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I. 12

mini DEFENCE

Indian visitor to the Persian Gulf: an Indian Air Force Tu-124, V-644 seen recently taking off from RAF Sharjah. It is one of three operated by the IAF communications sqn.

NATO's nuclear retaliation USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS in bo th strategic and tactical situations was defined by the Minister of Defence, Mr Denis Healey, as a core of current British defence policy when the Commons debated the Government's Statement on Defence 1970 on March 4 and 5.

He said that the best advice he ever received as Secretary of State for Defence—and which came from Lord Mountbatten, then Chief of Defence Staff —was that the only final answer to a major deliberate attack was strategic nuclear retaliation and that this was both effective and credible as a deterrent. "The role of the Nato powers in Europe—1 was told—was not to wage a general war," he said, "still less to fight a broken-backed war after the nuclear exchange; it was to contribute to the overall deterrent by being able to stop small-scale attacks and force the enemy to mount a major invasion if he wanted to move Westwards at all."

Secondly, Mr Healey said, he was told that to deter a minor incursion "Nato powers needed sufficient tactical nuclear weapons to make the risk of escalation a real one. I was told that provided they were properly armed with tactical nuclear as well as with conventional weapons, the existing level of Nato forces was sufficient, and was likely to remain sufficient in the future. And 1 was told very strongly that tactical nuclear weapons could not be used to fight and win a war or to defend an area—in the classical sense—like a sort of superior artillery: their role was. rather, to

strengthen the c r e d i b i l i t y of the deterrent."

Mr Healey said that the Government had helped to promote a significant change in Nato strategy. "Instead of the immediate and automatic use of nuclear weapons in case of a major attack, Nato has shifted to a more flexible strategy which maximises the conventional capa­bility to give Governments as much time as possible to decide whether the use of nuclear weapons is justified and, if so, how to use them.

"To illustrate the reality and import­ance of this shift in strategy," he added. "I will give an example of what it means in practice. Since the tripwire strategy assumed the immediate use of nuclear weapons in case of an all-out attack. Nato strike aircraft at that time were intended for nuclear attack and had little or no conventional capability. Moreover, little or no attempt was made to protect them at their airfields, since it was assumed that they would have left the ground on their one and only nuclear mission by the time that the first Soviet attacking planes or missiles arrived.

"Under the new strategy, Nato strike aircraft will, as far as possible, have a dual capability and will be ready for conventional as well as nuclear opera­tions, so that the bulk of them can be used initially in the conventional r&Ie to support ground forces in maximising the period of conventional response. This is why, as the White Paper explains, in Chapter 1 (27), we are sending Blood­hound and light anti-aircraft squadrons

to our airfields in Germany this year and why we are beginning a programme for the construction of aircraft shelters, since we envisage a period of conven­tional war in which aircraft must be protected while on the ground.

"But it remains as true today as it was in 1965. when Lord Mountbatten spoke, that the only final answer to a deliberate major attack would be nuclear retaliation by the strategic forces. How­ever, under the new strategy it would be possible to delay this ultimate response so that, at successive stages, the enemy could be given time and opportunity to cease his aggression, rather than to provoke escalation to the use of more destructive weapons on a larger scale."

Austria's Saab 105s FIRST PRODUCTION AIRCRAFT of the 40 Saab 1050s being built for the Austrian Air Force at Linkoping made its first flight in February. This lasted lhr 20min and was described by Saab test pilots Karl Erik Fernberg and Lars Ahrberg as "very successful". A photograph of the aircraft after its roll-out was pub­lished in Flight for February 12, page 247. The AAF ( 5 stand for osterreich) intends to use the aircraft for strike, reconnaissance and training duties. They are of considerably higher performance than the 105s in service with the Royal Swedish Air Force. The latter (Sk60Cs) are powered by 1,6401b s.t. Turbomeca Aubisque turbofan engines and have a maximum speed of 478 m.p.h.; the 1056s have General Electric J85-17BS of 2,8501b s.t., giving a 603 m.p.h. maxi­mum speed.