [unreasonable delay when probation was revoked three yearsafter the violation and the defendant attempted to bring the default to thecourts attention]. 4. Waiver Probationers due process rights may be

expressly waived, and may be deemed to have been waived if the defendant,with knowledge of the rights, fails to assert them in a timely manner. (In re LaCroix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 153; People v. Dale (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 191,195.) 5. Summary Revocation A summary revocation of probation, uponprobable cause that a violation of probation has occurred, is accepted practice.Summary revocation tolls the clock on the term of probation, and is simplya device by which the defendant may be brought before the court, andjurisdiction retained, before formal revocation proceedings begin. (People v.

Pipitone (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1117; People v. Barkins (1978) 81Cal.App.3d 30, 32-33; Pen. Code 1203.2, sub. a.) If, however, it isdetermined at a subsequent revocation hearing that the defendant did notviolate the terms of probation, the defendant gets back the time that passedbetween the summary revocation and the determination that no violation, infact, occurred. (People v. Tapia (2000) 91 Cal.App.4th 738, 743.) ThoughGagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at 781-782, would seem to require both apreliminary hearing and a final revocation hearing before probation may be

revoked, People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 895, held that a unitaryhearing will usually suffice in probation revocation cases to serve thepurposes of the separate preliminary and formal revocation hearings outlinedin Morrissey. 6. Right to Counsel 6. Right to Counsel-17- There is noabsolute due process right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings.(Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at 790.) On the other hand, there are "cases in whichfundamental fairness - the touchstone of due process - will require that theState provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees."

(Ibid.) Although there are no rigid guidelines, the United States SupremeCourt has suggested that counsel should be provided anytime the defendantmakes a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the allegedviolation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if theviolation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantialreasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocationinappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult todevelop or present.(Ibid.) In California, however, the Supreme Court has


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proclaimed a right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings as ajudicially declared rule of procedure. (Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at 461-462.) 7.Standard of Proof/Review The standard of proof applicable to probationrevocation proceedings is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (Peoplev. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 441.) In order to overturn a trial courtdecision that the defendant violated the terms of probation, an appellate court

would determine, looking at the record in the light most favorable to theprosecution, whether the record discloses substantial evidencethat is,-18-evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuesuch that areasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant violated the terms ofprobation. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) C. EvidentiaryIssues 1. Hearsay Documentary evidence, whose source is not live testimony,may be admitted when it is accompanied by reasonable indicia of reliability.(People v. Maki (1985) 39 Cal.3d 707,716 [defendants signature on a car

rental invoice seized from defendants home]; People v. Arreola (1994) 7Cal.4th 1144, 1156-1157.) However, a different rule applies to testimonialhearsay. Any attempt by the prosecution to introduce a preliminary hearingtranscript in lieu of live witness testimony requires a showing of good causebefore a defendant's right of confrontation at a probation revocation hearingcan be dispensed with.... (People v. Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 714-716.) TheCalifornia Supreme Court has held that it is improper to revoke probationbased upon hearsay statements of the sole percipient witness to the claimed

violation where there has been no showing of the witness's legal unavailabilityand no specific finding of good cause to deny the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. (People v. Winson (1981) 29 Cal.3d 711, 719; People v.Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1159.) In People v. Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th atpp.1158-1159, the court stated: If the declarant is available and the same -19-information can be presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony,with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of thedeclarant, there is little justification for relying on the weaker version. When

two versions of the same evidence are available, longstanding principles of thelaw of hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor thebetter evidence. In People v. OConnell, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at 1066-1067, the court attributed no error to the trial courts decision to allow intoevidence an Adult Drug Program Termination Report prepared by...theprogram manager... to show that the defendant had failed to satisfactorilyparticipate in drug counseling sessions as required by the terms of probation.The court analogized this report to the documentary evidence Maki prong of


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the Arreola hearsay analysis, determining that the report was preparedcontemporaneously to, and specifically for, the hearing where appellant's lackof compliance with the deferred entry of judgment program was at issue, andsuch reports were routinely received without undertaking the added burdenof calling the author to authenticate it because the reports were prepared inresponse to a referral from the court. (People v. OConnell, supra, 107

Cal.App.4th at pp.1066-1067.) -20- 2. Exclusionary Rule Generally, theexclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation proceedings. (Peoplev. Harrison (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 803, 808.) However, evidence that hasbeen previously suppressed at a preliminary hearing because of an illegalsearch or seizure may not be introduced at a probation revocation hearing ifthe criminal charges were dropped and a new complaint or indictment wasnever filed. (People v. Zimmerman (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 673, 676[statutory interpretation of Pen. Code 1538].) Illegally seized evidence will

be excluded, moreover, if the police conduct was so egregious as to shock theconscience. (People v. Washington (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1128.) 3.Probationers testimony The testimony of a probationer at a probationrevocation hearing, and its fruits, cannot be used in a later criminalprosecution. (People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at 891-892.) However, ifthe probationer takes the stand at a later criminal trial, the earlier revocationhearing testimony can be used to impeach the probationers truthfulness. (Id.at p. 892.) -21- 4. Collateral Estoppel The doctrine of collateral estoppel does

not generally apply to issues raised in both probation revocation hearings andcriminal trials. Thus, facts and issues may be relitigated regardless of whichhearing was held first and what determination was made. (Lucido v. SuperiorCourt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 347-349.) Likewise, refiling of a motion torevoke probation, following dismissal of the first revocation proceeding, ispermissible. (People v. Villines, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at 1305.) It is withinthe reasonable discretion of the trial court to decide whether to hold arevocation hearing before or after trial for a new offense. (People v. Jasper

(1983) 33 Cal.3d 931, 935.)

MORE ON THE IDEA OF THE TPO/EPO'S BEING SET ASIDE BASEDUPON VIOLATIONS OF COURTHOUSE SANCTUARY DOCTRINE ORAN ATTORNEY'S IMMUNITY FROM SERVICE OF PROCESS AT THECOURT, ETC.:


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http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-district-court/1372465.html

"THE LAW

(COURTHOUSE SANCTUARY)Despite antagonistic dicta to the contrary; most modern era precedent

dealing with the issue of Courthouse Sanctuary from service of process

have held that New York State residents receive no such immunity

protections. Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, 273 A.D. 411, 77 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1st

Dept.1948); Department of Housing Preservation, City of New York v.

Koenigsberg, 133 Misc.2d 893, 509 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. Civ.Ct.1986); Ford

Motor Credit Co. v. Bobo, N.Y.L.J., 1 Misc.3d 901(A), 2003 WL 22928513 (Dec.

17, 2003, J. Miller, Nassau Co. Dist. Ct.) These cases hold that theCourthouse Sanctuary is only available to foreign state residents who come

into New York's Courts to contest jurisdiction. This doctrine has been

slightly expanded to include New York residents who enter the jurisdiction of

a New York Court of limited territorial jurisdiction to contest jurisdiction.

See Palazzo v. Conforti, 50 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Civ.Ct.1944); Singer v. Reising,

154 Misc. 239, 276 N.Y.S. 714 (Queens County 1935).

The Baumgartner Appellate Division panel also acknowledges a limited

Courthouse Sanctuary rule for New York residents if such service wouldconstitute a disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of the

Court or to impair the respect due its authority. This rule by itself would

not be applicable to the instant case as service of process was effected in the

Courtroom but outside the Court's presence and in between calendar calls.

STATE RESIDENCY IMMUNITY DISTINCTION?

The English Common Law made no New York State residency distinction.

The doctrine of immunity from arrest of a litigant attending a trial of an

action to which he is a party found early recognition and dates back to thebook of 13 Henry IV, J.B. Sampson v. Graves, 208 A.D. 522, 203 N.Y.S. 729

(1st Dept.1924). This is for the obvious reason that England had no

sovereign states. The privilege is not a creature of statute, but was created

and deemed necessary for the due administration of justice. See Matthews

v. Tufts, 87 N.Y. 568 (1882); citing to Van Lien v. Johnson (N.Y. Ct. Appeals,

unreported 1871).

The logical question now arises, exactly when did New York's Appellate
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-district-court/1372465.html


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while attending

court.[FN1] The basis for this rule, sometimes known as the "Courthouse

Sanctuary" rule,

is that parties should be allowed to contest jurisdiction without submitting

to it.[FN2] Process

immunity is not for the convenience of the person seeking it but is for the

convenience of thecourt, and should be made available only to further the administration of

justice.[FN3] The

test is whether the privilege, if allowed, would so obstruct judicial

administration in the cause

for the protection of which it is invoked as to justify withholding it; this

depends on the nature

of the proceeding in which the service is made and its relation to the

principal suit.[FN4] Becausethe privilege is designed for the court's convenience, it is not automatic, and

the party

must affirmatively show that it is in the court's own interest in the

furtherance of the administration

of justice to quash the summons.[FN5]

Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, the burden

shifts to the defendant

seeking immunity from the service of process to produce evidenceestablishing immunity

by showing that he or she was attending a judicial proceeding.[FN6]

Caution:

In at least one state, the immunity rule is no longer the law, whether the

person seeking immunity

is a nonresident witness or a nonresident party.[FN7]

CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT

AMJUR PROCESS 21 Page 162B Am. Jur. 2d Process 21

Service of process effected in courtroom, but outside court presence and in

between calendar

calls, was not affected by limited courthouse sanctuary rule, which provided

immunity

from service of process for New York residents if such service would


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constitute a disturbance

directly tending to interrupt proceedings of court or to impair respect due its

authority. North

Fork Bank v. Grover, 3 Misc. 3d 341, 773 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Dist. Ct. 2004).

[END OF SUPPLEMENT]

[FN1] Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932);

Stewart v.Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916); Moreo v. Regan, 140

A.D.2d 313, 527 N.Y.S.2d 547 (2d Dep't 1988); Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v.

District

Court of Fourteenth Judicial Dist. In and For Tulsa County, 1980 OK 3, 605

P.2d

1323 (Okla. 1980).

[FN2] North Fork Bank v. Grover, 3 Misc. 3d 341, 773 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Dist. Ct.

2004).[FN3] Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932); Page

Co. v.

MacDonald, 261 U.S. 446, 43 S. Ct. 416, 67 L. Ed. 737 (1923); Stewart v.

Ramsay,

242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916); ARW Exploration Corp. v.

Aguirre,

45 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1995).

[FN4] Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932).[FN5] ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1995);

Republic

Productions, Inc v. American Federation of Musicians of U S and Canada, 173

F.

Supp. 330 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).

[FN6] LaRose v. Curoe, 343 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1983).

[FN7] Silverman v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 145, 249 Cal. Rptr. 724 (2d

Dist.1988).

II. AMENABILITY TO SERVICE OF PROCESSB. Persons Immune to Service of Process2. Persons Attending Court or Governmental Hearingsa. In GeneralTopic Summary Correlation Table References


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25. Remedies for violation of rule of immunityWest's Key Number DigestWest's Key Number Digest, Federal Civil Procedure k415, 416West's Key Number Digest, Process k126The service of process on one who is privileged or exempt from service is notvoid but

voidable.[FN1] To secure the right to claim privilege or immunity fromservice of process, theparty must appear and move to quash the service or proceed otherwise asrequired by the applicablerules of practice. It is insufficient to file a motion giving notice to the court ofa claimof immunity; the party must appear and submit the question to the court fordecision.[FN2]

[FN1] Northwestern Casualty & Surety Co. v. Conaway, 210 Iowa 126, 230N.W. 548,68 A.L.R. 1465 (1930); Beckham v. Johnson, 220 Tenn. 572, 421 S.W.2d 94(1967).[FN2] Northwestern Casualty & Surety Co. v. Conaway, 210 Iowa 126, 230N.W. 548,68 A.L.R. 1465 (1930).

II. AMENABILITY TO SERVICE OF PROCESSB. Persons Immune to Service of Process2. Persons Attending Court or Governmental Hearingsb. LitigantsTopic Summary Correlation Table References 27. GenerallyWest's Key Number Digest

West's Key Number Digest, Federal Civil Procedure k415, 416West's Key Number Digest, Process k119There is conflicting authority on the question of whether a party litigant mayclaim an exemptionfrom service of process while attending trial.[FN1] The generally prevailingrule isthat nonresident litigants are privileged from service of civil process whilegoing to, attending,


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or returning from, court.[FN2] The rule is especially true where parties maybe examined aswitnesses,[FN3] or where such a party is attending a trial to testify as awitness.[FN4] Theprivilege is generally limited to nonresidents and to residents attending courtin a county outside

their county of residence, and does not extend generally to residents.[FN5]In contrast, some jurisdictions have declined to extend to nonresident litigantsprotectionfrom the service of process in another action.[FN6][FN1] Mertens v. McMahon, 334 Mo. 175, 66 S.W.2d 127, 93 A.L.R. 1285(1933).[FN2] Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932);Stewart v.

Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916); Durst v. Tautges,Wilder &McDonald, 44 F.2d 507, 71 A.L.R. 1394 (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1930); LaRose v.Curoe, 343N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1983); Massengale v. Lester, 403 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 1966);CommercialBank & Trust Co. v. District Court of Fourteenth Judicial Dist. In and ForTulsa County, 1980 OK 3, 605 P.2d 1323 (Okla. 1980); Lox, Stock and

Bagels, Inc. v.Kotten Mach. Co. of California, Inc., 261 Pa. Super. 84, 395 A.2d 954(1978); Parkerv. Reddick, 196 Tenn. 472, 268 S.W.2d 357, 45 A.L.R.2d 1096 (1954); Stateex rel

II. AMENABILITY TO SERVICE OF PROCESSB. Persons Immune to Service of Process

2. Persons Attending Court or Governmental Hearingsb. LitigantsTopic Summary Correlation Table References 28. Parties who may claim privilegeWest's Key Number DigestWest's Key Number Digest, Federal Civil Procedure k415, 416West's Key Number Digest, Process k119The rule of immunity of litigants from a foreign jurisdiction from the service


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of processwhile attending court typically includes both plaintiffs and defendants.[FN1]There is authority,however, to the effect that nonresident plaintiffs are not privileged from theservice ofprocess,[FN2] on the theory that a plaintiff who voluntarily seeks the aid and

protection ofcourts of another state should not be shielded from the processes of thosecourts, a conditionwhich should not apply to a defendant whose attendance is compulsory.[FN3]Moreover,some courts, while usually extending the exemption to nonresident plaintiffs,hold that nonresidentplaintiffs who voluntarily come within the jurisdiction of the courts of a state

to attendthe trial of litigation commenced by them against citizens of that state are notexemptfrom service of a summons in an action by defendants for relief connectedwith the subject ofthe litigation commenced by them, where a full and complete adjustment ofthe rights of theparties cannot be had in the first action, and where full relief would be denied

the citizens ofthat state in courts of the state of the plaintiffs' residence.[FN4][FN1] Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916);Marlowev. Baird, 301 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1962); Lyf-Alum, Inc. v. C & M AluminumSupplyCorp., 29 Wis. 2d 593, 139 N.W.2d 601 (1966); State v. District Court ofEighth Judicial

Dist. in and for Cascade County, 73 Mont. 265, 235 P. 766 (1925).[FN2] Wilson Sewing Mach. Co. v. Wilson, 51 Conn. 595, 1884 WL 1053(1884);Livengood v. Ball, 1916 OK 1008, 63 Okla. 93, 162 P. 768 (1916).

Sincerely,


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Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667

7402 [email protected]
mailto:[email protected]

Documents

2 27 13 0204 063341 067980 Email to Lindsay and WCDA Helzer Lipparelli Kandaras Watts Proposal That Might Global Resolution