ADMINISTATIVE LAW CASES Atty. Gallant SorianoG.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989SOLID HOMES, INC.,petitioner,vs.TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.

FACTS:The complaint was filed by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Teresite, alleged that Solid Homes sold to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975, for P 28,080.00, and that by September 10, 1981, she had already paid the full amount of P 38,949.87 including interests. Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate of title because it was later discovered that Solid Homes had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. The plaintiff asked for delivery of the title to the lot or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid by her plus interest. She also claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957.ISSUE:WON the National Housing Authority has the jurisdiction to decide the case.HELD:Yes. The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957."SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and shall haveexclusive jurisdictionto hear and decide cases of the following nature:A. Unsound real estate business practices;B. Claimsinvolving refund and any other claimsfiled by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; andC. Casesinvolving specific performance of contractuala statutory obligationsfiled by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied.)This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129(Jurisdiction of courts in Civil Cases) and PD No. 1344 (Empowering the NHA) the special law.As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.

CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, INC. v. IGNACIOG.R. No. 164789 | August 27, 2009The extent to which an administrative entity may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers depends largely, if not wholly on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.

FACTSCGA entered into a Contract to Sell a subdivision lot4 (subject property) with the respondents the registered owners and developers of a housing subdivision known as Villa Priscilla Subdivision located in Bulacan. Under the Contract to Sell, CGA would pay P2,373,000.00 for the subject property on installment basis; they were to pay a down payment of P1,186,500, with the balance payable within three years. Subsequently, the parties mutually agreed to amend the Contract to Sell to extend the payment period from three to five years.

According to CGA, it religiously paid the monthly installments until its administrative pastor discovered that the title covering the subject property was actually part of two consolidated lots (Lots 2-F and 2-G Bsd-04-000829 [OLT]) that the respondents had acquired from Nicanor Adriano (Adriano) and Ceferino Sison (Sison), respectively. Adriano and Sison were former tenant-beneficiaries of Purificacion S. Imperial (Imperial) whose subject property had been placed under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27s Operation Land Transfer. According to CGA, Imperial applied for the retention of five hectares of her land under Republic Act No. 6657, which the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted. The DAR Order authorized Imperial to retain the farm lots previously awarded to the tenant-beneficiaries, including Lot 2-F previously awarded to Adriano, and Lot 2-G Bsd-04-000829 awarded to Sison.

Understandably aggrieved after discovering these circumstances, CGA filed a complaint against the respondents before the RTC. CGA claimed that the respondents fraudulently concealed the fact that the subject property was part of a property under litigation; thus, the Contract to Sell was a rescissible contract under Article 1381 of the Civil Code. CGA asked the trial court to rescind the contract; order the respondents to return the amounts already paid; and award actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

Instead of filing an answer, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. The respondents claimed that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB since it involved the sale of a subdivision lot. CGA opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that the action is for rescission of contract, not specific performance, and is not among the actions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. ISSUEWhich of the two the regular court or the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over CGAs action for rescission and damages.

HELDHLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over CGAs action for rescission and damages.

Rationale for HLURBs extensive quasi-judicial powers

The surge in the real estate business in the country brought with it an increasing number of cases between subdivision owners/developers and lot buyers on the issue of the extent of the HLURBs exclusive jurisdiction. The courts have consistently ruled that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in.

Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1344, "Empowering The National Housing Authority To Issue Writ Of Execution In The Enforcement Of Its Decision Under Presidential Decree No. 957," clarifies and spells out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB.

The provisions of PD 957 were intended to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was aimed at providing for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse. The business of developing subdivisions and corporations being imbued with public interest and welfare, any question arising from the exercise of that prerogative should be brought to the HLURB which has the technical know-how on the matter. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by the regular courts.

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise. In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well-nigh indispensable.

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.

Dadubo v. CSC, G.R. No. 106498, June 28, 1993Facts:Dadubo and Cidro of the DBP Borongan branch bank were administratively charged with conduct prejudicial to best interest of the service, based on allegations on the unposted withdrawal of P60,000 from the savings accounts of the Tius. DBP found Dadubo guilty of dishonesty for embezzlement of bank funds. She was penalized with dismissal and fined an amount equal to 1 month basic salary. However, Civil Service Commission reversed the DBP findings and reduced Dadubos penalty to suspension for 6 months. DBP moved for reconsideration and CSC affirmed the earlier findings as to Dadubos guilt. Dadubo brought the present case to SC on certiorari, claiming that CSC failed to comply w/ constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the decision is based. Issue: Whether or not there is violation of the administrative due processHeld: Compliance with the constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which a decision is based on applies only to courts of justice and not to administrative bodies like the Civil Service Commission.In any event, there was an earlier statement of the facts and the law involved in the decision rendered by the MSPB dated February 28, 1990, which affirmed DBP's decision to dismiss the petitioner. In both decisions, the facts and the law on which they were based were clearly and distinctly stated.Lianga Bay Logging, Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987Facts:The parties are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each other. Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they have a common boundary. Reports of encroachment by both parties on each others concessions triggered a survey to establish the common boundary of the respective concession areas and was held that the claim of Ago Timber Corporation runs counter to the intentions of the Office granting the Timber License Agreement to Lianga Bay Logging. Ago Timber appealed to Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and set aside the appealed decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled in favor of Ago. Lianga Bay Logging elevated the case to office of President and ruling of Agriculture and Natural Resources was affirmed. On Motion for Recon, decision was reversed and reinstated decision of Director of Forestry. A civil action was instituted by Ago Timber to determine the correct boundary line of license timber areas. TRO was set in place. Lianga brought the case to SC on certiorari. Issue: WON respondent court has jurisdiction over the administrative caseHeld:Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by respondent Ago, asking for the determination anew of the correct boundary line of its licensed timber area, for the same issue had already been determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President, administrative officials under whose jurisdictions the matter properly belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all public forests and forest reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and fish, and for the taking of forest products, including stone and earth therefrom. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as department head, may repeal or modify the decision of the Director of Forestry when advisable in the public interests, whose decision is in turn appealable to the Office of the President. For the respondent court to consider and weigh again the evidence already presented and passed upon by said officials would be to allow it to substitute its judgment for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically vested in them by law. it is a well-settled doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies and their expertise unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.

Luzon Development Bank vs Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (249 SCRA 162)Facts:From a submission agreement of the LDB and ALDBE arose an arbitration case to resolve the issue whether or not the company violated the CBA provision and the Memorandum Agreement. The parties agreed to submit their respective position papers.Atty Ester Garcia, Voluntary Arbitrator Received ALDBs position paper while LDB failed to do the same. Hence, the former rendered a decision that the bank has not adhered to the CBA nor Memorandum Agreement. Petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the VA and to prohibit her from enforcing the sameIssues: WON a voluntary arbiters decision is appealable to the Court of Appeals and not to the Supreme Court.Held:Yes, the court can refer the case to the CA. Voluntary arbiter performs state functions pursuant to governmental power delegated to him under the Labor Code and Section 9 of BP Blg. 129(as amended by RA 7902) stating CA shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, resolutions, orders, or awards or RTC and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, including SEC and CSC.

Iron and Steel Authority vs CA 249 SCRA 538

FACTS:

Petitioner ISA was created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry.

PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years counting from August 9, 1973. When ISAs original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31, 1979.

The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The construction of such steel mill was considered a priority and major industrial project of the government. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC.Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated November 16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFCs present occupancy rights on the subject land.

Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed.

ISSUE: WON the Government is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISAs term.

Held: Yes.Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of the Government of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic.

We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the RP. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as legal personality.

When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are reassumed by the RP, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties and functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the RP.

When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequence of such expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charters and, by way of supplementation, the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under PD 272.The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines and not the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved.

From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISAs statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.