48
ModnJ..i.ty end Case Gro.mmarH Joseph P. Calbert Indiana University Introduction Many difficuJ.ties encountered in syntactic trea.tmento of rnoda.ls aeetn to be the N:sult of' insufficient knowledge of' the semantic relationships underlying modality in general. rt is well known that .modality includes much more than what is traditionally called "modal auxiliaries.t1l :But there seems to be little a.~reement o.s to 1 see e.g •• J. Lyons (1968), pp. 307 ff, ho•tf' much should e.ctually be acco\Ulted fo:r in a treatment of modality. It is not our- purpose to revive the old conflict about whether 'moods• or 'modality' denote categories of form rather than of mes.ningt or whether it is possible to place all moods in & 1ogicnll~ consistent system and to arrive at a "notional" theory o,f modality, 2 For an outline or these problems, see o. Jes!'.)ersen (l924)'t pp. 315-321, However, we believe that it is essential to look for the underlying logical relationships of modal.ity~ e.nd possibly for a. basic meaning (GTU.ndbedeutung3), before looking for the "various overtones 11 that 3see e.g., G. Bech (1949). M. Ehrman (1966) 1 vho tried to abstract the ttbasic meaning" of modals. In a similar wey 2 R. *1~is is a co,.~p1etely revised version of a paper presented at Charles F'il:umore's Seminar in Syntax a.t the Ohio State University Linguistic '.i.nstitute, July 1970, The application of case gre.mmar to the analysis of mods.ls was suggested by Professor Fillmore. I am very grateful to him for encouraging the pubiication of this paper in the case-grammar anthology of' the Ohio State University Linguistics Department. I am also much indebted to Eeinz Vater (Indiana University) for va1uable discusi:;ions about German :medals nnd for information about unpublished Gertnun articles ( a'T!ong \:hich his m."TI} related to the topic.

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Page 1: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

ModnJity end Case GrommarH

Joseph P Calbert Indiana University

Introduction

Many difficuJties encountered in syntactic treatmento of rnodals aeetn to be the Nsult of insufficient knowledge of the semantic relationships underlying modality in general rt is well known that modality includes much more than what is traditionally called modal auxiliariest1l But there seems to be little a~reement os to

1see eg bullbull J Lyons (1968) pp 307 ff

hobulltf much should ectually be accoUlted for in a treatment of modality It is not our- purpose to revive the old conflict about whether moodsbull or modality denote categories of form rather than of mesningt or whether it is possible to place all moods in amp 1ogicnll~ consistent system and to arrive at a notional theory of modality

2For an outline or these problems see o Jes)ersen (l924)t pp 315-321

However we believe that it is essential to look for the underlying logical relationships of modality~ end possibly for a basic meaning (GTUndbedeutung3) before looking for the various overtones 11 that

3see eg G Bech (1949) M Ehrman (1966) 1 vho tried to abstract the ttbasic meaning of modals In a similar wey 2 R

1~is is a co~p1etely revised version of a paper presented at Charles Filumores Seminar in Syntax at the Ohio State University Linguistic institute July 1970 The application of case gremmar to the analysis of modsls was suggested by Professor Fillmore I am very grateful to him for encouraging the pubiication of this paper in the case-grammar anthology of the Ohio State University Linguistics Department I am also much indebted to Eeinz Vater (Indiana University) for va1uable discusiions about German medals nnd for information about unpublished Gertnun articles ( aTong hich his mTI related to the topic

86

Jakobson (1936) attempted to r~duce the Russinn Cnses to some 11Gesamtbed3utung (as pointed out by 1 Vater (1970))

dal t t 4mo s receive in var1ous con ex s middot It appears reasonable to assume

4This is the point of view adopted by C Leech (1970) p 202

that there is a basic semantic system of modality which is more er less com~letely represented in each language

Our evidence will meinly be draw-n from the system of models in German (occasionally in Dutch and in French) for German modals offer a clearer end apparently more complete picture of the general system of modality we want to propose In particular~ they present better evidence than English models tor postulating that modsls $hould be treated as main verbs and for illustrating the underlyin~ semantic relations of modals in general

In a first section we will shortly di3cuss the evideniJe that has been proposed for considering models as main verb5 Wewill then examine in a second section~ some syntactic characteristics of German modals and solutions that have been proposed thus far The necessity of a semantic approach to the ma1or problems related to modality will be pointed out in a third section and followed oy proposals for a new treatment based essentially on the use of semantic features in the frwiework of Fillmores partly revised case grammar5

5charles Fillmore (1970b) We will apply some or his proposals for reincorporating 1modelity 1 in the 1proposition 1 of the sentence as they were presented in the Seminar on Syntax at the 1970 Lingui$tic Institutebull Ohio State University

Derivations of the rnaJor types of modality in German vill be added in section 4 as an illustration of how models can be generated accounting for both their basic ambiguity and the various synonymy relations between their syntactically) very different reaJizations

Finally in an attempt to further abstract the meaning o~ medals ~e will add a few considerations about raodality and the speech act and proposals for a more general definition of modality

1 Modal Auxiliaries as Main Verbs

In recent treatments of English modals there seems to remain a certain disagreement as to whether models should be analyzed as main verba in the deep structure It is significant that linguists who ere most convinced of tbe necessitr to treat modnls as mein verbs often base their argwnents at least in part on Gennan

87

examples 6

6see mainly J R I~oss (1968) pp 6 ff J Lerot (1969) H Vater (1970)

l~l Looking at the surface itmiddot appears that modal verbs behave differently from main verbs Jackendoff (1968) pointed out some nroperties of English medals which he colls 11unverblike propeties They do not occur together theydo not participate in number agreement and perhaps most important they do not have participles or f_nfinitives 11 nnd so 11can only occur in the leftmost position (pp 5-6) middot

It is easy to show that none of these restrictions holds for German7 In (1) two modols occur together one participates in number

middot7Ihis was pointed ciut by H Veter (1970)

agreement the other has the infinitive form anddoes not occur in the leftmost position

(1) Das soilten Sie beweisen konnen You should be able to prov~ that

Such facts about German modals and similarly about Dutch and French modals)8 indicate that the so-called 11unverblike properties are

8Jackendoff 1 s properties are not valid for French and Dutch either

( i) Il raut vouloir pour pouvoirone must bi willing irgt order to be able ti

(ii) Hij zou het eigenlijk hebben moeten kunnen doen He should in fact have been able to do it

Note that Dutch 1Ulows for more than two medals to co-occur The same is true for German Bierwisch (1963 p 69 quoted by Vater) gives examples for sequences of three and even four models

idiosyncratic properties in the surface structure of modal auxiliaries in Bnglish This could certainly be used as an ergUment for consideritlg medals as true verbs Ross (1968) has given other convincing argumentsmiddot for analyzing modal auxiliaries os true verbs differing from real verbs like ver$UChen (try) only in having the feature C+ModalJwhere the latter has the feature C-ModalJ 11 (p 7) In a discussion of trie transitive-intransitive ch~acter of the verb begin in the deep structure Perlmutter (1970) suggests the same analysis for

---middot middot---middot---middot-- ~----middot

88

modals like must in order to account rot middottheir systematic (trlbiguity (p 115)~9 Heconcludes that if modals are trensitive-intransitive

9The same approach is proposed by Ross (1968) for German models and by Vetter (1967) for tneed 1 bull n Vater (1970) adopted a rery similar approach (see 2middotbelow)_~ It was impossible to consider Vaters more recent vork on the System of Modal Verbs in German which he is preparing for publication Our references to his vievs might therefore be a little outdated

verb doublets in deep structure this will constitute evidence for the hypothesis argued in Ross (1968) that there is no CauxiliaryJ constituent in deep structure and that the so-called bullauxiliary ver~s 1 are real verbs in deep ftructure 11

12 On the other hand the distinction between modal and non-modal verbs is particularly unclear in English We knov that in surface structure modals co-occur with other verb$ and somehow modii their meaning However it has often been pointed out that their function is not always clearly distinguished from tense and aspect markers os they- appear with main verbs1deg Furthermore-in some

lOsee J Lyons (1968) nintersection of tense and mood p 309) Intersection of tense and aspect 1bull (p 316) This ambiguity was also pointed out by Vater (1970) 0 Jespersen (1924) rejects the terms mo~al pnst tense and mQod-tense used by the NED and by Sweet respectively as inadequatebull middotbecause bullmoods bull have no fixed notional vel ue ( p bull 267 ~ note i )

cases English uses auxiliary verbs or other verbs to express the meaning conveyed bymodals in G~rman

(2) a The house is to be sold Das Haus~ verkauft verden

b He vants to come --rrwill kommen middot c He would like to come

Er m8chte kommen d He is BPnosed (e(Peeted) to come

Er muf3 kommen e lifl claims to be an actor

Er will Schauspieier sein r The film is said to be good

Der Film ill_ gut sein11

11Notice the English seni-modal11 dare and the corresponding vords in German (wagen) end Dutch (durven)deg which are 1pure 1 verbs

It is also interesting to examine the semantic relation between the etymologically related Dutch durven English dare t tgt and Gernan cliirfen bullbe allowemiddotd1 may (See below p 119)

In the case of 1want tclaim1 and said to English does not heve modal auxiliaries to express what clearly appears to be modality in German If we consider the meaning that these verbs convey aa part of the semantic system of modality ve can say that these verbs function semantically as models But for the rest without even postulating anv deep structure we have to recognize that they are pure verbs This is also true for the various paraphrases of modal verbs vhioh we want to derive from the same deep structure as the modal verbs vhich they are synonyms of

(3) a b

He He ~ read it is sble to read it

(4) a b

He lie

can reed it ~ reed it

We will not fUlther argue about this problem nov The evidence for considering all auxiliaries as main verbs in the deep structure vill certainly increase as we concentrate on the system of German modal8

2 Some Syntactic Characteristics o~ German Models

21 The surface structure of German modals reveals an important difference between the syntactic behavior of vollen and that of the other modals Yater (1970) considers the following major differences

21l wollen is the only modal allowing for a ~-sentence

(5) a Sein Vater wi11 da(3 er zu Hause bleibt ttHis fether wants him to stay home 0

b Sein Vater mu daft er zu Hause bleibt ilfHis father must that he stays home 11

212 wollen is the only modal that can be passivized

(6) a Von Hann 9rd gewollt da3 Anna zu Hause b~eibtl3y Hans is wanted that Ann stays nt home

b Von Hans wird gemu)t da~ Anna zu Uauee bleibt

21 3 The pass i vizat ion of the complement ot wollen requires an interpretation difrerent from the interpretation of the pnssivized complements of the other models

( () 11 Inge konnte von Peter tekuit werden Ingecould be kissed byPeter fl

( T) b bull tnge fill iQn P~teJ _sekiyt w~rden ~ tnge vsn~s middotto pe kisJed by Peteyenbull

middot(7a) is ideutic~middot ~ith (_Ba) but (Tb) is different from (8b _

- a-) a Peter konnte Inge kiirasen bull etar could )micross Inge

b middot leter will Inse ktisst~middot P~ter wants to kiss Inge

22 Onthe hasis of the syntactic properties that vollen does not shere vi~h the ~ther modela gtVater 1970) proposeB to adopt the distincti911 bet-ween transitivebull (for vollen middotarid intransitivebull (for th~ other mo(Jel~) as sUggested byPerlmutter (1970 j bull This i~ to reflect the deep-structure differences which condition the surface differ~nqes JustJllEntioned $ep~enoes (8~) and (8~) are th(ilnderived in the ro~owing W8112 middot middot middot middot -

l 2he middotclerivatiois are adapt~d from Perlmutter (l97q middot pp middotmiddot107-ibS) middot enil Vater (l97d) middot1lotice tbe following constructions in ti~r~nch

middot (-i) Il fautmiddot qumiddotbull il vienne middot middot middot middotHe middotrnust 00ltie itmiddot 1s necessary for him to come

ii) middot Il se peut q~ il vienne middot middot It is possible that he ~il come

middot~

were the that- sentence g_u t ii Vienne occ~ring after the modal~ pouvoir ( bulloan1 _or 1mq) d ello1r ( 11ftist ) funct~ons as a Sb1ect NP as shocent in the 4e1ivation of (8a)

(8)- c s

s

I ~

NP VP

~v I 1middot

Peter Anna kuasen

91

(8) d Smiddot

NP VP-~---_S V

UP VP middot---------I n(1

Peter Peter Anne kussen wollen -middot~- =i-If the subject or the embedded sentence with wollen in (8a) is d~fferent from the subject of the higher sentence it can not be deieted and the conjunction ds) is inserted~ as in

(9) Peter wtnmiddot da(3 Anna ihn kusst Peter wants Ann to middotkiss llim 0

With 11ll the other modals the subJect of the embedded S_has to be identical withthe subject of the higher S aa in middot

(10) Peter mu~ Anna kussen Peter must ki$s Jmn

where Peter is the subject of both predicates (milssen and kussen) As fqr the passivization of wollen it is easy to show howthe-complement da~sentence becomes the subject of the passive verb lhe difference between pnssivizatiorgt of the complement sentence of wolien and that of the complement sentences of the other modais is also a result of the difrerent deep structures or the transitive Wollen and the intransitive models

23 Although this analysis of modals offers a reasonable solution of the syntactic problems outlined in 2bull 1 middot it is clearly

middot inadequate in many respects We will consider two major shortcominps here and then try to extend the scope of the analysis in order to include all aspects of modality

middot 231 As we noticed the transitive-intransitive anaiysis is based on the syntactic differences between wollen and-the other German modals But these differences are only one aspectmiddot ot a more essential semnntic difference in the deep structure We will see oelow that modality is a semantic property of e higher predicate in the deep structure which is often (but by fer not always)realized as a modal verbr in the surfaceThere is a perfect structural similarty between l3

i 3The qngle brackets ~elimit the embedded sentence in the deep structure and its corresponding aurface realization bull

D~eu Structure Surface Structure

(ll) a X vents --- CY stay homeJ ~b CY~ ~tay home]

c Xmiddotpermits CY stay homeiJd CY~ stay homeJ

Must and mayen are the surface reali~ations ot the rvtgtiition and permissionbullmiddot present il) the higher deep-structure predicates twant and permit respectiv~iy To1middots1 menns that the German modal wollen is nothing elsethan the higher deep structurepredicate itself realized as a modal verb in the surface Notice that vhat the transitive-intransitive analysis caUs themiddot subject of the mein sentences colltaining wollen or one middotof the othtlr modals does not always express the Sallle function Thus the subject of wollen expresses the origin of the ivolition whereas the sublects of sollen or diirfen express the 0 destination11 11benefidaeybullt 11exper-iencerbull1) of the 1tolition and the 1permiasion 1 (see below 32) The syntactic enalysisproposeq by Perlmutter and Ross fails to explain the differencemiddotbetveen these underlving rolesbull We will return to further implications of this emilysis later It may suffice here to point out t~at we should not be misled by the surface differences between wo1len and e11 other modals in German iUld that we have to loqk for thEii deep semantic structure underlying the modsls ilollen then has to be paralleled -lth erlauben bullpennit1

although in the surface the former is a modal and the letter e pure verb We feel this to be a strong argument for dropping the distinctionmiddot between modal verb9 and pure verbsbull Whether and where we need a feature C+MODAJ (as suggested by Ross) wili b~middot examined below (322) 232 Another shortcoming of the transitive-intransitive

ena1ysis is related to Perlmutter s (and partly also Jackendorrts and Ross) suggestion to use this anal~tsis to account for the tollowingmiddotambiguity of nodals like must (using Perlmutterbulls examples p 115)

(12) a Clyde must work hard

paraphraJable es (12b) and (12c

t12) b Clyde is obli~ed to work hard c It must be the case that Clyde works hard

Such pairs of meaning (sometim~s called obJective and bullsubJective meaning of modals) will be shown to be derived from deep structures parallel to ( lla) and middotllc) butmiddot involvingmiddotone more embedded sentence Semantically however ve will postulate the s~e modality feature t+obligationJ underlyingmiddotboth meanings of bullmust 1 (see 32

3middot The Semantics of Modality

The differences aecountedformiddotby the standard theoey (outlined in 2 are middotclearlr only one aspemiddotct of tle yntax and middot

93

semantics 01middot mooale We vill tcy to show that they can be explair1ed much mo1bulle adeg_uately wi thi11 a theory of the sementics of modality

But what i modality If wemiddotlook at thr literature on moods 1 or modality we find the tollotdng -general considerations Jespersen 1924) pointed out that moods express certain attitudes or the mind of the sDeaker tovards the content of the sentence (p 3~3) thus follo~ing Brugmitnn Oertel end Noreen (mentioned in note l p 313) But he fails to relate this aspect of modality at lest explic L tly to the function of modal verbs~ Lyons 1968) entegorizes sentences in two major groups the ltclass of sentences which express smmple statements of fact unqualified with res-pect to the attitude of the speaker towards what he is seyingt1 (p 307 This class he calls the 0 non-modal-class of sentcentnces (ie unmarked fo1bullmiddot rnood) The other class of sentences which are mar~rnd for tnoori consists esaentially or imperative and interro-gsttbulle sentences~ which stand in contrast todeclarative sentences lrJ virtue of their modality11 bull Apartfrom these modalities expressing commands or insiructions produced by the speaker ( in the case of imperatives) and the expectations of the speaker (in the case of interrogatives) Lyons considers the lalge variety of vays in bullrhich the 1ettitude of the speaker 1a grBmmetically marked in different 1anttteges middot(p 308) These other inodalities (or scales 0pound lllodnlity) wllich have obvjous affinities with the modalities expressed middotby imperatives and interrogatives are frequently expressed with thehelp or modal auxiliaries (a term which Lyons does not use)

In ~ecent work in linguistics the affinitieg between moods and mocli1 verbs nave not been explicitly accounted for They sometimes eeem to be implicitly assumed t as in Leech (1970) and Langendoen (1969 1970)~ but most ~requently the approaches are restricted to modals and their paraphrases However within the performative analyses mainly Ross (1970 1971) Boeder (1968 ~ Wunderlich (1966) Sadock (1969) Domiddotming (1969) and Casagrande (1969) an increasing attention is given to thedElrivation of imperative~ end interrogatives Boyd and Thorne (1969) apply the performative an1r1_ts1s to the semeutiifsmiddot of English rnodals and shov the $imilarities b~tween imperatives models expressing some degree of volition 1 and questions (which are analyzed as a special type ot inrperatives 1i Le~ commands to sev (p 61))l4 Within this

l 4see also Casagrande (1969) p 87 (asking a question is a request for an snsbullrer11 ) and Ross (1970) y 263 Note 19

frimicronework moda1 verbs are treated 1es indicaiing the illocutionary potential of the sentences in which tpey middot o~cur11 (p 62) bull lhe higl1er sentences nostuleted in the deep structure of modal sentences (see our~xom~les (lle) and (llc) are said to carry the illocutionary Tgtotential of the sentence wherea~ the embedded sentences ore termed its pro9os i tional content 11 ( P 59) bull

By viewing modality ln this broader perspective ve are able to grasp the real problems that have to be solved in relation to

~ Imiddot- ~ bull ~bull~bull h middot-~---~~- -bull~rJ middot- bull--bull bullbullbullbulluv=middot -~-middot~-bull-

9i1

tmodal verbs- we w111 first outline thesec problems concentrattng mainly on German niodals (in 31~)15 we will then make proposals to

15 We domiddotnot attempt to describe ell the meanings of Germnn

modals novever ve are convincEd thet they QLn be titted middotinto the system imich we plopose to middotaccount ror the besic meanings

account for the exmined f11cts in terms of iemantic featur-es end middotFillmores case grafflllar (3 2)

31 Most of the problems encounterecl in a description of llOdals hav~ to ~o yith the se~ntic relations of synonymy1 ambimlty

1and inversion

16vre use this term in the sense of Leech ts prlnQiple of inversion systems tr one term is substituted for the other end -the position of the negative is changed the utterance undergoe~ no change of meaning (p 205) iAJ1 and bullsome are I inverses t as shown in the synonymy hetveen (i ) and (ii)

(i) Notmiddot s1i utterances are emlJiguous (ii) Some utterances are pound2i ambigUous

311 We poundirst want to capture the reiationehip betveen the following p~irs of modsls

(13) a wollen end sollen uwant have to

b erlauben and durfen ~permit may (be alloved)

in oonstrnct_ions of the follorlng type (compare to lla-(lld) iibove)

(14) X ~t dafl Y bull bull pnd Y Bollbull Cll Yon X -lfl mvollt2 da Y bull bull bull

b X 9rlaubt dn Y bull and Yderf bullbull or Von X Wsl ar~aubt I daft y bullbull _

In order to account for the possible synonytey betwetln the members of middotesch pairlT middotwe villpostulate that the modals sollen and dilrfen (and

17It is obvious that the right members or these pairs nre synonymous with the left members if the origin of the olition 1

or permission i1 also X

95

similariy mussen and konnen) have in their underiying structure the verb~ wollen and erlmilien respectively~ or ruther a complex of features one of which stands tor the volitiOn1 and themiddot permission expressed by -wollen and erlnuben respectiveiy

312 We similarly want to capt~rc the relationship betmiddotreen the members of the following pairs

(15) s wollen want and erlauben 1allo~ b mussen must and konnen may

which are inverses see note 16) We must be able to exoress this relation in the basic meaning feafa~res whlch we po$tulate for modality he complexity of combinations of mqdals with negation cWl be significantly reduced once we understand this logical relationship (See mainly Leech 1970) p 205)

Jl3 Another important fact about modals which we would like to acccunt for is the synonymy between modals (sub (a)) and the predicative adjectiyes or uast uarticinles (su~ (b)) which can be use4 to paraphrase them middot

(16) a konnen b moglich possible erlaubt allowed

mussen n5tig fneceSSUrf I eewollt wanted

ollen 5ewo1lt tvanted 1

notig necessary )18 durfen erlaubt bulla11oved mogen erlaubt alloved

18ner Cro~e Dudenltgt g_ (StilworteXbuch) and Wahri~ Deutsches W5rterbuch do not list sollen in the meaning of causal necessity and mussen in the meaning of volitionbull However since the lattermiddot is accepted by many native speakers~ we will consider it in our analysis

To the paraphrases illustrated under (16b) lfe coulci also add those that are used to indicate a certain degree of 1probaoility which these models can express see 3l5) We shomicrold therefore introduce modelity as a predicate in the deep structure allowing the specirication of the lexical category ((modal) verb adjective adverb noun) to enter the derivation at o later stage probablr with lexical insertion We will see how the use of semantic features instead 0pound lexical entities simplifies the generation of modality (see 32

314 Th~ paraphrases under (l6b) suggeet thnt the ~odals konnen and mGssen are ambiguous in the following wsy

(a) sollen gewollt twanted obliged 17 a milssen lt

(b) necessary

96 (a)

(17) b konnenlt ~--- (b) possiblet

In the system illustrated in (17a) and (17b) the modsla sollen and gilrren are tYPically unambiguous in that they only convey the meaningsmiddot 11sted sub (e) German thus shows a lati1er neat system w1th two pairs of which the second member only (sub (b)) is ambiguous

(18) a sollen b mussen durfen k5nnen

Class (a) and class (b) are therefore to some extent in complementary distributiori19 This dichotoiey can easily be accomicronted for withill

19It is interesting to notice that the opposition between (a and (b) is not le~ically realized in the R9mance languages

(i French devoir obligat~on and necessitySpanish ~

(ii) French P2UVOY bullpermission and possibilitySpanish poder

the framework alreody mentioned above bi deriving the meanings e) and (b) roughly in the following vay20

20Taking mussenmiddotend konnen in their m9st typical ~eaning (as illustrated in the (b) altelnatives of (1T))

(19 e sollen cliirfen

from horn

CpersonJ wants that bullbullbull CpersonJ permitst~at bullbullbull

b ndissen from [something) obliges necessitates bullbullbull konnen from CsomethingJ allows tnakes possible bullbull

CPERSONJ stands tor the Agent or the ~derlying volition or permission and CSOMElHIIiGJ stands for the ~I or the underlyinp obligation or possibility1 bull 21 We will see below that this

21Agency is usual~ understood as ceualton lixnitea to human causes Cause is then referring to non-human causes (Leech p 205 Lyons~ pp 352-353 359-360 We will see below that in tnodal sentences ceuse stands for the bullfacts 1 1 circumstances 1 events 1

etc which are at the origin of the 1 necessity 1 (or obli~ation 1 )

and the bull possibility (or I capadty) exp-eased by the models miissen

91

and konneii resmicroectively Jhe distinction betveen c eusa1 t and bullagentivemiddot necessity or possibility is particularly expl~cit in Bechmiddotbull s terniinltgtlog_v (1949) middot

( i) volitiv beatimmte ifotvendigkeit (agentive necessity) volitiv bestimmte Moglichkeit (agentive possibility) kausale Notwendigkeit (causal necessity middot

kausale Moglichkeit (causal p0S81bility)

Leech (1970) similarly distinguishes between possibility and necessity (omicror causal modalities) and permission and obligation our aeentivebull modalities) adding that nnossibility and necessity_ logically include oe~mission and 9bligati~ (p 217) In other words he considers permissionbull as11a particular kind of 12ossibility and obligation as e particular kind of necessity Mote that the cause~agent dichotoiey is also present in such verb pairs ~s

(ii) to prevent from (according to Leech causationbull only to forbid (authority only in Leech 1s terms

distinction plays an essential role inthe und~r1ying ey~tem of m~~i~ middot middot

31 ~ 5 The most typical ambig~ity o-f modals Ues in their ability to express a certain degree of 1 probabilitybull or ce~tainty 1 bull

This second meaning of medals has been termed subjectivebull (eg in German Grammars hypothetical (eg in Leech 1970)) inferentialbull (eg in Lyons (1968) epistemic or predictive (eg in Filltnore ( l970a)) as opposemiddotd to their obJective I or 1 pragmatic f

meaning The system of German modals exhibits a complete regularity in that they can all be used to convey the inferential meaning22

22we will use the term bullinferential because it best expresse~ the exact nature of this type of modality (see below)

Let us b~iefly examine these meanings and see how they qffer the strongest evidence for the general theory or modality that we want to postulate

First consider the following examples vith k6nnent m95en durfen verde~ and some p~aphreses of their inferential meaning

(26) a Peter kenn das Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

or Es ist moglich da~ Peter das Geld nimmt Es kann sein ~ ~ bullbull

b Peter mag des Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

~-- middotmiddot-------- middotmiddot--- - ----middot---middotmiddotmiddotmiddot __ --middotmiddot-----middot--- -middot- ----~-- --raquo-

23Peter darf das Geld nehmen (with the modal in the present tense cannotconvey the inferential mea~ing

98

Es ist m65lich da(3 bullbullbull Es ma13 iein daW bull bull

c Peter durfte das Celd nehmen23 Peter might take the money~

Es ist wohl m5glich da~middot Es konnte sein da~ bullbullbull

d Peter wirdmiddotdas Geld nehmen 24 tt isprobable that bullbull

24werden is the only German-modal vhich does not have a clear objective meaning However H Vater pointed out that it cnn sometimes conver the meaning of a command Dr a threat We might want to call this ite objective meaningbull Notice that werden is also used as an suxiliery for the future a function which is obviously connected with its inferential meaning

Es ist rahrscheinlich daB ls ist moglich da~ bullbullbull

notice thet most of these modal sentences when expressing the inferential meaning would have a much h_igher probability of occurrence with an embedded verb in the past tense They could then not carry the objective meaning 8$ in

(21) a Peter mag das getan haben Peter may have done tlat tt

b Peter ~ dos geten htiben 11Peter probably did that 11

Let us nov look at the folloving exaples with mussen wollen sollen and some paraphrases (considering 9nly their inferential meaning)

(22) a Peter mu~ frfiji aufstehen Peter mustmiddot get up eerly I em certain that bullbull

Es ist sehr ~rahrscheinlich da~ Peter fruh aufsteht It is highly pr-obeble that bull 11

Ich bin sicher 1 da~ ttr am sure th a t bull

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

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132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 2: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

86

Jakobson (1936) attempted to r~duce the Russinn Cnses to some 11Gesamtbed3utung (as pointed out by 1 Vater (1970))

dal t t 4mo s receive in var1ous con ex s middot It appears reasonable to assume

4This is the point of view adopted by C Leech (1970) p 202

that there is a basic semantic system of modality which is more er less com~letely represented in each language

Our evidence will meinly be draw-n from the system of models in German (occasionally in Dutch and in French) for German modals offer a clearer end apparently more complete picture of the general system of modality we want to propose In particular~ they present better evidence than English models tor postulating that modsls $hould be treated as main verbs and for illustrating the underlyin~ semantic relations of modals in general

In a first section we will shortly di3cuss the evideniJe that has been proposed for considering models as main verb5 Wewill then examine in a second section~ some syntactic characteristics of German modals and solutions that have been proposed thus far The necessity of a semantic approach to the ma1or problems related to modality will be pointed out in a third section and followed oy proposals for a new treatment based essentially on the use of semantic features in the frwiework of Fillmores partly revised case grammar5

5charles Fillmore (1970b) We will apply some or his proposals for reincorporating 1modelity 1 in the 1proposition 1 of the sentence as they were presented in the Seminar on Syntax at the 1970 Lingui$tic Institutebull Ohio State University

Derivations of the rnaJor types of modality in German vill be added in section 4 as an illustration of how models can be generated accounting for both their basic ambiguity and the various synonymy relations between their syntactically) very different reaJizations

Finally in an attempt to further abstract the meaning o~ medals ~e will add a few considerations about raodality and the speech act and proposals for a more general definition of modality

1 Modal Auxiliaries as Main Verbs

In recent treatments of English modals there seems to remain a certain disagreement as to whether models should be analyzed as main verba in the deep structure It is significant that linguists who ere most convinced of tbe necessitr to treat modnls as mein verbs often base their argwnents at least in part on Gennan

87

examples 6

6see mainly J R I~oss (1968) pp 6 ff J Lerot (1969) H Vater (1970)

l~l Looking at the surface itmiddot appears that modal verbs behave differently from main verbs Jackendoff (1968) pointed out some nroperties of English medals which he colls 11unverblike propeties They do not occur together theydo not participate in number agreement and perhaps most important they do not have participles or f_nfinitives 11 nnd so 11can only occur in the leftmost position (pp 5-6) middot

It is easy to show that none of these restrictions holds for German7 In (1) two modols occur together one participates in number

middot7Ihis was pointed ciut by H Veter (1970)

agreement the other has the infinitive form anddoes not occur in the leftmost position

(1) Das soilten Sie beweisen konnen You should be able to prov~ that

Such facts about German modals and similarly about Dutch and French modals)8 indicate that the so-called 11unverblike properties are

8Jackendoff 1 s properties are not valid for French and Dutch either

( i) Il raut vouloir pour pouvoirone must bi willing irgt order to be able ti

(ii) Hij zou het eigenlijk hebben moeten kunnen doen He should in fact have been able to do it

Note that Dutch 1Ulows for more than two medals to co-occur The same is true for German Bierwisch (1963 p 69 quoted by Vater) gives examples for sequences of three and even four models

idiosyncratic properties in the surface structure of modal auxiliaries in Bnglish This could certainly be used as an ergUment for consideritlg medals as true verbs Ross (1968) has given other convincing argumentsmiddot for analyzing modal auxiliaries os true verbs differing from real verbs like ver$UChen (try) only in having the feature C+ModalJwhere the latter has the feature C-ModalJ 11 (p 7) In a discussion of trie transitive-intransitive ch~acter of the verb begin in the deep structure Perlmutter (1970) suggests the same analysis for

---middot middot---middot---middot-- ~----middot

88

modals like must in order to account rot middottheir systematic (trlbiguity (p 115)~9 Heconcludes that if modals are trensitive-intransitive

9The same approach is proposed by Ross (1968) for German models and by Vetter (1967) for tneed 1 bull n Vater (1970) adopted a rery similar approach (see 2middotbelow)_~ It was impossible to consider Vaters more recent vork on the System of Modal Verbs in German which he is preparing for publication Our references to his vievs might therefore be a little outdated

verb doublets in deep structure this will constitute evidence for the hypothesis argued in Ross (1968) that there is no CauxiliaryJ constituent in deep structure and that the so-called bullauxiliary ver~s 1 are real verbs in deep ftructure 11

12 On the other hand the distinction between modal and non-modal verbs is particularly unclear in English We knov that in surface structure modals co-occur with other verb$ and somehow modii their meaning However it has often been pointed out that their function is not always clearly distinguished from tense and aspect markers os they- appear with main verbs1deg Furthermore-in some

lOsee J Lyons (1968) nintersection of tense and mood p 309) Intersection of tense and aspect 1bull (p 316) This ambiguity was also pointed out by Vater (1970) 0 Jespersen (1924) rejects the terms mo~al pnst tense and mQod-tense used by the NED and by Sweet respectively as inadequatebull middotbecause bullmoods bull have no fixed notional vel ue ( p bull 267 ~ note i )

cases English uses auxiliary verbs or other verbs to express the meaning conveyed bymodals in G~rman

(2) a The house is to be sold Das Haus~ verkauft verden

b He vants to come --rrwill kommen middot c He would like to come

Er m8chte kommen d He is BPnosed (e(Peeted) to come

Er muf3 kommen e lifl claims to be an actor

Er will Schauspieier sein r The film is said to be good

Der Film ill_ gut sein11

11Notice the English seni-modal11 dare and the corresponding vords in German (wagen) end Dutch (durven)deg which are 1pure 1 verbs

It is also interesting to examine the semantic relation between the etymologically related Dutch durven English dare t tgt and Gernan cliirfen bullbe allowemiddotd1 may (See below p 119)

In the case of 1want tclaim1 and said to English does not heve modal auxiliaries to express what clearly appears to be modality in German If we consider the meaning that these verbs convey aa part of the semantic system of modality ve can say that these verbs function semantically as models But for the rest without even postulating anv deep structure we have to recognize that they are pure verbs This is also true for the various paraphrases of modal verbs vhioh we want to derive from the same deep structure as the modal verbs vhich they are synonyms of

(3) a b

He He ~ read it is sble to read it

(4) a b

He lie

can reed it ~ reed it

We will not fUlther argue about this problem nov The evidence for considering all auxiliaries as main verbs in the deep structure vill certainly increase as we concentrate on the system of German modal8

2 Some Syntactic Characteristics o~ German Models

21 The surface structure of German modals reveals an important difference between the syntactic behavior of vollen and that of the other modals Yater (1970) considers the following major differences

21l wollen is the only modal allowing for a ~-sentence

(5) a Sein Vater wi11 da(3 er zu Hause bleibt ttHis fether wants him to stay home 0

b Sein Vater mu daft er zu Hause bleibt ilfHis father must that he stays home 11

212 wollen is the only modal that can be passivized

(6) a Von Hann 9rd gewollt da3 Anna zu Hause b~eibtl3y Hans is wanted that Ann stays nt home

b Von Hans wird gemu)t da~ Anna zu Uauee bleibt

21 3 The pass i vizat ion of the complement ot wollen requires an interpretation difrerent from the interpretation of the pnssivized complements of the other models

( () 11 Inge konnte von Peter tekuit werden Ingecould be kissed byPeter fl

( T) b bull tnge fill iQn P~teJ _sekiyt w~rden ~ tnge vsn~s middotto pe kisJed by Peteyenbull

middot(7a) is ideutic~middot ~ith (_Ba) but (Tb) is different from (8b _

- a-) a Peter konnte Inge kiirasen bull etar could )micross Inge

b middot leter will Inse ktisst~middot P~ter wants to kiss Inge

22 Onthe hasis of the syntactic properties that vollen does not shere vi~h the ~ther modela gtVater 1970) proposeB to adopt the distincti911 bet-ween transitivebull (for vollen middotarid intransitivebull (for th~ other mo(Jel~) as sUggested byPerlmutter (1970 j bull This i~ to reflect the deep-structure differences which condition the surface differ~nqes JustJllEntioned $ep~enoes (8~) and (8~) are th(ilnderived in the ro~owing W8112 middot middot middot middot -

l 2he middotclerivatiois are adapt~d from Perlmutter (l97q middot pp middotmiddot107-ibS) middot enil Vater (l97d) middot1lotice tbe following constructions in ti~r~nch

middot (-i) Il fautmiddot qumiddotbull il vienne middot middot middot middotHe middotrnust 00ltie itmiddot 1s necessary for him to come

ii) middot Il se peut q~ il vienne middot middot It is possible that he ~il come

middot~

were the that- sentence g_u t ii Vienne occ~ring after the modal~ pouvoir ( bulloan1 _or 1mq) d ello1r ( 11ftist ) funct~ons as a Sb1ect NP as shocent in the 4e1ivation of (8a)

(8)- c s

s

I ~

NP VP

~v I 1middot

Peter Anna kuasen

91

(8) d Smiddot

NP VP-~---_S V

UP VP middot---------I n(1

Peter Peter Anne kussen wollen -middot~- =i-If the subject or the embedded sentence with wollen in (8a) is d~fferent from the subject of the higher sentence it can not be deieted and the conjunction ds) is inserted~ as in

(9) Peter wtnmiddot da(3 Anna ihn kusst Peter wants Ann to middotkiss llim 0

With 11ll the other modals the subJect of the embedded S_has to be identical withthe subject of the higher S aa in middot

(10) Peter mu~ Anna kussen Peter must ki$s Jmn

where Peter is the subject of both predicates (milssen and kussen) As fqr the passivization of wollen it is easy to show howthe-complement da~sentence becomes the subject of the passive verb lhe difference between pnssivizatiorgt of the complement sentence of wolien and that of the complement sentences of the other modais is also a result of the difrerent deep structures or the transitive Wollen and the intransitive models

23 Although this analysis of modals offers a reasonable solution of the syntactic problems outlined in 2bull 1 middot it is clearly

middot inadequate in many respects We will consider two major shortcominps here and then try to extend the scope of the analysis in order to include all aspects of modality

middot 231 As we noticed the transitive-intransitive anaiysis is based on the syntactic differences between wollen and-the other German modals But these differences are only one aspectmiddot ot a more essential semnntic difference in the deep structure We will see oelow that modality is a semantic property of e higher predicate in the deep structure which is often (but by fer not always)realized as a modal verbr in the surfaceThere is a perfect structural similarty between l3

i 3The qngle brackets ~elimit the embedded sentence in the deep structure and its corresponding aurface realization bull

D~eu Structure Surface Structure

(ll) a X vents --- CY stay homeJ ~b CY~ ~tay home]

c Xmiddotpermits CY stay homeiJd CY~ stay homeJ

Must and mayen are the surface reali~ations ot the rvtgtiition and permissionbullmiddot present il) the higher deep-structure predicates twant and permit respectiv~iy To1middots1 menns that the German modal wollen is nothing elsethan the higher deep structurepredicate itself realized as a modal verb in the surface Notice that vhat the transitive-intransitive analysis caUs themiddot subject of the mein sentences colltaining wollen or one middotof the othtlr modals does not always express the Sallle function Thus the subject of wollen expresses the origin of the ivolition whereas the sublects of sollen or diirfen express the 0 destination11 11benefidaeybullt 11exper-iencerbull1) of the 1tolition and the 1permiasion 1 (see below 32) The syntactic enalysisproposeq by Perlmutter and Ross fails to explain the differencemiddotbetveen these underlving rolesbull We will return to further implications of this emilysis later It may suffice here to point out t~at we should not be misled by the surface differences between wo1len and e11 other modals in German iUld that we have to loqk for thEii deep semantic structure underlying the modsls ilollen then has to be paralleled -lth erlauben bullpennit1

although in the surface the former is a modal and the letter e pure verb We feel this to be a strong argument for dropping the distinctionmiddot between modal verb9 and pure verbsbull Whether and where we need a feature C+MODAJ (as suggested by Ross) wili b~middot examined below (322) 232 Another shortcoming of the transitive-intransitive

ena1ysis is related to Perlmutter s (and partly also Jackendorrts and Ross) suggestion to use this anal~tsis to account for the tollowingmiddotambiguity of nodals like must (using Perlmutterbulls examples p 115)

(12) a Clyde must work hard

paraphraJable es (12b) and (12c

t12) b Clyde is obli~ed to work hard c It must be the case that Clyde works hard

Such pairs of meaning (sometim~s called obJective and bullsubJective meaning of modals) will be shown to be derived from deep structures parallel to ( lla) and middotllc) butmiddot involvingmiddotone more embedded sentence Semantically however ve will postulate the s~e modality feature t+obligationJ underlyingmiddotboth meanings of bullmust 1 (see 32

3middot The Semantics of Modality

The differences aecountedformiddotby the standard theoey (outlined in 2 are middotclearlr only one aspemiddotct of tle yntax and middot

93

semantics 01middot mooale We vill tcy to show that they can be explair1ed much mo1bulle adeg_uately wi thi11 a theory of the sementics of modality

But what i modality If wemiddotlook at thr literature on moods 1 or modality we find the tollotdng -general considerations Jespersen 1924) pointed out that moods express certain attitudes or the mind of the sDeaker tovards the content of the sentence (p 3~3) thus follo~ing Brugmitnn Oertel end Noreen (mentioned in note l p 313) But he fails to relate this aspect of modality at lest explic L tly to the function of modal verbs~ Lyons 1968) entegorizes sentences in two major groups the ltclass of sentences which express smmple statements of fact unqualified with res-pect to the attitude of the speaker towards what he is seyingt1 (p 307 This class he calls the 0 non-modal-class of sentcentnces (ie unmarked fo1bullmiddot rnood) The other class of sentences which are mar~rnd for tnoori consists esaentially or imperative and interro-gsttbulle sentences~ which stand in contrast todeclarative sentences lrJ virtue of their modality11 bull Apartfrom these modalities expressing commands or insiructions produced by the speaker ( in the case of imperatives) and the expectations of the speaker (in the case of interrogatives) Lyons considers the lalge variety of vays in bullrhich the 1ettitude of the speaker 1a grBmmetically marked in different 1anttteges middot(p 308) These other inodalities (or scales 0pound lllodnlity) wllich have obvjous affinities with the modalities expressed middotby imperatives and interrogatives are frequently expressed with thehelp or modal auxiliaries (a term which Lyons does not use)

In ~ecent work in linguistics the affinitieg between moods and mocli1 verbs nave not been explicitly accounted for They sometimes eeem to be implicitly assumed t as in Leech (1970) and Langendoen (1969 1970)~ but most ~requently the approaches are restricted to modals and their paraphrases However within the performative analyses mainly Ross (1970 1971) Boeder (1968 ~ Wunderlich (1966) Sadock (1969) Domiddotming (1969) and Casagrande (1969) an increasing attention is given to thedElrivation of imperative~ end interrogatives Boyd and Thorne (1969) apply the performative an1r1_ts1s to the semeutiifsmiddot of English rnodals and shov the $imilarities b~tween imperatives models expressing some degree of volition 1 and questions (which are analyzed as a special type ot inrperatives 1i Le~ commands to sev (p 61))l4 Within this

l 4see also Casagrande (1969) p 87 (asking a question is a request for an snsbullrer11 ) and Ross (1970) y 263 Note 19

frimicronework moda1 verbs are treated 1es indicaiing the illocutionary potential of the sentences in which tpey middot o~cur11 (p 62) bull lhe higl1er sentences nostuleted in the deep structure of modal sentences (see our~xom~les (lle) and (llc) are said to carry the illocutionary Tgtotential of the sentence wherea~ the embedded sentences ore termed its pro9os i tional content 11 ( P 59) bull

By viewing modality ln this broader perspective ve are able to grasp the real problems that have to be solved in relation to

~ Imiddot- ~ bull ~bull~bull h middot-~---~~- -bull~rJ middot- bull--bull bullbullbullbulluv=middot -~-middot~-bull-

9i1

tmodal verbs- we w111 first outline thesec problems concentrattng mainly on German niodals (in 31~)15 we will then make proposals to

15 We domiddotnot attempt to describe ell the meanings of Germnn

modals novever ve are convincEd thet they QLn be titted middotinto the system imich we plopose to middotaccount ror the besic meanings

account for the exmined f11cts in terms of iemantic featur-es end middotFillmores case grafflllar (3 2)

31 Most of the problems encounterecl in a description of llOdals hav~ to ~o yith the se~ntic relations of synonymy1 ambimlty

1and inversion

16vre use this term in the sense of Leech ts prlnQiple of inversion systems tr one term is substituted for the other end -the position of the negative is changed the utterance undergoe~ no change of meaning (p 205) iAJ1 and bullsome are I inverses t as shown in the synonymy hetveen (i ) and (ii)

(i) Notmiddot s1i utterances are emlJiguous (ii) Some utterances are pound2i ambigUous

311 We poundirst want to capture the reiationehip betveen the following p~irs of modsls

(13) a wollen end sollen uwant have to

b erlauben and durfen ~permit may (be alloved)

in oonstrnct_ions of the follorlng type (compare to lla-(lld) iibove)

(14) X ~t dafl Y bull bull pnd Y Bollbull Cll Yon X -lfl mvollt2 da Y bull bull bull

b X 9rlaubt dn Y bull and Yderf bullbull or Von X Wsl ar~aubt I daft y bullbull _

In order to account for the possible synonytey betwetln the members of middotesch pairlT middotwe villpostulate that the modals sollen and dilrfen (and

17It is obvious that the right members or these pairs nre synonymous with the left members if the origin of the olition 1

or permission i1 also X

95

similariy mussen and konnen) have in their underiying structure the verb~ wollen and erlmilien respectively~ or ruther a complex of features one of which stands tor the volitiOn1 and themiddot permission expressed by -wollen and erlnuben respectiveiy

312 We similarly want to capt~rc the relationship betmiddotreen the members of the following pairs

(15) s wollen want and erlauben 1allo~ b mussen must and konnen may

which are inverses see note 16) We must be able to exoress this relation in the basic meaning feafa~res whlch we po$tulate for modality he complexity of combinations of mqdals with negation cWl be significantly reduced once we understand this logical relationship (See mainly Leech 1970) p 205)

Jl3 Another important fact about modals which we would like to acccunt for is the synonymy between modals (sub (a)) and the predicative adjectiyes or uast uarticinles (su~ (b)) which can be use4 to paraphrase them middot

(16) a konnen b moglich possible erlaubt allowed

mussen n5tig fneceSSUrf I eewollt wanted

ollen 5ewo1lt tvanted 1

notig necessary )18 durfen erlaubt bulla11oved mogen erlaubt alloved

18ner Cro~e Dudenltgt g_ (StilworteXbuch) and Wahri~ Deutsches W5rterbuch do not list sollen in the meaning of causal necessity and mussen in the meaning of volitionbull However since the lattermiddot is accepted by many native speakers~ we will consider it in our analysis

To the paraphrases illustrated under (16b) lfe coulci also add those that are used to indicate a certain degree of 1probaoility which these models can express see 3l5) We shomicrold therefore introduce modelity as a predicate in the deep structure allowing the specirication of the lexical category ((modal) verb adjective adverb noun) to enter the derivation at o later stage probablr with lexical insertion We will see how the use of semantic features instead 0pound lexical entities simplifies the generation of modality (see 32

314 Th~ paraphrases under (l6b) suggeet thnt the ~odals konnen and mGssen are ambiguous in the following wsy

(a) sollen gewollt twanted obliged 17 a milssen lt

(b) necessary

96 (a)

(17) b konnenlt ~--- (b) possiblet

In the system illustrated in (17a) and (17b) the modsla sollen and gilrren are tYPically unambiguous in that they only convey the meaningsmiddot 11sted sub (e) German thus shows a lati1er neat system w1th two pairs of which the second member only (sub (b)) is ambiguous

(18) a sollen b mussen durfen k5nnen

Class (a) and class (b) are therefore to some extent in complementary distributiori19 This dichotoiey can easily be accomicronted for withill

19It is interesting to notice that the opposition between (a and (b) is not le~ically realized in the R9mance languages

(i French devoir obligat~on and necessitySpanish ~

(ii) French P2UVOY bullpermission and possibilitySpanish poder

the framework alreody mentioned above bi deriving the meanings e) and (b) roughly in the following vay20

20Taking mussenmiddotend konnen in their m9st typical ~eaning (as illustrated in the (b) altelnatives of (1T))

(19 e sollen cliirfen

from horn

CpersonJ wants that bullbullbull CpersonJ permitst~at bullbullbull

b ndissen from [something) obliges necessitates bullbullbull konnen from CsomethingJ allows tnakes possible bullbull

CPERSONJ stands tor the Agent or the ~derlying volition or permission and CSOMElHIIiGJ stands for the ~I or the underlyinp obligation or possibility1 bull 21 We will see below that this

21Agency is usual~ understood as ceualton lixnitea to human causes Cause is then referring to non-human causes (Leech p 205 Lyons~ pp 352-353 359-360 We will see below that in tnodal sentences ceuse stands for the bullfacts 1 1 circumstances 1 events 1

etc which are at the origin of the 1 necessity 1 (or obli~ation 1 )

and the bull possibility (or I capadty) exp-eased by the models miissen

91

and konneii resmicroectively Jhe distinction betveen c eusa1 t and bullagentivemiddot necessity or possibility is particularly expl~cit in Bechmiddotbull s terniinltgtlog_v (1949) middot

( i) volitiv beatimmte ifotvendigkeit (agentive necessity) volitiv bestimmte Moglichkeit (agentive possibility) kausale Notwendigkeit (causal necessity middot

kausale Moglichkeit (causal p0S81bility)

Leech (1970) similarly distinguishes between possibility and necessity (omicror causal modalities) and permission and obligation our aeentivebull modalities) adding that nnossibility and necessity_ logically include oe~mission and 9bligati~ (p 217) In other words he considers permissionbull as11a particular kind of 12ossibility and obligation as e particular kind of necessity Mote that the cause~agent dichotoiey is also present in such verb pairs ~s

(ii) to prevent from (according to Leech causationbull only to forbid (authority only in Leech 1s terms

distinction plays an essential role inthe und~r1ying ey~tem of m~~i~ middot middot

31 ~ 5 The most typical ambig~ity o-f modals Ues in their ability to express a certain degree of 1 probabilitybull or ce~tainty 1 bull

This second meaning of medals has been termed subjectivebull (eg in German Grammars hypothetical (eg in Leech 1970)) inferentialbull (eg in Lyons (1968) epistemic or predictive (eg in Filltnore ( l970a)) as opposemiddotd to their obJective I or 1 pragmatic f

meaning The system of German modals exhibits a complete regularity in that they can all be used to convey the inferential meaning22

22we will use the term bullinferential because it best expresse~ the exact nature of this type of modality (see below)

Let us b~iefly examine these meanings and see how they qffer the strongest evidence for the general theory or modality that we want to postulate

First consider the following examples vith k6nnent m95en durfen verde~ and some p~aphreses of their inferential meaning

(26) a Peter kenn das Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

or Es ist moglich da~ Peter das Geld nimmt Es kann sein ~ ~ bullbull

b Peter mag des Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

~-- middotmiddot-------- middotmiddot--- - ----middot---middotmiddotmiddotmiddot __ --middotmiddot-----middot--- -middot- ----~-- --raquo-

23Peter darf das Geld nehmen (with the modal in the present tense cannotconvey the inferential mea~ing

98

Es ist m65lich da(3 bullbullbull Es ma13 iein daW bull bull

c Peter durfte das Celd nehmen23 Peter might take the money~

Es ist wohl m5glich da~middot Es konnte sein da~ bullbullbull

d Peter wirdmiddotdas Geld nehmen 24 tt isprobable that bullbull

24werden is the only German-modal vhich does not have a clear objective meaning However H Vater pointed out that it cnn sometimes conver the meaning of a command Dr a threat We might want to call this ite objective meaningbull Notice that werden is also used as an suxiliery for the future a function which is obviously connected with its inferential meaning

Es ist rahrscheinlich daB ls ist moglich da~ bullbullbull

notice thet most of these modal sentences when expressing the inferential meaning would have a much h_igher probability of occurrence with an embedded verb in the past tense They could then not carry the objective meaning 8$ in

(21) a Peter mag das getan haben Peter may have done tlat tt

b Peter ~ dos geten htiben 11Peter probably did that 11

Let us nov look at the folloving exaples with mussen wollen sollen and some paraphrases (considering 9nly their inferential meaning)

(22) a Peter mu~ frfiji aufstehen Peter mustmiddot get up eerly I em certain that bullbull

Es ist sehr ~rahrscheinlich da~ Peter fruh aufsteht It is highly pr-obeble that bull 11

Ich bin sicher 1 da~ ttr am sure th a t bull

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

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497-107

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87

examples 6

6see mainly J R I~oss (1968) pp 6 ff J Lerot (1969) H Vater (1970)

l~l Looking at the surface itmiddot appears that modal verbs behave differently from main verbs Jackendoff (1968) pointed out some nroperties of English medals which he colls 11unverblike propeties They do not occur together theydo not participate in number agreement and perhaps most important they do not have participles or f_nfinitives 11 nnd so 11can only occur in the leftmost position (pp 5-6) middot

It is easy to show that none of these restrictions holds for German7 In (1) two modols occur together one participates in number

middot7Ihis was pointed ciut by H Veter (1970)

agreement the other has the infinitive form anddoes not occur in the leftmost position

(1) Das soilten Sie beweisen konnen You should be able to prov~ that

Such facts about German modals and similarly about Dutch and French modals)8 indicate that the so-called 11unverblike properties are

8Jackendoff 1 s properties are not valid for French and Dutch either

( i) Il raut vouloir pour pouvoirone must bi willing irgt order to be able ti

(ii) Hij zou het eigenlijk hebben moeten kunnen doen He should in fact have been able to do it

Note that Dutch 1Ulows for more than two medals to co-occur The same is true for German Bierwisch (1963 p 69 quoted by Vater) gives examples for sequences of three and even four models

idiosyncratic properties in the surface structure of modal auxiliaries in Bnglish This could certainly be used as an ergUment for consideritlg medals as true verbs Ross (1968) has given other convincing argumentsmiddot for analyzing modal auxiliaries os true verbs differing from real verbs like ver$UChen (try) only in having the feature C+ModalJwhere the latter has the feature C-ModalJ 11 (p 7) In a discussion of trie transitive-intransitive ch~acter of the verb begin in the deep structure Perlmutter (1970) suggests the same analysis for

---middot middot---middot---middot-- ~----middot

88

modals like must in order to account rot middottheir systematic (trlbiguity (p 115)~9 Heconcludes that if modals are trensitive-intransitive

9The same approach is proposed by Ross (1968) for German models and by Vetter (1967) for tneed 1 bull n Vater (1970) adopted a rery similar approach (see 2middotbelow)_~ It was impossible to consider Vaters more recent vork on the System of Modal Verbs in German which he is preparing for publication Our references to his vievs might therefore be a little outdated

verb doublets in deep structure this will constitute evidence for the hypothesis argued in Ross (1968) that there is no CauxiliaryJ constituent in deep structure and that the so-called bullauxiliary ver~s 1 are real verbs in deep ftructure 11

12 On the other hand the distinction between modal and non-modal verbs is particularly unclear in English We knov that in surface structure modals co-occur with other verb$ and somehow modii their meaning However it has often been pointed out that their function is not always clearly distinguished from tense and aspect markers os they- appear with main verbs1deg Furthermore-in some

lOsee J Lyons (1968) nintersection of tense and mood p 309) Intersection of tense and aspect 1bull (p 316) This ambiguity was also pointed out by Vater (1970) 0 Jespersen (1924) rejects the terms mo~al pnst tense and mQod-tense used by the NED and by Sweet respectively as inadequatebull middotbecause bullmoods bull have no fixed notional vel ue ( p bull 267 ~ note i )

cases English uses auxiliary verbs or other verbs to express the meaning conveyed bymodals in G~rman

(2) a The house is to be sold Das Haus~ verkauft verden

b He vants to come --rrwill kommen middot c He would like to come

Er m8chte kommen d He is BPnosed (e(Peeted) to come

Er muf3 kommen e lifl claims to be an actor

Er will Schauspieier sein r The film is said to be good

Der Film ill_ gut sein11

11Notice the English seni-modal11 dare and the corresponding vords in German (wagen) end Dutch (durven)deg which are 1pure 1 verbs

It is also interesting to examine the semantic relation between the etymologically related Dutch durven English dare t tgt and Gernan cliirfen bullbe allowemiddotd1 may (See below p 119)

In the case of 1want tclaim1 and said to English does not heve modal auxiliaries to express what clearly appears to be modality in German If we consider the meaning that these verbs convey aa part of the semantic system of modality ve can say that these verbs function semantically as models But for the rest without even postulating anv deep structure we have to recognize that they are pure verbs This is also true for the various paraphrases of modal verbs vhioh we want to derive from the same deep structure as the modal verbs vhich they are synonyms of

(3) a b

He He ~ read it is sble to read it

(4) a b

He lie

can reed it ~ reed it

We will not fUlther argue about this problem nov The evidence for considering all auxiliaries as main verbs in the deep structure vill certainly increase as we concentrate on the system of German modal8

2 Some Syntactic Characteristics o~ German Models

21 The surface structure of German modals reveals an important difference between the syntactic behavior of vollen and that of the other modals Yater (1970) considers the following major differences

21l wollen is the only modal allowing for a ~-sentence

(5) a Sein Vater wi11 da(3 er zu Hause bleibt ttHis fether wants him to stay home 0

b Sein Vater mu daft er zu Hause bleibt ilfHis father must that he stays home 11

212 wollen is the only modal that can be passivized

(6) a Von Hann 9rd gewollt da3 Anna zu Hause b~eibtl3y Hans is wanted that Ann stays nt home

b Von Hans wird gemu)t da~ Anna zu Uauee bleibt

21 3 The pass i vizat ion of the complement ot wollen requires an interpretation difrerent from the interpretation of the pnssivized complements of the other models

( () 11 Inge konnte von Peter tekuit werden Ingecould be kissed byPeter fl

( T) b bull tnge fill iQn P~teJ _sekiyt w~rden ~ tnge vsn~s middotto pe kisJed by Peteyenbull

middot(7a) is ideutic~middot ~ith (_Ba) but (Tb) is different from (8b _

- a-) a Peter konnte Inge kiirasen bull etar could )micross Inge

b middot leter will Inse ktisst~middot P~ter wants to kiss Inge

22 Onthe hasis of the syntactic properties that vollen does not shere vi~h the ~ther modela gtVater 1970) proposeB to adopt the distincti911 bet-ween transitivebull (for vollen middotarid intransitivebull (for th~ other mo(Jel~) as sUggested byPerlmutter (1970 j bull This i~ to reflect the deep-structure differences which condition the surface differ~nqes JustJllEntioned $ep~enoes (8~) and (8~) are th(ilnderived in the ro~owing W8112 middot middot middot middot -

l 2he middotclerivatiois are adapt~d from Perlmutter (l97q middot pp middotmiddot107-ibS) middot enil Vater (l97d) middot1lotice tbe following constructions in ti~r~nch

middot (-i) Il fautmiddot qumiddotbull il vienne middot middot middot middotHe middotrnust 00ltie itmiddot 1s necessary for him to come

ii) middot Il se peut q~ il vienne middot middot It is possible that he ~il come

middot~

were the that- sentence g_u t ii Vienne occ~ring after the modal~ pouvoir ( bulloan1 _or 1mq) d ello1r ( 11ftist ) funct~ons as a Sb1ect NP as shocent in the 4e1ivation of (8a)

(8)- c s

s

I ~

NP VP

~v I 1middot

Peter Anna kuasen

91

(8) d Smiddot

NP VP-~---_S V

UP VP middot---------I n(1

Peter Peter Anne kussen wollen -middot~- =i-If the subject or the embedded sentence with wollen in (8a) is d~fferent from the subject of the higher sentence it can not be deieted and the conjunction ds) is inserted~ as in

(9) Peter wtnmiddot da(3 Anna ihn kusst Peter wants Ann to middotkiss llim 0

With 11ll the other modals the subJect of the embedded S_has to be identical withthe subject of the higher S aa in middot

(10) Peter mu~ Anna kussen Peter must ki$s Jmn

where Peter is the subject of both predicates (milssen and kussen) As fqr the passivization of wollen it is easy to show howthe-complement da~sentence becomes the subject of the passive verb lhe difference between pnssivizatiorgt of the complement sentence of wolien and that of the complement sentences of the other modais is also a result of the difrerent deep structures or the transitive Wollen and the intransitive models

23 Although this analysis of modals offers a reasonable solution of the syntactic problems outlined in 2bull 1 middot it is clearly

middot inadequate in many respects We will consider two major shortcominps here and then try to extend the scope of the analysis in order to include all aspects of modality

middot 231 As we noticed the transitive-intransitive anaiysis is based on the syntactic differences between wollen and-the other German modals But these differences are only one aspectmiddot ot a more essential semnntic difference in the deep structure We will see oelow that modality is a semantic property of e higher predicate in the deep structure which is often (but by fer not always)realized as a modal verbr in the surfaceThere is a perfect structural similarty between l3

i 3The qngle brackets ~elimit the embedded sentence in the deep structure and its corresponding aurface realization bull

D~eu Structure Surface Structure

(ll) a X vents --- CY stay homeJ ~b CY~ ~tay home]

c Xmiddotpermits CY stay homeiJd CY~ stay homeJ

Must and mayen are the surface reali~ations ot the rvtgtiition and permissionbullmiddot present il) the higher deep-structure predicates twant and permit respectiv~iy To1middots1 menns that the German modal wollen is nothing elsethan the higher deep structurepredicate itself realized as a modal verb in the surface Notice that vhat the transitive-intransitive analysis caUs themiddot subject of the mein sentences colltaining wollen or one middotof the othtlr modals does not always express the Sallle function Thus the subject of wollen expresses the origin of the ivolition whereas the sublects of sollen or diirfen express the 0 destination11 11benefidaeybullt 11exper-iencerbull1) of the 1tolition and the 1permiasion 1 (see below 32) The syntactic enalysisproposeq by Perlmutter and Ross fails to explain the differencemiddotbetveen these underlving rolesbull We will return to further implications of this emilysis later It may suffice here to point out t~at we should not be misled by the surface differences between wo1len and e11 other modals in German iUld that we have to loqk for thEii deep semantic structure underlying the modsls ilollen then has to be paralleled -lth erlauben bullpennit1

although in the surface the former is a modal and the letter e pure verb We feel this to be a strong argument for dropping the distinctionmiddot between modal verb9 and pure verbsbull Whether and where we need a feature C+MODAJ (as suggested by Ross) wili b~middot examined below (322) 232 Another shortcoming of the transitive-intransitive

ena1ysis is related to Perlmutter s (and partly also Jackendorrts and Ross) suggestion to use this anal~tsis to account for the tollowingmiddotambiguity of nodals like must (using Perlmutterbulls examples p 115)

(12) a Clyde must work hard

paraphraJable es (12b) and (12c

t12) b Clyde is obli~ed to work hard c It must be the case that Clyde works hard

Such pairs of meaning (sometim~s called obJective and bullsubJective meaning of modals) will be shown to be derived from deep structures parallel to ( lla) and middotllc) butmiddot involvingmiddotone more embedded sentence Semantically however ve will postulate the s~e modality feature t+obligationJ underlyingmiddotboth meanings of bullmust 1 (see 32

3middot The Semantics of Modality

The differences aecountedformiddotby the standard theoey (outlined in 2 are middotclearlr only one aspemiddotct of tle yntax and middot

93

semantics 01middot mooale We vill tcy to show that they can be explair1ed much mo1bulle adeg_uately wi thi11 a theory of the sementics of modality

But what i modality If wemiddotlook at thr literature on moods 1 or modality we find the tollotdng -general considerations Jespersen 1924) pointed out that moods express certain attitudes or the mind of the sDeaker tovards the content of the sentence (p 3~3) thus follo~ing Brugmitnn Oertel end Noreen (mentioned in note l p 313) But he fails to relate this aspect of modality at lest explic L tly to the function of modal verbs~ Lyons 1968) entegorizes sentences in two major groups the ltclass of sentences which express smmple statements of fact unqualified with res-pect to the attitude of the speaker towards what he is seyingt1 (p 307 This class he calls the 0 non-modal-class of sentcentnces (ie unmarked fo1bullmiddot rnood) The other class of sentences which are mar~rnd for tnoori consists esaentially or imperative and interro-gsttbulle sentences~ which stand in contrast todeclarative sentences lrJ virtue of their modality11 bull Apartfrom these modalities expressing commands or insiructions produced by the speaker ( in the case of imperatives) and the expectations of the speaker (in the case of interrogatives) Lyons considers the lalge variety of vays in bullrhich the 1ettitude of the speaker 1a grBmmetically marked in different 1anttteges middot(p 308) These other inodalities (or scales 0pound lllodnlity) wllich have obvjous affinities with the modalities expressed middotby imperatives and interrogatives are frequently expressed with thehelp or modal auxiliaries (a term which Lyons does not use)

In ~ecent work in linguistics the affinitieg between moods and mocli1 verbs nave not been explicitly accounted for They sometimes eeem to be implicitly assumed t as in Leech (1970) and Langendoen (1969 1970)~ but most ~requently the approaches are restricted to modals and their paraphrases However within the performative analyses mainly Ross (1970 1971) Boeder (1968 ~ Wunderlich (1966) Sadock (1969) Domiddotming (1969) and Casagrande (1969) an increasing attention is given to thedElrivation of imperative~ end interrogatives Boyd and Thorne (1969) apply the performative an1r1_ts1s to the semeutiifsmiddot of English rnodals and shov the $imilarities b~tween imperatives models expressing some degree of volition 1 and questions (which are analyzed as a special type ot inrperatives 1i Le~ commands to sev (p 61))l4 Within this

l 4see also Casagrande (1969) p 87 (asking a question is a request for an snsbullrer11 ) and Ross (1970) y 263 Note 19

frimicronework moda1 verbs are treated 1es indicaiing the illocutionary potential of the sentences in which tpey middot o~cur11 (p 62) bull lhe higl1er sentences nostuleted in the deep structure of modal sentences (see our~xom~les (lle) and (llc) are said to carry the illocutionary Tgtotential of the sentence wherea~ the embedded sentences ore termed its pro9os i tional content 11 ( P 59) bull

By viewing modality ln this broader perspective ve are able to grasp the real problems that have to be solved in relation to

~ Imiddot- ~ bull ~bull~bull h middot-~---~~- -bull~rJ middot- bull--bull bullbullbullbulluv=middot -~-middot~-bull-

9i1

tmodal verbs- we w111 first outline thesec problems concentrattng mainly on German niodals (in 31~)15 we will then make proposals to

15 We domiddotnot attempt to describe ell the meanings of Germnn

modals novever ve are convincEd thet they QLn be titted middotinto the system imich we plopose to middotaccount ror the besic meanings

account for the exmined f11cts in terms of iemantic featur-es end middotFillmores case grafflllar (3 2)

31 Most of the problems encounterecl in a description of llOdals hav~ to ~o yith the se~ntic relations of synonymy1 ambimlty

1and inversion

16vre use this term in the sense of Leech ts prlnQiple of inversion systems tr one term is substituted for the other end -the position of the negative is changed the utterance undergoe~ no change of meaning (p 205) iAJ1 and bullsome are I inverses t as shown in the synonymy hetveen (i ) and (ii)

(i) Notmiddot s1i utterances are emlJiguous (ii) Some utterances are pound2i ambigUous

311 We poundirst want to capture the reiationehip betveen the following p~irs of modsls

(13) a wollen end sollen uwant have to

b erlauben and durfen ~permit may (be alloved)

in oonstrnct_ions of the follorlng type (compare to lla-(lld) iibove)

(14) X ~t dafl Y bull bull pnd Y Bollbull Cll Yon X -lfl mvollt2 da Y bull bull bull

b X 9rlaubt dn Y bull and Yderf bullbull or Von X Wsl ar~aubt I daft y bullbull _

In order to account for the possible synonytey betwetln the members of middotesch pairlT middotwe villpostulate that the modals sollen and dilrfen (and

17It is obvious that the right members or these pairs nre synonymous with the left members if the origin of the olition 1

or permission i1 also X

95

similariy mussen and konnen) have in their underiying structure the verb~ wollen and erlmilien respectively~ or ruther a complex of features one of which stands tor the volitiOn1 and themiddot permission expressed by -wollen and erlnuben respectiveiy

312 We similarly want to capt~rc the relationship betmiddotreen the members of the following pairs

(15) s wollen want and erlauben 1allo~ b mussen must and konnen may

which are inverses see note 16) We must be able to exoress this relation in the basic meaning feafa~res whlch we po$tulate for modality he complexity of combinations of mqdals with negation cWl be significantly reduced once we understand this logical relationship (See mainly Leech 1970) p 205)

Jl3 Another important fact about modals which we would like to acccunt for is the synonymy between modals (sub (a)) and the predicative adjectiyes or uast uarticinles (su~ (b)) which can be use4 to paraphrase them middot

(16) a konnen b moglich possible erlaubt allowed

mussen n5tig fneceSSUrf I eewollt wanted

ollen 5ewo1lt tvanted 1

notig necessary )18 durfen erlaubt bulla11oved mogen erlaubt alloved

18ner Cro~e Dudenltgt g_ (StilworteXbuch) and Wahri~ Deutsches W5rterbuch do not list sollen in the meaning of causal necessity and mussen in the meaning of volitionbull However since the lattermiddot is accepted by many native speakers~ we will consider it in our analysis

To the paraphrases illustrated under (16b) lfe coulci also add those that are used to indicate a certain degree of 1probaoility which these models can express see 3l5) We shomicrold therefore introduce modelity as a predicate in the deep structure allowing the specirication of the lexical category ((modal) verb adjective adverb noun) to enter the derivation at o later stage probablr with lexical insertion We will see how the use of semantic features instead 0pound lexical entities simplifies the generation of modality (see 32

314 Th~ paraphrases under (l6b) suggeet thnt the ~odals konnen and mGssen are ambiguous in the following wsy

(a) sollen gewollt twanted obliged 17 a milssen lt

(b) necessary

96 (a)

(17) b konnenlt ~--- (b) possiblet

In the system illustrated in (17a) and (17b) the modsla sollen and gilrren are tYPically unambiguous in that they only convey the meaningsmiddot 11sted sub (e) German thus shows a lati1er neat system w1th two pairs of which the second member only (sub (b)) is ambiguous

(18) a sollen b mussen durfen k5nnen

Class (a) and class (b) are therefore to some extent in complementary distributiori19 This dichotoiey can easily be accomicronted for withill

19It is interesting to notice that the opposition between (a and (b) is not le~ically realized in the R9mance languages

(i French devoir obligat~on and necessitySpanish ~

(ii) French P2UVOY bullpermission and possibilitySpanish poder

the framework alreody mentioned above bi deriving the meanings e) and (b) roughly in the following vay20

20Taking mussenmiddotend konnen in their m9st typical ~eaning (as illustrated in the (b) altelnatives of (1T))

(19 e sollen cliirfen

from horn

CpersonJ wants that bullbullbull CpersonJ permitst~at bullbullbull

b ndissen from [something) obliges necessitates bullbullbull konnen from CsomethingJ allows tnakes possible bullbull

CPERSONJ stands tor the Agent or the ~derlying volition or permission and CSOMElHIIiGJ stands for the ~I or the underlyinp obligation or possibility1 bull 21 We will see below that this

21Agency is usual~ understood as ceualton lixnitea to human causes Cause is then referring to non-human causes (Leech p 205 Lyons~ pp 352-353 359-360 We will see below that in tnodal sentences ceuse stands for the bullfacts 1 1 circumstances 1 events 1

etc which are at the origin of the 1 necessity 1 (or obli~ation 1 )

and the bull possibility (or I capadty) exp-eased by the models miissen

91

and konneii resmicroectively Jhe distinction betveen c eusa1 t and bullagentivemiddot necessity or possibility is particularly expl~cit in Bechmiddotbull s terniinltgtlog_v (1949) middot

( i) volitiv beatimmte ifotvendigkeit (agentive necessity) volitiv bestimmte Moglichkeit (agentive possibility) kausale Notwendigkeit (causal necessity middot

kausale Moglichkeit (causal p0S81bility)

Leech (1970) similarly distinguishes between possibility and necessity (omicror causal modalities) and permission and obligation our aeentivebull modalities) adding that nnossibility and necessity_ logically include oe~mission and 9bligati~ (p 217) In other words he considers permissionbull as11a particular kind of 12ossibility and obligation as e particular kind of necessity Mote that the cause~agent dichotoiey is also present in such verb pairs ~s

(ii) to prevent from (according to Leech causationbull only to forbid (authority only in Leech 1s terms

distinction plays an essential role inthe und~r1ying ey~tem of m~~i~ middot middot

31 ~ 5 The most typical ambig~ity o-f modals Ues in their ability to express a certain degree of 1 probabilitybull or ce~tainty 1 bull

This second meaning of medals has been termed subjectivebull (eg in German Grammars hypothetical (eg in Leech 1970)) inferentialbull (eg in Lyons (1968) epistemic or predictive (eg in Filltnore ( l970a)) as opposemiddotd to their obJective I or 1 pragmatic f

meaning The system of German modals exhibits a complete regularity in that they can all be used to convey the inferential meaning22

22we will use the term bullinferential because it best expresse~ the exact nature of this type of modality (see below)

Let us b~iefly examine these meanings and see how they qffer the strongest evidence for the general theory or modality that we want to postulate

First consider the following examples vith k6nnent m95en durfen verde~ and some p~aphreses of their inferential meaning

(26) a Peter kenn das Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

or Es ist moglich da~ Peter das Geld nimmt Es kann sein ~ ~ bullbull

b Peter mag des Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

~-- middotmiddot-------- middotmiddot--- - ----middot---middotmiddotmiddotmiddot __ --middotmiddot-----middot--- -middot- ----~-- --raquo-

23Peter darf das Geld nehmen (with the modal in the present tense cannotconvey the inferential mea~ing

98

Es ist m65lich da(3 bullbullbull Es ma13 iein daW bull bull

c Peter durfte das Celd nehmen23 Peter might take the money~

Es ist wohl m5glich da~middot Es konnte sein da~ bullbullbull

d Peter wirdmiddotdas Geld nehmen 24 tt isprobable that bullbull

24werden is the only German-modal vhich does not have a clear objective meaning However H Vater pointed out that it cnn sometimes conver the meaning of a command Dr a threat We might want to call this ite objective meaningbull Notice that werden is also used as an suxiliery for the future a function which is obviously connected with its inferential meaning

Es ist rahrscheinlich daB ls ist moglich da~ bullbullbull

notice thet most of these modal sentences when expressing the inferential meaning would have a much h_igher probability of occurrence with an embedded verb in the past tense They could then not carry the objective meaning 8$ in

(21) a Peter mag das getan haben Peter may have done tlat tt

b Peter ~ dos geten htiben 11Peter probably did that 11

Let us nov look at the folloving exaples with mussen wollen sollen and some paraphrases (considering 9nly their inferential meaning)

(22) a Peter mu~ frfiji aufstehen Peter mustmiddot get up eerly I em certain that bullbull

Es ist sehr ~rahrscheinlich da~ Peter fruh aufsteht It is highly pr-obeble that bull 11

Ich bin sicher 1 da~ ttr am sure th a t bull

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 4: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

---middot middot---middot---middot-- ~----middot

88

modals like must in order to account rot middottheir systematic (trlbiguity (p 115)~9 Heconcludes that if modals are trensitive-intransitive

9The same approach is proposed by Ross (1968) for German models and by Vetter (1967) for tneed 1 bull n Vater (1970) adopted a rery similar approach (see 2middotbelow)_~ It was impossible to consider Vaters more recent vork on the System of Modal Verbs in German which he is preparing for publication Our references to his vievs might therefore be a little outdated

verb doublets in deep structure this will constitute evidence for the hypothesis argued in Ross (1968) that there is no CauxiliaryJ constituent in deep structure and that the so-called bullauxiliary ver~s 1 are real verbs in deep ftructure 11

12 On the other hand the distinction between modal and non-modal verbs is particularly unclear in English We knov that in surface structure modals co-occur with other verb$ and somehow modii their meaning However it has often been pointed out that their function is not always clearly distinguished from tense and aspect markers os they- appear with main verbs1deg Furthermore-in some

lOsee J Lyons (1968) nintersection of tense and mood p 309) Intersection of tense and aspect 1bull (p 316) This ambiguity was also pointed out by Vater (1970) 0 Jespersen (1924) rejects the terms mo~al pnst tense and mQod-tense used by the NED and by Sweet respectively as inadequatebull middotbecause bullmoods bull have no fixed notional vel ue ( p bull 267 ~ note i )

cases English uses auxiliary verbs or other verbs to express the meaning conveyed bymodals in G~rman

(2) a The house is to be sold Das Haus~ verkauft verden

b He vants to come --rrwill kommen middot c He would like to come

Er m8chte kommen d He is BPnosed (e(Peeted) to come

Er muf3 kommen e lifl claims to be an actor

Er will Schauspieier sein r The film is said to be good

Der Film ill_ gut sein11

11Notice the English seni-modal11 dare and the corresponding vords in German (wagen) end Dutch (durven)deg which are 1pure 1 verbs

It is also interesting to examine the semantic relation between the etymologically related Dutch durven English dare t tgt and Gernan cliirfen bullbe allowemiddotd1 may (See below p 119)

In the case of 1want tclaim1 and said to English does not heve modal auxiliaries to express what clearly appears to be modality in German If we consider the meaning that these verbs convey aa part of the semantic system of modality ve can say that these verbs function semantically as models But for the rest without even postulating anv deep structure we have to recognize that they are pure verbs This is also true for the various paraphrases of modal verbs vhioh we want to derive from the same deep structure as the modal verbs vhich they are synonyms of

(3) a b

He He ~ read it is sble to read it

(4) a b

He lie

can reed it ~ reed it

We will not fUlther argue about this problem nov The evidence for considering all auxiliaries as main verbs in the deep structure vill certainly increase as we concentrate on the system of German modal8

2 Some Syntactic Characteristics o~ German Models

21 The surface structure of German modals reveals an important difference between the syntactic behavior of vollen and that of the other modals Yater (1970) considers the following major differences

21l wollen is the only modal allowing for a ~-sentence

(5) a Sein Vater wi11 da(3 er zu Hause bleibt ttHis fether wants him to stay home 0

b Sein Vater mu daft er zu Hause bleibt ilfHis father must that he stays home 11

212 wollen is the only modal that can be passivized

(6) a Von Hann 9rd gewollt da3 Anna zu Hause b~eibtl3y Hans is wanted that Ann stays nt home

b Von Hans wird gemu)t da~ Anna zu Uauee bleibt

21 3 The pass i vizat ion of the complement ot wollen requires an interpretation difrerent from the interpretation of the pnssivized complements of the other models

( () 11 Inge konnte von Peter tekuit werden Ingecould be kissed byPeter fl

( T) b bull tnge fill iQn P~teJ _sekiyt w~rden ~ tnge vsn~s middotto pe kisJed by Peteyenbull

middot(7a) is ideutic~middot ~ith (_Ba) but (Tb) is different from (8b _

- a-) a Peter konnte Inge kiirasen bull etar could )micross Inge

b middot leter will Inse ktisst~middot P~ter wants to kiss Inge

22 Onthe hasis of the syntactic properties that vollen does not shere vi~h the ~ther modela gtVater 1970) proposeB to adopt the distincti911 bet-ween transitivebull (for vollen middotarid intransitivebull (for th~ other mo(Jel~) as sUggested byPerlmutter (1970 j bull This i~ to reflect the deep-structure differences which condition the surface differ~nqes JustJllEntioned $ep~enoes (8~) and (8~) are th(ilnderived in the ro~owing W8112 middot middot middot middot -

l 2he middotclerivatiois are adapt~d from Perlmutter (l97q middot pp middotmiddot107-ibS) middot enil Vater (l97d) middot1lotice tbe following constructions in ti~r~nch

middot (-i) Il fautmiddot qumiddotbull il vienne middot middot middot middotHe middotrnust 00ltie itmiddot 1s necessary for him to come

ii) middot Il se peut q~ il vienne middot middot It is possible that he ~il come

middot~

were the that- sentence g_u t ii Vienne occ~ring after the modal~ pouvoir ( bulloan1 _or 1mq) d ello1r ( 11ftist ) funct~ons as a Sb1ect NP as shocent in the 4e1ivation of (8a)

(8)- c s

s

I ~

NP VP

~v I 1middot

Peter Anna kuasen

91

(8) d Smiddot

NP VP-~---_S V

UP VP middot---------I n(1

Peter Peter Anne kussen wollen -middot~- =i-If the subject or the embedded sentence with wollen in (8a) is d~fferent from the subject of the higher sentence it can not be deieted and the conjunction ds) is inserted~ as in

(9) Peter wtnmiddot da(3 Anna ihn kusst Peter wants Ann to middotkiss llim 0

With 11ll the other modals the subJect of the embedded S_has to be identical withthe subject of the higher S aa in middot

(10) Peter mu~ Anna kussen Peter must ki$s Jmn

where Peter is the subject of both predicates (milssen and kussen) As fqr the passivization of wollen it is easy to show howthe-complement da~sentence becomes the subject of the passive verb lhe difference between pnssivizatiorgt of the complement sentence of wolien and that of the complement sentences of the other modais is also a result of the difrerent deep structures or the transitive Wollen and the intransitive models

23 Although this analysis of modals offers a reasonable solution of the syntactic problems outlined in 2bull 1 middot it is clearly

middot inadequate in many respects We will consider two major shortcominps here and then try to extend the scope of the analysis in order to include all aspects of modality

middot 231 As we noticed the transitive-intransitive anaiysis is based on the syntactic differences between wollen and-the other German modals But these differences are only one aspectmiddot ot a more essential semnntic difference in the deep structure We will see oelow that modality is a semantic property of e higher predicate in the deep structure which is often (but by fer not always)realized as a modal verbr in the surfaceThere is a perfect structural similarty between l3

i 3The qngle brackets ~elimit the embedded sentence in the deep structure and its corresponding aurface realization bull

D~eu Structure Surface Structure

(ll) a X vents --- CY stay homeJ ~b CY~ ~tay home]

c Xmiddotpermits CY stay homeiJd CY~ stay homeJ

Must and mayen are the surface reali~ations ot the rvtgtiition and permissionbullmiddot present il) the higher deep-structure predicates twant and permit respectiv~iy To1middots1 menns that the German modal wollen is nothing elsethan the higher deep structurepredicate itself realized as a modal verb in the surface Notice that vhat the transitive-intransitive analysis caUs themiddot subject of the mein sentences colltaining wollen or one middotof the othtlr modals does not always express the Sallle function Thus the subject of wollen expresses the origin of the ivolition whereas the sublects of sollen or diirfen express the 0 destination11 11benefidaeybullt 11exper-iencerbull1) of the 1tolition and the 1permiasion 1 (see below 32) The syntactic enalysisproposeq by Perlmutter and Ross fails to explain the differencemiddotbetveen these underlving rolesbull We will return to further implications of this emilysis later It may suffice here to point out t~at we should not be misled by the surface differences between wo1len and e11 other modals in German iUld that we have to loqk for thEii deep semantic structure underlying the modsls ilollen then has to be paralleled -lth erlauben bullpennit1

although in the surface the former is a modal and the letter e pure verb We feel this to be a strong argument for dropping the distinctionmiddot between modal verb9 and pure verbsbull Whether and where we need a feature C+MODAJ (as suggested by Ross) wili b~middot examined below (322) 232 Another shortcoming of the transitive-intransitive

ena1ysis is related to Perlmutter s (and partly also Jackendorrts and Ross) suggestion to use this anal~tsis to account for the tollowingmiddotambiguity of nodals like must (using Perlmutterbulls examples p 115)

(12) a Clyde must work hard

paraphraJable es (12b) and (12c

t12) b Clyde is obli~ed to work hard c It must be the case that Clyde works hard

Such pairs of meaning (sometim~s called obJective and bullsubJective meaning of modals) will be shown to be derived from deep structures parallel to ( lla) and middotllc) butmiddot involvingmiddotone more embedded sentence Semantically however ve will postulate the s~e modality feature t+obligationJ underlyingmiddotboth meanings of bullmust 1 (see 32

3middot The Semantics of Modality

The differences aecountedformiddotby the standard theoey (outlined in 2 are middotclearlr only one aspemiddotct of tle yntax and middot

93

semantics 01middot mooale We vill tcy to show that they can be explair1ed much mo1bulle adeg_uately wi thi11 a theory of the sementics of modality

But what i modality If wemiddotlook at thr literature on moods 1 or modality we find the tollotdng -general considerations Jespersen 1924) pointed out that moods express certain attitudes or the mind of the sDeaker tovards the content of the sentence (p 3~3) thus follo~ing Brugmitnn Oertel end Noreen (mentioned in note l p 313) But he fails to relate this aspect of modality at lest explic L tly to the function of modal verbs~ Lyons 1968) entegorizes sentences in two major groups the ltclass of sentences which express smmple statements of fact unqualified with res-pect to the attitude of the speaker towards what he is seyingt1 (p 307 This class he calls the 0 non-modal-class of sentcentnces (ie unmarked fo1bullmiddot rnood) The other class of sentences which are mar~rnd for tnoori consists esaentially or imperative and interro-gsttbulle sentences~ which stand in contrast todeclarative sentences lrJ virtue of their modality11 bull Apartfrom these modalities expressing commands or insiructions produced by the speaker ( in the case of imperatives) and the expectations of the speaker (in the case of interrogatives) Lyons considers the lalge variety of vays in bullrhich the 1ettitude of the speaker 1a grBmmetically marked in different 1anttteges middot(p 308) These other inodalities (or scales 0pound lllodnlity) wllich have obvjous affinities with the modalities expressed middotby imperatives and interrogatives are frequently expressed with thehelp or modal auxiliaries (a term which Lyons does not use)

In ~ecent work in linguistics the affinitieg between moods and mocli1 verbs nave not been explicitly accounted for They sometimes eeem to be implicitly assumed t as in Leech (1970) and Langendoen (1969 1970)~ but most ~requently the approaches are restricted to modals and their paraphrases However within the performative analyses mainly Ross (1970 1971) Boeder (1968 ~ Wunderlich (1966) Sadock (1969) Domiddotming (1969) and Casagrande (1969) an increasing attention is given to thedElrivation of imperative~ end interrogatives Boyd and Thorne (1969) apply the performative an1r1_ts1s to the semeutiifsmiddot of English rnodals and shov the $imilarities b~tween imperatives models expressing some degree of volition 1 and questions (which are analyzed as a special type ot inrperatives 1i Le~ commands to sev (p 61))l4 Within this

l 4see also Casagrande (1969) p 87 (asking a question is a request for an snsbullrer11 ) and Ross (1970) y 263 Note 19

frimicronework moda1 verbs are treated 1es indicaiing the illocutionary potential of the sentences in which tpey middot o~cur11 (p 62) bull lhe higl1er sentences nostuleted in the deep structure of modal sentences (see our~xom~les (lle) and (llc) are said to carry the illocutionary Tgtotential of the sentence wherea~ the embedded sentences ore termed its pro9os i tional content 11 ( P 59) bull

By viewing modality ln this broader perspective ve are able to grasp the real problems that have to be solved in relation to

~ Imiddot- ~ bull ~bull~bull h middot-~---~~- -bull~rJ middot- bull--bull bullbullbullbulluv=middot -~-middot~-bull-

9i1

tmodal verbs- we w111 first outline thesec problems concentrattng mainly on German niodals (in 31~)15 we will then make proposals to

15 We domiddotnot attempt to describe ell the meanings of Germnn

modals novever ve are convincEd thet they QLn be titted middotinto the system imich we plopose to middotaccount ror the besic meanings

account for the exmined f11cts in terms of iemantic featur-es end middotFillmores case grafflllar (3 2)

31 Most of the problems encounterecl in a description of llOdals hav~ to ~o yith the se~ntic relations of synonymy1 ambimlty

1and inversion

16vre use this term in the sense of Leech ts prlnQiple of inversion systems tr one term is substituted for the other end -the position of the negative is changed the utterance undergoe~ no change of meaning (p 205) iAJ1 and bullsome are I inverses t as shown in the synonymy hetveen (i ) and (ii)

(i) Notmiddot s1i utterances are emlJiguous (ii) Some utterances are pound2i ambigUous

311 We poundirst want to capture the reiationehip betveen the following p~irs of modsls

(13) a wollen end sollen uwant have to

b erlauben and durfen ~permit may (be alloved)

in oonstrnct_ions of the follorlng type (compare to lla-(lld) iibove)

(14) X ~t dafl Y bull bull pnd Y Bollbull Cll Yon X -lfl mvollt2 da Y bull bull bull

b X 9rlaubt dn Y bull and Yderf bullbull or Von X Wsl ar~aubt I daft y bullbull _

In order to account for the possible synonytey betwetln the members of middotesch pairlT middotwe villpostulate that the modals sollen and dilrfen (and

17It is obvious that the right members or these pairs nre synonymous with the left members if the origin of the olition 1

or permission i1 also X

95

similariy mussen and konnen) have in their underiying structure the verb~ wollen and erlmilien respectively~ or ruther a complex of features one of which stands tor the volitiOn1 and themiddot permission expressed by -wollen and erlnuben respectiveiy

312 We similarly want to capt~rc the relationship betmiddotreen the members of the following pairs

(15) s wollen want and erlauben 1allo~ b mussen must and konnen may

which are inverses see note 16) We must be able to exoress this relation in the basic meaning feafa~res whlch we po$tulate for modality he complexity of combinations of mqdals with negation cWl be significantly reduced once we understand this logical relationship (See mainly Leech 1970) p 205)

Jl3 Another important fact about modals which we would like to acccunt for is the synonymy between modals (sub (a)) and the predicative adjectiyes or uast uarticinles (su~ (b)) which can be use4 to paraphrase them middot

(16) a konnen b moglich possible erlaubt allowed

mussen n5tig fneceSSUrf I eewollt wanted

ollen 5ewo1lt tvanted 1

notig necessary )18 durfen erlaubt bulla11oved mogen erlaubt alloved

18ner Cro~e Dudenltgt g_ (StilworteXbuch) and Wahri~ Deutsches W5rterbuch do not list sollen in the meaning of causal necessity and mussen in the meaning of volitionbull However since the lattermiddot is accepted by many native speakers~ we will consider it in our analysis

To the paraphrases illustrated under (16b) lfe coulci also add those that are used to indicate a certain degree of 1probaoility which these models can express see 3l5) We shomicrold therefore introduce modelity as a predicate in the deep structure allowing the specirication of the lexical category ((modal) verb adjective adverb noun) to enter the derivation at o later stage probablr with lexical insertion We will see how the use of semantic features instead 0pound lexical entities simplifies the generation of modality (see 32

314 Th~ paraphrases under (l6b) suggeet thnt the ~odals konnen and mGssen are ambiguous in the following wsy

(a) sollen gewollt twanted obliged 17 a milssen lt

(b) necessary

96 (a)

(17) b konnenlt ~--- (b) possiblet

In the system illustrated in (17a) and (17b) the modsla sollen and gilrren are tYPically unambiguous in that they only convey the meaningsmiddot 11sted sub (e) German thus shows a lati1er neat system w1th two pairs of which the second member only (sub (b)) is ambiguous

(18) a sollen b mussen durfen k5nnen

Class (a) and class (b) are therefore to some extent in complementary distributiori19 This dichotoiey can easily be accomicronted for withill

19It is interesting to notice that the opposition between (a and (b) is not le~ically realized in the R9mance languages

(i French devoir obligat~on and necessitySpanish ~

(ii) French P2UVOY bullpermission and possibilitySpanish poder

the framework alreody mentioned above bi deriving the meanings e) and (b) roughly in the following vay20

20Taking mussenmiddotend konnen in their m9st typical ~eaning (as illustrated in the (b) altelnatives of (1T))

(19 e sollen cliirfen

from horn

CpersonJ wants that bullbullbull CpersonJ permitst~at bullbullbull

b ndissen from [something) obliges necessitates bullbullbull konnen from CsomethingJ allows tnakes possible bullbull

CPERSONJ stands tor the Agent or the ~derlying volition or permission and CSOMElHIIiGJ stands for the ~I or the underlyinp obligation or possibility1 bull 21 We will see below that this

21Agency is usual~ understood as ceualton lixnitea to human causes Cause is then referring to non-human causes (Leech p 205 Lyons~ pp 352-353 359-360 We will see below that in tnodal sentences ceuse stands for the bullfacts 1 1 circumstances 1 events 1

etc which are at the origin of the 1 necessity 1 (or obli~ation 1 )

and the bull possibility (or I capadty) exp-eased by the models miissen

91

and konneii resmicroectively Jhe distinction betveen c eusa1 t and bullagentivemiddot necessity or possibility is particularly expl~cit in Bechmiddotbull s terniinltgtlog_v (1949) middot

( i) volitiv beatimmte ifotvendigkeit (agentive necessity) volitiv bestimmte Moglichkeit (agentive possibility) kausale Notwendigkeit (causal necessity middot

kausale Moglichkeit (causal p0S81bility)

Leech (1970) similarly distinguishes between possibility and necessity (omicror causal modalities) and permission and obligation our aeentivebull modalities) adding that nnossibility and necessity_ logically include oe~mission and 9bligati~ (p 217) In other words he considers permissionbull as11a particular kind of 12ossibility and obligation as e particular kind of necessity Mote that the cause~agent dichotoiey is also present in such verb pairs ~s

(ii) to prevent from (according to Leech causationbull only to forbid (authority only in Leech 1s terms

distinction plays an essential role inthe und~r1ying ey~tem of m~~i~ middot middot

31 ~ 5 The most typical ambig~ity o-f modals Ues in their ability to express a certain degree of 1 probabilitybull or ce~tainty 1 bull

This second meaning of medals has been termed subjectivebull (eg in German Grammars hypothetical (eg in Leech 1970)) inferentialbull (eg in Lyons (1968) epistemic or predictive (eg in Filltnore ( l970a)) as opposemiddotd to their obJective I or 1 pragmatic f

meaning The system of German modals exhibits a complete regularity in that they can all be used to convey the inferential meaning22

22we will use the term bullinferential because it best expresse~ the exact nature of this type of modality (see below)

Let us b~iefly examine these meanings and see how they qffer the strongest evidence for the general theory or modality that we want to postulate

First consider the following examples vith k6nnent m95en durfen verde~ and some p~aphreses of their inferential meaning

(26) a Peter kenn das Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

or Es ist moglich da~ Peter das Geld nimmt Es kann sein ~ ~ bullbull

b Peter mag des Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

~-- middotmiddot-------- middotmiddot--- - ----middot---middotmiddotmiddotmiddot __ --middotmiddot-----middot--- -middot- ----~-- --raquo-

23Peter darf das Geld nehmen (with the modal in the present tense cannotconvey the inferential mea~ing

98

Es ist m65lich da(3 bullbullbull Es ma13 iein daW bull bull

c Peter durfte das Celd nehmen23 Peter might take the money~

Es ist wohl m5glich da~middot Es konnte sein da~ bullbullbull

d Peter wirdmiddotdas Geld nehmen 24 tt isprobable that bullbull

24werden is the only German-modal vhich does not have a clear objective meaning However H Vater pointed out that it cnn sometimes conver the meaning of a command Dr a threat We might want to call this ite objective meaningbull Notice that werden is also used as an suxiliery for the future a function which is obviously connected with its inferential meaning

Es ist rahrscheinlich daB ls ist moglich da~ bullbullbull

notice thet most of these modal sentences when expressing the inferential meaning would have a much h_igher probability of occurrence with an embedded verb in the past tense They could then not carry the objective meaning 8$ in

(21) a Peter mag das getan haben Peter may have done tlat tt

b Peter ~ dos geten htiben 11Peter probably did that 11

Let us nov look at the folloving exaples with mussen wollen sollen and some paraphrases (considering 9nly their inferential meaning)

(22) a Peter mu~ frfiji aufstehen Peter mustmiddot get up eerly I em certain that bullbull

Es ist sehr ~rahrscheinlich da~ Peter fruh aufsteht It is highly pr-obeble that bull 11

Ich bin sicher 1 da~ ttr am sure th a t bull

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 5: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

It is also interesting to examine the semantic relation between the etymologically related Dutch durven English dare t tgt and Gernan cliirfen bullbe allowemiddotd1 may (See below p 119)

In the case of 1want tclaim1 and said to English does not heve modal auxiliaries to express what clearly appears to be modality in German If we consider the meaning that these verbs convey aa part of the semantic system of modality ve can say that these verbs function semantically as models But for the rest without even postulating anv deep structure we have to recognize that they are pure verbs This is also true for the various paraphrases of modal verbs vhioh we want to derive from the same deep structure as the modal verbs vhich they are synonyms of

(3) a b

He He ~ read it is sble to read it

(4) a b

He lie

can reed it ~ reed it

We will not fUlther argue about this problem nov The evidence for considering all auxiliaries as main verbs in the deep structure vill certainly increase as we concentrate on the system of German modal8

2 Some Syntactic Characteristics o~ German Models

21 The surface structure of German modals reveals an important difference between the syntactic behavior of vollen and that of the other modals Yater (1970) considers the following major differences

21l wollen is the only modal allowing for a ~-sentence

(5) a Sein Vater wi11 da(3 er zu Hause bleibt ttHis fether wants him to stay home 0

b Sein Vater mu daft er zu Hause bleibt ilfHis father must that he stays home 11

212 wollen is the only modal that can be passivized

(6) a Von Hann 9rd gewollt da3 Anna zu Hause b~eibtl3y Hans is wanted that Ann stays nt home

b Von Hans wird gemu)t da~ Anna zu Uauee bleibt

21 3 The pass i vizat ion of the complement ot wollen requires an interpretation difrerent from the interpretation of the pnssivized complements of the other models

( () 11 Inge konnte von Peter tekuit werden Ingecould be kissed byPeter fl

( T) b bull tnge fill iQn P~teJ _sekiyt w~rden ~ tnge vsn~s middotto pe kisJed by Peteyenbull

middot(7a) is ideutic~middot ~ith (_Ba) but (Tb) is different from (8b _

- a-) a Peter konnte Inge kiirasen bull etar could )micross Inge

b middot leter will Inse ktisst~middot P~ter wants to kiss Inge

22 Onthe hasis of the syntactic properties that vollen does not shere vi~h the ~ther modela gtVater 1970) proposeB to adopt the distincti911 bet-ween transitivebull (for vollen middotarid intransitivebull (for th~ other mo(Jel~) as sUggested byPerlmutter (1970 j bull This i~ to reflect the deep-structure differences which condition the surface differ~nqes JustJllEntioned $ep~enoes (8~) and (8~) are th(ilnderived in the ro~owing W8112 middot middot middot middot -

l 2he middotclerivatiois are adapt~d from Perlmutter (l97q middot pp middotmiddot107-ibS) middot enil Vater (l97d) middot1lotice tbe following constructions in ti~r~nch

middot (-i) Il fautmiddot qumiddotbull il vienne middot middot middot middotHe middotrnust 00ltie itmiddot 1s necessary for him to come

ii) middot Il se peut q~ il vienne middot middot It is possible that he ~il come

middot~

were the that- sentence g_u t ii Vienne occ~ring after the modal~ pouvoir ( bulloan1 _or 1mq) d ello1r ( 11ftist ) funct~ons as a Sb1ect NP as shocent in the 4e1ivation of (8a)

(8)- c s

s

I ~

NP VP

~v I 1middot

Peter Anna kuasen

91

(8) d Smiddot

NP VP-~---_S V

UP VP middot---------I n(1

Peter Peter Anne kussen wollen -middot~- =i-If the subject or the embedded sentence with wollen in (8a) is d~fferent from the subject of the higher sentence it can not be deieted and the conjunction ds) is inserted~ as in

(9) Peter wtnmiddot da(3 Anna ihn kusst Peter wants Ann to middotkiss llim 0

With 11ll the other modals the subJect of the embedded S_has to be identical withthe subject of the higher S aa in middot

(10) Peter mu~ Anna kussen Peter must ki$s Jmn

where Peter is the subject of both predicates (milssen and kussen) As fqr the passivization of wollen it is easy to show howthe-complement da~sentence becomes the subject of the passive verb lhe difference between pnssivizatiorgt of the complement sentence of wolien and that of the complement sentences of the other modais is also a result of the difrerent deep structures or the transitive Wollen and the intransitive models

23 Although this analysis of modals offers a reasonable solution of the syntactic problems outlined in 2bull 1 middot it is clearly

middot inadequate in many respects We will consider two major shortcominps here and then try to extend the scope of the analysis in order to include all aspects of modality

middot 231 As we noticed the transitive-intransitive anaiysis is based on the syntactic differences between wollen and-the other German modals But these differences are only one aspectmiddot ot a more essential semnntic difference in the deep structure We will see oelow that modality is a semantic property of e higher predicate in the deep structure which is often (but by fer not always)realized as a modal verbr in the surfaceThere is a perfect structural similarty between l3

i 3The qngle brackets ~elimit the embedded sentence in the deep structure and its corresponding aurface realization bull

D~eu Structure Surface Structure

(ll) a X vents --- CY stay homeJ ~b CY~ ~tay home]

c Xmiddotpermits CY stay homeiJd CY~ stay homeJ

Must and mayen are the surface reali~ations ot the rvtgtiition and permissionbullmiddot present il) the higher deep-structure predicates twant and permit respectiv~iy To1middots1 menns that the German modal wollen is nothing elsethan the higher deep structurepredicate itself realized as a modal verb in the surface Notice that vhat the transitive-intransitive analysis caUs themiddot subject of the mein sentences colltaining wollen or one middotof the othtlr modals does not always express the Sallle function Thus the subject of wollen expresses the origin of the ivolition whereas the sublects of sollen or diirfen express the 0 destination11 11benefidaeybullt 11exper-iencerbull1) of the 1tolition and the 1permiasion 1 (see below 32) The syntactic enalysisproposeq by Perlmutter and Ross fails to explain the differencemiddotbetveen these underlving rolesbull We will return to further implications of this emilysis later It may suffice here to point out t~at we should not be misled by the surface differences between wo1len and e11 other modals in German iUld that we have to loqk for thEii deep semantic structure underlying the modsls ilollen then has to be paralleled -lth erlauben bullpennit1

although in the surface the former is a modal and the letter e pure verb We feel this to be a strong argument for dropping the distinctionmiddot between modal verb9 and pure verbsbull Whether and where we need a feature C+MODAJ (as suggested by Ross) wili b~middot examined below (322) 232 Another shortcoming of the transitive-intransitive

ena1ysis is related to Perlmutter s (and partly also Jackendorrts and Ross) suggestion to use this anal~tsis to account for the tollowingmiddotambiguity of nodals like must (using Perlmutterbulls examples p 115)

(12) a Clyde must work hard

paraphraJable es (12b) and (12c

t12) b Clyde is obli~ed to work hard c It must be the case that Clyde works hard

Such pairs of meaning (sometim~s called obJective and bullsubJective meaning of modals) will be shown to be derived from deep structures parallel to ( lla) and middotllc) butmiddot involvingmiddotone more embedded sentence Semantically however ve will postulate the s~e modality feature t+obligationJ underlyingmiddotboth meanings of bullmust 1 (see 32

3middot The Semantics of Modality

The differences aecountedformiddotby the standard theoey (outlined in 2 are middotclearlr only one aspemiddotct of tle yntax and middot

93

semantics 01middot mooale We vill tcy to show that they can be explair1ed much mo1bulle adeg_uately wi thi11 a theory of the sementics of modality

But what i modality If wemiddotlook at thr literature on moods 1 or modality we find the tollotdng -general considerations Jespersen 1924) pointed out that moods express certain attitudes or the mind of the sDeaker tovards the content of the sentence (p 3~3) thus follo~ing Brugmitnn Oertel end Noreen (mentioned in note l p 313) But he fails to relate this aspect of modality at lest explic L tly to the function of modal verbs~ Lyons 1968) entegorizes sentences in two major groups the ltclass of sentences which express smmple statements of fact unqualified with res-pect to the attitude of the speaker towards what he is seyingt1 (p 307 This class he calls the 0 non-modal-class of sentcentnces (ie unmarked fo1bullmiddot rnood) The other class of sentences which are mar~rnd for tnoori consists esaentially or imperative and interro-gsttbulle sentences~ which stand in contrast todeclarative sentences lrJ virtue of their modality11 bull Apartfrom these modalities expressing commands or insiructions produced by the speaker ( in the case of imperatives) and the expectations of the speaker (in the case of interrogatives) Lyons considers the lalge variety of vays in bullrhich the 1ettitude of the speaker 1a grBmmetically marked in different 1anttteges middot(p 308) These other inodalities (or scales 0pound lllodnlity) wllich have obvjous affinities with the modalities expressed middotby imperatives and interrogatives are frequently expressed with thehelp or modal auxiliaries (a term which Lyons does not use)

In ~ecent work in linguistics the affinitieg between moods and mocli1 verbs nave not been explicitly accounted for They sometimes eeem to be implicitly assumed t as in Leech (1970) and Langendoen (1969 1970)~ but most ~requently the approaches are restricted to modals and their paraphrases However within the performative analyses mainly Ross (1970 1971) Boeder (1968 ~ Wunderlich (1966) Sadock (1969) Domiddotming (1969) and Casagrande (1969) an increasing attention is given to thedElrivation of imperative~ end interrogatives Boyd and Thorne (1969) apply the performative an1r1_ts1s to the semeutiifsmiddot of English rnodals and shov the $imilarities b~tween imperatives models expressing some degree of volition 1 and questions (which are analyzed as a special type ot inrperatives 1i Le~ commands to sev (p 61))l4 Within this

l 4see also Casagrande (1969) p 87 (asking a question is a request for an snsbullrer11 ) and Ross (1970) y 263 Note 19

frimicronework moda1 verbs are treated 1es indicaiing the illocutionary potential of the sentences in which tpey middot o~cur11 (p 62) bull lhe higl1er sentences nostuleted in the deep structure of modal sentences (see our~xom~les (lle) and (llc) are said to carry the illocutionary Tgtotential of the sentence wherea~ the embedded sentences ore termed its pro9os i tional content 11 ( P 59) bull

By viewing modality ln this broader perspective ve are able to grasp the real problems that have to be solved in relation to

~ Imiddot- ~ bull ~bull~bull h middot-~---~~- -bull~rJ middot- bull--bull bullbullbullbulluv=middot -~-middot~-bull-

9i1

tmodal verbs- we w111 first outline thesec problems concentrattng mainly on German niodals (in 31~)15 we will then make proposals to

15 We domiddotnot attempt to describe ell the meanings of Germnn

modals novever ve are convincEd thet they QLn be titted middotinto the system imich we plopose to middotaccount ror the besic meanings

account for the exmined f11cts in terms of iemantic featur-es end middotFillmores case grafflllar (3 2)

31 Most of the problems encounterecl in a description of llOdals hav~ to ~o yith the se~ntic relations of synonymy1 ambimlty

1and inversion

16vre use this term in the sense of Leech ts prlnQiple of inversion systems tr one term is substituted for the other end -the position of the negative is changed the utterance undergoe~ no change of meaning (p 205) iAJ1 and bullsome are I inverses t as shown in the synonymy hetveen (i ) and (ii)

(i) Notmiddot s1i utterances are emlJiguous (ii) Some utterances are pound2i ambigUous

311 We poundirst want to capture the reiationehip betveen the following p~irs of modsls

(13) a wollen end sollen uwant have to

b erlauben and durfen ~permit may (be alloved)

in oonstrnct_ions of the follorlng type (compare to lla-(lld) iibove)

(14) X ~t dafl Y bull bull pnd Y Bollbull Cll Yon X -lfl mvollt2 da Y bull bull bull

b X 9rlaubt dn Y bull and Yderf bullbull or Von X Wsl ar~aubt I daft y bullbull _

In order to account for the possible synonytey betwetln the members of middotesch pairlT middotwe villpostulate that the modals sollen and dilrfen (and

17It is obvious that the right members or these pairs nre synonymous with the left members if the origin of the olition 1

or permission i1 also X

95

similariy mussen and konnen) have in their underiying structure the verb~ wollen and erlmilien respectively~ or ruther a complex of features one of which stands tor the volitiOn1 and themiddot permission expressed by -wollen and erlnuben respectiveiy

312 We similarly want to capt~rc the relationship betmiddotreen the members of the following pairs

(15) s wollen want and erlauben 1allo~ b mussen must and konnen may

which are inverses see note 16) We must be able to exoress this relation in the basic meaning feafa~res whlch we po$tulate for modality he complexity of combinations of mqdals with negation cWl be significantly reduced once we understand this logical relationship (See mainly Leech 1970) p 205)

Jl3 Another important fact about modals which we would like to acccunt for is the synonymy between modals (sub (a)) and the predicative adjectiyes or uast uarticinles (su~ (b)) which can be use4 to paraphrase them middot

(16) a konnen b moglich possible erlaubt allowed

mussen n5tig fneceSSUrf I eewollt wanted

ollen 5ewo1lt tvanted 1

notig necessary )18 durfen erlaubt bulla11oved mogen erlaubt alloved

18ner Cro~e Dudenltgt g_ (StilworteXbuch) and Wahri~ Deutsches W5rterbuch do not list sollen in the meaning of causal necessity and mussen in the meaning of volitionbull However since the lattermiddot is accepted by many native speakers~ we will consider it in our analysis

To the paraphrases illustrated under (16b) lfe coulci also add those that are used to indicate a certain degree of 1probaoility which these models can express see 3l5) We shomicrold therefore introduce modelity as a predicate in the deep structure allowing the specirication of the lexical category ((modal) verb adjective adverb noun) to enter the derivation at o later stage probablr with lexical insertion We will see how the use of semantic features instead 0pound lexical entities simplifies the generation of modality (see 32

314 Th~ paraphrases under (l6b) suggeet thnt the ~odals konnen and mGssen are ambiguous in the following wsy

(a) sollen gewollt twanted obliged 17 a milssen lt

(b) necessary

96 (a)

(17) b konnenlt ~--- (b) possiblet

In the system illustrated in (17a) and (17b) the modsla sollen and gilrren are tYPically unambiguous in that they only convey the meaningsmiddot 11sted sub (e) German thus shows a lati1er neat system w1th two pairs of which the second member only (sub (b)) is ambiguous

(18) a sollen b mussen durfen k5nnen

Class (a) and class (b) are therefore to some extent in complementary distributiori19 This dichotoiey can easily be accomicronted for withill

19It is interesting to notice that the opposition between (a and (b) is not le~ically realized in the R9mance languages

(i French devoir obligat~on and necessitySpanish ~

(ii) French P2UVOY bullpermission and possibilitySpanish poder

the framework alreody mentioned above bi deriving the meanings e) and (b) roughly in the following vay20

20Taking mussenmiddotend konnen in their m9st typical ~eaning (as illustrated in the (b) altelnatives of (1T))

(19 e sollen cliirfen

from horn

CpersonJ wants that bullbullbull CpersonJ permitst~at bullbullbull

b ndissen from [something) obliges necessitates bullbullbull konnen from CsomethingJ allows tnakes possible bullbull

CPERSONJ stands tor the Agent or the ~derlying volition or permission and CSOMElHIIiGJ stands for the ~I or the underlyinp obligation or possibility1 bull 21 We will see below that this

21Agency is usual~ understood as ceualton lixnitea to human causes Cause is then referring to non-human causes (Leech p 205 Lyons~ pp 352-353 359-360 We will see below that in tnodal sentences ceuse stands for the bullfacts 1 1 circumstances 1 events 1

etc which are at the origin of the 1 necessity 1 (or obli~ation 1 )

and the bull possibility (or I capadty) exp-eased by the models miissen

91

and konneii resmicroectively Jhe distinction betveen c eusa1 t and bullagentivemiddot necessity or possibility is particularly expl~cit in Bechmiddotbull s terniinltgtlog_v (1949) middot

( i) volitiv beatimmte ifotvendigkeit (agentive necessity) volitiv bestimmte Moglichkeit (agentive possibility) kausale Notwendigkeit (causal necessity middot

kausale Moglichkeit (causal p0S81bility)

Leech (1970) similarly distinguishes between possibility and necessity (omicror causal modalities) and permission and obligation our aeentivebull modalities) adding that nnossibility and necessity_ logically include oe~mission and 9bligati~ (p 217) In other words he considers permissionbull as11a particular kind of 12ossibility and obligation as e particular kind of necessity Mote that the cause~agent dichotoiey is also present in such verb pairs ~s

(ii) to prevent from (according to Leech causationbull only to forbid (authority only in Leech 1s terms

distinction plays an essential role inthe und~r1ying ey~tem of m~~i~ middot middot

31 ~ 5 The most typical ambig~ity o-f modals Ues in their ability to express a certain degree of 1 probabilitybull or ce~tainty 1 bull

This second meaning of medals has been termed subjectivebull (eg in German Grammars hypothetical (eg in Leech 1970)) inferentialbull (eg in Lyons (1968) epistemic or predictive (eg in Filltnore ( l970a)) as opposemiddotd to their obJective I or 1 pragmatic f

meaning The system of German modals exhibits a complete regularity in that they can all be used to convey the inferential meaning22

22we will use the term bullinferential because it best expresse~ the exact nature of this type of modality (see below)

Let us b~iefly examine these meanings and see how they qffer the strongest evidence for the general theory or modality that we want to postulate

First consider the following examples vith k6nnent m95en durfen verde~ and some p~aphreses of their inferential meaning

(26) a Peter kenn das Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

or Es ist moglich da~ Peter das Geld nimmt Es kann sein ~ ~ bullbull

b Peter mag des Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

~-- middotmiddot-------- middotmiddot--- - ----middot---middotmiddotmiddotmiddot __ --middotmiddot-----middot--- -middot- ----~-- --raquo-

23Peter darf das Geld nehmen (with the modal in the present tense cannotconvey the inferential mea~ing

98

Es ist m65lich da(3 bullbullbull Es ma13 iein daW bull bull

c Peter durfte das Celd nehmen23 Peter might take the money~

Es ist wohl m5glich da~middot Es konnte sein da~ bullbullbull

d Peter wirdmiddotdas Geld nehmen 24 tt isprobable that bullbull

24werden is the only German-modal vhich does not have a clear objective meaning However H Vater pointed out that it cnn sometimes conver the meaning of a command Dr a threat We might want to call this ite objective meaningbull Notice that werden is also used as an suxiliery for the future a function which is obviously connected with its inferential meaning

Es ist rahrscheinlich daB ls ist moglich da~ bullbullbull

notice thet most of these modal sentences when expressing the inferential meaning would have a much h_igher probability of occurrence with an embedded verb in the past tense They could then not carry the objective meaning 8$ in

(21) a Peter mag das getan haben Peter may have done tlat tt

b Peter ~ dos geten htiben 11Peter probably did that 11

Let us nov look at the folloving exaples with mussen wollen sollen and some paraphrases (considering 9nly their inferential meaning)

(22) a Peter mu~ frfiji aufstehen Peter mustmiddot get up eerly I em certain that bullbull

Es ist sehr ~rahrscheinlich da~ Peter fruh aufsteht It is highly pr-obeble that bull 11

Ich bin sicher 1 da~ ttr am sure th a t bull

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 6: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

( T) b bull tnge fill iQn P~teJ _sekiyt w~rden ~ tnge vsn~s middotto pe kisJed by Peteyenbull

middot(7a) is ideutic~middot ~ith (_Ba) but (Tb) is different from (8b _

- a-) a Peter konnte Inge kiirasen bull etar could )micross Inge

b middot leter will Inse ktisst~middot P~ter wants to kiss Inge

22 Onthe hasis of the syntactic properties that vollen does not shere vi~h the ~ther modela gtVater 1970) proposeB to adopt the distincti911 bet-ween transitivebull (for vollen middotarid intransitivebull (for th~ other mo(Jel~) as sUggested byPerlmutter (1970 j bull This i~ to reflect the deep-structure differences which condition the surface differ~nqes JustJllEntioned $ep~enoes (8~) and (8~) are th(ilnderived in the ro~owing W8112 middot middot middot middot -

l 2he middotclerivatiois are adapt~d from Perlmutter (l97q middot pp middotmiddot107-ibS) middot enil Vater (l97d) middot1lotice tbe following constructions in ti~r~nch

middot (-i) Il fautmiddot qumiddotbull il vienne middot middot middot middotHe middotrnust 00ltie itmiddot 1s necessary for him to come

ii) middot Il se peut q~ il vienne middot middot It is possible that he ~il come

middot~

were the that- sentence g_u t ii Vienne occ~ring after the modal~ pouvoir ( bulloan1 _or 1mq) d ello1r ( 11ftist ) funct~ons as a Sb1ect NP as shocent in the 4e1ivation of (8a)

(8)- c s

s

I ~

NP VP

~v I 1middot

Peter Anna kuasen

91

(8) d Smiddot

NP VP-~---_S V

UP VP middot---------I n(1

Peter Peter Anne kussen wollen -middot~- =i-If the subject or the embedded sentence with wollen in (8a) is d~fferent from the subject of the higher sentence it can not be deieted and the conjunction ds) is inserted~ as in

(9) Peter wtnmiddot da(3 Anna ihn kusst Peter wants Ann to middotkiss llim 0

With 11ll the other modals the subJect of the embedded S_has to be identical withthe subject of the higher S aa in middot

(10) Peter mu~ Anna kussen Peter must ki$s Jmn

where Peter is the subject of both predicates (milssen and kussen) As fqr the passivization of wollen it is easy to show howthe-complement da~sentence becomes the subject of the passive verb lhe difference between pnssivizatiorgt of the complement sentence of wolien and that of the complement sentences of the other modais is also a result of the difrerent deep structures or the transitive Wollen and the intransitive models

23 Although this analysis of modals offers a reasonable solution of the syntactic problems outlined in 2bull 1 middot it is clearly

middot inadequate in many respects We will consider two major shortcominps here and then try to extend the scope of the analysis in order to include all aspects of modality

middot 231 As we noticed the transitive-intransitive anaiysis is based on the syntactic differences between wollen and-the other German modals But these differences are only one aspectmiddot ot a more essential semnntic difference in the deep structure We will see oelow that modality is a semantic property of e higher predicate in the deep structure which is often (but by fer not always)realized as a modal verbr in the surfaceThere is a perfect structural similarty between l3

i 3The qngle brackets ~elimit the embedded sentence in the deep structure and its corresponding aurface realization bull

D~eu Structure Surface Structure

(ll) a X vents --- CY stay homeJ ~b CY~ ~tay home]

c Xmiddotpermits CY stay homeiJd CY~ stay homeJ

Must and mayen are the surface reali~ations ot the rvtgtiition and permissionbullmiddot present il) the higher deep-structure predicates twant and permit respectiv~iy To1middots1 menns that the German modal wollen is nothing elsethan the higher deep structurepredicate itself realized as a modal verb in the surface Notice that vhat the transitive-intransitive analysis caUs themiddot subject of the mein sentences colltaining wollen or one middotof the othtlr modals does not always express the Sallle function Thus the subject of wollen expresses the origin of the ivolition whereas the sublects of sollen or diirfen express the 0 destination11 11benefidaeybullt 11exper-iencerbull1) of the 1tolition and the 1permiasion 1 (see below 32) The syntactic enalysisproposeq by Perlmutter and Ross fails to explain the differencemiddotbetveen these underlving rolesbull We will return to further implications of this emilysis later It may suffice here to point out t~at we should not be misled by the surface differences between wo1len and e11 other modals in German iUld that we have to loqk for thEii deep semantic structure underlying the modsls ilollen then has to be paralleled -lth erlauben bullpennit1

although in the surface the former is a modal and the letter e pure verb We feel this to be a strong argument for dropping the distinctionmiddot between modal verb9 and pure verbsbull Whether and where we need a feature C+MODAJ (as suggested by Ross) wili b~middot examined below (322) 232 Another shortcoming of the transitive-intransitive

ena1ysis is related to Perlmutter s (and partly also Jackendorrts and Ross) suggestion to use this anal~tsis to account for the tollowingmiddotambiguity of nodals like must (using Perlmutterbulls examples p 115)

(12) a Clyde must work hard

paraphraJable es (12b) and (12c

t12) b Clyde is obli~ed to work hard c It must be the case that Clyde works hard

Such pairs of meaning (sometim~s called obJective and bullsubJective meaning of modals) will be shown to be derived from deep structures parallel to ( lla) and middotllc) butmiddot involvingmiddotone more embedded sentence Semantically however ve will postulate the s~e modality feature t+obligationJ underlyingmiddotboth meanings of bullmust 1 (see 32

3middot The Semantics of Modality

The differences aecountedformiddotby the standard theoey (outlined in 2 are middotclearlr only one aspemiddotct of tle yntax and middot

93

semantics 01middot mooale We vill tcy to show that they can be explair1ed much mo1bulle adeg_uately wi thi11 a theory of the sementics of modality

But what i modality If wemiddotlook at thr literature on moods 1 or modality we find the tollotdng -general considerations Jespersen 1924) pointed out that moods express certain attitudes or the mind of the sDeaker tovards the content of the sentence (p 3~3) thus follo~ing Brugmitnn Oertel end Noreen (mentioned in note l p 313) But he fails to relate this aspect of modality at lest explic L tly to the function of modal verbs~ Lyons 1968) entegorizes sentences in two major groups the ltclass of sentences which express smmple statements of fact unqualified with res-pect to the attitude of the speaker towards what he is seyingt1 (p 307 This class he calls the 0 non-modal-class of sentcentnces (ie unmarked fo1bullmiddot rnood) The other class of sentences which are mar~rnd for tnoori consists esaentially or imperative and interro-gsttbulle sentences~ which stand in contrast todeclarative sentences lrJ virtue of their modality11 bull Apartfrom these modalities expressing commands or insiructions produced by the speaker ( in the case of imperatives) and the expectations of the speaker (in the case of interrogatives) Lyons considers the lalge variety of vays in bullrhich the 1ettitude of the speaker 1a grBmmetically marked in different 1anttteges middot(p 308) These other inodalities (or scales 0pound lllodnlity) wllich have obvjous affinities with the modalities expressed middotby imperatives and interrogatives are frequently expressed with thehelp or modal auxiliaries (a term which Lyons does not use)

In ~ecent work in linguistics the affinitieg between moods and mocli1 verbs nave not been explicitly accounted for They sometimes eeem to be implicitly assumed t as in Leech (1970) and Langendoen (1969 1970)~ but most ~requently the approaches are restricted to modals and their paraphrases However within the performative analyses mainly Ross (1970 1971) Boeder (1968 ~ Wunderlich (1966) Sadock (1969) Domiddotming (1969) and Casagrande (1969) an increasing attention is given to thedElrivation of imperative~ end interrogatives Boyd and Thorne (1969) apply the performative an1r1_ts1s to the semeutiifsmiddot of English rnodals and shov the $imilarities b~tween imperatives models expressing some degree of volition 1 and questions (which are analyzed as a special type ot inrperatives 1i Le~ commands to sev (p 61))l4 Within this

l 4see also Casagrande (1969) p 87 (asking a question is a request for an snsbullrer11 ) and Ross (1970) y 263 Note 19

frimicronework moda1 verbs are treated 1es indicaiing the illocutionary potential of the sentences in which tpey middot o~cur11 (p 62) bull lhe higl1er sentences nostuleted in the deep structure of modal sentences (see our~xom~les (lle) and (llc) are said to carry the illocutionary Tgtotential of the sentence wherea~ the embedded sentences ore termed its pro9os i tional content 11 ( P 59) bull

By viewing modality ln this broader perspective ve are able to grasp the real problems that have to be solved in relation to

~ Imiddot- ~ bull ~bull~bull h middot-~---~~- -bull~rJ middot- bull--bull bullbullbullbulluv=middot -~-middot~-bull-

9i1

tmodal verbs- we w111 first outline thesec problems concentrattng mainly on German niodals (in 31~)15 we will then make proposals to

15 We domiddotnot attempt to describe ell the meanings of Germnn

modals novever ve are convincEd thet they QLn be titted middotinto the system imich we plopose to middotaccount ror the besic meanings

account for the exmined f11cts in terms of iemantic featur-es end middotFillmores case grafflllar (3 2)

31 Most of the problems encounterecl in a description of llOdals hav~ to ~o yith the se~ntic relations of synonymy1 ambimlty

1and inversion

16vre use this term in the sense of Leech ts prlnQiple of inversion systems tr one term is substituted for the other end -the position of the negative is changed the utterance undergoe~ no change of meaning (p 205) iAJ1 and bullsome are I inverses t as shown in the synonymy hetveen (i ) and (ii)

(i) Notmiddot s1i utterances are emlJiguous (ii) Some utterances are pound2i ambigUous

311 We poundirst want to capture the reiationehip betveen the following p~irs of modsls

(13) a wollen end sollen uwant have to

b erlauben and durfen ~permit may (be alloved)

in oonstrnct_ions of the follorlng type (compare to lla-(lld) iibove)

(14) X ~t dafl Y bull bull pnd Y Bollbull Cll Yon X -lfl mvollt2 da Y bull bull bull

b X 9rlaubt dn Y bull and Yderf bullbull or Von X Wsl ar~aubt I daft y bullbull _

In order to account for the possible synonytey betwetln the members of middotesch pairlT middotwe villpostulate that the modals sollen and dilrfen (and

17It is obvious that the right members or these pairs nre synonymous with the left members if the origin of the olition 1

or permission i1 also X

95

similariy mussen and konnen) have in their underiying structure the verb~ wollen and erlmilien respectively~ or ruther a complex of features one of which stands tor the volitiOn1 and themiddot permission expressed by -wollen and erlnuben respectiveiy

312 We similarly want to capt~rc the relationship betmiddotreen the members of the following pairs

(15) s wollen want and erlauben 1allo~ b mussen must and konnen may

which are inverses see note 16) We must be able to exoress this relation in the basic meaning feafa~res whlch we po$tulate for modality he complexity of combinations of mqdals with negation cWl be significantly reduced once we understand this logical relationship (See mainly Leech 1970) p 205)

Jl3 Another important fact about modals which we would like to acccunt for is the synonymy between modals (sub (a)) and the predicative adjectiyes or uast uarticinles (su~ (b)) which can be use4 to paraphrase them middot

(16) a konnen b moglich possible erlaubt allowed

mussen n5tig fneceSSUrf I eewollt wanted

ollen 5ewo1lt tvanted 1

notig necessary )18 durfen erlaubt bulla11oved mogen erlaubt alloved

18ner Cro~e Dudenltgt g_ (StilworteXbuch) and Wahri~ Deutsches W5rterbuch do not list sollen in the meaning of causal necessity and mussen in the meaning of volitionbull However since the lattermiddot is accepted by many native speakers~ we will consider it in our analysis

To the paraphrases illustrated under (16b) lfe coulci also add those that are used to indicate a certain degree of 1probaoility which these models can express see 3l5) We shomicrold therefore introduce modelity as a predicate in the deep structure allowing the specirication of the lexical category ((modal) verb adjective adverb noun) to enter the derivation at o later stage probablr with lexical insertion We will see how the use of semantic features instead 0pound lexical entities simplifies the generation of modality (see 32

314 Th~ paraphrases under (l6b) suggeet thnt the ~odals konnen and mGssen are ambiguous in the following wsy

(a) sollen gewollt twanted obliged 17 a milssen lt

(b) necessary

96 (a)

(17) b konnenlt ~--- (b) possiblet

In the system illustrated in (17a) and (17b) the modsla sollen and gilrren are tYPically unambiguous in that they only convey the meaningsmiddot 11sted sub (e) German thus shows a lati1er neat system w1th two pairs of which the second member only (sub (b)) is ambiguous

(18) a sollen b mussen durfen k5nnen

Class (a) and class (b) are therefore to some extent in complementary distributiori19 This dichotoiey can easily be accomicronted for withill

19It is interesting to notice that the opposition between (a and (b) is not le~ically realized in the R9mance languages

(i French devoir obligat~on and necessitySpanish ~

(ii) French P2UVOY bullpermission and possibilitySpanish poder

the framework alreody mentioned above bi deriving the meanings e) and (b) roughly in the following vay20

20Taking mussenmiddotend konnen in their m9st typical ~eaning (as illustrated in the (b) altelnatives of (1T))

(19 e sollen cliirfen

from horn

CpersonJ wants that bullbullbull CpersonJ permitst~at bullbullbull

b ndissen from [something) obliges necessitates bullbullbull konnen from CsomethingJ allows tnakes possible bullbull

CPERSONJ stands tor the Agent or the ~derlying volition or permission and CSOMElHIIiGJ stands for the ~I or the underlyinp obligation or possibility1 bull 21 We will see below that this

21Agency is usual~ understood as ceualton lixnitea to human causes Cause is then referring to non-human causes (Leech p 205 Lyons~ pp 352-353 359-360 We will see below that in tnodal sentences ceuse stands for the bullfacts 1 1 circumstances 1 events 1

etc which are at the origin of the 1 necessity 1 (or obli~ation 1 )

and the bull possibility (or I capadty) exp-eased by the models miissen

91

and konneii resmicroectively Jhe distinction betveen c eusa1 t and bullagentivemiddot necessity or possibility is particularly expl~cit in Bechmiddotbull s terniinltgtlog_v (1949) middot

( i) volitiv beatimmte ifotvendigkeit (agentive necessity) volitiv bestimmte Moglichkeit (agentive possibility) kausale Notwendigkeit (causal necessity middot

kausale Moglichkeit (causal p0S81bility)

Leech (1970) similarly distinguishes between possibility and necessity (omicror causal modalities) and permission and obligation our aeentivebull modalities) adding that nnossibility and necessity_ logically include oe~mission and 9bligati~ (p 217) In other words he considers permissionbull as11a particular kind of 12ossibility and obligation as e particular kind of necessity Mote that the cause~agent dichotoiey is also present in such verb pairs ~s

(ii) to prevent from (according to Leech causationbull only to forbid (authority only in Leech 1s terms

distinction plays an essential role inthe und~r1ying ey~tem of m~~i~ middot middot

31 ~ 5 The most typical ambig~ity o-f modals Ues in their ability to express a certain degree of 1 probabilitybull or ce~tainty 1 bull

This second meaning of medals has been termed subjectivebull (eg in German Grammars hypothetical (eg in Leech 1970)) inferentialbull (eg in Lyons (1968) epistemic or predictive (eg in Filltnore ( l970a)) as opposemiddotd to their obJective I or 1 pragmatic f

meaning The system of German modals exhibits a complete regularity in that they can all be used to convey the inferential meaning22

22we will use the term bullinferential because it best expresse~ the exact nature of this type of modality (see below)

Let us b~iefly examine these meanings and see how they qffer the strongest evidence for the general theory or modality that we want to postulate

First consider the following examples vith k6nnent m95en durfen verde~ and some p~aphreses of their inferential meaning

(26) a Peter kenn das Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

or Es ist moglich da~ Peter das Geld nimmt Es kann sein ~ ~ bullbull

b Peter mag des Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

~-- middotmiddot-------- middotmiddot--- - ----middot---middotmiddotmiddotmiddot __ --middotmiddot-----middot--- -middot- ----~-- --raquo-

23Peter darf das Geld nehmen (with the modal in the present tense cannotconvey the inferential mea~ing

98

Es ist m65lich da(3 bullbullbull Es ma13 iein daW bull bull

c Peter durfte das Celd nehmen23 Peter might take the money~

Es ist wohl m5glich da~middot Es konnte sein da~ bullbullbull

d Peter wirdmiddotdas Geld nehmen 24 tt isprobable that bullbull

24werden is the only German-modal vhich does not have a clear objective meaning However H Vater pointed out that it cnn sometimes conver the meaning of a command Dr a threat We might want to call this ite objective meaningbull Notice that werden is also used as an suxiliery for the future a function which is obviously connected with its inferential meaning

Es ist rahrscheinlich daB ls ist moglich da~ bullbullbull

notice thet most of these modal sentences when expressing the inferential meaning would have a much h_igher probability of occurrence with an embedded verb in the past tense They could then not carry the objective meaning 8$ in

(21) a Peter mag das getan haben Peter may have done tlat tt

b Peter ~ dos geten htiben 11Peter probably did that 11

Let us nov look at the folloving exaples with mussen wollen sollen and some paraphrases (considering 9nly their inferential meaning)

(22) a Peter mu~ frfiji aufstehen Peter mustmiddot get up eerly I em certain that bullbull

Es ist sehr ~rahrscheinlich da~ Peter fruh aufsteht It is highly pr-obeble that bull 11

Ich bin sicher 1 da~ ttr am sure th a t bull

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

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liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 7: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

91

(8) d Smiddot

NP VP-~---_S V

UP VP middot---------I n(1

Peter Peter Anne kussen wollen -middot~- =i-If the subject or the embedded sentence with wollen in (8a) is d~fferent from the subject of the higher sentence it can not be deieted and the conjunction ds) is inserted~ as in

(9) Peter wtnmiddot da(3 Anna ihn kusst Peter wants Ann to middotkiss llim 0

With 11ll the other modals the subJect of the embedded S_has to be identical withthe subject of the higher S aa in middot

(10) Peter mu~ Anna kussen Peter must ki$s Jmn

where Peter is the subject of both predicates (milssen and kussen) As fqr the passivization of wollen it is easy to show howthe-complement da~sentence becomes the subject of the passive verb lhe difference between pnssivizatiorgt of the complement sentence of wolien and that of the complement sentences of the other modais is also a result of the difrerent deep structures or the transitive Wollen and the intransitive models

23 Although this analysis of modals offers a reasonable solution of the syntactic problems outlined in 2bull 1 middot it is clearly

middot inadequate in many respects We will consider two major shortcominps here and then try to extend the scope of the analysis in order to include all aspects of modality

middot 231 As we noticed the transitive-intransitive anaiysis is based on the syntactic differences between wollen and-the other German modals But these differences are only one aspectmiddot ot a more essential semnntic difference in the deep structure We will see oelow that modality is a semantic property of e higher predicate in the deep structure which is often (but by fer not always)realized as a modal verbr in the surfaceThere is a perfect structural similarty between l3

i 3The qngle brackets ~elimit the embedded sentence in the deep structure and its corresponding aurface realization bull

D~eu Structure Surface Structure

(ll) a X vents --- CY stay homeJ ~b CY~ ~tay home]

c Xmiddotpermits CY stay homeiJd CY~ stay homeJ

Must and mayen are the surface reali~ations ot the rvtgtiition and permissionbullmiddot present il) the higher deep-structure predicates twant and permit respectiv~iy To1middots1 menns that the German modal wollen is nothing elsethan the higher deep structurepredicate itself realized as a modal verb in the surface Notice that vhat the transitive-intransitive analysis caUs themiddot subject of the mein sentences colltaining wollen or one middotof the othtlr modals does not always express the Sallle function Thus the subject of wollen expresses the origin of the ivolition whereas the sublects of sollen or diirfen express the 0 destination11 11benefidaeybullt 11exper-iencerbull1) of the 1tolition and the 1permiasion 1 (see below 32) The syntactic enalysisproposeq by Perlmutter and Ross fails to explain the differencemiddotbetveen these underlving rolesbull We will return to further implications of this emilysis later It may suffice here to point out t~at we should not be misled by the surface differences between wo1len and e11 other modals in German iUld that we have to loqk for thEii deep semantic structure underlying the modsls ilollen then has to be paralleled -lth erlauben bullpennit1

although in the surface the former is a modal and the letter e pure verb We feel this to be a strong argument for dropping the distinctionmiddot between modal verb9 and pure verbsbull Whether and where we need a feature C+MODAJ (as suggested by Ross) wili b~middot examined below (322) 232 Another shortcoming of the transitive-intransitive

ena1ysis is related to Perlmutter s (and partly also Jackendorrts and Ross) suggestion to use this anal~tsis to account for the tollowingmiddotambiguity of nodals like must (using Perlmutterbulls examples p 115)

(12) a Clyde must work hard

paraphraJable es (12b) and (12c

t12) b Clyde is obli~ed to work hard c It must be the case that Clyde works hard

Such pairs of meaning (sometim~s called obJective and bullsubJective meaning of modals) will be shown to be derived from deep structures parallel to ( lla) and middotllc) butmiddot involvingmiddotone more embedded sentence Semantically however ve will postulate the s~e modality feature t+obligationJ underlyingmiddotboth meanings of bullmust 1 (see 32

3middot The Semantics of Modality

The differences aecountedformiddotby the standard theoey (outlined in 2 are middotclearlr only one aspemiddotct of tle yntax and middot

93

semantics 01middot mooale We vill tcy to show that they can be explair1ed much mo1bulle adeg_uately wi thi11 a theory of the sementics of modality

But what i modality If wemiddotlook at thr literature on moods 1 or modality we find the tollotdng -general considerations Jespersen 1924) pointed out that moods express certain attitudes or the mind of the sDeaker tovards the content of the sentence (p 3~3) thus follo~ing Brugmitnn Oertel end Noreen (mentioned in note l p 313) But he fails to relate this aspect of modality at lest explic L tly to the function of modal verbs~ Lyons 1968) entegorizes sentences in two major groups the ltclass of sentences which express smmple statements of fact unqualified with res-pect to the attitude of the speaker towards what he is seyingt1 (p 307 This class he calls the 0 non-modal-class of sentcentnces (ie unmarked fo1bullmiddot rnood) The other class of sentences which are mar~rnd for tnoori consists esaentially or imperative and interro-gsttbulle sentences~ which stand in contrast todeclarative sentences lrJ virtue of their modality11 bull Apartfrom these modalities expressing commands or insiructions produced by the speaker ( in the case of imperatives) and the expectations of the speaker (in the case of interrogatives) Lyons considers the lalge variety of vays in bullrhich the 1ettitude of the speaker 1a grBmmetically marked in different 1anttteges middot(p 308) These other inodalities (or scales 0pound lllodnlity) wllich have obvjous affinities with the modalities expressed middotby imperatives and interrogatives are frequently expressed with thehelp or modal auxiliaries (a term which Lyons does not use)

In ~ecent work in linguistics the affinitieg between moods and mocli1 verbs nave not been explicitly accounted for They sometimes eeem to be implicitly assumed t as in Leech (1970) and Langendoen (1969 1970)~ but most ~requently the approaches are restricted to modals and their paraphrases However within the performative analyses mainly Ross (1970 1971) Boeder (1968 ~ Wunderlich (1966) Sadock (1969) Domiddotming (1969) and Casagrande (1969) an increasing attention is given to thedElrivation of imperative~ end interrogatives Boyd and Thorne (1969) apply the performative an1r1_ts1s to the semeutiifsmiddot of English rnodals and shov the $imilarities b~tween imperatives models expressing some degree of volition 1 and questions (which are analyzed as a special type ot inrperatives 1i Le~ commands to sev (p 61))l4 Within this

l 4see also Casagrande (1969) p 87 (asking a question is a request for an snsbullrer11 ) and Ross (1970) y 263 Note 19

frimicronework moda1 verbs are treated 1es indicaiing the illocutionary potential of the sentences in which tpey middot o~cur11 (p 62) bull lhe higl1er sentences nostuleted in the deep structure of modal sentences (see our~xom~les (lle) and (llc) are said to carry the illocutionary Tgtotential of the sentence wherea~ the embedded sentences ore termed its pro9os i tional content 11 ( P 59) bull

By viewing modality ln this broader perspective ve are able to grasp the real problems that have to be solved in relation to

~ Imiddot- ~ bull ~bull~bull h middot-~---~~- -bull~rJ middot- bull--bull bullbullbullbulluv=middot -~-middot~-bull-

9i1

tmodal verbs- we w111 first outline thesec problems concentrattng mainly on German niodals (in 31~)15 we will then make proposals to

15 We domiddotnot attempt to describe ell the meanings of Germnn

modals novever ve are convincEd thet they QLn be titted middotinto the system imich we plopose to middotaccount ror the besic meanings

account for the exmined f11cts in terms of iemantic featur-es end middotFillmores case grafflllar (3 2)

31 Most of the problems encounterecl in a description of llOdals hav~ to ~o yith the se~ntic relations of synonymy1 ambimlty

1and inversion

16vre use this term in the sense of Leech ts prlnQiple of inversion systems tr one term is substituted for the other end -the position of the negative is changed the utterance undergoe~ no change of meaning (p 205) iAJ1 and bullsome are I inverses t as shown in the synonymy hetveen (i ) and (ii)

(i) Notmiddot s1i utterances are emlJiguous (ii) Some utterances are pound2i ambigUous

311 We poundirst want to capture the reiationehip betveen the following p~irs of modsls

(13) a wollen end sollen uwant have to

b erlauben and durfen ~permit may (be alloved)

in oonstrnct_ions of the follorlng type (compare to lla-(lld) iibove)

(14) X ~t dafl Y bull bull pnd Y Bollbull Cll Yon X -lfl mvollt2 da Y bull bull bull

b X 9rlaubt dn Y bull and Yderf bullbull or Von X Wsl ar~aubt I daft y bullbull _

In order to account for the possible synonytey betwetln the members of middotesch pairlT middotwe villpostulate that the modals sollen and dilrfen (and

17It is obvious that the right members or these pairs nre synonymous with the left members if the origin of the olition 1

or permission i1 also X

95

similariy mussen and konnen) have in their underiying structure the verb~ wollen and erlmilien respectively~ or ruther a complex of features one of which stands tor the volitiOn1 and themiddot permission expressed by -wollen and erlnuben respectiveiy

312 We similarly want to capt~rc the relationship betmiddotreen the members of the following pairs

(15) s wollen want and erlauben 1allo~ b mussen must and konnen may

which are inverses see note 16) We must be able to exoress this relation in the basic meaning feafa~res whlch we po$tulate for modality he complexity of combinations of mqdals with negation cWl be significantly reduced once we understand this logical relationship (See mainly Leech 1970) p 205)

Jl3 Another important fact about modals which we would like to acccunt for is the synonymy between modals (sub (a)) and the predicative adjectiyes or uast uarticinles (su~ (b)) which can be use4 to paraphrase them middot

(16) a konnen b moglich possible erlaubt allowed

mussen n5tig fneceSSUrf I eewollt wanted

ollen 5ewo1lt tvanted 1

notig necessary )18 durfen erlaubt bulla11oved mogen erlaubt alloved

18ner Cro~e Dudenltgt g_ (StilworteXbuch) and Wahri~ Deutsches W5rterbuch do not list sollen in the meaning of causal necessity and mussen in the meaning of volitionbull However since the lattermiddot is accepted by many native speakers~ we will consider it in our analysis

To the paraphrases illustrated under (16b) lfe coulci also add those that are used to indicate a certain degree of 1probaoility which these models can express see 3l5) We shomicrold therefore introduce modelity as a predicate in the deep structure allowing the specirication of the lexical category ((modal) verb adjective adverb noun) to enter the derivation at o later stage probablr with lexical insertion We will see how the use of semantic features instead 0pound lexical entities simplifies the generation of modality (see 32

314 Th~ paraphrases under (l6b) suggeet thnt the ~odals konnen and mGssen are ambiguous in the following wsy

(a) sollen gewollt twanted obliged 17 a milssen lt

(b) necessary

96 (a)

(17) b konnenlt ~--- (b) possiblet

In the system illustrated in (17a) and (17b) the modsla sollen and gilrren are tYPically unambiguous in that they only convey the meaningsmiddot 11sted sub (e) German thus shows a lati1er neat system w1th two pairs of which the second member only (sub (b)) is ambiguous

(18) a sollen b mussen durfen k5nnen

Class (a) and class (b) are therefore to some extent in complementary distributiori19 This dichotoiey can easily be accomicronted for withill

19It is interesting to notice that the opposition between (a and (b) is not le~ically realized in the R9mance languages

(i French devoir obligat~on and necessitySpanish ~

(ii) French P2UVOY bullpermission and possibilitySpanish poder

the framework alreody mentioned above bi deriving the meanings e) and (b) roughly in the following vay20

20Taking mussenmiddotend konnen in their m9st typical ~eaning (as illustrated in the (b) altelnatives of (1T))

(19 e sollen cliirfen

from horn

CpersonJ wants that bullbullbull CpersonJ permitst~at bullbullbull

b ndissen from [something) obliges necessitates bullbullbull konnen from CsomethingJ allows tnakes possible bullbull

CPERSONJ stands tor the Agent or the ~derlying volition or permission and CSOMElHIIiGJ stands for the ~I or the underlyinp obligation or possibility1 bull 21 We will see below that this

21Agency is usual~ understood as ceualton lixnitea to human causes Cause is then referring to non-human causes (Leech p 205 Lyons~ pp 352-353 359-360 We will see below that in tnodal sentences ceuse stands for the bullfacts 1 1 circumstances 1 events 1

etc which are at the origin of the 1 necessity 1 (or obli~ation 1 )

and the bull possibility (or I capadty) exp-eased by the models miissen

91

and konneii resmicroectively Jhe distinction betveen c eusa1 t and bullagentivemiddot necessity or possibility is particularly expl~cit in Bechmiddotbull s terniinltgtlog_v (1949) middot

( i) volitiv beatimmte ifotvendigkeit (agentive necessity) volitiv bestimmte Moglichkeit (agentive possibility) kausale Notwendigkeit (causal necessity middot

kausale Moglichkeit (causal p0S81bility)

Leech (1970) similarly distinguishes between possibility and necessity (omicror causal modalities) and permission and obligation our aeentivebull modalities) adding that nnossibility and necessity_ logically include oe~mission and 9bligati~ (p 217) In other words he considers permissionbull as11a particular kind of 12ossibility and obligation as e particular kind of necessity Mote that the cause~agent dichotoiey is also present in such verb pairs ~s

(ii) to prevent from (according to Leech causationbull only to forbid (authority only in Leech 1s terms

distinction plays an essential role inthe und~r1ying ey~tem of m~~i~ middot middot

31 ~ 5 The most typical ambig~ity o-f modals Ues in their ability to express a certain degree of 1 probabilitybull or ce~tainty 1 bull

This second meaning of medals has been termed subjectivebull (eg in German Grammars hypothetical (eg in Leech 1970)) inferentialbull (eg in Lyons (1968) epistemic or predictive (eg in Filltnore ( l970a)) as opposemiddotd to their obJective I or 1 pragmatic f

meaning The system of German modals exhibits a complete regularity in that they can all be used to convey the inferential meaning22

22we will use the term bullinferential because it best expresse~ the exact nature of this type of modality (see below)

Let us b~iefly examine these meanings and see how they qffer the strongest evidence for the general theory or modality that we want to postulate

First consider the following examples vith k6nnent m95en durfen verde~ and some p~aphreses of their inferential meaning

(26) a Peter kenn das Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

or Es ist moglich da~ Peter das Geld nimmt Es kann sein ~ ~ bullbull

b Peter mag des Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

~-- middotmiddot-------- middotmiddot--- - ----middot---middotmiddotmiddotmiddot __ --middotmiddot-----middot--- -middot- ----~-- --raquo-

23Peter darf das Geld nehmen (with the modal in the present tense cannotconvey the inferential mea~ing

98

Es ist m65lich da(3 bullbullbull Es ma13 iein daW bull bull

c Peter durfte das Celd nehmen23 Peter might take the money~

Es ist wohl m5glich da~middot Es konnte sein da~ bullbullbull

d Peter wirdmiddotdas Geld nehmen 24 tt isprobable that bullbull

24werden is the only German-modal vhich does not have a clear objective meaning However H Vater pointed out that it cnn sometimes conver the meaning of a command Dr a threat We might want to call this ite objective meaningbull Notice that werden is also used as an suxiliery for the future a function which is obviously connected with its inferential meaning

Es ist rahrscheinlich daB ls ist moglich da~ bullbullbull

notice thet most of these modal sentences when expressing the inferential meaning would have a much h_igher probability of occurrence with an embedded verb in the past tense They could then not carry the objective meaning 8$ in

(21) a Peter mag das getan haben Peter may have done tlat tt

b Peter ~ dos geten htiben 11Peter probably did that 11

Let us nov look at the folloving exaples with mussen wollen sollen and some paraphrases (considering 9nly their inferential meaning)

(22) a Peter mu~ frfiji aufstehen Peter mustmiddot get up eerly I em certain that bullbull

Es ist sehr ~rahrscheinlich da~ Peter fruh aufsteht It is highly pr-obeble that bull 11

Ich bin sicher 1 da~ ttr am sure th a t bull

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 8: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

D~eu Structure Surface Structure

(ll) a X vents --- CY stay homeJ ~b CY~ ~tay home]

c Xmiddotpermits CY stay homeiJd CY~ stay homeJ

Must and mayen are the surface reali~ations ot the rvtgtiition and permissionbullmiddot present il) the higher deep-structure predicates twant and permit respectiv~iy To1middots1 menns that the German modal wollen is nothing elsethan the higher deep structurepredicate itself realized as a modal verb in the surface Notice that vhat the transitive-intransitive analysis caUs themiddot subject of the mein sentences colltaining wollen or one middotof the othtlr modals does not always express the Sallle function Thus the subject of wollen expresses the origin of the ivolition whereas the sublects of sollen or diirfen express the 0 destination11 11benefidaeybullt 11exper-iencerbull1) of the 1tolition and the 1permiasion 1 (see below 32) The syntactic enalysisproposeq by Perlmutter and Ross fails to explain the differencemiddotbetveen these underlving rolesbull We will return to further implications of this emilysis later It may suffice here to point out t~at we should not be misled by the surface differences between wo1len and e11 other modals in German iUld that we have to loqk for thEii deep semantic structure underlying the modsls ilollen then has to be paralleled -lth erlauben bullpennit1

although in the surface the former is a modal and the letter e pure verb We feel this to be a strong argument for dropping the distinctionmiddot between modal verb9 and pure verbsbull Whether and where we need a feature C+MODAJ (as suggested by Ross) wili b~middot examined below (322) 232 Another shortcoming of the transitive-intransitive

ena1ysis is related to Perlmutter s (and partly also Jackendorrts and Ross) suggestion to use this anal~tsis to account for the tollowingmiddotambiguity of nodals like must (using Perlmutterbulls examples p 115)

(12) a Clyde must work hard

paraphraJable es (12b) and (12c

t12) b Clyde is obli~ed to work hard c It must be the case that Clyde works hard

Such pairs of meaning (sometim~s called obJective and bullsubJective meaning of modals) will be shown to be derived from deep structures parallel to ( lla) and middotllc) butmiddot involvingmiddotone more embedded sentence Semantically however ve will postulate the s~e modality feature t+obligationJ underlyingmiddotboth meanings of bullmust 1 (see 32

3middot The Semantics of Modality

The differences aecountedformiddotby the standard theoey (outlined in 2 are middotclearlr only one aspemiddotct of tle yntax and middot

93

semantics 01middot mooale We vill tcy to show that they can be explair1ed much mo1bulle adeg_uately wi thi11 a theory of the sementics of modality

But what i modality If wemiddotlook at thr literature on moods 1 or modality we find the tollotdng -general considerations Jespersen 1924) pointed out that moods express certain attitudes or the mind of the sDeaker tovards the content of the sentence (p 3~3) thus follo~ing Brugmitnn Oertel end Noreen (mentioned in note l p 313) But he fails to relate this aspect of modality at lest explic L tly to the function of modal verbs~ Lyons 1968) entegorizes sentences in two major groups the ltclass of sentences which express smmple statements of fact unqualified with res-pect to the attitude of the speaker towards what he is seyingt1 (p 307 This class he calls the 0 non-modal-class of sentcentnces (ie unmarked fo1bullmiddot rnood) The other class of sentences which are mar~rnd for tnoori consists esaentially or imperative and interro-gsttbulle sentences~ which stand in contrast todeclarative sentences lrJ virtue of their modality11 bull Apartfrom these modalities expressing commands or insiructions produced by the speaker ( in the case of imperatives) and the expectations of the speaker (in the case of interrogatives) Lyons considers the lalge variety of vays in bullrhich the 1ettitude of the speaker 1a grBmmetically marked in different 1anttteges middot(p 308) These other inodalities (or scales 0pound lllodnlity) wllich have obvjous affinities with the modalities expressed middotby imperatives and interrogatives are frequently expressed with thehelp or modal auxiliaries (a term which Lyons does not use)

In ~ecent work in linguistics the affinitieg between moods and mocli1 verbs nave not been explicitly accounted for They sometimes eeem to be implicitly assumed t as in Leech (1970) and Langendoen (1969 1970)~ but most ~requently the approaches are restricted to modals and their paraphrases However within the performative analyses mainly Ross (1970 1971) Boeder (1968 ~ Wunderlich (1966) Sadock (1969) Domiddotming (1969) and Casagrande (1969) an increasing attention is given to thedElrivation of imperative~ end interrogatives Boyd and Thorne (1969) apply the performative an1r1_ts1s to the semeutiifsmiddot of English rnodals and shov the $imilarities b~tween imperatives models expressing some degree of volition 1 and questions (which are analyzed as a special type ot inrperatives 1i Le~ commands to sev (p 61))l4 Within this

l 4see also Casagrande (1969) p 87 (asking a question is a request for an snsbullrer11 ) and Ross (1970) y 263 Note 19

frimicronework moda1 verbs are treated 1es indicaiing the illocutionary potential of the sentences in which tpey middot o~cur11 (p 62) bull lhe higl1er sentences nostuleted in the deep structure of modal sentences (see our~xom~les (lle) and (llc) are said to carry the illocutionary Tgtotential of the sentence wherea~ the embedded sentences ore termed its pro9os i tional content 11 ( P 59) bull

By viewing modality ln this broader perspective ve are able to grasp the real problems that have to be solved in relation to

~ Imiddot- ~ bull ~bull~bull h middot-~---~~- -bull~rJ middot- bull--bull bullbullbullbulluv=middot -~-middot~-bull-

9i1

tmodal verbs- we w111 first outline thesec problems concentrattng mainly on German niodals (in 31~)15 we will then make proposals to

15 We domiddotnot attempt to describe ell the meanings of Germnn

modals novever ve are convincEd thet they QLn be titted middotinto the system imich we plopose to middotaccount ror the besic meanings

account for the exmined f11cts in terms of iemantic featur-es end middotFillmores case grafflllar (3 2)

31 Most of the problems encounterecl in a description of llOdals hav~ to ~o yith the se~ntic relations of synonymy1 ambimlty

1and inversion

16vre use this term in the sense of Leech ts prlnQiple of inversion systems tr one term is substituted for the other end -the position of the negative is changed the utterance undergoe~ no change of meaning (p 205) iAJ1 and bullsome are I inverses t as shown in the synonymy hetveen (i ) and (ii)

(i) Notmiddot s1i utterances are emlJiguous (ii) Some utterances are pound2i ambigUous

311 We poundirst want to capture the reiationehip betveen the following p~irs of modsls

(13) a wollen end sollen uwant have to

b erlauben and durfen ~permit may (be alloved)

in oonstrnct_ions of the follorlng type (compare to lla-(lld) iibove)

(14) X ~t dafl Y bull bull pnd Y Bollbull Cll Yon X -lfl mvollt2 da Y bull bull bull

b X 9rlaubt dn Y bull and Yderf bullbull or Von X Wsl ar~aubt I daft y bullbull _

In order to account for the possible synonytey betwetln the members of middotesch pairlT middotwe villpostulate that the modals sollen and dilrfen (and

17It is obvious that the right members or these pairs nre synonymous with the left members if the origin of the olition 1

or permission i1 also X

95

similariy mussen and konnen) have in their underiying structure the verb~ wollen and erlmilien respectively~ or ruther a complex of features one of which stands tor the volitiOn1 and themiddot permission expressed by -wollen and erlnuben respectiveiy

312 We similarly want to capt~rc the relationship betmiddotreen the members of the following pairs

(15) s wollen want and erlauben 1allo~ b mussen must and konnen may

which are inverses see note 16) We must be able to exoress this relation in the basic meaning feafa~res whlch we po$tulate for modality he complexity of combinations of mqdals with negation cWl be significantly reduced once we understand this logical relationship (See mainly Leech 1970) p 205)

Jl3 Another important fact about modals which we would like to acccunt for is the synonymy between modals (sub (a)) and the predicative adjectiyes or uast uarticinles (su~ (b)) which can be use4 to paraphrase them middot

(16) a konnen b moglich possible erlaubt allowed

mussen n5tig fneceSSUrf I eewollt wanted

ollen 5ewo1lt tvanted 1

notig necessary )18 durfen erlaubt bulla11oved mogen erlaubt alloved

18ner Cro~e Dudenltgt g_ (StilworteXbuch) and Wahri~ Deutsches W5rterbuch do not list sollen in the meaning of causal necessity and mussen in the meaning of volitionbull However since the lattermiddot is accepted by many native speakers~ we will consider it in our analysis

To the paraphrases illustrated under (16b) lfe coulci also add those that are used to indicate a certain degree of 1probaoility which these models can express see 3l5) We shomicrold therefore introduce modelity as a predicate in the deep structure allowing the specirication of the lexical category ((modal) verb adjective adverb noun) to enter the derivation at o later stage probablr with lexical insertion We will see how the use of semantic features instead 0pound lexical entities simplifies the generation of modality (see 32

314 Th~ paraphrases under (l6b) suggeet thnt the ~odals konnen and mGssen are ambiguous in the following wsy

(a) sollen gewollt twanted obliged 17 a milssen lt

(b) necessary

96 (a)

(17) b konnenlt ~--- (b) possiblet

In the system illustrated in (17a) and (17b) the modsla sollen and gilrren are tYPically unambiguous in that they only convey the meaningsmiddot 11sted sub (e) German thus shows a lati1er neat system w1th two pairs of which the second member only (sub (b)) is ambiguous

(18) a sollen b mussen durfen k5nnen

Class (a) and class (b) are therefore to some extent in complementary distributiori19 This dichotoiey can easily be accomicronted for withill

19It is interesting to notice that the opposition between (a and (b) is not le~ically realized in the R9mance languages

(i French devoir obligat~on and necessitySpanish ~

(ii) French P2UVOY bullpermission and possibilitySpanish poder

the framework alreody mentioned above bi deriving the meanings e) and (b) roughly in the following vay20

20Taking mussenmiddotend konnen in their m9st typical ~eaning (as illustrated in the (b) altelnatives of (1T))

(19 e sollen cliirfen

from horn

CpersonJ wants that bullbullbull CpersonJ permitst~at bullbullbull

b ndissen from [something) obliges necessitates bullbullbull konnen from CsomethingJ allows tnakes possible bullbull

CPERSONJ stands tor the Agent or the ~derlying volition or permission and CSOMElHIIiGJ stands for the ~I or the underlyinp obligation or possibility1 bull 21 We will see below that this

21Agency is usual~ understood as ceualton lixnitea to human causes Cause is then referring to non-human causes (Leech p 205 Lyons~ pp 352-353 359-360 We will see below that in tnodal sentences ceuse stands for the bullfacts 1 1 circumstances 1 events 1

etc which are at the origin of the 1 necessity 1 (or obli~ation 1 )

and the bull possibility (or I capadty) exp-eased by the models miissen

91

and konneii resmicroectively Jhe distinction betveen c eusa1 t and bullagentivemiddot necessity or possibility is particularly expl~cit in Bechmiddotbull s terniinltgtlog_v (1949) middot

( i) volitiv beatimmte ifotvendigkeit (agentive necessity) volitiv bestimmte Moglichkeit (agentive possibility) kausale Notwendigkeit (causal necessity middot

kausale Moglichkeit (causal p0S81bility)

Leech (1970) similarly distinguishes between possibility and necessity (omicror causal modalities) and permission and obligation our aeentivebull modalities) adding that nnossibility and necessity_ logically include oe~mission and 9bligati~ (p 217) In other words he considers permissionbull as11a particular kind of 12ossibility and obligation as e particular kind of necessity Mote that the cause~agent dichotoiey is also present in such verb pairs ~s

(ii) to prevent from (according to Leech causationbull only to forbid (authority only in Leech 1s terms

distinction plays an essential role inthe und~r1ying ey~tem of m~~i~ middot middot

31 ~ 5 The most typical ambig~ity o-f modals Ues in their ability to express a certain degree of 1 probabilitybull or ce~tainty 1 bull

This second meaning of medals has been termed subjectivebull (eg in German Grammars hypothetical (eg in Leech 1970)) inferentialbull (eg in Lyons (1968) epistemic or predictive (eg in Filltnore ( l970a)) as opposemiddotd to their obJective I or 1 pragmatic f

meaning The system of German modals exhibits a complete regularity in that they can all be used to convey the inferential meaning22

22we will use the term bullinferential because it best expresse~ the exact nature of this type of modality (see below)

Let us b~iefly examine these meanings and see how they qffer the strongest evidence for the general theory or modality that we want to postulate

First consider the following examples vith k6nnent m95en durfen verde~ and some p~aphreses of their inferential meaning

(26) a Peter kenn das Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

or Es ist moglich da~ Peter das Geld nimmt Es kann sein ~ ~ bullbull

b Peter mag des Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

~-- middotmiddot-------- middotmiddot--- - ----middot---middotmiddotmiddotmiddot __ --middotmiddot-----middot--- -middot- ----~-- --raquo-

23Peter darf das Geld nehmen (with the modal in the present tense cannotconvey the inferential mea~ing

98

Es ist m65lich da(3 bullbullbull Es ma13 iein daW bull bull

c Peter durfte das Celd nehmen23 Peter might take the money~

Es ist wohl m5glich da~middot Es konnte sein da~ bullbullbull

d Peter wirdmiddotdas Geld nehmen 24 tt isprobable that bullbull

24werden is the only German-modal vhich does not have a clear objective meaning However H Vater pointed out that it cnn sometimes conver the meaning of a command Dr a threat We might want to call this ite objective meaningbull Notice that werden is also used as an suxiliery for the future a function which is obviously connected with its inferential meaning

Es ist rahrscheinlich daB ls ist moglich da~ bullbullbull

notice thet most of these modal sentences when expressing the inferential meaning would have a much h_igher probability of occurrence with an embedded verb in the past tense They could then not carry the objective meaning 8$ in

(21) a Peter mag das getan haben Peter may have done tlat tt

b Peter ~ dos geten htiben 11Peter probably did that 11

Let us nov look at the folloving exaples with mussen wollen sollen and some paraphrases (considering 9nly their inferential meaning)

(22) a Peter mu~ frfiji aufstehen Peter mustmiddot get up eerly I em certain that bullbull

Es ist sehr ~rahrscheinlich da~ Peter fruh aufsteht It is highly pr-obeble that bull 11

Ich bin sicher 1 da~ ttr am sure th a t bull

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 9: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

93

semantics 01middot mooale We vill tcy to show that they can be explair1ed much mo1bulle adeg_uately wi thi11 a theory of the sementics of modality

But what i modality If wemiddotlook at thr literature on moods 1 or modality we find the tollotdng -general considerations Jespersen 1924) pointed out that moods express certain attitudes or the mind of the sDeaker tovards the content of the sentence (p 3~3) thus follo~ing Brugmitnn Oertel end Noreen (mentioned in note l p 313) But he fails to relate this aspect of modality at lest explic L tly to the function of modal verbs~ Lyons 1968) entegorizes sentences in two major groups the ltclass of sentences which express smmple statements of fact unqualified with res-pect to the attitude of the speaker towards what he is seyingt1 (p 307 This class he calls the 0 non-modal-class of sentcentnces (ie unmarked fo1bullmiddot rnood) The other class of sentences which are mar~rnd for tnoori consists esaentially or imperative and interro-gsttbulle sentences~ which stand in contrast todeclarative sentences lrJ virtue of their modality11 bull Apartfrom these modalities expressing commands or insiructions produced by the speaker ( in the case of imperatives) and the expectations of the speaker (in the case of interrogatives) Lyons considers the lalge variety of vays in bullrhich the 1ettitude of the speaker 1a grBmmetically marked in different 1anttteges middot(p 308) These other inodalities (or scales 0pound lllodnlity) wllich have obvjous affinities with the modalities expressed middotby imperatives and interrogatives are frequently expressed with thehelp or modal auxiliaries (a term which Lyons does not use)

In ~ecent work in linguistics the affinitieg between moods and mocli1 verbs nave not been explicitly accounted for They sometimes eeem to be implicitly assumed t as in Leech (1970) and Langendoen (1969 1970)~ but most ~requently the approaches are restricted to modals and their paraphrases However within the performative analyses mainly Ross (1970 1971) Boeder (1968 ~ Wunderlich (1966) Sadock (1969) Domiddotming (1969) and Casagrande (1969) an increasing attention is given to thedElrivation of imperative~ end interrogatives Boyd and Thorne (1969) apply the performative an1r1_ts1s to the semeutiifsmiddot of English rnodals and shov the $imilarities b~tween imperatives models expressing some degree of volition 1 and questions (which are analyzed as a special type ot inrperatives 1i Le~ commands to sev (p 61))l4 Within this

l 4see also Casagrande (1969) p 87 (asking a question is a request for an snsbullrer11 ) and Ross (1970) y 263 Note 19

frimicronework moda1 verbs are treated 1es indicaiing the illocutionary potential of the sentences in which tpey middot o~cur11 (p 62) bull lhe higl1er sentences nostuleted in the deep structure of modal sentences (see our~xom~les (lle) and (llc) are said to carry the illocutionary Tgtotential of the sentence wherea~ the embedded sentences ore termed its pro9os i tional content 11 ( P 59) bull

By viewing modality ln this broader perspective ve are able to grasp the real problems that have to be solved in relation to

~ Imiddot- ~ bull ~bull~bull h middot-~---~~- -bull~rJ middot- bull--bull bullbullbullbulluv=middot -~-middot~-bull-

9i1

tmodal verbs- we w111 first outline thesec problems concentrattng mainly on German niodals (in 31~)15 we will then make proposals to

15 We domiddotnot attempt to describe ell the meanings of Germnn

modals novever ve are convincEd thet they QLn be titted middotinto the system imich we plopose to middotaccount ror the besic meanings

account for the exmined f11cts in terms of iemantic featur-es end middotFillmores case grafflllar (3 2)

31 Most of the problems encounterecl in a description of llOdals hav~ to ~o yith the se~ntic relations of synonymy1 ambimlty

1and inversion

16vre use this term in the sense of Leech ts prlnQiple of inversion systems tr one term is substituted for the other end -the position of the negative is changed the utterance undergoe~ no change of meaning (p 205) iAJ1 and bullsome are I inverses t as shown in the synonymy hetveen (i ) and (ii)

(i) Notmiddot s1i utterances are emlJiguous (ii) Some utterances are pound2i ambigUous

311 We poundirst want to capture the reiationehip betveen the following p~irs of modsls

(13) a wollen end sollen uwant have to

b erlauben and durfen ~permit may (be alloved)

in oonstrnct_ions of the follorlng type (compare to lla-(lld) iibove)

(14) X ~t dafl Y bull bull pnd Y Bollbull Cll Yon X -lfl mvollt2 da Y bull bull bull

b X 9rlaubt dn Y bull and Yderf bullbull or Von X Wsl ar~aubt I daft y bullbull _

In order to account for the possible synonytey betwetln the members of middotesch pairlT middotwe villpostulate that the modals sollen and dilrfen (and

17It is obvious that the right members or these pairs nre synonymous with the left members if the origin of the olition 1

or permission i1 also X

95

similariy mussen and konnen) have in their underiying structure the verb~ wollen and erlmilien respectively~ or ruther a complex of features one of which stands tor the volitiOn1 and themiddot permission expressed by -wollen and erlnuben respectiveiy

312 We similarly want to capt~rc the relationship betmiddotreen the members of the following pairs

(15) s wollen want and erlauben 1allo~ b mussen must and konnen may

which are inverses see note 16) We must be able to exoress this relation in the basic meaning feafa~res whlch we po$tulate for modality he complexity of combinations of mqdals with negation cWl be significantly reduced once we understand this logical relationship (See mainly Leech 1970) p 205)

Jl3 Another important fact about modals which we would like to acccunt for is the synonymy between modals (sub (a)) and the predicative adjectiyes or uast uarticinles (su~ (b)) which can be use4 to paraphrase them middot

(16) a konnen b moglich possible erlaubt allowed

mussen n5tig fneceSSUrf I eewollt wanted

ollen 5ewo1lt tvanted 1

notig necessary )18 durfen erlaubt bulla11oved mogen erlaubt alloved

18ner Cro~e Dudenltgt g_ (StilworteXbuch) and Wahri~ Deutsches W5rterbuch do not list sollen in the meaning of causal necessity and mussen in the meaning of volitionbull However since the lattermiddot is accepted by many native speakers~ we will consider it in our analysis

To the paraphrases illustrated under (16b) lfe coulci also add those that are used to indicate a certain degree of 1probaoility which these models can express see 3l5) We shomicrold therefore introduce modelity as a predicate in the deep structure allowing the specirication of the lexical category ((modal) verb adjective adverb noun) to enter the derivation at o later stage probablr with lexical insertion We will see how the use of semantic features instead 0pound lexical entities simplifies the generation of modality (see 32

314 Th~ paraphrases under (l6b) suggeet thnt the ~odals konnen and mGssen are ambiguous in the following wsy

(a) sollen gewollt twanted obliged 17 a milssen lt

(b) necessary

96 (a)

(17) b konnenlt ~--- (b) possiblet

In the system illustrated in (17a) and (17b) the modsla sollen and gilrren are tYPically unambiguous in that they only convey the meaningsmiddot 11sted sub (e) German thus shows a lati1er neat system w1th two pairs of which the second member only (sub (b)) is ambiguous

(18) a sollen b mussen durfen k5nnen

Class (a) and class (b) are therefore to some extent in complementary distributiori19 This dichotoiey can easily be accomicronted for withill

19It is interesting to notice that the opposition between (a and (b) is not le~ically realized in the R9mance languages

(i French devoir obligat~on and necessitySpanish ~

(ii) French P2UVOY bullpermission and possibilitySpanish poder

the framework alreody mentioned above bi deriving the meanings e) and (b) roughly in the following vay20

20Taking mussenmiddotend konnen in their m9st typical ~eaning (as illustrated in the (b) altelnatives of (1T))

(19 e sollen cliirfen

from horn

CpersonJ wants that bullbullbull CpersonJ permitst~at bullbullbull

b ndissen from [something) obliges necessitates bullbullbull konnen from CsomethingJ allows tnakes possible bullbull

CPERSONJ stands tor the Agent or the ~derlying volition or permission and CSOMElHIIiGJ stands for the ~I or the underlyinp obligation or possibility1 bull 21 We will see below that this

21Agency is usual~ understood as ceualton lixnitea to human causes Cause is then referring to non-human causes (Leech p 205 Lyons~ pp 352-353 359-360 We will see below that in tnodal sentences ceuse stands for the bullfacts 1 1 circumstances 1 events 1

etc which are at the origin of the 1 necessity 1 (or obli~ation 1 )

and the bull possibility (or I capadty) exp-eased by the models miissen

91

and konneii resmicroectively Jhe distinction betveen c eusa1 t and bullagentivemiddot necessity or possibility is particularly expl~cit in Bechmiddotbull s terniinltgtlog_v (1949) middot

( i) volitiv beatimmte ifotvendigkeit (agentive necessity) volitiv bestimmte Moglichkeit (agentive possibility) kausale Notwendigkeit (causal necessity middot

kausale Moglichkeit (causal p0S81bility)

Leech (1970) similarly distinguishes between possibility and necessity (omicror causal modalities) and permission and obligation our aeentivebull modalities) adding that nnossibility and necessity_ logically include oe~mission and 9bligati~ (p 217) In other words he considers permissionbull as11a particular kind of 12ossibility and obligation as e particular kind of necessity Mote that the cause~agent dichotoiey is also present in such verb pairs ~s

(ii) to prevent from (according to Leech causationbull only to forbid (authority only in Leech 1s terms

distinction plays an essential role inthe und~r1ying ey~tem of m~~i~ middot middot

31 ~ 5 The most typical ambig~ity o-f modals Ues in their ability to express a certain degree of 1 probabilitybull or ce~tainty 1 bull

This second meaning of medals has been termed subjectivebull (eg in German Grammars hypothetical (eg in Leech 1970)) inferentialbull (eg in Lyons (1968) epistemic or predictive (eg in Filltnore ( l970a)) as opposemiddotd to their obJective I or 1 pragmatic f

meaning The system of German modals exhibits a complete regularity in that they can all be used to convey the inferential meaning22

22we will use the term bullinferential because it best expresse~ the exact nature of this type of modality (see below)

Let us b~iefly examine these meanings and see how they qffer the strongest evidence for the general theory or modality that we want to postulate

First consider the following examples vith k6nnent m95en durfen verde~ and some p~aphreses of their inferential meaning

(26) a Peter kenn das Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

or Es ist moglich da~ Peter das Geld nimmt Es kann sein ~ ~ bullbull

b Peter mag des Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

~-- middotmiddot-------- middotmiddot--- - ----middot---middotmiddotmiddotmiddot __ --middotmiddot-----middot--- -middot- ----~-- --raquo-

23Peter darf das Geld nehmen (with the modal in the present tense cannotconvey the inferential mea~ing

98

Es ist m65lich da(3 bullbullbull Es ma13 iein daW bull bull

c Peter durfte das Celd nehmen23 Peter might take the money~

Es ist wohl m5glich da~middot Es konnte sein da~ bullbullbull

d Peter wirdmiddotdas Geld nehmen 24 tt isprobable that bullbull

24werden is the only German-modal vhich does not have a clear objective meaning However H Vater pointed out that it cnn sometimes conver the meaning of a command Dr a threat We might want to call this ite objective meaningbull Notice that werden is also used as an suxiliery for the future a function which is obviously connected with its inferential meaning

Es ist rahrscheinlich daB ls ist moglich da~ bullbullbull

notice thet most of these modal sentences when expressing the inferential meaning would have a much h_igher probability of occurrence with an embedded verb in the past tense They could then not carry the objective meaning 8$ in

(21) a Peter mag das getan haben Peter may have done tlat tt

b Peter ~ dos geten htiben 11Peter probably did that 11

Let us nov look at the folloving exaples with mussen wollen sollen and some paraphrases (considering 9nly their inferential meaning)

(22) a Peter mu~ frfiji aufstehen Peter mustmiddot get up eerly I em certain that bullbull

Es ist sehr ~rahrscheinlich da~ Peter fruh aufsteht It is highly pr-obeble that bull 11

Ich bin sicher 1 da~ ttr am sure th a t bull

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 10: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

~ Imiddot- ~ bull ~bull~bull h middot-~---~~- -bull~rJ middot- bull--bull bullbullbullbulluv=middot -~-middot~-bull-

9i1

tmodal verbs- we w111 first outline thesec problems concentrattng mainly on German niodals (in 31~)15 we will then make proposals to

15 We domiddotnot attempt to describe ell the meanings of Germnn

modals novever ve are convincEd thet they QLn be titted middotinto the system imich we plopose to middotaccount ror the besic meanings

account for the exmined f11cts in terms of iemantic featur-es end middotFillmores case grafflllar (3 2)

31 Most of the problems encounterecl in a description of llOdals hav~ to ~o yith the se~ntic relations of synonymy1 ambimlty

1and inversion

16vre use this term in the sense of Leech ts prlnQiple of inversion systems tr one term is substituted for the other end -the position of the negative is changed the utterance undergoe~ no change of meaning (p 205) iAJ1 and bullsome are I inverses t as shown in the synonymy hetveen (i ) and (ii)

(i) Notmiddot s1i utterances are emlJiguous (ii) Some utterances are pound2i ambigUous

311 We poundirst want to capture the reiationehip betveen the following p~irs of modsls

(13) a wollen end sollen uwant have to

b erlauben and durfen ~permit may (be alloved)

in oonstrnct_ions of the follorlng type (compare to lla-(lld) iibove)

(14) X ~t dafl Y bull bull pnd Y Bollbull Cll Yon X -lfl mvollt2 da Y bull bull bull

b X 9rlaubt dn Y bull and Yderf bullbull or Von X Wsl ar~aubt I daft y bullbull _

In order to account for the possible synonytey betwetln the members of middotesch pairlT middotwe villpostulate that the modals sollen and dilrfen (and

17It is obvious that the right members or these pairs nre synonymous with the left members if the origin of the olition 1

or permission i1 also X

95

similariy mussen and konnen) have in their underiying structure the verb~ wollen and erlmilien respectively~ or ruther a complex of features one of which stands tor the volitiOn1 and themiddot permission expressed by -wollen and erlnuben respectiveiy

312 We similarly want to capt~rc the relationship betmiddotreen the members of the following pairs

(15) s wollen want and erlauben 1allo~ b mussen must and konnen may

which are inverses see note 16) We must be able to exoress this relation in the basic meaning feafa~res whlch we po$tulate for modality he complexity of combinations of mqdals with negation cWl be significantly reduced once we understand this logical relationship (See mainly Leech 1970) p 205)

Jl3 Another important fact about modals which we would like to acccunt for is the synonymy between modals (sub (a)) and the predicative adjectiyes or uast uarticinles (su~ (b)) which can be use4 to paraphrase them middot

(16) a konnen b moglich possible erlaubt allowed

mussen n5tig fneceSSUrf I eewollt wanted

ollen 5ewo1lt tvanted 1

notig necessary )18 durfen erlaubt bulla11oved mogen erlaubt alloved

18ner Cro~e Dudenltgt g_ (StilworteXbuch) and Wahri~ Deutsches W5rterbuch do not list sollen in the meaning of causal necessity and mussen in the meaning of volitionbull However since the lattermiddot is accepted by many native speakers~ we will consider it in our analysis

To the paraphrases illustrated under (16b) lfe coulci also add those that are used to indicate a certain degree of 1probaoility which these models can express see 3l5) We shomicrold therefore introduce modelity as a predicate in the deep structure allowing the specirication of the lexical category ((modal) verb adjective adverb noun) to enter the derivation at o later stage probablr with lexical insertion We will see how the use of semantic features instead 0pound lexical entities simplifies the generation of modality (see 32

314 Th~ paraphrases under (l6b) suggeet thnt the ~odals konnen and mGssen are ambiguous in the following wsy

(a) sollen gewollt twanted obliged 17 a milssen lt

(b) necessary

96 (a)

(17) b konnenlt ~--- (b) possiblet

In the system illustrated in (17a) and (17b) the modsla sollen and gilrren are tYPically unambiguous in that they only convey the meaningsmiddot 11sted sub (e) German thus shows a lati1er neat system w1th two pairs of which the second member only (sub (b)) is ambiguous

(18) a sollen b mussen durfen k5nnen

Class (a) and class (b) are therefore to some extent in complementary distributiori19 This dichotoiey can easily be accomicronted for withill

19It is interesting to notice that the opposition between (a and (b) is not le~ically realized in the R9mance languages

(i French devoir obligat~on and necessitySpanish ~

(ii) French P2UVOY bullpermission and possibilitySpanish poder

the framework alreody mentioned above bi deriving the meanings e) and (b) roughly in the following vay20

20Taking mussenmiddotend konnen in their m9st typical ~eaning (as illustrated in the (b) altelnatives of (1T))

(19 e sollen cliirfen

from horn

CpersonJ wants that bullbullbull CpersonJ permitst~at bullbullbull

b ndissen from [something) obliges necessitates bullbullbull konnen from CsomethingJ allows tnakes possible bullbull

CPERSONJ stands tor the Agent or the ~derlying volition or permission and CSOMElHIIiGJ stands for the ~I or the underlyinp obligation or possibility1 bull 21 We will see below that this

21Agency is usual~ understood as ceualton lixnitea to human causes Cause is then referring to non-human causes (Leech p 205 Lyons~ pp 352-353 359-360 We will see below that in tnodal sentences ceuse stands for the bullfacts 1 1 circumstances 1 events 1

etc which are at the origin of the 1 necessity 1 (or obli~ation 1 )

and the bull possibility (or I capadty) exp-eased by the models miissen

91

and konneii resmicroectively Jhe distinction betveen c eusa1 t and bullagentivemiddot necessity or possibility is particularly expl~cit in Bechmiddotbull s terniinltgtlog_v (1949) middot

( i) volitiv beatimmte ifotvendigkeit (agentive necessity) volitiv bestimmte Moglichkeit (agentive possibility) kausale Notwendigkeit (causal necessity middot

kausale Moglichkeit (causal p0S81bility)

Leech (1970) similarly distinguishes between possibility and necessity (omicror causal modalities) and permission and obligation our aeentivebull modalities) adding that nnossibility and necessity_ logically include oe~mission and 9bligati~ (p 217) In other words he considers permissionbull as11a particular kind of 12ossibility and obligation as e particular kind of necessity Mote that the cause~agent dichotoiey is also present in such verb pairs ~s

(ii) to prevent from (according to Leech causationbull only to forbid (authority only in Leech 1s terms

distinction plays an essential role inthe und~r1ying ey~tem of m~~i~ middot middot

31 ~ 5 The most typical ambig~ity o-f modals Ues in their ability to express a certain degree of 1 probabilitybull or ce~tainty 1 bull

This second meaning of medals has been termed subjectivebull (eg in German Grammars hypothetical (eg in Leech 1970)) inferentialbull (eg in Lyons (1968) epistemic or predictive (eg in Filltnore ( l970a)) as opposemiddotd to their obJective I or 1 pragmatic f

meaning The system of German modals exhibits a complete regularity in that they can all be used to convey the inferential meaning22

22we will use the term bullinferential because it best expresse~ the exact nature of this type of modality (see below)

Let us b~iefly examine these meanings and see how they qffer the strongest evidence for the general theory or modality that we want to postulate

First consider the following examples vith k6nnent m95en durfen verde~ and some p~aphreses of their inferential meaning

(26) a Peter kenn das Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

or Es ist moglich da~ Peter das Geld nimmt Es kann sein ~ ~ bullbull

b Peter mag des Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

~-- middotmiddot-------- middotmiddot--- - ----middot---middotmiddotmiddotmiddot __ --middotmiddot-----middot--- -middot- ----~-- --raquo-

23Peter darf das Geld nehmen (with the modal in the present tense cannotconvey the inferential mea~ing

98

Es ist m65lich da(3 bullbullbull Es ma13 iein daW bull bull

c Peter durfte das Celd nehmen23 Peter might take the money~

Es ist wohl m5glich da~middot Es konnte sein da~ bullbullbull

d Peter wirdmiddotdas Geld nehmen 24 tt isprobable that bullbull

24werden is the only German-modal vhich does not have a clear objective meaning However H Vater pointed out that it cnn sometimes conver the meaning of a command Dr a threat We might want to call this ite objective meaningbull Notice that werden is also used as an suxiliery for the future a function which is obviously connected with its inferential meaning

Es ist rahrscheinlich daB ls ist moglich da~ bullbullbull

notice thet most of these modal sentences when expressing the inferential meaning would have a much h_igher probability of occurrence with an embedded verb in the past tense They could then not carry the objective meaning 8$ in

(21) a Peter mag das getan haben Peter may have done tlat tt

b Peter ~ dos geten htiben 11Peter probably did that 11

Let us nov look at the folloving exaples with mussen wollen sollen and some paraphrases (considering 9nly their inferential meaning)

(22) a Peter mu~ frfiji aufstehen Peter mustmiddot get up eerly I em certain that bullbull

Es ist sehr ~rahrscheinlich da~ Peter fruh aufsteht It is highly pr-obeble that bull 11

Ich bin sicher 1 da~ ttr am sure th a t bull

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

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Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 11: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

95

similariy mussen and konnen) have in their underiying structure the verb~ wollen and erlmilien respectively~ or ruther a complex of features one of which stands tor the volitiOn1 and themiddot permission expressed by -wollen and erlnuben respectiveiy

312 We similarly want to capt~rc the relationship betmiddotreen the members of the following pairs

(15) s wollen want and erlauben 1allo~ b mussen must and konnen may

which are inverses see note 16) We must be able to exoress this relation in the basic meaning feafa~res whlch we po$tulate for modality he complexity of combinations of mqdals with negation cWl be significantly reduced once we understand this logical relationship (See mainly Leech 1970) p 205)

Jl3 Another important fact about modals which we would like to acccunt for is the synonymy between modals (sub (a)) and the predicative adjectiyes or uast uarticinles (su~ (b)) which can be use4 to paraphrase them middot

(16) a konnen b moglich possible erlaubt allowed

mussen n5tig fneceSSUrf I eewollt wanted

ollen 5ewo1lt tvanted 1

notig necessary )18 durfen erlaubt bulla11oved mogen erlaubt alloved

18ner Cro~e Dudenltgt g_ (StilworteXbuch) and Wahri~ Deutsches W5rterbuch do not list sollen in the meaning of causal necessity and mussen in the meaning of volitionbull However since the lattermiddot is accepted by many native speakers~ we will consider it in our analysis

To the paraphrases illustrated under (16b) lfe coulci also add those that are used to indicate a certain degree of 1probaoility which these models can express see 3l5) We shomicrold therefore introduce modelity as a predicate in the deep structure allowing the specirication of the lexical category ((modal) verb adjective adverb noun) to enter the derivation at o later stage probablr with lexical insertion We will see how the use of semantic features instead 0pound lexical entities simplifies the generation of modality (see 32

314 Th~ paraphrases under (l6b) suggeet thnt the ~odals konnen and mGssen are ambiguous in the following wsy

(a) sollen gewollt twanted obliged 17 a milssen lt

(b) necessary

96 (a)

(17) b konnenlt ~--- (b) possiblet

In the system illustrated in (17a) and (17b) the modsla sollen and gilrren are tYPically unambiguous in that they only convey the meaningsmiddot 11sted sub (e) German thus shows a lati1er neat system w1th two pairs of which the second member only (sub (b)) is ambiguous

(18) a sollen b mussen durfen k5nnen

Class (a) and class (b) are therefore to some extent in complementary distributiori19 This dichotoiey can easily be accomicronted for withill

19It is interesting to notice that the opposition between (a and (b) is not le~ically realized in the R9mance languages

(i French devoir obligat~on and necessitySpanish ~

(ii) French P2UVOY bullpermission and possibilitySpanish poder

the framework alreody mentioned above bi deriving the meanings e) and (b) roughly in the following vay20

20Taking mussenmiddotend konnen in their m9st typical ~eaning (as illustrated in the (b) altelnatives of (1T))

(19 e sollen cliirfen

from horn

CpersonJ wants that bullbullbull CpersonJ permitst~at bullbullbull

b ndissen from [something) obliges necessitates bullbullbull konnen from CsomethingJ allows tnakes possible bullbull

CPERSONJ stands tor the Agent or the ~derlying volition or permission and CSOMElHIIiGJ stands for the ~I or the underlyinp obligation or possibility1 bull 21 We will see below that this

21Agency is usual~ understood as ceualton lixnitea to human causes Cause is then referring to non-human causes (Leech p 205 Lyons~ pp 352-353 359-360 We will see below that in tnodal sentences ceuse stands for the bullfacts 1 1 circumstances 1 events 1

etc which are at the origin of the 1 necessity 1 (or obli~ation 1 )

and the bull possibility (or I capadty) exp-eased by the models miissen

91

and konneii resmicroectively Jhe distinction betveen c eusa1 t and bullagentivemiddot necessity or possibility is particularly expl~cit in Bechmiddotbull s terniinltgtlog_v (1949) middot

( i) volitiv beatimmte ifotvendigkeit (agentive necessity) volitiv bestimmte Moglichkeit (agentive possibility) kausale Notwendigkeit (causal necessity middot

kausale Moglichkeit (causal p0S81bility)

Leech (1970) similarly distinguishes between possibility and necessity (omicror causal modalities) and permission and obligation our aeentivebull modalities) adding that nnossibility and necessity_ logically include oe~mission and 9bligati~ (p 217) In other words he considers permissionbull as11a particular kind of 12ossibility and obligation as e particular kind of necessity Mote that the cause~agent dichotoiey is also present in such verb pairs ~s

(ii) to prevent from (according to Leech causationbull only to forbid (authority only in Leech 1s terms

distinction plays an essential role inthe und~r1ying ey~tem of m~~i~ middot middot

31 ~ 5 The most typical ambig~ity o-f modals Ues in their ability to express a certain degree of 1 probabilitybull or ce~tainty 1 bull

This second meaning of medals has been termed subjectivebull (eg in German Grammars hypothetical (eg in Leech 1970)) inferentialbull (eg in Lyons (1968) epistemic or predictive (eg in Filltnore ( l970a)) as opposemiddotd to their obJective I or 1 pragmatic f

meaning The system of German modals exhibits a complete regularity in that they can all be used to convey the inferential meaning22

22we will use the term bullinferential because it best expresse~ the exact nature of this type of modality (see below)

Let us b~iefly examine these meanings and see how they qffer the strongest evidence for the general theory or modality that we want to postulate

First consider the following examples vith k6nnent m95en durfen verde~ and some p~aphreses of their inferential meaning

(26) a Peter kenn das Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

or Es ist moglich da~ Peter das Geld nimmt Es kann sein ~ ~ bullbull

b Peter mag des Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

~-- middotmiddot-------- middotmiddot--- - ----middot---middotmiddotmiddotmiddot __ --middotmiddot-----middot--- -middot- ----~-- --raquo-

23Peter darf das Geld nehmen (with the modal in the present tense cannotconvey the inferential mea~ing

98

Es ist m65lich da(3 bullbullbull Es ma13 iein daW bull bull

c Peter durfte das Celd nehmen23 Peter might take the money~

Es ist wohl m5glich da~middot Es konnte sein da~ bullbullbull

d Peter wirdmiddotdas Geld nehmen 24 tt isprobable that bullbull

24werden is the only German-modal vhich does not have a clear objective meaning However H Vater pointed out that it cnn sometimes conver the meaning of a command Dr a threat We might want to call this ite objective meaningbull Notice that werden is also used as an suxiliery for the future a function which is obviously connected with its inferential meaning

Es ist rahrscheinlich daB ls ist moglich da~ bullbullbull

notice thet most of these modal sentences when expressing the inferential meaning would have a much h_igher probability of occurrence with an embedded verb in the past tense They could then not carry the objective meaning 8$ in

(21) a Peter mag das getan haben Peter may have done tlat tt

b Peter ~ dos geten htiben 11Peter probably did that 11

Let us nov look at the folloving exaples with mussen wollen sollen and some paraphrases (considering 9nly their inferential meaning)

(22) a Peter mu~ frfiji aufstehen Peter mustmiddot get up eerly I em certain that bullbull

Es ist sehr ~rahrscheinlich da~ Peter fruh aufsteht It is highly pr-obeble that bull 11

Ich bin sicher 1 da~ ttr am sure th a t bull

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 12: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

96 (a)

(17) b konnenlt ~--- (b) possiblet

In the system illustrated in (17a) and (17b) the modsla sollen and gilrren are tYPically unambiguous in that they only convey the meaningsmiddot 11sted sub (e) German thus shows a lati1er neat system w1th two pairs of which the second member only (sub (b)) is ambiguous

(18) a sollen b mussen durfen k5nnen

Class (a) and class (b) are therefore to some extent in complementary distributiori19 This dichotoiey can easily be accomicronted for withill

19It is interesting to notice that the opposition between (a and (b) is not le~ically realized in the R9mance languages

(i French devoir obligat~on and necessitySpanish ~

(ii) French P2UVOY bullpermission and possibilitySpanish poder

the framework alreody mentioned above bi deriving the meanings e) and (b) roughly in the following vay20

20Taking mussenmiddotend konnen in their m9st typical ~eaning (as illustrated in the (b) altelnatives of (1T))

(19 e sollen cliirfen

from horn

CpersonJ wants that bullbullbull CpersonJ permitst~at bullbullbull

b ndissen from [something) obliges necessitates bullbullbull konnen from CsomethingJ allows tnakes possible bullbull

CPERSONJ stands tor the Agent or the ~derlying volition or permission and CSOMElHIIiGJ stands for the ~I or the underlyinp obligation or possibility1 bull 21 We will see below that this

21Agency is usual~ understood as ceualton lixnitea to human causes Cause is then referring to non-human causes (Leech p 205 Lyons~ pp 352-353 359-360 We will see below that in tnodal sentences ceuse stands for the bullfacts 1 1 circumstances 1 events 1

etc which are at the origin of the 1 necessity 1 (or obli~ation 1 )

and the bull possibility (or I capadty) exp-eased by the models miissen

91

and konneii resmicroectively Jhe distinction betveen c eusa1 t and bullagentivemiddot necessity or possibility is particularly expl~cit in Bechmiddotbull s terniinltgtlog_v (1949) middot

( i) volitiv beatimmte ifotvendigkeit (agentive necessity) volitiv bestimmte Moglichkeit (agentive possibility) kausale Notwendigkeit (causal necessity middot

kausale Moglichkeit (causal p0S81bility)

Leech (1970) similarly distinguishes between possibility and necessity (omicror causal modalities) and permission and obligation our aeentivebull modalities) adding that nnossibility and necessity_ logically include oe~mission and 9bligati~ (p 217) In other words he considers permissionbull as11a particular kind of 12ossibility and obligation as e particular kind of necessity Mote that the cause~agent dichotoiey is also present in such verb pairs ~s

(ii) to prevent from (according to Leech causationbull only to forbid (authority only in Leech 1s terms

distinction plays an essential role inthe und~r1ying ey~tem of m~~i~ middot middot

31 ~ 5 The most typical ambig~ity o-f modals Ues in their ability to express a certain degree of 1 probabilitybull or ce~tainty 1 bull

This second meaning of medals has been termed subjectivebull (eg in German Grammars hypothetical (eg in Leech 1970)) inferentialbull (eg in Lyons (1968) epistemic or predictive (eg in Filltnore ( l970a)) as opposemiddotd to their obJective I or 1 pragmatic f

meaning The system of German modals exhibits a complete regularity in that they can all be used to convey the inferential meaning22

22we will use the term bullinferential because it best expresse~ the exact nature of this type of modality (see below)

Let us b~iefly examine these meanings and see how they qffer the strongest evidence for the general theory or modality that we want to postulate

First consider the following examples vith k6nnent m95en durfen verde~ and some p~aphreses of their inferential meaning

(26) a Peter kenn das Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

or Es ist moglich da~ Peter das Geld nimmt Es kann sein ~ ~ bullbull

b Peter mag des Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

~-- middotmiddot-------- middotmiddot--- - ----middot---middotmiddotmiddotmiddot __ --middotmiddot-----middot--- -middot- ----~-- --raquo-

23Peter darf das Geld nehmen (with the modal in the present tense cannotconvey the inferential mea~ing

98

Es ist m65lich da(3 bullbullbull Es ma13 iein daW bull bull

c Peter durfte das Celd nehmen23 Peter might take the money~

Es ist wohl m5glich da~middot Es konnte sein da~ bullbullbull

d Peter wirdmiddotdas Geld nehmen 24 tt isprobable that bullbull

24werden is the only German-modal vhich does not have a clear objective meaning However H Vater pointed out that it cnn sometimes conver the meaning of a command Dr a threat We might want to call this ite objective meaningbull Notice that werden is also used as an suxiliery for the future a function which is obviously connected with its inferential meaning

Es ist rahrscheinlich daB ls ist moglich da~ bullbullbull

notice thet most of these modal sentences when expressing the inferential meaning would have a much h_igher probability of occurrence with an embedded verb in the past tense They could then not carry the objective meaning 8$ in

(21) a Peter mag das getan haben Peter may have done tlat tt

b Peter ~ dos geten htiben 11Peter probably did that 11

Let us nov look at the folloving exaples with mussen wollen sollen and some paraphrases (considering 9nly their inferential meaning)

(22) a Peter mu~ frfiji aufstehen Peter mustmiddot get up eerly I em certain that bullbull

Es ist sehr ~rahrscheinlich da~ Peter fruh aufsteht It is highly pr-obeble that bull 11

Ich bin sicher 1 da~ ttr am sure th a t bull

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 13: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

91

and konneii resmicroectively Jhe distinction betveen c eusa1 t and bullagentivemiddot necessity or possibility is particularly expl~cit in Bechmiddotbull s terniinltgtlog_v (1949) middot

( i) volitiv beatimmte ifotvendigkeit (agentive necessity) volitiv bestimmte Moglichkeit (agentive possibility) kausale Notwendigkeit (causal necessity middot

kausale Moglichkeit (causal p0S81bility)

Leech (1970) similarly distinguishes between possibility and necessity (omicror causal modalities) and permission and obligation our aeentivebull modalities) adding that nnossibility and necessity_ logically include oe~mission and 9bligati~ (p 217) In other words he considers permissionbull as11a particular kind of 12ossibility and obligation as e particular kind of necessity Mote that the cause~agent dichotoiey is also present in such verb pairs ~s

(ii) to prevent from (according to Leech causationbull only to forbid (authority only in Leech 1s terms

distinction plays an essential role inthe und~r1ying ey~tem of m~~i~ middot middot

31 ~ 5 The most typical ambig~ity o-f modals Ues in their ability to express a certain degree of 1 probabilitybull or ce~tainty 1 bull

This second meaning of medals has been termed subjectivebull (eg in German Grammars hypothetical (eg in Leech 1970)) inferentialbull (eg in Lyons (1968) epistemic or predictive (eg in Filltnore ( l970a)) as opposemiddotd to their obJective I or 1 pragmatic f

meaning The system of German modals exhibits a complete regularity in that they can all be used to convey the inferential meaning22

22we will use the term bullinferential because it best expresse~ the exact nature of this type of modality (see below)

Let us b~iefly examine these meanings and see how they qffer the strongest evidence for the general theory or modality that we want to postulate

First consider the following examples vith k6nnent m95en durfen verde~ and some p~aphreses of their inferential meaning

(26) a Peter kenn das Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

or Es ist moglich da~ Peter das Geld nimmt Es kann sein ~ ~ bullbull

b Peter mag des Geld nehmen Peter may take the money

~-- middotmiddot-------- middotmiddot--- - ----middot---middotmiddotmiddotmiddot __ --middotmiddot-----middot--- -middot- ----~-- --raquo-

23Peter darf das Geld nehmen (with the modal in the present tense cannotconvey the inferential mea~ing

98

Es ist m65lich da(3 bullbullbull Es ma13 iein daW bull bull

c Peter durfte das Celd nehmen23 Peter might take the money~

Es ist wohl m5glich da~middot Es konnte sein da~ bullbullbull

d Peter wirdmiddotdas Geld nehmen 24 tt isprobable that bullbull

24werden is the only German-modal vhich does not have a clear objective meaning However H Vater pointed out that it cnn sometimes conver the meaning of a command Dr a threat We might want to call this ite objective meaningbull Notice that werden is also used as an suxiliery for the future a function which is obviously connected with its inferential meaning

Es ist rahrscheinlich daB ls ist moglich da~ bullbullbull

notice thet most of these modal sentences when expressing the inferential meaning would have a much h_igher probability of occurrence with an embedded verb in the past tense They could then not carry the objective meaning 8$ in

(21) a Peter mag das getan haben Peter may have done tlat tt

b Peter ~ dos geten htiben 11Peter probably did that 11

Let us nov look at the folloving exaples with mussen wollen sollen and some paraphrases (considering 9nly their inferential meaning)

(22) a Peter mu~ frfiji aufstehen Peter mustmiddot get up eerly I em certain that bullbull

Es ist sehr ~rahrscheinlich da~ Peter fruh aufsteht It is highly pr-obeble that bull 11

Ich bin sicher 1 da~ ttr am sure th a t bull

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 14: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

~-- middotmiddot-------- middotmiddot--- - ----middot---middotmiddotmiddotmiddot __ --middotmiddot-----middot--- -middot- ----~-- --raquo-

23Peter darf das Geld nehmen (with the modal in the present tense cannotconvey the inferential mea~ing

98

Es ist m65lich da(3 bullbullbull Es ma13 iein daW bull bull

c Peter durfte das Celd nehmen23 Peter might take the money~

Es ist wohl m5glich da~middot Es konnte sein da~ bullbullbull

d Peter wirdmiddotdas Geld nehmen 24 tt isprobable that bullbull

24werden is the only German-modal vhich does not have a clear objective meaning However H Vater pointed out that it cnn sometimes conver the meaning of a command Dr a threat We might want to call this ite objective meaningbull Notice that werden is also used as an suxiliery for the future a function which is obviously connected with its inferential meaning

Es ist rahrscheinlich daB ls ist moglich da~ bullbullbull

notice thet most of these modal sentences when expressing the inferential meaning would have a much h_igher probability of occurrence with an embedded verb in the past tense They could then not carry the objective meaning 8$ in

(21) a Peter mag das getan haben Peter may have done tlat tt

b Peter ~ dos geten htiben 11Peter probably did that 11

Let us nov look at the folloving exaples with mussen wollen sollen and some paraphrases (considering 9nly their inferential meaning)

(22) a Peter mu~ frfiji aufstehen Peter mustmiddot get up eerly I em certain that bullbull

Es ist sehr ~rahrscheinlich da~ Peter fruh aufsteht It is highly pr-obeble that bull 11

Ich bin sicher 1 da~ ttr am sure th a t bull

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 15: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

99

(22) b Peter _oll sehr fleissig arb~lten Peter is said to workvery hard hey say thnt bullbullbull

Mari aagt daj3 Peter sehr fleissig arbeitet Es wird behau~tet du~ bullbull

c Peter will Scheuspieler sein ltPetermiddotclaims that be ls anmiddot actor II

Peter behauptet~ da~ er Schauspieler ist Peter will ~lnuben machen da~ bullbull He wants people to believe bullbull 11

We notfoe immediately that whereas (22a) expresses probability or certainty in the same way as the modals in the sentences under (20)--although probably a higher degree of certainty~-22b) and (22c) convey a different type of probabilitybull To express this modali ty English uses verbs like bullsaid to 1 claim which are usually not considered as modal verbs

middotAs far as the meaning of these t~o modals sollen and vollen is concerned~ it is clearly middot inferential t that is something he13 to be inferred as a result of wllat is said or claimed However it is particularly important to distinguish betveen the varJous rolesbull involvedmiddotin the deep struture of this type of sentencesmiddot Further-more we vant to explain the use of the medals sollen and wollen (usually expressing 1volition 1 from the point of view of its agentive origin or its 1destination) in theampe inferential sentences and to relate these special types ofmodnlity to the inferential meanings expressed in (20) and (22a) We vill say that the use of the modal11 vollen and sollen to express inference 1 (in the meaning of claimbull said toJis not arbitrary and that it impl1e6 the presence of a volition in the underlying structure 25

25compare Tith the verb dare sometimes called a semi--modal in Enslish The Dutch verb with the same meaning is durven These verbs are etymologically related to German durfen (meaning may be allowed) We tentatively propose thut in the underlying semantic representation of daret (Dutch durven German wagen) there is a modality feature 1permissive 1 bull (see below)_

We will return to these problems and propose a solution in our next section At this point we should JMinly remember the baslc dichot9JIY between 1inferential and 1non-1nferential 1 mo~~ities keeping in mind6the almost perfect parallelism in the system of German inodals 2

261he distincmiddottion bemiddottween inferential I and I non-inferential 1

is not at ell clear in Leech (1970) His terms probability possibility11 necessitytt and nhypotheticalII all cover some part

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 16: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

100

of the iriferential m_odality1 bull On the otber hand the type of inference ~epresented by sollen and ~olleh in (22b and (22c) is not apparent in the middotEnglish mods1 system which is probably the reason why Leech has not included it

316 The semantic relationship between modals expressing volition and imperative sentences or even questions is another important tact thet we vant to investigate Lyons (1968) points out that there is an effinitr between irnperatbre sentences and the modalities of twish and necessity on the one hand and between interrogativ~ sentences and the modality of possibility on the other0 (pp 308-309) lie gives the examples Will you come here an overtly interrogative sentencemiddotand the imperatives Come here 2 will you or Come here which may be semsnticallY equivalent with the interrogative sentences

As We pointed out before it is within the pe~formative analysis that the derivation of imperatives and questions seems to be best understood The followin8 derivations have been prQ~osed Come ~ fron I -want It6u come herJ or (Ross (1971)) I command vou Cvou come hereJ2 and Will you come with me from I vant r1ou tell me LYou come middotwith men middotor (Ross (1970)) request of you Cyou tell me [ you come with meJJ

27we vill not discuss the problem o~how to represent the addressee or destination of the order hore (See 32 for the introduction of deep cases-adapted from Fillmore~)

We ean thus say that the imperative underlies the interrogative process (Casagrande 1969) p 87 since Hasking aquestion is a request for an answer Further11ore the imperative i tselt is nothing else than the surface realization of the 111ode11ty of volition but vithin a speciaJ context the origin of the volition has to be the speakers and the 1destinationbullis nornutlly the hearer 28

28see Downing (1969) for an investigation of 3rd person imperatives

Any theory ror modality should therefore allow us to explain the different types of volition modality and the s~on~v relations existing between them

317 Finally ve want our theory to account for the relations betveen modality and the speech a~t Uot only are the attitudes of the speaker (or hearer) basic to the meaning of modality but models also frequently function as performative verbs Boyd and Thorne (1969 have analyzed English modsls from the point of vi~w 0 -r the speech aet middot We will try to situate our theory of modality with respect to the performative analysis and investigate how the

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 17: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

101

underlying roles which we postulate for modality relate to the speech context

32 A theory of modality has to account for at leest all the facts just outlined and maybe more On the basis of these fects we will fiJmiddotst present the essentials of the logico-semantic srstem of modality (321 In order to sccount for the besic meanings of modality c will postulate a set of aementic features (322) We will then propose e model_ generating grammatical modal sentences by performing operations on underlying structures consisting essentially of sets of features and dceo cases (323)

321 We want to represent the general systems of modality with the following charts 23) and (24)

(23) (1) NON-INFERENTIAL

(A) VOLITIOU

X TeJlt [ y bullbull (I) OBLIGATION

Y must bullbullbull ( 8 )

V

X alloY [Y _ (a) ~

(II) POSSIBILITY Y can bullbullbull ( p)

where X = animate

Y = animate

(B) CAUSATION

X necessitate [Y_ ~ (a) __

Y heYO to ( t3)

X make possible ~Y (a)

Y oen bull ( (1)

X a inanimate

Y = animate (or inanimate)

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 18: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

102

(2) IlfFREHTIAL

(A) VOLITOU B_) CAU~ATION

_ -X want [ Y-infer ~ - X nec~ssitate CY

(a) CZ bull (I ) OBLGATI01I a) infer CZ bullbullbull-middot _

Z said to bullbull (be) bullbull (5) (s gt

X allo CY infer X make -COStible tY

(II) POSSIBILITY (a) CZ bullbullbull a) infer [Z middot

- Z may (be) bullbull (Z mey be (B)thought to bullbull )

(13)

X = animate X = inanimate

Y=animate Y = animate

Z = animate or inanimate Z = animate or inanimate

The two tYJ)cs of moiality NO~f-IIiFERWIAL (l) and InFERENTIAL (2) exhibit the same logico-setnantic systems of OBLIGATION (I) and POSSIBILITY (II) -with the same elternatives of VOLITION (A) and CAUSATIOW (B)

Boyd and Thorne (1969) ha~e proposed a characterization of the trpes of modality ( (1) and (2)) in terms of the ill~cutionary potentia1 11 of the modal statements We wHl represent it in the middotrollowing vay middot

(25) IiOli-INFERENTIAL

(a) ILLOCUTONARY -~ statement of a

necessar)bull demand

-ilFEREiTIAL

TElIlIAL (c

statement of a necessarv inmiddotrerence

(b) POGSIB statement of a

Tlermission

(d) statement of a

1lossible inrerenc~

We cnn illustrate these types of modality with the follonng examples (the examples under (25 are from Boyd and Thorne p 69) fWn-wnllir~(~dth respect to the plusmn1ifFEISTIAL nodalitici)

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 19: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

103

(26) a He must go b He gocan C bull I ~ be dreaming

I ~ be dreaming

mribi~ous (with respect to the plusmnINFERENTIAL mqdalities)

(27) a or c He~ ge~ up early b or d He~ kiss her

Boyd and Thorne seem to suggest a description of the iilocutionary notential of the inferential sentences in terms of necessary statement ~(c) or possible statementbull (d) (p 69) Hmrever our German examples in (22) suggest that in the case of the inferential modelity there is either an obligation or n possibility for someone to infc~ something This does not always imply that there is a necessary (or possible statement (in Boyd and Thorne 1s terms p 60) Compare the following synonymous examples

(28) a Er mu zu Hause sein He must be home

b Ich verrnute da~ er zu Hause ist I suspect that bull 11

~here we can indeed say that there is a necessary statement ie a statement of my belief0 as a result of strong evidence But in the following example where vermutet is not a performative verb29 we

29There is a certain unclarity in Boyd and Thornes article due to an excessive concentration on the performetive analysis of medals We will return to the relationship between modality and the speech net below (51)

can not talk of a necessary statement

(29) Er vermutet de~ seine Frau zu Hause ist He suspects that his wife is at home n

In this case ve have a neutra1 130 statement of the speakers knowledge

3degFor an interesting discussion o~ the speakers and hearers attitude towerd the truth value of somebody elses presumptions beliefs claims regrets etc see Kiparsky (1967) pp 183-184 (quoted by Boeder (1968) p 35) middot

of somebo~ 1s necess-2 inference about his wifes being home bull This is why we propose amp derivation of inferential sentencesmiddot from a higher ~ predicate an intermediate subjective predicate and

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 20: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

104

a lover sentence which is realized in the surface ris rin indepc~dent or a dependent r1enten9e rhis nllows JS to account for any kind of inferential modality31

31we will discuss two alternatives for deriving inferentil1 models helm (323bull )

The inferential non-inferential analysis is as valid for German modality es for English modalitymiddot We remember that a11 German rodals are smJiguous in tllis respect except Verden Vhich cannot be used to convey the non-inferential mealing as 1will 1 in lnplish

(30) Er wird zu Hause sein Herill be home 1

In other words in any sentence in 11hich it occur~~~ functions to indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence is a nrediction (See however note 24 __ middot Within the framework of tbe two types of modality just outlined there are tvo basic sxstems of modolity the obligative11 system and the permissive11 system This corresponds to what Leech (1970) celled the inversion systems We cari represent them as follows (SaGentence)

31) a COBLIGJ ~ S = not CPERMJ -- S b not [OBLIGJ -- S = CPERMJ -- not S

Bxalllples

(3~) a neg_uire sb agi to do sthg = Hot allot sb to do sthg

b lgtlot require sb to do sihg a fil2 sb not to do sthg

tfotice further the following synonymy rilations between e ther one or the systems with double neBation and the other system without negotton

(33) a [OBLIGJ S = not CPERMJ -- ~ S = (PEru(J -- sb not toBLIG J

Examples

34 a ~~e3uire sb to do sthg Not uermit sb not to do sthg

b Not require sh~ to do stbg Permit sb t9 do sthg

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

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497-107

Page 21: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

105

Each of the two systems of modality is further divided intwo alternatives VOLITIVE (A) and CAUSAL (B) The distinction here is i~ terms ot the 1 orign 1 of the obligation or possibility it is either agentie (ie un animate cause typically a human being or causal (ie middot an inanimate cause typically a (set of) fact (s) circumstance(s) etc) Ihe 1 destination 1 of the obligation or possibility (ie the person (or thing) to whom (or which) the obligation or possibility 11 is destined) is animate when the origin 1

is agentive and animate or inanimate ihen the origin ~s causal32

32In non~inferential causal sentences the benericiarybull or destination even when inanimate must be aomethinF cepable of movement or impldng some huma11 ectivity (see below 411 b ) as in

(i) The train had to stop The storm forced it to stop) (ii) The economr_ could flourish again (The situation -

made it possible)

This does not epply to inferential sentences where the beneficiary or destination of the obligation or permission is the person making the inference We therefore have to introduce a different role in the underlying structure of the inferential modality type namely the Experiencer 1 (E) of th~ inference (or the person mak~ng the prediction) We trill discuss these roles ~n 323 below when we introduce our model based on Case Grammar

Finally each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the origin (X in the (a) alternatives) or from the point of view of the destination (Yin the (e) alternatives of the non-interentiaJ types Zin the (a) alternatives of the inferential types) Thus in (35a) the 1 origin 1 of the volition is expressed whereas in (35b) only the 1 destinationbull is expressed33

33The relation between the (ex and the (13) alternatives can be compared to the relation between active and passive sentences

(a) X wants Y to ($) Y has to bullbullbull active) X carries Y (passive) Y is carried (by X) bullbull

Notice that the natural place for a modal euxiliaey to occur in surface structure seems to be vithi_n the ($ alternatives

(35) a Er will daf3 ich kornme Hewants me to come

middot b bull Er soll nach Hause bull nsb wants him toea home

In (36) er can be said to express at the same time the origin and the destination of the volition Hovever we will usually understand it as a volition from the point of view of the origin only~

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 22: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

-- -----

106

(36) Er will nach Hause gehen Jle wants to go home bull

To summarize we can represent the complete s~middotstem otmiddotrnodality as a tree diagram with the following binary opriositions middot middot middot Cplusmn inferentialJ ~ CplusmnobligativeJ (where t-obligativeJ st~ds for CpermissiveJ) Cplusmnagentivej vhere C-agentivel standa tor Cc~usalJ) and Ca) or (s) for the surface alternative between an 1origin oriented and a destination-oriented1 _modaiity

middot~ ~--(+OBLIGJ C-OBLIGJ C +oBLGJ C-ORLHlJ7lt C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ C+AGJ t-AGJ C+AGJ C-AGJ ~ 7-___ -7

~~ -A77~(c) (a) (a) (a (cdmiddot (~) (cd (e) (u) (a) (a) (s (a)(~) (a) (B)

322 Instead of having lexics1 items as verbs in the deep structure we choose to have sets of aemantic features that would be matchea by the verbs~ adjectives or adverbs in the lexicon which contain tllese features in their semantic descriptions34 ln thi3 ~i

(37)

~ c+nUERJ C-INFERJ

34Themiddotpossibility of having feature constituents in the base has been pointed out by Bqeder (1970 in relation to casesbull~ and by Lerot (1969) and vater ( 1970) middotin r~lation to bull modals 1 bull

the concepts necentded in the base ~or the generation of modal ve~bs can be expressed in a simpler and more economic way Furthermore~ we have said that modality is a semantic property of 1J higher predicate in deep structure If ve represent it by mea~s of semantic features we can more easily show the derivations leadin~ through the various transformations I to the actual rcnlizotion of these features as verbs adjectives or adverbs after 1exical insertion We will see in our next section that the choice of the surface verb~ adjective or adverb is further determined by the case frame associated with these sets or features and the various ways these cases are ~eelized (expressed or not) in the surface sentence

Within the framework of our theory tvo basic semantic features are needed for modality either C+OBLIGAT~V~J (abbreviated as [+OBLIGJ) or C+POSSIBILITYJ (abbreviated as C+POSSJ) Each modal nredicate beside being marked t+MODALJ~ will have one of the5e ~eatures in its feature ca~plex35

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 23: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

107

35we could use the feature COBtGJ only with a+ or - value Since this further abstraction is not necessery here~ re will avoid it for the sake of clarity

For the introduction of the subjective predicate with inferential modality lte will use the feature [+INFER J

It is evident that other features will be needed in order to further differentiote betveen lexical items exnressing different

- degrees of obligation or possibility or dirferent tYJ)eS of inference (We will investigate this further in 5 below)

323 The~ we propose for the generation of modal sentences is esGentiaJly based on Fillrnore 1 s Case GrOJTiJllar and his suggestions to lreincorporete th~ modality constituent within the proposition (Fillmore (1970))3 We have already indicated that

36rn the original version of Case Grammar (Fillmore (1968)) the modality constituent (which was supposed to include such modalities on the sentence-as-a-whole as negation tense mood and aspect) was separated in the deep structure from the 1 proposition bull It was shown by Fillmore (1970) that such a model would not allow to distinguish between the inferential and non-inferential meanings of modals

by incorporating modality (in a narrower sense as used in this article) as a higher predicate in the deep structure it is possible to account for 1111 the realizations of modality in the surface structure

lhe deep ~tructure of all modal sentences will then be of the following type

(38)

V [+MODAL]

S

I s

~ -rhere sbullmiddot is the higher sentence witn a modal predicate and o is the 101j ect I case dominating the complement S1 37 middot

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 24: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

lOH

3TA11 case labels in 1illmores new propcsals (1970) are used asgrarrunatical categories dominating HP 1s The Object case can also dominate a sentence We ill abbreviate and simply indicate the case label if O dominates a sentence vewill label it OS

We viJl furthermiddot introduce either one or the other or tne followinr cases in the higher S A for the agentive origin1 of the modality C for the icausal origin of the modality 9 as shown in (39) middot

39) S v-----r-----o C+IiIODALJ C)

The caie frame of modal verbs can now be represented as (10)

Amiddot (40 C --- o~ J ( where O meaJS neither bullbullbullor)C

In ~rder to accountmiddotror the derivation of inferential modal sentences ve supgested to have rut intermediate-subJectiveIt

sentence with a predicate havia~ tha feature C+INl~aJ (like infer think believe admit )3~

3Brrbe presence of the subJective (ot inferential) sentence in the deep structure can be seen in the question corresPOndinp to (i bulli1ich is (H ~ but not Hi)

(i) He pig_ come tomorrow It is possible bullbull ) (ii) Do you think he middotrill (or may) come tomo~romiddotr

(ii ) Mey he come tomorrow

(~his was pointed out by Fillmore 1970) Notice that wit~ might or cou1d (inthe same inferential meaning) it is possible to ask the question Might he come bullbull 7t1 Cou1d he bullbull

ci1 gt S ~ C+MODAL) A 0cl I

s ~ C+IIOERJ E 0

Isbullta ~

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 25: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

109

where E is a new caso middotlabel for the Experiencer of the inference 39

39The ~eriencer case wn~ suggested by Fillmore (1970) in partial) replacerient of the forner Dative cese It dcal11nntcs the human being undergoing the poundSycho1ogicyen effect of certain verbs

Wo can now fully represent the case frrun~ of modal predicates as

(42) C --- fAmiddotc Os (C (+DlFERJ E Oci J) J V

with an expansion of the De- into an intermediate tsubjeotive Sin the case of inferential modality

There seems to be the following aJternative deep structure for inferential modality~ where the modal predicate 1s no more in the higher S and where the lowest Sis more like the subjects of an 11intransitive modal (as in middot(8c)) middot

(43) s ~ CINFERJ E middot 0

middot1 I ~ CPOISJ ~-think possible ~

he comes

I think ( it is possi_le the comeJ J = It is possible that he will come ~ He may come

At first view such a derivation looks preferable to the one we suggested above (41) yielding

(44) Circumstances allow [that I think Cthat he will comeJ J ~ I think that it is uossible that he will come

gt I think that he may come - He~ come

However it is impossible to account for the German inferential modal wollen (claim as in (22c))with a deep structure 1ike (43) eg

(45) Er will das getan heben 11 He claims bullbull

If we vant to derive this inferential -rollen from the same deep structure ~s the other inferential modalst only the deep structure in (43) can be used with er middot(he) ae the source of the volition and the inferential predicate ( tinferJ) es part of the

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 26: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

110

obJect sentence or the higher modal S We can illustrate the introduction or wollen ana sollen as follows (0 means middotdeleted)

~

Er ~ Schauipieler sein 1He claims to be bull tt

------~ ---- a if ist Scihauspieler middot----------------9Er soll Schauspieler sein

He is said to be bullbullbull (see below ~422)

The folloving para~hrases of vollen a~d sollen also suppqrt our choice

47) wollen Er vill Schauspieler sein ttHe claims to be an actor

Er-will glauben mac~i ~~ er Schauspieler ist lir will da man glaubt da~ er bullbullbull 0 Hevants people to believe that bullbull n

sollen Er soil sehr klug sein He-rs-said to be ve_ry smart n

Men w1L1 giauben machenJ da~ er sehr klug ist Man will da~ man glaubt dafgt 40 11They want one to believe that bullbull

(46)

COBLIGJ ~6llen

I I I

I I

Er

CIftTFERJ ici1 I ----- 9) ---------4 _Er ist__________- SchausPieler

COBLIGJ sollen

ioh l

lCNotice that t say bull can have the strong11 meaning 1 want so to believe 1 claim as in

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

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497-107

Page 27: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

111

(i) He~ that he is sick This is related to its use in said tomiddot (for German sollen)

Boyd and Thorne Yben defining the illocutionary potential of inferential modals as necessary statcrnent 11 or npossible statement seem to suggestmiddot an interp~etation similar to ours (see our discus~ion above) middotwe might also point out the similarity between the deep structure of interrog~tive sentences (as suggested by Ross a~d others) and the deep structure ve propose for inferential modelity

(48) sbull Circumstances force tone to think Cthat he is sickJJ I SEJ1es11_ --- [you tell me [that he is sickJJ

where S ands are not realized in the surface and force+ think ie~ [+OBLIGJ and [+DrFERJ are responsible for must

(49 ~ He must be sick

and re uest + tell [+OBLIGJ and C+irELLJ are responsible for Question --

( 50) ~ Is he sick

However~ ~his will remain an open question until stronger arguments can be given in support of either (41) or (43)

To summarize in our model we have tried to providegenera1middot representations for modal sentences using a Case Grammar framework We essentially need the following cases~ Cause Exneriencer and Object (Sentence) Wcent further introduced the following features

to account for the basic meaning of modality C+MODALJ (which we use middot for the sake of clnrity we will not further investigate the relevance

of this feature) and [+OBLIGJ or C+POSSJ Finally each modal predicate is associated with a case frame feature which is of the tyne +[ --- A 0 J or +[ --- A O middot EO -J It 1middots not- c S middot c CCINFERJ 8 i clear to us whether the difference 9etween inferential end non- inferential modality should be introduced bymiddotmeans of a feature CplusmnINFERJ of the modal predicates or by means of a different case frame feature (as above) or by means of both

The rnost important question at this stage is what the lexical descrjltion of tnodal predicates sho~d be It is clear that we want to avoid any duplication in the lexicon of modal verbs which Ye claimed to be synonymous each of them being associated with a different case frame We have therefore proposed to consider wollen and sollen (and similarly erlauben and durfen) as a single underlying verb represented with the featUes [+MODAL +OBLIGJ (and C+MODAL +POSSJ) Thua all our modal verbs have a set of features of the type middot [+MODAL]

plusmnOBLIG plusmnIliFER

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 28: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

112

assumingmiddotthat we need CplusmnINFERJ aa a feature of mod~ vetbs) and one of the abve case framemiddot~eatures middotWe can now tentatively describe the generation of modal verbs es follows in the deep structure one of the fol~owing modal predicates appe~rs in the st~uctUlnl context deacribed by the corresponding case frs11e

(51)[+M~~AL] [+M~~1] [+M~~h] [+M~i~--]+OBLIG -OBLIG +OBLIG -OBLIG +lffJR +IlfiiER -IlffER -INFER

Let us illu$trate ith (51(4) the lexfoal item ellovt appearing in ihe lexicon bullrith the f(atllres C+Jl(DALJ C-0BLIGJ C~HFERJ ~ -tC--~OcJ) can be inserted yielding the derivation A allows that ot We cen also choose may which has the same features in the lexicon as tallot e~cept thnt it can also be [+UfPERJ but m~y must be SJ)ecified as obligatorily undergoing a rule which makes the A (Agent of the embedded S) the subject of the modal in the surface yieldinR (52)

(52) A1 ~ V(eb) middot(where A tbe Agent of the underlying modal is norrrta11Y deleted)41

41Fillmo~e (1970) proposed a similar solution to account for the deTivation of semanticaily related verbs like (i)

( i) 1 resemblebull and remind 1 erjol and Please

Compare (ii vi th ( Hi )

yii) X resembles Y reminds one or x X middotenjcrJs Y y amuses x

(iii) X BJlows that Y Y may bull

It is not our purpose to propose rules for the derivation of modaJs Many of those suggested by Fillmore (1970) tor psychological middotreros11 will probably also be valid for the generation of modal predicates This however needs further investigation

1- Derivation of Modality in German

The poundollowing diagram illustrates the possible combinations of features and their case frames with the main lexical items expresn~ng modality in German fthe models (I) and their paraphrases (II))

42middotrhe arrow -)- or indicate synonYmv relations Eg +SAGEN is one of the possible surface realizations of inferentia1 modality as a arephrase of Wollen soll~n or tU_s_Ll used with the srune inferential meaning

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 29: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

53) 113

~ C+MODALl ~

[+OBLIGJ C+POSSJ

(-INFER)(-IlqFER~) ----------C+INFERJ-------- ------[ C[ --- ~ OS ([INFER) E O JJ

I~ Ideg t -I bull _ bull e1 ner or only either or middot~ IC J ~ iJ bullbull WOLLEN WERDEti+ KONiEN

I SOLLEN MOGEIT MUSSEN

I OOI~FEM l I

--BEIL4UPTEN MciGLICH II VERLANGEN +SAGEN ERLAU3EN

Tfl1JNSCHEN ANIfEHMEN+ WAGEN I

(ambiguous) (ambiguous)

We will now examine how from the underlying meanings [+OBLIOJ and (+POSSJ we can progressively generate the German surface sentences encountered in our preceding sections In the first pert we will show the derivations of non-inferential modality in the second part we will treat inferential modnJity43

43we neither intend to exhaust the class of possible modal sentence types in German in our investigation nor do we try to write detailed structural descriptions and complete generations

11 1 Mon-Inferential Modality General Case Frrure

(54) c --- ~middot middotes J

h11 C+OBLIGATIOrn modality Main lexical items

(55 WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEH VERLANGEN WUNSCHEN

41la A5entive obligation Typical Deep Structure

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 30: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

S

V 0 [+OBLIGJ S

V ~ A

fo) A is exnressed 44

~-----------------------44(~) and (a) correspond to the alternetive points of view as

illustrated above (See dia~rams (23) and (2~ We abbreviate the tree diagrams in this section as follows

(i) V __ l1 --- 0 represent the hifher s Q do1ninates the lower S

[hus in a11 our derivations _ means Agent of the higher S11 (ie Aeent of the modal predicate~ origin of the volition or permission A meanamp flsent of the lower (or complement) s middot

t Ai I

57) V [+OBLIGJ

I Ich fil)JikE Jemand

Peter vergessen Anna

11 5we use D (for Dative) for the person affected by the action bullbull B for Beneficiary) for the 11person benefiting from the action bullbull However we do not want to m~e any claim that such cases have to be introduced in order to account for the 1deep rolesbull involved Dis probably not different from E (see above) But we will continue to use Din order to avoid confusion with ~he E of the lnferential modality

where wnschen fwish) and verlaniien (reauire) can be paraphrnaes of wollen)

Ich (58 Jemand bulltill de ~ Anna Hans vergi jl

Peter l sb Peter~ wants)Anna to forget Hans

Variants 1 If t is coreierential with A then A11 is deleted 46

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 31: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

115

1~6cent is used in the diagrams meaning deleted bull

(59) V A 0 [+OBLIGJ

I l ATI ~

WOLLEif Peter V D ver13essen PeterI J

(60

haben Peter (hapossess) ~~middot

cent

(60) ~ Peter ~ Hans vergessen Peter wants to forget Hans

2 The embedded S mw be of the tyne

If A is coreferential with B~ then (normally) haben and Bare deleted (61 ) Peter will ein Buch (haoen)

UPeterwants (to have)abook 11

or (62 Peter villein Buch rur sich (for himself)

(where wuniJlcht ru1d mocht~ aan be parephrases of will) bull 3 Two passives can be derived from (58)

(a) nassive of the higher S

If A is Jter

(63) ==gt Von Peter wird gewoJ-lt da~ Anna Hans verpift It is wanted by Peter bullbull

If A is Jemend (indef A~ent)

( 64 = Es wird 5ewollt 9 daf3 bullbull 11It is wanted bullbull

b) passive of the embedded S I bull

(65) gt Peter will da Hens von Anna) vergesrfp wird Peter tents lans t0 be torgotten bymiddotAnna)11

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

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liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 32: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

116

4 n the context of the sueech act 47 A ceri be the Il-~1 and A0 the ~Jdresmiddotsee

4~See belobull_1 5 1 about Modals and the Sneech 11ct

---------------_-- ---- --- ------~---66) V

C+OBLIGJ 0~f WOLLEN V---~- A ---- D

I I I yergessen

~ Du-middot

(67) =gt ich will dafl Du Hons vergiBt I wont you to for ge-t Himicrois

From the middotsame underlying structure we can further deri-ve the middotimperative sentences by deleting both A (th~ speaker) and Ati (the addrcentssee) which are then simply understood in the speech context (see also (8) bel ow)

(68) ~ Vergi~ Hans 11rorget Hans 11

( f3) A is iteinite ard deleted

v A middot O (69) C-t-OBLIGJ

~~DI I SOLLEM rJ vergessen lians

(MUSSEN)

Where A becomes the surface subject of the nodal verh yieldini 1bull8( 70 =) Anna soll Hans vergessen bull

11Ann has to forget Han~

48Hotice that this sentence is syn~~lllOlts with (58) Wit an indefinite It (lerand) middotThere is obviously a difference of focusbull and of de~ree of modelity But we vill not try ~6 decide whether this differ ence is a matter of overtonesbull and whether we need extrn features to capture it If A~ in (70) is the addressee e obtain

(i) Du sollst Hatis vergessen ttYou must forget Hans

which is a possible _paraphrase of (67) and (68)

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

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liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 33: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

117

Variants l Thi~ const__uction would yield the Eassive

(71) == Hans ~ (von Anna) vergessen werden 11Hans must be forgotten (by Ann)49

49u on Anna is deleted in the surface Amiddot mav still be understood (from the context) as Ann in the deep structure otherwise it is indefinite

Sentence (71 is synonymous with (63) and (65) We now see that the so-called different paasive11 middotith pound~ is simply the consequence of whicl1 cases are expressed in the surface structure and that it is not a valid argument for claiming that~~ is different in its deep structure from all other medals

2 An interestlnl variant of sentences (o ) cen be rcali zed with the phraseS

(72) meinetwegen seinetwegen meinethalben seinethalben um ireinetrlllen um seinetwillen fur mich fur ihn (etc ) as far as I core as far ea he cares

[Cp Dutch van mij (of me) van hem (of him)) end the modal sollen or mussen The phrases in (72) are adverbial pro-~orms standing forthe Agent ofthe highel predicate The degree of obligation they convey is hovever much lower than with Yol1en

(73 [+OBLIG) A V A D I 1 I I ISOLLEN ill vergesaen Anna ~

Er J r (becomes the surface subject) (becomes a surface adverb or dative)

( 7q ~Meinetvegen tSeinetwe_gen ~ Anna Ians vergessen

It is interesting to notice that the phrases in (72) are much more natural in sentences with a negated obligation and even sentences with a 1possib11ity_modsl

(75) Meinetwillen sell er nicht As far es I care he doesnt have to

(76) Meinetwegen darf er bleiben ltA~ -h t It ar as bullbullbull e m~ s avbull

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

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liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 34: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

77)

V C --o

110

In such sentences the weo volition contained in meinetvepen seems to be a relly to a req_uest for infor-mation about the sn~nker s (or another persons) desire or will

411b Causal obligation (necessitv~) Tvnical Deen Structure

[+OBLIGJ I t11bullgt ~

V A

Since the derivation of sentences with a causel obligation is very similar to that of sentences with an ageritive obligation we will only consider a few types here

(a) C i~

V C 0 (78) C+OBLIGJ

I 1 ~middot zwinaen UMSTANDE)

(forcer (cfrcumstonces)

(79) ~ Das l1euer zwane Karl das Haus zu verlassen 111rhe fire forced I~arl to abandon the house

80) ~Das Gewitter brachte den Zup zum Ualten nThe storm made the train stoji

There are many problems in connection with the derivation of these sentences We will not try to solve them here Notice that the 1subject 1 of the complement s can be inanimate Uowever we have pointed out that it has to designate something capable of an activity or movement

( $ C is indefinite an4_JelPted V cmiddot 0

(81) C+OBLIGJ ~ l V A

MUSSEH cent ~poundq ZlS

where A becomes tr1e surface s11bject of the roodaJ verb yielding

(82) ==) Der Zug mu8te hnlten 11The tra~d to stoy

412 f+POSSBILITYJ modalitl ~ lexical items

( 83) ouRPEM KOrnEn MOGEN ERLAUBEN WAGEN

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

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liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 35: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

119 412a Agentive nossibili~ Typical Deep Structure (seme as ~11a ~ith the feature r+POSSJ)

84) (tt) A is expressed

V A 0 [+POSSJ

I erlauben----

I Jemand---Ich

~ V A 0 I I I

ne~en Peter Geld

(where A1 c an become surfac e detive

(85 ) =gt J emand ~~__ Peter da$ Geld zu nehmen Ich 11Sb or I nllow Peter to take the money 11

~Jfil[t_~ 1 Notice the following passive constructions with erlauben

(where At is indefinite)

(86 = Es wird erlaubt das Peter das Geld nirilmt

(87) Es ~ird Peter ~rlaubt~ das Geld zu neh~en

88) Peter wird erlaubt das Geld ~u nehmen Peter is allowed to take the moneyn

The agent of the embedded S (Peter) can either be surface subject in the embedded Sor surface dativein the main S The latter is impossible vith voll~

2 We tentatively propose to derive g~en (dare) from the same deep structure where A is coreferentiaJ with A and as a consequencegt A11 becomes the surface subject

(89) V A 0 [+POSS] ~

A11I I V 0 1Sgen Karl nehmen ~arl Geld

(90) ) Karl~ es das Geld zu nelunen 11Karl dares to take the money 11

This analysis (with [+POSSJ as a feature of dare91a suggested (1) by the etymologica1 relation of dare1 and Dutch durven with German durfen (be ampllowed) (see notes 11 and 25) and (2) by the fact that it allows us to derive dee and can (be ampble in amp similar vay 1 d61e = aubJective ability as a result of allowing oneself 1 canbull t be able as a resuJt of ones obJective ability (see below 4 1 2o )

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 36: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

120

Compare the Dutchexalllc

( 91) Ik durf mear ik kan niet I dere but I cannot it

H) A1 is indefini te arid deleted

V 0 92) (+POSSJ

I ~ DUHFIN I I I(OGEN) E_e_hmen Q_eld_

(~EJI)

(where A1 becomes the surface subJ ect)

(darf(93 ~ Peter middot(~) das Geld nehlen

(kann) Peter mnv--1-e is authorized to take the rioney bullr

112b 90usal oossibilitir ( 11Eossibilitlt1 and nallil_iY) plusmnrnical Deen Stru~ (semc as ~llb Trith the feature C+POSSJ)

V C (94) [+POSSJ

I We distinguish between possibility as a result of an exterior c~use

(95) and ability as a result of an interior cause (onesawn ability (97)

V C (95) ermoglichen (Umstiinde bull bullbull )

mo~lich macl~ (circumstances) (take possible)

(96 ~ Das Stipendium ermoglichte es ihln zu studieren nThe fellowship allowed him to study

( 97) beflihi1en eigene Fahigkeiten) (ones own ability)

(98) ~ Seine Kenntnisse befahigten ihn die lhcorie zu verstehen

His koowledge enabled him to underst~d the theory r

(A11_sectJ__pound_ is indefinite end deleted beconies the surfa~e subject)

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 37: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

------

121

r C 0 (9~) (+POSSJ

bull I I v~ KONNEN (ioo) riehmeri Peter Geld MOGEN (101) leaen Peter Buch

(100) ~ Peter rkann das Geld nelunenl~-

Peter canmiddot take the money bee of exterior cause 11

(101) ~ Peter kann das Buch lesen Peter- can is able to read the book 11

Variant V

l mofilich (where A becomes surface bullaativebull)50

50conipare vith sentence (127) below ~middothere A remains the subject of the embedded Sand moamp1ich has anmiddotinferential meaning

(102) gs ist Peter mo~ic~ das Geld zu nehmen 1It is p9ssible to Peter bull 11

The examples (100) (101) and (102) can express either possibility (100) or ability (101) It is therefore not cl~ar hov relevant this distinction really is Boyd and Thorne (1969) say that 1can when parephrasable by 1be able to is a 11 non-modal (p 71) This very much depends on middotwhat we consider as modality from a semantic point of view We wil1 return to this problem below Notice however that if we want to exclude it we should similarly exclude all other causal modals This would result in a failure to account for the synonymy relations pointed out acoe (3 14) We see middotno reason thus rar for doing this

42 ~ferential modaliti_ General Cese Frame

103) C --- J0cc+INFERJ E OsJ

4 bull Z 1 t +OBLIGATION] modality Main lexical items

(104) WOLLEN SOLLEN MUSSEN BEliAUPTEN SAGEN

421a A~entive obli5ation Typical Deep Structure

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 38: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

middot(105)

(106) V--middot-middotmiddot A 1 V--middot-middotE middot0 ( +oBLIGJ ( + riiFER) ( INDEl) ~ ~-v AI I I

yen()ILEN Peter -61~i~n E_n

(lOTa) Peter YAJ1 dap pianglaubt cla~ s~fne Elterh komnen

or (107b) P~ter will glauben rrachen middot da$ bull middot Peter vants people to believe~ lets people believe

that his parents vill come~ 1

Variantsmiddot 1rhe subj~ctivebull or inferential se~tenPe [[+IUPER] E (indef)]

normally not expressed in the surface strllcture bull middotmiddot l If AI is expressed and is (or is hot) eorefercntial with At

the followirip lexicaJ insertions are possible

(lo8) behsupten for [ +OIILIG] [ [ +nrri~R) E ( indef)] ~ s~_g_~n

yielding Eehauptet_ middot da~ seine Eltern kommen(109) ~ Peter EMit middotda3 er

trPeter maimicrot~ins that his parents he bullbull

2 If Ar is expressed and i$coreferentialwithA11 the following

lexical insertion applies

for [ +OBLIG] I[ +INFER] E indef )l

yieldinp 111) Pltter bulldll das getan habliln

11Peter claims that he has done that bull 11

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 39: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

123

It is important to notioe that A of the inferential wollen can not be the speaker But E may include the speaker Englishi claimbull can have the speoker as A and does not require coreferentiality between Abull and Au (Cp 1 I make the claim that bull ) bull Notice further thampt both wollen and claim are generally understood as assert in the face of possible~yenradiction 11 We vill see below that this can be accounted for in the framework of inferential modality ([OBLG] A --- INFER] E) and its relation to the speech context

(~) A is indefinite end deleted

V---A -(112) +OBLIG) (INDEF)

I i sectp_LLE-middot_il (p

( where A 1 becomesmiddot the surface subject

(113) ) Peter soll dea getan haben 11People say they say it is said that Peter hea

done it 11

Notice the similarity with the passive construction in the possible hnglish translation of (113)

(114) Peter is said to have done that

Notice further that A1 is indef and can not be the speaker whereas E could be interpreted as tbe speaker (See the causal inferential modalities where i in the (a)-alternatives is the speaker (42lb))

42lb Causal obligation lJPical Deep Structure

(115)

V

S

C 0 [+OBIIO] I

S

v~o [ +IRFER] I

snbull

~ V A

(a) C ts expressed_ This bullrould yieId sentences of the following type

116a) The situation forces me to think that he is Wlong (ll6b) His acoent makes me-think that he is Russian

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 40: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

124

We will not further investigate such s~ntences)

ill_Q_ is indefinite and deleted r must middotbe tl1e speiker

(117) v----c T ---- E ------- 0 [ +OBLIG] (UMSTAlfDE) [ +niFER] (SPFAKER ~~

-I middott l J v--~ ti

middotYNSp~N cent cent ~ I I tun feter

(where t1 becomes the surface subject) bull

(118) == Peter mu$ das getan haben 1Peter-st i1ave done that 11

422 J~POSSIBILITY) modality Main lexicol items

(119) KONliEiJ lbulltOGtJf DUIUEN W~ttVlN ANNBHMlN

l122a A~entive Eossibility Tfical Deep Structure (srune as 4 middot La with tho feature [ +POS8] bull

1a A is expressed

(120) Y-A-middot~---t----E -------0 [+PT3S] [+IIFER] (SPIR ~

A11lassen Karl ~~ V I I

komtnen Eltern----middot-(121) ~Karl _aBt mich denken dsS seine Eltern kommen

11Karl lets me thinkmiddot that bullbull u

Notice the difference between (121) and (107) which is perceivable in the following loxical pairs

[+OBLIG] [+POSS] _ake one think lets one think ~t einen denken laSt einen denken

A1(q can probably only be deleted in passive sentences such as (122 where E is the surface subject

(122) You are allowed to think that bullbullbull

But we might prefer to interpret this sentence as a causal possibiiity rather than an agentive possibility

rlhis type of mcdaiity H2) II fi in diagram (24raquo is ~he only one which does not seem to be naturally eicpressed with a modal verb

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 41: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

125

422b Ceusal eossibilitz fflical Deep Structure (same as 42lb bullbull with the featuremiddot[+POSS)

(a) C is expressed This would yield sentences of the follo~ing type (compare to (116))

(123) lhe situat~on allovs me to think that bullbull

~S) C is irdeinite and deleted middotE lliust be the steaker

(124) V --- C - - - V --E------0 [ +POSS] (UMSTANDE) [+I1iFER) (SPEAKER)

I J I I ~ ~ ~ cent 3 V A 0 ~ ~ I I I WERDElJ ~~ etpoundr_ Geld

(JgturlFTE)

(where A becomes the surface subject)

(125) ~Peter das Geld penommen haben 5lmiddotr=~

wird diirfte

Peter may coul1t have taken the money~ it is probable that Peter bull

51rn some contexts werden can be interpreted as (+OBLlGJ rather than [+POssJ It certainly expresses a stronger possibility than k6nnen and mogen Compare to its use in the sentence i)

(i) Du wirst morgen kommen Youwill ~ome tomorrow

vhich can be interpreted as a command

Variants l [ +POSS J ~ adverb

(126) Peter hat wahrscheinlich das Geld geno1lInen Peter has probably taken bull -

2 [+FOSS] ~ oosich where Au remains the ~ubJect of the embedded S (compare with no~-in~erential mo5lich middot~n (102)

(127 ~ Es ist moglich daS Peter das Geld genommen hat It is possible probable thet bull 11

3 [+POSS]-~ konncn mogen followed by sein (be)

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 42: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

---------------------------------

l26

(128) ~ Es _kann sein dap Peter dtts Geld eenommen middothat 11 It mEgt-i be (the cose) middot thAt bullbullbull

4 +POSS] C --- [ +IlffER] E cal elso be realized as

annehler 52 vermu~ middot_dener1 as in

52 ~s sume ( vermuten) is the result of ~ logically poss i b1e inference conclude 1

( sc11iessen) ifl the result of a loPiclllly pecessary infe~ence

(129a) ~A~nn ~~utet d~q Peter es getamicro hat Ann presume~ that Peter 4idlit

129b) ~ Ich pehm~~ da0 Peter es getampn hat I assUJie that 11

txtra fentures may be needed to account for the meaning of thes~ verbs Notice that (129a) end (129b) cen only be synonymous bullrith sentences using modals as in (125 )) when the E is the speaker

5 inal Considerations

In our annlysis ve bullere led to the conclusion that not only do we have to include bull~odel verbs inn system of modnlity but aiso n variety of other predicates expressin~ a certain degree of obligation or poss~bility 1 bull It now appears to be necessary tomiddot reconsider the definitions of modality which we shortly introduced in section 3 and to -investigate a little further middotthe relationship between JtlOdality the attitude of the snealter and the sneech

middot poundOntcxt 51 The relations bet11een oodality and the sbeech act are

obvious Modals can indeed function as uerfornativ verbs thus indicating the ill6cut~onary p~tertial of the sentences i~ whiiq t ~ey occur (Boyd and middotThornemicro 62) and relating t o the context of speech involving ~he speaker and the hearer In the non-inferential modal sentences the speaker is then assooiated bullrith the origin of the voli tion or permission and the hearer vith the destination of the volition or permission Imperatives are thus a typical example of perforrnative modality of volition~ and SQ nre questions~ which are a special type of volition naltely requests for a re)Jvgt3 I~ the

53Leech (1970) noints out that in the c~~e of questions with must and may 1 th~re is actually an 11lppeal to the authorty of the listener p 229) Such qlestions can therefore be said to consist of a double modality the reques1 for an answer (the perfonnetive modality) and the authority Omiddotf the a9dressee

inferential modal sentences the speaker may be the person who claims

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 43: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

127

or aliows one to think however the relation of inferential modality to the speech act is more complex Indeed~ wi~h the majority or mod~s expressing inference (ie museen ~ konnen~ ~B verdeq) it is the speaker who is noturelly associated vd th the person vho mar-es the inference that is theex eriencer of the inference Only with wolleri (in the meaning of claim and sollen (in the ~eaning of be iaid tobull)is the experiencer typically indefinite This does not mean however that the attitude11 of the speaker ls necessarily excluded On the contrary wol1en (and similarly claim1

in English) frequently imply a certain scepticism on the part of the speaker in vhich case ve csn say that the speaker feels himself associated with the destination of the claim

But clearly moaa1 verbs do not alvsya function as perfoIllative veres Particularly in non-inferential modal sentences the origin of the obligation or possibilitybull does not have to be the speaker Even when the 1destinntion is the addressee in a present context the origin can be any person beside the speaker or simp1y a causebull54

54Notice that in these sentences we may still consider the presence of a higher performative predicate like Itell you I inform you middot In other words we may postulate the existenoeof a super-hypersentenceu (to use Sadocks terminology) that is a higher performative sentence dominating any sentence and accounting for the general context of language oomrounication that is the seaker-hearer context Thus sentences which are performative in the surface vould also be dominated bye super-performative and performative modal sentences of the type You mey come ie I allow you to come) would have the under~ing structure bulltspeaker says to hearer that speaket_ allows hearer to come1 bull

But we feel that there is still insufficient evidence for the linr5Uistic relevance of such deep structures

(130) You m~v leave rour parents Just told me) You can 50 in now (They wont mind) ~ middot (The door has been unlocked

You must leave now (Otherwise you vill miss the train)

We will not investigate the relation of modality to tle speech context any further Our purposebull was simply to point out that tle system of modality as we have presented it offers n11nterous possibilities for non-perfomative sentences Whether these sentencee should be considered modal sentences obviously depends on how we define modality

52 We tried to consider modal expressions as representing abstract logico-semantic structurea involving the notions obligation or possibility or [plusmnOBLIGJ) Furthermore two deep rolesbull were shown to be essential to these structures one expressing the origin and the other the destination of the 1obligation1 or possibilitybull55

middot55In a recent article H Seiler (1971) exposes a similar view

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 44: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

----------------------------------

111he l)roblem of will I and bulldsh in modal expressions will never be solved as lone as one takes these notionsmiddot ~s unanalrzed gtrimitives bullbullbull In the semantics of rill we must ask who is the T)erson who wants something~ from whom does he want it and vhat is it that he wants (p 80)

lids genere1 abstract structure cen be said to underly i1ny modal expression whether it is inferential or not or whether it is performative or not We cnn graphically represent it asfoJlovs

(131) -+ CplusmnOBLIGJ -+ DESTINATION ( -+ C +HfFEBJ) - - - __

- - - - -(I ROLES) -~ --PREDITBS

This meaT1$ that modals and moods are usedmiddot to express a certain predication of necessity or possibility with respect to the persons involved in the accompanying roles

If we now -want to say that modality implies the attitude of the speaker 11 bull we first have to be sure that we knov what ~ meen by 11 spcaker1

and attitude In sentence (132)

(132) John JllSint~~St ~hat Mary_ had ~orrn~

(vhich is accounted for by our model) the attitude of the speaker (ie the person reporting the 1 claim made by John is 110t involved it is 11 the subject of the sentence but not necesserily the speaker (who) thinks that the complement is true 11 (Kiparsky 1967~ p 163) In other words it is the speeker whose claim is being reiorted in the sentence who has to be associated iri th the origin of tho rnodali ty Hobull~rcver in (133)

(133) Karl sagte er _rare nie da pewesen Karl said that he had never been thereti

the usemiddot of the 11 subjunctive moodn implies an at~itude of scepticism on the pert of the speaker reporting Kerl s words And in (134 both

56Notice that the use of the so-celled nsubjunctive II in indirect aiscourse to suggest a contrary-to-fact statement (as in (133) end (134)) is not accepted by all nati ve spelkers

the reporting speaker and the speaker reported ahout play a role in the modality of the sentence

(134) Karl sagte er hatt~ es nicht tun durfc_ nKarl said that he was not allowed middotto do it

Indeed Karl has the role or the destinationbull of the prohibition and tqe reporting speaker has the role o~ the 1origin I in the subjunctive modalityu expressed in hatte We might suggestthe following tentative

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 45: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

129

deep structure for (134) middot

(135) (S0 ) Speaker say to hearer

(sl that Kar~ said

(s2 ) that (indef Agent) not allow

(s3) that Karl do it

and (s4) Speaker want

(s5) hearer to infer

(s6) that not s2+3

(vhere s0 stands for the direct speech act sl for the indirect speech act s2 for the (+POSS] modality s3 ior the object of the [-+POSsect) modality s4 and s5 for the inferential [+OBLIG] modality and s0 for the object of the latter)57

57so and s4+5 are performative sentences Hotice that the subjunctive mood (es represented in (133) and (134)) is of the inferential type (This explains why the inferential modal sollen is sometimes used to paraphrase the subjunctive mood in German) Notice further that H Seiler (1971) in his investigation of conditional sentences seems to come to a similar conclusion when he postulates an widerlying predicate claim to account for the modality present in such sentences (p~ 81 85)

As for the exact nature of the 11attitude 11 of the speaker in modal sentences we would like to suggest that it consists essentially or the speakers presence or absence of will too will for somebody to infer in the case of inferential modality) This remains of course an open question

If we conclude that the attitude of the speaker of either the immediate or the reported speech act) is central to modality it is still not clear whether this would force us to exclude all non-inferential causal models~ since they do not imply (at least not so far as we can see now) any attitude of the speaker of the type we want to postulate

On the other hand there are a variety of ways in which the attitude of the speaker can be expressed (consider sentences (136)-(138)) Whether ve should incorporate them in our system of modality and how we could do it is still a mystery

(136) Er kommt leider nicht uunrortunately I am sorry that he doesnt come 11

(137) ch bedauere daS er nicht kommt 11 regret that he doesnt come

130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

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130

(138) Ich bezweifle daa er kommt bull I doubt that he will come 1

Finally we should remember that modality is poundlso a matter or degree Within the system of 1ohligation ogq volition can be anythinc from a strong will to a wish~ and within the inferential system mo9-ali ty c~ rMge from ~bsolute certainty to slight probability 7his might well explain the difficulty if not the impossibility of separating modal expressions from non-modal expressions Wunderlich 1969) has shovn thatthe verbs dicendi (the verbs of saying) can also carry some degree of modality~58 We might therefore say that

58This was communicated to me by- Heinz Vater (See also note ho) It is interesting to notice that Ross (1970) has rroupedwthout distlnction such v~tbs as l declare Pro1gtos~ authorize_ sJem~d in his list of verbs that can be used performatively (pp 222-223)

any act or $8ying (or any se~tence) o~nveys a e1ertampin degree of modality which goes from zero (or near zero) in neutral reporting to the extremes of volition (will command) and absoJu~e certainty This suggests ir anything that a theory of modality such middotas the one ve propose can not do more than account for the basic meantng of modalitylllld expJan its abstract structures Should it do just that our task might be sailtl to have been not in vsin

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 47: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

131

Bibliography

Becht G 1949 Dss semantische System der deutschen Modalverba Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Cop~nhague 4

liierrisch M 1963 Grammatik des deutschen Verbs Studia Grammatica 3 Boeder W l9G8 Zur Struktur des I-Elements im Lateinischen

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Per9ier Nr 8 pp 35-40

Boeder~ W 1970 Neue orschungen zur Kasustheorie Unpublished paper 32 pp

Boyd~ J and JP Thorne 1969 The Semantics of Modal Verbs Joulnnl of Linguistics V 157-74

Casagrande J 1969 On the Source of Some Universels Papers in Linguistics 1176-90

Downing B 1969 Vocamptives and Third-person Imperatives in English Papers in Linguistics 13570-592

Duden 1956 Der Gro$e Duden 2 Stilworterbuch der deutschen Sprache Mannheim 1

Ehrman M 1966 The Meaninge or the Models in Present-day American English ~he Hague

Fillmore C J 1968 The Case for Case in Universals in Linguistic Theory ed E~ Bach and R Harms llew York

Fillmore C J 1970a Types of Lexical Information in Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed F Kiefer pp 109-132

Fillmore C J middot19f0b Notes from the seminar on Syntax Ohio State University Linguistic Institute Bummer 1970

Hofmann T R 1966 Past Tense Replacement and the Modal System in Harvurd Computation Laboratory Report No NSF-17 t Cambridge Mass

Huang Shuan-fan 1969 On the Syntex and Semantics of English Modals Working Papers in Linguistics No 3 pp 159-181

Jackendotf R s 1968 Speculations on Presentences and Determiners Paper reproduced by the IU Linguistics Club 20 pp

Jakobson R 1936 Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasmicroalehre Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 6240-268 (reprinted in Hamp et al Readings)

Jespersen O 1924 The Philosophy of Gr8lln8l The Norton Library~ New York (1965)

Kiparsky Carol and Paul Kiparsky 1967 The Semantics of Subordinate Clauses Resum~ des Communications Xeme Congr~s Intern des Linguistes Bucarest pp 183-184

Langendoen~ D T 1969 The Study of Syntax The Generative Transformational Approach to the Structure of American English lolt lfev York

Langendoen D T 1970 Essentials of English Grammar Holt New York Leech G N 1970 Towards a Semantic Description of English Indiana

University Press Bloomington amp London Lerot J 1969 Modalitet Tempus und Transformationa grammatjJt

Universitat Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguisti~ Papier Nrmiddot -11 15 pp

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107

Page 48: 1970, - kb.osu.edu · the meaning that these verbs convey . a.a . part . of the semantic system of . modality, ve ca.n say that these verbs function semantically as models, But for

132

Lyons J 1968 Introducticn to Theoretical Linguistics Crunbridee Universi t~ 0 ress

Perlmutter D M 1970 The iwo Verbs rBegin in Readings in Eneuroli sh Trdnsformationul Grrunmar ed R Jacobs amp P Rosenbaum Ginn amp Co Waltnwi ass Pmiddot 107-119

~oss J n 1968 Auxiliaries as Main Verbs Paper reprqduced by the IU Linguistics Club 16 pp

Ross J 1~ 1970 On Declarative Sentences in Readings in English Transformationa+ Grammar ed R Jacobs amp P RosenbaUII Ginn amp Co Haltham Mass pp 222-272

Ross J R 1971 Imperatives and the Performative Analysis ielk presented at IndilUla University Bloomin~ton March 4 1971

Sadock J 1969 Super-hrpersentences Papers in Linguistics 11 1-15

Seiler I 1971 Abstract Structures for Moods in Greek LanguaPe 4T 179-89

Thorne J P 1966 English Imperative Sentencest Journal of Linguistics 269-18

Vater H 1970 On the Generation of Moda1 Verbs Paper reed at the Bthno-Linguistic Seminar Indiana Uniyersity Bloomington

Vetter D 1967 1leed Honors Thesis M IT Wahrig 1968 Deutsches Worterbuch Bertelsmann Le)licon-Verlaii

Giitersloh Wunderlich D 1968 Pragmatik Sprechsituation Deixis Universitat

Stuttgart Lehrstuhl fur Linguistik Papier ilr 9 32 pp Wunderlich D 1969 Bemerkungen zu den verba dicendi Muttersprache

497-107